CHAPTER VI: STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE AND IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES

A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE

1. Generally
2. Intent ascertained from statute as whole
Optima statuti interpretatix est ipsum statutum - The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself

Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 (Jimenea)
Doctrine:
It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts.

Facts:
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of Pintor’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal
of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned Atty.
Gaanan, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer,
Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask
Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money.
Atty. Pintor called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways.
Laconico alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, then insisted that Atty.
Pintor himself should receive the money at the Igloo Restaurant. Atty. Pintor was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
The next day, Atty. Gaanan executed an affidavit stating that he heard Atty. Pintor demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for
direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of Atty. Gaanan to the complaint for robbery/extortion which he filed against Atty. Pintor.
Atty. Pintor then filed a complaint against Laconico and Atty. Gaanan for violating the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

IAC: found Atty. Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Sec. 1 of the Anti-Wiretapping Act
Atty. Gaanan filed for a petition for certiorari, hence this case.

Issue:
Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term ‘device or arrangement’ under R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)? =
NO

Ruling:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or taperecorder, or
however otherwise described; It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to
replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as
evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition."

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting,
or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

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An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that
in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known
as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

3. Purpose or context as controlling guide

4. Giving effect to statute as a whole
5. Apparently conflicting provisions reconciled

Republic v. Court of Appeals and ACIL Corp., G.R. No. 122256, October 30, 1996 (Navas)
Doctrine: A provision should not be read separately from other provisions found in the same statute. It is a rule in statutory construction
that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in 􏰀fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

Facts: Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao del Norte, which the
government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Private respondent's certificate of title were
cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.

LandBank, through the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings ("LISTASAKA") filed by Acil through the Department of Agriculture
(DAR), valued the seized lands at only P15,311.79 per hectare and fixed the amount of P390,557.84 as the total compensation to be
paid for the lands.

Acil, however rejected the government's offer stating that nearby lands, planted to the same crops were valued at the higher prices of
P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992,
sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP.

RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latter's Revised Rules of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had.

The Court of Appeals however, supported the contention of Acil that the RTC had original jurisdiction over the petition for just
compensation referencing R.A. No 6657 §§56-57:

§57. Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall
apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. The Special Agrarian Court shall decide all
appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.

The DAR however, in its petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, references par. 50 of the same law which states that the DAR
have primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform."

Issue: Does the DAR have primary jurisdiction over just compensation of lands seized under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (R.A. 6657)?

Ruling: No. The SC ruled that par. 50 should be construed in harmony with par. 57 of the same law

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considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from
the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR.

This means that Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two
categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]."

This is because the DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are
taking under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases.

With the petitioner's contention that the appeal should be only be filed under DARAB, citing Rule II, §5 and Rule XIII, §1 of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure, the Supreme Court ruled that these provisions too must be read with Rule XIII, §11:

§11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land
valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought
directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Court within Fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof.
Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.

This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is
a power vested in the courts.

Hence, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the CA's decision of remanding the case back to the RTC.

Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996 (Tagle)

Doctrine: In construing the law, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a construction that could render a
provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious
whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident
when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated.

Facts: Construing the new words of a statute separately is the raison d'etre of this appeal. This case is for cancellation of the inscription
of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property.

The sale of the land:

-On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin sold a parcel of residential land in Antipolo to the Sajonas
spouses. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the subject property. Upon
full payment of the purchase, the Deed of Sale was executed on September 4, 1984.
-Meanwhile, Pilares (defendant) filed Civil Case for collection of sum of money against Uychocde. Pilares and Uychocde had a
Compromise Agreement (June 1980). Uychocde agreed to pay Pilares the amount of P27,800 after two years. Uychocde failed to comply
with this Agreement. Upon request of Pilares, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982.
-On Feb 12 1985, defendant sheriff Garcia presented the notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds, it was annotated at
the back of TCT No. N-79073.
-When the Deed of absolute sale was registered on August 28, 1985, a new TCT for the land was issued in the name of Sajonas
couple(TCT No. N-109417). The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was then carried over to the new title.
-The Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer. Pilares
refused to cancel the annotation.

The Sajonases filed a complaint in RTC against Pilares, arguing among others that: (1) That at the time the notice of levy was annotated
by the defendant, the Uychocde spouses, have already transferred, conveyed and assigned all their title, rights and interests to Sajonases
and there was no more title, rights or interests therein which the defendant could levy upon; and (2) That the annotation of the levy on
execution which was carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegal and invalid and was made in utter bad faith.

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Pilares filed his answer: (1) that assuming that they filed an adverse claim against the subject property on August 27, 1984, the annotation
of adverse claim ceases to have any legal force and effect 30 days thereafter pursuant to Sectio 70 of P.D 1529. (2) that the Notice of
Levy annotated at the back of TCT, in pursuant to the Writ of Execution, is proper and appropriate because the property is registered in
the name of the judgement debtor and is not among those exempted from execution. (3) the sale is null and void and without legal force
and effect because it was done in fraud of judgement creditor, Pilares.

TC: In favor or Sajonas couple, ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate Title No. N-109417 (Title of
the subject property named under the Sajonas couple).

CTA: reversed the lower court’s decision and upheld the annotation of levy on execution on the certificate title. (Relied on Sec 70 of
PD 1529) That an adverse claim shall be of no legal effect after 30 days.

Sajonas appealed in this Court and argued that the rule of 30 day period from adverse claim under section 70 of PD 1529 is not absolute.
And that the CTA failed to read or construe the provision in its entirety.

Issue: Whether or not the adverse claim inscribed in the new title (Transfer Certificate No. N-109417) is still in force when Pilares
caused the notice of levy on execution.

Ruling:
If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are charged with knowledge of pre-existing interest over the subject property,
and thus, petitioners are entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the certificate of title.

The Court cited Section 110 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act reads:
Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered lands adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of
the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting
forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate
of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a place at which all
notices may be served upon him. The statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition
of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such
decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any
case, the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse
claimant double or treble the costs in its discretion."

The court further forwarded that Sec 110 of Act 496 provision must be re-examined in the light of the changes introduced by P.D. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
Sec . 70 Adverse Claim -- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to
the number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in
which the right or interest is claimed.
…The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period,
the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in-interest:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same
claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land
is situated for the cancellation the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity
of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid,
the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse
claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than
five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing
with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
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In construing the law, every part thereof should be given effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative
should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole.
In this case, in ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety. In the sentence
that reads: “The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration." It would seem to restrict the
effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But it should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads: “After the lapse
of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.”
The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective.

The law employs the phrase "may be cancelled", which indicates that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an adverse
claim, nothwitstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. The
limitation on the period of effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity of an adverse claim.
The purpose of the statute; the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure to protect the interest of a person over a real property, and
serves as a warning to third parties that someone is claiming interest thereof.
“validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the
Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication a justice and equity may warrant. And it is only when
such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of the
adverse claimant and giving notice and warning to third parties”
Hence, the inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 79073 was still in effect on February 12, 1985
when the notice of levy was annotated thereto. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on
the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners

On good faith: the petitioners are deemed to be purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.
Note: (if malabo yung facts, huhu)
-TCT No. 79073 - title of the property under the name of Ernesto Uychocde and Jarin.
-TCT No. 109417 – title of the property after it was sold, now under the name of Sajonases.
-The adverse claim of Sajonas couple was annotated on the first TCT (August 27 1984).
-The notice of levy on execution was annotated on the first TCT (Feb 12, 1985), and it was carried over to the 2 nd TCT.

6. Special and general provisions in same statute

7. Construction as not to render provision nugatory
8. Reason for the rule
9. Qualification of rule
Cuyegkeng, et al v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-16263, July 26, 1960 (Cerrero)
Doctrine:
In case of conflict between two (2) provisions of the same statute, the last in order of position is frequently
held to prevail, unless it clearly appears that the intent of Congress is otherwise, and no such intent is patent.

Facts:
1. A Quo Warranto Proceeding was initiated by the petitioners on November 25, 1959 against herein respondent, Dr. Cruz for
being appointed by the President as a member of the Board of Medical Examiners.
2. The Council of the Philippine Medical Association submitted a letter to the Office of the President in compliance with the
President’s request containing twelve (12) names for recommendation as members of the Board of Medical Examiners including
the names of the petitioners but excluding the name of the respondent (Dr Pedro Cruz).
3. By a letter of the Assistant Executive Secretary, said Council was advised that the President had decided to appoint, as member
of said Board, Dr. Cesar Filoteo, Dr. Oscar Chacon, Dr. Edgardo Caparas, Dr. Jose Cocjin, Dr. Antonio Guytingco and Dr. Pedro
M. Cruz.

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 4. The President has decided to appoint in the board two graduates from the University of the Philippines, two from the University
of Santo Tomas and two government physicians irrespective of alma mater.
5. Of the twelve (12) names submitted in the letter of October 16, 1959, Dr. Antonio Guytingco and Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan,
government physicians, happen to be both personal physicians of the President. For this reason, the President decided on renewing
the appointment of Dr. Pedro M. Cruz, also a government physician, whose term under the old law would not have expired until
August 7, 1960, were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 2382.
6. Petitioners herein, as well as the intervenors, maintain that, pursuant to section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, the President
cannot appoint to the Board of Medical Examiners any person not named in the list submitted by the Executive Council of the
Philippine Medical Association, and that, accordingly, the aforementioned appointment of respondent is null and void.
7. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959):
o The Board of Medical Examiners, its composition and duties. — The Board of Medical Examiners shall be
composed of six members to be appointed by the President of the Philippines from a confidential list of not more
than twelve names approved and submitted by the executive council of the Philippine Medical Association, after
due consultation with other medical associations, during the months of April and October of each year. The
chairman of the Board shall be elected from among themselves by the members at a meeting called for the
purpose. The President of the Philippines shall fill any vacancy that may occur during any examination from the
list of names submitted by the Philippine Medical Association in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Dr Pedro Cruz is valid pursuant to the provisions of The Medical Act of 1959 ? YES

Ruling:
(STATCON DOCTRINE) The members of said group opine that it is not absolutely necessary that the person reappointed under this
provision be included in the list mentioned in section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, for, in case of conflict between two (2) provisions
of the same statute, the last in order of position is frequently held to prevail, unless it clearly appears that the intent of Congress is
otherwise, and no such intent is patent in the case at bar.

Furthermore, the purpose of section 13, in requiring the favorable indorsement of the Philippine Medical Association, evidently, to
reasonably assure that the members of the Board of Medical Examiners are among the best in their profession, and one who has already
held, or who still holds a position in said Board, is presumed to belong to such class, in the absence of proof to the contrary. There is
not even the slightest suggestion that respondent does not live up to the standard required for membership in said Board.

The members of this Court are split into three (3) groups in their views on the issues thus raised by the pleadings. One group of members
of this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of this section are mandatory in character; that, although Congress may, by law,
prescribe the qualifications for appointment to a public office created by statute, inclusion in the list submitted by the Executive Council
of the Philippine Medical Association, in compliance with section 13 of the same Act, is not one of the qualifications enumerated in
said section 14. Consequently, the pertinent portion of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is unconstitutional and the appointment of
respondent herein lawful and valid.

Another group adheres to the view that said portion of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is merely directory in nature. the function
of the former under said section 13 is purely recommendatory. Needless to say, a "recommendation", as such, implies merely an advice,
exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made. The members
of the Court constituting this group feel, therefore, that, although section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is constitutional, respondent
herein has a valid title to his office as member of the Board of Medical Examiners.

The third group, which is bigger than any of the two (2) groups already adverted to, deems it unnecessary, either to inquire into the
constitutionality of said section 13, or to determine whether the same is mandatory or directory, for the reasons presently to be stated.The
list submitted by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association included two (2) government physicians, namely, Dr.
Antonio Guytingco and Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan, both of whom were "personal physicians of the President".

Believing, perhaps, that their appointment to the Board may either deprive him completely of the benefits of their professional services,
or impair the quality or usefulness thereof, or that a choice in favor of his two (2) personal doctors, as representatives of the government
physicians in said Board, may smack of, or be misconstrued as, an act of nepotism, it was deemed best to appoint to the Board only one
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of them so that the other could continue giving his undivided attention to the health of the President. Hence, the latter had to look for
another government physician for appointment to the Board. In this connection, it should be noted that respondent's professional
competency for the post he now holds is not disputed.

When the questioned appointment was extended to him, on November 18, 1959, respondent was a member of said Board, and his term
as such would have expired on August 7, 1960, had it not been for the approval of Republic Act No. 2382 on June 20, 1959. The
President appointed him by virtue of Section 15 of RA 2382:

o "Tenure of office and compensation of members. - The members of the Board of Medical Examiners shall hold
office for one year: Provided, That any member may be reappointed for not more than one year.
·

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, the writ prayed for should be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

10. Construction as to give life to law

11. Construction to avoid surplusage
12. Application of rule
13. Statute and its amendments construed together

B. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES

1. Statute construed in harmony with the Constitution
2. Statutes in pari materia
3. How statutes in pari materia construed

Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, September 30, 1992 (Evangelista)
Facts: On May 15, 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 25 that created a Presidential Committee on Public
Ethics and Accountability. Pursuant to AO No. 25, former DOTC Sec. Rainerio Reyes issued Office Order No.88-318 creating the
Administrative Action Board (AAB) "to act, decide and recommend to the Secretary appropriate measures on cases of administrative
malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department".

On Aug 26, 1988, two Philippine Port Authority (PPA) police officers filed in the AAB, a complaint for dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service against Leopoldo Bungubung (Respondent), District Manager of the Port of Manila.
Bungubung assailed the jurisdictional competence of the AAB on the ground that it was the General Manager of the PPA who
had jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio Dayan (Petitioner), filed another formal charge
against Bungubung and one Mario Tan for dishonesty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, willful
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

On Aug 26, 1988 or on the same date as the first administrative case against Bungubung was filed, Sec. Reyes also filed a complaint
with the AAB against Cristeto Dinopol (Respondent), Manager of the Port of Davao, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. PPA General Manager Dayan issued a preventive
suspension order against Dinopo and also filed an Administrative Case for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Hearings were conducted by the AAB, and Dinopol also contended that the PPA General Manager, not the AAB, had the
jurisdiction to initiate and conduct an administrative investigation (Sec. 6 of PD 857, PPA Charter).

The AAB rendered decision on both Administrative Case of Dinopol finding him guilty as charged and dismissed him from the service
with cause plus the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibilities, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification for re-employment in the government service. However, Dinopol filed with the RTC of Pasig, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order challenging the jurisdiction of the
AAB over the administrative cases against him. The RTC issued a resolution ordering the reinstatement of Dinopol to his former
position of Port Manager of Davao and the payment to him of back salaries and other emoluments during his preventive suspension.
The court also issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by Dinopol.
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The cases of Bungubung and Dinopol were consolidated and were referred to the Court of Appeal. They asserted that the periods of
their preventive suspension had been unduly extended thus they moved for their immediate reinstatement and this was granted
by the CA. The CA held that the DOTC Secretary had no jurisdiction over the administrative cases of Bungubung and Dinopol because:
(1) The Civil Service Law vests upon the Department heads "jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action
against officers and employees under their jurisdiction," said law cannot prevail over Sec. 8, Art. V of the PPA Charter (P.D. No.
857) which states that "(t)he General Manager (of the PPA) shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint and remove personnel
below the rank of Assistant General Manager." because the PPA Charter is a particular law and more recent; and (2) The power of
review by the Office of the President has been repealed by P.D. 1409. The DOTC Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, can
no longer exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over PPA personnel.

Issue: Whether or not the AAB has jurisdiction over the Administrative cases? - NO

Ruling: The Court, agrees with the Court of Appeals' ratiocination in arriving at the conclusion that Sec. 8, Art. V of the PPA Charter
should prevail over Sec. 37(b) of the Civil Service Law, considering that where a later special law on a particular subject is repugnant
to, or inconsistent with, a prior general law on the same subject, a partial repeal of the latter will be implied to the extent of the
inconsistency, or an exception grafted upon the general law. Since, in a sense, the two laws are in pari materia, both should be construed
as to harmonize with each other. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi. Every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. For the assumption is that whenever the legislature enacts
a law, it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the absence of any express repeal or amendment,
the new statute is deemed enacted in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes. Applying the foregoing
rules on statutory construction, the DOTC Secretary has not entirely relinquished his power of control and supervision over an attached
agency, such as the PPA. The PPA Charter merely defined and, to a certain extent, delimited such power which, under the Civil Service
law is of general application.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The decisions of the Administrative Action Board in AAB-006-
88 and AAB-016-88 against Cristeto E. Dinopol are hereby declared NULL AND VOID and, together with the cases against Leopoldo
F. Bungubung, AAB-031-88 and Adm. Case No. 11-01-88, they shall be REMANDED to the General Manager of the Philippine Ports
Authority for immediate reinvestigation. SO ORDERED.

4. Reasons why laws on same subject are reconciled

City of Naga v. Agna, G.R. No. L-36049, May 31, 1976 (Tan)
Statute construed in relation to constitution and other statutes; Reasons why laws on the same subject are reconciled
Doctrine: In pari materia - Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class, or
have the same purpose. Statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is because enactments of legislature
on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system.

Whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together.

However, when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the new provision shall prevail as it is
the latter expression of the legislative will.

FACTS: The parties to this case are assailing the effectivity date of Ordinance No. 360, which was passed by the City of Naga in June
15, 1970. Sec. 2 thereof amended Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 4 by changing the graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of merchants to
percentage tax on gross sales.

Respondents’ contention: 1971, Sec. 2309 of Revised Administrative Code

Catalino and Felipe Agna as well as Salud Velasco (respondents) filed a claim for refund with the city treasurer. They alleged that said
ordinance took effect in 1971 and that therefore, taxes paid in 1970 for the quarter of July to Sept were illegal and should be refunded.

8
Pursuant to Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code, they contend that Ordinance No. 306 falls within the first type of municipal
ordinance which changes an existing municipal license tax. Under the first type, an ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December
changing or repealing an existing municipal license tax will have to take effect in the next year. The purpose of this is to enable taxpayers
to adjust themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by the new ordinance.

Petitioners’ contention: 1970, Sec. 2 of Local Autonomy Act

On the other hand, the city treasurer denied said claim for refund. They contend that said ordinance was valid and became effective in
July 30, 1970 by invoking Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act.

Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act provides that:

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the 15th day after its passage unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise

Ordinance No. 306 was enacted and passed by municipal board in 1970 June 15, 1970. It was later transmitted to mayor for approval or
veto on June 25, 1970. However, the said ordinance was not returned by the mayor with his veto or approval within 10 days after he
received it on June 25, 1970. Therefore, Ordinance No. 360 could have taken effect on June 30, 1970, which is the 15th day after its
passage on June 15, 1970 by the municipal board. Moreover, it also contends that since the Local Autonomy Act was a later enactment,
it has repealed the said provision in the Revised Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
1) Was Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act repealed Sec. 2309 of the RAC insofar as the effectivity of the tax ordinance is concerned?
NO
2) Did Ordinance No. 306 take effect in 1970, and not in 1971? NO

RULING: SC reversed the decision of the CFI. It ruled in favor of the Agnases and Velasco (respondents).
First. The court held that there is no provision in the Local Autonomy Act that expressly repealed said provision of the RAC. All that
is mentioned therein is the ff.
All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or parts thereof, inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed and modified accordingly (Sec. 9).
Said provision does not amount to an express repeal of Sec. 2309 of the RAC.

When does a statute repeal a prior statute of the same subject? A statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the same subject
in the absence of words to that effect unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or the new law is evidently intended
to supersede all prior acts. Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject
matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together.

Second. Sec. 2309 of the RAC and Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act refer to the same subject matter: enactment and effectivity of a
tax ordinance. In this respect, they can be considered in pari materia.

The court also held that there is no conflict between said statutes. That it can only be reconciled depending on the matter at hand:
Where the problem refers to the effectivity of an ordinance changing or repealing an existing municipal license tax, Sec. 2309
of RAC governs.
Where the problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new tax, Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act governs.

In this case, Ordinance No. 306 is one which changes the graduated sales tax to percentage tax, therefore, it is Sec. 2309 of the RAC
that must govern.

Hence, in accordance with respondents’ contention, said ordinance shall be effective and enforceable in 1971 (a year after approval).
Respondents shall also be refunded the taxes paid in 1970 for the quarter of July to Sept plus interests.

Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class, or have the same purpose.
Statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same
subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system.
9
Whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together.

However, when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the new provision shall prevail as it is
the latter expression of the legislative will.

5. Where harmonization is impossible

6. Illustration of the rule
7. General and special statutes
8. Reason for the rule
9. Qualifications of the rule
10. Reference statutes
11. Supplemental statutes
12. Reenacted statutes
13. Adoption of contemporaneous construction
14. Qualification of the rule
15. Adopted statutes

CHAPTER VII: STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

A. IN GENERAL
1. Generally
2. Strict Construction, generally
3. Liberal Construction, defined
4. Liberal construction applied, generally
Javellana v. Mirasol and Nunez, G.R. No. 14881, February 5, 1920 (Dimen)
Doctrine: "Redemptions are looked upon with favor and where no injury is to follow, a liberal construction will be given to our
redemption laws, to the end that the property of the debtor may pay as many of the debtor's liabilities as possible."
Facts: In 1915, Julio Javellana recovered a judgment for the sum of P5,710.50, with interest in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Iloilo against Maximino Mirasol and Eugenio Kilayco and in order to satisfy the same an execution was in due time levied upon
certain properties of Maximino Mirasol.
On July 6, 1915, said properties were exposed to sale by the sheriff at public auction and were purchased by Julio Javellana, the highest
bidder for P5,920.

Before the expiration of the period of one year allowed by law for the redemption of property sold under execution, or on July 3, 1916,
Alejandro Mirasol, brother of Maximino Mirasol, acting in representation of another brother, Luis Mirasol, appeared before the deputy
sheriff, Geronimo Nuñez, for the purpose of redeeming the properties in accordance with section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Alejandro Mirasol placed in the hands of said officer a check drawn on the Bank of the Philippine Islands and payable to bearer, for the
sum of P6,604.74.

In making this redemption it was represented to the deputy sheriff that Luis Mirasol was a redemptioner, or person entitled to redeem,
within the meaning of section 464 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In proof of this fact, Alejandro Mirasol exhibited a document bearing date of April 4, 1916, executed by the president of the Bank of
the Philippine Islands, transferring to Luis Mirasol two claims, amounting to several thousand pesos, which had been reduced to
judgment by the bank against Maximino Mirasol.
The consideration for the transfer of these judgments is stated in the document of transfer to be P6,150, paid to the bank by Luis Mirasol.

The right of Luis Mirasol to redeem the property was not questioned by the deputy sheriff, and the check presented by Alejandro Mirasol
was accepted. At the same time a receipt was delivered to Alejandro Mirasol, signed by Geronimo Nuñez as deputy sheriff,
acknowledging the receipt of the sum of P6,604.74, as a deposit for the purpose of redeeming the properties which had been sold as the
property of Maximino Mirasol and purchased by the judgment creditor Julio Javellana.
10
The check which was delivered to Geronimo Nuñez by Alejandro Mirasol upon the occasion of making this deposit was not immediately
presented for payment to the bank upon which it was drawn but was delivered by that officer to his superior, the Honorable Amando
Avanceña, at that time Governor of the Province of Iloilo, and ex officio sheriff.
The check was retained until the expiration of his term of office, then it was turned over to his successor in office, Honorable Gregorio
Yulo. On December 13, 1916, the latter official presented the check to the bank upon which it was drawn and received payment.

Pursuant to the redemption thus effected, the deputy sheriff, Geronimo Nuñez, at the request of Luis Mirasol, on March 9, 1918, executed
and delivered to the latter a public document purporting to convey to him all the right, title and interest in said property which had
formerly been vested in Maximino Mirasol.

On April 11, 1918, Julio Javellana, the original judgment creditor of Maximino Mirasol and purchaser of the properties which had been
sold, appeared before the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo. He filed an original complaint attacking the said redemption
as irregular and unauthorized and as fraudulent or simulated, and praying that the document of March 9, 1918, executed by Geronimo
Nuñez, and purporting to convey to Luis Mirasol the title to said property which had formerly been vested in Maximino Mirasol, be
declared fraudulent and void, and that said instrument be cancelled by order of the court. The plaintiff further asked that the sheriff be
required to issue to the plaintiff, as purchaser, a deed of conveyance of said property of a definitive character, as contemplated in section
466 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Judge L. M. Southworth, presiding in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, held that the redemption had been effected in good faith and
in accordance with the requirements of law. Judgment was entered on October 7, 1918, declaring Luis Mirasol to be the owner of the
properties in question and absolving the defendants from the complaint, with costs.
From this judgment, Julio Javellana filed an appeal.

Three points: Regarding the interpretation of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which treat of redemption from execution
sales, among which may be noted the following, namely, whether the redemption was rendered ineffectual by reason of the fact (1) that
a check was used as a medium of payment instead of money, (2) that the tender of payment was made to the officer who conducted the
sale instead of directly to the purchaser, and (3) that the redemptioner failed to produce to said officer the documents specified in section
467 of the Code of Civil Procedure in proof of his right to redeem.

Issue: Whether or not the redemption of the properties in question by Alejandro Mirasol in representation of Luis Mirasol was lawfully
accomplished.

Ruling: Yes, upon the first point, the Court said that the redemption was not rendered invalid by the fact that the officer accepted a
check for the amount necessary to make the redemption instead of requiring payment in money. It goes without saying that if he had
seen fit to do so, the officer could have required payment to be made in lawful money, and he undoubtedly, in accepting a check, placed
himself in a position where he would have been liable to Julio Javellana if any damage had been suffered by the latter as a result of the
medium in which payment was made. But this cannot affect the validity of the payment. The check as a medium of payment in
commercial transactions is too firmly established by usage to permit of any doubt upon this point at the present day.

As to the second point, direct authority for making payment to the officer who conducted the sale is found in section 446 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and it was manifestly unnecessary for the redemptioner to seek out the purchaser, Julio Javellana, for the purpose of
making payment to him.

The third point, which relates to the production of the document necessary to prove the right of the redemptioner to make the redemption,
is of somewhat greater significance. Section 467 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, as maybe recalled, that where the assignee of
a judgment seeks to redeem he must produce, in proof of his right, to the person to whom the offer to redeem is made: (1) a certified
copy of the judgment of which he claims to be the owner; (2) a copy of the assignment, verified by the affidavit of himself, or of a
subscribing witness thereto; (3) an affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount then actually due on said judgment. In the
present case Geronimo Nuñez was content to permit the redemption without requiring compliance with these provisions. The original
of the assignment executed by the bank to Luis Mirasol was, however, produced before him; and for the rest he was fully aware of the
existence of the judgments in favor of the bank against Maximino Mirasol and of the fact that they still remained unsatisfied upon the
11
records of his court. This irregularity, if such it may be termed, in the manner of making the redemption does not affect the validity of
that act. The primary purpose of the provision under consideration is to define with precision the conditions under which the person
redeeming can enforce redemption as a matter of unquestionable right; and, if the person to whom the offer of redemption is made sees
fit to accept the money without reference to the information which the documents mentioned would give, the failure on the part of the
person redeeming to produce them is of no moment. It is hardly necessary to say that the act of the officer in accepting the tender would
not have made the redemption effectual, if the person redeeming had in fact had no interest which entitled him to redeem, and the
sufficiency of his title or right to redeem may of course be question. This circumstance affords all the protection needed to prevent the
purchaser at the execution sale from being deprived of the property by an unwarranted redemption.

A few words upon these points will not come amiss; and by way of preface we may be permitted to repeat the following words from a
decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, which have heretofore been quoted with approval by this court: "Redemptions are looked
upon with favor, and where no injury is to follow, a liberal construction will be given to our redemption laws, to the end that the property
of the debtor may pay as many of the debtor's liabilities as possible."

The foregoing suggestions furnish the clue to the proper interpretation of the provision now under consideration; and the result is that
any ordinary creditor, or assignee of such, having a judgment subsequent to that under which the property was sold may exercise the
right of redemption. This interpretation, instead of being strained or artificial, as might superficially appear, is really forced upon us to
save the provision from total obliteration. No rule of interpretation is better accredited than that which is expressed in the Latin Maxim
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

Therefore, the redemption of the properties in question by Luis Mirasol was lawfully accomplished. The judgment of the trial court
dismissing the complaint must therefore be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

5. Construction to promote social justice

6. Construction taking into consideration general welfare or growth of civilization

B. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED

1. Penal statutes, generally
2. Penal statutes strictly construed

People v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05, February 10, 1998 (Delocario)

Doctrine: Criminal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally construed in favor of the accused. No act can be pronounced
criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so too no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within
them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Sec. 11 of RA 7659 or The Death Penalty Law prescribes the capital penalty in rape, only "when the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim," and not by reason of any other kinship.
Art. 15 of the RPC lists “relationship” as an alternative aggravating circumstance. encompasses only "the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, and relative by affinity in the same degrees."
Outside these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused, no
other relationship, kinship or association between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime
committed. The fact, then, that the offended party (Regina Guafin) is the granddaughter or descendant of appellant's live-in partner
cannot justify the imposition of death upon the rapist.

Facts:
The trial court sentenced the appellant to death, holding that his common-law relationship with the victim's grandmother
aggravated the penalty. The offended party is the granddaughter or descendant of appellant's live-in partner cannot justify the imposition
of death upon the rapist. The RTC of Ormoc City ruled that Alejandro Atop, alias "Ali," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of rape and sentencing him to two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for the third.
Regina Guafin, told the court that she is a granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos and that the accused Alejandro Atop is the common
law husband of said Trinidad Atop [sic]. Her mother is a daughter of said Trinidad Atop [sic] and lives in Pangasinan. She is an
illegitimate child and she had never met her father. Since her early childhood she stayed with her grandmother Trinidad Atop. Sometime
12
in 1991, when she was already 10 years old when the accused started having lustful desire on her. The accused then inserted his finger
into her vagina. She told her grandmother about this but her grandmother did not believe her. She was then told by her grandmother,
Trinidad Mejos, that what her grandfather did to her was just a manifestation of fatherly concern. On October 9, 1992, she was called
by the accused Alejandro Atop to do something for him. When she approached him the accused rushed towards her, removed her panty
and inserted his male organ into her vagina. She was not able to do anything to resist him because the accused gagged her mouth and
was carrying a knife with him. She was then 12 years old when the first rape was committed to her and at that time her grandmother
was then attending a delivery since her grandmother was a 'hilot'. When her grandmother returned home she told her what the accused
did to her but her grandmother, again, refused to believe her. On December 26, 1994, the accused again raped her. She could not ask for
help because her mouth was gagged by the accused. On December 31, 1994, while she together with her Aunt Gloria Montealto and her
two (2) nieces Rubilen and Jubilen Atop were about to go to sleep, she noticed that the accused was looking for her. Upon seeing her
the accused rushed towards her and was about to lay on top of her. She kicked him. After that, the accused caressed and touched his
nieces but his nieces also kicked him. Thereafter, the accused stopped molesting her and his nieces and went to sleep instead. She
reported the incidents of rape that happened in 1992, 1993 and 1994 only in January 1995. It took her so long to report the said incidents
because she was afraid. The accused threatened to kill her should she tell anybody about the incidents. She was accompanied by her
Aunts Fe Decio and Rosenda Andales in reporting the said incidents to the police. Her statement was taken by the police at the police
headquarters. Thereafter, she filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Judge of Matag-ob, Leyte.
The trial court gave the testimony of Regina Guafin full credit because when she told the court that she was raped by the
accused she said it all with candor. The mixed expression of sadness and anger shown in the private complainant's face during her
testimony convinced this court that she was telling the truth. The trial court also ruled that the circumstances of nighttime and
relationship aggravated all the three incidents of rape, but that there was no sufficient evidence proving attempted rape on December
31, 1994. Considering that the last rape occurred after the effectivity of RA 7659, the death penalty law, the court meted out the capital
punishment to accused-appellant.

Note: Two aggravating circumstances: nighttime and relationship

Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of relationship and penalty of death as provided by Sec. 11 RA 7659 is applicable
to Alejandro Atop’s commission of the crime. NO, Atop is not within the scope of Sec. 11 RA 7659.

Ruling: The Supreme Court did not appreciate relationship as an aggravating circumstance. The scope of relationship as defined by law
encompasses (1) the spouse; (2) an ascendant; (3) a descendant; (4) a legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister; or (5) a relative by
affinity in the same degree. Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity
therefore are those commonly referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like; in contrast to relatives by
consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed under the second, third and fourth enumeration above. The law cannot be stretched to
include persons attached by common- law relations. Here, there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his
victim. Thus, the modifying circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him.

Neither is the following provision of Sec. 11, RA 7659 applicable:

"Sec. 11. Article 335 of the [Revised Penal] Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx

Atop is not the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. He is the common-law husband of the girl's grandmother. Needless to
state, neither is appellant the victim's "parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree." Hence, he is not encompassed in any of the relationships expressly enumerated in the aforecited provision. It is a basic rule of
statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Courts must not bring cases within the
provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so,
too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the accused.
13
Additional Note- On nighttime as aggravating circumstance: The time-settled rule is that nocturnity, as an aggravating circumstance,
must have been deliberately sought by the offender to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his
escape. The prosecution failed to prove that nighttime was deliberately sought by appellant to facilitate his dastardly acts. In fact, the
prosecution failed to show that appellant consummated his carnal designs at night, except only for the December 26, 1994 incident
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant Alejandro
Atop shall not suffer the penalty of death but shall SERVE three (3) terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of the three (3) counts of
rape for which he was found GUILTY by the trial court, and is ordered to PAY Regina Gua􏰀n indemnity in the amount of P150,000
plus moral damages of P50,000.
SO ORDERED.

3. Reason why penal statutes are strictly construed

4. Acts mala in se and mala prohibita
5. Applications of rule
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997 (Garcia)

Doctrine: Penal statutes "must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant.”

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling "dirt and ore." His services were contracted
by the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP). Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime
Ancla whose trucks were left at the former's premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the BIR addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa)
or his authorized representative commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime
Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo
Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. The
Warrant of Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985. Accused then signed the "Receipt for Goods, Articles, and
Things Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue.” which voluntarily assumes the liabilities of safekeeping as a
“custodian” of the the dump truck.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain possession of the
property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew
his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. Said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not
relieve him from his responsibility.

Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, Petitioner Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in an information:

…[Accused] as depository/administrator of property seized/deposited by the BIR, having voluntarily offered himself to act as custodian
of one Isuzu Dumptruck and was authorized to be such under the authority of the BIR, has become a responsible and accountable officer
and said motor vehicle having been seized from Jaime C. Ancla in satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum of P80,831.59 became
a public property and the value thereof as public fund, with grave abuse of confidence and conspiring and confederating with said Jaime
C. Ancla, likewise, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his personal use and benefit the aforementioned motor vehicle or the value thereof in the aforestated amount, by then
and there allowing accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and tow away the said Isuzu Dumptruck with the
authority, consent and knowledge of the BIR, Butuan City, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of
P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.

The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan alleging that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the
preliminary investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not a public officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he was being charged with
malversation under the RPC. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991. After the reinvestigation,
Special Prosecution Officer Roger Berbano, Sr., recommended the "withdrawal of the information" but was "overruled by the
Ombudsman.
14
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on the ground that the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner since he was not a public officer, but the Sandiganbayan denied the motion and found him guilty of malversation.

Issues: both issues r related to each other

1. Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained
property. - no
2. Whether or not Azarcon is a public officer for being a “custodian” or “depository of distrained property” [because if hes a
public officer, he can be charged with malversation] - no

Ruling:
1. No. Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when
the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a
co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

2. No. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public officers:
Who are public officers. — For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of the book, any person who,
by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its
branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.

Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an
activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed
by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained
truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing
a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon
is not a public officer.

The prosecution argues that "Article 222 of the RPC defines the individuals covered by the term 'officers' under Article 217 of the
same Code. And accordingly, since Azarcon became "a depository of the truck seized by the BIR" he also became a public officer
who can be prosecuted under Article 217.

Article 222 of the RPC reads: Officers included in the preceding provisions. — The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private
individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to
any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs
to a private individual.

The Court is not persuaded. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." This is particularly observed in
the interpretation of penal statutes which "must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant.
”The language of the foregoing provision is clear.. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual
falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.
After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be
both private individuals erroneously charged before and convicted by Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over
them. It is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished
dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public
funds or property, the prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly charged
as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings
taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction

15
 6. Limitation of rule

People v. Gatchalian, G.R. Nos. L-12011-14, September 30, 1958 (Alejaga)

Doctrine: The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the State may be invoked only where the law is ambiguous
and there is doubt as to their interpretation. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for the application of the rule.

Facts: Alfonso Gatchalian was charged before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga with a violation of Section 3 of||| Minimum
Wage Law. He paid his employee Expedito Fernandez a monthly salary of P60-P90 which is less than that prived by the law.

On trial, he filed a motion to dismiss the Information on grounds that the violation charged does not constitute a criminal offense but
carries only a civil liability, and even if it does, the section of the law (Section 3, Minimum Wage Law) alleged to have been violated
does not carry any penalty penalizing it. Thus, inasmuch as the provisions of the law under which he was prosecuted are ambiguous and
there is doubt as to their interpretation, that doubt should be resolved in his favor because a penal statute should be strictly construed
against the State.

For his part, the City Attorney of Zamboanga argued that Section 3 which was violated by the accused carries with it both civil and
criminal liability, the latter being covered by Section 15 which provides for the penalty for all willful violations of any of the provisions
of the Minimum Wage Law.

However, the CFI, after hearing the arguments, dismissed the charge against Gathcalian. Thus, the present appeal

Issue: Whether or not Gatchalian should be held criminally and civilly liable in violating Sec. 3 of the Minimum Wage Law, although
the said provision does not provide penalties for the violation thereof

Ruling: Yes. It is true that Section 3 under which Gatchalian was charged does not state that it shall be unlawful for an employer to pay
his employees wages below the minimum wage but merely requires that the employer shall pay wages not below the minimum wage.
But failure of such declaration does not make the non-observance of the provisions less unlawful than otherwise, for such provision
embodies precisely the raison d'etre of the law itself. Indeed, Section 3 is the very provision on which all the other provisions of the law
are built. Thus, while Section 3 merely requires that the employer shall pay wages not below the minimum wage, Section 15 imposes
both a criminal penalty for a willful violation of any of the above provisions and a civil liability for any underpayment of wages due an
employee. The intention of the law is clear: to slap not only a criminal liability upon an erring employer for any willful violation of the
acts sought to be enjoined but to attach concurrently a civil liability for any underpayment he may commit as a result thereof. The law
speaks of a willful violation of "any of the provisions of this Act", which is all-embracing, and the same must include what is enjoined
in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted.

Thus, the contention accused that penal statue should be liberally construed in his favor must fail. The law here is clear and unambiguous,
and if such is the case then there is no room for the application of the principle invoked by the accused Gatchalian. The rule that penal
statutes should be strictly construed against the State may be invoked only where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to their
interpretation. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for the application of the rule.

7. Statutes in derogation of rights

8. Statutes authorizing expropriations
9. Statutes granting privileges
10. Legislative grants to local government units
11. Statutory grounds for removal of officials
12. Naturalizations law
13. Statutes imposing taxes and customs duties
14. Statutes granting tax exemptions

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107135, February 23, 1999 (Ruzol)
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Doctrine: Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals in affirming the decision of the Court of
Tax appeals requiring the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to credit the sales taxes paid by Central Vegetable Manufacturing Co., Inc.
(CENVOCO).

CENVOCO is a manufacturer of edible oil and coconut, coprameal cake and such other coconut related oil subject to the miller tax of
3%. In 1986, CENVOCO purchased a number of containers and packaging materials for its edible oil and thus paid the sales tax due.
After an investigation by the Revenue Examiner, CENVOCO was assessed for deciency miller’s tax (P1,575,514.70).

CENVOCO filed for a request for reconsideration with the CIR contending that the final provision of Sec 168 of the Tax Code does not
apply to sales tax paid on containers and packaging materials thus the amount CENVOCO has paid should have been credited against
the miller’s tax assessed against it. CIR replied with a letter reiterating the validity of the assessment.

CENVOCO filed for a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals which rendered a decision in favor of CENVOCO. An appeal
to the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CTA.

Issue: Whether or not the sales tax paid by CENVOCO when it purchased the containers and packaging materials for its edible oil can
be credited against the deficiency miller’s tax

Ruling: The law relied upon by the BIR Commissioner was just a proviso of Sec 168 of the old Tax Code:

“Provided, finally, That credit for any sales, miller's or excise taxes paid on raw materials or supplies used in the milling process shall
not be allowed against the miller's tax due, except in the case of a proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory as provided hereunder.”

The restriction in the proviso is limited only to sales, miller’s or excise taxes paid “on raw materials used in the milling process”.

The Court ruled that under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed.
They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than
the exception.

In the case at bar, the exception provided in Sec 168 of the Tax Code should be strictly construed. The sales, miller’s and excise tax paid
on all other materials (except on raw materials used in the milling process) such as sales taxes paid on containers and packaging materials
of the milled products may be credited against the miller’s tax due.

It is also a rule in statutory construction words and phrases used in the statute, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary,
should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage or meaning. In this case, containers and packaging materials are not raw
materials. Cans and tetrapacks are used to package the finished products of CENVOCO in.

Dispositive: dismissed petition and affirmed CA decision. There is no error in allowing sales taxes paid on the containers should be
credited against the miller’s tax due.

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INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES’ UNION (IBAA-EU) vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, and
IBAA (Narag)

DOCTRINE:
The provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit – it provides for both the
coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state
that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular
holiday pay.

FACTS:
The employees’ union filed a COMPLAINT against IBAA for the payment of holiday pay. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the
employees’ union. IBAA did not appeal this decision and began paying the holiday pay.

Later, a new PD amended the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Pursuant to this, the Department of Labor
promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads: “Sec. 2.
Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days
therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month
whether worked or not. For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by
365 days divided by twelve”

Later, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor interpreting the above-quoted rule, pertinent portions of which
read: “xxx xxx xxx
The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of monthly, only those
whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit.”

IBAA by reason of the ruling laid down by the aforecited rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction No.
9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to all its employees.
Writ of execution of the previously decided case for them to be paid their holiday pay was filed by the petitioner. Labor arbiter and
NLRC ruled in their favor. IBAA filed an MR to the Office of the Minister of Labor which set aside the decision of NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not holiday pay does not apply to monthly-paid employees?

HELD/RATIO: NO
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Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and
void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code’s provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended them by enlarging the scope of
their exclusion.

The provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit – it provides for both the
coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state
that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular
holiday pay.

The Secretary of Labor exceeded his statutory authority.

Lino Luna, vs. Rodriguez (Labrador)

Doctrine: It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the
election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where,
if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part.

Facts: An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held where Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando
de los Angeles were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes cast in the various municipalities were counted, and a
return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial board of canvassers, who, after a canvass of said returns,
proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez the winner. Against said proclamation Jose Lino Luna presented a protest In the Court of First Instance.

Judge McMahon found from the evidence that 50 ballots cast for Eulogio Rodriguez should not have been counted for him, and ordered
that number of votes deducted from his total. In the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon found that the inspectors did not close
the polls at 6 o'clock p. m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time, and directed that the total vote of Eulogio Rodriguez
should be reduced by the number of such votes. By deducting the said Votes in the municipality of Taytay and those cast after six o'clock
p. m. in the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon concluded that Jose Lino Luna had received a plurality of the legal -votes
cast at said election and ordered the provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly.

Issue: Are the provisions with reference to the time of opening and closing the polls mandatory? No.

Ruling: The law provides that "at all the elections held under the provisions of this Act the polls shall be open from seven o'clock in the
morning until six o'clock in the afternoon, during which period not more than one member of the board of inspectors shall be absent at
one time, and then for not to exceed twenty minutes at one time." It is admitted in the present case that the polls were not closed at 6 p.
m. The record shows that at 6 p. m. a large number of voters had not yet been able to vote and that, for that reason, an agreement was
made between some of the candidates for office who were present and the board of inspectors, to the effect that the polls should be kept
open in order that such electors might vote. One of the reasons why all of the voters of the municipality had not voted before 6 p. m.
was that the board of inspectors failed to have the list of voters properly prepared at 7 a. m., and therefore but few of the voters were
able to vote before eleven or eleven-thirty in the morning. That failure, on the part of the board of inspectors, made it impossible for
many of the voters of the municipality of Binangonan to vote before the regular time for the closing of the polls.

It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election,
but when it is sought to enforce them after the election they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are
held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. Irregularities in conducting an

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election and counting the votes, not proceeding from any wrongful intent and which deprives no legal voter of his vote, will not vitiate
an election or justify the rejection of the entire votes of a precinct.

The purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall
be their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted,
unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted
and the election should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their
government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible.

When the polls are kept open after the hour prescribed by the law for the purpose of defeating the will of the people, such a violation of
the law should result in annulling and setting aside the election of that precinct. No such facts exist in the present case. It is true, perhaps,
that a number of the votes cast after the hour for closing the polls were sufficient to change the result of the election, but the result would
have been the same had those same voters been permitted to vote, except for the negligence of the inspectors, during the regular hours
for voting. There seems to be no more reason for annulling the votes cast, after the hour for closing the election, than for annulling the
election for the reason that the inspectors failed to provide the means for voting at the time fixed for opening the polls in the morning.

We are firmly of the opinion that instead of depriving the innocent voters of their right to participate in the affairs of their government
for irregularities committed by the election inspectors, the latter should be proceeded against in a criminal action for failure, on their
part, to comply with the law and be punished

The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law are adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the
government, and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply
because the officers appointed, under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of elections, have not done their duty. The law
provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through
his ballot, should be protected and upheld.

As a result of the count of the ballots, cast in the various municipalities by the provincial board of inspectors, Eulogio Rodriguez received
4,321 votes, Jose Lino Luna received 4,157 votes and Servando de los Angeles received 3,576 votes. Servando de los Angeles did not
protest the election. From all of the foregoing, the total votes of Eulogio Rodriguez must be reduced by 50 votes, leaving him a total of
4,271 only, or a clear majority of 114 votes.

Therefore, with the modification herein indicated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed as modified, and it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the record be immediately returned to the lower court with direction that a judgment be entered directing and ordering the
provincial board of inspectors to amend its count accordingly. It is so ordered, without any finding as to costs.

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