FACTS
hearing is violative of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
Chief State Prosecutor Zuno filed a complaint against respondent Judge
Cabebe for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of
the law and partiality.
A criminal case was filed against 5 police officers for Illegal Possession of
Prohibited or Regulated Drugs with the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte presided
by Judge Cabebe. Upon arraignment, all plead not guilty. On March 14
2001, the prosecution filed for change of venue but was denied. On May
2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right to
speedy trial. In November 2002, respondent Judge motu propio issued an
Order granting bail to the accused, fixing bail at P70K or P120K property
bond, except one whose bail was fixed at P20K. Respondent issued this
Order without the accused’s application or motion for bail. The
prosecution filed an MR but instead of acting on the motion, respondent
Judge inhibited himself from further proceeding with the case, realizing
what he did was very irregular. Complainant thus prayed that Judge
Cabebe be dismissed from the service, disbarred and forfeiture of benefits.
In his comment, Judge Cabebe denied the allegation saying that he did
issue the Order granting bail to the accused, without hearing, premised on
the constitutional right to a speedy trial. He said that the prosecution’s
failure to present their witnesses causing the delay in the proceedings, and
counsel’s absences which resulted in the cancellation of the hearings. The
prosecution however, did not object to the grant of bail to the accused.
Without waiting for the resolution, Judge Cabebe compulsorily retired in
March 2003.
In July 2003, the Deputy Court Administrator found respondent Judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law and recommended a fine of P20K and
a stern warning.
ISSUE: WON the act of the Judge of granting bail without conducting a
RULING
Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it
is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the
denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and
the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to
properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases
where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused
without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of
the judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be
denied.
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure
enumerated in Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing before he granted bail
to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to
interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the
strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he
should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a
summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered
aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
The failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of the
prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense with the
requirement of a bail hearing.
There is no indication in the records of the criminal case that the
prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming
there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a hearing.
This is utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has
been incessantly stressed by this Court.
FACTS
The Philippines and Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons” in January 30, 1995. It took effect June
20, 1997. On July 1 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Private Respondent Munoz was charged in Hong Kong with 3
counts of “accepting an advantage as agent” (bribery), as well as 7 counts
of “conspiracy to defraud”. Warrants of Arrest were issued against him. On
September 1999, the DOJ received a request from the HK DOJ for the
provisional arrest of Munoz. Through the NBI and the RTC of Manila, the
court issued an Order of Arrest against Munoz on September 23. That
same day, Munoz was arrested and detained by the NBI.
Munoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. The CA ruled
that it was void. The DOJ appealed the decision to the SC, which reversed
the CA decision and declared the Order of Arrest valid. Meanwhile,
petitioner Hong Kong filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for extradition
raffled to Judge Bernardo. Munoz also filed for application for bail. After
hearing, Judge Bernardo denied the application for bail stating that there is
no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that Munoz was a
flight risk. Subsequently, Bernardo inhibited himself from further
proceedings, and the case was raffled off to herein respondent Judge
Olalia. He sustained the MR of Munoz and thus granted his application for
bail, subject to certain conditions.
Petitioner filed to vacate the above Order but was denied.
ISSUE: WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail, that
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law provides a potential extradite
has the right to bail
RULING
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available
only in criminal proceedings," thus:
As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the
loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s
case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in
international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in
public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in
the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to
observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations;
and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under
our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the
other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. The
Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail. In light of the various international treaties
giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to
life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in
order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual
of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents
in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have
likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would
be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence
has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in
detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Clearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed
in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,
bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. Records show
that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court
ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of
his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation
of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While
our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required
in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in
Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
Notes:
Extradition - the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object
of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on
him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.
FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted
Persons” that took effect on June 20, 1997.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of “accepting an advantage as agent,” in
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.
201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued
against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14)
years for each charge.
This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the following Orders: (1)
the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying
the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by
the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges
that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
ISSUE: WON a potential extradite can be granted bail?
RULING
Yes. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required
in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in
Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing
evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should
be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent
may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”
FACTS
Charged with murder, Petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted with
the lesser crime of Homicide by the Makati RTC and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor to 12 years
and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal. He appealed to the CA. Pending appeal,
he filed an admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
health condition and absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his petition, invoking the principle “that in the matter of bail
pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal should be exercised "with grave caution and only for strong
reasons." To determine whether petitioner’s application for bail could be
allowed pending appeal, the CA made a preliminary evaluation of the case
and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason
substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s MR was also denied.
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his
application for bail. He contends that where the penalty imposed is more
than 6 years but not more than 20 years, and the circumstances under Par.
3, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 is absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.
ISSUE: WON in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced to more than 6 years, does the discretionary nature of the grant
of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted
when none of the circumstances in Par.3, Sec.5 of Rule 114 is present
RULING
We disagree. It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed
resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or
disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the
appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and
resolve petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal.
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where
the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment
exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances
enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement,
evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if
released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The
second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused
may be summarized in the following rules:
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed,
and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of
the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5)
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to
grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied
even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail
pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by
and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion. On the other hand, in the
second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion,
that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option
except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate
court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be
committed.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From
then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of
being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution
and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact
convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be
guided by a stringent-standards approach.
Notes:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion
FACTS
Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder with the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his alleged involvement in the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Enrile filed an Omnibus
Motion requesting to post bail. After the Sandiganbayan ordered his
arrest, Enrile voluntarily surrendered and again asked the Sandiganbayan
in a Motion to Fix Bail arguing that: (1) the prosecution had not established
the evidence of his guilt was strong; (2) because of his advanced age and
that he voluntarily surrendered, the penalty would only be Reclusion
Temporal thus allowable for bail; and (3) he is not a flight risk due to his
age and physical condition. Enrile claims that before judgment of
conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted
bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine
whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.
ISSUE: WON Enrile is entitled to bail
RULING
Yes. Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian
grounds.
The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail,
which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II
of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well
as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of
bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extradites upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate
that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal
processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time
many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during
the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his
solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of
public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.
Notes:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a
good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to
the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure
that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec.
13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
Napoles v Sandiganbayan
FACTS
In 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received: (1) a Complaint from its
Field Investigation Office; and (2) a recommendation from the NBI;
charging Janet Lim Napoles, former Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, his Chief of
Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes and several other individuals with the crime
of Plunder under RA 7080 and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019) for allegedly misappropriating former Sen. Enrile’s
PDAF through fictitious NGO’s.
The Ombudsman Special Panel of Investigators found probable cause and
thereafter Informations against them were filed before the
Sandiganbayan.
In 2014, Napoles filed a Petition for Bail arguing that the evidence of the
prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. The prosecution presented
several witnesses but Napoles did not present any nor any other evidence.
The Sandiganbayan thereafter denied the Petition for Bail of Napoles as
well as her Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Petition for Bail
RULING
No. Applying these jurisprudential standards to the present case, it is
readily apparent that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Upon receiving
Napoles' Petition for Bail, it scheduled hearings to allow the parties to
submit their respective pieces of evidence. The prosecution submitted
numerous testimonial and documentary evidence, endeavoring to
establish evident proof of Napoles' guilt. Napoles, on the other hand,
opted not to submit any evidence on her behalf and relied instead on the
supposed weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
In this case, Napoles was charged with Plunder which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua. She cannot, thus, be admitted to bail when the
evidence of her guilt is strong. The burden of proof to show such is on the
prosecution. The prosecution can discharge its burden by proving that the
evidence shows evident proof of guilt or a great presumption of guilt.
The Sandiganbayan scheduled hearings to allow the parties to submit their
respective pieces of evidence. The prosecution submitted numerous
testimonial and documentary evidence. Napoles, on the other hand, opted
not to submit any evidence on her behalf and relied instead on the
supposed weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. The evidence of the
prosecution was summarized accordingly, effectively complying with the
due process requirements. It even extensively discussed the available
evidence in relation to the elements of Plunder, which the prosecution
intended to prove point by point for purposes of demonstrating Napoles’
great presumption of guilt. PETITION DISMISSED CA decision AFFIRMED.
Notes:
Right to Bail
As a rule, bail may be granted as a matter of right prior to conviction.
Except (1) when it involves a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is
strong; or (2) when the accused is a flight risk. In such cases, the grant of
bail is a matter of discretion.
How should a trial court exercise such discretion? The following are the
duties of the trial court in applications for bail:
(1) notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application or require him to
submit his recommendation, whether the application for bail is a matter of
right or discretion;
(2) where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing on the
application regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence, to enable the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(3) decide whether the evidence of guilt is strong;
(4) if so, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond;
otherwise, petition should be denied.
Proof evident” or “Evident proof’ in this connection has been held to mean
clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment
to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that
accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally
if the law is administered. “Presumption great” exists when the
circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to
be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased
judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.
Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an
examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is
guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.
FACTS
Complainant Ruiz and Paran are the accused in an adultery case. On March
19 2014, Paran was apprehended in Quezon City by virtue of a Warrant of
Arrest issued by Judge Mapili in Trece Martires, Cavite. He was detained at
the Paranaque City Police station for several days. Paran filed an
application for bail and was approved by Respondent Judge Pichay, after
the accused posted a P12K bond. Ruiz on the other hand, voluntarily
surrendered to Judge Mapili and was temporarily released on bail upon
posting a P12K bond.
Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay had no authority to approve Paran's
application for bail since the latter already had a pending criminal case for
adultery in another court, and he was actually arrested in Quezon City
which was outside Judge Pichay's territorial jurisdiction. The Office of the
Court Administrator directed Pichay to submit his comment on the
complaint against him. Pichay answered that his acts were done in good
faith and in strict compliance to his duties. He insisted that his court had
jurisdiction since Paran was detained in Paranaque City Police Station.
The OCA found Judge Pichay was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
meted him a fine of P5K with stern warning.
ISSUE: WON Judge Pichay was guilty of gross ignorance of the law by
granting bail without jurisdiction
RULING
Section 17(a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which governs the approval of bail bonds
for criminal cases pending outside the judge's territorial jurisdiction is
instructive, to wit:
Section 17. Bail, where filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with
the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of
the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality
other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any
Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is
arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is
pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or
municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation,
the accused may file bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the
same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the accused
has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where his case is
pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the
province, city or municipality where he was arrested. When no regional
trial court judge is available, he may file bail with any metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
However, in the instant case, the case where Judge Pichay approved
Paran's bail bond and issued release order was not pending before his sala.
As correctly pointed out by the OCA, although accused Paran was detained
at the Station Detention Cell, Parañaque City Police Station, he was
nevertheless arrested at his residence in Quezon City. Considering that
Paran was arrested in Quezon City, he could also file his bail application
before any branch at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and in the
absence of any judge thereat, then before any branch of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City. Paran ·could have also filed his bail application
before the MTCC, Trece Martires City, where his case was pending.
Indeed, the only circumstance where Judge Pichay can exercise authority
to rule on Paran's bail application is if the latter, who was detained in
Paranaque City, was not yet charged with a criminal offense in another
court, pursuant to Section l 7(c),9 Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. However, in the instant case, there was already a pending
criminal case against Paran before the MTCC, Trece Martires, Cavite as
shown in the Certificate of Detention10 attached in Paran's application of
bail. In fact, Paran's arrest was by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by
Judge Mapili of the MTCC, Trece Martires City. More importantly, Judge
Pichay likewise failed to prove that there was no available judge to act on
Paran's application of bail in the said respective courts. Clearly, Judge
Pichay's approval of Paran's bail constituted an irregularity arising from his
lack of the authority to do so.
It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and
promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the
wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law. Judges should
ensure strict compliance therewith at all times in their respective
jurisdictions. PETITION GRANTED.