ARTICLE 21 and 26

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen on March 1, 1987. On May
18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian Family Court. On June
26, 1992, respondent became an Australian Citizen. Petitioner, a Filipina, was married to respondent on January 12,
1994. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared “single” and “Filipino”

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground
of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. In his Answer, respondent
averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution, thus,
he was legally capacitated to marry Grace. Five years after the couple’s wedding, and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia
because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down”

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element
of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the
divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more
martial union to nullify or annual.

ISSUES: 1. WON the divorce between respondent and Editha was proven
2. WON respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

FIRST ISSUE: Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a written official act
of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

SECOND ISSUE: Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the
court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.47

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

 "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy." 48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling
of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of
the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner;
and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.