Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
in Axiology
Studies
s
II
e,4
-l
VIBS
Volume95
RobertGinsberg
Executive Editor
Associate Editors
G, JohnM. Abbarno StevenV. Hicks
Mary-RoseBarnl RichardT. Hull
GerholdK. Becker JosephC. Kunkel
KennethA. Bryson VincentL.Luizzi
H. G. Callaway Alan Milchman
RemB. Rlwards GeorgeDavidMiller
Rob Fisher PeterA. Redpath
William C. Gay Alan Rosenberg
DaneR. Gordon ArleenSalles
J. EveretGreen JohnR. Shook
HetaAleksandraGylling Alan Soble
Mafti Hayry JohnR. Welch
The paper on which this book is printed meetsthe requirementsof "ISO
9706:1994, Information and documentation- Paper for documents
Requirementsfor permanence".
ISBN: 90-420-0670-6
@EditionsRodopi8.V., Amsterdam- Atlanta,GA 2000
Printedin TheNetherlands
Contents
PART ONE
A DISCOVERY: THE REALM OF VALUES
ChapterOne. From the Mystery of Values to Axiotogy a
J
1. BeyondAppearances ^J
2. Axiology's Long Journeytoward Itself 10
3. The Searchfor Identity t3
ChapterTwo. Is a Scientific Reconstructionof the Axiological Possible? 23
1. The Challengesof Science 23
2. Values versusMeasurement 32
3. The Value Judgment 42
PART TWO
A CONNECTION: VALUE AND CULTURE
Chapter Three. Value in Culture and Culture as Value 55
1. Value, Creativity, Culture ))
2. Knowledge and value: The Problem of Axiological Rationality 63
3. Culture and Civilization; An IrreconcilableOpposition? 68
ChapterFour. Positivist Reductionismand the Mirage of
Non-PhilosophicalCulture 73
1. Definition by Reduction:The standardParadigmof Reductionism 73
2. Transfigurations,Mutations, Alternatives 78
3. A PhilosophicalMetamorphosis:From Logical Empiricism to
Constructive Empiricism 80
Chapter Five. Reductionism to Literature and the Temptation of a
Post-PhilosophicalCulture 85
1. Difficulties of the Theory of Post-PhilosophicalCulture 85
2. Post-Philosophyor Postmodernism? 90
3. "Philosophy as Style and Literature as Philosophy" 93
PART THREE
A PROJECT: THE AXIOCENTRIC ONTOLOGY
ChapterSix. The Phenomenologyof Value and the Value of
Phenomenology 99
ChapterSeven.Coordinatesof an Axiocentric ontology of the Human 107
vl CONTENTS
PARTFOUR
A HOPE:UNIVERSALISM
Editorial Note rt7
ChapterEight. Happiness:The Loftiest Value of Humankind rL9
ChapterNine. The Orphic Myth and the Human Condition r33
Notes r39
Bibliography t45
About the Author 151
Index 153
Editorial Foreword
G. John M. Abbarno
AssociateEditor
Value Inquiry Book Series
Preface
I first met Ludwig Grtinberg in 1983 in Montreal at the World Congressof
Philosophy. He was perfectly at home in the Francophone culture. We
participatedin the program organizedby John Somerville and Ronald Santoni
for International Philosophers for the Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide
(IPPNO). Everyone at these sessionsspoke on behalf of peace and thereby
recognizedone anotheras peace-lovers.
After the Congress, Griinberg initiated regular conespondence with me
from Bucharest.His letters, graceful and gracious, though at times guarded,
were another opportunity for him to engagein philosophical activities outside
the closed world of Romania. For almost his entire professional life, he
remained a solitary thinker in a remote and restricted outpost of the mind,
while participating as an active member of the cosmopolitan community of
scholars.
"We live in a strangeworld," he wrote one New Year's eve, "but we are
not strangers." He was to repeat this observation - and this commitment -
years afterward. Another time he wrote, "We try, together (in spite of
distance,space,and time) to make life better." And again, "Let's hope in the
'world of values'!" Another
time, "Let us hope in the power of philosophy."
Yet again: "Where there is a will there is a way. And a hope too."
After being preventedby Romanianrestrictionsfrom going to Nairobi to
give his invited paper on philosophy of values at the Extraordinary World
Congressof Philosophy, he wrote, on 1 August 1991, of future opportunities,
"Let's hope again.As Bacon told us, hope is always a good breakfast,but it is
a bad supper."
Grtinberg took keen interest in international activities involving
philosophy of values, especially the Journal of Value Inquiry and the
American Society for Value Inquiry (ASVI). From his distant yet far-seeing
perspective, he had striking insights about the role, the value, and the
developmentof such activities. On 3 May 1984, he sent an extensiveletter to
me with this historic proposal:
I can't believe it! Our idea to build an International Society for Value
Inquiry crossedboundaries,grew over the years until it [has] given the
fruits it could give. We Ere now THE philosophical organization in the
world dealing with values.I am sure our Society will becomelonger and
stronger,... In our epoch, for all the humanisttrends in philosophy, there
is no area more important than the field of values.
In his suggestionsfor developing the tie between the American Society and
the International Society, Gri.inberg also alluded to further cooperation
between the American Society and the Journal which shared its name.
Nothing could be more natural than that this Society and this Journal unite,
especially as both were engagedin international activities. JamesB. Wilbur,
the founder and editor of the Journal, and also a founder and past presidentof
the Society, favored the connection.
I wrote Grtinberg,20 January1987:
When the Value Inquiry Book Series was established in 1992, Griinberg
wrote, 13 December 1992, that VIBS is "the most important event in our
realm of researches which has happened for the last decade." Though
"overwhelmed with my work, ... and with the gap between my hopes in a
world of values and what has happenedhic et nunc," Grtinberg was in the
midst of writing a book-length work in English on values with the alternative
working titles, Axiology and Universalism,and The World of Values.
On2 May 1993he wrote
a short letter in order to let you know that I am still alive and our value-
inquiry is going on to be ranked as the third value in my own hierarchy
(after life and freedom).... And let's hope in our vocationto plea[d] and
to work - with professionalmeans- for a better world! (Am I crazy?)
Homo Aestimans
Axiology and the Mystery of Values
Axio Iogy between P henomenology and Univ ersalis m
Axiolo gy, Phenomenology, and Universalism
Axiology and Universalism
and Human Condition and the World Of Values
This searchfor the right title tells a story of Grtinberg's searchfor his place
among current philosophical movements. As he treated me to bottle after
bottle of mineral water at the Congresscaf6, we went over the list. The VIBS
stylesheets had used The Mystery of Values as a hypothetical book title for
formatting instructions; Griinberg gently asked permission to use this for a
real book. Hence, The Mystery of Values:Studiesin Axiology.
Once the title was settled, Griinberg reached into his leather briefcase
and took out the book in typewritten pages. I was pleased to receive this
contribution to the human spirit as we sat in the former training academy for
Communist Party workers, now a school for administration.
Later he wrote (27 September1993) of the Russianhospitality:
"Griinberg and Ginsberg as Jews are lost in the world," I wrotehim. "What
can we do about that? Help the world. So we aresharersin thework."
Grtinberg revised and finished this book while busily engaged in the
early days of Romanian intellectual independence.But at the height of his
Preface xiii
Your mind is young and strong; so should your body be. I am only a
doctor of philosophy, so I cannot prescribetreatmentfor you, other than
rest and a little Romanian wine. Work will always await you. Don't
worry about that.
The last letter Ludwig Griinberg wrote me he was unable to send. It was
forwarded by his widow Cornelia Grtinberg and his daughterLaura Grtinberg.
With failing hand, and many beginnings,the short letter concludes:
Cornelia Grtinberg and Laura Gri.inberg have completed the preiparation for
press of The Mystery of Ltfe with loving care. It is a remarkable book of
original reflection on what humanity means. Griinberg's life's work is the
appreciation of human axiocenfficity. That is, we human beings are the
universe of value. Values are not simply something we possessor exercise.
We are value-beings. Grtinberg probes this mystery of human life with
engagingstyle, refreshingscholarship,and illuminating insight.
This is a work of hope contributed to all the co-workers of the world:
humanitv.
RobertGinsberg
ExecutiveEditor
ValueInquiryBook Series
Introduction by the Editors
A book, once printed, departsfrom its author. The ideas in it acquire a life of
their own. They come into contact with other ideas and harmonize with them
or challengethem. The book, on its separateprogress,becomesa successor a
failure. It may take up its well-deservedplace on the library shelvesor it may
get lost in a Pandemoniumof ideas.And what does the author do meanwhile?
From the outside,the author can defend his/her ideas with new argumentation,
may suffer for them, or may rejoice due to them. Ultimately, the author can
write a new book resuming the ideas and strengtheningthem with a new
rationale and new evidence.The author can correct or even changethe details
and fundamentals of his/trer theoretical creation, with the hope for a better
receptionby the reader.
Ludwig Grtinberg has had no such chance. He left this world for the
world of the just. His ideas, good or less good, have been left alone. We
cannot foreseetheir fate. We would like though to forewarn the reader on the
dramatic history of the preparationof this volume.
An older project, the book was left unfinished.Ludwig Grtinberg would
think of it as a synthesisof the stage his reflections on values had reached,
which is the reasonwhy the volume resumessome of his previous writings.
Ludwig Gri.inbergloved his project and he believed in it. Several days
before his tragic decision, speaking with Professor Adrian Miroiu of the
University of Bucharest,Ludwig Grtinberg expressedhis apprehensionas to
the publication of his book. In subsidiary, vague terms, he was asking his
younger friend for help. And at a later date, ProfessorMiroiu fully contributed
to the publication of this volume.
The effort of those proposing the current structureof the book has been
guided by the author's last wish and heartache.We have done our best to be
true to the intention and spirit in which Ludwig Grtinberg conceived his
volume. We have had our momentsof great despair and helplessness.Should
we have lacked the force of persuasion and encouragement of Robert
Ginsberg, Executive Editor of Value Inquiry Book Series, we might surely
have abandoned the task. Professor Ginsberg and Professor G. John M.
Abbarno, Associate Editor of Value Inquiry Book Series, have restored our
motivation to finish the task already begun. We feel we lack the proper
number of words to thank them both for their support and for their mutual
esteemtoward Ludwig Grtinberg.
Now, in the end, we are fully aware that this book is far from what it
could have been. Our hope though is that the love with which we have
completedit will not be an act of treasontoward the author.
Further on, we would like to provide some clarification as imposed by
the probity of our action.
XVI INTRODUCTIONBY THE EDITORS
Cornelia Grtinberg
Laura Grtinberg
Part One
While following the dispute betweenAlexius von Meinong and Christian von
Ehrenfels,r or reading Ralph Barton Perry's book on the general theory of
values,2or the 1,500page-longtreatiseon axiology by Louis Lavelle,3you feel
that, before having startedthe reading, you could have given a better answer
to the question, What is valuel And you are tempted to agree with Andrd
Gide: any time a philosopher answersa question, what the question has been
about is no longer clear. Philosophy may look like the useless intricate
accountof simple mattersthat are within the graspof common sense.
Everybody seemsto know the nourishing value of food, the moral value
of behavior, the theoretical value of some scientific discovery, or the artistic
value of a painting that makes us evaluate, estimate, and covet it. Thus, in
everyday life, value might designatewhatever we crave for, seek for, love,
and hold high. Beyond the whims of personal bias, craving, and needs, we
might even try to draw up a list of values.We may open a dictionary and look
up various modifiers that make up antonymous pairs, good-evil, beauty-
ugliness,honesty-dishonesty,honor-dishonor,leaving out those toward which
we are indifferent and exclusively preserving those that trigger off a
preferentialchoice, such as, Would you rather have A than A'?
Theoretically, a complete list of values could be achieved.The world of
qualities to which we have assignedthe name of values looks like a world
which draws our attention, attracts support, arouses desire, urges us into
action, as an invisible waiting-room where all setting changesin the visible
world are wrought. Since we value these invisible qualities together with the
things or personsendowed with them, a painting, a house, a work of art, or a
human being are said to have value.
Furthermore, turn modifiers into nouns, and say they are values. Thus
values do not appear as mere subjective imaginings, but as real aspects of
existence,as featuresof the objects that our mind might discover there where
they have been lying as before. The concept of value is used whenever an
actual active interrelationshipexists betweennecessities,attitudes,and desires
on the one hand, and objects on the other hand.
Yet, far from solving the matter, this conclusion only discloses more
questionsto further unexpecteddifficulties.
A first difficulty: the infinite number of values. Height is not a value in
itself, but the height of a hill may establish its value as a military obstacle,
and, function of concurrent factors, the height of a Gothic cathedral is a
FROM THE MYSTERYOF VALUESTO AXIOLOGY
closer analysis, however, reveals that value does not designatethat which is
desired,but that which is desirable.Even if, in principle, value is acceptedas
the object of desire, then it does not follow that whatever one person or
another desiresis endowed with value only becauseit is desired.There are a
lot of things that we may desire, a luxurious car, a voyage to the Caribbean,
etc., not only becausethey satisfy human needs,the need for communication,
for work or rest, for spiritual fulfillment and ethical achievement,but also
becauseto possessthem grants us prestige in the eyes of the others.We may
watch stupid action-movies,with relaxing effects, while admitting that other
films have a grater aesthetic and ethical value. We may not feel enraptured by
Mozart's music, while being aware of its value. We may indulge in listening
to a one-night hit without ranking it topmost in our hierarchy of values. This
happensbecausenobody, when expressinga valuejudgment, claims to simply
translate a personal desire or preference.The value judgment is relatively
independentof the judgment expressingpreference.Value envisagesvirtual
choices that may be distinct from achieved preferential options. What value
refers to is not a matter of what happensto be, but a matter of what ought to
be. Value enablespassagefrom the desired to the desirable,from indicative
assertion to imperative and practical meanings to conscienceand behavior,
norms of action. Value is always expressedby means of imperative feelings
and judgments that designatenot what it is, but that what an individual or a
group considers, under given circumstances,it should be worth desiring,
prizing, seeking for, conquering.
Thus, values cannot be restricted to the preferences of individual
conscience. If anything X or Y prizes were value-bearing, we might
completely credit the spontaneousacknowledgementof value accompaniedby
a feeling of evidence, without resorting to any criteria, or float about in a
relativistic blur, allowing personal whims to acquire the rank of norm and
general standard. If the relationship a person establishesbetween personal
needs,desires,and aspirationsand a specific object meant to satisfy them fails
to be acknowledgedby other people,too, then we cannot be sure that what we
are dealing with is value. Value is trans-individual.It involves appreciationat
the level of the collective conscienceof a given human community. Far from
translating this or that individual preference, values prove to be realities
imposed by relating objects to ideals built according to society-specific
criteria. Judgmentsof the type, I prefer tennis to football, or, This flower is
worth one dollar, are descriptive judgments: the first because it states an
individual preference, the second because it expressesa value judgment.
Alternatively, judgments such as Kim Basinger is beautiful, Gold is more
precious than iron, X is good-hearted, are value judgments because they
reveal, implicitly or explicitly, our relating to a world that we might
conventionally call the realm of values. Whether we agree or not with the
phrase,we still cannot deny that valuesmake up a different kind of reality and
BeyondAppearances
that is why our valuation of some objects dependson the value-ideal and not
on the existenceor non-existenceof the value-assigner.Freedom and justice
are conferredvalue even there where they are not enthroned.That is also why,
despite the fact that many of our individual choices are made freely, the
criteria of our choices comply with the society we live in, although we often
let ourselves be cheated into thinking of them as emissions of our own
conscience.As Max Schelerwould say, society operatesas a sluice gate.
Next, values are lived through. They are generatedby and act within
living experience. The mental representationof an object, no matter how
appropriate, is a necessarybut insufficient condition for crediting it with
value. Many things are known without being estimatedbeautiful or ugly, good
or bad, useful or useless;they appear to us indifferent, therefore they lack
value. Objects appearas beautiful, good, or useful not only becausewe come
to representor know them, but becausewe are the ones who endow them with
an aesthetic,ethical, utilitarian value becausethey echo human needs and
desires, becausewe become value-sensitivein their presence,becausethey
impress us, they interest us, they appeal to our sensitivity, Therefore, values
cannot be exhaustedby an exclusively logical analysis. Because language
often concealsthe purpose of value choices.An egocentricthinks, I must do
so-and-so becauseit is for my own good, what do I care about the others?,
but tells people around, I do so-and-so becauseit is for everybody's good,
becauseit is the right thing to do. Also, becausewe cannot offer a rational
explanationto everything.Why are we in love with a particular woman? Why
are we delighted by Chopin's nocturnein D flat major, opus 27?
Living, wanting, pursuing, cherishing values would suggestintuition as
the only way to locate them while probing into living experience.
Nevertheless,any value implies the transcendent.In other words, it is not to
be identified with its contingent occurrences;it appearsto the human mind as
a never-ending, poignant demand that needs fulfilling. It is not a mere
projection of our desireupon things, it seemsto entice us from beyond, it stirs
our heart and our will, it demandsour painstaking efforts, it offers us a goal
and incentive for action. Despite the free choice they imply, values look like
they are imposed upon us by a more or less clearly delineated social
constraint.Even while enthusiasticallyperforming a moral deed, we feel as if
we were outside ourselves,as if we were mastering ourselves,as if we rose
above our ordinary strength, which entails combining the desirable with the
compulsory to a hardly traceable extent. An impressive number of human
actions are generatedby what everyday languagecalls thirst for truth, need
for love, aspiration to social justice and equality.In this light, value appears
as the only way to transcendhuman servitude in the face of its imminent
demise,as the only way to transcendnatureitself.
Further difficulties arise becauseeach instanceof human behavior has a
purpose that becomesthe key-value in choosing the means and that holds up
FROM THE MYSTERYOF VALUESTO AXTOLOGY
Values are not independent of the facts they result from, owing to the
experience that human beings acquire in their complex relationships with
natural and social objects.The experienceof value is relatedto reflection, and,
at leasttheoretically,it can be verified.
Values are not independentof human thoughts, desires,and yearnings.
As long as values were regardedby ancient or modern philosophersas things
or as ideal objects, or as projections of affective and desire-oriented
experience,they could still be dealt with in terms pertaining to other domains
of reality. A failure occurred in pursuing the general coordinatesby virtue of
which all specific values occur as instaritiationsof the manner, specific and
irreducible, in which humankind relatesto reality.
From now on, all attempts to reduce the realm of values to other
domains of reality, things, essences,states of mind, become anachronistic.
Values are not things, since they cannot be mistaken for their material
carriers, although they cannot exist without their material frame, messenger,
bearer, carrier. Beauty does not exist by itself; it is always a feature of a
physical object, be it a piece of marble, the sunrise, or the human body.
However, value survives even after having been dissociatedfrom its physical
frame. Death deprivesgreat historic personalitiesor our nearestand dearestof
their existencebut fails to deprive them of their value, which seemsto depend
not so much on their physical frame, but on the life and feeling of the
survivors who grant the deceasedsubjectiveimmortality and value.
The treatmentof values as things relies on identifying values with their
material frame. But reducing them to ideal objects, such as essencesof the
Platonic type, relies, as with Nicolai Hartmann, on emphasizingthat they are
sensoriallyperceivable,which is a peculiarity of value. Thus, quality has been
14 FROM THE MYSTERYOF VALUES TO AXIOLOGY
Different natural things, together with different human acts do not rank
the same with all human beings. Their difference in rank relates to their
human significance, to the degree they satisfy needs or cravings that are
socially delimited and historically conditioned. Unequal ranking is
encounteredin any life experience,since attraction, preferences,and desires
all display hierarchies,and it finds its rational expressionin the concept of
value.
The difference in ranking is not produced by the relationship among
objects. It is engendered by the relationships between objects and the
appraising subject, and it does not rely on the intrinsic characteristicsof the
object, but on the significancethesecharacteristicspresentto the subject who
is more or less attracted by them, according to their utilitarian, moral,
political, aestheticneeds.
Value implies polarity, a potential "yes" and a potential "no," a potential
approval and disapproval,and hierarchy, the vertical ordering of objects from
the inferior to the superior, in accordanceto their significance to the subject.
Whenever an object is grantedvalue, the granting is performed by comparing
and distinguishing it from something else bearing a different value. In other
words, by implicitly expressingpolarity, somethingis judged as positive when
compared with something estimated as negative, and with respect to
hierarchy, something is estimated as superior when compared to something
estimatedas inferior. If value is regardedas a relationship between an object
that is worth valuing and a subject that is able to evaluate it, and not as an
intrinsic quality, then polarity and hierarchy must be understood as the
primary relational determinantsof value. Polarity leads to revealing the poles
of value, while hierarchy reveals the degreesof value. These characteristics
further point to the peculiar statusof the "realm of values" as opposedto the
"realm of things," henceto the irreducibility of values.
The polarity of value evinces an axiological breakup from the
contemplative indifference that levels all objects pertaining to the physical
world and regardsall actionsexertedupon theseobjects as equivalent.We can
be indifferent to objects belonging to the physical world as long as we do not
invest that world with human significance,as long as they are not important to
us, and as long as we are not their value assigners.Once value is assignedto
an object, indifference is impossible. Axiological temperature never reads
zero. Any moral requirementis either attractiveor repulsive to us. There is no
axiologically neutral work of art. No looker-on might ever feel wholly
indifferent while listening to a symphony, contemplating a painting, or
watching a stage performance. Our evaluating response must be either
positive or negative. It will indicate approval or disapproval, acceptanceor
rejection. Since our valuation swings between two poles, discarding the ugly
by approving the beautiful, and acceptinggood while rejecting evil, all values
make up polar pairs, clear-cut dichotomies: good and evil, beauty and
18 FROMTHEMYSTERYOF VALUESTOAXIOLOGY
The dimensions of value come now into view in a wide vista. Value
displays an instrumental dimension, since it represents an item in an
assimilatedsymbolic systemserving as tool and standardfor potential choices
between alternatives, for any preferential trend toward an optimal
participation in the creation of cultural goods. Value displays an affective
dimension resulting from an intended active involvement of feelings, desires,
and choice that we develop toward objects,which, due to their characteristics,
can satisfy the variegated range of human needs: vital, utilitarian, moral,
aesthetic,political. Since value implies drawing out a hierarchy of human
behavior starting from needs, but related to an ideal, it has a goal-oriented
dimension expressedin the clash between goals and the self-censorshipof
conscience,the uttermostpatheticexpressionof which is remorse.Thus, value
involves principles in terms of which human beings set a relative degree to
each value, choose their goals, coordinate them in axiological systems, and
legitimize the meanssuitableto achievingthem.
This dimension is linked to three others: (l) the projective dimension,
since values provide reasons and projects for action, deeply rooted in the
human existential status during a given historical period; (2) the prospective
dimension, since value is not grantedto a desiredor favored object, but to an
object regardedas worth being desiredand favored and which complies with a
human ideal establishedby the potential prospectingof the future; and (3) the
norm-setting dimension, since once established,value becomes a means of
guiding for what cybernetics might call "inputs" and "outputs" of human
behavior in given "situations." Human desirescan never be wholly fulfilled.
Once a goal is reached, new action requirements arise, stirred by the
"inventiveness" of values. Consequently,value is also endowed with an
epigenetic dimension. The selective dimension of value is equally obvious,
since values expressthe hierarchy of objects or acts in human experience,a
hierarchy that is generatedby the relationshipsbetweendesiresand needs,but
that is brought forward and made objective by the social impact.
I do not claim my enumeration to have exhaustedthe dimensions of
value. I only wanted to emphasize the many-sidednessand the multiple
functionality of value. Whenever in the history of axiology only one
dimension has been made absolute or minimal, serious errors have been
committed.
Only by weighing the plurality of dimensionsand functions of value can
we understandwhy value is not a quality in the common perception of the
term. It does not belong to a classof objects,but to a classof cultural assets.It
implies that objects should be related neither to their immanent structure,nor
to the causes that once generated them, but to historically and socially-
conditioned human needs, desires, and yearnings. Value appears as a
relationship.We cannot perceive it with our life experience.We cannot grasp
and retrieve it in the absenceof an object characterizedby value and which
The Searchfor ldentity 21
unavoidably bring about theoretical deviations. For the time being, the
following ten propositionscan be validatedby science:
(1) Valuesdo not have a natural,but a socialexistence.
(2) Values are not qualities, but social relationshipsbetweenthe subject
and the valuation object.
(3) The primary relational determinants of value are polarity and
hierarchy.
(4) Values do not exist outside the subject's valuation, although they
stem from objective data independentof the estimating subject and observe
some social and historical criteria.
(5) Values are meaning, not signs. To discover value is to discover a
human meaning; to create value is to create a human meaning. This way, a
new dimension and a new ontological depth are assignedto things turning
them into cultural assets.
(6) The relationship among rules, values, and signs is a counterpart of
the relationship among structure, function, and meaning in terms of human
behavior.
(7) Values are cognizable, since meaning occurs in and by intelligible
structures.Knowing values has a sui-generischaractersince it connotesboth
explanationand comprehension.
(8) The experienceof value involves feeling, volition, and desire, and
also acquaintancewith the object of value, a noetic feature.
(9) Value is action, not evidence;it belongs to the realm of actions as a
prospectiveand purposeful requirement,verifiable by its empirically provable
consequences.
(10) If consideredcoordinatesof human actions, and when their finality
is distinguishedfrom their efficiency, qualitative values, by virtue of items 1
to 9 above,flay become,within some limits, quantifiable.
It is now possibleto outline an open deductivesystemin axiology and to
draw out a generaltheory of values basedon a genuine methodologicalbasis.
Since any clearly formulated axiological theory cannot fail being functional,
the functional component of the theory of values can be implicitly expressed
by resorting to the clearest definition of terms that enables them to be
identified by experience and to the measurement procedures set forth
accordingto the specificity of qualitative values.
One of the most captivating attempts in this sense opens up the way
toward the reinterpretationof axiological problems according to the rigorous
theory of information. The starting point is that the experience of value
involves not just feelings, desires,volition, but also noesis, which may be
regarded as the informational side of value. The analogy between
informational operations and mental functions information storage:
memory; combining information: imagination; generation of information:
The Challengesof Science 25
Since values involve information, they display ineducible aspects that are
mistranslated into other structures. Far from implying their purity, the
ineducible character of values reveals their interaction. The message that
values always carry is never restricted to a single value, and, despite the
sender'sintention to assignit just one value, the receiver, by means of proper
reading, can decode in the messageother values embeddedin the respective
structure. A value always presupposes and embeds other values. pure
goodness,pure beauty, and pure justice are mere illusions, though sometimes
necessary.I get involved in the act by means of which I perform my good
deed, I do my duty. Theoretically, my action relies on a moral or theoretical
principle; politically, I statemy allegianceto a social group, and I might even
have to sacrifice my health or life in order to solve a problem of human
existence.There is no pure science,just as there is no pure art. Without an
explicitly alleged pu{pose, means claim to have the status of aims. Value
choicesdo not perish irrespectiveof their rank in a hierarchy. A scientist is in
pursuit of truth, but while decoding such truths, we come across plenty of
"impurities": moral, political, and ideological. Likewise, there is no pure
human beauty, since beauty is always an expressionthat implies the presence
of moral and intellectual qualities which masterfully mould the biological
matter into new, striking plasticity. Even when axiological clashesoccur, we
cannot and should not side with one value against another.We never defend
truth from goodnessor goodnessfrom beauty. What we fight against is the
opposite of that value within its specific area: truth against lie, goodness
against evil, beauty against ugliness. One value cannot exclude another; it
presupposesit. Each value can substantiatethe othersin the semanticworld in
which we live. This is how the ineducibility of values implies translatability,
and translatability implies comparability, which, in its turn, implies
measurement.
From a different point of view, the re-valuation of value may resort to
the theory of decision-making.Individual consciousnesstranslatesvalues into
preferential acts. If we study preferential choices in their simplest
instantiations, attraction or rejection, we may envisage them as choices
between two different objects, as the accomplishment of either of two
alternativeactions,or as the triggering of either of two possibleevents.In this
respect, instead of X prefers a to b, we may say Object a is superior to object
b, in terms of its utility to person X. Whatever our formulation, a preference is
merely revealed,not explained.
If we want to account for the choice of a value beyond a proven
preference, we come across serious hindrances when trying to apply the
theory of choice. This happensbecausechoices may be inconsistent,options
may vary with each successivechoice the subject makes among a, b, and c,
and becausechoices may not display transitivity. A is prefened to b and b is
preferred to c do not entail a is preferred to c. Choices vary according to the
The Challengesof Science 27
needs and aspirationsit voices, with the structure within which it has been
generated,and with the precisegoals it pursues:its finality.
What I have called re-valuation of value might enable axiology to rely
on the theory of purpose as well. Human behavior is purposeful, it always
aims at achieving one thing or another, and it alters according to its partial
consequences,success,or failure. But human behavior is not to be accounted
for only causally, since one moment is relevant not for the previous moment,
but for the future ones. Purposefulnessappearsas the process by means of
which balanceis gradually achievedbetweenprevious information and future
requirements. It simultaneously involves the orientation that any structure
striving toward increasing equilibrium requires, by a trial-and-error process.
Purposefulnessappearsthus as the instantiation of the various aspectswhich
come to strike a balanceowing to the action-interactiongame. Purposefulness
does not leave out causality; it includes and surpassescausality, since every
human action is purposeful and oriented. Values do not acquire the coercive
powers of causality that rules out option; all that they acquire is the
compulsory norm-setting character of requirements, the nature of which
allows us to observeor infringe upon them.
If value implies purposefulness, and measuring values supposes
understandingpurposefulnessin causal terms, then whenever it makes sense
to measure qualitative values, we have to perform reduction. On
methodological grounds, values involving fundamentalpurposesare reduced
to efficiency values.
If we consider Jean Piaget's idea that value can be seen as a conscious
understandingof the functional utility, we can distinguish between primary
utilities, related to the quality of values produced and preserved, and
secondaryutilities, related to quantitativefunctioning. Thus, values involving
fundamental purposes,oriented toward satisfying primary utilities, are to be
distinguished from efficiency values oriented toward satisfying secondary
utilities. Values involving fundamental purposes weigh the purpose-way
relationshipand are preeminentlyqualitative, while efficiency values envisage
the costs or gains in the inner energeticeconomy of the individual or inter-
individual actions,becausethey are quantifiable.
When dealing with qualitative values, due to their being coordinatesof
human actions, we may shift our focus from finality to efficiency. This is how
such values become quantifiable. Whenever a mathematicianis interestedin
and satisfied with changing opinions with a musician, their dialogue does not
sound like an economic exchange.Even if they agreeto trade math classesfor
music classes, they strike up an economic relation, which becomes
quantifiable, although there are no material assets,only spiritual values that
are traded.
Thus, translated into terms of efficiency, value becomes a secondary
weight of objects that is not gravity-bound but generatedby the attraction of
The Challengesof Science 29
the axiological sensitivenessof the desiring mind. Since the idea of weight
associates with that of balance, the value of an object results from its
equivalence to the value of another, as if human beings were weighing
everything on some invisible scale and thereby estimating the secondary
weight, the relative meaning of things and beings versus the sacrifices they
acceptto do.
Quantitative comparisonsbecome possible becausewe act as if things
and beings possessed,in addition to their perceptible properties, a dynamic
quality measurableby the effort we are willing to make to acquirethat quality.
Quantification is possible whenever stressis laid upon the efficiency and the
purposefulnessof value.
We may say that axiology faces a dynamic alternative.It aims at using a
rigorous method to measurethe human ability of making value options, and at
gathering enough pertinent meanings and explanations to obtain maximal
accuracy.It has to choose between refusing measurementand performing it
by painfully renouncingpurposefulnessin favor of efficiency.
The dilemma forces the researchersinvolved in the theory of values to
question theoretical and epistemologicalissuesand to critically examine their
own methods. They should render obvious any over-reduction, and they
should prevent any potential distorting effects. Redefining the concept in
terms susceptibleof operational analysisremains the sine qua non condition
usedto apply modern researchmethodsand strategies.
As specific products of the object-subject interaction, values do not
make up a realm of things or of information regarding the properties or
relationships between things. Values constitute a realm of feelings and
preference, of human intentions and valuation, that could not subsist, as
physical reality can, outside the active instantiation of desire, within direct
experience, and of appreciativejudgments, when translated into intelligible
language.
The realm of values is not separatedfrom the world of action. If we see
action as inclusive of a whole range of kinds of behavior and activities aimed
at satisfying social human needsand ruled by the purposethey strive to reach,
then values representthe basics of human action. The concept of action is
employed to designateall the determined,goal-oriented,and finalized human
activities becoming socially useful by contentsand manner of being.
This concept should be distinguished from the Parsonian notion of
action that points to social behavior as a range of responsesto a given social
situation. Values have their source not in the conditions of action, but in
action itself. Social-human action is simultaneously value-generating and
value-oriented.Since it unfolds within precisehistorical circumstancesand is
value-oriented, action is wrapped up into social backgrounds and fields of
decision even when it makesuse of symbolic expression.
30 A SCIENTIFIC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AXIOLOGICAL
human and social needs. Value-creating human activities unfold under the
guidance of valued needs. Within the praxiological interlinking of agent-
object-goal-achievement-consequence,an interference occurs between
nomological and psycho-sociological motivations and value-based
motivation. Nicolai Hartmann used to say that moral Daltonism or
"axiological cecity" short-circuit action, since the entire human activity relies
on observingfunctional parametersthat logically are conditionedformally and
deontically-axiologically. Value is present during each stage of action: the
agent embraces values, prefers one valued object to another, establishesa
goal, picks up and employs the meansto accomplishthat goal, and weighs the
consequencesby resortingto a scaleof values.
To conclude, I would call value that specific determination of an
assimilated symbolic system which, under given historical circumstances,
offers the criteria or the standards for selecting among alternatives and for
openly and intrinsically directing preferential behavior. In this way, during
one stage in its cognitive journey, axiology may become what Charles W.
Morris named a scienceof preferentialbehavior.3Axiological inquiry pursues
not the manifest but the latent side of human behavior.
By identifying value in latent behavior, we can see that any attempt to
quantify the axiological realm should adopt from the start a definition of value
which could open up the way for the functional analysis of the meaning
implied in the manifestpreferentialresponses.
In this sense,Robert S. Hartman's attempt to reconstruct axiologya is
worth considering for the following reasons:(1) The attempt starts from the
fundamental axiom: value is meaning. (2) It achieves more rigorous
reformulation of the theory of valuesby employing methodsof axiomatization
and formalization, the efficiency of which has been proven by modern
science,and it thus has becomethe enticing gatewayto formal axiology. (3) It
achievesmeasurementof values while operating with qualitative mathematics
or human mathematics,as Claude L6vi-Strauss called them. (4) It aims at
measuring generic value, that is the very object of axiology, and it always
avoids being overlappedby specific values.
The value measurement-systemdesigned by Hartman endeavors to
surmount traditional difficulties, including those arising from the attempt to
formulate purposefulnessin terms of efficiency, by formalizing axiology.
Logically and mathematically,Hartman's systemis nearly faultless.However,
unless we take methodological precautions, the granting of sovereignty to
mathematicalproceduresrisks turning everything into an exquisite yet barren
game. The test Hartman suggestedis a tempting hypothesis to have the
axiological approachat leastpartly controlled by science.
Among the many possible objections that call for methodological
caution, I shall mention:
32 A SCIENTIFIC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AXIOLOGICAL
person defines the kinds of desideratathat are activated within the respective
fields of forces according to assimilated cultural patterns and to social
interaction. The many-sided axiological space which hosts the relationship
between the desideratumand its values should be regardedas a sociocultural
product. In this context, I attempt to correct Catton's magnetic model of
values that renders absolute the treatment of values as forces. Within
operational analysis, value may be a sui generis force, but it can be such a
force only in a sociologicaland psycho-sociologicalsense,and not in the
physical sense. This idea paves the way for the investigation of the
mathematicalstructureof the axiological space.
From this point of view, we could considerthat the axiological space,as
a socio-culturalproduct, containssubsetsin different culturesand subcultures.
If preferencesfor some desideratavary with the distancebetween subject and
desideratawithin the axiological space,the size of the axiological spacewill
vary with eachpersonor group.
The graph below presentsthe one-sidednessof the desiderata,located
within a two-sided axiological space,with X1 and X2 as dimensions,and A, B,
..., H, the desideratafound in a coordinating system with the value assignerat
the origin.
preferential order D', A', H', F', C', G', E', B', while the second person will
favor a different order, H"rG", F", E", D", C", A",8", althoughthe values
are the same for both groups and their variations can be a measured function
of the referential dimensions of the axiological space. Though limited, a
gateway is thus opened to measurepreferences,explain the functionality of
values,and passfrom manifest behaviorto potential values.
The separateuse of a peculiar technique of value measurementwould
not engendertricky methodological issues.Serious hardships,however, may
arise in our analysis if we use an overwhelming variety of methods and
proceduresin order to collect, analyze,and measureobservationaldata. Not
even Hartman's and Catton's approachesare comparable. They fail to be
comparable because their logical syllabus is different. To make them
comparable,to help them communicatewithin a wider theoreticalpattern, we
should keep in mind that they both operatewith reductions.My suggestionis
that the measurementof values might become a pseudo-problemfor whoever
deniesreduction.
An axiological analysis that overlooks the emotional, intentional, and
desiderativemeaning and pays heed only to the descriptive meaning of the
uneven ranking of things, expressed in human hierarchies, is bound to
underestimateor disregard the specific cognitive core of axiology. Statistics,
mathematical models, or axiomatic schemesshould not deprive axiology of
the need for observation and experience.All they can do is outline efficient
and rigorous devices for analysis and comparison over some stages of the
cognitive journey. Each measurement strategy has its limits, since it
complicates the concept of value. With each of them, the strategy considers
only one dimension, functionally defined, in a many-sidedsystem.The limits
are obvious even in the fortunate casesof contextual analysis,when variables
are set for individuals and their environment and the scientific proceduresare
enriched by a sociological perspective. Measurement is performed at the
expenseof reducing value to its instrumental,noetic, perspectival,epigenetic,
selective, or desiderativedimension. Each kind of measurementis justified,
since it converts raw phenomena,the result of the investigation of symbolic
matter in the natural environmentof social life or in simulatedconditions, into
data liable to quantitative treatment that can be integrated into a notional
system and lead to conclusions that apply beyond the boundaries of their
generatron.
Notwithstanding, any type of measurementis one-sided. If we rely
exclusively on just one kind of measurement,this might deal a deadly blow to
research,all the moreso that measurementis meaninglessat a macro-social
level. Relying on just one type of measurementwould entail leaving out the
complex structure of society as a whole and focus just on elementary
responsesand exchangesbetween individuals or small groups, where the
connection among valuation, the structure and dynamics of culture, and the
ValuesversusM easurement 39
Independent Relative
behavior behavior
'1.r..
II A
Task A I
IIB
TaskB ilI ry
From an axiological point of view, to introduce data into one of the four
squaresmeans to adopt one or anothermethod of data-collection,elucidating
the type of information to be extractedfrom the data in question,and to use a
precise method of analysis: a set of proceduresfor the data that fit into each
square.By meansof measurement,this should help the investigatorpass from
phenotypic information to genotypical conclusionsand from a gnoseological
ValuesversusM easurement 41
sensibility has the intuition of a discrepancy between value and the given
situation, declining to actualizeother values except for those that could really
function as adequate values in a given situation. The situation seen as a
context of circumstances, objective and subjective, becomes one of the
constitutive moments of our axiological experience. Situations have both
generaldeterminantsand somethingindividual that only exists once. A person
who, having been in a situation, has failed to perceive its virtual richness of
ethical attainment,has lost the possibility to actualize a value and will regret
the irreparable. Our axiological experience is woven from a multitude of
situationsin which major axiological conflicts are engraved.In any situation,
a human being has the occasionto discover valuesthat he or she can attain or
through which she or he can self-realize.Each situation is an occasionto test
human forces or weaknesses;it is a stimulation or tension, an occasion for
ethical self-realizationor abdication.The signs of a value judgment reside in
understandingthe concretesituation. In a historically constitutedcommunity,
an individual is determinedto consider as moral a certain behavior, and not
another one. The axiological experienceof humankind is not oriented by the
timeless transcendentalprinciples of good or beauty, but by criteria able to
always solve concrete problems posed by concrete events in concrete
situations. Values exist and have a meaning in a given situation alone, in a
given social context. In point, perennial values are explained by the
generality,recurrence,and stability of some situationaldata. Quite frequently,
the situation offering support to a value judgment may change.Its horizontal
axis is the pluralism of social positions and roles, of the types of human
communication,and of cultural patterns.Its vertical axis is temporality. There
are contexts when we judge a certain behavior as intrinsically good or a
picture is intrinsically beautiful, but this is just a way of distinguishing a
categoryof goals from other categoriesthat we want to rule out.
The value judgment conceives and organizes values that appear in
axiological experienceas a responseto typical situations.The processis based
on social criteria of desirability and has its consequencesin the world in
which humankind circumscribesits existence.The aspiration of the value of
judgment toward universality, by passing on from existence to need, and
toward objectivity, by relating to extra-individual criteria, is based on the
dialectics of the social and individual. The disagreementbetween someone
saying,X is yellow, and someoneelse saying,X is not yellow, is solved by
confronting the descriptivejudgment with facts. The axiological disagreement
between someonesaying, X is good, and someoneelse saying, X is not good,
is solvable by confronting the value judgment with its consequenceon the
axiological experiencein a given situation.
The predicate of the value judgment no longer appearsas a manifest
entity, but as arecognizablemeaning,since it relies on the consequenceof the
value judgment being involved in actions that are participative and verifiable
50 A SCIENTIFICRECONSTRUCTION
OF THEAXIOLOGICAL
at the same time, and not on psychological motivation. Value judgments are
not equivalent. They can rank hierarchically because they are involved in
humanexperience,
in theenvironment-changing
humanaction.
Taking into accountthe above considerations,I feel reticent toward Max
Weber's desideratumof axiological neutrality of the cognitive approach.13I
admit that the cognitive approachincreasesin objectivity while unloading its
distorting axiological connotations,its deceiving ideological prejudices, and
its narcissistic survey of the subject's emotional responsesprojected on the
investigated object. I agree with Weber in his request that axiological
presuppositionsnot be convertedinto explanatoryhypotheses.I agreewith the
requirement for the researcherto formulate verifiable statements,to acquaint
others with the valuationsdemandedby investigation,atrd to reach an optimal
degree of objectivity. I cannot believe that excluding the value judgment
might provide an outer condition for scientific objectivity, as causal
explanations provide the inner condition for objectivity. Counting out the
value judgment from the cognitive investigationcarried out by social sciences
is neither possible nor necessaryin order to enhancethe degreeof objectivity
in research. It is not possible, since, on the one hand, by establishing an
axiological ratio, Wertbeziehung,as Rickert calls it, the researcherinvolves a
value judgment in the selectivecriteria that allow the delineation of a specific
field of social research.On the other hand, the truth-value sentencesare not
value-free, Wertfreiheit. Neither is the exclusion necessary, since value
judgments do not boost objectivity in research,becausethey have an objective
content and objective consequencesentdiled by action, and they do not turn
causal reasoning into conditional reasoning. The much-discussedevaluative
must rn the value judgment is generatedby concretehistorical circumstances,
and if we consider the referential system, the context, we can establish the
objective source of the informational content of the judgment. This
information can be proven by the value judgments being compatible with
scientific truths and can be verified by their practical consequences.Overrated
causality as a way to neutralizethe subjectivity of value judgments is useless,
since making a valuejudgment implies a causalrelationshipto a standard.
In phenomenologicalterms, axiological sensibility is intentional, aiming
at objects that correspondto its interests.But, if our own structurescan be
intentionally directed toward objects, this means that, in reality, something
allows for or favors the assignmentof values. Without being based on the
objective data of the real, values could no longer play the key role of
optimizing human action.
I have thus adopted a view that is the antithesis of the empiricist-
positivist position: valuejudgments are not cognitive.
A new beginning was promised to axiology by the type of conceptual
analysispracticed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations
and by ordinary-languagephilosophy, as practiced by Ryle, John Austin, and
The Value Judgment 51
Valuein CultureandCultureasValue
1. Value, Creativity, Culture
Two centuries have passed since, in a book that was a trailbreaker for the
modern concept of culture, Johann Gottfried Herder complained about
nothing being vaguer than the term, "culture." He insistedon the idea that the
term, "culture," might involve a philosophical predicament to the extent to
which it comprisesthe whole range of customs,morals and manners,ways of
thinking and acting, characteristicof a given society, and to which it manages
to enable that society to bring its significant contribution to the notion of
"humanitas."
Far from losing ground, interrogatory issues related to culture have
acquired new dimensionsin modern times. The query is about what we have
done to ourselves, about our responsibility. It is concerned with what we
should be, and with what we could do for our life to have a meaning and for
humanity to have a future. These are questionsthat human sciences,such as
sociology, ethnology, or psychology may try to answer by providing the clues
of a possible solution, but the questionsare commonly ascribedto philosophy,
given their scope,comprehensiveness, and perspective.r
The starting point of the discussion is that the old prerogatives of the
philosophy of culture have become questionable under the impact of the
successesof cultural sciences.Cultural anthropology and culture theory have
a set of rigorous concepts, such as element, complex) area,type of culture,
acculturation,cultural pattern,function of culture, and others,that overshadow
reiterated philosophical distinctions between culture and civilization,
immersed in a disconcerting semantic indetermination. However, a concept
pertaining to the philosophy of culture resistsany attempt made by sciencesat
capturing it in operational definitions, at reducing it to laws, structures, or
logic-mathematical symbolism. This is the axiological concept of value.
Starting from this concept, philosophy can render, in an integrated
perspective,what is specific to culture. This is what I will try to prove in the
following pages.
A philosophy of culture that tries to ignore the gains of sciencesabout
culture would be inconceivabletoday. Philosophy offers a propaedeuticand
completes the scientific approach; it is not a substitute for this approach.
When it rises to that conceptus cosmicus Immanuel Kant talks about,
philosophy can remain behind or beyond the scientific data, creating
phenomenologicalcircles.
56 VALUEIN CULTURE AND CULTUREAS VALUE
2. Post-Philosophyor Postmodernism?
Thc debates in reccnt years over the relation between literature and
philosophyhave brought lbrward the option for either a new type ol their
alliancewithin culture,or for transitiontoward a type o1-culture meant to
transformphilosophyinto a literary genre.The first option is pursued,with
typical ditlbrencesand nuances,by the theoreticians of postmodernism.The
secondoption is pursuedby the partisansof the so-callcd"post-philosophical
culture."
The diverging connotationsof the option are revealcd by a debate
initiatcd a l'ew ycars ago by The Monisf. Thc topic was Philosophl,as Style
und Literature as Philosophl'.The authorsof thc articlesare quasi-unanimous
in admitting that duc to an unjustificd inferiority complex in the facc ol'
science,the philosophyof Logical Positivismmimed its jargon, and, in some
casesan aberrantstyle was reachcd.From lhc texts of Plato and Aristotlc,
Michel de Montaignc and David Humc, Jean-JacquesRousscau and
ImmanuelKant, John Dcwey and Martin Hcidegger,a privategamc has been
developedby sorneprof-essionals who spcnd their erudition in specialized
rcvicw to establishif the sentence, Thereore gra\t thingsand thereore cows,
is bcttcrexpressed by the formula:
A Project:The AxiocentricOntology
ChapterSix
Fourth, the axioccntric ontology of the human does not start lrom
apodicticalpostulateswhich might throw it in thc situationto fall back in the
prc-criticalontologies.Thc axioc;entricontology o1'the human starts fiom
epistemological prcmisestestedin rigorousthcoretioalcontexts,deliberately
adoptingwhat Willard van Orman Quine calls thc principle oJ'ontologicctl
relativity. Its disooursedoes not. propose a "picture of the world," a
systematics but replacesthe descriptivetheoryof
of the ne varieturcategories,
the traditionalontologiesby a critical metatheory.Such a metatheorybecomes
suitableto supportthe self-reflexivityof the philosophicalconscienceagainst
the "will of the system," and with a view to pursuing the program of
ontological reconstructionby problem-raisingand theme-posingwithin
determinedknowledgecontextscontrolledby the legitimacyinstanceof the
socio-historical practice.As a matterof [act, as Max Born usedto say, with
the scientistand the philosopheralike, the belief that you hold a uniquetruth
is thc deepestrootedevil in the world.
In my proposinga reconstructionproject of the ontologyof the human,I
hope that it could be fostered,corrected,deepened.The merit will be greater
ol thosc who know to go further, on unknown paths, into what we do not
know yet. As Ludwig Wittgensteinuscdto joke, in philosophy,the winner of
the raceis the one who runs slowest,the one who reachesthe aim the last.
Part Four
A Hope:Universalism
EditorialNote
This part of the book was left unfinished.
In our introduction,we have advancedthe legitimacyof maintainingthe
title of this Part when preparingthis volume for the printing press.To the
argumentsof a theoreticalnature,we must add our sorrow that the author's
intentionscould not be fulfllled by himself,duringhis lif-etime.
Wt: consideredunproductivethe mere reproductionof some fragments
lrom the studieson philosophicaluniversalismpublishedby Griinberg.This
would havebccnrcdundantfor thosewho readthe specialized reviews.And it
would have been theoreticallyinconsequential so long as the editorslacked
thc author'sbeaconin termsof organizingthe ideas.
Gri.inbergscnseda changedneed for philosophy of humankind in the
third millennium.This is what he wrote in his essay"$anseleuniversalismului
filosofic" [Chancesof PhilosophicalUniversalism],publishedin 1995, in
Bucharest:
Cornelia Griinberg
Laura Griinberg
ChapterEight
human cause. This option ol philosophy does not threatento lose the
objectivity accessibleto it, the sameway medicinedoesnot repudiateitself as
knowledgeby placingitself in the serviceof the ailing.Thosechallengingthe
possibilityof placingthe problemof happinesson a theoreticallevel, by virtue
of the idea that their sciencedeniesthem any commitment of value, decline
responsibility.Deolensionof responsibilitydoes not concernthc mcans thcy
command,but the objectivesthey set forth lbr themselves,and thus the very
senseof their activity is invalidated.But even while refusing the idea, such
philosopherstake happinessas a relative term of referenceby consideringit
the highest reason of human lif'e that, in the absence of a conceptual
correspondent, can unleashhopelessness, resignation,or the longing for the
lost paradise. In the end, this refusaljustified by a specificidea aboutscience
is alsothe resultof a philosophy.
In contemporary philosophy, we can encounter a second type of
conception.With it, the problem of happinesscan and must be posed; yet it
has no solution, since the human being has been sentencedto fieedom. The
structuralistpreconceptionof the hiatus between knowledge and values is
substitutedfor by a new preconception:freedomand happinesswould be two
irreconcilablevalues.We deal here with what I like to call the philosophyof
the compromisedhappiness.The most signiflcant exponentof this trend of
thoughtis existentialism.
Existentialismgrantsa privilegedpositionto the problemof happiness.
Albert Camus's essay,The Myth of Sisyphus,startswith the assertionthat to
appreciatewhetheror not life is worth living meansto answerthe basic topic
of philosophy.Then, after havingtaking the mythicalSisyphusas the symbol
of the human condition, Camus concludes with the much-commented
sentence,"We should imagine a happy Sisyphus." We deal with an
individualisticphilosophy, primarily in its maior, Heiddegerianversion,
maybethe most ambitiousevcr. Human existencebuilds itself as a projectin
its progresstoward the essence.Transcendingthe humanconditionby making
a choiceseemsto be the sourceof any sense,thereforeof any foundation.And
the freedom to make a choice one variant of action appearsto be the implied
and ultimatefoundationof the progressfrom existencetoward humanessence.
Paradoxically, this moraleof unlimitedindividualismrefusesto presentitself
as moral.We are not told that humanbeingsmust exceedthemselves, but that
human reality is a project perpetuallyand unjustifiablytranscendingexistence
towardessence.
Thus, in existentialism, freedomceasesto be a processualachievement
of culture and becomesan initial gift, a structureconsubstantial to any human
bcing hurled into the still world of things and into the anonymousworld of
human creatures,forever having to make a choice. Yet, while making their
choice, human beingscan find relief nowhere:not in the objectivereality, as
the absenceof determinism renders the human being helpless,not in the
choice made by other people,sinceeach human being has a personalfbrmula
in creatingher or his own essence, not in a transccndentalfactor."If there is
no God, then everythingis permitted,"says Jean-PaulSartre,resumingthe
words of the well-known Dostoevskiancharacter.What countsis to makc a
choice,to be you, to take responsibility.It is equivalentwhetheryou choosc
Ibr your role model a giant of human knowledge,say Einstcin,a symbol of
mystical ecstasy,say Saint Vincent de Paul, or the f-arnousCasanova,to
whom any conqueredwomanis a new stagein his philosophicalstudyof life.
EmbracingCaligula'scredo,"I believethat all actionsare equivalent,"
points to existentialismas a philosophydissociatingstrictly between thc
individualand the social.Taking as a startingpoint the isolateclindividualand
her or his iife expericnccindependentof the economic and socio-cultural
structures,cxistentialismcan no longer find any objectivecriteriafor hurnan
choiceand ends up by deploringthc imperfectionof a world ruled by moral
chaos. In such a world, the human being would be a Sisyphus,fbrever
engagedin actionsdesignedto expressillusoryfieedom,foreverfrustratedby
the consequcnceso1' his or her actions, expericncingthe tragic cJivorcc
betweenproject and result,and ultimatelyhaving to acceptthe world as is,
sonseless, devoidof value.In sucha world, happiness is compromised.
From the moment when freedom, internal, subjective,located on the
level of pure choice, is consideredto be the fragile principle of values,
happinessceasesto be the goal of humanexistence,the ideal,the meaningof
our presencein the world. Happinessis compromisedas soon as you accept
this freedom-spell, in the absenceof supportelementsand criteria,luring you
away into quicksand,on a path where the contrast betwcen happinessand
unhappiness is canceledby the absurdityof humanexistence.
In our time, a third type of conceptionabout happinessexists, that
exceedsboth structuralism,by stating that the problem of happincssdoes
arise,and existentialism, by maintainingthat the problem of happinessdoes
havesolutions.I particularlyrefer to Neo-Thomismand the Amcrican l,arianf
of pcrsonalism,which proposes,in diversc styles, what we could lcrm a
philosophyof the happy unhappiness, since it recomrnends mystical ecstasy
as the uniquehappinessinsteadof real happiness.
Both the neo-ThomistJacquesMaritain and the personalistw. E.
Hocking respond to thc question, what is happiness?,with the answer
proposedby ThomasAquinas:a perfectsatisf-action. absolute,independcntof
temporality,permanent.This kind of happinesscannot be aspired to or
reachedby thosewho focus their attentionon the hurnanworld alone,a world
breedingtemptationsand suffering,impcrf'ectsatisfactions,irrelevant,subjcct
to temporality,ephenreral. Only thosewho havc not lost their faith in God can
hopefor it. The unhappiness of the modernhumanbeing would be explained
exclusivelyby the lossof faith. The conclusionis the sameboth with Maritain
and Hocking;only the argumentation differs.Maritaincalls the new situation,
Il uppiness: The LoJiiestValue r$'Il urnunkind 123
ChaptcrOne
ChapterTwo
Part Two
Chapter Three
70. John Rawls, A Theory of' Justice (London: Oxfbrd University Press,
t973).
21. Edrnund Husserl, Die Krisis des europc)isches Menschentumsund die
Philosophie(The Hague:Martinus Nrjhoff, 1962),pp. 347-348.
2?. HerbertMarcuse,One-DimensionalMan (Boston:BeaconPrcss,1912).
23. Alvin To1'fler,The Third Wave( New York: BantamBooks, 198I ).
Chapter Four
Chapter Five
Part Three
Chapter Six
Bertalanf-fy,Ludwig von. "Body, Mind, and Valucs," Human VaLuesand the Mind of
Mctn, cds.:Ervin Laszlo and JamesB. Wilbur (New York: Gordon and Breach Science
Publishers.197l\.
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Postmodernism: Essayson Value and Culture, ed. John Fekete (LSnclon:Macmilian,
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Frondizi, Risieri. What Is Value? (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court PublishingCompany,
r963).
-. "Rationalism and the Basis of the Value Judgment," The Journttl rf' Value
Inquiry,,12:3(Spring1978).
Hartmann, Eduard von. Grundriss cler Axiologie (Bacl Sachsaim Harz: H. Haacke,
r908)
Hartmann,Nicolai. Ethik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1949)
Hintikka, Jaakko, The Intentions rf Intentionality and Other New Models for
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Deflnitions," Dictionary oJ Social Sciences,eds. Julius Hould and William L- Kolb
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Perry,Ralph Barton.GeneraLTheorr*
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Ltd., Eighthlmprcssion,1975).
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Prigogine,Ilya and IsabelleStengers.La nouveLLe
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EditionsMontmorency,I 986).
Rokeach, Milton. The Nature of' Human VuLues (London: Collier Macmillan
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Russell,Bertrand.Histoire de mesid'6esphiLosophiques
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Tymieniecka, Anna-Tercsa. "The Creative Self and the Other in Man's Self-
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A restlessflame has recently found its tranquility. Much too early than
we could have expected,too early for how much he still had to say and
do. Professor Ludwig Gri.inbergpassed on into posterity with his
characteristictenaciousanxiousness:in his philosophicaland non-
philosophicalliiends.
Index
Abbarno,G. JohnM., viii, xv ix, xvii, xviii, 36, 152
Bucharest,
American Societylbr Value Inquiry Academyof EconomicStudies,
( A S V I ) ,i x , x , x i , 1 5 1 ,1 5 2 151
analyticalphilosophy , Jl , 8l , 109, BucharestAxiology Circle,vii, 151
120,152 Bunge,Mario, 67
Aquinas,Thomas,122 Burckhardt,Jakob,68
A r i s t o t l e 9. 3 . 1 0 1 . 1 2 9
Arundel, England,x Cahgula,122
Austin,John,50 Camus,Albert, ll9,l2l
axiocentricontology,vii, 58, 61,62, CardinalBellarmino,81
6 6 , 8 9 , 1 0 5 ,I 1 1 , 1 1 3 C a r n a pR, u d o l f ,3 4 , J 3 , 7 4 , 7 5 , J 6 ,
r e g i o n aol n t o l o g y ,1 0 7 ,1 0 8 ,1 1 2 141
a x i o l o g y i,x , x v i i i , 3 , 1 2 , 2 0 , 2 4 , 2 8 , C a s a n o v a1, 2 2
2 9 , 3 1 , 3 3 , 3 4 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 5 0 , 5180, 0 , C a s s i r e r , E r n s t , 5 6 ,16480,
1 0 2 , 1 0 3 1, 0 9 ,1 5 1 , 1 5 2 C a t t o nJ r . ,W i l l i a mR . , 3 5 , 3 6 , 3 " 1 , 3 8 ,
axionomy,17 139
reconstruction o1'axiology, vii, I l2 Cauchy,Venant,140
t h e o r yo f v a l u e s3, , 5 , 1l , 1 2 , 1 3 , C h o p i n 7,
24,29,34,42 C i c c r o , 5 81, 2 5
timology,11,12 c i v i l i z a t i o 5n , 5 5 , 6 8 ,6 9 ,1 0 , 7 1 ,1 1 9 ,
v a l u et h e o r yv, i i , 4 2 , 1 0 0 , 1 5 2 123,121
axiomaticof value,23 Coleman,James,46, 139
axiosphere, 57, 60, 111 conceptof value,xvi, xvii, 3, 8, 9, 10,
axiologicalexperience,lS,32,45, 11,11,23,27,38,551 , ,59
4 8 , 4 9 , 5 1 ,1 0 3 ,1 3 4 goods-valuc,4
axiologicalrationality,63,64,66, means-value, 12
6l purpose-value,72, J0
axiologicalsensitivity,47,95 Congressof Universalism, xvi
Connor,Steve,140
B a c h ,2 3 C o o m b sC , l y d eH . , 3 4 , 4 0 , 1 3 9
Bachelard,Gaston,61, 89 creativity,58, 61, 62, 67, 69,95
Bacon,Roger,ix Cudworth,Ralph,102
Baudelaire C,h a r l e s , 8 5 , 8 7 , 9 0 , 9 1 , c u l t u r ev, i i , r x , x v i , x v i i , x v i i i , 1 1 , 3 7 ,
1 4 2 ,1 4 3 ,1 5 1 3 8 ,4 6 , 5 5 ,5 6 , 5 7 ,5 8 , 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 2 ,
B e e t h o v e 3n 2, 6 5 , 6 8 ,6 9 , J 0 , J 7 , J 3 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 1 0 9 ,
B e n t h a mJ,e r e m y9, , 1 4 I I 1,I 17,I2I,123,133,l3l
Bergson,Henry, 109 non-philosophical culture,J3,J4,
Berleant,Arnold, 42,139 84
Berlin wall. xviii
Blaga,Lucian, 109 Delacroix,90
Bloom, Harold,86, 142 judgment,6, 46,51, 66,
descriptive
Bouveresse, Jacques, 93,142 103
Bowne,9 Dewey,John,vii, 93
Brighton,England,x, xii Don Quixote,8
Dumitrescu,Maria-Ana,xviii H a h n .H . . 7 4
Hanson,NorbertR.,79
Ehrenfels, von,3,9, I l, 14,
Christian h a p p i n e s s6,0 , 6 9 , 1 1 7 , 1 1 9 , 1 2 0 . 1 2 2 ,
1 0 31, 3 9 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 ,1 2 5 ,1 2 7 , 1 2 9 , 1 2 9 ,1 3 0 ,
E i n s t e i nA , l b e r t ,5 , 1 2 2 , l 3 l 1 31 , 1 3 4
Eliade,Mircea,69.133 H a r t m a nR, o b e r S t . ,v i i , 3 1 , 3 5 , 3 8 ,
Eluard,Paul,6l , 105 139
empiricism,80, 81, 83 Hartmann,Eduardvon, 1l
classicalempiricism,83 Hartmann,Nicolai, 13,3l , 48
constructive empiricism,80, 82, Hassan,Ihab,142
8 3 ,8 4 hedonism,129
inductiveempiricism, 77 Hcgel,Georg W. F., 85, 109, 110,129
logicalempiricism,65, 66,'74, 76, I-leidegger, Martin, 93
J8,J9,80,81,83,94 Hemingway,Ernest,135
modernempiricism,Sl HempelC , . G.,76,141
Eros, 124 H e n z eD , o n a l d ,9 3 . 1 4 2
ethics Herder,JohannGottfried,55
Christian,51 hermeneutics, 89, 94,109, 111, 133
Kantian,5l Herriot,8., 63
E u r i d i c e .1 3 5 .1 3 6 Hintikka, Jaakko,88, 142
existentialism, 121, 122,152 H o c k i n gW , .8.,122
homoaestimans, 58, 59, 61, 64, 99.
F a u s t ,1 3 5 1 0 5 .r 2 7 . 1 3 5
Fekete,John,62,140 h u m a nc o n d i t i o nv, i i , x v i i , 4 , 5 6 , 5 8 ,
Feyerabend,Paul, 80, l4l 6 2 , 6 J , 8 6 ,g g , 9 0 , 9 6 , 1 0 0 ,l 0 g ,
Flonta.Mircea. xvii 1 1 2 ,l 1 7 , 1 1 9 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 6 ,1 3 3 ,1 3 5
Foucault,Michel, 120 h u m a ns i g n i f i c a n c el J, , 5 l , 6 7, 9 5 ,
Francastel,Pierre, l5 I 101
FrankfurtSchool,123 h u m a nl i e e d o m ,x i , x v i i i , 7 , 5 9 , 6 0 ,
Freud,Sigmund,123 6 1, 110, 120, 121, 122, 124, 127
FrondiziR , i s i e r i ,v i i Hume,David, 46, 93, 94, 101
H u s s e r lE, d m u n d ,1 4 , 1 6 , 4 3 ,6 0 , 6 1 ,
G a l i l e i ,G a l i l e o , 8 l 6 4 , 6 1 , 9 8 , 9 9 1, 0 0 ,l 0 l , 1 0 3 ,1 0 4 ,
Gide,Andr6,3 1 0 5 ,I 3 9 , 1 4 0 , 1 4 1 , 1 4 3
Ginsberg,Robert,xii, xiii, xv, 59, 140 H u y g h eR , e n 6 , 9 11 , 4 3 ,1 5 1
gnoseology,I 3
G o e t h e 2, 1 . 5 9 . 6 0 . 1 2 0 i d e a l ,6 , 8 , 1 9 ,3 0 , 3 9 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 5 8 ,
Goodman.Nelson.65 6 0 , 6 9 ,7 1 , 9 5 , 1 0 3 ,l 0 g , 1 1 9 , 7 2 0 ,
Grtinberg,Arie. xviii 122,133,131 53 , 6
Grtinberg,Cornelia,xiii, xviii, 118 culturalideal.123
Grrinberg,Laura,xiii, xviii, 118 human ideal, 20
Gninberg,Ludwig, vii, ix, x, xi, xii, idealobjects,13, l5
xiii, xv, xvi, xvii, xvili,142,143, idealofhappiness,124,125,l2l
1 5 1 ,1 5 2 ideal of perf-ection, 125
G u n t e rP , e t eA . Y . , 6 2 , 7 4 0 idealvalues,125
Guttman,39 value-ideal .1 . 62
Inde.t 155
InternationalCongresson Value
Inquiry,x Marcuse,Herbert,69,123,724,133,
InternationalInstituteof Sociology, l4l
I 5l Margolis,Joseph,139
InternationalPhilosophersfbr the Maritain, Jacques,722
Preventionof NuclearOmnicide Marx, Karl,62
(IPPNO),ix Mcluhan, Marshali,68
InternationalSocietyfbr Meinong,Alexiusvon, 3, I I , 103, 139
Universalism,151 Menger,l0
InternationalSocietyfor Value Merton, RobertT., 36
I n q u i r y( I S V I ) ,i x , x , x i i , x v i i m e t a t h e o r yl 1,3
Ionesco,Eugdne,131 Michelangelo,16,57
y 1 ' v a l u e s , 51, 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 ,
i r r e d u c i b i l i to M i r o i u , A d r i a n ,x v
17,23,25,26,43,57,58,62,95, M i s c hG , eorg,99
1 0 0 ,1 l l , 1 1 2 M o n t a i g n e , M i c h e l E . d e ,19531,
Montesquieu,59
Janus1
, 19 M o o r e ,G e o r g eE d w a r d , 5 1 , 6 6 ,1 0 3
M o r r i s ,C h a r l e sW . , 3 1 , 1 3 9
K a n t ,I m m a n u e l5, , 9 , 1 0 , 4 3 , 5 5 ,6 l , M o s c o w ,x i
6 6 , 9 3 , 1 0 1 I, 1 1 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 61, 4 0 , Mozart,6,44
152 m y t h ,x v i , 5 6 , 6 4 , 7 0 , 11 0 ,1 2 1 , 1 3 3 ,
Kluckhohn,Clydc, 56, 140 136, 137
Koyr6, Alexandre,63, 140
K r e i b i g ,l l Nairobi,ix
K r o e b e rA , lfied L.,56, 140 N a r c i s s u s1,3 3 ,1 3 6
K u c z y n s k iJ, a n u s z6, 1 , 1 4 0 N e u r a t hO, tto,J4,76,141
Kuhn, ThomasS., 79, 80, 141 Newton,9
N i e t z s c h e , 91,1 ,1 9 , 6 9 ,1 0 9
La Mettrie, 66 Novalis, 86
Labiche.42 Nozick,Robert,89,94,109,144
L a i r d , . l o h n2, 3 , 1 3 9
Lapie,Paul, 1l one-dimensional man,69
Laskey,Dallas,100, 143 ontology
LavelleL , o u i s , 3 , 8 , 1 8 , 5 8 , 1 0 3 ,1 3 9 , h u m a nb e i n g ' so n t o l o g i c asl t a t u s ,
140,143 46,5J,64,703,107,108,110,
Lazarsl-eld, 39 111, 135
Le Senne,Ren6,43 ontologyof the human,57,94, 10J,
L c c ,S a n d eH r ., x 1 0 8 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 2 ,1 5 2
Levinas,Emmanuel,I 17 ontologyof the humancondition,
L 6 v i - S t r a u sCs l, a u d e , 4 , 3 l , 6 8 v i i , x v i , 6 0 ,1 0 5
L e w i s ,C . I . , v i i O r p h e u s1, 3 3 ,1 3 4 ,1 3 5 ,1 3 6
Linton, Ralph,68
L o c k e J, o h n , 9 , 6 0 , 8 1 ,1 4 0 Paris,4Z
L o g i c a lP o s i t i v i s m7, 3 , 74 , 7 7 , 8 1, 8 2 , P a r s o n sT, a l c o t t 3 ,6
8 3 ,9 3 P A r v u I, l i e , x v i , 7 1 , 1 4 1
Lotze,Rudolf Hermann,l0 Perry,Ralph Barton,vii, 3, 9, 14, 139
Lyotard, Jean-FranEois, 88, 142 Petrescu,Camil, vii, 8, 105, 143
phenomenology, 74, 88, 94, I 00, 105, Rogca.Dumitru D.. 109
109 Roth,Alois, 64, 100,143
phenomenologyof value,99 Rousseau,Jean-Jacques, 93. 152
philosophy Roycc,9
Lelbnizian,25 Russell,Bertrand,80, 130, l4l
Piaget,Jean,28, 35, 139 Ryle,50
Picasso,88
Plato,4, 43,93, 137 SaintVincentde Paul, 122
p l e a s u r e9,, 1 4 ,18 , 3 3 ,4 7 , 5 8 , I 0 3 . Santayana, George,9
I 1 9 ,1 2 0 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 , 1 2 9 Santoni,Ronald,ix
P o e ,E d g a r4 . , 9 2 Sartre,Jean-Paul, 122, 152
Polin,Raymond,30, 139 S c h e l e rM
, a x , 7 , 9 , 1 5 , 1 0 3 ,1 0 5
P o p p e rK , arl R.,78,79,741 Schlegel,Friedrich,85, 86
postmodernism, 88, 90, 93 scientificrealism,8l , 82, 83
Prigogine,Ilya, 63, 94,140 Sellars,Wilfiid, 82
P r o m e t h e u s1,3 3 ,1 3 4 S e n e c a5, 2 , 1 2 4
psychoanalysis, 152 Shelley,PercyBysshc,4
Putnam,Hilary, 65, 80, 82, 84, 94, S i s y p h u s1,2 1 ,1 2 2
1 0 9 .1 4 0 .l 4 l S m i t h ,A d a m , l 0
Socratcs,45
Quine,Willard van Orman,80, 1l3 Somerville,John,ix
Sofea,Dana,xvii
R a w l s J, o h n ,6 6 , 1 0 5 ,I 4 1 , 1 4 3 Spengler,Oswald,69
r e a l i t y ,6 , 7 2 , 7 3 , 7 4 , 1 5 ,2 9 , 3 4 ,4 7 , Stein,Gertrude,88
5 0 ,6 2 , 6 4 , 7 6 ,8 1 , 8 2 , 8 3 , 8 5 , 8 7 , Stengers, Isabelle,63, 140
l 0 l , I 1 0 , I I l , 1 2 1 ,1 2 3 ,r 2 4 . 1 3 0 , S t e v e n s oC n ,h a r l e Ls . , 5 1 , 6 6 . 1 0 3 ,
133,134 120
reductionism, 58, 73, I 4, 76, J9, 84, Strawson,51
95,112 structuralism, 122
logical reductionism,I 00
logicistreductionism, 80 Taylor,Edward8., 140
logisticreductionism, 74 Thanatos,124
mcchanisticreductionism. 74 Iheorem
positivistreductionism, xvii, 73 Pythagorean,4
psychological reductionism,100 Thalesian,4
r e d u c t i o n3, 8 , 6 3 , 6 6 ,J 3 , 74 , 1 5 , theory7 , 6 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 8 0 , 8 2 ,9 1 , 9 4 , 9 9 ,
1 6 . 1 8 . 7 9 ,1 0 0 l 1 l , 1 2 0 ,1 2 4
reductionismto literature,85, 95 axiologicaltheory, 107
scientiticreductionism, 63, 74, 77, c u l t u r ct h c o r y .5 5
90, 95 philosophical theory,I 20
Reichenbach, Hans,I4, 7l , 141 theoryof behavior,35
Richardson,Samuel,60 theoryof choice, 26
R i c k e r t ,3 9 , 5 0 , 1 0 3 theoryof communication, 25
Ricoeur,Paul,89, 94 theoryof decision-making, 26
R i t s c h i eA . . D.. l0 theory of infbrmation,24
R o m a n i ai,x , x i , x v i , 6 0 , l 5 l theoryof post-philosophical
R o r t y ,R i c h a r d 8 , 5 , 8 6 , 8 8 ,9 2 , 9 4 , 1 4 2 c u l t u r e8, 5 ,8 7 ,9 0
Incle.t t5l