V.
ON JOINT TORFEASORS
Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.
RUKSKONSULT VS. ADWORLD SIGN
FACTS:
Adworld filed for damages against Transworld when Transworld’s billboard structure collapsed
and crashed against Adworld’s billboard structure, which was misaligned and its foundation
impaired.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred that the collapse of its billboard structure
was due to extraordinarily strong winds that occurred instantly and unexpectedly, and maintained
that the damage caused to Adworld’s billboard structure was hardly noticeable. Transworld
likewise filed a Third-Party Complaint against Ruks, the company which built the collapsed
billboard structure in the former’s favor. It was alleged therein that the structure constructed by
Ruks had a weak and poor foundation not suited for billboards, thus, prone to collapse, and as
such, Ruks should ultimately be held liable for the damages caused to Adworld’s billboard
structure.
ISSUE:
Whether Ruks was solidarily liable with Transworld for the damages in Adworld’s billboard
HELD:
Yes. Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do,
or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to
observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding that Transworld’s initial construction of
its billboard’s lower structure without the proper foundation, and that of Ruks’s finishing its upper
structure and just merely assuming that Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation are the
two (2) successive acts which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages sustained by
Adworld. Worse, both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the foundation for the former’s
billboard was weak; yet, neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely
relied on each other’s word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but none was done at
all. Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that both Transworld and Ruks are guilty of
negligence in the construction of the former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its
collapse and the resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard structure.
As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily liable to Adworld. Verily, "[j]oint tortfeasors are
those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet
the commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also
referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each
other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves." The Court’s pronouncement in People v. Velasco is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes
and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint [tortfeasors] whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of
two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
CHAN V IGLESIA NI CRISTO
FACTS:
Chan owned the Aringay Shell Gas Station in Aringay, La Union. It is bounded on the south by
Iglesia ni Cristo’s chapel. The gas station was supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic
tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the services Yoro, a retired general of the AFP, was
procured as Yoro was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. They entered into a MOA
which stipulated that ”[a]ny damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY (Chan)
incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY (Yoro).” Further, the MOA
discusses division of wealth in case hidden treasure is found during the digging. After some time,
Chan was informed by the members of the INC that the digging traversed and penetrated a
portion of the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel
was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent. A complaint against
petitioner was filed by the respondent before the RTC La Union. Petitioner filed an Answer with
Third-Party Complaint impleading Yoro. RTC: The diggings were intended to find hidden treasure!
Chan and Yoro solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-65% basis! CA: I agree with RTC. Chan
avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He argues that the
MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight by the
courts. Since nothing in the MOA goes against the law, morals, good customs and public policy, it
must govern to absolve him from any liability.
ISSUE:
W/N the MOA entered into by Chan and Yoro has the effect of making the latter solely responsible
for damages to the respondent? NO
HELD AND RATIO:
NO. Chan is still liable. INC says that the MOA clearly shows that the intention of the parties
therein was to search for hidden treasure. The alleged digging for a septic tank was just a cover-up
of their real intention. The aim of the petitioner and Yoro to intrude and surreptitiously hunt for
hidden treasure in INC’s premises should make both parties liable. It should be noted that findings
of the lower courts on this point are in complete unison. Petitioner and Yoro were in quest for
hidden treasure and, undoubtedly, they were partners in this endeavor.
The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the fact that they have
become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or
when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. All the requisites of a quasi-delict
are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the
respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the
foundation of the chapel. The excavation on INC’s premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was
no pre-existing contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the
respondent on the other.
For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint
tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary. The heavy reliance of petitioner in the MOA cited earlier cannot steer him clear of any
liability. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve
of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in
committing the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the
treasure if any was found within or outside petitioners property line.
Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures that
he be so declared as liable. Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the
excavation traversed the respondents property. In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually
observe the diggings, his security guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller. Side issue (You may skip):
INC wanted more exemplary damages. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. Surreptitiously digging under the respondents chapel
which may weaken the foundation thereof, thereby endangering the lives and limbs of the people
in worship, unquestionably amounts to gross negligence. For such tortious act done with gross
negligence, the Court feels that the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals is inadequate. The
exemplary damages must correspondingly be increased to P100,000.00. SO ORDERED
BERNABE L. NAVIDA, et al. Vs HON. DIZON, JR.
FACTS:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by
citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought
damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP),
a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases
were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the
dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss provided the defendants:
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional
defense in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country
or the country in which his injury occurred.
(3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured since the commencement of
these actions in the courts of Texas;
(4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the pendency of these actions may be
used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted in
proceedings initiated there; and
(5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor
of plaintiffs by a foreign court.
In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country
in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court
will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for.
Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078 and 125598
A total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General
Santos City on August 10, 1995. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow
Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh
Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred
to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte
Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL
MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac
Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant
companies.)
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the
reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP.
Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued an Order
dismissing the complaint.
First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the
substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign companies
cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the
territorial domain of the Philippines.
Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into submitting
their case to the Philippine courts, merely to comply with the U.S. District Court’s Order and in
order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.
Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant
companies.
Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the
Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia.
RTC of General Santos City declared that it had already lost its jurisdiction over the case. Hence,
this petition for review.
Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC of Davao City and G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856, and
128398
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE,
and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao
City. They alleged that as workers in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said
plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical
DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in “serious and permanent injuries to
their health, including, but not limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive
capacities.”
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) W/N the RTC of Gensan and Davao have jurisdiction over the case.
(2) W/N the defendants are entitled to reimbursement.
I. YES
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law,
on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot
be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive
of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought
in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs
unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City.
The allegations of the plaintiffs in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants
a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-
delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with
individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls
within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which
undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., “the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers,
their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of
commerce,” and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of
the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where
they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts
a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third,
the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers,
family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.
II. NO.
It is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for the same quasi-delict is solidary. A solidary obligation is one in which each of the
debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the
satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors.
In solidary obligations, the paying debtor's right of reimbursement is provided for under Article 1217
of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two
or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to each,
with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no
interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor
paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of
each.
The above right of reimbursement of a paying debtor, and the corresponding liability of the co-
debtors to reimburse, will only arise, however, if a solidary debtor who is made to answer for an
obligation actually delivers payment to the creditor.
As succinctly held in Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
"payment, which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance, in any other
manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to
seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the other debtors."
The merits must necessarily be conducted first in order to establish whether or not defendant
companies are liable for the claims for damages filed by the plaintiff claimants, which would
necessarily give rise to an obligation to pay on the part of the defendants.
At the point in time where the proceedings below were prematurely halted, no cross-claims have
been interposed by any defendant against another defendant. If and when such a cross-claim is
made by a non-settling defendant against a settling defendant, it is within the discretion of the trial
court to determine the propriety of allowing such a cross-claim and if the settling defendant must
remain a party to the case purely in relation to the cross claim.