RULES OF COURT | RULE 138 FACTS:
• Ferdinand A. Cruz was the plaintiff in a civil case for
Sec. 33. Standing in court of persons authorized to appear for
Government. - Any official or other person appointed or
designated in accordance with law to appear for the
Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly
authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which
said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Sec. 34. By whom litigation conducted. - In the court of a justice
of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
RULES OF COURT | RULE 116
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court,
considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the
questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de officio
such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of
their experience and ability, can competently defend the
accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are
not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the
province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the
accused.
CRUZ VS MIJARES
Abatement of Nuisance pending in the sala of respondent
judge.
• He sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his
behalf.
o Claim anchored on Sec. 34, Rule 138: a non- lawyer may
appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
• During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required petitioner to secure
written permission from the Court Administrator before he could
be allowed to appear as counsel for himself.
• Counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.
• Petitioner objected, alleging that an MTD is not allowed after
the Answer has been filed.
• Respondent judge remarked, “Hay naku, masama yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?”
• Petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to inhibit: there was
partiality on the part of respondent judge as can be seen from
her contumacious remarks.
• Motion denied. MR denied.
• Cruz’s appearance was also denied as he failed to submit the
document required by Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.
• MR: basis of his appearance was Rule 138, Sec. 34, not Rule
138-A.
o 138 – applicable to any non-lawyer;
o 138-A– specifically for law students.
• MR denied, still invoking Rule 138-A.
• Hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
ISSUES + RULING:
Does the SC have jurisdiction to entertain the petition? YES.
• SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and CA to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and injunction.
• This concurrence does not mean that the petitioner has
absolute freedom to choose where the petition will be filed.
o Still has to give due regard to the judicial hierarchy.
o Thus, petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
RTCs should be filed with the CA.
• Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the
SC take cognizance of petitions directly filed before it.
• SC assumes jurisdiction over this petition as it concerns the
interpretation of Sec. 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court.
• Petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing
directly with the SC.
What rule applies in the case of petitioner, Rule 138 or 138-A?
Rule 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the
purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Rule 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who
has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the
legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed
by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
• Court agrees with petitioner that the basis of his appearance
is Rule 138, not 138-A. As plaintiff, he can personally conduct
the litigation of the case.
• He would be acting not as counsel or lawyer, but as a party
exercising his right to represent himself.
• The fact that petition is a law student does not mean that the
applicable rule is always 138-A. Again, he seeks to represent
himself.
• TC’s conclusion that 138-A superseded 138 is incorrect. It is
an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear
in courts.
Should respondent judge inhibit herself? NO.
• Her “hay naku” statement is not enough to show arbitrariness
and prejudice.
• In fact, petitioner’s administrative case against respondent
judge for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics was
dismissed for lack of merit.
• Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
applies.
DISPOSITION: Petition partially granted.
FIVE J TAXI VS NLRC
Five J Taxi and Juan Armamento v. NLRC, Domingo Maldigan
and Gilberto Sabsalon
G.R. No. 111474. August 22, 1994
Facts:
1. Maldigan and Sabsalon were hired by the Five J Taxi as taxi
driver. Nov. 1987 and June 1979, respectively.
a. They worked for 4 days weekly on a 24 hour shifting
schedule.
b. Aside from the daily “boundary” of P700.00 for air-conditioned
taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also
required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a
P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their “boundary,”
for every actual working day.
2. Subsequently, in less than 4 months after he was hired,
Maldigan failed to report to work for unknown reasons.
3. Sabsalon was held up by his armed passenger who took all
his money and stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his
discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
4. While Sabsalon was re-admitted to work by Five J Taxi, he
was only required to work every other day. However, on several
instances, he also failed to report for work during his schedule.
Despite repeated requests for him to report to work, he refused.
5. In 1989, Maldigan requested Five J Taxi for the
reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but they
told him that nothing was left of his deposits as these were not
even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the
taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by
Five J Taxi to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their
taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his
deposit, petitioners terminated his services.
6. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from
employment was effected when he refused to pay for the
washing of his taxi seat covers.
7. Maldigan and Sabsalon then filed a complaint with the NLRC
for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. Complaint was
dismissed.
a. The filing of the case was a mere after-thought since it took
them two years to file the same. Such delay is unreasonable.
b. It was also discovered that Maldigan was working for another
taxi company called “Mine of Gold” and that Sabsalon was
driving a taxi for “Bulaklak Company.” Both of them failed to
controvert the evidence showing this and that they voluntarily
left their jobs.
c. However, ordered Five J Taxi and Armamento to pay
Maldigan and Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car
wash payments.
Issue: WON Maldigan and Sabsalon’s deposits and car wash
payments should be refunded. YES.
Held/Ratio: Deposits should be refunded to them. Car wash
payments should not be refunded.
1. NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by
respondents to defray any shortage in their “boundary” is
covered by the general prohibition in LC 114 against requiring
employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that
the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a “practice”
in the taxi industry. Therefore, the deposits made were illegal
and the respondents must be refunded.
2. It can be deduced that the LC114 provides the rule on
deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipment
supplied by the employer. Clearly the same does not apply to
or permit deposits not to defray any deficiency which the taxi
driver may incur in the remittance of his “boundary.”
3. Furthermore, when Maldigan and Sabsalon stopped working
for Five J Taxi, the alleged purpose for which the deposits were
required no longer existed. As such, any balance due to private
respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them
with legal interest.
4. HOWEVER, Maldigan and Sabsalon are not entitled to the
reimbursement of the car wash payments.
5. Car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi
industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play. It is incumbent upon
the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean
condition when he took it out.
6. There was nothing to prevent Maldigan and Sabsalon from
cleaning the taxi units themselves if they wanted to save P20.
KANLAON CONSTRUCTION VS NLRC | 1997
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
construction business nationwide with principal office at No. 11
Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988,
petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to
construct residential houses for its plant employees in
Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were
hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked under
the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre.
In 1989, the project neared its completion and petitioner started
terminating the services of private respondents and its other
employees.
In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against
petitioner before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan
City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner
paid them wages below the minimum and sought payment of
their salary differentials and thirteenth-month pay. Engineers
Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.
The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were
attended by Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private
respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter
Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner’s liability to private
respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and
thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this
agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner’s right
to file its position paper. 1 Private respondents declared that
they, too, were dispensing with their position papers and were
adopting their complaints as their position paper.
Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer
company to pay the employees.
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission. It alleged that it was denied due process and that
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent
and bind petitioner. NLRC affirmed the decisions of the Labor
Arbiters.
RULING: It has been established that petitioner is a private
domestic corporation with principal address in Quezon City. The
complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and
summons served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The
question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and
authorized representative of petitioner.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private
domestic corporation or partnership must be made upon its
officers, such as the president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so
integrated with the corporation that they know their
responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any
legal papers served on them.
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer
Dulatre, managed and supervised the construction project. 9
According to the Solicitor General and private respondents,
Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City and
supervised the work of the employees thereat. As manager, he
had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the
importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the
same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner.
Summons for petitioner was therefore validly served on him.
Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his
promise to settle the claims of private respondents is another
matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear
before the labor arbiter and respondent Commission in cases
before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule,
viz:
Sec. 6. Appearances. — “xxx A non-lawyer may appear before
the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if: (a) he represents
himself as party to the case; (b) he represents the organization
or its members, provided that he shall be made to present
written proof that he is properly authorized; or (c) he is a duly-
accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter xxx”
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the
NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a party to the case;
(b) he represents an organization or its members, with written
authorization from them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited member
of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of
Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred
to by the latter. 11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were
they duly-accredited members of a legal aid office. Their
appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as parties
to the cases was authorized under the first exception to the rule.
However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner required
written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the
arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since both
engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the
arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and
declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could
not bind petitioner.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty.
Abundiente were authorized to appear as representatives of
petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural matters
before the arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner’s
liability arose from Engineer Estacio’s alleged promise to pay.
A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and
requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of
petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly
presumed and should be duly established by evidence.
Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other
representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their
clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a
special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a
compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial
discharge of a client’s claim.
After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the
workers’ claims as promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan
did not order the parties to file their respective position papers.
The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on the merits without
at least requiring private respondents to substantiate their
complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their right to
file position papers but petitioner’s waiver was made by
Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid
and settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled
conference. Since petitioner reneged on its “promise,” there
was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have
prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their position
papers.
Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. —
Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, in
whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall
issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed
upon during the conferences and directing the parties to
simultaneously file their respective verified position papers.
IN RE: ARGOSINO | 1995
FACTS: On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13
others, was charged with the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan
stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries uponhim
in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university
fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused
were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and
his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period
of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition
to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam,
but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.On April
15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the
attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He
averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is
noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10
months.
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of
attorney and be admitted to the practice of law
HELD: Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he
may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking
admission to the bar. He should show to the Court how he has
tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student
to the family of the deceased student and to the community at
large. In short, he musts how evidence that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the
profession of law. He is already directed to inform the Court, by
appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the parents
or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.
NOTES: The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited
to citizens of goodmoral character, with special education
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. Requirement of
good moral character is of greater importance so far as the
general public and proper administration of justice is concerned.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired
into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those
who wouldseek admission to the bar must be a necessity more
stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of
the general public. Participation in the prolonged mindless
physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant
was possessed of good moral character. Good moral character
is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at
the time of the application for permission to take the bar
examinations and more importantly at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
GRANDE VS DE SILVA
FACTS:Complainant Grande was the private offended party in
certain Criminal Cases entitled “People vs. Sergio Natividad.
During the proceedings, respondent Atty. De Silva, counsel of
the accused, tendered to complainant a check drawn against
her account as settlement of the civil aspect of the said case.
Complainant refused to accept it but respondent assured him
that the same will be paid upon its presentment and as a lawyer
she will not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. So,
complainant accepted the check.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned
unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: “Account Closed”.
Then, he wrote a demand letter to the respondent but the latter
ignored it. Hence, complainant instituted a criminal case for
violation of B.P. 22 and the instant disbarment case against
respondent.
A Resolution requiring her to comment on the complaint was
sent to her, but she moved to another location. So, a second
Resolution was sent to her new address, but she refused to
accept it.
The case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
which recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for 2 years for deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of Lawyer’s Oath.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the same.
ISSUE: W/N respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath.
RULING: YES. Respondent assured that the check has
sufficient funds. In doing so, she deceived complainant into
withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a
check which she drew against a closed account. It is clear that
the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a
bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation
of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.
Such an act constitutes gross misconduct.
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to
accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful
character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal
profession. Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of
respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more
sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law:
a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her
profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the
administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of
the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer; as stated in
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IN RE: DISQUALIFICATION OF HARON MELING | 2004
FACTS: On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez
(Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a
Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the
2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in
his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three
(3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa.
15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and
Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which
occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of
media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries
to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the
title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor
of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the
Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which
shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face
to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002,
Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the
criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired
Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to
settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good
faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has
moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in
the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that
actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies
the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve
moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that
some of his communications really contained the word
“Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office
clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003,
the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against
Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed
against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor
a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same
for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to
take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not
be taken lightly by an applicant.
ISSUE: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling is proper and shall subsequently barred him
from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of
Attorneys

HELD: The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the
imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition
seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine
Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic.
RATIO: Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a
Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are
also known to possess good moral character. The requirement
of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to
determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are
pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such
cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the
cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to
impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
TAPUCAR VS TAPUCAR | 1998
FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993,
complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the
ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting
with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances. Prior to this complaint, respondent was already
administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved
on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan
City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without
pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-
CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981
ordered the separation from service of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code
of professional responsibility
RATIO: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted
from him, as a member of the profession charged with the
responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right,
are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and
responsibility that have been compendiously described as
“moral character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to
strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his
profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the
Bar but also the administration of justice.
GARRIDO VS GARRIDO
Facts:
The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-
affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for disbarment against the
respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.
Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee
on Discipline, charging them with gross immorality, in violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The complaint arose after the petitioner caught
wind through her daughter that her husband was having an
affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child
with her; and the same information was confirmed when oner of
her daughters saw that her husband walking in a Robinsons
mall with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in
tow.
After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and
effort given yielded results telling her that Atty. Valencia and her
legal husband had been married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on
June 1993, her husband left their conjugal home and joined
Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence, and has
since failed to render much needed financial support. In their
defense, they postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet
when they committed the supposed immorality, so as such, they
were not guilty of a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions constitute
a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and thus a good enough cause
for their disbarment, despite the offense being supposedly
committed when they were not lawyers.
Held:
Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege
bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in
the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances show the
lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers,
be they academic or moral.
In the present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P.
Valencia for the reason of their blatant violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
commands that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Furthermore, The
contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers when
they got married shall not afford them exemption from
sanctions; good moral character was already required as a
condition precedent to admission to the Bar.
As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty.
Garrido and Valencia were shouldered with the expectation that
they would set a good example in promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws. When they violated the law and
distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish
motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession.
Such actions by themselves, without even including the fact of
Garrido’s abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the
detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that
Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other
marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear
indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the
proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As
such, their disbarment is affirmed.
SPS TEJADA VS PALANA | 2007

FACTS: Respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana taking
advantage of his special knowledge as a lawyer represented to
the petitioners that he has an alleged parcel of land covered by
TransferCertificate of Title No. (73196) 16789 and that he needs
an amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) so
that he could reconstitute the torrens title on the same.
Respondent then induced by sweet promises and assurances
petitioners spouses to finance such undertaking with a solemn
commitment on his part that after he has already reconstituted
such torrens title, he will deliver the same to the petitioners
spouses as security for the amount they had financed.
However, after respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana had
gotten the P100,000.00 amount from the petitioner spouses,
respondent from that time on up to the present had intentionally
evaded the performance of his due, just, legal and demandable
obligations to petitioner spouses.It turned out that all his
assurances that he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute the
same and deliver an amount of P170,000.00 to petitioner
spouses were all fraudulent representations on his part or else
were only fictitious in character to defraud petitioner spouses of
their hard owned monies. Despite due notice, respondent failed
to file his answer to the complaint as required by the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Respondent likewise
failed to appear on the scheduled date of the mandatory
conference despite due notice
ISSUE: W/N respondent should be suspended
HELD: Yes. Respondent, like all other members of the bar, is
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following
Canons, viz:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession. Membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality,
honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a member
of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." The nature of the office of a
lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission
to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential
to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. In the instant
case, respondent’s unjustified withholding of petitioners’ money
years after it became due and demandable demonstrates his
lack of integrity and fairness, and this is further highlighted by
his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. Instead
of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to
file an answer nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer
a valid explanation for his conduct
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all
katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must
appear in person without the assistance of counsel or
representative, except for minors and incompetents who may
be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES
SEC. 17. Availability of Forms; Assistance by Court Personnel.
– The Clerk of Court or other court personnel shall provide such
assistance as may be requested by a plaintiff or a defendant
regarding the availability of forms and other information about
the coverage, requirements as well as procedure for small
claims cases.
BAR MATTER 850 | MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL
ED
Considering the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the
Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by
the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court
hereby resolves to adopt, as it hereby adopts, the following
rules for proper implementation:
RULE 1: PURPOSE
Section 1. Purpose of the MCLE - Continuing legal education
is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast
with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession
and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
RULE 2: MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
Section 1. Constitution of the MCLE Committee - Within two (2)
months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court
En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted in
accordance with these Rules.
Section 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE - Members of
the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every three (3)
years, at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education
activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics.
(b) At least (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute
resolution.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on
substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and
oral advocacy.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law
and international conventions.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such
subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee.
RULE 3: COMPLIANCE PERIOD
Section 1. Initial compliance period - The initial compliance
period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the
constitution of the MCLE Committee. Except for the initial
compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after the
establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be
for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end
of the previous compliance period.
Section 2. Compliance Group 1. - Members in the National
Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila shall be permanently
assigned to Compliance Group 1.
required to complete a number of hours of education in legal
ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to
the next whole number.
RULE 4: COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS

Section 3. Compliance Group 2. - Members in Luzon outside Section 1. Guidelines - The following are the guidelines for
NCR shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 2. computation of credit units (CU):

Section 4. Compliance Group 3. - Members in Visayas and PROGRAMS CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
Mindanao shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group
3. 1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES,
SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS,
Section 5. Compliance period for members admitted or WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS
readmitted after establishment of the program. - Members BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER
admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the RELATED RULES
program shall be permanently assigned to the appropriate
Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the 1.1 PARTICIPANT 1 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATE OF
date of admission or readmission. ATTENDANCE WITH NUMBER OF HOURS

The initial compliance period after admission or readmission 1.2 LECTURER 5 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE
shall begin on the first day of the month of admission or OR SPONSOR'S CERTIFICATION
readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group. 1.3 RESOURCE 3 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE
OR SPONSOR'S SPEAKER CERTIFICATION
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial
compliance period after admission or readmission, the member 1.4 ASSIGNED 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM
is not required to comply with the program requirement for the SPONSORING PENALIST/ ORGANIZATION
initial compliance. REACTOR/COMMENTATOR

(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial 1.5 MODERATOR/ 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM
compliance period after admission or readmission, the member SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved FACILITATOR
continuing legal education activities equal to the number of
months remaining in the compliance period in which the 2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be
2.1 RESEARCH/ 5-10 CREDIT UNITS DULY Section 1. Classes of credits - The credits are either
CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED INNOVATIVE TECHNICAL participatory or non-participatory.
REPORT/PAPER PROGRAM/CREATIVE PROJECT
Section 2. Claim for participatory credit - Participatory credit
2.2 BOOK 50-100 PP 101+ PUBLISHED BOOK SINGLE may be claimed for:
AUTHOR 12-16 CU 17-20 CU
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars,
2 AUTHORS 10-12 CU 13-16 CU conferences, symposia, in-house education programs,
workshops, dialogues or round table discussions.
3 OR MORE 5-6 CU 7-11 CU
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist,
2.3 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK reactor, commentator, resource speaker, moderator,
WITH PROOF AUTHORSHIP AS EDITOR CATEGORY coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE 5-10 PP 11+ PUBLISHED ARTICLE (c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SINGLE AUTHOR 6 CU 8 CU
Section 3. Claim for non-participatory credit - Non-participatory
2 AUTHORS 4 CU 6 CU credit may be claimed per compliance period for:
3 OR MORE 2 CU 4 CU (a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials
published or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an
2.5 LEGAL 3-6 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the
NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL NEWSLETTER/LAW JOURNAL legal education of the author member, which were not prepared
EDITOR in the ordinary course of the member's practice or employment.
3. PROFESSIONAL 6 CU PER CHAIR CERTIFICATION OF (b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
LAW DEAN CHAIR/BAR 1 CU PER LECTURE OR BAR
REVIEW DIRECTOR REVIEW/ HOUR LECTURE/LAW RULE 6: COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS
TEACHING
Section 1. Computation of credit hours - Credit hours are
Section 2. Limitation on certain credit units - In numbers 2 and computed based on actual time spent in an activity (actual
3 of the guidelines in the preceding Section, the total maximum instruction or speaking time), in hours to the nearest one-
credit units shall not exceed twenty (20) hours per three (3) quarter hour.
years.
RULE 7: EXEMPTIONS
RULE 5: CATEGORIES OF CREDIT
Section 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE - The following
members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and
the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executives
Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary,
incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and
incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial
Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant
Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional
Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the
Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial
functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who
have teaching experience for at least 10 years accredited law
schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps
of Professors and Professorial Lectures of the Philippine
Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
Section 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE - The
following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval
of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of
requirement - A member may file a verified request setting forth
good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness,
post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from
compliance with or modification of any of the requirements,
including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance
with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
Section 4. Change of status - The compliance period shall
begin on the first day of the month in which a member ceases
to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end
on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.
Section 5. Proof of exemption - Applications for exemption from
or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath
and supported by documents.
RULE 8: STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION
ACTIVITIES
Section 1. Approval of MCLE program - Subject to the rules as
may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal
education program may be granted approval in either of two (2)
ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an approved provider and
certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 3 of this
Rules; and (2) the provider is specially mandated by law to
provide continuing legal education.
Section 2. Standards for all education activities - All continuing
legal education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or
practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of
learning related to legal subjects and the legal profession,
including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or
medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice
law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length,
substantive written materials must be distributed to all
participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the
time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time
and location so as to be free from interruption like telephone
calls and other distractions.
RULE 9: APPROVAL OF PROVIDERS
Section 1. Approval of providers - Approval of providers shall
be done by the MCLE Committee.
Section 2. Requirements for approval of providers - Any
persons or group may be approved as a provider for a term of
two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application.
All providers of continuing legal education activities, including
in-house providers, are eligible to be approved providers.
Application for approval shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the IBP;
(b) Contain all information requested on the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the approval fee;
Section 3. Requirements of all providers - All approved
providers shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall
be maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the
completion date. The provider shall include the member on the
official record of attendance only if the member's signature was
obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official
record of attendance shall contain the member's name and
number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date,
location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A
copy of such record shall be furnished the IBP.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved for MCLE by the IBP in the
amount of ________ hours of which hours will apply in (legal
ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved
education activities prescribed by these Rules and such
regulations as may be prescribed by the IBP pertaining to
MCLE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all
participants identifying the time, date, location, subject matter
and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all
approved continuing legal education activities by members of
the IBP Board of Governors, the MCLE Committee, or
designees of the Committee and IBP staff for purposes of
monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the
nature of the activity, the time devoted to each devoted to each
topic and identify of the instructors. The provider shall make
available to each participant a copy of IBP-approved Education
Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity
Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after
the activity, copy furnished the IBP.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity
under this program or issues a spurious certificate in violation
of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
Section 4. Renewal of provider approval - The approval of a
provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied
if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of
these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities
for the preceding period.
Section 5. Revocation of provider approval - The approval of
any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority
vote of the IBP Board of Governors, upon recommendation of
the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good
cause.
RULE 10: ACTIVITY AND PROVIDER APPROVAL FEE
Section 1. Payment of fees - Application for approval of an
education activity or as a provider requires payment of an
appropriate fee.
RULE 11: GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. Compliance card - Each member shall secure from
the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his
compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting
under oath that he has complied with the education requirement
or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption.
Such Compliance Card must be returned to the address
indicated therein not later than the day after the end of the
member's compliance period.
Section 2. Member record keeping requirement - Each member
shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption,
copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be
provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section
3(c) of Rule 9 should be sufficient record of attendance at a
participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall
also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3
of Rule 5.
RULE 12 - NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance - The following
shall constitute non-compliance
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the
compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance
(including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed
period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish
evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt
of a non-compliance notice;
(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing
or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain
compliance - A member failing to comply will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be
given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to explain the
deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements.
Such notice shall contain, among other things, the following
language in capital letters:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION
FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60
DAYS FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE), SHALL BE A CAUSE
FOR LISTING AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER.
The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number
of credit hours for compliance. Credit hours earned during this
period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior
compliance period requirement unless hours in excess of the
requirement are earned, in which case, the excess hours may
be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.lawphil.net
RULE 13: CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Section 1. Non-compliance fee - A member who, for whatever
reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance
period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
Section 2. Listing as delinquent member - Any member who
fails to satisfactorily comply with Section 2 of Rule 12 shall be
listed as a delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which
case, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
RULE 14: REINSTATEMENT
Section 1. Process - The involuntary listing as a delinquent
member shall be terminated when the member provides proof
of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment
of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary
credit hours to meet the requirement for the period of non-
compliance during the period the member is on inactive status.
These credit hours may not be counted toward meeting the
current compliance period requirement. Credit hours attained
during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number
needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may
be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.lawphil.net
Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative
process - The termination of listing as a delinquent member is
administrative in nature but it shall be made with notice and
hearing by the MCLE Committee.
RULE 15: MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
COMMITTEE
Section 1. Composition - The MCLE Committee shall be
composed of five (5) members, namely: a retired Justice of the
Supreme Court, as Chair, and four (4) members, respectively,
nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law
center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of
law schools and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and
integrity. They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a
term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as
may be determined by the Court.
Section 2. Duty of the Committee - The MCLE Committee shall
administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be
necessary subject to the approval by the Supreme Court. It
shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe
a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme
Court.
Section 3. Staff of the IBP - The IBP shall employ such staff as
may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing,
reporting, approval and other necessary functions.

Section 4. Submission of annual budget - The IBP shall submit

to the Supreme Court an annual budget for a subsidy to
establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect in October 2000, following its

publication in two (2) newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ.,concur.