G.R. No.

227757 July 25, 2017

BAGUILAT v. ALVAREZ

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to

recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives;
and (b) petitioners as the only legitimate members of the House of Minority.

HELD:

The petition is without merit.

Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or

person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: “The Senate shall
elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote
of all its respective Members.

Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Said provision also states that the House may decide to have officers other
than the Speaker, and that the methos and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control.

The Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole authority to,
inter alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.” Hence, as a general rule, This
Court has not authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of Constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and
uphold. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a
coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the
House of Representatives.

FACTS:

The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress, several
news articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez’s announcement that he sought the
adoption or anointment of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte’s Administration as the
“Minority Leader” to lead a “cooperative minority” in the House of Representatives,
and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao shortly after the May 2016
Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the majority partisans.
The petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez’s election as the Minority
Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House allegedly “lent” Rep. Suarez some

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of its members to feign membership in the Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as
the Minority Leader.

On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza
had an interchange before the Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from
the former: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority
and those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those
who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the
Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority. Thereafter, the
Elections for the Speakership were held, “with 252 Members voting for Alvarez, eight
voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one
registering a no vote,” thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress.

On August 1, 2016 one of the “abstentionists,” Rep. Abayon, manifested

before the Plenary that those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez convened and
elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader. Thereafter, Rep. Farinas moved for the
recognition of Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader. This was opposed by Rep.
Lagman essentially on the ground that various “irregularities” attended the election,
particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as he voted for
Speaker Alvarez, and that his “transfer” to the minority was irregular; and (b) that the
“absentionists” who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez are
supposed to be considered independent members of the House, and thus, irregularly
deemed as part of the Minority. However, Rep. Lagman’s opposition was overruled,
and consequently, Rep Suarez was officialy recognized as the House Minority
Leader.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep.
Baguilat should be recognized as the Minority Leader in liht of: (a) the “long-standing
tradition” in the House where the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and
the (b) irregularities attending Rep. Suarez’s election to said Minority Leader
Position.

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 INTER-ORIENT MARITIME VS CANDAVA
G.R. No. 201251, June 26, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts:

In January 2002, petitioner Inter-Orient Maritime Incorporated hired Joselito C.

Candava as an able-bodied seaman for its foreign principal, Tankoil Carriers Limited.
Joselito was then deployed to M/T Demetra for a contract period of nine (9)
months. Despite expiration of his contract period on October 28, 2002, Joselito
continued to work aboard the vessel due to the unavailability of a replacement and
such work extension lasted until February 2003.

On February 13, 2003, Joselito complained of significant pain in the abdominal

region and was rushed to a hospital. He was diagnosed to be suffering from “direct
inguinal hernia strangulated right” and “acute appendicitis.” He was then repatriated
to Manila and upon his arrival, the company designated physician examined him and
declared him fit to work. Nonetheless, his supplications for work were rejected.

On March 28, 2003, Joselito, accompanied by representatives of petitioner

Inter-Orient, filed a complaint for recovery of sick wages and reimbursement of
medical expenses before the NLRC – National Capital Region (NLRC-NCR).
However, on even date, Joselito sought for its dismissal in consideration of the sum of
P29,813.04 and in relation thereto, executed a Release of All Rights.

On August 11, 2003, Joselito, again accompanied by representatives from

petitioner Inter-Orient, filed another complaint for medical benefits before the NLRC –
San Pablo City. Similarly, on even date, Joselito sought for the dismissal of his
complaint in consideration of the amount of P77,000.00 and executed a Receipt and
Release.

On October 9, 2003, Joselito passed away. His death certificate listed the
following causes:
Immediate Cause: RESPIRATORY FAILURE
Antecedent Cause: PULMONARY METASTASIS
Underlying Cause: GERM CELL TUMOR
Other Significant Conditions
Contributing to Death: PNEUMONIA
Respondent Cristina sent a Letter dated December 17, 2003 to petitioner Inter-
Orient, demanding payment of death benefits but her pleas fell on deaf ears. As such,
Cristina filed a complaint for death and other monetary benefits against petitioners
before the NLRC-NCR.

The LA ruled in favor of Cristina. The LA found that the release papers executed
by Joselito during his lifetime cannot bar his heirs’ right to receive death benefits and
burial expenses which only arose and accrued upon his death. Further, the LA opined
that the payment of sickness wages and other benefits made by petitioners is an
acknowledgement that his death was compensable.

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 The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s ruling, holding that Joselito did not
die during the term of his contract with petitioners and that his illness was not proven
to be work-related. Nonetheless, the NLRC held that contrary to petitioners’ claims,
Cristina’s complaint is not barred by res judicata considering the lack of identity of
causes of action between Joselito’s and Cristina’s respective complaints.

The CA annulled and set aside the NLRC’s ruling and reinstated that of the LA.
It held that while the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) allows an employer to extend a seafarer’s
employment beyond the period stipulated if there was no replacement crew available,
such extension should not exceed three (3) months. In Joselito’s case, his original
contract period expired sometime in October 2002 but petitioners extended his
employment until February 2003, or for four (4) additional months. Thus, the CA
deemed that there was an implied renewal of Joselito’s employment contract for
another nine (9) months starting from the expiration of the allowable three (3) month
extension on January 28, 2003, or for the period of January 29, 2003 up to October
28, 2003. In view of this, Joselito’s death on October 9, 2003 was within the term of
his contract and thus, compensable. Petitioners sought for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Joselito’s death is compensable as to entitle his wife, Cristina

Candava, to claim death benefits.

Held:

Yes. Joselito’s death is compensable for having been caused by an illness duly
established to have been contracted in the course of his employment.

At this point, it should be noted that the compensability of Joselito’s death

should be resolved under the provisions of the 1996 POEA-SEC, which is the POEA-
SEC in effect when petitioners employed him in January 2002. This is because the
2000 POEA-SEC which introduced amendments to the 1996 POEA-SEC initially took
effect on June 25, 2000 but its implementation was suspended and lifted only on June
5, 2002.

The prevailing rule under the 1996 POEA-SEC was that the illness leading to
the eventual death of seafarer need not be shown to be work-related in order to be
compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the term of the
contract. An injury or accident is said to arise “in the course of employment” when it
takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee
reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing
something incidental thereto. A meticulous perusal of the records reveals that
Joselito contracted his illness in the course of employment. It cannot also be denied
that the same was aggravated during the same period. Thus, there was a clear causal
connection between such illness and his eventual death, making his death
compensable.

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 Dungo v People (2015)

DANDY DUNGO and GREGORIO SIBAL, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015

Facts:

On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna, the
Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members
and officers conducted initiation rite. MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte
was subjected to physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he
was ignored by Castillo. He then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo
arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal
Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo
had done the same.

RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-
Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not herein accused were guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.

Ruling:

Yes, they are guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a

prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by
placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating
situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:

1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into

membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;

2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or

organization; and

3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or

humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar
tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering
or injury.

Classes of direct participants are: the first class of principals would be the actual
participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of

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initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and
members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. The second class of principals
would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity
or sorority who actually planned the hazing. The third class of principals would be the
officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or sorority who knowingly
cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat
due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend
the hazing. The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser.
The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the
fraternity, group, or organization.

Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during
the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.

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 International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v.

Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301 &
209430 (December 8, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

The Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a lower court decision invalidating an
administrative order governing import and release of genetically-modified organisms
(GMOs) in the Philippines. The Court addressed a range of issues, from standing
and mootness to application of the precautionary principle. On the procedural claims
by the petitioners that the case was moot and “academic” because all field trials had
been suspended, the Supreme Court found the paramount public interest in the case
and the fact that the legal issues were capable of repetition yet evading review
justified the Court’s review of the case.

The Court also noted the petitioners were warranted in seeking judicial review
because the biotechnology administrative framework does not provide “a speedy, or
adequate remedy.”

The decision explains the current controversy over GMOs and, in particular,
genetically-modified food crops for human consumption. Drawing on research and
case studies from around the world, and the testimony of expert witnesses, the
Supreme Court found there to be no consensus on the safety of Bt talong to humans
and the environment, stating “[t]hese divergent views of local scientists reflect the
continuing international debate on GMOs and the varying degrees of acceptance of
GM technology by states.

The Court also cautioned that the “uncertainties generated by conflicting scientific
findings or limited research [are] not diminished by extensive use at present of GM
technology in agriculture.”

Turning to the existing biosafety regulation in the Philippines, the Supreme Court
found Administrative Order (DAO) 08-2002 deficient because it lacks provisions for
meaningful, participatory, and transparent public consultation prior to field trials and
contains no mechanisms requiring applicants seeking to import or release GMOs to
comply with international biosafety standards. Pages 89-91. The Court also found
that officials should have complied with environmental impact assessment (EIA)
procedures prior to approving release of Bt talong.

Invoking the precautionary principle, the Supreme Court blocked further field trials of
Bt talong until regulatory systems governing the import and release of GMOs are
strengthened. “When these features - uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible
harm, and the possibility of serious harm - coincide, the case for the precautionary
principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.”

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The Court proceeded to nullify DAO 08-2002 and enjoined applications for contained
use, field testing, propagation and commercialization, and importation of any GMOs
until a new administrative order is adopted.

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