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Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 10/08/2019 11:10 AM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by N. Alvarez,Deputy Clerk


19STCV35879
Assigned for all purposes to: Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Judicial Officer: Barbara Scheper

1 Jason C. Marsili (SBN 233980)


Brianna Primozic Rapp (SBN 274397)
2 Amanda Pitrof (SBN 307530)
ROSEN MARSILI RAPP LLP
3 3600 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1800
Los Angeles, CA 90010-1800
4 phone: (213) 389-6050
facsimile: (213) 389-0663
5 jmarsili@rmrllp.com
brapp@rmrllp.com
6 apitrof@rmrllp.com
7
Attorneys for Plaintiff
8 CHRISTINA KRAUSE
9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
11
12 CHRISTINA KRAUSE, an individual, CASE NO.
13 Plaintiff, COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
14 v.
1. Gender Discrimination
15 CANOO, INC. f/k/a EVELOZCITY, a 2. Marital Discrimination
Delaware Corporation; STEFAN KRAUSE, an 3. Violation of California Equal Pay Act
16 Individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 4. Harassment
17 5. Failure to Prevent Harassment
Defendants. 6. Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(i)
18 7. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public
Policy
19 8. Breach of Contract
20 9. Violation of Right of Privacy Under
California Constitution Art I, sec. 1
21 10. Common Law Invasion of Privacy
11. Quantum Meruit
22
23 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

24
25
26 COMES NOW Plaintiff Christina Krause and for causes of action against Defendants, and

27 each of them, alleges the following:

28
1 THE PARTIES

2 1. Plaintiff Christina Krause (“Plaintiff”) is and, at all times relevant hereto, was a

3 resident of the City of Los Angeles in the State of California.

4 2. Defendant Canoo, Inc. (“Canoo” or “Company”) is and, at all times relevant hereto,

5 was a startup electric vehicle company, formerly known as Evelozcity, and located in Los Angeles

6 with its principle place of business located in Torrance, California.

7 3. Defendant Stefan Krause (“Krause”) is, and at all times relevant hereto, was a

8 founding member, Chief Executive Officer, and formerly named “In Charge” of Defendant Canoo.

9 Defendant Krause is domiciled in the State of California and a resident of the City of Los Angeles.

10 Canoo and Krause are referred to herein collectively as “Defendants” where appropriate.

11 4. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants in the State of

12 California, performing her duties and responsibilities in the county of Los Angeles.

13 5. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants Canoo and Krause maintained the practical

14 ability to prevent the alleged statutory violations stated herein, including the authority to

15 promulgate work rules, assignments, and duties and responsibilities; set employees’ hours of work

16 and conditions of employment; and oversight of the day-to-day supervision of employees. Neither

17 Canoo nor Krause may shield themselves from liability for statutory violations by delegating some

18 level of control to one Defendant.

19 6. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants were agents, servants, employees,

20 successors, and/or assigns of each other. Defendants, at all times mentioned herein, were acting

21 within the course and scope of their authority as such agents, servants, employees, successors,

22 and/or assigns.

23 DOE ALLEGATIONS

24 7. The true names and capacities, whether corporate, associate, individual, or

25 otherwise of Defendants DOES 1 through 10 inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore

26 sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE

27 is negligently or otherwise legally responsible in some manner for the events and happenings

28 herein referred to and thereby proximately caused injuries and damages to Plaintiff as herein

1
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 alleged. Plaintiff will ask leave of Court to amend this Complaint to show their true names and

2 capacities when the same have been ascertained.

3 INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

4 8. As the personal fiefdom of Defendant Stefan Krause, Defendant Canoo (formerly

5 known as Evelozcity) terminated Plaintiff Christina Krause as an extension of Defendant Krause’s

6 estrangement from and infidelity to his wife of seven years. In doing so, Defendant Canoo scorned

7 the legal rights of Plaintiff in order to assuage the ego of its man In Charge. Despite Plaintiff’s

8 tireless effort to build Canoo since its inception, Plaintiff was treated inferiorly to her male

9 counterparts by virtue of her status as Defendant Krause’s wife. When the marriage between

10 Plaintiff and Defendant Krause began to deteriorate, Defendant Krause used his position and

11 influence throughout Canoo to antagonize, belittle, and otherwise harass Plaintiff, while inciting

12 Canoo employees and investors to follow suit. Defendant Krause’s antagonism of Plaintiff quickly

13 spread to other employees of Defendant Canoo known to socialize with Plaintiff, while Plaintiff

14 Krause herself was systematically placed under increasing oversight and stripped of her previous

15 duties and responsibilities. Defendants’ harassment of Plaintiff escalated to result in the hiring of a

16 private investigator to follow Plaintiff around and photograph her during non-work hours, after

17 which Plaintiff was placed under “formal investigation” and ultimately terminated.

18 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

19 9. Plaintiff and Defendant Krause were married on July 14, 2012.

20 10. In October 2017, while Plaintiff and Defendant Krause were traveling in Hong

21 Kong, Defendant Krause met with Pak Tam “David” Li and David Stern—two eventual investors

22 in Defendant Canoo—about starting a new electric vehicle company.

23 11. At the conclusion of the meeting, Defendant Krause, David Li, and David Stern

24 entered into a gentlemen’s agreement to start an electric vehicle company. Defendant Krause was

25 tasked with securing talent to develop the electric vehicle. David Li and David Stern would

26 provide the necessary startup capital. Plaintiff was responsible for the Company’s formation,

27 administrative functions, logistics, and other business-related tasks.

28

2
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 12. Given her previous business experience, Plaintiff was well-suited to oversee the

2 administration, operations, and communication functions of Defendant Canoo. From 1997 to

3 2003, Plaintiff worked at BMW Financial Services as a Sales Program Analyst in the marketing

4 department, responsible for all dealer communications, residual value portfolio management,

5 company handbook creation, as well as various marketing activities. Additionally, Plaintiff had

6 previously started two of her own companies: (1) Chrissy’s Closet, an exclusive fashion boutique

7 in Palma de Mallorca, Spain; and (2) Belongers, a luxury handbag and accessories company in

8 New York City. As a result of these two small start-ups, Plaintiff had the expertise needed to form

9 a company, and from BMW, Plaintiff had gained valuable process-oriented experience that

10 allowed her to set up proper policy and procedures for Defendant Canoo.

11 13. One evening at home in early November 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant Krause were

12 discussing naming the Company over a glass of wine and ultimately selected Evelozcity as

13 Defendant Canoo’s original name. Plaintiff thereafter obtained and registered the domain

14 www.evelozcity.com from her personal GoDaddy account and the two started planning the future

15 of Defendant Canoo.

16 * * *

17 14. Plaintiff was named the First and Sole Director of Defendant Canoo. Plaintiff

18 performed all of the administrative work regarding the formation of the company along with

19 Andrew Wolston (“Wolston”)—the eventual General Counsel of Defendant Canoo.

20 15. As Director, Plaintiff was responsible for securing a financial institution to serve as

21 the corporate bank of Defendant Canoo, including the receipt of investment funding. Plaintiff

22 selected Silicon Valley Bank, which was accustomed to working with start-up companies and was

23 able to efficiently set up Defendant Canoo’s bank accounts.

24 16. Plaintiff and Wolston also engaged and worked with Silicon Beach Talent to recruit

25 employees for Defendant Canoo, and Plaintiff also hired a public relations firm to handle

26 forthcoming press.

27 17. Plaintiff located Defendant Canoo’s first office location in El Segundo, California,

28 and secured the lease for the office location through Plaintiff’s personal credit. Plaintiff initiated a

3
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 corporate Verizon account for mobile phone usage and opened a corporate credit account for

2 Defendant Canoo, again securing both with her personal credit.

3 18. As Director, Plaintiff was also responsible for reviewing and executing contracts on

4 Canoo’s behalf, including but not limited to the contracts with Silicon Valley Bank, Silicon Beach

5 Talent, Applecentricity, an IT services company, and Verizon.

6 * * *

7 19. As a direct result of Plaintiff’s efforts, Defendant Canoo was formed in November

8 2017, and by December 2017, comprised a team of ten (10) individuals, including Defendant

9 Krause and Plaintiff. A true and correct copy of the photograph of Defendant Canoo’s founding

10 members is attached hereto as Attachment A. The photograph depicted on Attachment A was

11 hung in Defendant Canoo’s Torrance, California, office location on the wall of Company

12 milestones, a true and correct photograph of which is attached hereto as Attachment B. The

13 photograph depicted on Attachment A was also included in the history timeline on the Company

14 website until July 2019.

15 20. Despite Plaintiff being the Director, as well as her personal contributions to

16 Defendant Canoo since its inception, including the personal credit backing of Defendant Canoo

17 and its entire working operation, Plaintiff—the only female member of the founding team—was

18 not considered a “Founder” by Defendant Canoo or awarded an equity stake in the Company.

19 21. When Plaintiff confronted Defendant Krause about being named a “Founder” of

20 Defendant Canoo—like the other nine (9) male members of the founding team—Defendant Krause

21 informed her that she was not qualified because her “role wasn’t critical for the building of the

22 car.” Defendant Krause further told Plaintiff that because she was his wife, for Plaintiff to ask for

23 more would be distasteful. Defendant Krause rationalized his statements to Plaintiff on the notion

24 that—as Defendant Krause’s wife—they would share all of his equity in Defendant Canoo.

25 Therefore, Plaintiff’s suggested recognition as a “Founder” would be considered greedy.

26 22. Defendant Canoo nonetheless employed Plaintiff for the position of “In Charge of

27 Administration,” a title which would later be modified to include “In Charge of Administration &

28 Communications.” The formal offer of employment from Defendant Canoo afforded Plaintiff an

4
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 annual salary of $140,000, with a stock option to purchase 12,000 ordinary shares of Company

2 stock. With this title, Plaintiff was responsible for all Human Resource functions including

3 recruiting, Information Technology, Internal/External Global Communications, Facilities, and the

4 Administrative team.

5 23. By comparison, Defendant Krause and Ulrich Kranz (“Kranz”), both officially

6 recognized as Founders, were each granted two and one half million (2,500,000) shares of stock,

7 and each were compensated at annual salaries of $720,000. With the exception of Plaintiff, every

8 member present at the time of Defendant Canoo’s formation earned a salary of at least $260,000.

9 * * *

10 24. Notwithstanding Defendants’ diminished view of Plaintiff, for nearly a year after its

11 creation, Plaintiff was responsible for accelerating the rapid growth of the Company, regularly

12 advancing payment for the Company’s expenditures with her personal American Express credit

13 line, with expenses frequently exceeding $500,000 each month. Additionally, when the Company

14 was sued by Faraday Future in January 2018, Plaintiff managed the public relations crisis on behalf

15 of the company and all employees of Defendant Canoo that were involved in the litigation. In

16 addition to the PR efforts during this time, Plaintiff also coached and helped each of the founders,

17 as an Employee Relations function of Human Resources.

18 25. In January 2018, Plaintiff located and secured a second office location for

19 Defendant Canoo—referred to throughout the Company as the “coffee shop”—which was needed

20 to accommodate the steady influx of employees resulting from Defendant Canoo’s rapid growth.

21 26. In March 2018, Defendant Canoo grew to one hundred employees, ultimately

22 needing a third location in El Segundo, which was referred to throughout the Company as the

23 “graffiti house,” again secured by Plaintiff.

24 27. It was clear from the growth of Defendant Canoo that a corporate headquarters was

25 needed. Plaintiff was responsible for the initial selection process to find a Global Headquarters for

26 Defendant Canoo, as well as overseeing the renovation project—turning a traditional office space

27 into a state-of the art automotive research and design center. Within a month, in or about April

28 2018, Defendant Canoo began construction on a 90,000 square-foot facility in Torrance, California.

5
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 28. Defendant Canoo reached two hundred employees in or about September 2018, and

2 had more than three hundred employees by March 2019—milestones which are depicted in the

3 photograph on Attachment B. This critical growth happened under the direction of Plaintiff, who

4 was responsible for human resources and recruiting.

5 29. During this period of time, as Defendant Canoo secured new investors and the

6 Company grew, Plaintiff and her title were gradually removed from official Company documents

7 by Defendants, ultimately relegating Plaintiff to a signatory capacity as “Founders Representative.”

8 30. As the Company employee “In Charge of Administration and Communications,”

9 Plaintiff effectively served as Chief Administrative Officer for Defendant Canoo. Plaintiff

10 oversaw virtually all areas of the administrative operations of Defendant Canoo, including but not

11 limited to Human Resources and Recruiting, the Administrative Team, Information Technology,

12 Internal and External Corporate Communications, and Facilities Management.

13 31. Though she was not recognized as a Founder nor compensated commensurately as

14 other founding members, Plaintiff served as the only female member of the Group Think

15 Committee (“GTC”), Defendant Canoo’s highest-level executive committee responsible for the

16 strategic direction of the Company.

17 32. Plaintiff was involved in nearly every aspect of Defendant Canoo’s administrative

18 operations, whether it meant securing and editing the Company’s first website, drafting and editing

19 press releases, arranging interviews with the Press and/or speaking engagements, drafting and

20 distributing internal communications, approving all expenses on the administrative side of the

21 business, managing Defendant Canoo’s bank account, recruiting new employees, overseeing

22 construction of a state-of-the-art R&D facility, setting up Defendant Canoo’s office in Shanghai,

23 China, securing and setting up Defendant Canoo’s office in San Jose, California, or meeting on a

24 regular basis with the employees under her supervision as well as employees throughout the

25 Company with employment relation issues. Additionally, because of Defendant Krause’s frequent

26 travel, Plaintiff often assumed tasks and work within the purview of the employee “In Charge” of

27 Defendant Canoo to ensure the smooth running of the Company.

28 * * *

6
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 33. Given the rapid growth and financial prospect of Defendant Canoo, Defendant

2 Krause instructed Plaintiff in or around March 2019, to have an attorney draft an enforceable

3 postnuptial agreement for the two of them.

4 34. By April 2019, Defendant Krause had become impatient with the speed by which

5 Plaintiff was expediting the process of finding a suitable attorney. As a result, Defendant Krause

6 personally drafted a postnuptial agreement in or around April 2019, and demanded that Plaintiff

7 execute the document without the advice of counsel. Plaintiff refused.

8 35. Conflict surrounding the postnuptial agreement escalated while Plaintiff and

9 Defendant Krause were on a private family trip in Munich, Germany. Defendant Krause

10 exclaimed that he would “not leave Germany without this contract signed.” Plaintiff again refused

11 and returned to the United States.

12 36. In or around May 2019, Plaintiff informed Defendant Krause that each of them

13 would need to retain separate legal counsel for purposes of drafting a postnuptial agreement in

14 order to avoid conflicts of interest. Accordingly, Plaintiff retained a family law attorney and

15 advised Defendant Krause to do the same.

16 37. Defendant Krause continued to pressure Plaintiff to sign his personally drafted

17 postnuptial agreement without the assistance of counsel. Defendant repeatedly sent electronic

18 messages belittling Plaintiff and accusing her of being a coward, a liar, and of “playing games,”

19 while demanding to know what Plaintiff’s family law attorney would include in a postnuptial

20 agreement.

21 * * *

22 38. At Defendant Canoo’s office on June 6, 2019, Defendant Krause reprimanded

23 Plaintiff via email for sending an internal communication about an HR Employee Relations topic

24 without first receiving his approval. Historically, as the individual at Defendant Canoo “In Charge

25 of Administration and Communications,” including Human Resources, Plaintiff had been

26 empowered to resolve conflict within the organization as it related to Employee Relations,

27 especially when they resulted in positive results as did this incident. Now, Defendant Krause

28 insisted that Plaintiff not act in her official capacity without his prior approval.

7
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 39. When Plaintiff inquired about the issue with Defendant Krause, Defendant Krause

2 responded, stating: “Everyone checks with me if I am fine with stuff but you.”

3 40. Later that same day, Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant Krause requesting his

4 approval for a job offer to a candidate for CEO of Defendant Canoo’s China office. Defendant

5 Krause responded that he “just resigned from my position so I will not get involved any longer.”

6 41. Plaintiff confronted Defendant Krause about his email, as the two were both at

7 home. Defendant Krause was on the phone with David Stern (“Stern”), a primary investor in

8 Defendant Canoo and a personal friend of Defendant Krause. Defendant Krause insisted to Stern

9 that he was resigning as CEO of Defendant Canoo immediately, and blamed his resignation on

10 Plaintiff’s refusal to sign the postnuptial agreement he drafted personally.

11 42. From June 6-9, 2019, Defendant Krause sent Plaintiff repeated messages demanding

12 a draft of her attorney’s postnuptial agreement, and repeatedly told her that his resignation was her

13 fault, adding in a message on June 6, 2019, “I hope you are proud of what you have achieved with

14 your lies and dishonesty,” and “[y]es there is only one person in the world to blame . . . and that is

15 you.” Defendant Krause’s aggression toward, and bullying of, Plaintiff escalated to the point that

16 Plaintiff went to a hotel for her own safety.

17 43. On June 8, 2019, Defendant Krause messaged Plaintiff “I think you can finally

18 forward me a draft of this contract. I need to decide if I can go back on Monday to work or not,”

19 following with another message the same night, stating “[n]o I can’t work on Monday if I don’t

20 know your demand.”

21 44. On or about June 10, 2019, Plaintiff’s family law attorney sent Defendant Krause a

22 first draft of the requested postnuptial agreement.

23 * * *

24 45. On or about June 11, 2019, Plaintiff received a phone call from Stern, who was

25 aware of the marital tension between Plaintiff and Defendant Krause. During the call, Stern

26 advised Plaintiff “to fight for everything else, just not the Canoo shares because it is critical that

27 the CEO not quit.”

28

8
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 46. Plaintiff understood Stern’s phone call to be an appeal from one of Defendant

2 Canoo’s major investors regarding her marital situation, specifically requesting that Plaintiff sign

3 Defendant Krause’s personally drafted postnuptial agreement, because Defendant Krause’s

4 “return” to Canoo was contingent on Plaintiff signing that agreement.

5 47. In the same vein, on or about June 12, 2019, while at work, Plaintiff was called into

6 a meeting with Ulrich Kranz (“Kranz”), Canoo’s executive “In Charge of Design and

7 Engineering,” and to whom Plaintiff directly reported.

8 48. During the meeting, Kranz informed Plaintiff that he had been made aware of both

9 her disintegrating marriage to Defendant Krause and his alleged resignation from Defendant

10 Canoo—two topics that Plaintiff had never discussed with Kranz. Nonetheless, Kranz encouraged

11 Plaintiff to honor the demands of Defendant Krause for the sake of Defendant Canoo.

12 49. Plaintiff complained to Kranz that she felt bullied and harassed by Defendant

13 Krause and, in turn, Kranz and Stern for involving the Company regarding the state of her marriage

14 and the pressure being placed on her by the CEO, employees, and investors of Defendant Canoo.

15 50. The following day, on June 13, 2019, Plaintiff received a follow-up email from

16 Stern, stating that “[t]he key point of my call was to share with you my concern about the impact

17 the situation may have on the Company and the investment.” Stern added “[e]nsuring Stefan

18 [Krause] stays at the helm of the Company is quite critical in my view.”

19 * * *

20 51. While Stern and Kranz were busy doing Defendant Krause’s bidding against

21 Plaintiff on behalf of Defendant Canoo, Defendant drove to Las Vegas on June 14, 2019, to meet

22 with David Li—another primary investor in Defendant Canoo. Kranz also attended the meeting,

23 but flew round trip to and from Las Vegas on June 15, 2019.

24 52. Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Krause after the meeting and inquired about his

25 return to Los Angeles, provided that Sunday, June 16, 2019 was Father’s Day, and Monday, June

26 17, 2019, was Defendant Canoo’s summer party—one of only two company-wide events

27 Defendant Canoo has for its employees.

28

9
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 53. Defendant Krause informed Plaintiff that he would not be back from Las Vegas by

2 June 17, 2019, for the summer party because he needed to spend time with the investors to secure

3 the next round of investment funding for Defendant Canoo. As a result, Defendant Krause

4 entrusted that Plaintiff and Kranz would be present at the summer party on behalf of himself and

5 Defendant Canoo.

6 54. On June 15, 2019, Plaintiff confirmed what had long been suspected: that Defendant

7 Krause was engaged in an affair—spending the weekend in Las Vegas with another woman—in

8 lieu of celebrating Father’s Day with his six-year old son.

9 55. On June 17, 2019, Kranz requested that Plaintiff give the speech to the employees at

10 the summer party in lieu of Defendant Krause. Plaintiff informed Kranz that she did not have the

11 emotional strength to speak to Defendant Canoo’s 350 employees on behalf of Defendant Krause

12 while he was in Las Vegas with another women. The episode nearly caused Plaintiff to suffer a

13 panic attack, having to present the new branding for Defendant Canoo, notwithstanding Defendant

14 Krause’s infidelity and absence.

15 56. On or around July 8, 2019, Defendant Krause filed for divorce from Plaintiff and

16 subsequently extended the psychological abuse of Plaintiff to the working environment at

17 Defendant Canoo.

18 * * *

19 57. Defendants’ hostility toward Plaintiff increased in the weeks immediately following

20 Defendant Krause’s divorce filing from Plaintiff.

21 58. On or about July 10, 2019, Plaintiff sent a message to Defendant Krause noting that

22 the two of them needed to visibly support each other for the benefit of other employees in order for

23 the working environment of Defendant Canoo to function. Krause responded that he would not do

24 so “if at the same time you behave like an asshole to me on the passwords. . . .”

25 59. That same day, Defendant Krause sent an email to Plaintiff and Kranz, accusing

26 Plaintiff of failing to secure Defendant Krause’s approval for internal communications on

27 “repeated occasions over the last weeks.” Defendant Krause insisted that “no internal or for the

28 matter external communication should occur without my prior personal approval.”

10
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 60. This new mandate from the CEO represented a level of oversight and control which

2 had not existed prior to July 2019. As the employee in charge of internal and external

3 communications, Plaintiff was regularly required to operate without approval for every

4 communication, particularly in light of Defendant Krause’s frequent domestic and international

5 travel. Defendant Krause concluded the email, stating: “Please respond to this email

6 acknowledging receipt and concurrence.”

7 61. When Plaintiff did not immediately respond to Defendant Krause’s demand that she

8 agree to his increased oversight over her duties and responsibilities, Defendant Krause again raised

9 the subject of “approval of corporate communications and internal communication” at the GTC

10 meeting on or around July 16, 2019.

11 62. During this meeting, Plaintiff acknowledged that all communications would now be

12 approved by Defendant Krause. Despite her acknowledgement of the new policy during the GTC,

13 Defendant Krause sent a follow-up email that night threatening to remove Plaintiff’s duties and

14 responsibilities if she did not provide a written acknowledgement of his directive. Specifically,

15 Defendant Krause stated: “You have not answered this email as requested confirming our

16 understanding in terms of internal communication. If you do not respond and confirm this

17 understanding[,] I will move the communications job to someone else.”

18 63. Following another GTC meeting on or around July 16, 2019, Kranz removed

19 Plaintiff’s authority over recruiting, a Human Resource function, and placed it under the authority

20 of the legal department, overseen by Wolstan who reports to Defendant Krause.

21 * * *

22 64. In addition to the increased hostility by Defendants toward Plaintiff, Defendant

23 Krause also intimidated and harassed known associates of Plaintiff at the Company.

24 65. On or about July 15, 2019, Defendant Krause met with Susanna Gonzalez

25 (“Gonzalez”), an executive assistant at Defendant Canoo with whom Plaintiff had become friends.

26 During the meeting, Defendant Krause began interrogating Gonzalez about a social media post

27 depicting an outing to Soho House and Nobu in Malibu, California, on or around July 5, 2019.

28

11
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 66. Defendant Krause demanded to know whether Plaintiff was with Gonzalez that

2 afternoon, and whether “Christina’s boyfriend” was with them, further pressing to learn the name

3 of “Christina’s boyfriend.” When Gonzalez responded that she was not willing to discuss what she

4 did in her private life, Defendant Krause warned Gonzalez: “be careful who you hang out with.”

5 67. Gonzalez reported the interaction to Defendant Canoo’s legal department. Within a

6 week, on or about July 22, 2019, Defendant Krause sent an email to Kranz and Plaintiff stating that

7 Gonzalez’s t-shirt printing set-up, located in Defendant Canoo’s lobby and beloved by Canoo

8 employees “should be stopped.” He added: “It was a funny idea and I supported but I think it is

9 enough now.”

10 68. On or about July 22, 2019, the Canoo employee In Charge of Membership, Jeremy

11 Behar (“Behar”), was pulled into a meeting with James Cox (“Cox”), Behar’s supervisor and the

12 Canoo employee In Charge of Product.

13 69. During the meeting, Cox informed Behar that Defendant Krause was surprised to

14 find out that Plaintiff had been accepted to Soho House Malibu, following Behar’s introduction of

15 Plaintiff to the program membership manager of Soho House Malibu.

16 70. Cox instructed Behar that he had two options: (1) call Soho House and terminate

17 Plaintiff’s membership immediately, or (2) inform Plaintiff that he had acted unethically and

18 instruct Plaintiff to resign from Soho House immediately. Cox further informed Behar that “by no

19 means can this ever be known that the order came from Stefan [Krause] directly.”

20 71. On or about July 24, 2019, Behar expressed to Cox a desire to discuss the ultimatum

21 with Canoo’s legal counsel. In response, Cox stated: “Stefan isn’t coming after you anymore. He

22 is going to go after [Plaintiff] Christina Krause.”

23 72. Nonetheless, Behar informed the legal department about the ultimatum given to him

24 by Cox regarding Plaintiff on or about July 29, 2019. Defendant Canoo terminated Behar on

25 August 7, 2019.

26 * * *

27 73. On or around July 22, 2019, Plaintiff noticed that the photograph depicted in

28 Attachment A had been removed from Defendant Canoo’s Torrance office location on the wall of

12
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 Company milestones. A true and correct photograph depicting Attachment A’s removal is

2 attached hereto as Attachment C.

3 74. When Plaintiff learned that the photograph had been removed by Richard Kim

4 (“Kim”), the employee In Charge of Design, she approached him to ask the reason. Kim told

5 Plaintiff that he was “just following orders.”

6 75. On or around July 25, 2019, Defendant Canoo undertook a formal “investigation” of

7 Plaintiff without notice to her. When Defendant attempted to interview Plaintiff without first

8 providing her any notice of the subject of the investigation, Plaintiff informed Defendant Canoo

9 that she had retained counsel and requested an opportunity to consult with her attorney.

10 76. In response to Plaintiff’s request, Defendant Canoo placed Plaintiff on

11 administrative leave pending the investigation, and told Plaintiff not to contact employees of

12 Canoo or access her company email account.

13 77. On July 31, 2019, Defendant Canoo terminated Plaintiff, effective August 1, 2019.

14 78. On September 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint of discrimination and

15 harassment with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”).

16 79. On September 12, 2019, Plaintiff received a Right-To-Sue letter from the DFEH.

17
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
18 (Discrimination on the Basis of Gender
Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
19
20 80. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
21 paragraphs 1 through 79, inclusive.
22 81. At all times relevant hereto, the Government Code section 12940 was in full force
23 and effect, and prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person in compensation or in
24 terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, on the basis of gender.
25 82. As alleged in paragraphs 12 through 32, inclusive, Plaintiff’s gender and/or other
26 characteristics protected by the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Government Code
27 section 12900, et seq., were motivating factors in Defendants’ decision not to compensate Plaintiff
28 commensurately as a Founder of Canoo, and/or to take other adverse employment actions against

13
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 Plaintiff.

2 83. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 81 through 82, inclusive, was a

3 substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the

4 jurisdiction of this Court.

5
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
6 (Discrimination on the Basis of Marital Status
Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
7
8 84. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
9 paragraphs 1 through 83, inclusive.
10 85. At all times relevant hereto, the Government Code section 12940 was in full force
11 and effect, and prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person in compensation or in
12 terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, on the basis of marital status.
13 86. As alleged in paragraphs 12 through 32, inclusive, Plaintiff’s marital status and/or
14 other characteristics protected by FEHA, Government Code section 12900, et seq., were
15 motivating factors in Defendants’ decision not to compensate Plaintiff commensurately as a
16 Founder of Canoo, and/or to take other adverse employment actions against Plaintiff.
17 87. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 85 through 86, inclusive, was a
18 substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the
19 jurisdictional requirement of this Court.
20
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
21 (Violation of the California Equal Pay Act
Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
22
23 88. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
24 paragraphs 1 through 87, inclusive.
25 89. At all times relevant hereto, Labor Code section 1197.5 was in full force and effect,
26 and prohibited employers from paying any individual at a lower rate than employees of a different
27 gender for substantially similar work when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and
28 responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions.

14
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 90. As alleged in paragraphs 12 through 32, inclusive, Plaintiff, who worked alongside

2 Defendant Krause and the other founders to build Defendant Canoo from its infancy, who served

3 as its First and Sole Director and funded its expenses from her own pocket, who served as the

4 employee In Charge of Administration and Communications, who oversaw the daily operations of

5 Canoo’s employees, facilities, IT, and public relations, and who often took on further duties while

6 Defendant Krause spent much of his time out of town, received substantially less in remuneration

7 than her nine male co-founders. Defendants were informed of their failure, yet continued to fail to

8 pay Plaintiff equal wages until the termination of her employment.

9 91. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 89 through 90, inclusive, was a

10 substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the

11 jurisdictional requirement of this Court.

12
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
13 (Harassment [Hostile Work Environment]
Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
14
15 92. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
16 paragraphs 1 through 91, inclusive.
17 93. At all times relevant hereto, the Government Code Section 12940(j) was in full
18 force and effect, and prohibits an employer from sexually harassing employees.
19 94. As identified herein, during Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants, Defendant
20 Krause and several other employees of Defendant Canoo engaged in actions that constitute
21 harassment of Plaintiff, including but not limited to: messages calling Plaintiff a liar, a coward, and
22 accusing her of “playing games;” pressure from a supervisor and a major investor admonishing
23 Plaintiff to acquiesce to the demands of Defendant Krause; warnings that conceding to Defendant
24 Krause’s demands were necessary for the sake of the company; interrogation of Plaintiff’s known
25 friends at Canoo regarding her personal activities; removing entire areas of work responsibility
26 previously under Plaintiff’s authority; increasing the oversight of Plaintiff’s activities and
27 demanding she seek constant approval for common communications; and threats of reprisal. These
28 actions created a hostile working environment for Plaintiff, who felt bullied and harassed by her

15
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 supervisor and coworkers.

2 95. All of these actions were taken against Plaintiff’s will and desire. Defendants took

3 no action to prevent the harassment of Plaintiff, even after she complained to her direct supervisor,

4 Ulrich Kranz.

5 96. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 93 through 95, inclusive, was a

6 substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the

7 jurisdictional requirement of this Court.

8
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
9 (Failure to Prevent Sexual Harassment
Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
10
11 97. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
12 paragraphs 1 through 96, inclusive.
13 98. At all times relevant hereto, Government Code section 12940(k) was in full force
14 and effect and forbids an employer “to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent
15 discrimination and harassment from occurring.”
16 99. During the course of Plaintiff’s employment, Defendants failed to prevent their
17 employees from engaging in intentional actions that resulted in Plaintiff’s being harassed on the
18 bases of gender, marital status, and/or other protected statuses or protected activities.
19 100. Plaintiff believes and on that basis alleges that her gender, marital status, and/or
20 other protected statuses or protected activity were substantial motivating factors in Defendants’
21 harassment of her.
22 101. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 98 through 100, inclusive, was
23 a substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the
24 jurisdictional requirement of this Court.
25
26
27
28

16
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2 (Aiding, Abetting, Inciting, Compelling, or Coercing Actions
Constituting Sexual Harassment Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
3
4 102. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
5 paragraphs 1 through 101, inclusive.
6 103. At all times relevant hereto, Government Code section 12940(i) was in full force
7 and effect, and prohibits any person “to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce” acts constituting sexual
8 harassment.
9 104. As alleged herein, Defendants abetted, incited, compelled, and/or coerced
10 employees of Defendant Canoo to commit acts constituting sexual harassment.
11 105. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 103 through 104, inclusive,
12 was a substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the
13 jurisdictional requirement of this Court.
14
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
15 (Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
16
17 106. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
18 paragraphs 1 through 105, inclusive.
19 107. The public policy of the State of California is codified in Government code section
20 12945.2 as well as through the provisions of FEHA.
21 108. Plaintiff was In Charge of Administration and Communications and suffered an
22 adverse employment action when Canoo terminated her employment in violation of FEHA.
23 109. The conduct alleged above constitutes wrongful termination in violation of public
24 policy.
25 110. The termination of Plaintiff was a substantial factor in causing damage and injury to
26 Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the jurisdictional requirement of this Court.
27 111. Defendant Canoo acted for the purpose of causing Plaintiff to suffer financial loss
28 and is guilty of oppression and malice, justifying an award of exemplary damages.

17
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract
2 Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
3 112. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
4 paragraphs 1 through 111, inclusive.
5 113. On or about December 8, 2017, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a written
6 contract of employment, which included provisions for Plaintiff’s option grant to participate in
7 Defendant Canoo’s equity plan.
8 114. The December 2017 Contract between Plaintiff and Defendants provided, inter alia,
9 the following:
10 a. Subject to the approval of the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of
11 EVelozcity Holdings Ltd. (“Holdco”), the owner of 100% of the Company, it will be
12 recommended to the Board of Directors that you will be granted an option to purchase 120,000
13 ordinary shares of EVelozcity Holdings Ltd., the 100% of the Company’s capital stock. The
14 option will be subject to the terms and conditions applicable to options granted under the equity
15 plan that will be put into place by Holdco and approved by the Board, as described in that plan.
16 You will vest in accordance with the schedule as approved by the Board, but it is currently
17 expected that you will vest on a standard schedule of 1/4th of your initial equity grant allocation
18 after your first year of employment with 1/48th of your initial equity grant allocation vesting
19 monthly thereafter.
20 115. Plaintiff fully performed her obligations under the December 2017 Contract until
21 continued performance became impossible as a result of Defendants’ termination of Plaintiff’s
22 employment.
23 116. When Plaintiff was terminated by Defendants, she was informed by Kranz that
24 because Plaintiff was being terminated “for cause,” Defendant Canoo would exercise a buy back
25 provision on Plaintiff’s stock options.
26 117. As alleged herein, Defendants’ termination of Plaintiff was without justifiable
27 cause. As a result, Defendants’ exercising of the option to buy back Plaintiff’s vested stock shares
28 constitutes a breach of Defendant Canoo’s equity plan.

18
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 118. Defendants’ breach of Defendant Canoo’s equity plan was without justification or

2 excuse.

3 119. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 114 through 118, inclusive,

4 was a substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the

5 jurisdictional requirement of this Court.

6
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
7 (Violation of Right of Privacy under California Const. Art. I, section 1
Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
8
9 120. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
10 paragraphs 1 through 119, inclusive.
11 121. In or around July 2019, Defendants hired a private investigator for the purpose of
12 following and documenting Plaintiff in conducting her private life, off of Canoo property and
13 during non-work hours, during which Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy from her
14 employer.
15 122. The private investigator hired by Defendants followed Plaintiff and repeatedly
16 photographed Plaintiff off of Canoo property and during non-work hours, while Plaintiff was not
17 acting on behalf of or within the scope of her employment with Defendant Canoo.
18 123. When she learned of the invasion into her private life, in which Plaintiff had a
19 reasonable expectation of privacy from her employer, Plaintiff considered the intrusion highly
20 offensive.
21 124. The intrusions, ordered and paid for by Defendants, violated Plaintiff’s right to
22 conduct her private life without observation, intrusion, or interference, as guaranteed by Article 1,
23 section 1 of the California Constitution, to a degree which is not and cannot be justified by any
24 competing interests.
25 125. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 121 through 124, inclusive,
26 was a substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the
27 jurisdictional requirement of this Court.
28

19
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Common Law Invasion of Privacy
2 Against Defendants, and Each of Them)
3 126. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
4 paragraphs 1 through 125, inclusive.
5 127. As alleged in paragraphs 121 through 124, inclusive, Defendant Canoo intentionally
6 intruded into the nature and activities of Plaintiff’s private life, a matter to which Plaintiff had a
7 reasonable expectation of privacy.
8 128. As alleged in paragraphs 121 through 124, inclusive, Plaintiff found the intrusion
9 highly offensive.
10 129. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 121 through 124, inclusive,
11 was a substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the
12 jurisdictional requirement of this Court.
13
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
14 (Quantum Meruit Against
Defendants, and Each of Them)
15
16 130. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein,
17 paragraphs 1 through 129, inclusive.
18 131. As alleged in paragraphs 12 through 77, inclusive, Defendants requested, by words
19 and conduct, that Plaintiff perform labor and services for Defendants’ benefit by acting as the
20 individual In Charge of Administration and Communications.
21 132. As alleged in paragraphs 12 through 77, inclusive, Plaintiff did perform the above-
22 described labor and services for Defendants’ benefit as requested, and Defendants, and each of
23 them, have failed to compensate Plaintiff for the reasonable value of services provided.
24 133. The conduct alleged in paragraphs 9 through 77 and 131 through 132, inclusive,
25 was a substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of the
26 jurisdictional requirement of this Court.
27 ///
28 ///

20
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Christina Krause prays for judgment against Defendants, and each

2 of them, as follows:

3 As to the First Cause of Action:

4 1. For general damages according to proof;

5 2. For special damages according to proof;

6 3. For attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Gov. Code section 12965(b) and/or any

7 other applicable provision of law;

8 4. For punitive damages according to proof;

9 As to the Second Cause of Action:

10 5. For general damages according to proof;

11 6. For special damages according to proof;

12 7. For attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Gov. Code section 12965(b) and/or any

13 other applicable provision of law;

14 8. For punitive damages according to proof;

15 As to the Third Cause of Action:

16 9. For general damages according to proof;

17 10. For special damages according to proof;

18 11. For liquidated damages pursuant to Labor Code section 1197.5 and/or any other

19 applicable provision of law;

20 12. For attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Labor Code section 1197.5 and/or any

21 other applicable provision of law;

22 As to the Fourth Cause of Action:

23 13. For general damages according to proof;

24 14. For special damages according to proof;

25 15. For attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Gov. Code section 12965(b) and/or any

26 other applicable provision of law;

27 16. For punitive damages according to proof;

28

21
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 As to the Fifth Cause of Action:

2 17. For general damages according to proof;

3 18. For special damages according to proof;

4 19. For attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Gov. Code section 12965(b) and/or any

5 other applicable provision of law;

6 20. For punitive damages according to proof;

7 As to the Sixth Cause of Action:

8 21. For general damages according to proof;

9 22. For special damages according to proof;

10 23. For attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Gov. Code section 12965(b) and/or any

11 other applicable provision of law;

12 24. For punitive damages according to proof;

13 As to the Seventh Cause of Action:

14 25. For general damages according to proof;

15 26. For special damages according to proof;

16 27. For punitive damages according to proof;

17 28. For attorney’s fees and costs;

18 As to the Eighth Cause of Action:

19 29. For general damages according to proof;

20 30. For special damages according to proof;

21 As to the Ninth Cause of Action:

22 31. For general damages according to proof;

23 32. For special damages according to proof;

24 As to the Tenth Cause of Action:

25 33. For general damages according to proof;

26 34. For special damages according to proof;

27
28

22
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 As to the Eleventh Cause of Action:

2 35. For the reasonable value of Plaintiff’s services to Defendants and any interest

3 thereon according to proof;

4 36. For any such other equitable relief according to proof;

5 As to All Causes of Action:

6 37. For cost of suit incurred herein;

7 38. For attorney’s fees as provided by law;

8 39. For civil penalties as provided by law;

9 40. For prejudgment interest as provided by law; and

10 41. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

11
12 DATED: October 8, 2019 ROSEN MARSILI RAPP LLP

13
14 By: ___________________________
JASON C. MARSILI
15 BRIANNA M. PRIMOZIC
16 AMANDA PITROF
Attorneys for Plaintiff
17 CHRISTINA KRAUSE
18
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22
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26
27
28

23
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

2 Plaintiff Christina Krause hereby demands a jury trial on all causes of action at law.

3
4 DATED: October 8, 2019 ROSEN MARSILI RAPP LLP

5
6 By: ___________________________
JASON C. MARSILI
7 BRIANNA M. PRIMOZIC
8 AMANDA PITROF
Attorneys for Plaintiff
9 CHRISTINA KRAUSE
10
11
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13
14
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28

24
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
ATTACHMENT A
Top Row from Left to Right:

Sohel Merchant, Bill Strickland, Stefan Krause, Phil Weicker, Alexi Charbonneau, Andrew Wolstan

Bottom Row from Left to Right:

Christoph Kuttner, Richard Kim, Ulrich Kranz, Christina Krause


ATTACHMENT B
ATTACHMENT C

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