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INTRODUCTION
Despite the increased interest in appraisal systems in business, their spread from manage
ment down to manual workers (Townley, 1990,1991; Swan, 19911, and their rapid growth
in further and higher education in Britain, there is still precious little interest in or research
on upward appraisal. This, in itself, may be puzzling given the extent to which many
businesses now openly professthemselves to be concerned with ‘empoweringthe workforce’
(Kirkpatrick, 1992) or ‘maximizing employee voice’ (McCabe and Lewin, 19921, either
through formal empowerment schemes, or, more commonly, as part of the move towards
Human Resource Management (Storey,1992)and Total Quality Management (Wdkinsonet
a1.,1992).
This article provides a critical overview of performance appraisals and develops some
arguments for supplementing traditional downward appraisals of subordinates with
upward appraisals of superordinates. It is primarily concerned with the epistemological
basis of appraisals, ie the quest for objectiveassessment,rather than the details of alternative
schemes and processes. It argues that the traditional criticism of appraisals - their subjectiv-
ity - leads to a fruitless search for ever more objectiveappraisal criteria that are illusory. The
appraisal does not so much discover ‘the truth‘ about the appraised as construct it. The
consequence need not be that appraisals should be abandoned but they should be treated
much more sceptically and reflexively. Moreover, rather than suffering from the effects of
this constructedworld we might benefit by embodying the perspective in an additional form
of performance assessment upward appraisal.
APPRAISING APPRAISAL
According to Stroul(1987), performance appraisal has been a ’staple‘element of personnel
management for over 35 years, though Gellerman and Hodgson (1988) add a further fifteen
years onto this in their appraisal of appraisals. In McGregofs (1957) celebrated article ‘An
Uneasy Look at Performance Appraisal’ he argued that appraisals had become standard
practice in many US companies during the previous twenty years. Appraisal systems, of
some sort at least, actually have a rather longer history: Swan (1991:16), for example, quotes
a third century Chinese appraisal assessment. The use of technology to monitor perform-
ances in ‘high tech’ manufacturers where any component failure ’would result in the
normative sanction of an identifying or “black” mark being placed above the operatofs
station’ (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992280) is hardly recent either. Robert Owen used similar
’silentmonitors’:a piece of wood mounted over a machinewith one of four colours to denote
daily performance. Arkwright went one better and provided different dresses for different
performances (Pollard, 1968225).
The similarities between past and present are also illustrated by developments in
performancerelated pay for teachers. The scheme under consideration at the time of writing
(December1992)would involve the provision of extra pay for those teachers deemed to be
performing well and the withholding of increments and pay rises for those deemed to be
failing. Interestingly, in 1862 the Revised Code of Regulations drawn u p by the Newcastle
Committee after a review of the education system suggested that ’the junior classes in the
schools,comprehendingthe great majorityof thechildren, do not learn, or learn imperfectly,
themost necessarypart of what they come tolearn- reading, writing and arithmetic’(quoted
in Hopkins, 1979:119).The response to this parlous state of affairs (which bears a perilously
close resemblance to almost all general complaints about education ever since) was
performance related pay:
The managers of schools may claim Id per scholar for every attendanceafter the first 100,
at the morning or afternoon meeting.One third of this sum thus claimable is forfeited if the
scholar fails to satisfy the inspector in reading, one third if in writing,and one third if in
arithmetic respectively. (Quoted in Hopkins, 1979120)
Thoseanxiousabout the value of such an appraisal scheme maybe relieved to know that the
only apparent benefit was a 16 per cent reduction in the annual grant provided by the
government.As Robert Lowe, the vice president of the committee, proclaimed to the House
of Commons: ‘if it is not cheap it shall be efficient; if it is not efficient, it shall be cheap’
(Hopkins, 1979:120).Performance related pay was abandoned by the end of the nineteenth
century.
Such ‘under-performing’ teachers became early victims of the behavioural appraisal
approach - what you do as opposed to what you are like. Its primary alternative, the trait
approach, which was developed initially by the US and UK military after the end of the
Second World War (Randell, 1989), tends to be restricted to non-managerial appraisal
schemes (Long, 1986).In the USA,at least, trait-based appraisals received a considerable
attack at the hands of McGregor (1957), Whisler and Harper (1962), and Maier (1952,1958).
Despitesome subsequent recovery (Gill, 1977),trait-based appraisal systems have generally
slipped into the background over the last two decades as researchers have found few
signhcant correlations between ‘positive’ traits (responsibility, friendliness, etc.) and
‘constructive’behaviour or action (Kane and Lawler, 1979; Gill et al., 1973).Moreover, the
behavioural approach is preferred on the grounds that behaviour can be objectively
observed, while traits are merely subjective assessments. Other appraisal schemes include
written reports (500words on why X should not have your job); peer ranking (why Y, your
best friend, is better than X, who regularly beats you at squash); ‘criticalincidents‘(what did
X do when you dumped responsibility for making 500 employees redundant on X’s lap);
management by objectives (why did X not achieve the impossible sales target you set last
year);and finally the ultimate challenge in appraisal schemes- the NMJ (Not my Job)scheme
(Xis so good at doing that subordinate job that X really should stay there and not take mine).
Such approaches include a wide variety of forms of appraisal that range from written to oral
and whose focus alters from process to content.
There seems to be considerable, though not universal, dislike of and dissatisfactionwith,
all performance appraisal systems to some degree. Crudely speaking, human resource
managers seem favourablyinclined, line managers much less so.In the graphic words of one
such line manager from County NatWest Group Ltd.: 'Performance appraisal is a load of
rubbish. You decide on the rating you want in the box and then make up a few words of
narrative in the other sections to justify it' (quoted by Carlton and Sloman, 199286).
Appraisals designed to provide private feedback which are not entrammelled by pay or
promotion issues are often far more popular. Some organisationshave attempted to embody
this 'safer' approach to appraisal in their own schemes. One education authority, for
example, officially considers teacher appraisals to be
Yet scepticism remains and this relates to both the process of undertaking and responding
to the appraisal, and the well known 'distortions' that are likely in the assessment itself. In
the latter category the most popularly acknowledged 'distortions' are manifest in several
forms. The 'Halo Effect' (Guilford, 1954)is the result of an assessmentwhich is based on one
specificcriterion that distorts the assessmentof others. Alternately, what might be called the
Crony Effect, is the result of an assessment distorted by the closeness of the personal
relationship between the appraiser and the appraised. A variant of the Crony Effect is the
Doppelgunger Effect, where the rating reflects the similarity of character or behaviour
between the appraiser and the appraised (Wexley and Yukl, 197'7). Finally, there is the
Veblen Effect, so named after Veblen's habit of giving all his students 'Cs' irrespechve of
their quality, where all those appraised end up with moderate scores (Dorfman, 19611. Some
of the more significant social characteristics which are also alleged to affect appraisals
include the gender of both appraiser and appraised, with the tendency for women to receive
lower ratings; the ethnic origin,with similarityof ethnicitybetween appraiser and appraised
tending to lead to higher scores;and age, with increasing age correlating with decreasing
assessment (Smither, 19881656).
But whatever the distortions that are likely to impair appraisals, one thing seems to be
immune to all forms of bias: just as most people like to be the bearer of good news so most
people dislike being the messenger of doom. This is clearly apparent in the general
reluctance of managers to undertake appraisals of their subordinates which are less than
enthusiasticand deemed likely to have a negativeeffect on that person's work effort. Indeed,
it is the lack of interpersonal skills on the part of managers (as well as a general distrust of
the validity of the system) that is often cited as their reason for avoiding the task wherever
possible. McGregor (19571,for instance, suggests the underlying reason for managerial
resistanceis a dislike of 'playing god', especiallywhen managers are constantly exhorted to
besupportiveof, rather than authoritarian with, their subordinates. In the words of Edwards
(198917),'many managers prefer dental appointments to playing ''God'' in preparing
appraisals', a view supported in the most recent ACAS paper on motivating and rewarding
staff (Ridley, 1992). Little wonder that most people, appraisers and appraised, approach
appraisals with high levels of anxiety - much of this rooted in the common assumption that
appraisals are often 'political' in nature. That is, they are mechanismsfor justifying decisions
already taken and without regard to individual merit. Those appraised also tend to believe
that appraisers, like their schemes,are often less than honest and potentially unbshvorthy
(Longeneckerand Gioia, 1988).
Accordingto Swan (1991:27-8), besides such 'political' concernsthere are many common
errors made in the development and use of appraisal schemes, including inadequately
defined standards of performance, reliance on gut feeling, unclear performance documen-
tation, and inadequatetime for discussion.But since formal performanceappraisal systems
have been subjected to constant criticism and reconstruction over the last fifty years one
might ask, 'why, in the constant process of appraisal systems revisions, can't we seem to get
it right?' (Metz, 1988.47). In some areas, notably halo errors, 'despite over 80 years of
research ... the causes and consequences are still poorly understood' (Murphyand Anhalt,
1992494).What evidencewe have certainly seemsto support a justified scepticism of their
utility. In their review of executiveappraisals, Longeneckerand Gioia suggestthat 'although
over 90per cent of all organizations in the US employ some typeof appraisal system, it has
been estimated that less than 20 per cent of performance appraisals are done effectively'
(1988:41). Moreover, they suggest that the higher the level in the organisation the less
-
frequently and the less satisfactoryare the appraisals despite the increased significanceof
individual performance at this level and the persistent demand for appraisal of their own
performanceby senior executives.This is all in sharp contrast to the claimsmade on behalf
of performance appraisals which, we are led to believe, can
Rarely in the history of business can such a system have promised so much and delivered
so little.
Most of the explanationsfor the inadequacy of the systems relate either to the complexity
of the variablesbeing assessedor the subjectiveelementsthat confusethe assessment.Efforts
can be made to lessen the scope for subjectivityby relying upon assessment criteria that are
-
allegedly more objective the financialperformance of a group, section or department, for
example. However, this can hardly be helpful in developing the skills of the appraised;the
problem also remains that the rewards due to, and progress of, a subordinateare usually in
the hands of a single superordinate.This may not matter too much if other appraisers are
involved or if the significance of any single appraisal is marginal to the subordinate's
prospects; or indeed if the contribution of such a subordinateto the successof the enterprise
is minimal(thoughif the latter is the case then onewonders why an appraisalschemeis used
at all).
There is also a fundamental problem with appraisals of individuals by individuals:
individuals only act within social situations. This not only problematises an appraisal
system grounded in assumptionsabout the abilities and attributes of individuals (Salaman,
19801, but it also ignores the extent to which these same individuals will have to work with
their appraisers after the appraisal. This is not to overlook the point that a major aim of
appraisalschemesand performancerelated pay is to limit the collectiveaspects of work and
individualisethe relationship; F.W. Taylor would indeed be impressed. But, as those who
implementedTaylorismthe first time round found to their cost, there are as many problems
as there are advantages to individualisation.As Russel and Goode (1988) have suggested,
the highest level of satisfactionwith appraisal systems tends to relate to those subordinates
who already have a satisfactoryrelationship with their appraising superordinate(see also
Burke, Weitzel and Weir, 1978; Anderson and Barrett, 1987; and Geary, 1992). In effect, a
poor relationship with your superordinateis bad for both your own and your organisation's
health. But there is another aspect of the appraisal that has a fundamentally social, rather
than an individual, essence: the 'reality' which we construct.
Overall, the literature on peer assessment suggests that supervisorsand their subordinates
typically evaluate different aspects of performance. Consequently, it is difficult to deter-
mine if one approach is more accurate than the other.
In other words, the multiplicity of views reflectsthe unscientificnature of the procedure, not
the sociallyconstructednature of what we take tobe 'reality'. The consistentmessage is clear:
only those pictures of the world which reduce it to clear, simply manipulable variables are
of any practical help to managers.When such variables lead to hard prescriptive rules - and
when the implemented rules fail to generate successful outcomes - the fault is laid at the
inadequate objectivityand inadequate clarity about the world, rather than the lack of clarity
which we necessarily have as we construct, rather than discover, the world.
The assumption that others construct us, and construct us in potentially limitless ways,
is critically important if the major part of the management process involves interrelating
with others. In terms of assessment, it is also crucial in that the relationships between
individuals appear to become more tightly constrained as the status distance between them
increases. The result is that, as we ascend the hierarchy, the superordinates are less and less
likely to be aware of what their subordinates think of them and their performance. This
'difference of opinion' is also replicated through the contending constructions of corporate
culture, with an 'official' version and probably several 'subordinate' subcultural versions
(see Fortado, 1992). Of course, if the superordinate really does not care what his or her
subordinates think, this may not be a problem - except that such a response may itself be an
effective inhibitor of subordinate work.
The problem here is the distinctionbetween 'what actuallytranspires' - 'reality' -and 'what
the employeeperceives'. If the employeemisconstrues'reality', who has a faithful rendering
of it?Presumablythe appraiser does -but why should their perceptionbe any more accurate
than that of the appraised?And who adjudicatesbetween rival claims of accuracy? A third
party who has some special insight into 'reality'? The point here is twofold. First, since
'reality' is constructed in and through our interpretive processes (which are social not
individual in nature because of our reliance upon language),we are really left with rival
interpretations of reality, not interpretations that can easily be judged right or wrong.
Second,thesignificanceofthispoint liesinKleinetal.'sargumentabouttheroleofthesevery
interpretive processes, which they wish to subordinateto some magical objechvity embod-
ied, presumably, in management. It is categorically not that everyone's interpretationsare
as good as anyone else's - there is not an anarchy of competingintepretationshere and it is
not the case that 'anything goes'. On the contraryjthe conventional result is that the most
powerfully resourced renderingof 'reality' is the one that prevails, becomes legitimate-and
thereby delegitimatesall alternatives.Essentially, it is usually not what the appraised thinks
has transpired which accounts for his or her subsequent reward package, it is what the
appraiser thinks that normally carries more weight - and with the weight the reward or the
punishment.
So is there a 'constructivist' solutionto this problem?It is unlikely if a solutionimpliesthat
there is, after all, a way to measure performance objectively and in a way that everyonewill
acceptas legitimate.That being the case, there are (at least)two further approachesthat may
be worth considering.The first is simplyto acceptthe difficultiesinvolvedand note how they
will lead to particular forms of appraisal. In effect, the appraisal constructs rather than
reflects the appraised and this should be borne in mind when any appraisal system used.
Caveat emptor should perhaps be requiredas a government 'health' warning on the front of
all appraisal schemes.This is especiallyimportant if the appraisalsystem is geared towards
altering the behaviour of the appraised in line with the appraisal: if the appraiser changes
or indeed unless one can guarantee the appraisal will be constructed in precisely the same
way the next time round, then changing patterns of behaviour may be irrelevant to the
acquisition of a superiorappraisal (see Murphy and Anhalt, 1992). Appraisal systems,then,
do not so much discover the skillsof those appraised as create them. To take an exampleclose
to the hearts of many readers, in academia it has long been the case that one of the simplest
criteria for academic appraisal is the number of publications. The result of promoting this
criterion has been to stimulateacademicsto 'publish or be damned'. Whether the quality of
the publications suffers as a result of this appraisal criterion, or whether other aspects of
academicskills,such as teaching abilityjare adversely affected,is anybodfs guess. But the
point really is that the criteria used are not reflectionsof pre-existing or objective character-
istics, rather they are active in producing the characteristics which they then purport to
measure objectively.
The second alternative is rather more radical and suggests that we should accept the
plurality of appraisal constructionsand make positive use of them. In particular, we might
try to embody the principles in the appraisal scheme rather than consider them as a
persistent and ineradicable nuisance. One such scheme involves inverting the traditional
direction of appraisals altogether:upward appraisal.
UPWARD APPRAISAL
Upward appraisal is far less popular than downward appraisal, although not novel in the
USA. Most writers suggest that upward appraisal began in IBM in the 1960s, and by 1985
there were suggestions that around 20 per cent of US companieswere experimentingwith
it (Kiechel, 19891,though a larger survey puts the proportion undertaking peer review (the
lessradical scheme)at 5per cent (Bulaho,1991).Though somelargecorporationsin the USA,
such as Pratt and Whitney, Digital Equipment Corporation and AT&T, do use it, the
proportionundertakingupward appraisalis probablymuch smaller - despiteall the current
talk about employee empowerment. The appraisal of teachers and lecturers by their
students is also common there, and beginning to develop in the UK, but it is still rare in
British companies and only a few pioneering firms,like W.H. Smith and BP Exploration,
have taken it up.
Upward appraisal has its roots in democratic theory and practice going back as far as
ancientGreekdemocracies,whoseinstitutionswere open to all adult male citizensand were,
with the exception of some military positions, not open to re-election. That Athenian
generals, for example, seemed privileged by their potentially permanent employment
should be tempered by the recognition that the upward appraisal system in operation
included not just a tenured position for the successful but capital punishment for the
unsuccessful (see Finley, 1963; Held, 1987).
Democracy is not something that business usually involves itself in. In the main, the
argument has swung forcefully towards the Weberian argument that efficient administra-
tion requires hierarchies of expertise, manifest by that most rationalised form of organisa-
tion: bureaucracy. Organisationsthat are grounded in images and institutions of hierarchi-
cal expertise positively discourage subordinate intervention in superordinate decision-
making. That is to say, while subordinates in bureaucracies may be actively involved in
either ensuring their tasks are properly executed or in developing routines to protect
themselvesfrom superordinatecriticism,they are seldomencouragedto help superordinates
solve organisationalproblems. As a result, a huge array of talent, skill and expertiseis lost
to the organisation. The upshot of this approach is classicallydisplayed in British manage-
ment and trade unions.For generations management have taken major decisionswithout
any significantinput from unions or employees,and for generationsunions and employees
have reciprocated by delegating all responsibility to those that traditionally make the
decisions. The 'irresponsibility' of the 'permanent opposition' has left the unions and
employees basically impotent and managers bereft of any advice beyond that which
cascades from above or seeps sideways from their peers.
Upward appraisals are problematic, given this background, in so far as they inculcate an
apparent reversal of roles. They are also potentially compromised by another common
problem of conventional appraisals: either the appraiser is regarded as deflating the
appraisal of junior staff in revenge for some misdemeanour or to ensure that the office
favourite securesthe best appraisal; or the appraiser inflatesthe appraisals of all those being
appraised in the knowledge that such an exemplary set of appraisals reflects favourably on
the manager who leads such a dedicated team. Naturally, the opposite tack can also be
employed: a troublesome team member is provided with a first class appraisal in the hope
that he or she will secure promotion and move out. In the case of upward appraisals the
appraisers may still be ‘out to get’ their superordinate, but if they are, the superordinate
probably ought to know about it rather than be unaware of the ‘conspiracy‘. Nonetheless,
the experience of T-Groups from the 1960s onwards is that sometimes the ‘honest opinions’
of subordinates look more like the barbs on a whale harpoon than gentle and constructive
nudges. This is something which is likely to occur at some time, but it also depends on the
situation in which the appraisal takes place. An array of academic research on group
behaviour has pointed to the likelihood of extreme group decisions in comparison with the
conservative nature of individual decisions Uanis, 1972; McCauley, 19891, and certainly
some writers have advocated upward appraisals that consciously avoid any form of ‘active’
group appraisal (Levinson, 1987). But where such an appraisal is constructed it is surely
worth consideringthe actions which stimulated the poor review and resolving the problem,
rather than suffering the consequences.
There are other consequences of a shift towards upward appraisals which may not be so
self-evident but which may prove significant. For example, supervisors may interact
differently with their subordinates,especiallyas the period of appraisalapproaches. But this
need not be considered a detrimental effect since close cooperationbetween team and team
leader is one of the primary aims of the system anyway. Indeed, where cooperation is not
improved, or at least where there is no evident improvement in the team performance, one
might conclude either that the appraisal system is having no apparent effect or that the
manager involved requires some additional help in securing the requisite improvement.
Edwards (1989) certainly claims that team-based appraisals generated sigruhcant produc-
tivity enhancements amongst Faculty at Arizona State University, at Westinghouse Corpo-
ration’s steam turbine generator division, and at the Salt River Project in the south west of
the USA, but this does not mean that the multiple appraisal system is ’objective’ or ‘accurate‘.
If the results were to increase the productivity there is still no necessary connection to a
model of objective accuracy in the appraisal system; a system which (erroneouslyin the eyes
of the members) regarded all members of a team as idlers - and also threatened them with
unemployment in the absence of extra effort - might still generate enough motivation to
secure that improvement, however allegedly inaccurate the assessment.
Upward appraisal, then, replaces the subjectivity of a single author appraisal with the
subjectivity of a collective author appraisal. This, of course, still leaves us bereft of an
objective appraisal, but it is perhaps less likely to be wholly fabricated: if all the appraisals
are positive then, other things being equal, the superordinatesubordinates relationship is
at the very least constructive.If all the appraisals are negativethen, other things being equal,
there is obviously a problem with the staff-managementrelationship - or the manager or the
staff. It may be that the manager above the appraised superordinate regards that manager
as good despitethe negative appraisals (or even because of them), nevertheless evidence of
the state of play is always a useful attribute. Moreover, there are (many) cases where
superordinatesaresimply unaware of their subordinates’attitudestowardsthem and deny
the very possibility that something is wrong. A sheaf of appraisals all pointing in the same
negativedirectionis probably a more useful tool in the hands of someoneseeking to change
therelationshipthangoing on uncorroborated hearsay.This alsoappliesto the subordinates
who may, for whatever reason, have refrained from telling their superordinate about the
problematic nature of the relationship. If such problems are left unresolved and do have
negative consequences for performance,the possibility of airing one’s feelings may be the
first opportunity for improvingthe situation. If organisationsare serious about involving
their employees in a much wider variety of tasks and responsibilitiesthan has traditionally
been the case, it would be unwise to assume that the provision of opportunities, in and of
themselves, will lead automatically to an increase in employee involvement. Rather
managers must provide opportunitiesfor employeesto learn to participatein organisations
that have hitherto not encouraged them to get involved in areas beyond the task level. As
Pateman (1970) has argued, participation begets participation. In effect, participation is a
skill which has to be learned and, in the absence of such learning experiences, individuals
become, rather thaninherentlyare, disinterestedin participation. What better way to impress
upon employeesthat their voice actually matters than embodying it in an appraisal of their
superordinate?
USA the authors argued that ‘any notion that employees would always side with one
another was immediately dispelled. Employee panellists are equally concerned at looking
for a just decision,and oftentend to be tougher on their co-workersthan managementwould
be‘ (quotedby Ventura and Harvey, 1988:51).In the Raritan River Steel casea criticalbenefit
of the peer review system was also the utility of the process in stavingoff union intervention,
but this is not an essential element of peer review and even more contingently related to
upward appraisals.
The military have also been influentialin the developmentof peer reviews. In the USA the
-
peer review system has become known colloquiallyas the SYB system Screw Your Buddy
- with strong hints that where reviews are linked to promotional opportunities, the
competitivespirit tends to prevail over disinterested assessment (Trainingand Development,
1991). But despite the SYB system the upshot of most peer reviews is that teams also want
someresponse to their feedbackto peers or manager. Thisis clearly tricky in that the remarks
will have to remain anonymousto protect the subordinatesand the manager will not want
his or her failingsto be exposed in a way that opens him or her to ridicule. Nevertheless,the
manager will need to demonstratethat the commentsarebeing taken seriouslyand thismay
involve a team meeting to discuss the broad issues raised, rather than anythingtoo spectfic.
A third party may also help in this area,both in interpretingthe originaldata for the manager
and in acting as a mediator in the final team debriefing.
A third way to avoid negative reactions to upward appraisal is to explain to those being
appraised from the very beginning that what is about to happen is merely the formalisation
of what already exists. Each and every day we are all appraised by someone and are
appraisingothers. Admittedly, such appraisalstend to be covertor at least camouflaged,but
they are still appraisals. Moreover, if we are not made aware of our limitations, and are not
aware of them ourselves, how are we supposed to transcend such limitations?It would be
a strange manager who refused to accede to upward appraisal on the basis that they were
already perfect, and far more likely that refusal was grounded in fear of the consequences
to their self-image or position within the company.
On the other hand, any overt relationship between upward appraisal and career or job
security is likely to push the risks involved beyond an acceptable level and turn the whole
system into a mutual supporters’ club subordinatesprovide glowing references for their
manager in returnfor subsequentfavours.If the criterionfor successis future activity,rather
than positive feedback h m subordinates, this cynical mutuality is considerablyless likely
and less important anyway.
It is perhaps worth emphasisingat this point that the reviews are not likely to be totally
negative. On the contrary, most managers are likely to get some kind of positive feedback
from their subordinates and it may well be the first time that such feedback has occurred.
After all, few subordinates bother to tell their manager that they are doing a good job and
most are likely to remain silent until somethinggoes wrong. In effect, since managers tend
to hear nothing but complaints, on the assumption that no news is good news, it may welI
provea useful fillipfor many to hear from their staff that they are actuallypretty good at their
job.
It is also worth bearing in mind that some areas of managers’ jobs will be beyond the
experienceof most of their subordinatesand consequentlyshould not be evaluated by them.
This too can be used as a constructiveadvance rather than seen as a problem since it may
highlight areas that subordinates were hitherto unaware of, and thus unable to relate to, in
their accounts of managers’ actions (Normanand Zawacki, 1991).W.H.Smith’s experience
suggeststhat employeesarewell awarethat managementis concernedwith more than being
pleasant to subordinatesand that sometimes harsh decisionshave to be taken. That said, it
did raise a lot of questions about the interpersonal skills deployed by managers (Financial
Times, 10February 1992).Moreover,it confirms the point that upward appraisalsshould be
seen as an additional element in the appraisal armoury, not as the sole occupier of the
position left vacant by a displaced downward appraisal.
This still leaves a major stumbling block in the shape of unpersuaded or suspicious
managers. But if the underlying philosophy of the upward appraisal system is one which
espouses the single cultural model - the image of a team or a crew in a lifeboat - a system as
potentially disruptiveas this is only likely to succeed where those nominally in charge take
the plunge too. After all, if feedback about performance (or at least the level of honesty)
declines as one climbs the hierarchy, CEOs are likely to know very little about their image
within a company. If, as the CEO may imply, the medicine is entirely safe and positively
health-enhancing, then let us see the CEO directly involved too. On the other hand, if
upward appraisals are not involved in any change towards a more participative style, then
subordinatesmight be justified in questioningthe intentionsof the superordinates:are they
concerned with empowering subordinates or just exploiting them in more subtle ways?
The possibility of excessive resistance to upward appraisal should not be exaggerated:
there is, after all, much evidence that all managers seek regular feedbackon their perform-
ance (Longenecker and Gioia, 1991). Indeed, were managers to insist on shooting the
messenger all the time, or at least ensuring they never delivered their message, one might
begin to wonder what precisely was so damning - and whether somethingshould be done
about it.
CONCLUSION
This article has considered the relatively long and generally unhappy life of performance
appraisal schemes. Despite the applicationof several generationsof specialists in the field,
the ineffectiveness and alleged inaccuracy of appraisal schemes have tended to lead those
seeking to improve them deeper and deeper into the labyrinth that promises an objective
solution to the subjectiveproblem. It has not been argued that we should thereforeabandon
the existingappraisal methods.Indeed, if they coerce managers into a greater consideration
of the effortsof their subordinates,then at least someuseful purpose may be served by them.
On the other hand, the approach developed here suggests that it might well be more
productiveto retrace our stepsout of the objectivitylabyrinthand accept our subjectivefate.
This is particularly so in the light of theoreticaldevelopmentsmade in socialconstructivism
which pose a vision of reality that is imposed upon the world rather than one that reflects
the world. The upshot is not that we should abandon appraisal schemes but we should
consider them more scepticallyand more reflexively. Indeed, one way to move beyond the
present impasse is to embody the subjective approach in the performance assessement
schemes by developingupward appraisals. This is particularly by apposite in the wake of
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank John Batey, Jim Dukes, Gerry Grint, Sandra Grint, Ian
Kessler, Keith Lathrope, John Purcell and Peter Seglow for their help and advice in the
development of this article.
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