Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.

Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.

Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the
Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled
TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by
the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.

On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No.
50023 into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained
Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for
said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and
twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter
refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property
which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan,
San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association;
that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the
promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a
permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the
Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the
condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be
affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of
their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed
wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit
bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and
intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to
harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation
of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1

On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for
forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the
dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3

Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July
24,1986, said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the
Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. 4

The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right
to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in
its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6

Hence, this recourse.

The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to
petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the
opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a
forcible entry case against petitioner. 7

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process
to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the
issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of
Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other
additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on
its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process.

Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the
subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry
case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses
Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents'
peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit
bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession
raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a
strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria. 10

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's
drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of
the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is
unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been
lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from
Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he
has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970

FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO

VILLADELREY, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Godofredo F. Trajano and Rafael A. Francisco for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant

Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T.
Limcaoco for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip,
Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey, for review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
that of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting them
of the crime of Grave Coercion, with which they are charged,
and sentencing each to four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of
the principal penalty, as well as one-third of the costs. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the

present case is this:

The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino

Guevarra who cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A
of Hacienda Palico situated in Sitio Bote-bote, Barrio Tampisao,
Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be
tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda
Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia and administered by Antonio
Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one
of the accused herein. Even before the occurrence of the
incident presently involved, there had been a series of
misunderstandings and litigations involving the complainant
and her husband, on one hand, and the men of Hacienda
Palico on the other.chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra

filed an action with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking
recognition as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia. over lot No. 105-
A of Hacienda Palico. In a decision dated February 22, 1958,
the Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no jurisdiction
over the case, inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the
said parcel of land. An appeal was taken by Guevarra to the
Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed in a resolution
dated April 10, 1958. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against

Marcelino Guevarra in the justice of the peace court of
Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible entry, praying therein that
Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot No. 105-A. After
due hearing, the said Court in a decision dated May 2, 1959
ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot and to pay damages and
accrued rentals. A writ of execution was issued by Justice of
the Peace Rodolfo A. Castillo of Nasugbu, which was served on
Guevarra on June 6, 1959, and the return of which was made
by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R. Aquino of this Court on June 23,
1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ recites among other things that
the possession of the land was delivered to the Roxas y Cia.
thru Felix Caisip, the overseer, and Guevarra was given twenty
days from June 6, 1959 within which to leave the premises.

The record before Us does not explain why said decision was
executed. According to the complainant, her husband's counsel
had appealed from said decision. The justice of the peace who
rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had
been an attempt to appeal, which was not given due course
because the reglementary period therefor had expired; that a
motion to reconsider his order to this effect was denied by
him; and that a second motion for reconsideration was "still
pending consideration," and it was October 19, 1959 when
such testimony was given. chanroble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor,

the Trial Judge, added:

On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the

complainant and Caisip regarding the cutting of sugar cane on
Lot 105-A. The following day June 16, 1959, the complainant
allegedly again entered the premises of Lot 105-A and refused
to be driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the aforementioned
incidents, Gloria Cabalag was charged in the justice of the
peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, with grave coercion for the
incident of June 15, 1959, docketed in the said court as
Criminal Case No. 968 (Exhibit "3"); and with the crime of
unjust vexation for the incident of June 16, 1959, docketed in
the said court as Criminal Case No. 970. Both cases, however,
were filed only on June 25, 1959.

In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970,

against Gloria Cabalag, were filed eight (8) days after the
incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy that
both cases were - on motion of the prosecution, filed after a
reinvestigation thereof - provisionally dismissed, on November
8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance of Batangas, upon the
ground "that the evidence of record ... are insufficient to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." The
decision of said court, in the case at bar, goes on to say:

It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria

Cabalag to remain in the premises, Caisip sought the help of
the chief of police of Nasugbu who advised him to see Deputy
Sheriff Aquino about the matter. The latter, however, informed
Caisip that he could not act on the request to eject Gloria
Cabalag and to stop her from what she was doing without a
proper court order. Caisip then consulted Antonio Chuidian, the
hacienda administrator, who, in turn, went to the chief of
police and requested for the detail of policemen in sitio Bote-
bote. The chief of police, acting on said request, assigned the
accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey, police
sergeant and police corporal, respectively, of the Nasugbu
Police Force, to sitio Bote-bote. 1 chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was

seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield.
Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but
she refused to do so, alleging that she and her husband had
the right to stay there and that the crops thereon belong to
them. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he
threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his co-defendants,
Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who
were some distance away, and brought them with him. Rojales
told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position, to stop
weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot,
Rojales grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same,
wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding. Thereupon,
Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales,
forcibly dragged her northward - towards a forested area,
where there was a banana plantation - as Caisip stood nearby,
with a drawn gun. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary
Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!" 2her
neighbors, Librada Dulutan, followed, soon later, by Francisca
Andino, came and asked the policemen why they were
dragging her. The policemen having answered that they would
take Gloria to town which was on the west - Francisca Andino
pleaded that Gloria be released, saying that, if their purpose
was as stated by them, she (Gloria) would willingly go with
them. By this time, Gloria had already been dragged about
eight meters and her dress, as well as her blouse 3were torn.
She then agreed to proceed westward to the municipal
building, and asked to be allowed to pass by her house, within
Lot 105-A, in order to breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the
request was turned down. As they passed, soon later, near the
house of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which
she was affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called
out for him, whereupon, he went down the house and
accompanied them to the municipal building. Upon arrival
thereat, Rojales and Villadelrey turned her over to the
policeman on duty, and then departed. After being
interrogated by the chief of police, Gloria was, upon
representations made by Zoilo Rivera, released and allowed to
go home. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense

is to the effect that, upon being asked by the policemen to
stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria, not only refused
to do so, but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According
to the defense, she was arrested because of the crime of
slander then committed by her. Appellants Rojales and
Villadelrey, moreover, testified that, as they were heading
towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria proceeded to tear
her clothes. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of

the prosecution and found that of the defense unworthy of
credence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which
fully concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to
review on certiorari its appealed decision is limited to
questions purely of law. 4Appellants maintain that the Court of
Appeals has erred: (1) in not finding their acts "justified under
Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2) in holding that the 20-
day period of grace given to Marcelino Guevarra and his wife,
Gloria Cabalag, by the sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A, was valid
and lawful; (3) in finding that the elements of the crime of
grave coercion are present in the case at bar; and (4) in
finding appellants guilty as charged. This pretense is clearly
untenable.chanroble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:

The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to

exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case

at bar, for, having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959,
within which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on June
17, 1959 - or within said period - invade or usurp said lot. She
had merelyremained in possession thereof, even though the
hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants
did not "repel or prevent in actual orthreatened ...
physical invasion or usurpation." Theyexpelled Gloria from a
property of which she and her husband were in
possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed
against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the
Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property
up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could
not oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial
order therefor.

It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A,

Gloria had committed a crime in the presence of the
policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which,
appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This
contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period
was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's
representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto,
had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by the
sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to
remain, and had, in fact, remained, in possession of the
premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or
his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from
the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and to whomsoever the
crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does
not constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and
her husband had been sentenced to vacate the land, the
judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as
the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no
rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops,
inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor," 5and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep
has been held to partake of the nature of necessary
expenses. 6chanrobles v irt ual law li bra ry

It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means

of violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented the
complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law,"
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do
something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving
said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the
law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code. 7 chanrobles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against

the complaining witness, he should be acquitted of the charge.
In this connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge, correctly
observed:

... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on
the complainant, unlike the accused Rojales and Villadelrey
who were the ones who used force against Gloria, and while
the Court is also inclined to discredit the claim of the
complainant that Felix Caisip drew a gun during the incident, it
sufficiently appears from the record that the motivation and
inducement for the coercion perpetrated on the complainant
came from the accused Caisip. It was his undisguised and
particular purpose to prevent Gloria from entering the land and
working on the same. He was the one who first approached
Gloria with this objective in mind, and tried to prevent her
from weeding the land. He had tried to stop Gloria from doing
the same act even the day previous to the present incident. It
was Caisip who fetched the policemen in order to accomplish
his purpose of preventing Gloria from weeding the land and
making her leave the premises. The policemen obeyed his
bidding, and even when the said policemen were already over-
asserting their authority as peace officers, Caisip simply stood
by without attempting to stop their abuses. He could be hardly
said to have disapproved an act which he himself induced and
initiated. 8
chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry

In other words, there was community of purpose between the

policemen and Caisip, so that the latter is guilty of grave
coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by
induction. 9 chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

In the commission of the offense, the aggravating

circumstances of abuse of superior strength 10and disregard of
the respect due the offended party, by reason of her
sex, 11were present, insofar as the three appellants herein are
concerned. As regards appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, there
was the additional aggravating circumstance of having taken
advantage of their positions as members of the local police
force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted out to
appellants herein, which is the minimum of the maximum
prescribed in said Art. 286, 12and the fine imposed upon them,
are in accordance with law. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,

with costs against the defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

Dizon, J., is on leave. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Makasiar and Villamor, JJ., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES
OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.

Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.

Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:

The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-
82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren
Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition
to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular
inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an
order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the
related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.

Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court
issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules
of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by
6
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986.

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and
the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a
quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law
to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party
filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its
title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be
liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective
claims. 9

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-
748:

4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang,

Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant
constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading
to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower
portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its
cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant
to a man height inter-connected cement culverts which were also constructed
and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate,
the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again connected by
defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same
concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which
hole or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of
a big canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a
big hole or opening which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion
of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from
 that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater
coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point
of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or
stormy seasons.

5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is
soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system
thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain
water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it
seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining
land of plaintiffs.

6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's

aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young
man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue
to suffer, as follows:

a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted

to deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no
longer be planted to any crop or plant.

b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several

occasions, washed away.

c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and

their laborers are always in danger.

d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the

land of plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict
are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff. 11

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the
Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike,
stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss
and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and
damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to
the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner
or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his
act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct
and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito"
has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction
of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is
entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in
the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal —
would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in
Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch
18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial
court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and
Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with
the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
respondent corporation.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.