PERSONS
 Any physical or juridical being susceptible o frights and obligations, or of
being the subject of legal relations
Persons vs. Things
 A person is the subject of legal relations
 A things is the object of legal relations
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through
death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost.
 2 component elements of capacity:
1. Juridical capacity
 There are no degrees of juridical capacity.
 Juridical capacity is the same in every person. No one has more
juridical capacity than others. It is inherent in natural persons. On
the other hand, it arises in artificial persons when such artificial
persons are created.
2. Capacity to act
 This is best presented by a spectrum:
0% Infant Alien Most 100%
People
Nobody has 100% capacity to act. The law imposes
restrictions on capacity to act. As long as one has contractual
capacity (a.k.a. full civil capacity) one is near 100% capacity to
act. ―Full civil capacity‖ is not really 100% but close to it. With
contractual capacity, one is generally able to perform
contracts and dispose of property.
 Nobody has 0% capacity to act. Infants are close to 0% but still
have capacity to act. For example, even fetus has the right to
succeed and also have the right to the integrity of body. Aliens
cannot own colleges or broadcast media.
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-
mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to
act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as
when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements.
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit
capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and
trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this
Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is
not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for
all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law
Articles 38 and 39 are really the same thing. They are redundant.
 Insolvency – certain obligations cannot be performed (i.e., one cannot pay
off debts in favor of one creditor while excluding other creditors)
 Trusteeship - one is placed in guardianship.
 Prodigality - it is not by itself a restriction. It
is a ground to be placed in guardianship
 These restrictions don‘t exempt incapacitated persons from certain
obligations. Under Article 1156, there are 5 sources of obligations:
1. Law
2. Contract
3. Delict
4. Quasi-delict
5. Quasi-contract
 Thus, Articles 38 and 39 prevent incapacitated persons from incurring
contractual obligations only. Thus, even though an insane person cannot be
thrown in jail for a criminal act, the insane person is still civilly liable (delict).
An incapacitated person must still pay income tax if income is earned.
 Although Articles 38 and 39 don‘t mention it, incapacitated persons may
acquire rights. For example, they have the right to accept donations or to
succeed.
 The enumeration in Articles 38 and 39 is not exclusive. There are others
spread throughout the code. (i.e., a lawyer cannot buy property in litigation –
Article 1491 (5) )
 Article 39, last ¶ has been amended by R.A. No. 6809. 21 years is no
longer the age of majority but 18.
 Article 39, last ¶ – What are the cases specified by la
 Modern medicine estimates the fetus age in weeks.
I. Natural Persons
 An example of a case where upon birth occurs personality retroacts to the
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall moment of conception is in case of succession since it is favorable to the
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be child. On the other hand, if the purpose is for paying taxes, personality does
born later with the conditions specified in the following article. not retroact since it is unfavorable to the child.

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive
at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if
the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not
deemed born
 In Geluz vs. CA, the SC said that the father could not file the action for
damages. The fetus never acquired personality because it was never born –
it was not alive at the time it was delivered from the mother‘s womb. Since the
fetus did not acquire any personality, it acquired no rights which could be
transmitted to the father. Thus, the father could not sue in a representative
capacity. The father could have sued in his personal capacity had the father
suffered anguish which he did not.

Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased
at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of is determined by law, by contract and by will.
another:

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior

courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
 This article deals with the extinguishment of civil personality
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied  Death is not defined in the Civil Code. Not even doctors know precisely when
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or death occurs. There are many theories.
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,  The fact of death is important because it affects civil personality and legal
relations. The main effect of death is readily seen in succession. Death is also
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
relevant to labor law and insurance.
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who
if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal
are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever
womb.
alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there
 Principles: shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.
1. For personality to be acquired one must be born
2. Once birth occurs, personality for favorable purposes retroacts to the
moment of conception

 To be born means to be alive after the fetus is completely separated from the
mother‘s womb by cutting off the umbilical cord.

 General Rule: To be born, it is enough that the fetus is alive when the
umbilical cord is cut

 Exception: If the intra-uterine life is less than 7 months, it must live for at
least 24 hours, before it is considered born (There is no distinction as to how
the child dies – whether natural, accidental, etc.)

 According to Professor Balane, modern medicine cannot as of yet determine

if the intra-uterine life is 7 months or less in terms of number of days. Modern
medicine cannot determine the exact time when fertilization took place.
 conflict between the Rules of Court and Article 43.

RULE 131, RULES OF COURT  In Joaquin vs. Navarro, Article 43 was not applied. There was no need to
apply the presumption in Article 43 since there was evidence to show who
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are died first.
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish
in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration,
and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is
determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength
and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:

1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is

deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to
have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former
is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be
different, the male is deemed to have survived; if the sex
be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between
those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.

 This is a presumption regarding simultaneous death and not a rule on

survivorship. On the other hand, the Rules provide for a presumption of
survivorship based on certain criteria.

 The Rules of Court shall apply where:

1. The issue does not involve succession but something else (i.e.,
insurance, suspensive conditions); and

2. The persons perish in the same calamity

 Article 43 shall apply where:

1. The case involves succession; and

2. The persons do not perish in the same calamity.
 If the conditions in the Rules of Court or Article 43 do not concur, do not apply
either.

 Problem: What if succession is involved and the persons perish in the

same calamity?
Most commentators say Article 43 will prevail. This is the only case of
 HEIRS OF FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MERCEDES
CATALAN (JESUS BASA), respondents
G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.
Facts:
 On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military
service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs
found that he was unfit to render military service due to his mental disorder
(schizophrenia).
 On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.
 On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-
half of the real property through the execution of a document, titled,
“Absolute deed of Donation”.
 On December 11,1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special
Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent.
 On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order of Adjudication of
Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance
of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly
the People’s Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian
by the trial court.
 On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her
in issue in her children Delia and Jesus Basa.
 On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, as well as damages against herein respondents.
 BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab
initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI
averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her,
the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was
therefore incapable of giving valid consent.
 On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away.
 Both the lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of
insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he
executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.
Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is
legally in possession of the latter
Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court
of Appeals and denied the petition.
 A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a
thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
 Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in
contracts presupposes the following requisites:
(1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it
refers;
(2) it should be free; and
(3) it should be spontaneous.
 The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent,
like any contract, renders the donation voidable.
 A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his property.
 By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano
Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities.
 Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that
time and this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was
adduced.
 Since the donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to
whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove
the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was tainted with
fraud or falsehood.
 Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The
Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the first time
on appeal before the court.
 It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the
deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it
remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within
four years.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners,
the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66073 is affirmed in toto.
 DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu,

defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-11872, 1 December 1917

FACTS:

The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of Jose
Espiritu, the defendant) and the heirs of his sister Margarita Mercado; Domingo and
Josepha Mercado, who pretended to be of legal age to give their consent into the
contract of sale of the land they inherited from their deceased mother Margarita
Mercado (sister of Luis Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the
annulment of contract asserting that Domingo and Josepha were minors during the
perfection of contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale is valid, when the minors presented themselves
of legal age, at the time of the perfection of the contract.

RULING:

The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it were made
and entered into by minors, who pretended to be of legal age.

Whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another party to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,
cannot be permitted to falsify it. Furthermore, the sale of real estate made by a
minor who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact he is not, is VALID, and he
will not be permitted to excuse himself from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by him or to have it annulled. The judgment that holds such sale to
be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does
not violate the laws relative to the sale of minor’s property, nor the judicial rules
established in consonance therewith.

In the given case, annulment of the sale cannot be invoked on the ground of
minority, since at the time of the perfection of the contract; Domingo and Josefa
presented themselves to be of legal age.