1
Spouses Dolores Medina and Moises
Bernal, petitioners, vs. Nelly L. Romero
Valdellon, and Spouses Cipriano
Villanueva and Rufina Panganiban,
respondents.
FACTS: ESGUERRA, J :
• The complaint alleges that petitioners
are the owners of a parcel of land in
Hagonoy, Bulacan purchased (April 1967)
for P800
• Defendants are family friends of the
petitioners, and were allowed to remain in
the premises and to construct their
residential house, subject to the
condition that defendants will return unto
the plaintiffs the premises upon demand,
this info was amended to state that they
defendants will return to the plaintiffs the
premises in 1969; On demand, defendants
refused to surrender the property in
question.
• Thus, plaintiffs had to institute action
praying that defendants be ordered: (1) to
vacate the premises and surrender the
said property; (2) to pay plaintiffs P500 as
incidental expenses ; and, (3) to pay P100
a month from the filing of this action to the
time they surrender its possession to the
plaintiffs.
• CFI dismissed the complaint because of
another case pending between the same
parties over the same property (Land
Registration Case). MR was denied.
ISSUE: Will the pendency of a land
registration case bar the institution of an
action for the recovery of possession?
HELD: The nature of this case is one for
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION brought before
the CFI by the alleged owners of a piece of
land against the defendants who were
supposed to have unlawfully continued in
possession since 1969 when they were
supposed to return it to plaintiffs, plus
damages.
The defendants withheld possession from the
plaintiffs since 1969, more than the one year
period contemplated in unlawful detainer
cases at the time the complaint was filed in
1973.
Not all cases of dispossession are covered by
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (Forcible Entry
and Unlawful Detainer cases) because
whenever the owner of property is
dispossessed by any other means than those
mentioned in the said rule, he may initiate
and maintain a plenary action to recover
possession in the Court of First Instance, and
it is not necessary for him to wait until the
expiration of one year before commencing
such action.
It may also be brought after the expiration of
said period of one year, if no action had been
initiated for forcible entry and detainer during
that time in the inferior court. ACCION
PUBLICIANA must be instituted in the CFI.
RE CFI’s ACTION: The respondent court's
action in dismissing this case is precipitate,
there is sufficient merit in petitioners'
contention that the rights sought to be
enforced and the reliefs prayed (recovery of
possession and damages) are entirely
separate and distinct from that sought in L. R.
C. Case.
It is a fundamental principle in the law
governing UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES
(including recovery of possession cases) that
a mere plea of title or ownership over the
disputed land by the defendant cannot be
used as a sound legal basis for dismissing an
action for recovery of possession because an
action for recovery of possession can be
maintained even against the very owner
of the property.
In this case, there is not even a plea of title
on the part of private respondents over the
disputed property but a mere allegation
that there is another action for
registration of title to that land the
possession of which is being recovered by
petitioners in the Civil Case.
An action for recovery of possession is totally
distinct and different from an action for
recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a
judgment rendered in a case of recovery
of possession is conclusive only on the
question of possession and NOT THAT OF
OWNERSHIP. It does not in any way bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or
building.
Thus, the Civil Case was arbitrarily and
erroneously dismissed on the basis of the
alleged pendency of another action, because
while identity of parties may be established in
both cases, there is no identity of cause of
action or of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, so that judgment which may be rendered
in one case would not necessarily result in res
judicata for the other case.

RE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL AND LAND
CASES: No sufficient reason for any of the
parties in this case to object to the
consolidation of the trial of both cases, since
the evidence that may be presented by the
parties involving possession and ownership of
the disputed parcel of land may facilitate an
expeditious termination of both cases. The
evidence involving the issues of possession
and ownership over the same land must be
related and its presentation before one court
of justice would redound to a speedy
disposition of this litigation.
WHEREFORE, the respondent court's orders
are hereby declared null and void and set
aside; the complaint and amended complaint
in Civil Case revived; both the respondent
Judge and the Presiding Judge, Branch VI, of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, being
directed to consolidate the trial of L. R. C. No.
2814 and Civil Case No. 4353-M in one branch
of that court.
[G.R. No. 173021. October 20, 2010.]
Delfin Lamsis, et al, petitioners, vs.
Margarita Semon Dong-e, respondent.
FACTS:DEL CASTILLO, J:
• This case involves a conflict of ownership
and possession over an untitled parcel of
land (80,736 sqm) located along Asin
Road, Baguio City. While petitioners are
the actual occupants, respondent is
claiming ownership and is seeking to
recover its possession from petitioners.
• According to respondent Margarita, her
family's ownership and occupation of
subject Lot can be traced as far back as
1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. A
survey plan was obtained 1964 (186,090-
sqm). On the same year, they declared the
property for taxation purposes.
• The heirs of Ap-ap then executed a Deed
of Quitclaim in favor of their brother
Gilbert Semon.
• Gilbert Semon allowed his in-laws Manolo
Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay
on a portion of the subject together with
their respective families. They were
allowed to erect their houses, introduce
improvements, and plant trees. When the
Lamsis died, their children, petitioners
Delfin Lamsis and Agustin Kitma took
possession of certain portions of Lot No. 1.
Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon
tolerated the acts of their first cousins.
2
When Gilbert Semon died in 1983, 13 his
children extrajudicially partitioned the
property among themselves and allotted Lot
No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita. 14 Since
then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax
over Lot No. 1 15 and occupied and improved
the property together with her husband; while
at the same time, tolerating her first cousins'
occupation of portions of the same lot.
This state of affairs changed when petitioners
Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding
their occupation on the subject property and
selling portions thereof. 16 Delfin allegedly
sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1
to petitioner Maynard 17 Mondiguing
(Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion
to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose). 18 CAcDTI
With such developments, Margarita filed a
complaint 19 for recovery of ownership,
possession, reconveyance and damages
against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
4140-R and raffled to Branch 59. The
complaint prayed for the annulment of the
sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners
to vacate the portions of the property which
exceed the areas allowed to them by
Margarita. 20 Margarita claimed that, as they
are her first cousins, she is willing to donate
to Delfin and Agustin a portion of Lot No. 1,
provided that she retains the power to choose
such portion. 21
Petitioners denied Margarita's claims of
ownership and possession over Lot No. 1.
According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a
public land claimed by the heirs of Joaquin
Smith (not parties to the case). 22 The Smiths
gave their permission for Delfin and Agustin's
parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969
or 1970. They also presented their neighbors
who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as
well as their respective parents who occupied
Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents.
Delfin and Agustin also assailed the
muniments of ownership presented by
Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated, and
invalid. It was pointed out that the Deed of
Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-ap's
children, failed to include two — Rita Bocahan
and Stewart Sito. 23 Margarita admitted
during trial that Rita Bocahan and Stewart
Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not
explain why they were excluded from the
quitclaim. HSIaAT

According to Maynard and Jose, Delfin and
Agustin were the ones publicly and openly in
possession of the land and who introduced
improvements thereon. They also
corroborated Delfin and Agustin's allegation
that the real owners of the property are the
heirs of Joaquin Smith. 24
In order to debunk petitioners' claim that the
Smiths owned the subject property, Margarita
presented a certified copy of a Resolution
from the Land Management Office denying
the Smiths' application for recognition of the
subject property as part of their ancestral
land. 25 The resolution explains that the
application had to be denied because the
Smiths did not "possess, occupy or utilize all
or a portion of the property . . . . The actual
occupants (who were not named in the
resolution) whose improvements are visible
are not in any way related to the applicant or
his co-heirs." 26
To bolster her claim of ownership and
possession, Margarita introduced as evidence
an unnumbered resolution of the Community
Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands
(CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), acting
favorably on her and her siblings' ancestral
land claim over a portion of the 186,090-
square meter property. 27 The said resolution
states: DEICTS
The land subject of the instant application is
the ancestral land of the herein applicants.
Well-established is the fact that the land
treated herein was first declared for taxation
purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No.
363 by the applicant's grandfather Ap-Ap (one
name). Said application was reconstructed in
1965 after the original got lost during the war.
These tax declarations were issued and
recorded in the Municipality of Tuba, Benguet,
considering that the land was then within the
territorial jurisdiction of the said municipality.
That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his
heirs . . . transferred the tax declaration in
their name, [which tax declaration is] now
with the City assessor's office of Baguio.
The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total
area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX
THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE
METERS, is covered by Psu-198317 duly
approved by the Director of Lands on October
4, 1963 in the name of Ap-Ap (one name). In
1964, the same land was the subject of a
petition filed by Gilbert Semon, as petitioner,
before the Court of First Instance of the City
3
of Baguio in the reopening of Judicial
Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO
Record No. 211 for the registration and the
issuance of Certificate of Title of said land.
The land registration case was however
overtaken by the decision of the Supreme
Court declaring such judicial proceedings null
and void because the courts of law have no
jurisdiction.
It has been sufficiently substantiated by the
applicants that prior to and at the time of the
pendency of the land registration case and
henceforth up to and including the present,
the herein applicants by themselves and
through their predecessor-in-interest have
been in exclusive, continuous, and material
possession and occupation of the said parcel
of land mentioned above under claim of
ownership, devoting the same for residential
and agricultural purposes. Found are the
residential houses of the applicants as well as
those of their close relatives, while the other
areas planted to fruit trees, coffee and
banana, and seasonal crops. Also noticeable
therein are permanent stone and earthen
fences, terraces, clearings, including irrigation
gadgets. IDScTE
On the matter of the applicant[s'] indiguinity
[sic] and qualifications, there is no doubt that
they are members of the National Cultural
Communities, particularly the Ibaloi tribe.
They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-
Ap (one name) who lived along the Asin Road
area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married
to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap, married to Jose
Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon
Wakit; and Gilbert Semon, a former vice-
mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the
common name of their father Semon, as it is
the customary practice among the early
Ibalois. . . .
On the matter regarding the inheritance of
the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to state
[that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership
thereof and became the sole heir in 1964, by
way of a "Deed of Quitclaim" executed by the
heirs in his favor. As to the respective share
of the applicants['] co-heirs, the same was
properly adjudicated in 1989 with the
execution of an "Extrajudicial
Settlement/Partition of Estate with Waiver of
Rights."
With regard to the overlapping issue, it is
pertinent to state that application No. Bg-L-
066 of Thomas Smith has already been

denied by us in our Resolution dated
November 1997. As to the other adverse
claims therein by reason of previous
conveyances in favor of third parties, the
same were likewise excluded resulting in the
reduction of the area originally applied from
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND
NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, more or
less to ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FORTY TWO (110,342) SQUARE
METERS, more or less. Considering the
foregoing developments, we find no legal and
procedural obstacle in giving due course to
the instant application.
Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the
application for Recognition of Ancestral Land
Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon,
represented by Juanito Semon, be granted
[and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim
(CALC) be issued to the herein applicants by
the Secretary, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Visayas Avenue,
Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional
Executive Director, DENR-CAR, Diego Silang
Street, Baguio City. The area of the claim
stated herein above is however subject to the
outcome of the final survey to be forthwith
executed. ETDAaC
Carried this 23rd day of June 1998. 28
The resolution was not signed by two
members of the CSTFAL on the ground that
the signing of the unnumbered resolution was
overtaken by the enactment of the Republic
Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous People's
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA removed
the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral
land claim certificates and transferred the
same to the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 29 The Ancestral
Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of
Gilbert Semon was transferred to the NCIP,
Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad,
Benguet and re-docketed as Case No. 05-
RHO-CAR-03. 30 The petitioners filed their
protest in the said case before the NCIP. The
same has been submitted for resolution.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court 31
After summarizing the evidence presented by
both parties, the trial court found that it
preponderates in favor of respondent's long-
time possession of and claim of ownership
over the subject property. 32 The survey plan
of the subject property in the name of the
Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962
and the tax declarations thereafter issued to
the respondent and her siblings all support
4
her claim that her family and their
predecessors-in-interest have all been in
possession of the property to the exclusion of
others. The court likewise gave credence to
the documentary evidence of the transfer of
the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to
respondent's father and, eventually to
respondent herself. The series of transfers of
the property were indications of the
respondent's and her predecessors' interest
over the property. The court opined that while
these pieces of documentary evidence were
not conclusive proof of actual possession,
they lend credence to respondent's claim
because, "in the ordinary course of things,
persons will not execute legal documents
dealing with real property, unless they
believe, and have the basis to believe, that
they have an interest in the property subject
of the legal documents . . . ." 33
In contrast, the trial court found nothing on
record to substantiate the allegations of the
petitioners that they and their parents were
the long-time possessors of the subject
property. Their own statements belied their
assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose both
admitted that they could not secure title for
the property from the Bureau of Lands
because there were pending ancestral land
claims over the property. 34 Petitioner
Agustin's Townsite Sales Application over the
property was held in abeyance because of
respondent's own claim, which was eventually
favorably considered by the CSTFAL. 35
DTAHEC
The dispositive portion of the trial court's
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the
[respondent] and against the [petitioners] —
(1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of
Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the [petitioner]
Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose
Valdez, Jr. null and void;
(2) Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin
Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard Mondiguing
and Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they
are presently occupying that is within Lot 1 of
PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent]
and to surrender possession thereof to the
[respondent];
(3) To pay [respondent] attorney's fees in
the amount of P10,000.00; and
(4) To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 36

It appears that no motion for reconsideration
was filed before the trial court. Nevertheless,
the trial court issued an Order 37 allowing the
petitioners' Notice of Appeal. 38
Ruling of the Court of Appeals 39
The sole issue resolved by the appellate court
was whether the trial court erred in ruling in
favor of respondent in light of the adduced
evidence. Citing the rule on preponderance of
evidence, the CA held that the respondent
was able to discharge her burden in proving
her title and interest to the subject property.
Her documentary evidence were amply
supported by the testimonial evidence of her
witnesses. aTSEcA
In contrast, petitioners only made bare
allegations in their testimonies that are
insufficient to overcome respondent's
documentary evidence.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration 40 of
the adverse decision but the same was
denied.
Hence this petition, which was initially denied
for failure to show that the CA committed any
reversible error. 41 Upon petitioners' motion
for reconsideration, 42 the petition was
reinstated in the Court's January 15, 2007
Resolution. 43
Petitioners' arguments
Petitioners assign as error the CA's
appreciation of the evidence already affirmed
and considered by the trial court. They
maintain that the change in the presiding
judges who heard and decided their case
resulted in the appreciation of what would
otherwise be inadmissible evidence. 44
Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their
petition from the general rule that a trial
judge's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great respect on
appeal.
To support their claim that the trial and
appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of
respondent, they assailed the various pieces
of evidence offered by respondent. They
maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed
by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and lacks the
parties' and witnesses' signatures. Moreover,
it is a mere photocopy, which was never
authenticated by the notary public in court
and no reasons were proffered regarding the
existence, loss, and contents of the original
copy. 45 Under the best evidence rule, the
Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence
and should have been disregarded by the
court.
5
Respondent did not prove that she and her
husband possessed the subject property since
time immemorial. Petitioners argue that
respondent admitted possessing and
cultivating only the land that lies outside the
subject property. 46 aDHScI
Petitioners next assail the weight to be given
to respondent's muniments of ownership,
such as the tax declarations and the survey
plan. They insist that these are not
indubitable proofs of respondent's ownership
over the subject property given that there are
other claimants to the land (who are not
parties to this case) who also possess a
survey plan over the subject property. 47
Petitioners then assert their superior right to
the property as the present possessors
thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the
New Civil Code which presume good faith
possession on the part of the possessor and
puts the burden on the plaintiff in an action to
recover to prove her superior title. 48
Petitioners next assert that they have a right
to the subject property by the operation of
acquisitive prescription. They posit that they
have been in possession of a public land
publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the
concept of owners for more than 30 years.
Respondent's assertion that petitioners are
merely possessors by tolerance is
unsubstantiated. 49
Petitioners also maintain that the
reivindicatory action should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction in light of the enactment of
the IPRA, which gives original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral
lands and domains to the NCIP. 50 They
assert that the customary laws of the Ibaloi
tribe of the Benguet Province should be
applied to their dispute as mandated by
Section 65, Chapter IX of RA 8371, which
states: "When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, 51
customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve the dispute." ADEaHT
In the alternative that jurisdiction over an
accion reivindicatoria is held to be vested in
the trial court, the petitioners insist that the
courts should dismiss the reivindicatory action
on the ground of litis pendentia. 52 They
likewise argue that NCIP has primary
jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the
courts should not interfere "when the dispute
demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative
tribunal . . . In cases where the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the
court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence." 53 The courts
should stand aside in order to prevent the
possibility of creating conflicting decisions. 54
Respondent's arguments
Respondent opines that the appellate court
did not commit any reversible error in
affirming the trial court's decision. The
present petition is a mere dilatory tactic to
frustrate the speedy administration of justice.
55
Respondent also asserts that questions of fact
are prohibited in a Rule 45 petition. 56 Thus,
the appreciation and consideration of the
factual issues are no longer reviewable. 57
The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for
the first time in the petition before this Court.
It was never raised before the trial court or
the CA. Thus, respondent insists that
petitioners are now barred by laches from
attacking the trial court's jurisdiction over the
case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals, 58
respondent argues that the jurisdictional issue
should have been raised at the appellate level
at the very least so as to avail of the doctrine
that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings even on appeal.
59 HEacDA
Respondent maintains that there is no room
for the application of litis pendentia because
the issues in the application for ancestral land
claim are different from the issue in a
reivindicatory action. The issue before the
NCIP is whether the Government, as grantor,
will recognize the ancestral land claim of
respondent over a public alienable land; while
the issue in the reivindicatory case before the
trial court is ownership, possession, and right
to recover the real property. 60
Given that the elements of lis pendens are
absent in case at bar, the allegation of forum-
shopping is also bereft of merit. Any judgment
to be rendered by the NCIP will not amount to
res judicata in the instant case. 61
Issues
The petitioners present the following issues
for our consideration:
1. Whether the appellate court
disregarded material facts and circumstances
in affirming the trial court's decision;
2. Whether petitioners have acquired the
subject property by prescription;
6
3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction
to decide the case in light of the effectivity of
RA 8371 or the Indigenous People's Rights Act
of 1997 at the time that the complaint was
instituted; TCASIH
4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction,
whether the ancestral land claim pending
before the NCIP should take precedence over
the reivindicatory action. 62
Our Ruling
Whether the appellate court disregarded
material facts and circumstances in
affirming the trial court's decision
Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled
that respondent has proven her claims of
ownership and possession with a
preponderance of evidence. Petitioners now
argue that the two courts erred in their
appreciation of the evidence. They ask the
Court to review the evidence of both parties,
despite the CA's finding that the trial court
committed no error in appreciating the
evidence presented during trial. Hence,
petitioners seek a review of questions of fact,
which is beyond the province of a Rule 45
petition. A question of fact exists if the
uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. 63 "Such questions as
whether certain items of evidence should be
accorded probative value or weight, or
rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the
proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition in issue, are without doubt
questions of fact." 64
Since it raises essentially questions of fact,
this assignment of error must be dismissed
for it is settled that only questions of law may
be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari. 65
There is a question of law when there is doubt
as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts. Questions of law can be resolved
without having to re-examine the probative
value of evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted. 66 The
instant case does not present a compelling
reason to deviate from the foregoing rule,
especially since both trial and appellate
courts agree that respondent had proven her
claim of ownership as against petitioners'
claims. Their factual findings, supported as
they are by the evidence, should be accorded
great respect. ECDaTI
In any case, even if petitioners' arguments
attacking the authenticity and admissibility of
the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of

respondent's father are well-taken, it will not
suffice to defeat respondent's claim over the
subject property. Even without the Deed of
Quitclaim, respondent's claims of prior
possession and ownership were adequately
supported and corroborated by her other
documentary and testimonial evidence. We
agree with the trial court's observation that,
in the ordinary course of things, people will
not go to great lengths to execute legal
documents and pay realty taxes over a real
property, unless they have reason to believe
that they have an interest over the same. 67
The fact that respondent's documents
traverse several decades, from the 1960s to
the 1990s, is an indication that she and her
family never abandoned their right to the
property and have continuously exercised
rights of ownership over the same.
Moreover, respondent's version of how the
petitioners came to occupy the property
coincides with the same timeline given by the
petitioners themselves. The only difference is
that petitioners maintain they came into
possession by tolerance of the Smith family,
while respondent maintains that it was her
parents who gave permission to petitioners.
Given the context under which the parties'
respective statements were made, the Court
is inclined to believe the respondent's version,
as both the trial and appellate courts have
concluded, since her version is corroborated
by the documentary evidence.
Whether petitioners have acquired the
subject property by prescription
Assuming that the subject land may be
acquired by prescription, we cannot accept
petitioners' claim of acquisition by
prescription. Petitioners admitted that they
had occupied the property by tolerance of the
owner thereof. Having made this admission,
they cannot claim that they have acquired the
property by prescription unless they can
prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that
possession, in order to ripen into ownership,
must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in
the concept of owner, such as the one
claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into
ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless
the juridical relation is first expressly
repudiated and such repudiation has been
communicated to the other party. Acts of
possessory character executed due to license
or by mere tolerance of the owner are
inadequate for purposes of acquisitive
7
prescription. Possession by tolerance is not
adverse and such possessory acts, no matter
how long performed, do not start the running
of the period of prescription. 68 cSDHEC
In the instant case, petitioners made no effort
to allege much less prove any act of
repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the
acquisitive prescription. At most, we can find
on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and
Agustin of parts of the property to petitioners
Maynard and Jose; but the same was done
only in 1998, shortly before respondent filed a
case against them. Hence, the 30-year period
necessary for the operation of acquisitive
prescription had yet to be attained.
Whether the ancestral land claim
pending before the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should
take precedence over the reivindicatory
action
The application for issuance of a Certificate of
Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP
is akin to a registration proceeding. It also
seeks an official recognition of one's claim to
a particular land and is also in rem. The titling
of ancestral lands is for the purpose of
"officially establishing" one's land as an
ancestral land. 69 Just like a registration
proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does
not vest ownership 70 upon the applicant but
only recognizes ownership 71 that has
already vested in the applicant by virtue of
his and his predecessor-in-interest's
possession of the property since time
immemorial. As aptly explained in another
case:
It bears stressing at this point that ownership
should not be confused with a certificate of
title. Registering land under the Torrens
system does not create or vest title because
registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein.
Corollarily, any question involving the issue of
ownership must be threshed out in a separate
suit . . . The trial court will then conduct a full-
blown trial wherein the parties will present
their respective evidence on the issue of
ownership of the subject properties to enable
the court to resolve the said issue. . . . 72
(Emphasis supplied) ECSaAc
Likewise apropos is the following explanation:
The fact that the [respondents] were able to
secure [TCTs over the property] did not
operate to vest upon them ownership of the

property. The Torrens system does not create
or vest title. It has never been recognized as a
mode of acquiring ownership . . . If the
[respondents] wished to assert their
ownership, they should have filed a judicial
action for recovery of possession and not
merely to have the land registered under their
respective names. . . . Certificates of title do
not establish ownership. 73 (Emphasis
supplied)
A registration proceeding is not a conclusive
adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is later
on found in another case (where the issue of
ownership is squarely adjudicated) that the
registrant is not the owner of the property,
the real owner can file a reconveyance case
and have the title transferred to his name. 74
Given that a registration proceeding (such as
the certification of ancestral lands) is not a
conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will
not constitute litis pendentia on a raising the court's lack of jurisdiction. Laches
reivindicatory case where the issue is
ownership. 75 "For litis pendentia to be a
ground for the dismissal of an action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity with respect
to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases is such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other case." 76 The third
element is missing, for any judgment in the
certification case would not constitute res
judicata or be conclusive on the ownership
issue involved in the reivindicatory case.
Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no
reason for the reivindicatory case to be
suspended or dismissed in favor of the
certification case. DHSACT
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we
cannot agree with petitioners' contention that
respondent committed forum-shopping.
Settled is the rule that "forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other." 77
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction
to decide the case in light of the
effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous
People's Rights Act of 1997 at the time
that the complaint was instituted
8
For the first time in the entire proceedings of
this case, petitioners raise the trial court's
alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter in light of the effectivity 78 of the IPRA
at the time that the complaint was filed in
1998. They maintain that, under the IPRA, it is
the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land
disputes involving indigenous cultural
communities and indigenous peoples.
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the
proceedings. This is because jurisdiction
cannot be waived by the parties or vested by
the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is
vested by law, which prevails at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
An exception to this rule has been carved by
jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 79 the Court ruled that the
existence of laches will prevent a party from
is defined as the "failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it." 80 Wisely, some cases 81 have cautioned
against applying Tijam, except for the most
exceptional cases where the factual milieu is
similar to Tijam. ETAICc
In Tijam, the surety could have raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court
but failed to do so. Instead, the surety
participated in the proceedings and filed
pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached
the appellate court, the surety again
participated in the case and filed their
pleadings therein. It was only after receiving
the appellate court's adverse decision that
the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a
motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for
reconsideration. The CA certified the matter
to this Court, which then ruled that the surety
was already barred by laches from raising the
jurisdiction issue.
In case at bar, the application of the Tijam
doctrine is called for because the presence of
laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in
Tijam was barred by laches for raising the
issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA,
what more for petitioners in the instant case

who raised the issue for the first time in their
petition before this Court.
At the time that the complaint was first filed
in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the
petitioners never raised the same as a ground
for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the value of the
property did not meet the jurisdictional value
for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take
the IPRA into consideration. IaAEHD
When the amended complaint was filed in
1998, the petitioners no longer raised the
issue of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction.
Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time
aware of the existence of the IPRA as
evidenced by the cross-examination 82
conducted by petitioners' lawyer on the
CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the
cross-examination, it was revealed that the
petitioners were aware that the DENR,
through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction
over ancestral land claims by virtue of the
enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the
validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring
respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL
had been rendered functus officio under the
IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not
question the trial court's jurisdiction.
When petitioners recoursed to the appellate
court, they only raised as errors the trial
court's appreciation of the evidence and the
conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their
brief, they once again assailed the CSTFAL's
resolution as having been rendered functus
officio by the enactment of IPRA. 83 But
nowhere did petitioners assail the trial court's
ruling for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
It is only before this Court, eight years after
the filing of the complaint, after the trial court
had already conducted a full-blown trial and
rendered a decision on the merits, after the
appellate court had made a thorough review
of the records, and after petitioners have
twice encountered adverse decisions from the
trial and the appellate courts — that
petitioners now want to expunge all the
efforts that have gone into the litigation and
resolution of their case and start all over
again. This practice cannot be allowed.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that
petitioners' theory about the effect of IPRA is
correct (a matter which need not be decided
here), they are already barred by laches from
raising their jurisdictional objection under the
circumstances.
9
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is denied for lack of merit. The March
30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26, 2006
Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration are AFFIRMED. CETDHA
Placido Noceda, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
Marcos Escobar, defendant-appellee.
FACTS: • Plaintiff-appellant was the owner
of a motor cutter (N. S. del Rosario I). which
cost about P16K. He used it to transport
passengers and cargo (Albay – Catanduanes).
During WW2 (1942), the Japanese armed
forces seized the said vessel and utilized it to
transport troops, ammunition, and supplies.
• After the liberation, US armed forces
found said vessel in Cebu and sold it (May 17,
1945) as enemy property for P100. It was
then sold (August 14, 1945) for P8K to the
defendant Marcos Escobar who caused
extensive repairs to be made on the vessel
and named it "Long Distance."
• Plaintiff instituted an action to recover
from the defendant the possession of said
vessel in the CFI-Cebu or its value in the sum
of P20K, plus damages in the sum of P5K.
• The trial court found in effect that
"Long Distance" is the same vessel as "N. S.
del Rosario I". It held that the boat had been
lawfully seized and confiscated by the
Japanese armed forces and that ", the US
armed forces acquired a valid title over the
same when in the course of liberation of the
Philippines said authority took possession of
the vessel in Philippine waters." Defendant,
thus acquired a valid title to said vessel. CFI
dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
• Appellant's contention is predicated on
Article 3 of Hague Conventions of 1907 which
provides that “Vessels used exclusively for
fishing along the coast or small boats
employed in local trade are exempt from
capture."
ISSUE: *Should the plaintiff reimburse
the defendant for necessary and useful
expenditures on said vessel? YES.
*Does the defendant have a corresponding
obligation to account to the plaintiff the
earnings of the vessel during the pendency of
this action? YES.

HELD: Section 3 of Hague Convention of 1907
is not applicable. When the Japanese armed
forces seized the vessel (February 11, 1942),
they were already in military occupation of
that territory. The vessel was not captured in
the course of a naval war, but was seized by
the military occupant, who used it in the
prosecution of the war.
The trial court erred in holding that the
Japanese Army could lawfully confiscate said
vessel. The regulations under Article 53
authorized the seizure of the vessel but did
not authorize its confiscation. It is expressly
provided that the things seized must be
restored at the conclusion of peace and
indemnities paid for them.
Therefore, the title to the vessel did not pass
to the Japanese but remained in the owner.
The vessel did not become enemy property
and was not such when it was sold to Vicente
Asuncion. Hence said SALE WAS NOT VALID,
and the DEFENDANT ACQUIRED NO VALID
TITLE to said vessel by virtue of his purchase
from Vicente Asuncion.
RE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO BE
REIMBURSED:
The defendant-appellee was initially a
purchaser in good faith. But he ceased to be a
possessor in good faith from the moment the
owner of the vessel claimed it from the
defendant judicially or extrajudicially. From
that moment the defendant was not unaware
that his possession was wrongful.
Article 451 of the old Civil Code provides that
"fruits received by one in possession in good
faith, before possession is legally interrupted,
become his own." And article 453 says that
"necessary expenditures shall be refunded to
every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until they are
repaid to him. Useful expenditures shall be
paid the possessor in good faith. . . ."
Thus, the defendant must account to the
plaintiff for the net earnings of the vessel
from the time the plaintiff claimed said vessel
from him judicially or extrajudicially, and
whatever necessary expenditures he may
have made on said vessel as well as all useful
expenditures made before the possession was
legally interrupted, may be deducted from or
set off against said earnings.
Plaintiff is entitled to the vessel in question.
SC reversed the judgment appealed from and
ordered the case REMANDED to the court of
10
origin for further proceedings in accordance
with this decision.
Republic v. CA
- The subject property was first owned
by Santos de la Cruz who declared the
same in his name under Tax
Declaration
- Subsequently, the subject property was
successively bought or acquired by
Pedro Cristobal
o They presented Tax Declarations
as proof
- After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extra-
judicially partitioned the subject
property and declared it in their names
- On 5 July 1966, they executed a "Deed
of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the
subject property to petitioner-appellee,
the payment of which was secured by a
mortgage on the property
- After the sale, petitioner-appellee took
possession of the subject property and
paid the taxes due thereon
- Due to losses, the property in question
was cultivated only for a while
- On 14 November 1986, petitioner-
appellee filed a petition, which was
amended on 17 July 1987, for the
registration and confirmation of his title
over the subject property
- Oppositor-appellant, the Republic of
the Philippines (Republic, for brevity),
filed its opposition
o Petitioner-appellee and his
predecessors-in-interest have
not been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of
the land in question since 12
June 1945 or prior thereto
- The Heirs of de la Cruz and Kadakilaan
Estate likewise filed their opposition
o Their predecessor-in-interest,
Santos de la Cruz, is the
"primitive owner" of the subject
lot
o He, his heirs, and upon their
tolerance, some other persons
have been in open, peaceful,
notorious and continuous
possession of the land in
question since time immemorial
- The Kadakilaan Estate contends
o By reason of its Titulo de
Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891
 11

Royal Decree 01-4, with o Merely withdrew it from sale but

approved plans registered under still subject to actual survey and
the Torrens System in existing private rights
compliance with, and as a o Registration does not vest title;
consequence of, P.D. 872, it is merely evidence of title
the owner of the subject - We have found that petitioner-appellee
property has proven his claim of ownership over
o Petitioner-appellee or his the subject property
predecessors-in-interest have o This does not contravene or
not been in open, continuous, negate the intention of the
exclusive and notorious proclamation
possession and occupation of - Petition is DISMISSED
the land in question since 12 Pleasantville Development Corporation
June 1945 or earlier v. CA
- On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No.
- Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner
679 was issued by the President of the
a parcel of land
Republic of the Philippines withdrawing
- In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico
the subject property from sale or
bought the rights to the lot from
settlement
Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant
- LC rendered judgment
- A TCT was then issued under his name
o Confirmed Democrito Plaza’s
- It was then that he discovered that
title over Relocation Plan 1059
improvements had been introduced on
- CA affirmed the decision of LC
Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who
- Hence this petition
had taken possession thereof
o According to petitioner, aside
- It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee
from mere tax declarations all of
bought on installment Lot 8 of the
which are of recent vintage,
same subdivision from C.T. Torres
private respondent has not
Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive
established actual possession of
real estate agent of petitioner
the property
o Under the Contract to Sell on
o Petitioner also alleges that the
Installment, Kee could possess
land in question had been
the lot even before the
withdrawn from the alienable
completion of all installment
portion of the public domain
payments
pursuant to Presidential
- After the preparation of the lot plan
Proclamation No. 679
and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI
- Proof that petitioner-appellee and his
through its employee, Zenaida
predecessors-in-interest have acquired
Octaviano, accompanied Kee’s wife,
and have been in open, continuous,
Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8
exclusive and notorious possession of
- Unfortunately, the parcel of land
the subject property for a period of 30
pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9.
years under a bona fide claim of
Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct
ownership are the tax declarations of
his residence, a store, an auto repair
petitioner-appellee's predecessors-in-
shop and other improvements on the
interest, the deed of sale, tax payment
lot
receipts and petitioner-appellee's tax
- After failing to reach an amicable
declarations
settlement, a complaint for ejectment
- They constitute at least proof that the
was filed against Kee in the MTCC
holder has a claim of title over the
- Kee, in turn, filed a third-party
property
complaint against petitioner and CTTEI
- The proclamation did not prohibit the
- MTCC ruled:
registration of title of one who claims,
o The MTCC found that petitioner
and proves, to be the owner thereof
had already rescinded its
contract with Kee over Lot 8 for

the latter’s failure to pay the
installments due
o The rescission was effected in
1979 before the complaint was
instituted
o The MTCC concluded that Kee no
longer had any right over the lot
subject of the contract between
him and petitioner.
Consequently, Kee must pay
reasonable rentals for the use of
Lot 9, and, furthermore, he
cannot claim reimbursement for
the improvements he introduced
- RTC ruled:
o Kee was a builder in bad faith
o Assuming that he was a builder
in good faith, nonetheless, guilty
of unlawfully usurping the
possessory right of Jardinico over
Lot 9 from the time he was
served with notice to vacate said
lot
- He appealed directly to the SC, but
referred back to the CA
o The appellate court ruled that
Kee was a builder in good faith,
as he was unaware of the “mix-
up” when he began construction
o It further ruled that the
erroneous delivery was due to
the negligence of CTTEI, and
that such wrong delivery was
likewise imputable to its
principal, petitioner herein.
- Petitioner then filed the instant petition
against Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI
- W/N Kee was a builder in good faith
- The roots of the controversy can be
traced directly to the errors committed
by CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong
property to Wilson Kee and his wife
- Under the circumstances, Kee had
acted in the manner of a prudent man
in ascertaining the identity of his
property
o Lot 8 is covered by a TCT
different from that which covers
Lot 9; Kee is then presumed to
have knowledge of the metes
and bounds of his property
o But as Kee is a layman not
versed in the technical
description of his property, he
had to find a way to ascertain
12
that what was described was Lot
8
o Hence, he was accompanied by
a CTTEI employee, who declared
that the land she was pointing at
is Lot 8
o There was no reason for Kee to
be present during the geodetic
engineer’s relocation survey as
the final delivery of subdivision
lots was part of the regular
course of business of CTTEI
- Good faith consists in the belief of the
builder that the land he is building on is
his and his ignorance of any defect or
flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of
proving bad faith on the part of Kee
- At the time he built improvements on
Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was
what he bought from petitioner. He
was not aware that the lot delivered to
him was not Lot 8
o Petitioner failed to prove
otherwise
- Petitioner, to demonstrate bad faith,
pointed to contractual breaches
committed by Kee
o Such violations have no bearing
whatsoever on whether Kee was
a builder in good faith, that is,
on his state of mind
o These merely give rise to a
cause of action
- Petitioner then points out the rescission
of the contract between Kee and the
former
o This fact does not negate the
negligence in the pointing of the
wrong lot to Kee
o This merely gives rise an action
for unlawful detainer
- As for the petitioner’s liability
o CTTEI is the agent of petitioner
o The rule is that the principal is
responsible for the acts of the
agent, done within the scope of
his authority, and should bear
the damage caused to third
persons. On the other hand, the
agent who exceeds his authority
is personally liable for the
damage
o CTTEI was acting within its
authority as the sole real estate

representative of petitioner
when it made the delivery to
Kee. In acting within its scope of
authority, it was, however,
negligent; should then be held
liable for damages
- The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis
each other, as builder in good faith and
owner in good faith, respectively, are
regulated by law
- Kee and Jardinico have amicably
settled through their deed of sale their
rights and obligations with regards to
Lot 9
- Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED
o Kee was a builder in good faith
o Petitioner and its agent are
solidarily liable for damages due
to negligence
Kasilag v. Roque
- The heirs of the deceased Emiliana
Ambrosio commenced a civil case for
the recovery of possession of the land
and its improvements from petitioner,
which was granted to Emiliana by way
of homestead
- Petitioner alleged that he was in
possession of the land and that he was
receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of
a mortgage contract between him and
the deceased
- A year after the execution of the said
deed, Emiliana was unable to pay the
stipulated interests as well as the tax
on the land and its improvements
o They then entered into an oral
contract whereby she conveyed
the to the latter the possession
of the land on condition that the
latter would not collect interest,
attend to the payment of land
tax, benefit from the fruits of the
land and would introduce
improvements thereon
- Thus, petitioner entered upon the
possession of the land
- The CA concludes thus:
o That the contract entered into by
and between the parties, set out
in the said public deed, was one
of absolute purchase and sale of
the land and its improvements
13
o It held the whole contract null
and void and without legal effect
as well as the subsequent verbal
contract
- The literal sense of the stipulations in
the contract should be followed
o If the words appear to be
contrary to the evident intention
of the contracting parties, the
intention shall prevail
- The words used by the contracting
parties in the deed clearly show that
they intended to enter into the
principal contract of loan in the amount
of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent
per annum
o In other words, the parties
entered into a contract of
mortgage of the improvements
on the land acquired as
homestead to secure the
payment of the indebtedness for
P1,000 and the stipulated
interest thereon
- Another fundamental rule in the
interpretation of contracts, not less
important than those indicated, is to
the effect that the terms, clauses and
conditions contrary to law, morals and
public order should be separated from
the valid and legal contract and when
such separation can be made because
they are independent of the valid
contract
- In the contract, should Emiliana fail to
pay the mortgage, she would execute a
deed of absolute sale
o This was however modified in
that the petitioner would take
possession of the land and would
benefit by the fruits thereof on
condition that he would condone
the payment of interest upon the
loan and he would attend to the
payment of the land tax
o This converted it into a contract
of antichresis
 This being a real
encumbrance burdening
the land, this is illegal and
void
- Hence, it was error to hold that the
contract entered into was one of
absolute sale and for holding that the
contract is null and void

- Moreover, the petitioner was arguing
that the CA erred in holding that the
petitioner was a holder in bad faith in
taking possession of the land and in
taking advantage of the fruits thereof
o From the facts found established
by the Court of Appeals we can
neither deduce nor presume that
the petitioner was aware of a
flaw in his title or in the manner
of its acquisition, aside from the
prohibition contained in section
116
o This being the case, the question
is whether good faith may be
premised upon ignorance of the
laws
 Gross and inexcusable
ignorance of law may not
be the basis of good faith,
but possible, excusable
ignorance may be such
basis
- It is a fact that the petitioner is not
conversant with the laws because he is
not a lawyer. In accepting the
mortgage of the improvements he
proceeded on the well-grounded belief
that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of
the land
- In taking possession thereof and in
consenting to receive its fruits, he did
not know, as clearly as a jurist does,
that the possession and enjoyment of
the fruits are attributes of the contract
of antichresis and that the latter, as a
lien, was prohibited by section 116
o Hence, his ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is
excusable and may, therefore,
be the basis of his good faith
o Therefore, the respondents are
entitled to the improvements
upon indemnifying the petitioner
or compel the petitioner to buy
the land by paying its market
value
- The appealed decision is REVERSED
o The contract is valid and binding
o The contract of antichresis is null
and void and without legal effect
o Petitioner is a possessor in good
faith
14
Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Corp
- The "Compañia Agricola Filipina"
bought a considerable quantity of rice-
cleaning machinery company from the
defendant machinery company, and
executed a chattel mortgage thereon
to secure payment of the purchase
price
o It included in the mortgage deed
the building of strong materials
in which the machinery was
installed, without any reference
to the land on which it stood
- The indebtedness was not paid, the
mortgaged property was thus sold by
the sheriff and was bought by the
machinery company
- A few weeks thereafter, on or about the
14th of January, 1914, the "Compañia
Agricola Filipina" executed a deed of
sale of the land upon which the
building stood to the machinery
company, but this deed of sale,
although executed in a public
document, was not registered
- At or about the time when the chattel
mortgage was executed in favor of the
machinery company, the mortgagor,
the "Compañia Agricola Filipina"
executed another mortgage to the
plaintiff upon the building, separate
and apart from the land on which it
stood, to secure payment of the
balance of its indebtedness to the
plaintiff under a contract for the
construction of the building
o Upon failure of the mortgagor to
pay, it levied the execution upon
the building
- At the time when the execution was
levied upon the building, the defendant
machinery company, which was in
possession, filed with the sheriff a
sworn statement setting up its claim of
title and demanding the release of the
property from the levy
- The sheriff sold the property at public
auction to the plaintiff, who was the
highest bidder at the sheriff's sale
- This action was instituted by the
plaintiff to recover possession of the
building from the machinery company
- TC ruled in favor of the machinery
company

o The company had its title to the
building registered prior to the
date of registry of the plaintiff's
certificate
o Relied on Article 1473
 If the same thing is sold to
many vendees, the
ownership should transfer
to the person who may
have first taken
possession in good faith
 If it’s real property, it shall
belong to the party who
first recorded it in the
registry
 If there’s no entry, then it
shall belong to the person
who first took possession
in good faith
- The Court however rules that the
property mortgaged is not personal but
real property, considering that it was
attached to the building of strong
materials
- The ruling of the TC should be
sustained on the basis of the third
paragraph as herein respondent took
possession of it first
- Having bought in the building at the
sheriff's sale with full knowledge that at
the time of the levy and sale the
building had already been sold to the
machinery company by the judgment
debtor, the plaintiff cannot be said to
have been a purchaser in good faith
o The subsequent inscription of
the sheriff’s certificate of title
must likewise be tainted with the
same defect
o Good faith does not merely
relate to possession and title,
but also to the inscription of the
property
- One who purchases real estate with
knowledge of a defect or lack of title in
his vendor cannot claim that he has
acquired title thereto in good faith
- Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
Banco Espanol Filipino v, Peterson
- The Spanish-Filipino Bank filed a
complaint against the sheriff of the city
of Manila and the other defendant, Juan
Garcia for declaring that the execution
levied upon the property referred to in
the complaint, to wit, wines, liquors,
15
canned goods, and other similar
merchandise, was illegal
- Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that
under the contract entered into on the
4th of March, 1905, by and between
the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco
Reyes, the former, loaned to the latter
the sum of P141,702 which, added to
the amount of the loan, made a total of
P226,117.38, Philippine currency
- That to secure the payment of these
two sums and the interest thereon, the
debtor, Francisco Reyes, by a public
instrument executed before a notary
on the aforesaid date mortgaged in
favor of the plaintiff bank several
pieces of property belonging to him,
and pledged to the said bank part of
his personal property
o That in the aforesaid deed of
pledge it was agreed by and
between the bank and the
debtor, Reyes, that the goods
should be delivered to Ramon
Garcia y Planas for safe-keeping
- On the 19th of October, 1905, in an
action brought in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila by Juan
Garcia y Planas against Francisco
Reyes and Ramon Agtarat
o Judgment was rendered against
the last-mentioned two for the
sum of P15,000 upon which
judgment execution was issued
against the property of the
defendants, Reyes and Agtarap
- For the purpose of levying upon the
property of the defendants, the sheriff
at the request of Garcia, seized the
goods which had been pledged to the
bank, depriving the latter of the
possession of the same
o Without the authority of the
bank, Reyes could not dispose of
the said goods
- The said sheriff continued to refuse to
return the same to the bank and insist
that until the Court prohibits him, he
would proceed with the public auction
and apply the proceeds to the
satisfaction of the judgment rendered
in favor of Garcia
- The defendant sheriff, Peterson and
Juan Garcia accordingly asked that the
action be dismissed and that it be
adjudged that the plaintiff had no

interest whatever in the property
described in the complaint
- The court below entered judgment on
the 4th of January, 1906, dismissing
plaintiff's action and directing that the
defendant recover from the Spanish-
Filipino Bank
- Main issue is W/N the contract of
pledge entered into by and between
the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco
Reyes to secure a loan made by the
former to the latter was valid, with all
the requisites prescribed by the Civil
Code having been complied with
- The contract in question complies with
all the requisites provided in article
1857 of the Civil Code
o The property was pledged to
secure a debt the date of the
execution, the terms of the
pledge, and the property
pledged, all of which appears in
a public document, and the
property pledged was placed in
the hands of a third person by
common consent of the debtor
and creditor, under the
supervision of an agent of the
bank
- From the evidence introduced at the
trial, both oral and documentary, it
appears that a third person, appointed
by the common consent of the debtor
and creditor, was in possession of the
goods pledged in favor of the bank
under the direct supervision of an
agent of the bank expressly appointed
for this purpose
o Testimonies support the fact
that Reyes did not continue with
the possession of the goods after
they had been pledged to the
plaintiff bank
- The contract in question was,
therefore, a perfect contract of pledge
under articles 1857 and 1863
o Conclusively shown that the
pledgee took charge and
possession of the goods pledged
through a depository and a
special agent appointed by it
o The owner, the pledgor, could no
longer dispose of the same, the
pledgee being the only one
authorized to do so through the
depositary and special agent
16
who represented it, the
symbolical transfer of the goods
by means of the delivery of the
keys to the warehouse where
the goods were stored being
sufficient to show that the
depositary appointed by the
common consent of the parties
was legally placed in possession
of the goods
o The fact that the goods
remained in the warehouse of
Reyes is immaterial
- The fact that the debtor, Reyes,
procured purchasers and made
arrangements for the sale of the goods
pledged and that the bills for the goods
thus sold were signed by him does not
affect the validity of the contract, for
the pledgor, Reyes, continued to be the
owner of the goods
- Judgment is hereby REVERSED; the
plaintiff had a preferential right over
that of the defendant Garcia
German Management and Services Inc v.
CA
- Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and
Manuel Rene Jose, residents of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in
Sitio Inarawan
- On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose
executed a special power of attorney
authorizing petitioner German
Management Services to develop their
property into a residential subdivision
- Finding that part of the property was
occupied by private respondents and
twenty other persons, petitioner
advised the occupants to vacate the
premises but the latter refused
- Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded
with the development of the subject
property which included the portions
occupied and cultivated by private
respondents
o forcibly removing and destroying
the barbed wire fence enclosing
their farmholdings without notice
o bulldozing the rice, corn fruit
bearing trees and other crops of
private respondents by means of
force, violence and intimidation
o trespassing, coercing and
threatening to harass, remove

and eject private respondents
from their respective
farmholdings
- The respondents then filed an action
for forcible entry against the petitioner
o Alleging that they are the
mountainside farmers of Sitio
Inarawan
o That they have occupied and
tilled their farmholdings some 12
to 15 years prior to the
promulgation of PD 27
o Petitioner deprived them of their
property without due process of
law
- MTC dismissed respondents complaint
for forcible entry
- RTC sustained the decision of the MTC
- CA reversed the decisions of the lower
courts
o since private respondents were
in actual possession of the
property at the time they were
forcibly ejected by petitioner,
private respondents have a right
to commence an action for
forcible entry regardless of the
legality or illegality of possession
- Petitioner’s MR was denied
- Hence this appeal
- Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that
it was duly authorized by the owners to
develop the subject property, private
respondents, as actual possessors, can
commence a forcible entry case
against petitioner because ownership is
not in issue
o Forcible entry is merely a
quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an
estate
- In the case at bar, it is undisputed that
at the time petitioner entered the
property, private respondents were
already in possession thereof
- Although admittedly petitioner may
validly claim ownership based on the
muniments of title it presented, such
evidence does not responsively
address the issue of prior actual
possession raised in a forcible entry
case
- It must be stated that regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet
17
possession shall not be turned out by a
strong hand, violence or terror
- The MTC and RTC rationalized their
decision on the basis of the principle of
self-help
o Such justification is unavailing
because the doctrine of self-help
can only be exercised at the
time of actual or threatened
dispossession which is absent in
the case at bar
o When possession has already
been lost, the owner must resort
to judicial process for the
recovery of property
- Petition is DENIED
Cuaycong v. Benedicto
- The issues in this case relate to the
right of plaintiffs to make use of two
roads existing on the Hacienda Toreno
which is the property of the defendants
- One of these roads is referred to in the
proceedings as the Nanca-Victorias
road and the other as the Dacuman-
Toreno road
- The allegations in the complaint with
respect to the Nanca-Victorias road are
that the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong,
Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are
the owners of a group of haciendas
situated between the southern
boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and
the barrio of Nanca
o That more than twenty years the
appellees and their predecessors
in interest have made use of the
Nanca-Victorias road, which
crosses the Hacienda Toreno,
openly, publicly, and
continiously, with the knowledge
of the owners of the said
hacienda
o That on the fifteenth day of
November, 1912, the defendants
closed the road in question
- Defendants in their answer averred
that the road crossing the Hacienda
Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the
right of passage, is the private property
of defendants
o That they have not refused
plaintiffs permission to pass over
this road but have required them

to pay toll for the privilege of
doing so
- The court held that it was a public
highway over which the public had
acquired a right of use by immemorial
prescription
o It was only in 1911-1913 that toll
was being collected; apparently
done to raise funds for its repair
- The question is whether this use was
limited to the plaintiffs, and their
tenants and employees, or whether it
was, as held by the lower court, a use
enjoyed by the public in general
- Plaintiffs produced 2 witnesses who
testified with regard to the use of the
road by the present and former owners
and occupants of the estates of
Bacayan, Esperanza, Alcaigan, Pusot,
and Dolores for the transportation of
the products of these estates to the
town of Victorias, and of supplies and
agricultural implements from Victorias
to the haciendas, but neither of them
testified expressly that any other use
had been made of said road
o it may be reasonably inferred
that the public made use of the
road but such use did not extend
beyond transportation of
products and supplies and
agricultural implements from
Victorias to the haciendas
- Apart from the fact that there is no
direct evidence to support the finding
of the court concerning the general
public use of the road in dispute, the
record contains data strongly tending
to show that when the complaint was
filed, plaintiffs did not contend that the
road was a public highway, but merely
contended that they had acquired by
prescription an easement of way across
the Hacienda Toreno
- It also appears that the road has
existed since 1885 but still did not
prove that the road was a public
highway
- Although the defendants closed the
Nanca-Victorias road in the month of
February, 1911; nothing was done by
them to prevent the continuation of
this restriction until December, 1912,
when this action was commenced
- It was thus concluded that
18
o The road has been in existence
for 30-40 years
o No public funds have been spent
for its construction or upkeep,
but was worked on by laborers
of the owners of the haciendas
and their predecessors-in-
interest
o The Nanca-Victorias wagon road,
including that part of it which
crosses the Hacienda Toreno,
has for thirty-five or forty years
been used by the appellees and
their predecessors in title for the
transportation, by the usual
means, of the products of their
estates to their shipping points
in or near the town of Victorias,
and the transportation to their
estates of all supplies required
by them, and has been used by
all persons having occasion to
travel to and from all or any of
the estates now owned by the
appellees
o The use of the Nanca-Victorias
road in the manner and by the
person above mentioned was
permitted without objection by
the owners of the Hacienda
Toreno until the year 1911,
when they closed it, and began
charging a toll
o The Nanca-Victorias road
constitutes the only outlet from
the estates of appellants to the
nearest public road
- W/N the Nanca-Victorias road a public
highway
- The defendants are the owners of the
Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title
o It is admitted that there is no
annotation on the certificate of
title regarding the road here in
question, either as a "public
road" or as a "private way
established by law,"
- There is no evidence, even remotely,
tending to show that the road existed
prior to the time when the property
now known as the Hacienda Toreno
passed from the State into private
ownership
- The record fails to disclose any
evidence whatever tending to show

that the Government has at any time
asserted any right or title in or to the
land occupied by the road, or that it
has incurred any expense whatever in
its upkeep or construction
- The evidence shows that the repairs
were made by the owners of the
estates benefited by the road, and by
their laborers, as a pure voluntary act
for their own convenience and interest
- There being no evidence that the
original use of the road by plaintiffs'
predecessors was based upon any
grant of the fee to the road or of an
easement of way, or that it began
under the assertion of a right on their
part, the presumption must be that the
origin of the use was the mere
tolerance or license of the owners of
the estates affected
- the claims of plaintiffs, whether
regarded as members of the public
asserting a right to use the road as
such, or as persons claiming a private
easement of way over the land of
another must be regarded as resting
upon the mere fact of user
o it was not shown that the road
had been maintained at the
public expense to show adverse
possession by the government
- It is a fundamental principle of the law
in this jurisdiction concerning the
possession of real property that such
possession is not affected by acts of a
possessory character which are
"merely tolerated" by the possessor, or
which are due to his license
o Mere permission granted by the
owner for people to cross his
property does not equate to his
relinquishment of his ownership
- Acts of a possessory character
performed by one who holds by mere
tolerance of the owner are clearly not
such possessory acts, no matter how
long so continued, do not start the
running of the period of prescription
- We are, therefore, of the opinion, and
so hold, that upon the facts established
by the evidence it does not appear that
the road in question is a public road or
way
o Their use of the Nanca-Victorias
road across the Hacienda Toreno
was due merely to the tacit
19
license and tolerance of the
defendants and their
predecessors in title
o That license was essentially
revocable
o The defendants were within their
rights when they closed the road
in 1911
- We are also of the opinion that
plaintiffs have failed to show that they
have acquired by prescription a private
right of passage over the lands of
defendants
- No evidence was shown to prove
immemorial use
o It is evident, therefore, that no
vested right by user from time
immemorial had been acquired
by plaintiffs
- Judgment is REVERSED
Bishop of Balanga v. CA
- The parties do not dispute that the
Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of
Manila was the owner of a parcel of
land covered by OCT No. 14379
- With respect to its rights over its
properties in Bataan (inclusive of Lot
No. 1272), the said church was
succeeded by the Roman Catholic
Bishop of San Fernando, Pampanga
which was, likewise, succeeded by . . .
Catholic Bishop of Balanga —
registered as a corporation on 15
December 1975
- Prior thereto, or on 23 August 1936 the
then parish priest and administrator of
all the properties of the said church in
the Municipality of Balanga Bataan,
Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, executed an
Escritura De Donacion donating an
area of Lot No. 1272 to Ana de los
Reyes and her heirs, as a reward for
her long and satisfactory service to the
church
- Her acceptance of the donation, as well
as her possession of the subject
property, is indicated in the deed of
donation, which deed, for unknown
reasons, was refused registration by
the Register of Deeds
o In 1939, Ana died
- Nevertheless, before her death, she
had given the subject property to her
nephew who had been living with her,
the herein defendant-appellant [private

respondent] who immediately took
possession of the property in concept
of owner
- Herein petitioner filed the instant
complaint against him after more than
49 years after the deed of donation
was executed
o Alleged that the respondent, w/o
knowledge and consent of the
petitioner and its predecessors-
in-interest, entered and
occupied the subject property
and that defendant refused to
vacate the premises
- As his defense, defendant-appellant
[private respondent] maintains that by
virtue of the deed of donation of 23
August 1936 executed in favor of his
predecessor-in-interest, he is the lawful
owner of the subject property and the
complaint states no cause of action as
it was filed only to harass him
- After 10 months, the respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the instant action is barred
by the statute of limitations
- Petitioner opposed alleging that the
defense of prescription was not raised
in a timely filed motion to dismiss
- LC rendered judgment
o Defendant-appellant [private
respondent] failed to present the
necessary power of attorney
executed by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila giving Rev.
Fr. Mariano Sarili the authority to
execute the deed of donation
o The first 2 paragraphs of the
Excritura de Donacion indicates
that the parish priest . . . was
only the administrator of all,
hence, had no authority to
dispose in whatever manner any
of the properties of the Roman
Catholic Church of Balanga,
Bataan
o Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili was not
authorized to, and could not
validly, donate the subject lot
o Thus, the deed of donation he
executed is unenforceable under
Art. 1403 of the New Civil Code
and defendant-appellant [private
respondent], as well as his
predecessor-in-interest, never
20
acquired ownership over the
subject property
- CA ruled in favor of respondent
o Private respondent could not
have acquired ownership over
the subject property through
acquisitive prescription because
the same having been duly
registered under the Torrens
system
o Nonetheless, respondent Court
of Appeals ultimately ruled that
under the doctrine of laches, the
consequence of petitioner's
inaction for 49 years since the
execution of the deed of
donation, despite its apparently
undeniable knowledge of private
respondent's adverse, peaceful
and continuous possession of
the subject property in the
concept of an owner from 1936
to the institution of the recovery
suit in 1985, is that it has lost its
rights to the subject property
and can no longer recover the
same
- Hence this petition
o Laches means the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have
been done earlier
 The time-honored rule
anchored on public policy
is that relief will be denied
to a litigant whose claim
or demand has become
"stale", or who has
acquiesced for an
unreasonable length of
time
o Elements of laches
 Conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one
under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation
complained of
 Delay in asserting
complainant's right after
he had knowledge of the
defendant's conduct and
after he has an
opportunity to sue

 Lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the
defendant that the
complainant would assert
the right on which he
bases his suit
 Injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the
complainant
- Petition is DISMISSED
Dizon vs. Suntay47 SCRA
FACTS:Respondent Lourdes G. Suntay and
one Clarita R. Sison entered into a transaction
wherein the Suntay’s three-carat diamond
ring, valued atP5,500.00, was delivered to
Sison for sale on commission. Upon
receivingthe ring, Sison executed and
delivered to the receipt to Suntay. After
thelapse of a considerable time without
Clarita R. Sison having returned to thering to
her, Suntay made demands on Clarita R.
Sison for the return of said jewelry. Clarita R.
Sison, however, could not comply with
Suntay’s demands because on June 15, 1962,
Melia Sison, niece of the husband ofClarita R.
Sison, evidently in connivance with the latter,
pledged the ringwith the petitioner
Dominador Dizon's pawnshop for P2,600.00
without Suntay’s knowledge. When Suntay
found out that Clarita R. Sison pledged the
ring, she filed a case of estafa against the
latter with the fiscal's office.Subsequently,
Suntay wrote a letter to Dizon on September
22, 1962 asking for the return of her ring
which was pledged with the latter’s pawnshop
under its Pawnshop Receipt serial B No.
65606, dated June 15,1962.Dizon refused to
return the ring, so Suntay filed an action for
its recoverywith the CFI of Manila, which
declared that she had the right to
itspossession. The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed said decision.
ISSUE:Who has the right title over the subject
property?
COURT RULING:The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the lower courts.
Thecontrolling provision is Article 559 of the
Civil Code which provides that “[T]he
possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable
or has beenunlawfully deprived thereof may
21
recover it from the person in possession ofthe
same. If the possessor of a movable lost of
which the owner has beenunlawfully deprived,
has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
the ownercannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
” The only exception the law allows is when
there is acquisition in good faith ofthe
possessor at a public sale, in which case the
owner cannot obtain its return without,
reimbursing the price. Hanging on to said
exception as hisbasis, Dizon insisted that the
principle of estoppel should apply in this
casebut the Supreme Court ruled otherwise.In
the present case not only has the ownership
and the origin of the jewelsmisappropriated
been unquestionably proven but also that
Clarita R.Sison, acting fraudulently and in bad
faith, disposed of them and pledgedthem
contrary to agreement with no right of
ownership, and to theprejudice of Suntay,
who was illegally deprived of said jewels and
who, asthe owner, has an absolute right to
recover the jewels from the possession of
whosoever holds them, which in this case is
Dizon’s pawnshop. Dizon ought to have been
on his guard before accepting the pledge in
question,but evidently there was no such
precaution availed of and he has no one to
blame but himself. While the activity he is
engaged in is no doubt legal, it isnot to be lost
sight of that it thrives on taking advantage of
the necessitiesprecisely of that element of our
population whose lives are blighted
byextreme poverty. From whatever angle the
question is viewed then,estoppel certainly
cannot be justly invoked.
[G.R. No. L-2939. August 29, 1950.]
Placido Noceda, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
Marcos Escobar, defendant-appellee.
FACTS: OZAETA, J:
• Plaintiff-appellant was the owner
of a motor cutter (N. S. del Rosario I).
which cost about P16K. He used it to
transport passengers and cargo (Albay
– Catanduanes). During WW2 (1942),
the Japanese armed forces seized the
said vessel and utilized it to transport
troops, ammunition, and supplies.
• After the liberation, US armed
forces found said vessel in Cebu and
sold it (May 17, 1945) as enemy
property for P100. It was then sold
(August 14, 1945) for P8K to the
defendant Marcos Escobar who caused

extensive repairs to be made on the
vessel and named it "Long Distance."
• Plaintiff instituted an action to
recover from the defendant the
possession of said vessel in the CFI-
Cebu or its value in the sum of P20K,
plus damages in the sum of P5K.
• The trial court found in effect
that "Long Distance" is the same vessel
as "N. S. del Rosario I". It held that the
boat had been lawfully seized and
confiscated by the Japanese armed
forces and that ", the US armed forces
acquired a valid title over the same
when in the course of liberation of the
Philippines said authority took
possession of the vessel in Philippine
waters." Defendant, thus acquired a
valid title to said vessel. CFI dismissed
plaintiff's complaint.
• Appellant's contention is
predicated on Article 3 of Hague
Conventions of 1907 which provides
that “Vessels used exclusively for
fishing along the coast or small boats
employed in local trade are exempt
from capture."
ISSUE: *Should the plaintiff
reimburse the defendant for necessary
and useful expenditures on said vessel?
YES.
*Does the defendant have a
corresponding obligation to account to
the plaintiff the earnings of the vessel
during the pendency of this action?
YES.
HELD: Section 3 of Hague Convention
of 1907 is not applicable. When the
Japanese armed forces seized the
vessel (February 11, 1942), they were
already in military occupation of that
territory. The vessel was not captured
in the course of a naval war, but was
seized by the military occupant, who
used it in the prosecution of the war.
The trial court erred in holding that the
Japanese Army could lawfully
confiscate said vessel. The regulations
under Article 53 authorized the seizure
of the vessel but did not authorize its
confiscation. It is expressly provided
that the things seized must be restored
22
at the conclusion of peace and
indemnities paid for them.
Therefore, the title to the vessel did not
pass to the Japanese but remained in
the owner. The vessel did not become
enemy property and was not such
when it was sold to Vicente Asuncion.
Hence said SALE WAS NOT VALID, and
the DEFENDANT ACQUIRED NO VALID
TITLE to said vessel by virtue of his
purchase from Vicente Asuncion.
RE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO BE
REIMBURSED:
The defendant-appellee was initially a
purchaser in good faith. But he ceased
to be a possessor in good faith from the
moment the owner of the vessel
claimed it from the defendant judicially
or extrajudicially. From that moment
the defendant was not unaware that
his possession was wrongful.
Article 451 of the old Civil Code
provides that "fruits received by one in
possession in good faith, before
possession is legally interrupted,
become his own." And article 453 says
that "necessary expenditures shall be
refunded to every possessor; but only
the possessor in good faith may retain
the thing until they are repaid to him.
Useful expenditures shall be paid the
possessor in good faith. . . ."
Thus, the defendant must account to
the plaintiff for the net earnings of the
vessel from the time the plaintiff
claimed said vessel from him judicially
or extrajudicially, and whatever
necessary expenditures he may have
made on said vessel as well as all
useful expenditures made before the
possession was legally interrupted,
may be deducted from or set off
against said earnings.
Plaintiff is entitled to the vessel in question.
SC reversed the judgment appealed from and
ordered the case REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance
with this decision.