Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
CHAPTER III: of Sec. 122, NIRC. In effect, the Collector insists that
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
G.R. No. L-13250, October 29, 1971
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ANTONIO
CAMPOS RUEDA
Antonio Campos Rueda was the administrator of the
estate of late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, a
Spanish national and Tangier resident, in the
Philippines. In the estate tax return he filed with the
Collector of Internal Revenue, Rueda claimed the value
of intangible personal properties as exempt from taxes
under the proviso of Sec. 122, NIRC:
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect
of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the
time of his death was a resident of a foreign country
which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer
tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible
person property of the Philippines not residing in that
foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country
of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his
death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or
death taxes of every character in respect of intangible
personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines
not residing in that foreign country.
The Collector, however, denied the exemption and
assessed the estate of deficiency estate and inheritance
taxes (amounting to P161, 874.95) for the transfer of
intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The
Collector reasoned that there is no reciprocity between
Tangier and the Philippines because Tangier is a mere
principality and not a foreign country within the meaning
1
the acquisition of international personality is a condition
sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign
country."
Upon appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the CTA ruled
that the expression “foreign country” in Sec. 122 refers
to a government of that foreign power which, although
not an international person in the sense of international
law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon
intangible person properties of Philippine citizens not
residing therein, or whose law allows a similar
exemption from such taxes. It was therefore not
necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by
the Philippine Government in order to entitle the estate
of Estrella to the exemption benefits of Sec. 122.
ISSUE: Whether Section 22, NIRC requires that the
“foreign country” possesses an international personality
to come within its terms.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Tangier comes
within the term “foreign country” of Sec. 122 because
independence is not a condition of statehood. The
following definitions of a State were provided by the
Court to justify Tangier’s statehood:
- it is a politically organized sovereign community,
independent of outside control, bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
through a government functioning under a regime of law
(Pound)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- a sovereign person with the people composing it,
viewed as an organized corporate society under a
government, with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands (Willoughby)
- a body-politic organized by common consent for
mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the
general welfare (Cooley)
- the juridical personification of the nation (Esmein)
- a territorial society divided into government and
subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy
over all other institutions (Laski)
- a nation, its people occupying a definite territory,
politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within
it and maintaining its separate international personality
The SC emphasized, however, that as long as there is
power entrusted to its government to maintain within its
territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into
international relations (McIver), international law does
not exact independence as a condition of statehood.
Assuming that Tangier was bereft of international
personality, jurisprudence supports the finding that Sec.
122 treats even a principality as a foreign country.
Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara considered
California as a foreign country. In Kiene v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, the tiny principality of Liechtenstein,
with hardly an international personality, was found to fall
under the exemption of Sec. 122.
G.R. No. 104226, August 12, 1993
CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
2
FACTS:
Conchita Romualdez-Yap filed a petition for certiorari to
question her separation from the Philippine National
Bank. She was the Senior Vice President of the Fund
Trust Department of PNB. While she was on leave of
absence for medical reasons (April 1, 1986 – February
20, 1987), PNB underwent reorganization (December 3,
1986 by virtue of the Revised Charter of PNB or
Executive Order No. 80) that caused the abolition of the
Fund Trust Department. As a result of the
reorganization, Romualdez-Yap was notified of her
separation from service (effective February 1987,
though the letter erroneously stated 1986). She
contested her separation in the Civil Service
Commission, arguing that her separation was made in
bad faith because, among others: (1) it was based on
her close identification with the previous regime, being
the sister of Imelda Marcos; (2) her separation was
antedated on February 16, 1986, prior to the effectivity
of Executive Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986; (3) the
Fund Transfer Department has recently been restored;
and (4) she was not extended preference in
appointment to the positions in the new staff.
The CSC and the Supreme Court upheld the validity of
her separation.
ISSUE: Whether the separation arising from
reorganization was made in good faith
HELD: YES
1. Requirements for a valid reorganization
Reorganization is a management prerogative exercised
pursuant to a business judgment. While a distinction
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
can be made between a government bureau or office
performing constituent functions (e.g. Customs) and a
government-owned or controlled corporation performing
ministrant functions (e.g. PNB), the common test for
their valid reorganizations is the test of good faith.
CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS are those which
constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory
in nature. These are functions which our government is
required to exercise to promote its objectives as
expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised
by it as an attribute of sovereignty.
On the other hand, MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS are
those undertaken by way of advancing the general
interests of society, and are merely optional functions of
government. These are functions which it may exercise
to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity
of the people. The option is exercised on the basis of
the following are the principles: (1) that a government
should do for the public welfare those things which
private capital would not naturally undertake; and (2)
that a government should do those things which by its
very, nature it is better equipped to administer for the
public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine
Islands). Examples are commercial or universal
banking which is, not a governmental but, a private
sector endeavor.
Reorganization in either case must be made in good
faith. According to Dario v. Mison: Reorganizations in
this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided
3
they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is
carried out in "good faith" if: (1) it is for the purpose of
economy, or (2) to make bureaucracy more efficient. In
those events, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. Otherwise, an "abolition" is void ab
initio if it is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security
of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith.
2. The reorganization of PNB was done in good
faith.
The SC found the following circumstances as indicative
of PNB’s good faith in pursuing reorganization:
 it was by virtue of a valid law
 it was pursued to achieve economy considering
PNB’s critical financial situation at the time
 the year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation
from the service wa s a typographical error where
PNB had submitted documents supporting its stand
that the separation actually took effect on 16
February 1987.
 the later restoration of the Fund Transfer
Department, which took effect after the lapse of over
four years from the date it was abolished in 1987,
was primarily caused by the improved financial
capability and present needs of PNB
 the appointment of SVP Federico Pascual as head of
the International Department, from among other
officers including Yap, is because his qualifications
far exceeded those of the other candidates for the
position, being a lawyer from the University of the
Philippines, a Bachelor of Arts degree holder from
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 4

Ateneo de Manila, a Master of Laws graduate of The SC had ruled that NIA was liable as a government
Columbia Law School, and a Masteral Arts in Public entity exercising proprietary functions. Thus NIA filed a
Administration graduate of the London School of Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it is a
Economics; he had also undergone extensive governmental entity.
seminars at the International Department and had
been assigned in several foreign branches of PNB; ISSUE: Whether NIA is a government entity exercising
he held the second highest position of Executive governmental or proprietary functions.
Vice President and served as Acting President of
PNB; while Yap only holds a Bachelor of Science in HELD:
Commerce Degree from Assumption Convent and 1. NIA is a governmental entity exercising
has undergone only one seminar on Management proprietary functions.
and Leadership Training Program. Governmental functions are classified into governmental
/ constituent and proprietary / ministrant.
Assuming that her separation was made in bad faith, an GOVERNMENTAL / CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS
action for a quo warranto proceeding prescribes 1 year involve the exercise of sovereignty and are thus
from the questioned termination. She was separated considered as compulsory. PROPRIETARY /
from PNB on February 16, 1987 and it was only in 1989 MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS connote merely the
or about 2 years after when she brought the matter to exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as
the CSC. By her inaction in questioning her termination optional.
within a period of 1 year, she was considered to have
acquiesced to her separation from the service and 2. The operation of an irrigation system is a
abandoned her right to the position. proprietary function.
In the United States where its irrigation districts are
G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991 identical to Philippine irrigation systems, irrigation
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA districts are characterized, according to jurisprudence,
v. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL as public quasi corporations organized to conduct a
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION business for the private benefit of the owners of land
Sps. Fontanilla sued the National Irrigation within its limits (Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.).
NATIONAL IRRIGATION
Administration ADMINISTRATION
for damages, v. SPOUSES
arising from the tortious act They are not considered as exercising sovereign
JOSE FONTANILLA
of its driver, Hugoand VIRGINIA
Garcia. FONTANILLA
NIA denied liability, alleging functions where they furnish no facilities for the
that it is a government agency tasked with administration of the sovereign government and its
governmental functions and is, therefore, not liable for officers have no power or authority to exercise any of
the tortious acts of its driver who is not a special agent. the functions of the general government, or to enforce
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
any of the laws of the state or any of its other
subdivisions, or collect taxes other than those assessed
by the district. They have no more power or authority
than that of the officers of a private corporation
organized for like purposes (Holderbaum vs. Hidalgo
County Water Improvement District). They are thus
considered as businesses because the land owners, as
members of the corporation, control the affairs of the
district and alone are benefited by its operations. While
public benefit and public welfare may be found in the
operation of certain enterprises (like those engaged in
the supply of electric power, or in supplying telegraphic,
telephonic, and radio communication, or in the
production and distribution of prime necessities,), and
even though the service rendered caters to the
community as a whole and the goal is for the general
interest of society (NAWASA v. NWSA Consolidated
Unions), the functions performed by such enterprises
are basically proprietary in nature. Its general purposes
are not essentially public in their nature, but are only
incidentally so.
G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001
Therefore, an irrigation district is the owner of its system
SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED v. COURT OF APPEALS and
in a proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must
the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership
(Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.). According to
McQuillin (The Law of Municipal Corporations), when
municipalities undertake to supply water at price, they
are engaged in trade. Although the State may regulate
the service and rates of water plants owned and
operated by municipalities, such property is not
employed for governmental purposes and in the
ownership and operation thereof, the municipality acts
5
in its proprietary capacity, free from legislative
interference. Consequently, they are liable as any
private company would be for any negligence in laying
out of its pipes, in keeping them in repair, or in
furnishing potable water through them.
NIA was not created for purposes of local government.
NIA was created as a body corporate with a corporate
personality separate and distinct from the government
for the purpose of "constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
systems in the Philippines, including all communal and
pump irrigation projects." While it is essentially a
service agency of the government aimed at promoting
public interest and public welfare, such fact does not
make NIA essentially and purely a "government-
function" corporation. Certainly, the state and the
community as a whole are largely benefited by the
services NIA renders, but these functions are only
incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is
the irrigation of lands.
An action for revival of judgment was instituted by the
Republic of the Philippines but which the Court
dismissed, having found that the Republic was not the
real party in interest.
The issue began when Rafael Galvez obtained an
Original Certificate of Title over four lots in La Union.
He sold Lots 1 and 4 to Mamaril, Llana, Bustos and
Balatbat, who obtained TCTs in their names and who, in
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
turn, subsequently sold the same lots to Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company. Lepanto obtained a
TCT in its name. Meanwhile, unknown to Lepanto, CFI
La Union ordered the cancellation of Galvez/s title over
the lots in a land registration case initiated by the
Republic of the Philippines. The Order was issued on
February 1, 1963, but the same subjects lots were
unknowingly sold by Lepanto to Shipside Incorporated
on October 28, 1963. Shipside had obtained a TCT in
its name and had been exercising proprietary rights
since then.
The CFI Order was contested by Galvez, but was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The CA Decision
became final and executory on October 23, 1973. A
writ of execution was issued and served upon the
Register of Deeds. However, the writ had not been
executed for 24 years until the OSG, representing the
Republic of the Philippines, initiated a complaint for
revival of judgment and cancellation of titles on April 21,
1999, against the successors-in-interest of Rafael
Galvez.
Shipside filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the Republic was not the real party in interest because
the real property covered by the titles were allegedly
part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station) and under
the ownership and administration of the Bases
Conversion Development Authority under Republic Act
No. 7227; and that the action has prescribed. The
Republic, however, countered that prescription does not
run against the State, which is still the real party in
interest because the transfer of the military reservations
to the Conversion Authority does not amount to an
abdication on the part of the Republic of its interests,
6
but simply a recognition of the need to create a body
corporate which will act only as its agent for the
realization of its program. The MTD was dismissed thus
Shipside raised the issue before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines
is a real party in interest and can thus claim the
imprescriptibility of the State’s action – N
HELD:
The action to revive judgment has prescribed (CA
Decision became final on October 23, 1973 while the
action for revival of judgment was instituted only in
1999, or more than 25 years) under NCC 1144(3): an
action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10
years from the time the right of action accrues."
The Republic, represented by the OSG, cannot invoke
imprescriptibility of State actions because the Republic
is not the real party in interest, having transferred the
ownership of Camp Wallace, which used to belong to
the government, to the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority. Under Sec. 4 of R.A. 7227
(Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), the
BCDA owns, holds and/or administers military
reservations including Wallace Air Station and, under
Sec. 4, all areas covered by the Wallace Air Station are
hereby transferred to the BCDA. Being the owner of the
areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the BCDA, not the
Government, which stands to be benefited if the land
covered by Shipside’s title is cancelled.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The Republic also cannot invoke the relationship of
mere agency between the Government and BCDA.
BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate
and distinct from the government, having been created
as a body corporate and vested with the powers of a
corporation (Sec. 3, R.A. 7227). It is not a mere agency
of the Government but a corporate body performing
proprietary functions. While public benefit and public
welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and
social development of Central Luzon, may be
attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is
certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are
basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of
economic and social development of Central Luzon, in
particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in
general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the
Government. Other corporations have been created by
government to act as its agents for the realization of its
programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA arid the NIA, to
count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these
entities, although performing functions aimed at
promoting public interest and public welfare, are not
government-function corporations invested with
governmental attributes.
The Republic cannot also invoke E.B. Marcha Transport
Co., Inc. v. IAC which held that the Republic is the
proper party to sue for the recovery of possession of
property, which, at the time of the institution of the suit,
was no longer held by the national government but by
the Philippine Ports Authority. In E.B. Marcha, the
claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority
against the petitioner therein were the same and to
7
dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would have
brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter
since the PPA would have to re-file the case on the
same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case
at bar since to allow the government to sue herein
enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim
which is not available to the BCDA. The rule that
prescription does not run against the State does not
apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the
State for special purposes, it being said that when the
title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees,
although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the
same category as ordinary persons (Kingston v. LeHigh
Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). To hold otherwise is to
begin bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to
prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled
corporations, causes of action which have already
prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the
real party in interest against whom prescription does not
run, said corporations having been created merely as
agents for the realization of government programs.
G.R. No. L-32052, July 25, 1975 Commented [a1]:
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, et al
Labor claims (overtime compensations) were filed by
laborers against the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration before the Court of Industrial Relations.
The claims were granted by CIR. PVTA sought to
declare the nullity of the decision on the ground that CIR
had no jurisdiction over it and that the Eight-Hour Labor
Law did not apply to it being an agency exercising
governmental functions.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The laborers of PVTA sued the latter before the CIR for
payment of their overtime services (in excess of the
regular eight hours a day rendered by them) by virtue of
the Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. No. 444). PVTA sought
the dismissal of the suit on the following ground that it is
an agency exercising governmental functions and by
such reason, the 8-Hour Labor Law does not apply to it
(lack of cause of action) and the CIR has no jurisdiction.
The CIR ignored these defenses and ruled in favor of
the laborers.
ISSUES:
Whether or not PVTA exercises governmental functions
–Y
Whether or not agencies exercising governmental
functions fall outside the jurisdiction of the CIR and the
operation of the Eight-Hour Labor Law – N
HELD:
1. PVTA is an agency exercising governmental
functions.
Under its Charter (R.A. 2265), PVTA was established
to, among others, promote the effective merchandising
of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets
so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a
basis of economic security; create, establish, maintain,
and operate processing, warehousing and marketing
facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling
and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will
enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their
investments; and improve the living and economic
conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco
industry.
8
The distinction, however, between constituent and
ministrant functions of governments as set forth in
Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation has become
futile in the era of welfare states where the increased
responsibility to provide for the general welfare
necessitated the expanded role of government.
According to Laski, "a definite increase in the profundity
of the social conscience," resulted in "a state which
seeks to realize more fully the common good of its
members." Chief Justice Makalintal explained in
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration v. Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices how the welfare
state concept and the policy for social justice has
blurred the distinction of the traditional functions of
governmental agencies: the increasing social
challenges of the times necessitated the government to
undertake private enterprise and initiative, in its
sovereign capacity, and to move towards a greater
socialization of economic forces for the promotion of
social justice. As the welfare state concept "is not alien
to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution", it is thus
much more so under the present Charter (1987
Constitution), which is impressed with an even more
explicit recognition of social and economic rights.
Functions of that sort [general welfare] "may not
be strictly what President Wilson described as
"constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),
such as those relating to the maintenance of
peace and the prevention of crime, those
regulating property and property rights, those
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and
those relating to national defense and foreign
relations. Under this traditional classification,
such constituent functions are exercised by the
State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely
to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity
of the people — these latter functions being
ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on
the part of the government.
Nonetheless, the growing complexities of
modern society, however, have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of
government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally,
and only "because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any
private individual or group of individuals",
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly
towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy,
by the Constitution itself in its declaration of
principle concerning the promotion of social
justice.
9
Accordingly, in Rubi v. Provincial Board, the Court found
that the modern period has shown a widespread belief
in the amplest possible demonstration of government
activity. Edu v. Ericta ruled that laissez-faire was
rejected by the 1987 Constitution, having entrusted to
our government the responsibility of coping with social
and economic problems with the commensurate power
of control over economic affairs. The State could thus
live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare
through state action. Through such activities, "the
harsh contract which [does] obtain between the levels of
the rich and the poor" may be minimized. There is no
longer any constitutional obstacle to a government
pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private
enterprise. It is a response to a trend noted by Justice
Laurel in Calalang v. Williams for the humanization of
laws and the promotion of the interest of all component
elements of society so that man's innate aspirations be
attained.
2. The exercise of governmental functions does not
exempt an agency from the operation of labor
laws.
Naric Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia ruled that it is
precisely CIR and not ordinary courts that should pass
upon labor controversies. On the other hand, the Eight-
Hour Labor Law provides that it shall apply to all
persons employed in any industry or occupation,
whether public or private.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land
Transportation Commissioner v. HON. VICENTE G.
ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and
TEDDY C. GALO (1970)
Teddy Galo assails the constitutionality of
Administrative Order No. 2 (“the Reflector Law”) on the
grounds that: 1. It violates the due process clause,
following the American principle of laissez faire, and 2. It
constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
The Reflector Law reads: "(g) Lights and reflector when
parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or
flares visible one hundred meters away shall be
displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such
vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not
well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger
passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall
be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other
similar warning devices either pasted, painted or
attached to its front and back which shall likewise be
visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No
vehicle not provided with any of the requirements
mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."
ISSUE: W/N the “Reflector Law” violates the due
process clause, following the American principle of
laissez faire.
HELD: No, it does not. The Laissez faire principle is
rejected my contemporary American jurisprudence and
by Philippine Constitution and jurisprudence.
10
Definition of police power (“the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government”):
“state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of
the state." ~Calalang v. Williams
“the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people." ~Primicias v.
Fugoso
2. Laissez faire principle no longer recognized in US.
There was a period in American history where series
of legislations tending to reduce economic inequality
(e.g. in People v. Pomar, a provision providing for
maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty
days after confinement; in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
a statute providing for minimum wages) were struck
down as violative of the due process clause, under the
theory that individuals should have unrestricted freedom
in entering into contracts (laissez faire).
But under Pres. Roosevelt’s “The New Deal
administration” the US Supreme Court began rejecting
the laissez faire doctrine.
3. Laissez faire doctrine had always been rejected in the
Philippines
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro: “The doctrines of
laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the
individual, as axioms of economic and political theory,
are of the past”
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 “the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the
concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our
government the responsibility of coping with social and
economic problems with the commensurate power of
control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to
its commitment to promote the general welfare through
state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory
measures adversely affecting property rights, especially
so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded,
unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory
proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.”
Justice Laurel, concurring in Antamok Goldfields
Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, said that the
1935 Constitution did away with the laissez-
faire doctrine.
”during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional
infirmity was found to have attached to legislation
covering such subjects as collective
bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum
wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of
tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of securities, 27 and
control of public services.”
4. “Galo thus could have profited by a little more
diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered
with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our
Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of
such a shibboleth as laissez-faire…The Reflector Law is
thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled
against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the
constitutional test.”
11
ISSUE: W/N the “Reflector Law” (A.O.) is contrary to the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
HELD: No, it is not.
The A.O. states: “No motor vehicles of whatever style,
kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if
not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either
be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors,
reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall
have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at
all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be
visible 100 meters away at night."
penalty for non-compliance is rejection or suspension
of vehicle’s registration and a fine.
 “It is a fundamental principle flowing from the
doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches
of the government… What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them…”
A distinction has rightfully been made between
delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of
authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection call be made.
”The test is the completeness of the statute in all its
term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature…The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.”
Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is
well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature
often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to
anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect.
All that is required is that the regulation should germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to
the standards that the law prescribes ... "
”It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed
together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic
Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no
doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety
which is the prime consideration in statutes of this
character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of
the power of petitioner as Land Transportation
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to
give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental
purpose.
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT
DESICCATORS v. PHILIPPINE COCONUT
AUTHORITY
FACTS:
the Philippine Coconut Authority issued on March 24,
1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the
withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all
regulation of the coconut product processing industry.
In its whereas clause, it stated that it is the policy of the
State to promote free enterprise unhampered by
12
protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red
tapes. As such, the PCA will no longer require any
coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the
latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit
as condition prior to establishment or operation of such
mills or plants. Rather, it shall limit itself only to simply
registering coconut product processors for the purpose
of monitoring their volumes of production, administration
of quality standards.
The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of
registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated
coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to
appeal to the Office of the President
When petitioner received no reply from the Office of the
President, they brought this suit for
certiorari and mandamus before the SC.
PCA: case should be dismissed as they did not wait for
President’s reply, thereby violating principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
ISSUE: W/N rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies.
HELD: No, it does not.
“The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies before a party may seek judicial review…has
obviously no application here. The resolution in question
was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making
or legislative power. However, only judicial review of
decisions of administrative agencies made in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the
exhaustion doctrine.”
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE: W/N PCA’s resolution is valid.
HELD: No, it does not.
 “The Philippine Coconut Authority is… an
independent public corporation . . . directly reporting to,
and supervised by, the President of the Philippines, and
charged with carrying out the State's policy "to promote
the rapid integrated development and growth of the
coconut industry…through a regulatory scheme set up
by law.”
Through this scheme, the government, on August 28,
1982, temporarily prohibited the opening of new coconut
processing plants and, four months later, phased out
some of the existing ones in view of overproduction in
the coconut industry which resulted in cut-throat
competition, underselling and smuggling of poor quality
products and ultimately in the decline of the export
performance of coconut-based commodities. The
establishment of new plants could be authorized only
upon determination by the PCA of the existence of
certain economic conditions and the approval of the
President.
On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the
existing plants was ordered by the government after
finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of
existing plants will not afford a viable solution to the
problem considering that the total available limited
market is not adequate to support all the existing
processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the
number of existing processing plants.
It was only on October 23, 1987 when the PCA
adopted Resolution No. 058-87, authorizing the
establishment and operation of additional DCN plants,
13
subject to the approval of the President, in view of the
increased demand for desiccated coconut products in
the world's markets. This authorized the opening of new
plants in "non-congested areas only as declared by the
PCA" and subject to compliance by applicants with "all
procedures and requirements for registration. This form
of "deregulation" was approved by President Aquino.
 “These measures — the restriction in 1982 on entry
into the field, the reduction the same year of the number
of the existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the
restrictions in 1987 — were adopted within the
framework of regulation as established by law "to
promote the rapid integrated development and growth of
the coconut industry.” The PCA could have only worked
under this structure.
 “In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the
PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the questioned
resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate
opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual
dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure…In effect,
the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on
these matters, but in case of violations of standards
there would be nothing much it would do. “
Under the Revised Coconut Code, the role of the
PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program of
development for the coconut and other palm oil industry
in all its aspects." And “To regulate the marketing and
the exportation of copra and its by-products by
establishing standards for domestic trade and export..”
By limiting the purpose of registration to merely
"monitoring volumes of production [and] administration
of quality standards" of coconut processing plants, the
PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
completely to market forces how the coconut industry
will develop. The result can very well be a repeat of
1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-
all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the
production of inferior products and the like, which badly
affected the foreign trade performance of the coconut
industry.
In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned
resolution as set out above, the PCA invokes a policy of
free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective
regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as
justification for abolishing the licensing system. But free
enterprise does not call for removal of "protective
regulations."
At all events, any change in policy must be made by
the legislative department of the government. The
regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond
the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. EL

MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA
 Government was merely a trustee. It was never the
 owner of the money, and therefore could not sue for its
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the
treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of
the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged
by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine
Islands on June 3, 1863.
Subsequently, a central relief board was appointed to
distribute the money. It allotted $365,703.50 to the
various sufferers named in its resolution, which was
published in the Official Gazette.
14
Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte
de Piedad, the Philippine Government directed its
treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of
$80,000 of the relief fund in four installments of $20,000
each.
On account of various petitions of the originally
intended beneficiaries of the money, the Philippine
Government sued Monte de Piedad to recover the
$80,000. The lower court ruled in favor of the
Government.
Monte de Piedad asserts:
1. The sum was actually a donation, not a loan,
2. the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to
return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering
it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty.
Hence, the present Philippine government cannot
maintain this suit.
3. The Philippine Government has no competence to
institute the suit. The money was part of a charitable
subscription, whereby the donors were people in Spain,
the donees were people in the Philippines, and the
recovery as it is not the proper party.
4. Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when
ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June,
1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the
time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912
HELD:
1. Evidence shows that the money was a loan, not a
donation.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to
the Governor-General its financial condition and its
absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that
out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the
Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief
board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to
be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the
disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad
agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be
approved by the Government of Spain, the same would
be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be
given to it as a donation.
2. The present Philippine government has the
prerogative to enforce charities, as parens patriae
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict
with the political character, constitution or institutions of
the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their
force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
United States, but if they are among "that great body of
municipal law which regulates private and domestic
rights," they continued in force and are still in force
unless they have been repealed by the present
Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear
from their very nature and character.
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine
Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved
upon he United States. Chancellor Kent: “In this
country, the legislature or government of the State,
as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of
public nature, by virtue of its general superintending
authority over the public interests, where no other
person is entrusted with it.” .
15
Mormon Church v US: “it is a most beneficient
functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the
interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to
those who cannot protect themselves.
Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital: this beneficient
functions has not ceased t exist under the change of
government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it
now resides in the legislative department, ready to be
called into exercise whenever required for the purposes
of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being
exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases
whatever.
3. The Philippine government has competence to sue.
It would be impracticable for them to institute an
action or actions either individually or collectively to
recover the $80,000. The only course that can be
satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again
assume control of the fund and devote it to the object
for which it was originally destined.
To deny the Government's right to maintain this action
would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to
discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of
humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in
the future.
4. The action has not and can not prescribe.
U. S.vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway
Co.: “the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a
sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of
limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its
intention that it should be so bound”
the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal
party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action,
is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the
Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan
Keh
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during
the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila
and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon
refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had
invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without
an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (the Philippine government under the
Japanese).
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions
made during the Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation
MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by
MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue
hearing the cases pending before them.
16
RATIO:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts
and proceedings of a de facto government are good and
valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their
authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually
remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war,
for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did
not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the laws.
And if they were not valid, then it would not have been
necessary for MacArthur to come out with a
proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the
interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other
government” and whether or not he intended it to annul
all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts
during the Japanese military occupation.m
IF, according to international law, non-political
judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the
occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not
have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial
processes, which would be in violation of international
law.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result
from a particular construction, or great mischief done,
such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to
presume that such construction was not intended by the
makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the
Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and
violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said
should not be construed to mean that judicial
proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of
any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such
laws and institutions are continued in use by the
occupant, they become his and derive their force from
him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not
become, by being continued as required by the law of
nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature,
“law once established continues until changed by some
competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED
MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of
course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a
change.
17
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired
sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and
courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan,
as the said courts and laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now,
it follows that the same courts may continue exercising
the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before
the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until
abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction
upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to
take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
SUMMARY OF RATIO:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto
government are valid and civil laws continue even
during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other
governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate
the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue
hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established
through rebellion (govt gets possession and control
through force or the voice of the majority and maintains
itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the
enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state)
(source:
http://danabatnag.wordpress.com/2008/12/04/co-kim-
chan-v-valdez-tan-keh/)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. GREGORIO

PERFECTO
 the land to-day…” Fernando was convicted following the
Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M.
Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which
constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses
in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared
from his office. Senate was convened and was informed
of the loss.
Subsequently, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as
follows: “Half a month has elapsed since the discovery,
for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records
which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the
Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest
indication that the author or authors of the crime will
ever be discovered…To find them, it would not,
perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Senate itself,..
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from
the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but
followed the example of certain Senators who secured
their election through fraud and robbery.”
The Senate then adopted a resolution referring the
case to the Attorney-General. An information was filed
18
against Perfecto for violation of Art 256 of the Penal
Code: “Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other
person in authority . . .,"
The CFI convicted Fernando, stating: “We now have
no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority
in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and
said provision, with other articles of the Penal Code,
had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has, by a
majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of
ruling in U.S. v Helbig.
Issue: whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code,
punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall
defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or
other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
HELD: No, it is not.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on
article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law
took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel
Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal
Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal
Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults,
must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law.
Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia
Valdez, the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as
"reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject
of calumnia and injuria." It was found that those
provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
and insults in which the elements of writing and publicity
entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law.
The Libel Law must have had the same result on
other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance
article 256.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian
sovereignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code.
It is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of
the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here
used to denominate the laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
 According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain
to protect Spanish officials who were the
representatives of the King. With the change of
sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no
sense a continuation of the old, although merely for
convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws
were continued. The demands which the new
government made, and makes, on the individual citizen
are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of
the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted
position that the citizen must speak of him only with
bated breath.
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius
and fundamental principles of the American character
and system of government. Penalties out of all
proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a
distorted monarchical conception of the nature of
19
political authority, as opposed to the American
conception of the protection of the interests of the
public, have been obliterated by the present system of
government in the Islands.
it must be noted that this article punishes contempts
against executive officials, although its terms are broad
enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for
contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a
government based upon American principles. Our
official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some
authority greater than the people but it is an agent and
servant of the people themselves. These officials are
only entitled to respect and obedience when they are
acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction.
The crime of lese majeste (crime against the crown,
crimes against the Cortes and its members and against
the council of ministers) disappeared in the Philippines
with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of
the Crown have no place under the American flag.
Vilas v. City of Manila
(1911)Trigas, and Aguado are creditors of Manila as it
Vilas,
existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands
(PI) to the US by the treaty of Paris. According to them,
under its present charter, the Government of the PI is
the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations
of the old city. The Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands denied relief, holding that the present
municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in
no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality.
Thus it was elevated to the US Supreme Court.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE:WON notwithstanding the cession of the PI to
the US followed by a reincorporation of the city, the
present municipality liable for obligations of old city.
YES
HELD:
The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of
the property rights of the old city and to the right to
enforce all its causes of action. There is identity of
purpose between Sp and Am charters and substantial
identity of municipal powers, area, and inhabitants.
Argument against liability: Ayuntamiento of Manila was
a corporation entity created by the Sp government .
When the sovereignty of Sp ceased, municipality,
ceased as well.--> analogy to doctrine of principal and
agent, death of principal=death of agent
Dual Character of Municipal Corporations:
1. Governmental: exercises by delegation a part of the
sovereignty of the state
2. Private/Business: mere legal entity or juristic person.
Stands for the community in the administration of local
affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes
for which its governmental powers are conferred
In view of the dual character of municipal corporations,
there is no public reason for presuming their total
dissolution as a mere consequence of military
occupation or territorial cession.
McKinley’s instruction: relinquishment or cession cannot
in any respect impair the property or rights which by law
belong to the peaceful possession of property of all
kinds.
Property rights of municipal corporations and individuals
were safeguarded. The cession did not operate as an
20
extinction or dissolution of corporations. The legal entity
survived both military occupation and cession. The
corporate identity and liability of the city was not
extinguished.
That there is a total abrogation of the former political
relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is
obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in
conflict with the political character, constitution, or
institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force,
is also plain. But it is equally settled in the same public
law that that great body of municipal law which
regulates private and domestic rights continues in force
until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. In Chicago,
R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, it was said:
'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted
upon by the United States, that whenever political
jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are
transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the
municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are
intended for the protection of private rights, continue in
force until abrogated or changed by the new
government or sovereign. By the cession, public
property passes from one government to the other, but
private property remains as before, and with it those
municipal laws which are designed to secure its
peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all
laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the
political character, institutions, and constitution of the
new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a
cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and
the latter is involved in the former-to the United States,
the laws of the country in support of an established
religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the
like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force
without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of
the country on other subjects would necessarily be
superseded by existing laws of the new government
upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws
affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property,
and designed to secure good order and peace in the
community, and promote its health and prosperity,
which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is
general, that a change of government leaves them in
force until, by direct action of the new government, they
are altered or repealed.'
Peralta v. Director of Prisons
(1945)
Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of
Manila charged with the supervision and control of the
production, procurement and distribution of goods and
other necessaries, was prosecuted for the crime of
robbery. He was found guilty and sentenced to life
imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August
21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance
No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the
said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial
was the summary one established in Chapter II of
Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the
Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial
violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and
section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.
21
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground
that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal
Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political
instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese
Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are
repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of
the United States of America, and therefore, null and
void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No.
7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner
has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that
Peralta is being punished by a law created to serve the
political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the
Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are
much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in
the Revised Penal Code."
The Solicitor General opined that the Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the
summary procedure prescribed therefor are tinged with
political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in
Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the
Constitutional rights of accused persons under their
legitimate Constitution.
The features of the summary procedure adopted by
Ordinance No. 7, assailed by Peralta and the Solicitor
General as impairing the constitutional rights of an
accused are: that court may interrogate the accused
and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in
dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the
questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if
from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be
immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the
sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case
of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and
until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the
Supreme Court composed of three Justices.
FIRST ISSUE:
What is the nature and status of the government
established in the Islands by the Japanese forces of
occupation under the designation of Republic of the
Philippines?
In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon it washeld:
The Philippines Executive Commission, which was
organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942,
by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil
government established by the military forces of
occupation and therefore a de facto government of the
second kind. As Halleck says, "the government
established over an enemy's territory during the military
occupation may exercise all the powers given by the
laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is
subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is
of little consequence whether such government be
called a military or civil government. Its character is the
same and the source of its authority the same. In either
case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and
so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or
the rest of the world those laws alone determine the
legality or illegality of its acts." The fact that the
Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a
22
military government and was run by Filipinos and not by
Japanese nationals is of no consequence. The so-called
Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and
organized as a sovereign state independent from any
other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth
and reality, a government established by the belligerent
occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was
of the same character as the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority
was the same — the Japanese military authority and
government. As General MacArthur stated in his
proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which
has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-
called government styled as the 'Republic of the
Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943,
based upon neither the free expression of the peoples"
will nor the sanction of the Government of the United
States.' Japan had no legal power to grant
independence to the Philippines or transfer the
sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the
latent sovereignty of the Filipino people, before its
military occupation and possession of the Islands had
matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or
sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means
recognized in the law of nations.”
As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de
facto government of the second kind (of paramount
force), the question involved cannot be decided in the
light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth
Government; because the belligerent occupant was
totally independent of the constitution of the occupied
territory in carrying out the administration over said
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the cases involving the
validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate
States, considered as de facto governments of the third
kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines which is a de
facto government of paramount force. The Constitution
of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither
be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent
occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of
the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn
entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations.
In the case of United States vs. Rice, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that, by the military
occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the
United States in the territory was, of course, suspended,
and the laws of the United States could no longer be
rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the
inhabitants who remained and submitted to the
belligerent occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants
passed under a temporary allegiance to the British
government, and were bound by such laws, and such
only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And
Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says
that, in carrying out the administration over the occupied
territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent) occupant
is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of
the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and
the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the
purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest
23
and must be promoted under all circumstances or
conditions.
SECOND ISSUE:
The validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary
procedure adopted for that court
It is well established in International Law that "The
criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the
occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of
the conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn
entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted
either through special tribunals, whose authority and
procedure is defined in the military code of the
conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and
authorities of the occupied district."
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a
governmental instrumentality of the belligerent
occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to
create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not
a court is of political complexion, for it is mere a
governmental agency charged with the duty of applying
the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its
judgments and sentences may be of political
complexion, or not depending upon the nature or
character of the law so applied. There is no room for
doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the
court in question.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
THIRD ISSUE:
The validity of the sentence which imprisonment during
the Japanese military occupation
There is question as to the power or competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for
such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the
relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory
towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares
certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the
country, to be punishable; and he so far suspends the
laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the
summary punishment of any one doing such acts."
FOURTH ISSUE:
If they were then valid, the effect on said punitive
sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government
All judgments of political complexion of the courts during
the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the
reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or
right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the
present case, the sentence which convicted the
petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be
considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto
upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by
General Douglas MacArthur.
Laurel v. Misa
(1947)
Anastacio Laurel was a detainee for alleged
collaboration with the enemy during the Japanese
occupation.
24
He petitioned for habeas corpus on the theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the
latter, aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason as
defined and penalized by Article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Laurel contends that sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines, and consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
then suspended.
Moreover, there was a change of sovereignty over
these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
ISSUE:
WON Laurel’s contentions were valid? NO.
RATIO:
A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance
which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience
to his government or sovereign. This should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government of his current
residence. This absolute allegiance to their government
is not abrogated by enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred thereby to the occupier, remaining
vested in the legitimate government. What may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
with the control and government of the territory
occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
occupant. The sovereignty itself is not suspended and
subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the inhabitants to their legitimate government or
sovereign also subsists, and therefore there is no such
thing as suspended allegiance, on which petitioner's
contention rests.
Adopting the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance
would lead to disastrous consequences for it would
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a
free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious
task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence.
The second contention was also invalid since the
change of government from Commonwealth to Republic
does not affect the prosecution of crime of treason
committed during the former, because it is an offense
on the same government and sovereign people for Art.
XVIII of the 1935 Constitution provided that upon the
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the US, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines will be known as the
Republic of the Philippines.
Dispositive: Petition was denied.
PARAS, J., DISSENTING OPINION
He said that in Peralta v. Director of Prisons, the SC
held that the Constitution of the Commonwealth
Government was suspended during the Japanese
occupation and that SC should hold that no treason
could have been committed during it because Art. 114
of the RPC was not then in force. He also does not
agree with the majority that adopting theory of
suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequence for the reason that the suspension does
25
not exempt the occupant from complying with the
Hague Regulation of not involving the population to take
part in the military operations against their own country.
He also said that the Commonwealth was an
instrumentality of the US and had no sovereignty of its
own and that treason committed against it or the US is
not treason against the sovereign and independent
Republic of the Phil.
Republic v. Villasor
Respondent judge Guillermo Villasor ordered in a
previous case to release funds from bank accounts
belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as
compensation to two construction companies.
The Philippine government sought to reverse Villasor's
decision, on the ground that it did not authorize the
release of funds.
ISSUE:WoN Villasor had the authority and jurisdiction to
order the release of funds as restitution for damages in
a suit against the State?
HELD/RATIO:
No. Article XV, Section 16 of the 1935 Constitution
says, "The State may not be sued without its consent."
Villasor awarded the money belonging to a component
of the government, the military, without the express
authorization from Congress. Villasor acted contrary to
the Constitution, and thus acted in excess of jurisdiction.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing
from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as
well as its government is immune from suit unless it
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it
must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: “A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends.” Sociological jurisprudence supplies an
answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent
decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v.
Republic of the Philippines, with its affirmation that “a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is
not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that
may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
With the well known propensity on the part of our people
to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time
and energy required to defend against law suits, in the
absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such
an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.”
Judgment: Petition granted, judgment reversed.
Minucher v. CA
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor
Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and
Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and
continued to stay as head of the Iranian National
Resistance Movement.
In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information
for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs
26
Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by the Philippine police narcotic
agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said
to have been seized. The narcotic agents were
accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo
(agent of US Drug Enforcement Agency) who became
one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.
In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the
‘trumped-up’ charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo.
ISSUE:WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be
sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity
conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations
RULING:The SC DENIED the petition.
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions
of the diplomatic mission involve the representation of
the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly
relations with the receiving state. Only “diplomatic
agents,” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity
from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick
in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled
to immunity is the determination of whether or not he
performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache,
Scalzo’s main function is to observe, analyze and
interpret trends and developments in their respective
fields in the host country and submit reports to their own
ministries or departments in the home government. He
is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that
simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial
court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic
immunity is contentious.
Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit,
the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of
a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are
those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be
barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from
suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a
state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.
The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is,
under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium –
that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if
the judgment against an official would require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself, although it
has not been formally impleaded.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be
cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the directives
of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an
indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between
the two sovereigns.
27
The “buy-bust operation” and other such acts are
indication that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within
Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance
activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
scope of his official function or duties.
LASCO vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
Resources Exploration (UNFRFNRE)
23 February 1995
 Petitioners were dismissed from their employment
with UNRFNRE, which is a special fund and
subsidiary of the UN.
 UNRFNRE: Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it
because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity under the
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the UN. This is backed up by a letter from the DFA
confirming this.
 1991- LA dismissed the complaint, MR denied.
NLRC affirmed.
 They then filed for certiorari without first seeking a
reconsideration of the NLRC. Certiorari was not
proper because petitioners failed to ask for
reconsideration but the SC gave due course
because of the implications in international law.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Petitioners: acts of mining exploration and exploitation
are outside the official functions of an international
agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even
assuming that private respondent was entitled to
diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private
respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration
work and entered into a contract of employment with
petitioners. Moreover, it is a Constitutional mandate that
the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote
full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
OSG: UNRFNRE is covered by the mantle of diplomatic
immunity. It is a specialized agency of the UN and
under the UN Charter (Art. 105), it enjoys privileges and
immunities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
The Philippines is a signatory to the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities Specialized Agencies of the
UN in which Sec. 4 states that “the specialized
agencies, their property and assets, wherever located
and by whomsoever held shall enjoy immunity from
every form of legal process” and Sec. 5 states that “the
property and assets of the specialized agencies,
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be
immune from search, requisition, confiscation,
expropriation and any other form of interference,
whether by executive, administrative, judicial or
legislative action.”
ISSUE: W/N UNRFNRE enjoys diplomatic immunity.
28
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The diplomatic immunity of private respondent
was sufficiently established by the letter of the DFA,
recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE
in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations where the
Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether
an international organization is entitled to diplomatic
immunity is a "political question" and such determination
by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and
quasi-judicial agencies. The courts can only assume
jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly
waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at
bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III,
Sec. 4).
As a matter of state policy as expressed in the
Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law (1987
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the
United Nations and a party to the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies
of the United Nations, the Philippine Government
adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the
United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both
treaties have the force and effect of law.
Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded
performance of their functions. The purpose is "to shield
the affairs of international organizations, in accordance
with international practice, from political pressure or
control by the host country to the prejudice of member
States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions"
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In the International Catholic Migration
Commission case, it was held that there is no conflict
between the constitutional duty of the State to protect
the rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and
the grant of immunity to international organizations.
Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are now standard in
the charters of the international organizations to
guarantee the smooth discharge of their functions.
UNRFNRE is not engaged in a commercial venture in
the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint
project entered into by the government and the UN for
mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not
to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily
thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the
people, including that of petitioners.
This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.
Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make
a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of
private character to which the specialized agency is a
party."
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-
Aquaculture Department vs. NLRC
14 February 1992
 1975-1983: Lazaga was employed by SEAFDC-AQD
as Research Associate, Senior External Affairs
Officer, then Head of the External Affairs Office.
29
 1986- he was terminated from office due to alleged
financial constraints. He was deemed entitled to
separation benefits.
 1987- he filed a complaint against SEAFDC-AQD for
nonpayment of his separation pay and damages.
 SEAFDC-AQD: NLRC has no jurisdiction since it is
an international organization and that Lazaga must
first secure clearances from the proper departments
for property or money accountability before any claim
for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances
had not yet been obtained him
 LA (1988)- ordered SEAFD-AQD to pay separation
pay and other employment benefits plus actual
damages and attorney’s fees. NLRC affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N NLRC had jurisdiction.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. SEAFDC-AQD is an international agency beyond
the jurisdiction of NLRC established by ASEAN
Countries with Japan to purpose of which is to
contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development
in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the
member governments of the Center. Being an
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its
Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence
and freedom from control of the state in whose territory
its office is located.
Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the
Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by
one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council
(Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1) and
that its national laws and regulations shall apply only
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed
amount of money, movable and immovable property
and services necessary for the establishment and
operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11.). It
expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws
on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-
AQD.
Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the
issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does
not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has
none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by
law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties
can provide one.
SEAFDEC v. Acosta,
NLRC
2 September 1993
 SEAFDEC- filed MTC on the ground that NLRC had
no jurisdiction
 NLRC- MTD denied, petitioner is not immune from
suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not
expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising
the issue of jurisdiction.
 SC (1992)- dismissed petition for certiorari
ISSUE: W/N the NLRC had jurisdiction.
HELD/ RATIO:
NO. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is
an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity.
(See first SEAFDEC case). AJ Isagani Cruz stated:
Certain administrative bodies created by agreement
30
among states may be vested with international
personality when two conditions concur, to wit:, that
their purposes are mainly non-political and that they are
autonomous,i.e., not subject to the control of any state.
Anent the issue of waiver of immunity, suffice it to say at
the moment that the petitioner has timely raised the
issue of jurisdiction. While the petitioner did not question
the public respondent's lack of jurisdiction at the early
stages of the proceedings, it, nevertheless, did so
before it rested its case and certainly well before the
proceedings thereat had terminated.
Tijam v Sibonghanoy
15 April 1968
 After being duly served with summons the
defendants filed their answer in which, after making
some admissions and denials of the material
averments of the complaint, they interposed a
counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by
the plaintiffs.
 RTC- found in favor of Tijam and a writ of execution
was issued against the Surety’s bond. The Surety
filed to deny the motion for execution and motion to
quash the writ all denied by the cour
 CA affirmed the CFI. On MR, Surety filed its Motion
to Dismiss alleging that a month before the filing of
the case before the RTC, RA 296 or the Judiciary
Act of 1948 became effective. Under such law, the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
actions where the value of the subject-matter or the
amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00,
exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. CA forwarded the case to the SC.
ISSUE: W/N Surety may question the jurisdiction of
the CFI.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. Furthermore, it has also been held
that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too
late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the judgment,
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse.
The action was commenced in the CFI of Cebu on July
19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety
filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising
the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. Upon
the filing of the first motion for execution against the
counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written
opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked
for an additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of
its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds
relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of
jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution
against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through
31
counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead
of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion
to dismiss mentioned heretofore. It could have raised
the question of the lack of jurisdiction but failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the
court a quo as well as in the CA, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits.
It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by
the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.
International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja
 On February 23, 1981, an Agreement was forged
between the Philippines and then High
Commissioner for Refugees, providing for a refugee
operating center in Bataan. ICMC was accredited by
the Philippine Government to operate the refugee
operating center. On July 14, 1986, Trade Unions of
the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed
with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a
Petition for Certification Election among the rank and
file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed
the petition on the ground that it is an international
organization registered with
the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic
immunity.
 On February 7, 1987, the Med-Arbiter sustained
ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack
of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Bureau of Labor
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Relations (BLR) reversed the Med-Arbiter’s decision
and ordered for the immediate conduct of the
certification election. On July 15, 1988, ICMC’s
request for recognition as a specialized agency was
granted by the Dept. of Foreign Affairs including the
grant of corresponding diplomatic privileges and
immunities, as evidenced by a MOA between the
Philippine Government and ICMC. The latter then
sought for the dismissal of the TUPAS petition for
Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly
granted by the Philippine Government, through
the DFA.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of diplomatic privileges and
immunities granted to ICMC extends to immunity
from the application of Philippine labor laws.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. There is no doubt that ICMC was granted
immunity. Article II of the MOA between the Philippine
Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have
the status of a specialized agency. Article III, Sections 4
and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN
General Assembly on Nov. 21, 1947 and concurred by
the Senate on May 17. 1949, explicitly provides that
specialized agencies, including their properties and
assets, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal
process. Moreover, DFA’s opinion expressing its view
that the conduct of the Certification Election is volatile of
ICMC’s diplomatic immunity constitutes a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch that ICMC indeed
enjoys immunities accorded to international
32
organizations, which determination has been
held to be political question
conclusive upon the courts in order not to embarrass a
political department of the government. The term
“international organization” generally describes an
organization set up by agreement between two or
more states. They are organized mainly as a means
for conducting general international business in which
the member states have an interest. “Specialized
agencies” are international organizations having
functions in particular fields, as mentioned in Articles 57
and 63 of the UN Charter. There are basically three
propositions underlying the grant of international
immunities to international organizations: 1.international
institutions should have a status which protects them
against control or interference by any
one government in the performance of functions or the
effective discharge of which they
are responsible to democratically constituted
international bodies in which all the nations concerned
are represented; 2. No country should derive any
national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on
common international funds; and, 3. The international
organization should, as a collectivity of States members,
be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official
business customarily extended to each other by its
individual member States. The theory behind all three
propositions is said to be essentially institutional in
character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or
privileges of individuals, but with the elements
of functional independence necessary to
free international institutions from national control and to
enable them to discharge their responsibilities
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
impartially on behalf of all their members."The raison
d’être for these immunities is the assurance of
unimpeded performance of their functions by
the agencies concerned. The exercise of jurisdiction by
the Department of Labor over ICMC would defeat the
very purpose of immunity accorded to the agency,
which is to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice,
from political pressure or control by the host country to
the prejudice a member States of the organization, and
to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions.
ICMC’s immunity does not deprive labor of its basic
rights. ICMC employees are not without recourse
whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides
that "each specialized agency shall make provision for
appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising
out of contracts or other disputes of private character to
which the specialized agency is a party."Moreover,
pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement
between ICMC and the Philippine Government,
whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the
Government is free to withdraw the privileges and
immunities accorded. The immunity granted being "from
every form of legal process except in so far as in any
particular case they have expressly waived their
immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification
election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the
reason that it is not a suit against ICMC.
33
A certification election cannot be viewed as an
independent or isolated process. It could trigger off a
series of events in the collective bargaining process
together with related incidents and/or concerted
activities, which could inevitably
involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any
penal, civil and administrative proceedings.
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRI v.
SECRETARY OF LABOR
These are two consolidated cases involving the validity
of the claim of immunity by the International Catholic
Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International
Rice Research Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from the application
of Philippine labor laws.
HELD:
There are basically three propositions underlying the
grant of international immunities to international
organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO
Memorandum are stated thus:
1) international institutions should have a status which
protects them against control or interference by any one
government in the performance of functions for the
effective discharge of which they are responsible to
democratically constituted international bodies in which
all the nations concerned are represented;
2) no country should derive any national financial
advantage by levying fiscal charges on common
international funds; and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
3) the international organization should, as a collectivity
of States members, be accorded the facilities for the
conduct of its official business customarily extended to
each other by its individual member States.
SANDERS v. VERIDIANO
The theory behind all three propositions is said to be
essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned
with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but
with the elements of functional independence necessary
to free international institutions from national control and
to enable them to discharge their responsibilities
impartially on behalf of all their members. The raison
d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of
unimpeded performance of their functions by the
agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC
and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international
character and respective purposes. The objective is to
avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the
host country in their internal workings. The exercise of
jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these
instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity,
which is to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice,
from political pressure or control by the host country to
the prejudice of member States of the organization, and
to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions.
ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no
means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are
guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III,
34
Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the
1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and
246 of the Labor Code, 16 relied on by the BLR Director
and by Kapisanan.
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of
the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private
respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent
residence in the Philippines.
Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both
employed as game room attendants in the special
services department of the NAVSTA. On October 3,
1975, the private respondents were advised that their
employment had been converted from permanent full-
time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance
proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S.
Department of Defense. The hearing officer
recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-
time status. However, in a letter addressed to petitioner
Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr.
Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and
supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have
proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though
the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case
with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places
where others not involved in the case could hear."
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from
petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval
Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondent's employment status. So, private
respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters
contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment
of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their
personal and proprietary rights. However, petitioners
argued that the acts complained of were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties and that,
consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them
under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the
motion was denied on the main ground that the
petitioners had not presented any evidence that their
acts were official in nature.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
W/N the petitioners were performing their official duties.
YES.
Sanders, as director of the special services department
of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its
personnel, including the private respondents. Given the
official character of the letters, the petitioners were
being sued as officers of the United States government
because they have acted on behalf of that government
and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that
government and not the petitioners personally that is
responsible for their acts. It is stressed at the outset that
the mere allegation that a government functionary is
being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the law
of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state
35
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of
official character will not suffice to insulate him from
suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his
authority. These well-settled principles are applicable
not only to the officers of the local state but also where
the person sued in its courts pertains to the government
of a foreign state, as in the present case. Assuming that
the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants
have a right to the payment of damages, such award
will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their
personal capacities but by the United States
government as their principal. This will require that
government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary
amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making
the action a suit against that government without its
consent
REPUBLIC v. FELICIANO
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985
reversing the order of the Court of FirstInstance of
Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980,
which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo
Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the
State.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
W/N the State can be sued for recovery and possession
of a parcel of land.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
NO. A suit against the State, under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing
that the State has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be
invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the
proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of
sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be
construed in
strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the
Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the
State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority.
Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of
the legislative body.
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General,that the informacion posesoria registered in the
Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on
September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory
information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate
presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo
Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the
alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original
thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made
only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances
raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of
the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent
Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document
is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area
of only100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by
respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares,
later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be
36
wary in accepting "possessory information documents,
as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof
of alleged ownership of lands.
TAN v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No.
2087,advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales.
Herein petitioner-appellant Tan submitted his
application after paying the necessary fees and posting
the required bond therefore. Nine other applicants
submitted their offers before the deadline. The proposed
area was awarded to petitioner. Thereafter he was
given an Ordinary Timber License. However, it was not
signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as required. One of the bidders, Ravago
Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources praying that the
license issued in the name of petitioner be cancelled or
revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was
irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry
laws, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources revokes Tan‘s timber license.
His motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition. Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that
he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no
avail as respondents-appellees have failed, neglected,
refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-
appellant to continue operation in the area covered by
his timber license.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE/HELD:
W/N petitioner has exhausted all administrative
remedies before filing his petition to the Supreme Court.
NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
CFI. Petitioner did not appeal the order of the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines, who
issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the
area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that
the President has the power to review on appeal the
orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the
petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his
part to exhaust all available administrative remedies.
VETERANS MANPOWER v. COURT OF APPEAL
VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services,
Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA5487 (Private
Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and
combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favor and
institutionalize the PADPAO (Philippine Association of
Detective and Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore,
VMPSI questions the provision on requiring all private
security agencies or company security forces to register
as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within
the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of
Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate
per guard for8hours of security service per day at
37
P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of
Metro Manila. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat
competition when it charged Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System lower than the standard
minimum rates provided in the MOA. As a result,
PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of
membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against
the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary
Supervisory Unit for Security and Investigation
Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the
State, which had not given consent thereto.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PCChief and PC-
SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
YES. A public official may sometimes be held liable in
his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction,
however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were
performed as part of their official duties, without malice,
gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had
against them in their private capacities. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12,
1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the
State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued
must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a
legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without
such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction
over the public respondents.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
PNB v. CIR
Petitioner’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment
was denied for lack of merit. What was sought to be
garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in
Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court
which had become final and executory. A writ of
execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued. He was the
counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite
Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the
order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the
appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as
authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution
was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the
garnishment "may be public in character." The order of
August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the
motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding,
reads as follows:” The Philippine National Bank moves
to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its
branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff
of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice
by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court
contravenes Section11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105,
as amended which reads:"'All writs and processes
issued by the Court shall be served and executed free
of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person
authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs
and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the
law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon
City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio
Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of
38
garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter
officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court
finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201
has, since June 19, 1965, already repealed
Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is
now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the
Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk
of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of
execution and notices of garnishment in an area
encompassing the whole of the country, including
Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous
with that of the Court itself, which is national in nature.
... At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the
appeal to the Supreme Court by individual employees of
PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to
Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been dismissed
and that the same became final and executory on
August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason,
therefore, for withholding action in this case.
[Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine
National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The said Bank
is therefore ordered to comply within five days from
receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6,
1970."
There was a motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22,
1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
ISSUE/HELD/RULING: W/N the funds mentioned may
be garnished
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of
Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief
Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that
the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the
government, and that, as such, the same may not be
garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as
a government owned and controlled corporation. The
NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant
to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October
23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been
established — 'all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be
sued and may be subjected to court processes just like
any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as
amended."
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association
v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through Justice
Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that
when the government enters into commercial business,
it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated
like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular
business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the
rules of law governing private corporations."
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public
Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the
doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental
concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are
immune from garnishment. It is an entirely different
matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v.
39
Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is
"possessed of a separate and distinct corporate
existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its
funds may be levied upon or garnished
PNB V CIR
Facts:
 Petition for certiorari was filed to assail the validity
of a writ of execution granted in favour of Atty.
Manansala (counsel for United Homesite
Employees and Laborers Association—prevailing
party). The writ sought to garnish the money of
People’s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a GOCC)
deposited in PNB.
 PNB assailed the order on 2 grounds (1) that the
appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as
authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of
execution was contrary to law and (2) that the
funds subject of the garnishment "may be public
in character”. CIR denied PNB’s motion to quash
hence PNB filed this petition for certiorari.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n People’s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a
GOCC), can be considered a public fund and
in effect exempt from garnishment? NO
General rule is that governmental funds are
immune from garnishment however it is now
settled in our jurisprudence that when the
government enters into commercial business,
it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
treated like any other corporation. By engaging
in a particular business thru the instrumentality
of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself
pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as
to render the corporation subject to the rules of
law governing private corporations." If the
office or agency or entity has its own charter
vesting it a separate and distinct corporate
existence then it can sue and be sued.
Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or
garnished.
RAYO V CIF BULACAN
Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies
Facts:
 On Oct 26, 1978, during "KADING" the NPC,
acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin
Chavez, caused to opened simultaneously all the
three floodgates of the Angat Dam as a result
several towns in Bulacan were inundated (hardest
hit in Norzagaray). About a hundred of residents
died properties worth million of pesos destroyed
or washed away. Petitioners were one of the
many victims of the inundated town filed
complaint for damages against NPC and Chavez.
 NPC raised its defense that "in the operation of
the Angat Dam it is performing a purely
governmental function hence it can’t be sued
without the express consent of the State.
40
Petitioners opposed and argued that NPC is
performing merely proprietary functions and that
under its own organic act, Sec.3 (d) of RA 6395, it
can sue and be sued in any court.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n NPC performs a governmental function with
respect to the management and operation of the
Angat Dam? YES
2. w/n NPC to sue and be sued under its organic
charter includes the power to be sued for tort?
YES
It is sufficient to say that the government has organized
a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it
to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A.
No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and
controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government.
(National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR) Moreover,
the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be
sued in any court"is without qualification on the
cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort
claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
SSS v CA
Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies
Facts:
 March, 1963 spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro
Concio Cruz were granted real estate loan of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
P48,000 by SSS with their located at Lozada
Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal as collateral.
Spouses Cruz complied with their monthly
payments although there were times when delays
were incurred in their monthly payments which
were due every first 5 days of the month
 July 9, 1968, SSS filed for the foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage executed by Spouses Cruz
on the ground:conditions of the mortgage have
been broken since October, 1967 with the default
on to pay in full the installments then due and
payable on the principal debt and the interest
thereon (Indebtedness as of June, 1968
P10,702.58 excluding interests). Notice of
Sheriff's Sale was initially published in July 14,
1968 issue of the Sunday Chronicle.
 Before second publication Spouses Cruz wrote
SSS, demanding SSS to withdraw the foreclosure
and discontinue the publication of the notice of
sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were
up-to-date in the payment of their monthly
amortizations. Attempts of out of court settlement
failed.
 On July 24, 1968, the Cruz spouses filed for
damages and attorney's fees against SSS and
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal allegingthat they
had fully paid their monthly amortizations and had
not defaulted in any payment. SSS In its answer
stressed its right to foreclose the mortgage
executed in its favor by private respondents by
virtue of the automatic acceleration clause
provided in the mortgage contract.
41
 RTC: ruled in favor of Spouses, enjoined SSS
from holding the sale and ordered them to pay
the Spouses for Damages-P2,500.00 actual;
P35,000.00 moral; P10,000.00 exemplary
PP5,000.00 attorney's fees.
 CA: affirmed RTC’s decision but eliminated
P5000 moral damages; SSS filed for MFR which
CA denied hence this appeal
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real
estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would
have warranted the publications of the notices of
foreclosure? Not, necessarily.
Records show that it was a certain 'Socorro J. Cruz'
who was in arrears in the amount of P10,702.58 at the
time the application for foreclosure of real estate
mortgage was filed. SSS committed an error in picking
the record of 'Socorro C. Cruz'instead of the record of
'SocorroJ. Cruz'. SSS, however, denied having
committed any error and insists that their motion for
foreclosure covers the real estate mortgage of spouses
David E. Cruz and Socorro C. Cruz. Court is convinced
that the foreclosure proceedings should have been on
the real estate mortgage of 'Socorro J. Cruz' and not
Spouses Cruz.
2. w/n SSS can be held liable for damages? YES
 SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its
own.It has corporate powers separate and
distinct from the Government. SSS' own
organic act specifically provides that it can sue
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
and be sued in Court. These words "sue and
be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a
legal action. So that, even assuming that the
SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as
an entity performing governmental functions,
by virtue of the explicit provision of the
aforecited enabling law, the Government must
be deemed to have waived immunity in
respect of the SSS, although it does not
thereby concede its liability. That statutory law
has given to the private-citizen a remedy for
the enforcement and protection of his rights.
The SSS thereby has been required to submit
to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether
the SSS performs governmental or proprietary
functions thus becomes unnecessary to
belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen
may bring a suit against it for varied
objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain
compensation in damages arising from
contract and even for tort.
 Even conceding that the SSS is not, in the
main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied
that, in so far as contractual loan agreements
with private parties are concerned, the SSS
enters into them for profit considering that the
borrowers pay interest, which is money paid
for the use of money, plus other charges.In so
far as it is argued that to hold the SSS liable
for damages would be to deplete the benefit
funds available for its covered members,
suffice it to say, that expenditures of the
42
System are not confined to the payment of
social security benefits.
 SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as
awarded RTC and CA as the basis used by
the lower courts for the award of actual
damages (cancelled trip abroad)were too
speculative. It appears that Spouses Cruz's
passports had already expired and they did
not secure the necessary visas for their trip
abroad. No moral and temperate damages as
the negligence of SSS is not so gross as to
warrant moral and temperate damages. With
the ruling out of compensatory, moral and
temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or
corrective damages should also be set aside.
SAN FERNANDO LA UNION V FIRME
Facts:
Issue/Held/Ratio:
 December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving
a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a
gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg
and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump
truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney
including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of
the injuries they sustained 4 others suffered
varying degrees of physical injuries.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 A compliant for damages against, Third Party
Complaint and cross claims were filed.
Respondent Judge Firme ordered Alfredo Bislig
and Municipality of San Fernando to pay the heirs
of Banina with P1,500.00 as funeral expenses
and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of
the late Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as
moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's
fees. The complaint against Estate of Nieveras
and Balagot was dismissed. Petitioners filed an
MFR which respondent Judge Firme denied
hence this appeal on certiorari.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n municipality of San Fernando is suable? YES
Under Art XVI sec 3 Constitutional Law, the State may
not be sued without its consent. Consent can be implied
or expressed. Expressed consent may be embodied in
a general such as Act No. 3038 which provides for the
standing consent of the State to be sued in cases of
money claims; or special law such as in the Merritt
case. Implied consent is when government enters into
business contracts descending to the level of the other
contracting party or when State files a complaint
opening itself to counter claim. Municipal Corporations
are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued.
2. w/n municipality of San Fernando liable for torts?
NO
43
Test of liability of the municipality depends on whether
or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions. As
emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the
distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of
its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Nevertheless, Municipality are not liable for the torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable if it is shown that
they were acting in proprietary capacity. In the case at
bar, the driver of dump truck was on his way to
Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the
repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets, a
governmental function. The municipality cannot be held
liable for the torts committed by its regular employee
who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions.
NIA V CA
Facts:
 1967 NIA constructed an irrigation canal on the
property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson which
passed through Ventura’s landholdings as said
irrigation canal traverses the Cinco-Cinco Creek
which abuts said landholding. The irrigation canal
has 2 outlets which provide private respondents’
landholdings with water coming from said canal
and at the same time serve to drain the excess
water of said landholdings.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 In 1975 Ventura filed a complaint for the
abatement of nuisance with damages against
petitioners NIA alleging that the outlets
constructed on both sides of the irrigation canal
were not provided with gates to regulate the flow
of water from the canal to their landholdings
which resulted to the inundation of said
landholdings causing the destruction of the
planted crops and also prevented them from
planting on their landholdings.
 Lower court ruled in favor of the Ventura and
ordered NIA to pay for damages of P35,000 and
P5,000 attorney’s fee; CA affirmed.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict? NO
NIA “is not immune from suit, by virtue of the express
provision of P.D. No. 552 granted NIA the power “to
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act.” Paragraph 4 of said law
also provide that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in
court for all kind of actions, whether contractual or
quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and
damages as in the instant case considering that private
respondents’ action is based on damages caused by
the negligence of petitioners.
2. w/n NIA is not liable for tort since it did not act
through a special agent as required under
paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code? NIA
is liable.
44
 Paragph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines states that: “The State is responsible
in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in article 2176 shall be applicable.” Article 2176
of said Code provides that: “Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.” Thus, petitioners
are liable for the damages caused by their
negligent act.
 In this case NIA constructed irrigation canals on
the landholdings of the plaintiffs by scrapping
away the surface of the landholdings to raise the
embankment of the canal. As a result of the
said construction, in 1967 the landholdings of the
plaintiffs were inundated with water. Although it
cannot be denied that the irrigation canal of the
NIA is a benefit to the Venturas, the delay of
almost 7 years in installing the safety measures
such as check gates, drainages, ditches and
paddy drains has caused substantial damage to
the annual harvest of the plaintiffs of about 30
cavans per hectare. The failure of NIA to provide
the necessary safeguards to prevent the
inundation of plaintiffs’ landholdings is the
proximate cause of the damages to the poor
farmers.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
PNR v. IAC
G.R. No. 70547 January 22, 1993
Upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao,
Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of
August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's
express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its
passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three
(53) others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging
that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its
locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its
passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars,
semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to
warn the public of approaching train that would pass
through the crossing, filed the instant action for
Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their
Answer traversed the material allegation of the
Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the
collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence
and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo
Hughes.
ISSUE: WON the PNR may be sued. YES
It was demonstrated beyond cavil in the course of the
pre-trial hearings held for the purpose of stipulating on
crucial facts that the bus was hit on the rear portion
thereof after it crossed the railroad tracks. Then, too the
train engineer was frank enough to say that he saw the
jeep maneuvering into a parking area near the crossing
which caused the obstruction in the flow of traffic such
that the gravel and sand truck including the bus of
herein private respondent were not able to move
45
forward or to take the opposite lane due to other
vehicles. The unmindful demeanor of the train engineer
in surging forward despite the obstruction before him is
definitely anathema to the conduct of a prudent person
placed under the same set of perceived danger. Indeed:
When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of
reasonable diligence commensurate with the
surroundings it should be apparent, to the company that
a person on its track or to get on its track is unaware of
his danger or cannot get out of the way, it becomes the
duty of the company to use such precautions, by
warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as may be
reasonably necessary to avoid injury to him.
Likewise, it was established that the weather condition
was characterized with intermittent rain which should
have prompted the train engineer to exercise extra
precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan
ahead of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating that the
train was travelling more than the normal speed of
30 kilometers per hour. If the train were really
running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was
approaching the intersection, it would probably not
have travelled 190 meters more from the place of
the accident. All of these factors, taken collectively,
engendered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion
that the train engineer was negligent who, moreover,
despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-a-vis
the weather condition including the presence of people
near the intersection, could have obviated the
impending collision had he slackened his speed and
applied the brake..Withal, these considerations were
addressed to the trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, was in a better position to assign weight on
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
factual questions. Having resolved the question of
negligence between the train engineer and the bus
driver after collating the mass of evidence, the
conclusion reached thereafter thus commands great
respect especially so in this case where respondent
court gave its nod of approval to the findings of the court
of origin.
PNR also failed to install a semaphore or at the very
least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the public
of the passing train amounts to negligence.
In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en
banc, declared:
The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor,
as a common carrier, was not immune from suit under
Act No. 1510, its charter.
The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended
by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No.
741, provides that the PNR is a government
instrumentality under government ownership during its
50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the
President of the Philippines. Republic Act No. 6366
provides:
Sec. 1-a. Statement of policy. — The Philippine National
Railways, being a factor for socio-economic
development and growth, shall be a part of the
infrastructure program of the government and as such
shall remain in and under government ownership during
its corporate existence. The Philippine National
Railways must be administered with the view of serving
the interests of the public by providing them the
maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest
utility by the public, the economy of operation must be
46
ensured so that service can be rendered at the
minimum passenger and freight prices possible.
The charter also provides:
Sec. 4. General powers. — The Philippine National
Railways shall have the following general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such
business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or
conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the
corporation; and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad
corporation under the Corporation Law. (This refers to
Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad
corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.)
Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every
corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its
corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law
provides that every corporation has the power to sue
and be sued in any court.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends (Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa vs.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 353, 51 L. 3d 834).
The public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be
subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen and,
consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of
the means required for the proper administration of the
Government (The Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152, 19 L. ed.
129). (at pp.
 65-66).
To the pivotal issue of whether the State acted in a
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR for the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
purpose of engaging in transportation, Malong
continued to hold that:
. . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is
no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit.
It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles
1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities,
whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character
of the objects for which the entity was organized."
Malong v. IAC
L-49930, Aug. 7, 1985
PNR’s charter provides the ff:
SECTION 1-a. Statement of policy. - …The Philippine
National Railways must be administered with the view of
serving the interests of the public by providing them the
maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest
utility by the public, the economy of operation must be
ensured so that service can be rendered at the
minimum passenger and freight prices possible.
"SEC. 4. General powers. - The Philippine National
Railways shall have the following general powers:
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad
corporation under the Corporation Law." (This refers to
sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad
corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.)
Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every
corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its
corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law
47
provides that every corporation has the power to sue
and be sued in any court.
Issue: 1.WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or
corporate capacity when it created PNR.
2.WON PNR, being a gov’t instrumentality, is immune
from suit.
Decision: It acted in a corporate capacity. No, it is not
immune from suit.
Reasoning: SC held that the State divested itself of its
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is
no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
Company. MRC is not immune from suit according to its
charter. The point is that when the government enters
into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other private
corporation. “Suits against State agencies with relation
to matters in which they have assumed to act in a
private or nongovernmental capacity, and various
suits against certain corporations created by the State
for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business
rather than functions of a governmental or political
character, are not regarded as suits against the State.”
In this case the State has impliedly given its consent to
be sued by engaging into a business activity.
Judgment: The order of dismissal is reversed and
set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. THE BUREAU OF
PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
FACTS:
The action in question was — upon complaint of the
respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association
(NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano
Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting
prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein
petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the
Acting Secretary of the Department of General
Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the
Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin
Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in
unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the
employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the
members of the complaining association petition, in the
exercise of their right to self-organization an
discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their
employment in order to discourage them from pursuing
the union activities.
The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and
Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor
practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative
defenses, alleged, among other things, that
respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza
Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were
suspended pending result of an administrative
investigation against them for breach of Civil Service
rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of
48
Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued;
that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern
engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the
Republic performing government functions.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government
created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No.
2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it
operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with
the execution of all printing and binding, including work
incidental to those processes, required by the National
Government and such other work of the same character
as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be
authorized to undertake.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners be sued.
HELD:
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing
cannot be sued. The record also discloses that the
instant case arose from the filing of administrative
charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau
of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting
Secretary of General Services. Said administrative
charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and
acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting
the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of
their jobs against the order of the duly constituted
officials.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus
are authorized to institute and investigate administrative
charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial
Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it,
which is in effect a review of the acts of executive
officials having to do with the discipline of government
employees under them, would be to interfere with the
discharge of such functions by said officials.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is
granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the
complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners
is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than
the respondent court.
G.R. No. 42204
FAROLAN JR v.January
CTA 21, 1993
FACTS:
On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk"
with Registry No. 170 arrived at the Port of Manila
carrying, among others, 80 bales of screen net
consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading. Said importation
was declared through a customs broker under Entry No.
8651-72 as 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls with a
gross weight of 12,777 kilograms valued at $3,750.00
and classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the
Tariff and Customs Code 2 at 35% ad valorem.
Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment
reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid the
49
duties and taxes. Thereafter, the customs appraiser
made a return of duty.
Acting on the strength of an information that the
shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of nylon
dutiable under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, the Office of the Collector of Customs
ordered a
 re-examination of the shipment. A report on
the re-examination revealed that the shipment consisted
of 80 bales of screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls
or a total of 1,600 rolls.
Re-appraised, the shipment was valued at $10.15 per
yard instead of $.075 per yard as previously declared.
Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the
subject shipment as made of synthetic woven fabric with
100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was
assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the
shipment in question.
Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to
quantity and value, the Collector of Customs
forfeited the subject shipment in favor of the
government.
Private respondent then appealed the decision of the
Collector of Customs by filing a petition for review with
the Commissioner of Customs. Commissioner affirmed
the Collector of Customs.
Upon review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the
decision of the Commissioner of Customs. It ruled that
the Commissioner erred in imputing fraud upon private
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
respondent because fraud is never presumed and thus
concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in question
was not in accordance with law.
On August 20, 1976, private respondent filed a petition
asking for the release of the questioned goods which
this Court denied. In view of the fact that the goods
were being exposed to the natural elements, release of
the goods was ordered..
Private respondent alleges that of the 143,454 yards (64
bales) released to Bagong Buhay, only 116,950 yards
were in good condition and the 26,504 yards were in
bad condition. Consequently, private respondent
demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay
for damages for the 43,050 yards 13 it actually lost.
TOPICAL ISSUE: whether or not the Collector of
Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards
actually lost by private respondent. NO
Re: forfeiture: Although it is admitted that indeed there
was a misdeclaration, such violation, however, does not
warrant forfeiture for such act was not committed
directly by the owner, importer, exporter or consignee
as set forth in Section 2530, paragraph m,
subparagraph (3), and/or (4).
Re: liability: The SC opined that the Bureau of
Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages
that the private respondent sustained with regard to
50
its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's
claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the
Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual
damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will
fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has
been converted technically into a suit against the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may
not be sued without its consent," categorically applies.
As an unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of
Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an
inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an
agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the
governmental function of collecting revenues which is
definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private
respondent's claim for damages against the
Commissioner of Customs must fail.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of
Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Collector of Customs is
directed to expeditiously re-compute the customs duties
applying Tariff Heading 39.02 at the rate of 35% ad
valorem on the 13,600 kilograms of polyethylene plastic
imported by private respondent.
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., VS.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE
FACTS:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court
of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value
of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37
plus other damages. The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being
persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25,
1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground that
neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of
Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the
order of dismissal.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are
immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as
operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is
discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be
sued by private individuals.
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a
natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity
authorized by law to be sued. Neither the Bureau of
Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs
Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts of
the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs
is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81,
Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the
Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of
Custom, set up under Customs Administrative Order
No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to
Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record an Appeal). It follows that
the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first
two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical
persons.
51
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant is immune from suit.
HELD:
Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial
Relations had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be sued.
Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution
stating only that "the issue on the personality or lack of
personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does
not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over the
subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that
amendment may be made in the pleadings by the
inclusion as respondents of the public officers deemed
responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by
petitioning Unions".
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government
created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No.
2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it
operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with
the execution of all printing and binding, including work
incidental to those processes, required by the National
Government and such other work of the same character
as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be
authorized to undertake.
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing
cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a
suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself,
and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be
sued without its consent, much less over its objection. It
must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving
State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that
waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty,
will not be lightly inferred.
DAR v. NLRC, November 11, 1993
1. DAR and Sultan Security agency entered into a
contract for security services. However, several
guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages,
non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances,
night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime
pay as well as for damages before the Regional
Arbitration Branch of CDO against the DAR and
Sultan Security Agency.
2. LA: found them jointly and severally liable with
Sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money
claims. Since both didn't appeal, the decision became
final and executory. The LA then issued a writ of
execution commanding the city sheriff to enforce the
judgment against their property.
3. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction
with the NLRC contending that the LA didn’t acquire
jurisdiction over DAR thus the decision was null and
void. Likewise, it pointed out that the attachment or
seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize
52
DAR’s governmental functions to the prejudice of the
public good.
4. NLRC temporarily suspended the enforcement
and execution of judgment to enable DAR to source
and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against
it. It also dismissed the petition for injunction.
5. DAR filed a petition for certiorari claiming that
NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for
refusing to quash the writ of execution. It faults the
NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim
against DAR, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More
importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has disregarded
the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
6. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that
DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.
ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable. YES
HELD:
1. Generally, the State can’t be sued without its
consent. The State’s consent may be given
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through general or special law.
2. The general law waiving the immunity of the state
from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
Philippine government "consents and submits to be
sued upon any money claims involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties."
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
3. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded
when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaimor when it enters into
a contract.
4. Here, the government is deemed to have descended
to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However,
not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction
must still be made between one which is executed in
the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity
5. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture has
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character
6. The claims of private respondents arising from the
Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims.
Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be
"sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied but the
money claim first be brought to the Commission on
Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083,
provides the legal basis for the State liability but the
prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof
must still be pursued in accordance with the rules
and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
amended by P.D. 1445.
7. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in
effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
53
8. The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit the claimant's
action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law.
NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION 
 v.
 JOSE
TEODORO
1. These fees are said to have been due and payable to
the Capitol Subdivision Inc which owned the land
used by the NAC as airport, and thus the owner
commenced an action against PAL in 1951 to recover
the amount.
2. PAL countered with a third party complaint against
the NAC, which at that time had been dissolved thus
CAA was served with summons. The complaint
alleged that it had paid to the NAC the fees claimed
by Capitol Division.
3. Sol Gen: filed a MTD on the ground that the court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the TPC because NAC
has lots its juridical personality and because agency
of the Phils, unincorporated and not possessing
juridical personality under the law, is incapable of
suing and being sued.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
4. E0 365, Sec 7: All records, properties, equipment,
assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities
and contracts of the National Airport Corporation
abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred to,
vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.All works, construction, and
improvements made by the National Airports
Corporation or any agency of the National
Government in or upon government airfields,
including all appropriations or the unreleased and
unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be
transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Sec 3 likewise empowers CAA to execute contracts
of any kind and to grant concession rights.
ISSUE: W/N NAC/CAA may be sued
HELD/RATIO: Yes. CAA should have been made the
defendant.
1. The above provisions confer upon the CAA the
power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be
sued is implied from the power to transact private
business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued
on its behalf, the CAA should have the power to
prosecute and defend suits for and against the
National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the
properties, funds and choses in action and assumed
all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the NAC’s
creditors access to the courts of justice against the
CAA is to say that the government could impair the
obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient
of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
54
2. Not all government entities, whether corporate or
non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from
suits is determined by the character of the
obligations for which the entity was organized
3. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters
in which they have assumed to act in private or
nongovernment capacity, and various suits against
certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of
the nature of ordinary business rather than functions
of a governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the state.
4. The CAA comes under the category of a private
entity. Although not a body corporate it was created,
like the NAC, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a
business, even if revenues be not its prime objective
but rather the promotion of travel and the
convenience of the travelling public.
5. The CAA can not, claim for itself the privileges and
immunities of the sovereign state.
6. PAL’s third party-complaint is premised on the
assumption that the NAC is still in existence, at least
for the limited object of winding up its affairs under
Section 77 of the Corporation Law. By its abolition
that corporation stands abolished for all purposes.
No trustees, assignees or receivers have been
designated to make a liquidation and, what is more,
there is nothing to liquidate. Everything the National
Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the
Civil Aeronautics Administration.
7. To all legal intents and practical purposes, the
National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal
representative, acting by the law of its creation upon
its own rights and in its own name. The better
practice then should have been to make the Civil
Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant
instead of the National Airports Corporation. The
error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue,
and may be corrected by amendment of the
pleadings if deemed necessary.
Larkins v NLRC, February 23, 1995
1. They filed a complaint with the NLRC against
Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col
Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air
Force who were assigned to oversee the
dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment
of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by
LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the
employees and ordered reinstatement with full back
pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not
possible.
2. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor
Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person
because no summons or copies of the complaints,
both original and amended, were ever served on her.
Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with
notices of hearing were not in accordance with the
provisions of the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases
Agreement of 1947.
3. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: “In the
event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and
55
considering our finding that the real party respondent
is the United States Government through its Armed
Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such
execution be made subject to existing international
agreements diplomatic protocol”
ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins
HELD: No
1. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America
Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the
R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the
rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by
Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S.
military bases in the country.
2. The Agreement mandates that summonses and
other processes issued by Philippine courts and
administrative agencies for United States Armed
Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the
Philippines could be served therein only with the
permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds
giving his permission, he should instead designate
another person to serve the process, and obtain the
server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court.
The labor arbiter didn’t follow the procedure and
instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and
NOT the Base Commander.
3. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the
hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not
summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without
the latter being served with summons. In the
absence of service of summons or a valid waiver
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the
Labor Arbiter are null and void.
4. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and
participated in the oral argument before the said
body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of
summons and a voluntary submission of her person
to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have
raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in
relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of
jurisdiction. If an appearance before the NLRC is
precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said
agency over the person of the defendant, then this
appearance is not equivalent to service of summons
5. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US is
the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS
where the appellees previously worked as dormitory
attendants is just one of the various units of the
United States Armed Forces inside the said military
base.
6. Under the "Agreement Between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the United States of America Relating to the
Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United
States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise
known as the Base Labor Agreement of May 27,
1968, any dispute or disagreement between the
United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees
should be settled under grievance or labor relations
procedures established therein (Art. II) or by the
arbitration process provided in the Romualdez-
Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or
56
if the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was
appealable by either party to a Joint Labor
Committee established in Article III of the Base
Labor Agreement.
7. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over the
case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is void.
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR,

 v.
 HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, June 10,
1988
1. Sanders, special services Director, and Moreau,
commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing
officer’s report and asked for the rejection as Mr.
Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most
coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be
difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath
not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed
the records in public places.
2. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages
against Sanders claiming that the allegations were
libelous imputations that had exposed them to
ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The
private respondents made it clear that the petitioners
were being sued in their private/personal capacity.
Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the acts complained of were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties thus the court
had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of
state immunity.
ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over
both petitioners - NO
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is
being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the
law of public officers and the doctrine of state
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of
official character will not suffice to insulate him from
suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his
authority.
2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldn’t have been denied
because it had been sufficiently shown that the act
for which he was being sued was done in his official
capacity on behalf of the American government. The
United States had not given its consent to be sued.
3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against
certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown
to be acting officially in the name of the American
government.
4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners
are being called to account were performed by them
in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as
director of the special services department of
NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel,
including the private respondents, and had a hand in
their employment, work assignments, discipline,
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed
that the letter he had written (which included the
libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request
from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
information regarding the case of the private
respondents.M
5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was
write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence
57
with the conversion of the private respondents' type
of employment even before the grievance
proceedings had even commenced. This act is
clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the
immediate superior of Sanders and directly
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving
the special services department of NAVSTA In fact,
the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary
problems of the department and contained
recommendations for their solution, including the re-
designation of the private respondents. There was
nothing personal or private about it.
6. Given the official character of the above-described
letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being
sued as officers of the United States government. As
they have acted on behalf of that government, and
within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that
is responsible for their acts.
7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved
that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by
the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
United States government as their principal. This will
require that government to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded,
thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.
8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau
director could be sued for damages on a personal
tort committed by him when he acted without or in
excess of authority in forcibly taking private property
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
without paying just compensation therefor although
he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was
not necessary to secure the previous consent of the
state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party
defendant, as it was not responsible for the
defendant's unauthorized act.
9. In the case at bar, the government of the United
States has not given its consent to be sued for the
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is
the American government itself that will have to
perform the affirmative act of appropriating the
amount that may be adjudged for the private
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of
the petitioners are protected by the presumption of
good faith, which has not been overturned by the
private respondents. Even mistakes concededly
committed by such public officers are not actionable
as long as it is not shown that they were motivated
by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
faith.
11. Since the questioned acts were done in the
Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the
performance of their official duties and the private
respondents are themselves American citizens, it
would seem only proper for the courts of this country
to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and
to treat it as coming under the internal administration
of the said base.
WYLIE V RARANG [GR No. 74135 (May 28, 1992)]
58
PONENTE: J. Gutierrez
FACTS:
Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the Assistant
Administrative Officer and Commanding Officer,
respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic.
Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the
Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the
Merchandise Control Guard.
Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of
the “Plan of the Day” a daily publication that featured
among others, an “action line inquiry”. On Feb. 3, 1978,
an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods
were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the
merchandise control inspector and that a certain
“Auring” was, in herself, a disgrace to the office.
Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said
office, went to press an action for damages against
Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That
Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry
was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the
inadvertent publication.)
She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious,
and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach
her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in
performance of their official functions as officers of the
US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval
Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties involved.
Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages
because acts were not official acts of the US
government, but personal and tortious acts (which are
not included in the rule that a sovereign country can’t be
sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base
was dismissed.
ISSUES
1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine
Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune
from suit.
2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortuous act
while discharging official functions still covered by the
principle of state immunity from suit?
HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes, they are immune.
Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the
US government are immune from suit (but only when
they are acting/ discharging their official functions.
Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 constitution provides that state
may not be sued without its consent. But even
without this affirmation, court is still bound by the
doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine is applicable
not only to suits against the state but also to
complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly
performed by them in discharge of their official duties.
59
The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State
from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. Because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them –
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii.
There is no question, therefore, that the
petitioners actively participated in screening the
features and articles in the POD as part of their
official functions.
Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of
their official functions are immune from suit, then
it should follow that the petitioners may not be held
liable for the questioned publication.
It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued
in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts
in publishing a libelous article.
2. No.
Ratio. Our laws and, we presume, those of the
United States do not allow the commission of crimes
in the name of official duty. The general rule is
that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where
they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize
irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic.
Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act
or omission, causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the
POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation
against the character and reputation of the
private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted
that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly
recommended the deletion of the name Auring if
the article were published. The petitioners,
however, were negligent because under their
direction they issued the publication without
deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra
vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious
act which ridiculed the private respondent. The
petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable
for the damages they caused the private respondent.
REPUBLIC v SANDIGANBAYAN [GR No. 142476
(March 20, 2001)]
Ponente: J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
FACTS:
60
 July 31, 1987: the Republic and PCGG filed with
the Sandiganbayan for the reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages
against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and 60 other
defendants.
 On the strength of the complaint, PCGG issued
several sequestration orders, one of which covers
a Breguet Falcon 50 (aircraft).
o The Falcon jet was leased by Unichem
from Faysound Ltd. (a US company)
o The lease lapsed in 1987, Unichem should
have returned in to the owner, Faysound.
o Cojuangco or any of the defendants has
not claimed ownership or interest in the
Falcon jet
o Unichem has not been sequestered, only
the shared of Cojuangco in Unichem
have been sequestered
 1987: the lease has been expired for 2 years.
PCGG filed a Motion for Authority to Sell
Sequestered Aircraft pending Litigation with the
Sadiganbayan, because said aircraft was fast
deteriorating
o Sandiganbayan denied – saying that there
was no justification, prima facie or
otherwise, for the seizure of the jet.
o PCGG filed petition for certiorari with the
SC. SC issued a TRO directing the
Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from
enforcing its assailed Resolution
 Relying on the TRO, PCGG sold the aircraft to
Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 SC dismissed PCGG’s petition holding that "the
decision to sell the aircraft is not within the limited
administrative powers of the PCGGbut requires
the sanction of the Sandiganbayan which can
grant or withhold the same in the exercise of
sound discretion and on the basis of the evidence
before it."
 FAYSOUND FILED WITH THE DISTRICT
COURT OF ARKANSAN AN ACTION TO
RECOVER THE FALCON JET FROM FULLER
AIRCRAFT.
o The District Court ordered that the title to
the Falcon jet be returned by Fuller to
Faysound
o Fuller sued the Republic and PCGG for
breach of warranty and damages  a
decision was rendered against the Republic
and PCGG ordering them to pay Fuller the
amount of $13,945,443.01
 the PCGG, in order to settle the money
judgment against it, entered into an
"Agreement"6with Fuller Aircraft providing,
among others, that the Republic of the
Philippines agreed to pay Fuller $11 million on
October 15, 1996 and $3 million, in equal
monthly installments, beginning November 15,
1996 and ending October 15, 1997 in settlement
of Fuller Aircraft's claim which, per decision
of the Texas Court, amounts to
$14,928,457.29.
 The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan an Ex-
Parte Motion to Withdraw the amount previously
deposited with the PNB for the account of the
61
Sandiganbayan in trust for the beneficial owner
and that PNB be immediately directed to release
the funds on deposit to the Bureau of Treasury for
transmission to Walter Fuller Sales, Inc., with the
above Agreement and decisions of the US
Federal Courts
o Sandiganbayan denied the motion saying:
 (a) it does not appear from the
records that the person lawfully
entitled to the escrow deposit has
been determined;
 (b) the motion contravenes the ruling
of the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayanrequiring the PCGG
to deposit the proceeds of the sale of
the sequestered aircraft with the
PNB; and
 (c) although the records disclose two
authenticated copies of foreign
judgments,there is no indication that
copies of the deed of sale of the
aircraft and the compromise
agreement have been duly
authenticated.
o MR by PCGG was denied
 In the present petition: Republic contends that
respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion when it denied PCGG'S motion to
release the funds deposited in escrow with
the PNB to the Bureau of Treasury for
transmission to Fuller Aircraft.
o The Sandiganbayan failed to file a
comment on the instant petition. Thus, this
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Court has no way of determining why it
failed to resolve in more than one
decade who is lawfully entitled to the
escrow deposit
ISSUE/S:
WON Republic is liable for “Agreement” with Fuller
Aircraft. NO.
HELD/RATIO:
As shown by the records, Faysound Ltd. is the owner
of the Falcon jet. In fact, this is admitted by petitioner
Republic itself. As mentioned earlier, Cojuangco or any
of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0033 has no interest
in it. Clearly, this aircraft was erroneously
sequestered. It is thus patently illegal for the PCGG
to sell it to Fuller Aircraft.
Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case,
we rule that petitioner Republic cannot be held liable
under the "Agreement." It must be stressed that
petitioner did not authorize the PCGG to enter into
such contract with Fuller Aircraft. Granting that the
PCGG was so authorized, however, it exceeded its
authority. Worse, the sale of the aircraft was without
the approval of the Sandiganbayan.
Moreover, inasmuch as the sale of the aircraft by the
PCGG to Fuller Aircraft is void, it follows that the
"Agreement" between the PCGG and Fuller Aircraft
is likewise a nullity.
62
Correspondingly, petitioner Republic cannot be bound
by the terms of the said "Agreement" and thus, there
can be no cause of action against it.
In Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that the
PCGG or any of its member may be held civilly
liable if they did not act in good faith and within the
scope of their authority in the performance of their
official duties. Likewise, in Director of Bureau of
Communications vs. Aligaen, this Court held that
unauthorized acts by its government officials or
officers are not acts of the State.
Petitioner must, therefore, take immediate appropriate
action against the PCGG personnel involved in the
unauthorized sale of the aircraft.
US v REYES [GR No. 79253 (March 1, 1993)
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.
FACTS:
• Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen,
worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange
(NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in QC. She’s married to Edgardo, a
Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US
Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
• Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at
the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange
manager.
• Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the
retail store Bradford managed, where she had
purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow
ID checker approached her & told her that she needed
to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya
approached Bradford to protest the search but she was
told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees
on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search
on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other
curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she
was allowed to leave afterwards.
• Montoya learned that she was the only person
subjected to such search that day & she was informed
by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG
employees are not searched outside the store unless
there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya
can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger
suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of
Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft
and/or shoplifting.
• Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no
action was taken.
• Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due
to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by
petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager.
• May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on
Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with
USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds
that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign
sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2)
Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the
performance of her official functions under Phil-US
Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases
Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights,
power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the
63
establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will
also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have
effective command over the facilities, US personnel,
employees, equipment & material. They further claim
that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine
procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect &
safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to
par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST.
5500.1.
• July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary
attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave
the country & was removing & disposing her properties
w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by
RTC.
• July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to
dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX
JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-
discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority; (2) due
to excess in authority and since her liability is personal,
Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3)
Bradford’s act was committed outside the military base
thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the
Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case
to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her
authority.
• RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of
attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to
present evidence & Bradford declared in default for
failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya
claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless,
oppressive & against Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by
Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual
expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining
Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing
decision.
• Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian
employee thus not performing governmental functions.
Even if she were performing governmental acts, she
would still not be covered by the immunity since she
was acting outside the scope of her authority. She
claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are
his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She
believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction
because act was done outside the territorial control of
the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses
where US has been given right to exercise its
jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic
immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire
into the factual circumstances & determine WON
Bradford is immune.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction – YES
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the
Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like
asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the
present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to
intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to
dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene.
By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have
subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction.
64
2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. – NO
Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to
dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court.
Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action
is necessary so that Court would be able to render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause
of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred
the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But
this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have
already brought this petition to the SC.
3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. – NO
Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec.
3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties
since it will require the state to perform an affirmative
act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages.
This will be regarded as a case against the state even if
it has not been formally impleaded. But this is not all
encompassing. It’s a different matter where the public
official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against
officials by one whose rights have been violated by such
acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his
private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This
usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority
or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public
official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf
vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not
conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or
its agents in the Philippines merely because they have
acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their
official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her
private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the
scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in
the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. – NO
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic
immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military
Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second,
even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if
they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31,
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL 220 SCRA 124
Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC
of Manila, Branch 9
Facts:
 This case deals with the tragedy that transpired
on January 22, 1987. Popularly known as the
Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre.
65
Twelve people died and the heirs of these people
are seeking for retribution. (the gist is that the
people marched to Mendiola because of failed
agrarian reforms and the police and military were
there to defend the palace. There were shooting
and no one knows who started it. End result =
some people were killed.)
 Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this
case for damages.
 President Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created
the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission and in their
report the recommended the criminal prosecution
of four unidentified, uniformed individuals. The
most significant recommendation that they made
was that the deceased and wounded victims of
the Mendiola incident be compensated by the
government. This recommendation of the
commission was the basis of the claim for
damages by the petitioners.
 February 23, 1988 the Solicitor General filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the State
cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner
maintained that the State has waived its immunity
from suit and that the dismissal of the instant
action is contrary to both the Constitution and the
International Law on Human Rights.
Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from
suit.
Held: No
Ratio:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article
XVI , sec. 3. The principle is based on the very
essence of sovereignty and on the practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends. It also rests on reason of public
policy – that public policy would be hindered and
the public endangered, if the sovereign authority
could be subjected to law suits at the instance of
every citizen and consequently controlled in the
uses and disposition of the means required for
the proper administration of the government.
 Recommendation made by the commission does
not in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State. The purpose of the
commission as provided for in AO 11 was to have
a body that will conduct an investigation of the
disorder, deaths and casualties that took place.
The findings of the commission shall only serve
as the cause of action in the event that any party
decides to litigate his/her claim.
 Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it
cannot be maintained that such consent was
given in this case. The commission was a fact
finding body. The commission was merely a
preliminary venue and it wan not an end in itself.
 The case does not qualify as a suit against the
state. Some instances when a suit against the
State is proper are
o When the Republic is sued by name
o When the suit is against an unincorporated
government agency
66
o When the suit is on its face against a
government officer but the case is such that
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer
but to the government.
 The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain
to the government. Based on the investigation the
military officials acted beyond their authority and
there was lack of jurisdiction by the government
forces in the use of firearms. The committed a
prohibited act under BP 880 as there was
unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the
marchers.
The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter
himself by plea that he is a public agent acting under
the color of his office when his acts are wholly without
authority.
LANSANG vs. CA
FACTS: Private respondents were allegedly given office
and library space as well as kiosks area selling food
and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M.
Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private
respondent General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI)
was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived
from operating the kiosks, without again anything shown
in the record who received the share of the profits or
how they were used or spent.
With the change of government after the EDSA
Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein
petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private
respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner
terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI
and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and
the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. In
another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were
given until March 8, 1988 to vacate.
The latter notice was signed by private respondent
Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his
conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is
totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing
the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva,
then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely
acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind,
Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run
GABI as well as its business.
GABI's action for damages and injunction was
subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the
complaint was actually directed against the State which
could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the
trial court ruled that GABI could not claim damages
under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was
a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it
could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it
could realize from the conclusion. The trial court noted
that no such proof was presented.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
mere allegation that a government official is being sued
in his official capacity is not enough to protect such
official from liability for acts done without or in excess of
his authority.7 Granting that petitioner had the authority
67
to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and
capricious manner in which that authority was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be
held liable for damages"8 according to the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in not holding that private
respondents’ complaint against petitioner, as
chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the
state which cannot be sued without its consent.
2. WON CA erred in not holding that petitioner’s act
of terminating respondent GABI’s concession is
valid and done in the lawful performance of
official duty.
Held:
1. NO - The doctrine of state immunity from suit
applies to complaints filed against public officials
for acts done in the performance of their duties.
RULE: Suit must be regarded : as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgement against the state
where the satisfaction of the judgement against public
official concerned will require the state itself to perform
positive act, such as appropriation of the amount
necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
The rule does not apply where the public official is
charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful
and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are
not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability
arising from acts committed in bad faith. It also does not
apply when the official acts in his personal capacity,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
although the acts complained of may have been
committed while he occupied a public position.
Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman
but in his personal capacity. This is evident in paragraph
4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued
allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the
ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
2. NO - There was no evidence of any abuse of
authority on the part of Lansang.
Public streets, Public parks are beyond the commerce
of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and,
thus, could not be subject of a lease contract. GABI was
allowed to occupy office and kiosk space in the park
was a matter of accommodation by previous
administrators. Lansang may validly discontinue the
accommodation extended to private respondents, who
may be ejected from the park when necessary.
Sayson v. Singzon
FACTS:
In January,19,1967,
December 1973 the Office of the District Engineer
requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair
of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District
Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning
Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. It was also
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza
A canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5,
1967 wherein the bid of the Singkier Motor Service
owned by respondent Felipe Singson was accepted.
68
After being approved by Secretary of Public Works, a
voucher for the payment of the parts reached the hands
of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit which later
approved it finding it just and reasonable. He approved
the payment of for payment in the sum of P34,824.00,
with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. His
reason for withholding the 20% was to submit the
voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising
Auditor
The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of
P34,824.00 to respondent Singson.
Sayson received a telegram from the Supervising
auditor who found that there was an overpricing on the
spare parts and equipments as shown in the vouchers.
Because of the failure of Singson to receive the balance
of the purchase price, he filed for mandamus with the
lower court which was granted. Thus this petition with
the SC.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in issuing the
mandamus sought for by respondent
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the
collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary
action for specific performance. The suit disguised as
one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve
the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State,
which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court
except with the consent of the State.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
What respondent should have done was to file his claim
with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of
Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under
which money claim against the government may be filed
Ministerio
FACTS: v.
Petitioners filed a complaint for payment of just
Cebu
compensation
August 31, 1971
for a registered lot, containing an area of
1045 square meters, which the National Government
through its authorized representatives took physical and
material possession of and used for the widening of the
Gorordo Avenue, a national road. They also allege that
demanded either payment or return of the property to
which
defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the
Auditor General did not reply.
Defendants, through the Solicitor General filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the suit in reality was one
against the government and therefore should be
dismissed, no consent having been shown.
The lower court dismissed the petition and held that it
was a suit against the government. It was also held that
although the suit was filed in the name of the Public
Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, they
were filed against them in their official capacity and thus
the action is one against the National Government.
Thus this petition for certiorari.
69
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in granting the
motion to dismiss on the ground that it is a suit
against the National Government
HELD/RATIO: YES,
The government is immune from suit without its
consent. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it
liable, the doctrine calls for application.
However, it is a different matter where the public official
is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. An
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or
the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades
the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure
indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of
the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender
to the party entitled to such payment of the amount
fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the
land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the
public use defined in the judgment
Department of Agriculture v NLRC
November 11, 1993
In 1989, the Department of Agriculture and Sultan
Security Agency entered into a contract for security
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. In 1990 a similar contract was
made with the same conditions except for the increase
in the monthly rate of the guards.
In September 1990, several guards filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month
pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages,
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding
DA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security
Agency for the payment of money claims. This decision
became final and executor.
The Labor Arbiter forthwith issued a writ of execution
against the vehicles of DA. A petition for injunction,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the
NLRC. Petitioner alleged that the decision of the Labor
Arbiter was null and void and had of no legal effect for
the failure of Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over
petitioner.
NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. Thus the
appeal on certiorari with the SC
ISSUE: WON the suit against the DA is a suit against
the National Government which requires its consent
HELD/RATIO:
No. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution
that the State may not be sued without its consent.
However, such is rule is not absolute for it does not say
that the state may not be sued under any
circumstances.
70
The States' consent may be given expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the
general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit
is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon
any money claims involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties."
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from
its being a governmental entity when it entered into the
questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character. Moreover
the suit filed by the security guards is a money claim
entered into in its governmental capacity and thus falls
under the purview of Act no. 3083 provided that the
money claim first be brought to the Commission on
Audit.
G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
The PCGG filed a case for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against Bienvenido
R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago etc.
Tantoco and party however questioned the case filed
against them. The Sandiganbayn admitted their
Interrogatories and granted the motion for production
and inspection of documents.
This was objected to by the PCGG. However, after
hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying
reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of
documents), and the second, reiterating by implication
the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on
the plaintiff. Thus the present petition for certiorari.
The PCGG contends that none none of its members
may be "required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance," since it is covered by the State’s immunity
from suit.
ISSUE: WON the PCGG is covered under State
immunity?
HELD: NO, they had impliedly waived it by instituting
the case, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of
the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it
brings itself within the operation and scope of all the
rules governing civil actions, including the rights and
duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the
absurd would have to be conceded, that while the
parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required
to "disgorge all the facts" within their knowledge and in
their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like
compulsion.
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense
that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But
it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit,
descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The
PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the
State, even while assuming to represent or act for the
State
71
The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver
of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it acts
in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-
governmental capacity, is unacceptable.
It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of
eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as
distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis.
Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where
private property has been taken in expropriation without
just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity
from suit cannot be set up by the State against an
action for payment by the owner
G.R. Nos. L-71998-99 June 2, 1993
DE LOS SANTOS v. IAC
FACTS:
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land which they
alleged to have been misappropriated without their
knowledge or consent by Lorenzo Cadiente, who
constructed a road and a creek.
Alleging that if completed, the road and the creek would
"serve no public profitable and practicable purpose but
for respondents' personal profit, to the great damage
and prejudice of the taxpayers and the petitioners," the
same petitioners invoked their rights under Art. IV Secs.
1 and 2, of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution
and prayed for the issuance of restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction to stop the construction. An
action for damages was also filed.
The trial court ruled that since the construction was a
project by Minister of Public Works, the respondents
cannot be sued without the consent of the State.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE: WON the state is immune from suit?
HELD: NO, it had impliedly given his consent.
Quoting MInisterio v CFI:
“The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon
payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or
after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon
the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the
public use defined in the judgment. If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would
not be in the said plaint they are now. It is unthinkable
then that precisely because there was a failure to
abide by what the law requires, the government
would stand to benefit. It just as important, if not more
so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of the
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is
not too much to say that when the government takes
any property for public use, which is conditioned upon
the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the
jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked.
In this case, respondent government officials executed
a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for
public use is concerned. As in the Amigable case, no
72
expropriation proceedings were initiated before
construction of the projects began
Public respondents' belief that the property involved is
public, even if buttressed by statements of other public
officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioners'
property, especially since it was under the Torrens
system in Santos’ name. A public infrastructure loses its
laudability if, in the process of undertaking it, private
rights are disregarded
Quoting Republic v Sandiganbayan, It can hardly be
doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain,
the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from
its proprietary rights of jus gestionis. Yet, even in that
area, it has been held that where private property has
been taken in expropriation without just compensation
being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be
set up by the State against an action for payment by the
owner.
G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001
EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar
FACTS:
Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS
Development Corporation, initiated a housing project on
a government property along the east bank of the
Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. For this purpose,
the Ministry of Human Settlement entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Ministry of
Public Works and Highways,2 where the latter
undertook to develop the housing site and construct
thereon 145 housing units.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
By virtue of the MOA, the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways forged individual contracts with herein
petitioners for the construction of the housing units.
Under the contracts, the scope of construction and
funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit.
Due to the verbal assurance of the DPWH
Undersecretary, petitioners agreed to undertake and
perform "additional constructions"4 for the completion of
the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations
and written contracts to cover subsequent expenses for
the "additional constructions”
While petitioners completed these agreements, even
the verbal one, the Government failed and afterwards
refused to compensate them arguing that the contracts
were null and void due to the absence of proper
appropriation of public funds.
The government further argues that they are covered by
State’s immunity from suit.
ISSUE: WON respondents are covered by State
immunity?
HELD: NO
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Justice and equity sternly demand that the
State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this
particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be
duly compensated — on the basis of quantum meruit —
for construction done on the public works housing
project.
In this case, although the verbal contracts are indeed
null and void due to lack of proper appropriation of
73
public funds, the records reveal that the verbal request
and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas
led petitioners-contractors to undertake thecompletion
of the government housing project, despite the absence
of covering appropriations. On the principle of quantum
merui, it would be the apex of injustice and highly
inequitable to defeat petitioners-contractors' right to be
duly compensated for actual work performed and
services rendered, where both the government and the
public have, for years, received and accepted benefits
from said housing project and reaped the fruits of
petitioners-contractors' honest toil and labor.
G.R. No. L-48214, December 19, 1978
SANTIAGO v. GOVT of PHIL
FACTS:
Ildefonso Santiago filed an action against the
Government represented by the Director of the Bureau
of Plant Industry for the revocation of a deed of donation
executed by him and his spouse in with the Bureau of
Plant Industry as the donee.
As alleged, such Bureau, contrary to the terms of the
donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and water
system on the property donated and to build an office
building and parking [lot] which should have been
constructed and ready for occupancy on or before
December 7, 1974. That led him to conclude that under
the circumstances, he was exempt from compliance
with such an explicit constitutional command.
The lower court however dismissed the case under the
rule that “the state cannot be sued without its consent.”
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE: WON the state is immune from suit?
HELD: NO
While the court concedes that the general rule is for a
government body to be immune from suit and a party’s
remedy would therefore be to file a claim with such
general office, this case falls under an exception. It
would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee,
alleged to have violated the conditions under which it
received gratuitously certain property, thereafter to put
as a barrier the concept of non-suitability. That would be
a purely one-sided arrangement offensive to one's
sense of justice. Such conduct, whether proceeding
from an individual or governmental agency, is to be
condemned.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. the alleged failure to abide by the conditions
under which a donation was given should not prove an
insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent
likewise being presumed. Where there is consent, a
suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It
can be implied.
The decision goes no further than to rule that a donor,
with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee,
is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of
the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be
heard.
Under the circumstances, the fundamental
postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way.
It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of
procedural due process, which is the negation of
arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the
74
final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its
adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can
only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of
the people, the repository of the sovereign power.
The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave
responsibility of living up to the ideal of objectivity and
impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law. Only by
displaying the neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it
happens to be one of the departments of a litigant, can
the decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command
respect and be entitled to acceptance.
GR. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916
MERRITT v. GOVERNMENT OF PHIL ISLANDS
FACTS:
Merritt was riding on his motorcycle when he was hit by
a General Hospital ambulance causing extensive injury.
He therefore filed a case for tort against the
Government. The Government however claims
immunity from suit.
ISSUE: WON the government is immune from suit?
HELD: NO
The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to
the claim Under CC1903(5).
In this case, since the chauffeur of the ambulance was
not a special agent, the Government cannot be held
liable without its consent.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by
defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending
civil suit for the collection of a money claim arising from
an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private
respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where
Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a
court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office
or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national
government unless consent be shown, had been
applied in 53 other decisions.
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of
First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss
dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
ISSUE: WON the respondent’s decision is valid
RULING: No.
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the
explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present
Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its
consent."
"The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this
jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935]
Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist
concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates
75
the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in
itself the source of the law on which such a right may be
predicated. "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent, as it has operated in
practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be
the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and
ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants
may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all
factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so
unavoidable in the determination of what principles must
prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the
verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for
its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of
constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co.,
Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the
State acting through a duly enacted statute as
pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus,
whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
Administration agreed to had no binding force on
the government.
FROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL
On March 7, 1947, Fernando A. Froilan purchased from
the Shipping Administration a boat described as MV/FS
197 for the sum of P200,000.00, with a down payment
of P50,000,00. To secure payment of the unpaid
balance of the purchase price, a mortgage was
constituted on the vessel
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 76

The Republic of the Philippines, having been allowed to United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi
intervene in the proceeding, also prayed for the Kagawa, national of Japan
possession of the vessel in order that the chattel
mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed. For which reason the said Alien Property Custodian, on
Defendant Pan Oriental resisted said intervention, March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order vesting in
claiming to have a better right to the possession of the himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots
vessel by reason of a valid and subsisting contract in its Nos. 1 and 2.
favor, and of its right of retention, in view of the
expenses it had incurred for the repair of the said On July, 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property
vessel. Administrator (successor of the Alien Property
Custodian) issued a supplemental vesting order, vesting
As counterclaim, defendant demanded of the intervenor in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4.
to comply with the latter's obligation to deliver the vessel
pursuant to the provisions of the charter contract. On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator (acting on behalf of the President of the
ISSUE: Can the Government be sued in a United States) executed two formal agreements, one
counterclaim? YES referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4,
whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said
HELD: The trial court dismissed the defendants four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon the
counterclaim against the Republic on the ground, latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States
among others, that the state is immune from suit. On for all claims in relation to the property transferred, for
appeal, this Court held that the dismissal of the all such costs and expenses of administration.
counterclaim was untenable, because by filing its
complaint in intervention the Government in effect On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to
waived its right to non-suability. Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed on
November 15, 1948 a formal notice of claim to the
property with the Philippine Alien Property
BROWNELL V. LIM
Administrator.
On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land Vested Property Claims Committee of the Philippine
situated in Tondo, City of Manila, with a total area of Alien Property Administrator,
29,151 square meters. The lands were, after the last
world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the The claimant, however, took no appeal to the Philippine
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Alien Property Administrator, so the decision of the
committee became final
On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as
administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later
substituted by the Attorney General of the United
States) for the recovery of the property in question with
back rents.
Plaintiff’s action was dismissed.
ISSUE: Can the plaintiff claim for damages? NO
HELD: The claim for damages for the use of the
property against the intervenor defendant Republic of
the Philippines to which is was transferred, likewise,
cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the
state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge
against, or financial liability to, the Government and
consequently cannot be entertained by the courts
except with the consent of said government. Plaintiff
argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the
Philippines, in effect, waived its right of non-suability,
but it will be remembered that the Republic intervened
in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney
General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's
claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief
against any party in the answer in intervention it filed
77
US vs. Ruiz
JUSMAG v. NLRC
On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint
with the Department of Labor and Employment on the
ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed
from service by JUSMAG
ISSUE:Can JUSMAG be sued? NO
HELD: It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the
services of private respondent, it was performing a
governmental function on behalf of the United States
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated
March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that
the suit is, in effect, one against the United States
Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the
complaint. Considering that the United States has not
waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot not prosper.
G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M.
SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES vs. HON.
ELIODORO B. GUINTO
INDONESIA v.
VINZON
CASE#1: Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa
Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for barber
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
services through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw.
Private respondents who have been concessionaires
inside Clark for years submitted their bids.
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon. The private
respondents filed a complaint in the court below to
compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel
the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for
the barbershop concessions.
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary
injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a
suit against the United States of America, which had not
waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as
official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also
immune from suit.
CASE#2: Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages
for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio
City. It was found during investigation that Genove had
poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as
club manager, suspended him and referred the case to
a board of arbitrators, who found him guilty and
recommended his dismissal. Col. David C. Kimball of
the PACAF Clark Air Force Base effected his dismissal.
Genove then filed a complaint in RTC Baguio.
Defendants, joined by USA, alleged that Lamachia, as
an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air
Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him
in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in
effect against the United States, which had not given its
consent to be sued.
78
CASE#3: Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O'
Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested
following a buy-bust operation conducted by officers of
the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). As a result of
the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his
employment. Defendants alleged that they had only
done their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the
Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement, and that they were
acting in their official capacity when they did the acts
complained of and that the complaint against them was
in effect a suit against the United States without its
consent.
ISSUE: W the cases should be dismissed on the ground
of immunity from suit - YES.
1. General Principles: The rule that a state may not be
sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land under the
constitution. Even without such affirmation, we would
still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
Under this doctrine, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state
immunity is based on the justification given by Justice
Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
authority which makes the law on which the right
depends." There are other practical reasons for the
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the
added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in
parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."
In the case of the United States of America, the
customary rule of international law on state immunity is
expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases
Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows:
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have
the rights, power and authority within the bases which
are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and
defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof
and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of
the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the
vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide
access to them or appropriate for their control.
It bears stressing at this point that this does not confer
on the United States of America a blanket immunity for
all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines.
Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are
also insulated from suit in this country merely because
they have acted as agents of the United States in the
discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America,
like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract
in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the
79
contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
that no such waiver may be implied.
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they
have acted in the discharge of their official functions as
officers or agents of the United States. However, this is
a matter of evidence. The charges against them may
not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that
their acts are imputable to the United States of America,
which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the
defendants are sought to be held answerable for
personal torts in which the United States itself is not
involved. If found liable, they and they alone must
satisfy the judgment.
2. However, in Case#3, it is clear that the individually-
named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they
were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when
they apprehended and later testified against the
complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties
as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which
has not given its consent to be sued.
Luis Bautista invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code
which holds the government liable if it acts through a
special agent. The argument, it would seem, is
premised on the ground that since the officers are
designated "special agents," the United States
government should be liable for their torts.
But the circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it
can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the
state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff
the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not
suability. The government may be held liable under this
rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of
the accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is
not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in
the case at bar. No less important, the said provision
appears to regulate only the relations of the local state
with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the
Philippine government and not to foreign governments
impleaded in our courts.
3. In Case#2, the Court can assume that the restaurant
services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of
the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the
United States government in its proprietary capacity.
Such services are not extended to the American
servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in
the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it
appear that they are exclusively offered to these
servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they
are available to the general public as well, including the
tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to
visit John Hay for this reason.
So the officers cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit
against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper
even if it be established that they were acting as agents
80
of the United States when they investigated and later
dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United
States government itself can claim such immunity. The
reason is that by entering into the employment contract
with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions,
it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from
suit.
4. In Case#1, we also find that the barbershops subject
of the concessions granted by the United States
government are commercial enterprises operated by
private person's. They are not agencies of the United
States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable
as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
establishments provide for the grooming needs of their
customers and offer not only the basic haircut and
shave (as required in most military organizations) but
such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure
and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee.
Also, the barbershop concessionaires are under the
terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United
States government fixed commissions in consideration
of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their
respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any
immunity from the complaint filed by the private
respondents in the court below.
G.R. No. L-26400,, February 29, 1972
VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs.
 NICOLAS CUENCA, as
Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC
FACTS:
OF THE PHILIPPINES
1. Victoria Amigable owns a lot in Cebu City shown by a
TCT No. T-18060 issued by Register of Deeds on
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
February 1, 1924. Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said
lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Note:
these avenues were already existing in 1921.
2. March 27, 1958 - Amigable's counsel wrote the
President of the Philippines requesting payment of the
portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the
government. The Auditor General disallowed it.
3. February 6, 1959 - Amigable filed a complaint against
the Republic and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the 6,167 sqm of land.
4. July 29, 1959 - the court held that that it had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the
recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of
her lot in question on the ground that the government
cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither
original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide
plaintiff's money claim against the government; nor did it
have jurisdiction over the claim for moral damages
because the government had not given its consent to be
sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed
ISSUE: W Amigable may properly sue the government
under the facts of the case - YES. Case remanded to
the court a quo for the determination of compensation
1. Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu - where
the government takes away property from a private
landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
81
government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure,
petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now.
It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a
failure to abide by what the law requires, the
government would stand to benefit.
3. Considering that no annotation in favor of the
government appears at the back of her certificate
of title and that she has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of
the whole lot. As registered owner, she could
bring an action to recover possession of the
portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO
FACTS:
1. Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1, the PCGG
issued writs placing under sequestration all business
enterprises, entities and other properties, real and
personal, owned or registered in the name of private
respondent Benedicto, including 227 shares in Negros
Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI).
2. So the PCGG representatives sat as members of the
Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
resolution assessing a monthly membership due of
P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. The 227 sequestered
shares were declared delinquent (bec. it could not pay
the membership due) and so it had to be disposed of in
an auction sale.
3. Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the
Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al.,
defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, reconstitution and damages that PCGG
filed with the Sandiganbayan against Roberto S.
Benedicto. On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic
and private respondent Benedicto entered into a
Compromise Agreement, wherein Republic agreed and
bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI
shares, impliedly recognizing that the shares of stock
are not ill-gotten.
4. Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first
assailed Resolution directing PCGG to deliver to the
Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI]
free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default
thereof, to pay their value. PCGG failed to comply.
ISSUE: W Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the
membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI
shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the
foreclosure sale thereof - NO.
1. PCGG, as a receiver of the sequestered 227 shares,
has the function to pay outstanding debts pertaining to
the sequestered entity or property. It contends,
however, that membership dues owing to a golf club
cannot be considered as an outstanding debt.
82
2. (relevant part) In a last-ditch attempt to escape
liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes
state immunity from suit. As argued, the order for it to
pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix
monetary liability on a government agency, thus
necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy
the judgment claim. But, as Benedicto correctly
countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the
exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the
government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No.
0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the
plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be
effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when
the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the
initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby
descends to the level of a private individual and thus
opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the
latter may have against it. Petitioner Republic’s act of
filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a
waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff
in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its
immunity against private respondent Benedicto’s
prayers in the same case.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with
private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic
thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and
placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When
the State enters into contract, through its officers or
agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose
and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority,
whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights
and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued
even without its express consent, precisely because by
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the
level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied
from the very act of entering into such contract, breach
of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the
other party to the agreement.
G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs.
 THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.
FACTS:
1. Apr 1, 1989 - DAR entered into a contract for security
services with Sultan Security Agency. On 13 September
1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed
a complaint for underpayment of wages, etc. against the
DAR and Sultan Security Agency.
2. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on
31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally
liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of
money claims. The decision became final and
executory.
3. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the two
respondents.
4. The City Sheriff levied on execution the motor
vehicles of DAR. These units were put under the
custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the
petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the
final settlement of the case, whichever would come first.
83
5. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and
mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction
with NLRC CDO, alleging that the writ issued was
effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void. The
petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or
seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize
petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of
the public good.
6. NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. DAR
now filed a petition for certiorari. It argues: (1) that
NLRC cannot assume jurisdiction over a money claim
against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit; (2)
NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-
suability of the State.
ISSUE: W DAR waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency - NO. Petiiton for Certiorari granted.
1. The rule that "the State may not be sued without its
consent," is not really absolute for it does not say that
the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On
the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only
conveys, "the state may not be sued without its
consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at
times be sued.
2. The States' consent may be given expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
general lawor a special law. Implied consent, on the
other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
counterclaimor when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended
to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied
upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not,
however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered
into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one
which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary
capacity.
3. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from
its being a governmental entity when it entered into the
questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character.
4. But, be that as it may, the claims of private
respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday
pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from
the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money
claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of
the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied.. .
Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No.
327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
1145, the money claim first be brought to the
Commission on Audit.
5. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides
the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution,
enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued
in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down
in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
84
6. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does
thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution
against it. tersely put, when the State waives its
immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party
an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a
liability.
G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON.
GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance
 of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF
 QUEZON
CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA,
THE CLERK OF COURT,
 Court of First Instance of
Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO
 UNCHUAN,
AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
1. July 3, 1961 - in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R, a
decision was rendered in favor of P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd.,
Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction
 Corporation, and against the Republic for
the amount of P1,712,396.40.
2. June 24, 1969 - Honorable Guillermo P.
 Villasor,
issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of
July 3,
 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs
of Rizal Province,
 Quezon City [as well as] Manila to
execute the said decision.
3. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein)
served
 notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969
with several Banks,
 specially on the “monies due the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
 form of deposits
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the
said
 Writ of Execution”
4. The funds of the Armed
 Forces of the Philippines on
deposit with the Banks, particularly, with
 the Philippine
Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank
[or]
 their branches are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the
 payment of pensions of retirees,
pay and allowances of military and
 civilian personnel
and for maintenance and operations of the
Armed
 Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification
dated July 3, 1969 by
 the AFP Controller,…"
ISSUE: W the garnishment of the AFP funds were
proper - NO.
1. The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the
outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not
in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It
 is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from
the
 juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well
as its
 government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent.
2. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense
from a basic
 concept is that public funds cannot be the
object of a garnishment
 proceeding even if the consent
to be sued had been previously granted
 and the state
liability adjudged.
3. Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego: “The
universal rule that where the State gives its consent
 to
be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may
 limit claimant’s action ‘only up to the
completion of proceedings
 anterior to the stage of
execution’ and that the power of the Courts
 ends when
85
the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and
 properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to
 satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public
 policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by
the
 corresponding appropriation as required by law.
The functions and
 public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
 or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law.”
4. The above applies even to an attempted garnishment
of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee.
5. Another reason is that moneys sought to be
garnished, as long as they
 remain in the hands of the
disbursing officer of the Government, belong
 to the
latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be
entitled to
 a specific portion thereof. And still another
reason which covers both
 of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids
 it.
CITY OF CALOOCAN v.
ALLARDE
 Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the
position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other
positions via Ordinance 1749. The affected
employees assailed the legality of the abolition.
 The CFI declared abolition illegal and ordered the
reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and
the payment of their back-wages and other
emoluments. The City Government appealed the
decision but such was dismissed.
 The City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial
payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in
full.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 The City appropriated funds for her unpaid back
salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City
refused to release the money to Santiago. The City
of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to
back wages.
 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one
of the motor vehicles of the City Government for
P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The
City Government questioned the validity of the motor
vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt
from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and
directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public
auction 3 more vehicles.
 The City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance
0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14
claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest.
Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer
to release the check but the City Treasurer can¶t do
so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check.
 Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately
garnish the funds of the City Government of
Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago.
Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but
the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that
the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold
PNB liable for any damages which may be caused
by the withholding the funds of the city.
ISSUE:WON the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB,
may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to
satisfy Santiago’s claim - YES
86
RATIO:
 Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment
by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his
claim property of the defendant in the hands of a
third person, or money owed by such third person or
garnishee to the defendant.
 The rule is and has always been that all government
funds deposited in the PNB or any other official
depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or
special deposit, remain government funds and may
not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence
of a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from
suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when
the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the
state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at
liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the
judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on
a judgment against the state. Such statutes do
not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
judgments recovered, and only convey an implication
that the legislature will recognize such judgment as
final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a
well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
corresponding appropriation as required by law.
 In such a case, the monetary judgment may be
legally enforced by judicial process. Herein, the City
Council of Caloocan already approved and passed
Ordinance 0134, allocating the amount
of P439,377.14 for Santiago’s back-wages plus
interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
exception. The judgmentof the trial court could then
be validly enforced against such funds
City of Caloocan v
FACTS: In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan
Allarde
abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator
and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The
affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition.
The CF I in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered
the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and
the payment of their back-wages and other
emoluments. The City Government appealed the
decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the City paid
Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-
wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City
appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries
(supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to
release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan
argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages.
On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at
public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City
Government for P100,000.The amount was given to
Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity
of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were
exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the
motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at
public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the
City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134
which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by
Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde
issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the
check but the City Treasurer can’t do so because the
87
Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993
Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately
garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan
corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of
garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City
Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the
garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB
liable for any damages which may be caused by the
withholding the funds of the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in
PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to
satisfy Santiago’s claim.
HELD: Garnishment is considered a specie
of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to
subject to his claim property of the defendant in the
hands of a third person, or money owed by such third
person nor garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and
has always been that all government funds deposited in
the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine
Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
whether by general or special deposit, remain
government funds and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding
appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule
as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power
of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered.
Although the liability of the state has been judicially
ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself
whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution
cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such
statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an
implication that the legislature will recognize such
judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction
thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of
a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
corresponding appropriation as required by law.
In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally
enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council
of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance
No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount
of P439,377.14for Santiago’s back-wages plus interest.
This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The
judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced
against such funds.
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI v. COURT OF
APPEALS
 In lieu of an expropriation proceeding filed,
petitioner Municipality of Makati opened a bank
account with the PNB Buendia Branch under
petitioner's name containing the sum of
P417,510.00, pursuant to the provisions of PD. 42.
 After due hearing, the court fixed the amount of the
property and ordered petitioner to pay such amount
minus the advanced payments it has made.
 After this decision became final and executory, a writ
of execution was issued and a Notice of
Garnishment was served by respondent sheriff upon
the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch.
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o However, respondent sheriff was informed that
a "hold code" was placed on the account of
petitioner.
o Private respondent then filed a motion praying
for the court to order the bank to deliver to the
sheriff the unpaid balance, while petitioner
also filed a motion to lift the garnishment.
 While these motions are pending, a “Manifestation”
was filed, informing the court that private respondent
was no longer the owner of the subject property and
that ownership to this has been transferred to
Philippine Savings Bank, Inc.
 A compromise agreement was made between
private respondent and Philippine Savings Bank,
Inc., which was then approved by the court. The
court further ordered PNB Buendia Branch to
immediately release to PSB the sum of
P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of
the appraised value of the subject property, from the
garnished account of petitioner but the bank failed to
comply as it was still waiting for proper authorization
from the PNB head office enabling it to make a
disbursement for the amount so ordered.
 As the case was in the Supreme Court, petitioner
raised for the first time that it had two accounts with
PNB Buendia Branch: one was made exclusively for
the expropriation of the subject property, and the
other is for statutory obligations and other purposes
of the municipal government
ISSUE: WON the balance of the appraised value of the
subject property may be levied upon the second
account of petitioner municipality - YES
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
RATIO:
 Well-settled is the rule that public funds are not
subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise
provided for by statute.
o More particularly, the properties of a municipality,
whether real or personal, which are necessary for
public use cannot be attached and sold at
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment
against the municipality.
o Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses
and market fees, and which are intended primarily
and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the
municipality, are exempt from execution.
 The foregoing rule finds application in the case at
bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council
of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating
from its public funds an amount corresponding to the
balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4,
1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in
Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds
of petitioner deposited in the said account.
Municipality of Makati v Court of
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a
Appeals
portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings,
the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land
89
which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents
amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced
payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding
writ of execution accompanied with a writ of
garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was
deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed
by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration,
contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would
result in the disbursement of public funds without the
proper appropriation required under the law, citing the
case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio. The RTC
dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the
Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and
petitioner now filed this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of
Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution.
HELD: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders
of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which
are public fund and thereby are exempted from
execution without the proper appropriation required
under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are
not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise
provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from
taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed
an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its
public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy
under execution may be validly effected. However, this
court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has
been in their use already. This Court will not condone
petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation
arising from expropriation of land they are already
enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should
be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
Pacific Products v Ong
FACTS:
PPI filed a case against Labrador; the Sheriff was
ordered to attach Labrador’s properties.
In the mean time, BML Trading won a bid to supply the
Bureau of Telecommunications worth 10,500 for copper
sulfate. This was garnished by the Sheriff as Labrador
was doing business under the name BML Trading. BML
however assigned its rights to Ong as Ong advanced
the necessary funds to purchase the copper sulfate. He
filed a third party claim.
ISSUE:
Could the money payable to BML be garnished even if it
was still in the possession of the Bureau of
Telecommunications?
HELD:
No. The notice of garnishment was made pursuant to an
order of attachment against Labrador’s property. By the
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process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the
garnishee for a debt due to the defendant. The debtor
stranger becomes a forced intervenor. The Director of
the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, an officer of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, when served with
the writ of attachment, thus become party to the
action. It becomes a suit against the state without their
consent.
In this case, immunity from suit was not waived because
the Bureau entered into a business transaction with
BML. The Bureau is a service bureau, not engaged in
business.
It further was never proved that Labrador was doing
business under the name BML trading.
Petition dismissed.
PACIFIC PRODUCTS v. ONG
 Petitioner Pacific Products filed an action for sum of
money against Hilarion Labrador, doing business
under the name and style of BML Trading and
Supply. A court order was issued directing the Sheriff
of Manila to attach the properties of the latter.
 BML Trading won in a bid to supply the Bureau of
Telecommunications with 15,000 pounds of
bluestone copper sulfate worth P10,500.00.
Labrador, as agent of BML Trading delivered the
compound.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 Before the Bureau could release the payment to
BML Trading, the Sheriff of Manila garnished
P9,111.70 out of the P10,500.00.
 Unknown to Pacific, BML Trading, through its
attorney in-fact, H.D. Labrador assigned its tights
over the P10,500.00 to respondent, Vicente Ong.
o It was Ong who advanced the necessary funds to
purchase the copper sulfate and the parties
agreed that the profits will be shared by BML
Trading and Vicente Ong on a 40-60 percent
basis. It was also their agreement that BML
Trading will waive its share in the net profits
which may be realized from the transaction
should it fail to secure the release of the payment.
 Pacific learned about the assignment only when a
copy of the third party claim filed by Ong with the
Office of the Sheriff of Manila was served on them.
 H.D. Labrador was declared in default and was
ordered to pay Pacific the sum of P 9,111.70. The
corresponding writ of execution was issued and the
Sheriff of Manila further garnished Pl,181.65 of the
P10,500.00 in the possession of the Bureau.
 Ong's third party claim was frustrated when Pacific
filed an Indemnity Bond with the Office of the Sheriff.
 Ong filed an action for damages against Macario
Ofilada in his capacity as Sheriff of Manila, the
Pacific Products, and the First Quezon City
Insurance.
 RTC dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed
the decision. Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari
filed by Pacific.
91
ISSUE: WON the garnishment was illegal and void –
YES. Petition denied.
RATIO:
 It is noted that the notice of garnishment served
upon the Bureau of Telecommunications was made
pursuant to an order of attachment issued by the trial
court in the case for sum of money against Labrador.
At the time of such service, the amount against
which the notice was issued was still in the
possession and control of the Bureau.
o Petitioner contends that immunity from suit was
waived when the Bureau entered into a business
transaction with BML Trading since in this
jurisdiction, it is "a well established doctrine that
when the Government engages in business, it
abdicates part of its sovereign prerogatives and
ascends to the level of a citizen".
o This contention is not correct. Suability would
follow only if the contract entered into by the
government is in the exercise of a proprietary as
distinguished from a governmental function. The
Bureau is a service bureau and is not engaged in
business.
 By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually
sues the garnishee for a debt due to the defendant.
The debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor – a
party to the action upon service of the writ of
attachment. The State, by virtue of its sovereignty
may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to Subject its
officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly
what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as it
remains in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion
thereof. And still another reason which covers both
of the foregoing is that every consideration of public
policy forbids it.
FONTANILLA v. MALIAMAN
 In an earlier decision, National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) was declared liable for the
injuries, resulting in the death, of Francisco
Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and
Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or
negligence of NIA’s driver employee Hugo Garcia.
The Court held that NIA is a government agency
performing proprietary functions.
 NIA maintains, however, that it does not perform
solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an
agency of the government tasked with governmental
functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous
act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special
agent. For this, they have filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON NIA may be held liable for damages
caused by its driver - YES
92
HELD:
 The functions of government have been classified
into governmental or constituent and proprietary or
ministrant. The former involves the exercise of
sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter
connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions
and thus considered as optional.
 The National Irrigation Administration is a
government agency with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government. It is not a
mere agency of the government but a corporate
body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it
may be held liable for the damages caused by the
negligent act of its driver who was not its special
agent.
o NIA was not created for purposes of local
government. While it may be true that the NIA
was essentially a service agency of the
government aimed at promoting public interest
and public welfare, such fact does not make the
NIA essentially and purely a "government-
function" corporation.
o NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
improving, rehabilitating, and administering all
national irrigation systems in the Philippines,
including all communal and pump irrigation
projects." Certainly, the state and the community
as a whole are largely benefited by the services
the agency renders, but these functions are only
incidental to the principal aim of the agency,
which is the irrigation of lands.
o NIA is a government agency invested with a
corporate personality separate and distinct from
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the government. It has its own assets and
liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be
exercised by a Board of Directors.
Fontanilla v Maliaman
FACTS:
A pickup owned and operated by the National Irrigation
Administration driven officially of Hugo Garcia bumped a
bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla and Resituto
Deligo. Fontanilla died as a result of his injuries.
Fontanilla’s parents sued Nia for damages. The trial
court directed NIA to pay damages and actual
expenses.
ISSUE:
Could the award for moral damages be awarded?
HELD:
Yes. The solicitor general argues that Garcia was a
regular driver, not a special agent who was performing a
job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability
should not be borne by the government agency, but by
Garcia himself.
The liability of the state has two aspects: its public or
governmental aspects were it is liable for the tortuous
acts of special agent only and its private or business
aspects where it becomes liable as ordinary employer.
The NIA is an agency of the government exercising
proprietary functions by express provision of its charter.
93
Given the negligence in the supervision of the driver as
he was travelling at a high speed, NIA is directed to pay
damages.
Petition granted.
CHAPTER IV:
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
QUEZON CITY v ERICTA
 Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 provides that: “At least 6%
of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons
who are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death,
to be determined by competent City Authorities.”.
 For years, that section of the Ordinance was not
enforced but 7 years after enactment, the City
Council passed a resolution to request the City
Engineer to stop any further selling of lots where the
owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6%
space intended for paupers.
 Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to
annul Sec. 9 of the Ordinance in question, alleging
that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the
Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and
the Revised Administrative Code.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE: WON Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is a valid
exercise of police power - NO
HELD:
 Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 cannot be justified under
the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the
license fee, and regulate such business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practiced in the
City.
 Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers
of government by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police power,
(2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
 The police power of Quezon City is defined as “To
make such further ordinance and regulations not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, …, and for the protection of property therein;
and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines
or penalties as the City Council may prescribe
 The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the
power to confiscate.
o The ordinance in question not only confiscates
but also prohibits the operation of a memorial
park cemetery, because under Sec. 13 -
“Violation of the provision thereof is punishable
with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon
94
conviction thereof the permit to operate and
maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or
cancelled”. The confiscatory clause and the penal
provision in effect deter one from operating a
memorial park cemetery.
o It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If
he is deprived of his property outright, it is not
taken for public use but rather to destroy in order
to promote the general welfare.
o Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is not a mere police
regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives
a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation.

ICHONG v HERNANDEZ
 Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said
law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as
well as corporations owned by foreigners from
engaging from retail trade in our country. In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business.
 Petitioner Lao Ichong, for and in his own behalf and
on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of
RA 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional.
o He alleges that the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Philippines, specifically the Treaty of Amity
between the Philippines and China.
ISSUE: WON RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police
power – YES
RATIO:
 Charter of the United Nations imposes no strict or
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of
their subjects and the Declaration of the Human
Rights adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations
o This can be inferred from the fact that
members of the United Nations Organizations,
such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit
foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in
most nations of the world laws against
foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.
 All that the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines
and China guarantees is the equality of treatment to
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country."
o The nationals of China are not discriminating
against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States -
who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging
in the retail trade.
o Even supposing that the law infringes upon the
said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent
95
law and the same may never curtail or restrict
the scope of the police power of the State.
LUTZ v ARANETA
 Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the
Sugar Adjustment Act, was enacted due to the threat
to the sugar industry by the imminent imposition of
export taxes upon sugar. It provides for an increase
of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a
graduated basis, on each picul of sugar
manufactured, to stabilize the sugar industry so as to
prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its
preferential position in the US market.
 Walter Lutz, in his capacity as administrator of the
Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover
from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the
estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act; alleging
that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being
levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry
exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally
levied.
 CFI dismissed the action, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the tax levied under CA 567 is
unconstitutional – NO
RATIO:
 The tax provided for in CA 567 is not a pure exercise
of the taxing power. The tax under said Act is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
great industries of our nation,
its promotion, protection, and advancement,
therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.
Hence, the said objectives of CA 567 are of public
concern and CA 567 is therefore constitutional.
 Even from the standpoint that CA 567 is a pure tax
measure, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax
money to experimental stations to seek increase of
efficiency in sugar production, utilization of by-
products and solution of allied problems, as well as
to the improvements of living and working conditions
in sugar mills or plantations, without any part of such
money being channeled directly to private persons,
constitutes expenditure of tax money for private
purposes.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v constitutional - YES
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
 This case (“land for the landless”) is a consolidation
of several cases because they involve common legal
questions, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of specific laws.
o 1 – a petition alleging the constitutionality of
PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657.
Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5
hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. The
tenants were declared as full owners by EO
228 and as qualified farmers under PD 27.
The petitioners now contend that President
Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.
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o 2 – a petition by landowners and sugar
planters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental
against Proclamation 131 and EO 229.
Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian
Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
o 3 - a petition by owners of land which was
placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer.
o 4 – a petition invoking the right of retention
under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares.
 The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice
and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural
lands.
ISSUE: WON the aforementioned legal measures are
RATIO:
 There are traditional distinctions between the police
power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at
the same time on the same subject. Recent trends,
however, would indicate not a polarization but a
mingling of the police power and the power of
eminent domain, with the latter being used as an
implement of the former like the power of taxation.
o To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where,
to carry out such regulation, it becomes
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative.
The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the
power of eminent domain.
o The promulgation of PD 27 by President
Marcos was a valid exercise of police power
and eminent domain.
o The power of President Aquino to promulgate
Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was
authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore
it is a valid exercise of Police Power and
Eminent Domain.
o RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of
the regulation under CARP becomes
necessary to deprive owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title and the
physical possession of said excess and all
97
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer.
 A statute may be sustained under the
police power only if there is concurrence
of the lawful subject and the method.
The subject and purpose of the Agrarian
Reform Law is valid, however what is to
be determined is the method employed
to achieve it.
ORTIGAS & CO. v COURT OF APPEALS
 Petitioner Ortigas & Co. sold to a parcel of land in
Greenhills Subdivision IV to Emilia Hermoso.
Conditions for the sale include restrictions on the use
of the land for the construction of residential housing
only and the non-erection of signs and billboards for
advertisement purposes. Such conditions were
annotated on the back of the title of the property.
 Respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from
Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty and
constructed a single story commercial building for
Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
 Petitioner filed a complaint against Hermoso,
seeking the demolition of the commercial structure.
The complaint was later amended to include a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and impleaded Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P.
Hermoso Realty, the latter having 10% interest in the
lot.
 The trial court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction, but the appellate court reversed the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
decision upon Mathay’s special civil action for
certiorari, claiming that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01
classified the area where the lot was located as
commercial area and said ordinance must be read
into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete
exercise of police power.
ISSUE: WON the zoning ordinance can be read into the
contract as a valid exercise of police power - YES
Ratio:
 The Court observed that the contract of sale was
entered into in August 1976, while the zoning
ordinance was enacted only in March 1981.
 Laws are to be construed as having only prospective
operation. Equally settled, only laws existing at the
time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are
specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
o A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any
manner changes the intent of the parties to the
contract necessarily impairs the contract
itselfand cannot be given retroactive effect
without violating the constitutional prohibition
against impairment of contracts.
 But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain
exceptions. One involves police power. A law
enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or
govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair
vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to
those already in existence.
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o Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights
clauses will have to yield to the superior and
legitimate exercise by the State of police
power to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in
exercise of valid police power must be read
into every contract.
 PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION v
DE GUZMAN
 The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima
College of Medicine that passed the Physician
Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993
by the Board of Medicine. Petitioner Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their
names as successful examinees in the medical
licensure examination.
 Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the
grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees
from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects
in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-
Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne),
were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven
Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and
ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99%
in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-
Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those
who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better
in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than
90%. A comparison of the performances of the
candidates from other schools was made. The Board
observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was
a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the
Physician Licensure Examination.
 The Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the
registration as physicians of all the examinees from
the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the
NBI to investigate. The NBI found that the
questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees
leads to the conclusion that they gained early access
to the test questions.
 A statistical analysis concluded that there must be
some unusual reason creating the clustering of
scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause
"strong enough to eliminate the normal variations
that one should expect from the examinees [of
Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy,
etc."
 The respondents filed a special civil action for
mandamus to compel the petitioners to proceed with
their oath taking ceremony. The RTC decided in their
favor and the CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE: WON a writ of mandamus may lie - NO
RATIO:
 The function of mandamus is not to establish a
right but to enforce one that has been established
by law. There must be a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long
established rule that a license to practice
medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the
government.
 The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional
CHAVEZ v ROMULO
right of every citizen to select a profession or
99
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic
requirements.But like all rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be
so regulated pursuant to the police power of the
State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of
the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage
in the learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to take an
examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
chosen careers. This regulation takes particular
pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the
public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance among those who
would practice medicine.
 To be granted the privilege to practice medicine,
the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements
imposed by the law and the licensing authority.
Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as
being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will
not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable
from a matter of right, which may be demanded if
denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the
aforesaid requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the
writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
thwarting the legislative will.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a
speech before the members of the PNP stressing the
need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to
avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the
then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the
issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence (PTCFOR).
 Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, respondent
Ebdane issued the “Guidelines in the Implementation
of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence”
 Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner
to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. However, his request was
denied. Thus, he filed the present petition
impleading the public respondents.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the assailed guidelines is
a valid exercise of police power – YES
RATIO:
 Even if petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property
right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot
be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond
the reach of the State’s police power. All property in
the state is held subject to its general regulations,
necessary to the common good and general welfare.
 The test for determining the validity of a measure is:
100
o The interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power; and
o The means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
 It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the
basis for its issuance was the need for peace and
order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of
crimes, the President deemed it best to impose a
nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating
factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is
the interest of the public in general.
 The assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
possession of firearms. What they proscribe is
merely the carrying of firearms outside of
residence. However, those who wish to carry their
firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for
a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated,
necessarily, crime incidents will be
curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for
their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their
homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would
be difficult for criminals to roam around with their
guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the
PNP to apprehend them.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORPORATION
v BALITE PORTAL MINING
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted
Exploration Permit No. 133 over 4,491 hectares of
land, which included the Diwalwal area.
 Thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act which
established a Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by the DENR Secretary and created
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB)
under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and
control.
 A petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the
admission of a Mineral Production Sharing
Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was
filed with the DENR Regional Executive Director,
docketed as RED Mines Case.
 While the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper
assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation, which in turn
applied for an integrated MPSA over the land
covered by the permit.
 The Mines and Geosciences Bureau accepted and
registered the integrated MPSA application of
petitioner and thereafter, several cases were filed.
 Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act,
was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the cases
were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators
tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting
mining rights. The panel subsequently took
cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was
consolidated with the cases.
 The DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order
No. 97-03 which
provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and e
101
xhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the
mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.
 Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus praying for
the nullification of MO 97-03 on the ground that the
"direct state utilization" espoused therein would
effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133;
and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed
the unwarranted condition that certain studies
be conducted before mining and environmental laws
are enforced by the DENR.
ISSUE: WON MO 97-03 impairs the petitioner’s rights
under EP 133 – NO
RATIO:
 The challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt
“direct state utilization” as a policy in resolving the
Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum
clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder
was merely a study of this option and nothing
else. Consequently, the petition was premature. The
said memorandum order did not impose any
obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation
whatsoever between and among the parties to the
dispute.
 With respect to the alleged “vested rights” claimed by
petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably
based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being
disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. Until a
positive pronouncement is made in the Consolidated
Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired
by the issuance of MO 97-03.
 Under no circumstances may petitioner’s rights
under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and
absolute. EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege
granted by the State, which may be amended,
modified or rescinded when the national interest so
requires. This is necessarily so since the
exploration, development and utilization of the
country’s natural mineral resources are matters
impressed with great public interest. Like timber
permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the
grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the
purview of the non-impairment of contract and due
process clauses of the Constitution,since the State,
under its all-encompassing police power, may alter,
modify or amend the same, in accordance with the
demands of the general welfare
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs. DANTE O.
GARIN, respondent.
Atty. Dante Garin’s driver’s license was confiscated
by the MMDA for illegal parking along Gandara St.. He
was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR), requiring
him to appear before the MMDA Traffic Operations
Center for appropriate action within 48 hours.
Garin claims: 1. In the absence of any IRR, Sec. 5(f)
of RA No. 7924 (MMDA’s charter), which authorizes it to
confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in
the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations, grants
the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring
motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
102
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby
violating the due process clause of the Constitution; 2.
the provision violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative authority,
allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other
penalties on erring motorists. Therefore, MMDA has no
authority to confiscate licenses.
MMDA: 1. a license to operate a motor vehicle is
neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege
subject to reasonable regulation under the police power
in the interest of the public safety and welfare. 2.
Revocation or suspension of this privilege does not
constitute a taking without due process as long as the
licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation. He
has 3 options: 1. Voluntaryily pay, file a protest with the
MMDA Adjudication Committee, 3. Request referral of
TVR to Public Prosecutor.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through
its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining
the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic
Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring
motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any
Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer
confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in
cases of traffic violations
HELD:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that
the state may withhold in the exercise of its police
power.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property
right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be
suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its
police power, in the interest of the public safety and
welfare, subject to the procedural due process
requirements
The power to license imports further power to
withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance
with prescribed conditions.
Commonwealth v. Funk: "Automobiles are vehicles of
great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an
element of danger to persons and property upon the
highways…e Legislature, in the exercise of the police
power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must,
prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be
operated on the highways. One of the primary
purposes of a system of general regulation of the
subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure
the competency of the operator of motor vehicles.”
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc.,14we categorically stated that
Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police
power, let alone legislative power, and that all its
functions are administrative in nature.
There is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in
nature . here is no grant of authority to enact
103
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare
of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
Insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is
understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to
grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend
or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other
legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise
of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with
the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the
"Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila
Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec.
5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer
a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines
and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules
and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in
nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers'
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations…
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly
enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom
legislative powers have been delegated (the City of
Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded –
and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of
transport and traffic management.
Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD

 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
R.A. No. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act) was
signed into law in 2004. Under Section 4(a), senior
citizens are entitled to a grant of 20% discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments. The establishment may claim the
discounts granted as tax deduction based on the net
cost of the goods sold or services rendered.
Department Of Finance Director Lourdes Recente
clarified the meaning of tax deduction: Under the old
Senior Citizens Act, the grant was in the form of a tax
credit, which necessitates that prior payments of taxes
have been made and the taxpayer is attempting to
recover this tax payment from his/her income tax due. In
the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, the grant is in the
form of a tax deduction, the establishment concerned
is allowed to deduct from gross income, in computing
for its tax liability, the amount of discounts granted to
senior citizens. While in the former scheme government
shoulders 100% of the discount, in the current scheme
government forgoes revenue equivalent to 32%
(marginal tax rate) of 20% discounts granted.
Establishments thus shoulder some of the burden.
A.O. No. 171 was then issued by the DOH, providing
the grant of 20% discount in the purchase of unbranded
generic medicines from all establishments dispensing
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
This was later expanded by A.O. 177 to both
prescription and non-prescription medicines whether
branded or generic.
Carlos SuperDrug asserts that Sec. 4(a) of RA 9257
is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of
104
private property. Compelling drugstore owners and
establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss
of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a
mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and
2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby
drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
Held:
Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax
deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners
for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens.
This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a
tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross
income and results in a lower taxable income.
Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a
deduction reduces the net income of the private
establishments concerned. The discounts given would
have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross
sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A.
No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total
revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the
taking of private property for public use or benefit. This
constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners
would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the
owner’s loss. A tax deduction does not offer full
reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it
would not meet the definition of just compensation.
However, the State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon
private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
government program. The Senior Citizens Act was
enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior
citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and
privileges to them for their improvement and well-being
as the State considers them an integral part of our
society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its
basis in the Constitution (Article XV, Section 4; Article
XIII, Section 11)
To implement the above policy, the law grants a
twenty percent discount to senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to
senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction.
 The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. “Police power” as been
described as “the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs.”It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature
by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of
the subjects of the same.For this reason, when the
conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.”
Moreover, the right to property has a social
dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides
the precept for the protection of property, various laws
105
and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and
the regulation of contracts and public utilities,
continuously serve as a reminder that the right to
property can be relinquished upon the command of the
State for the promotion of public good.
CAMARINES NOTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
(CANORECO); RUBEN, N. BARRAMEDA; ELVIS L.
ESPIRITU; MERARDO G. ENERO, JR.; MERCELITO B.
ABAS; and REYNALDO V. ABUNDO, petitioners, vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; REX TANTIONGCO; HONESTO DE JESUS;
ANDRES IBASCO; TEODULO M. MEA; and VICENTE
LUKBAN, respondents.
- CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized
under the provisions of P.D. No. 269, otherwise known
as the National Electrification Administration Decree.
As of March 1995, its Officers (Pres  treas) were
Barrameda, Espiritu, Enero and Abas, respectively.
- In May 1995, CANONECO Directors Obias, Ochoa,
Pascua and Ilan held a special meeting of the Board of
Directors of CANORECO. The minutes of the
meeting 5 showed that President Ruben Barrameda,
Vice-President Elvis Espiritu, and Treasurer Marcelito
Abas were absent despite the fact that he had called the
attention of President Barrameda and Directors Abas
and Espiritu for the holding thereof, the three chose not
to appear.
- In that meeting, those present declared all positions in
the board vacant and thereafter proceeded to hold
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
elections, which resulted in the present directors’ being
elected as the new officers.
- Barrameda, et al challenged the above resolutions and
the election of officers by filing with the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA) a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election of Officers.
The CDA resolved the petition in favor of the petitioners
and declared the election null and void.
in defiance of the abovementioned Resolution of the
CDA and with the active participation of some officials of
the National Electrification Administration (NEA), the
group of Norberto Ochoa, et al forcibly took possession
of the offices of CANORECO and assumed the duties
as officers .
Fortunately, pursuant to the writ of execution and
order to vacate issued by the CDA, the petitioners were
able to reassume control of the CANORECO and to
perform their respective functions.
However, the President of the Philippines issued
Memorandum Order No. 409 constituting an Ad Hoc
Committee to temporarily take over and manage the
affairs of CANORECO, “to efficiently and effectively
address the worsening problem of the Camarines Norte
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order
not to prejudice and endanger the interest of the people
who rely on the said cooperative for their supply of
electricity” The present Board may be called upon to
render advisory services.
Petitioners: 1.) There is no provision in the
Constitution or in a statute expressly, or even impliedly,
authorizing the President or his representatives to lake
over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives. The
exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation of
106
the business or commerce and that the power to
regulate does not include the power to take over,
control, manage, or direct the operation of the business.
2.) Memorandum Order No. 409 removed them from
their positions as members of the Board of Directors of
CANORECO. The President does not have the authority
to appoint, much less to remove, members of the board
of directors of a private enterprise including electric
cooperatives
ISSUE: May the Office of the President validly
constitute an ad hoc committee to take over and
manage the affairs of an electric cooperative?
HELD:petition is impressed with merit.
Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to
Section 128 of R.A. No. 6938 and Section 17 of R.A.
No. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the
coverage of said laws. Under Article 34 of the Code, the
general assembly of cooperatives has the exclusive
power, which cannot be delegated, to elect or appoint
the members of the board of directors and to remove
them for cause.
Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from
the Board of Directors of CANORECO the power to
manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such
power to the Ad Hoc Committee, albeit temporarily.
Nothing in law supported the take-over of the
management of the affairs of CANORECO, and the
"suspension," if not "removal," of the Board of Directors
and the officers thereof.
Obviously there was a clear case of intra-cooperative
dispute. Article 121 of the Cooperative Code is explicit
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
on how the dispute should be resolved: “be settled
amicably in accordance with the conciliation or
mediation mechanisms…”Should such a 1 of R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall, except as
conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall
be settled in a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Even granting for the sake of argument that the party
aggrieved by a decision of the CDA could pursue an
administrative appeal to the Office of the President on
the theory that the CDA is an agency under its direct
supervision and control, still the Office of the President
could not in this case, motu proprio or upon request of a
party, supplant or overturn the decision of the CDA
Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with
validity the assailed Memorandum Order No. 409.
Police power is the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the
order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of
society. 15 It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may
also be exercised by the President and administrative
boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all
municipal levels, including the barangay. 16 Delegation
of legislative powers to the President is permitted in
Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution. 17 The pertinent laws on cooperatives,
namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No.
269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for
the President or any other administrative body to take
over the internal management of a cooperative.
Furthermore, It violates the basic underlying principle
enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that
cooperatives are democratic organizations and that their
affairs shall be administered by persons elected or
107
appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members.
Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section
provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-
interference in the management and operation of
cooperatives.
G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.





Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) association of
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in
Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
MMDA notified BAVA that pursuant to MMDA’s
mandate to rarionalize the use of Metro Manila’s roads,
Neptune St. would be opened to vehicular traffic. Thus,
it requests BAVA to open the points of entry and exit on
that street. It also informed BAVA that the perimeter wall
separating Neptune and Kalayaan ave, a public road,
would be demolished.
BAVA instituted a case for injunction, asserting that
MMDA has no authority to order the opening of a private
road without a municipal ordinance.
MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune Street to
public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed
with police power in the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic
management which involves the regulation of the use of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and
welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police
power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the
consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate
Appellate Court. There is no need for the City of Makati
to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the
public.
HELD:
Police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. Once delegated,
the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Local government units exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies.
With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in
1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
development and administrative region" and the
Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting
the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA.
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have
metro-wide impact and transcend local political
boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it
would not be viable for said services to be provided by
the individual local government units comprising Metro
Manila." 26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide
108
services and the scope of these services cover the
following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and
traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and
management; (4) flood control and sewerage
management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation,
urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public
safety. The basic service of transport and traffic
management includes the following:
(b) Transport and traffic management which include the
formulation, coordination, and monitoring of
policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize
the existing transport operations,infrastructure
requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion
of safe and convenient movement of persons and
goods; provision for the mass transport system and the
institution of a system to regulate road
users; administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a
single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila"
The scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the
delivery of the seven (7) basic services. Thee powers of
the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation
of a system and administration. There is no syllable in
R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power.
its functions are administrative in nature and
these are actually summed up in the charter itself: “The
MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the
delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila,
without diminution of the autonomy of the local
government units concerning purely local matters.“
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang
cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both
involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal
council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is
contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by
petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president.
The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the
MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of
Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its
authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of
roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient
movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads
and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the
scope of transport and traffic management. By no
stretch of the imagination, however, can this be
interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-
making power, much less police power. Secondly, the
MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang.
Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present
MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.)
No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter
possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on
the present MMDA.
Ernesto Francisco v. Bayani Fernando in his capacity
asChairman of the MMDA
 mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while
109
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (“petitioner”), as member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, an
original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition
and Mandamus to enjoin the MMDA from implementing
its “wet flag scheme” because:
(1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s governing
body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it;
(2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a
summary punishment for jaywalking;
(3) disregards the Constitutional protection against
cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and
(4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians
to various potential hazards.
Fernando: dismiss because of petitioner’s lack of
standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Alternatively, contendeds that the
Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against
jaywalking.
Francisco: the Court should take cognizance of the
case as it raises issues of “paramount and
transcendental importance.”
HELD: Case dismissed.
1. No standing
no showing of direct injury; no showing of illegal
expenditure of money; no showing of clear statutory or
constitutional violation to merit transcendental
importance
2. Violated doctrine of hierarchy of courts
“petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
when he filed this petition directly with us. This Court’s
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court
of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom
of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.”
3. Flag scheme has legal basis
All the cities and municipalities within the MMDA’s
jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted
anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic
management codes with provisions for pedestrian
regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for
respondents’ implementation of schemes, or ways and
means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and
similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an
administrative agency tasked with the implementation of
rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities.
Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual
determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a
reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances
and similar enactments. This Court is not a trier of
facts. The petition proffers mere surmises and
speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag
Scheme.
G.R. No. 170656
MMDA v. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 170657
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, et al v. MENCORP
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC.
- Pursuant to MMDA’s recommendation to decongest
traffic by eliminating bus terminals along Metro Manila’s
thoroughfares, and providing instead ,ass transport
terminal facilities, President Arroyo issued E.O. 179,
110
designating MMDA as the implementing Agency for the
project.
- Viron Transportation Co. filed a petition for declaratory
relief, alleging that the MMDA was poised to issue a
Circular closing all bus terminals in Metro Manila. Viron
asserts that theMMDA’s authority to regulate traffic
does not include the power to direct provincial bus
operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus
deprive them of the use of their property.
-Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp),
another provincial bus operator, asked the court to
declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and
operators of public land transportation units over their
respective terminals. Averring that MMDA Chairman
Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and
eliminate all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in
the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their
operations to common bus terminals, Mencorp prayed
for the issuance of a TRO.
- MMDA asserts: there is no justiciable controversy in
the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of
the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination
of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila. the E.O. is only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and
to make available for use government property along
EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that
the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the
Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not
between third persons.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 111

HELD: The MMDA’s Motion for Reconsideration must E.O. No. 125,which former President Aquino issued
fail in the exercise of legislative powers, mandated the
1. There is a justiciable controversy DOTC to be the primary policy, planning,
The E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDA’s plan to programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating
"decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now and administrative entity to promote, develop and
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and regulate networks of transportation and
providing more convenient access to the mass transport communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC
system to the commuting public through the provision of includes the power to
mass transport terminal facilities” establish and administer comprehensive and
Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and integrated programs for transportation and
Management to allocate funds of not more than one communications.
hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
of the construction of the north and south terminals. And authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the E.O. was made effective immediately. the one subject of the cases at bar.
a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal By designating the MMDA as the implementing
had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal is agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped
already in progress. The MMDA in fact affirmed that the the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering
government had begun to implement the Project. E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of
2. EO 179 involves 3rd persons MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of
Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the authority to it under R.A. No. 7924 (MMDA’s charter),
Project for which the concerned government agencies which merely grants MMDA with planning, monitoring,
are directed to coordinate their activities and resources, coordinating functions for the delivery of metro-wide
the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by services, including transportation and traffic
third persons like respondents would have to be management.
eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate In the case of MMDA v. Bel-Air, it was ruled that the
from the common bus terminals. It cannot be gainsaid MMDA has no legislative, police power. Hence, it has
that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on no authority to close terminals, and no authority to
respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would implement the project.
mean, among other things, the loss of income from the Even if it had police power, the test for valid police
operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. power is: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
3. EO 179 is ultra vires. exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
the means employed in this case (closing terminals),
as ruled in Lucena v JAC Liner, constitutes undue
taking of private property and creates monopolies. It
thus failed to go for the less intrusive means.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC.,
FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION v. THE BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION
- The Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which declares that no
car beyond six years shall be operated as a taxi. All
models older that 6 years are ordered withdrawn from
public service and thereafter may no longer be
registered and operated as taxis.
- Pursuant to the Circular, the Director of the Bureau of
Land Transportation issued an implementing Circular
stating: all taxi units with year models over six (6) years
old are now banned from operating as public utilities in
Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be
considered as automatically dropped as public
utilities and, therefore, do not require any further
dropping order from the BOT. taxi units within the
National Capitol Region having year models over 6
years old shall be refused registration.
- Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), a
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators
who are grantees of CPC to operate taxicabs within
112
Manila, filed a Petition with the BOT seeking to nullify
MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation of earlier models which were
phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration,
they are roadworthy and fit for operation
- Petitioners claim: 1.) they were denied procedural due
process as they were not called upon to submit position
papers nor summoned to attend any conference as
regards the issuance of the BOT Circular, 2.) fixing the
ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive
because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon
their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are
subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition
should be taken into consideration at the time of
registration. Their right to substantive due process is
thereby violated, 3.) their right to equal protection of the
law is violated because the Circular is being enforced in
Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi
industry.
ISSUES:
1. W/N BOT violated petitioners’ right to Procedural
and Substantive Due process.
2. W/N BOT violated petitioners’ right to equal
protection of the law.
HELD:
1. No, it is not violated.
P.D. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the
power to fix just and reasonable standards,
classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or
service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and
followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
it provides procedural guidelines for said agency to
follow in the exercise of its powers: that it “may also can
conferences, require the submission of position papers
or other documents, information, or data by operators or
other persons that may be affected by the
implementation of this Decree, or employ any other
suitable means of inquiry.”
it is clear from the provision, however, that the leeway
accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in
gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not
mandatory that it should first call a conference or
require the submission of position papers or other
documents from operators or persons who may be
affected, this being only one of the options open to the
Board, which is given wide discretionary authority.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of
the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process.
As regards substantive due process argument, it is
impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and
recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can
open the door to the adoption of multiple standards,
possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A
reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an
vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span
of six years supplies that reasonable standard.
2. No, it is not violated.
it should be pointed out that implementation outside
Metro Manila is also envisioned in the Circular, which
states: “its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be
carried out only after the project has been implemented
113
in Metro Manila and only after the date has been
determined by the Board.”
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially
in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to
those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic
pressure and more constant use. This is of common
knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not
the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so
that infringement of the equal protection clause can
hardly be successfully claimed.
the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort
of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police
power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare
of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. CJ Fernando: "the
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the
exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded"
In so far as the non-application of the assailed
Circulars to other transportation services is concerned,
it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause
does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all
and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or
similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object
or subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial distinctions.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 114

G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995

HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of issue a permit/license to Associated Development
Manila, and the City of Manila v. HON. FELIPE G. Corporation (ADC), allowing it to “operate the jai-alai”,
PACQUING, pursuant to Manila Ordinance No. 7065.
- Subsequently, Executive Secretary Guingona issued a
directive to then chairman of the Games and
Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr.
Background ~ to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or to withdraw
Charter of the City of Manila (1949): “The Municipal such grant of authority, to ADC to operate the jai-alai in
Board shall have the following legislative powers…To the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are
tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by properly resolved:
the public on…jai-alai…as well as grant exclusive rights 1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai
to establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any franchisers issued by local governments is
existing law to the contrary. unconstitutional.
in 1951, EO 392 transferring the authority 2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power to
to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development
and Amusements Board. Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valied
in 1953, RA 954 criminalized the playing of jai-alai by considering that the franchise has no duration, and
persons without a LEGISLATIVE franchise. appears to be granted in perpetuity.
in 1971, Municipal Board of Manila nevertheless 3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a
passed
as Judge, Ordinance
branch 40,no Regional
7065, authorizing theofmayor
Trial Court Manilato Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development
permit
and the ADC to CORPORATION
ASSOCIATED establish and operate a Jai-alai in Corporation in view of executive Order No. 392 which
Manila. transferred from local governments to the Games and
in No.
G.R. 1975, Marcos
117263 issued27,
January PD1995
771, revoking all powers Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai.
of local government
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, to grant
JR.franchises for jai-alai and
and DOMINADOR R. - ADC then filed a petition for prohibition, injunction,
other forms of gambling. That same
CEPEDA v. HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED year, PD 810 mandamus against Guingona and Sumulong seeking to
granted the Philippine
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Jai-Alai And Amusement prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authority
Corporation A Franchise To Operate a Jai Alai in that had earlier been granted to ADC. This was granted
Manila. This franchise was cancelled by Aquino’s EO by Judge Reyes.
169.
ISSUES:
The case~ 1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the
- In March-April 1974, Judge Pacquing of RTC Manila Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is proper
issued a series of orders ordering Mayor Alfredo Lim to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2. whether or not the Associated Development
Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to
maintain and operate the jai-alai
3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the
temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of
preliminary injunction) and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction
HELD:
1. Yes, it is proper
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals allowed
intervention even beyond the period prescribed in
Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled
in said case that a denial of the motions for intervention
would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to
the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all
purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open
the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation,
should intervenors' claim be proven to be true."
 the resulting injustice and injury in this case, should
the national government's allegations be proven correct,
are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned
the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and
operate the jai-in favor of ADC. The national
government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065
which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct
jai-alai operations is void since Republic Act No. 954,
approved very much earlier than said Ordinance No.
7065 requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal
franchise, for the operation of jai-alai.
Assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned
ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless
115
effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771
which expressly revoked all existing franchises and
permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities
(including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.
On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance
No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila
pursuant to its delegated powers under it charter,
Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the
constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal
protection and non-impairment clauses
it will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties
in this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the
issue of constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has,
in our view, become the very lis mota in resolving the
present controversy
on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid
franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot
be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its
officials or agents
2. No, it does not.
Petitioners argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively
removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to
grant franchises for gambling operations. It is argued
that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954
is used to refer to franchises issued by Congress.
ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 (Manila
Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board
to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954
does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as
referring exclusively to Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954
did not remove the power of the Municipal Board
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to
support its alleged possession of a valid franchise,
namely the Charter of the City of Manila and Manila
Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". It is
clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate
to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or
betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such
power "to franchise".
What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in
Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was
the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which
therefore means that a license or permit issued by the
City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity,
such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not
amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of
the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the
national government to so operate. Even this power to
regulate was removed from local governments and
transferred to the GAB in 1951.
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the
Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting
under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus
generally prohibited by law, unless another law is
enacted byCongress expressly exempting or excluding
certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law
It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of
gambling do not promote public morals and welfare.
Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It
breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest
and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771,
a vice and a social ill which government must minimize
(if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic
development.
116
There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal
protection clause since the decree
revoked all franchises issued by local governments
without qualification or exception.
3. yes, there was grave abuse of discretion.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for
the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent
judge should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act
No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the
Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any
legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so
as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD v. COURT OF
APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING
CORPORATION
- Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order
directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from
utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations
which were discharging untreated wastewater directly
into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros
River.
- The order was based on National Pollution Control
Commission ("NPCC") and DENR reports which found
that Solar textile was bleaching, rinsing and dyeing
textiles with wastewater being directly discharged
untreated into the sewer. Solar’s Wastewater Treatment
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Plant was noted unoperational and the combined
wastewater generated from its operation was about 30
gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was
being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading
to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Result of the analyses
of the sample taken showed that the wastewater is
highly pollutive
- Solar went to the RTC QC on petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction, asserting that its right to due
process was violated. Under the Board's own rules and
regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the
effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant
life." The reprots made no finding of such a threat.
- Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it
has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend
the operations of an establishment when there is prima
facie evidence that such establishment is discharging
effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which
exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the
NPCC. the reports before it concerning the effluent
discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River
provided prima facie evidence
- RTC dismissed the petition, saying that appeal and
not certiorari was the proper remedy, and that the
Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate
temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic. CA reversed the RTC order.
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had
been denied due process by the Board.
117
HELD: The Board is sustained.
Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner
Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders: (a)
whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment
pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such
discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards
set by the [NPCC]."
it is not essential that the Board prove that an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare,
or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte
cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if
the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed
"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."
Inspections reports show that there was at least prima
facie evidence before the Board that the effluents
emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum
allowable levels of physical and chemical substances
set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was
adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and
desist order issued by the Board.
Also, previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch
Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of
Violation directing it to cease and refrain from carrying
out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant
was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner,
seemed very casual about its continued discharge of
untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos
River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary
to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an
operating condition.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law
and regulations in situations like that here presented
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and
other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to
wait until protracted litigation
The relevant pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign
power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare
and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of
plant and animal life, commonly designated as the
police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like
those here involved, through the exercise of police
power.
Where the establishment affected by an ex
parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of
the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must
hold a public hearing where such establishment would
have an opportunity to controvert the basis of suchex
parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently
available is really all that is required by the due process
clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have
here. The Board's decision rendered after the public
hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to
the Court of Appeal
Ynot v. IAC (1987)
FACTS:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when they
were confiscated by the police station commander for
violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the
118
interprovincial movement of carabaos. The penalty is
confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and
carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries, thus denying due process
RULING:
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so
it would remain so conveniently resilient for due process
is not an “iron rule.” Flexibility must be the best virtue of
guaranty. The minimum requirements of due process
are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may
not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness.
It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the question of measure is missing. Even if
there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an
outright confiscation and a supersedeas bond of
Php12,000.00. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old
guaranty of elementary fair play.
There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male
and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still
fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion. The Court opined that they do
not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in on province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be
easily circumscribed by simply killing the animal.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either
to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead
meat.
To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is
an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated for the
owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was
not seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive
Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional,
and the supersedeas bond is cancelled.
JMM Promotion v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory
banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan
119
and other destinations. This was relaxed however with
the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory
Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen
and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In
pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of
DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing
artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The
Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines
assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated
the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights
and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM
intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower
court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation
is a valid exercise of police power. Police power
concerns government enactments which precisely
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare or the common good. As
the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed
validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners
to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB
requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or
was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare
of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.
Short of a total and absolute ban against the
deployment of performing artists to “high risk”
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
destinations, a measure which would only drive
recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the
very least rationalizes the method of screening
performing artists by requiring
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and
limits deployment to only those individuals adequately
prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment
as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme
at least lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec (1995)
FACTS:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772
directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of
not less than one-half page for the common use of
political parties and candidates. The Comelec space
shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge,
among all candidates to enable them to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their
platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also
be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-
profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the
ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
120
Constitution upon the government against the taking of
private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec,
the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police
power) of the Comelec over the information operations
of print media enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is
unconstitutional
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as
unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to
“taking” of private personal property without payment of
the just compensation required in expropriation cases.
Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has
not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to
sell advertising space. The taking of private property for
public use is authorized by the constitution, but not
without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution
No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is
no showing of existence of a national emergency to take
private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner
(2005)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
FACTS:
The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which
provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-
of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from
entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to
the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of
their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the
City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting
from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides
that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the
grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc.
assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the
ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid
exercise of police power, an undue taking of private
property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of
valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and
lawful means
HELD:
The local government may be considered as having
properly exercised its police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
121
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise
stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with
the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of
Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the
interference of the State. The first requisite for the
proper exercise of police power is thus present. This
leaves for determination the issue of whether the means
employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to
attain its professed objective were reasonably
necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by
overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally,
since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees,
rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court.
What should have been done was to determine exactly
where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an
equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights
are exercised within the framework of the law and the
laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon
its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were
measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical
laws may be justified whenever they happen to be
effective.
Government of Quezon City v. Ericta
(1983)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
FACTS:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled
"Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, Maintenance
And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or
Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City
And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof"
provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior
to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately
be developed and should be open for operation not later
than six months from the date of approval of the
application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the
Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council
passed a resolution to request the City Engineer,
Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate the required
6% space intended for paupers burial.
The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the
ordinance would be enforced.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of
122
the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the
same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is
a valid exercise of police power
HELD:
Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid
exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot be justified
under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the
license fee, and regulate such other business, trades,
and occupation as may be established or practiced in
the City.
Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art.
Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the
other hand, there are three inherent powers of
government by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent
domain, (3) taxation.
The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-
section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as follows:
“To make such further ordinance and regulations not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, …, and for the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
protection of property therein; and enforce obedience
thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City
Council may prescribe under the provisions of
subsection (jj) of this section.”
The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the
power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of
said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is
punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that
upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and
maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or
cancelled’. The confiscatory clause and the penal
provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial
park cemetery.
Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the
power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of
his property outright, it is not taken for public use but
rather to destroy in order to promote the general
welfare.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives
a person of his private property without due process of
law, nay, even without compensation.
123
De la Cruz v. Paras
(1983)
FACTS:
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They
assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975
or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue,
Bulacan.
De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their
right to engage in a lawful business for the said
ordinance would close out their business. That
the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are
not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued
against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads
“AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN
THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of police power to promote general
welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were
deprived of due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue,
Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant
to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HELD:
The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely
then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations,
as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the
State. It cannot be said that such a On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11,
sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective
of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end
can be attained by a measure that does not encompass
too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should
and can only regulate not prohibit the business of
cabarets.
Solicitor General v. MMA
FACTS:
On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of
Metropolitan Traffic Command,West Traffic District vs.
Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the
license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was
not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the
Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was
permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI
43 in the case of stalledvehicles obstructing the public
streets. Even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for
traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed
by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of
124
the decision was filed the judgment became final and
executory. Nothwithstanding the Gonong decision, still
violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there
were several persons who sent complaint letters to the
Court regarding the confiscation of driver’s licenses
and removal of license plate numbers.
Series of 1991, authorizing itself “to detach license
plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned
motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of
traffic in Metro Manila.”On July 2, 1991, the Court
issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated
that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in
conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court
has received several complaints against the
enforcement of such ordinance.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid exercise of delegated
power to local government acting as agents of
the national legislature?
HELD:
No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality
of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-
enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from
removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except
when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating driver’s
licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
For a municipal ordinance to be valid the following
requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene
the
Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not
be unreasonable; and 6) must be general
and consistent with public policy.
In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures
under consideration did not pass the first criterion
because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605
does not allow either the removal of license plates or
the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in
the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such
sanctions. Thus local political subdivisions are able
to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature (except
only that the power to create their owns ources of
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with
what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As
delegates of the Congress, the local government unit
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of
the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in
question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail
against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
statute.
Magtajas v. Pryce
(1994)
125
FACTS:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan
de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
renovated and equipped the same and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas
season.
Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The
religious elements echoed the objection and so did the
women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were
led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media
trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an
affront to the welfare of the city.
The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for
the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos.O n the other hand,
the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created
PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of thePhilippines. The Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the
petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No.
3375-93 are valid
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
RATIO:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power under what is
known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 of the LGC.
There is a requirement, however, that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute. Municipalgovernments
are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegatedlegislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannotb e superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. It is a heresy to suggest thatt he local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate
by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has
the status of a statute that cann otbe amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance.
• The morality of gambling is not prohibited by the
constitution. Such discretion is given to the legislature.
In this case, PD 1869 allows the existence of legal
forms of gambling. The will of the national legislature
cannot be subservient to local ordinances. Ordinances
must conform to the following requirements for it to be
considered valid:
o Must not contravene the constitution
o Must not be unfair or oppressive
o Must not be partial or discriminatory
o Must not prohibit but it may regulate
126
o Must be general and consistent with public policy
o Must not be unreasonable
Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the challenged d
ecision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
City of Manila v. Laguio (2005)
FACTS:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate
which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited
with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved
an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where
women are used as tools in entertainment and which
tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants,
and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower
court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments,
be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several
reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of
police power and it constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power
W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the
law
HELD:
The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since
the requisites for a valid exercise of police power are
not met. The prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the
social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in
itself eradicate the alluded social ills fo prostitution,
adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day
clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls,
motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not
per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take
place in the most innocent places.... Every house,
building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that
matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply
because there are no "pure" places where there are
impure men.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to
address the core issues of morality. Try as the
Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster
127
the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it
because immorality is not a thing, a building or
establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is
repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The Local
Government Code merely empowers local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental
personal and property rights adn impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance
contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten,
the City Council unde the Code had no power to enact
the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v
FACTS:
CA
1964-vLakeview
DARAB CA Development Corp. bought a parcel
of land in Carmona, Cavite. LDC was succeeded by
Credito Asiatico Inc. LDC/CAI undertook to develop
the property into a residential and industrial estate
thus it applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona
for an ordinance approving the zoning and
subdivision of the property,
 1976- Kapasiyahang Bilang 30 was approved
granting the application and affirming the project. A
consolidated survey was approved by the Bureau of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Lands. The housing project was registered with the
National Housing Authority and was granted a
locational clearance from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Local
Government and Community Development subject to
certain conditions.
 1980- the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite
declared certain areas including the subject land as
industrial areas.
 1987- while developing a phase of the property, a
complaint for damages with TRO and PI were filed
against CAI in the RTC of Cavite. The plaintiffs
therein alleged that they were the actual tillers of the
land. The defendant had surreptitiously applied for
the conversion of the 35.8-hectare portion of the
aforesaid property from agricultural to residential and
the same was granted by the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform but that the parties had earlier agreed that
the plaintiffs would remain in the peaceful
possession of their farmholdings. Notwithstanding
such agreement, CAI ordered the bulldozing of the
property, by reason of which the plaintiffs suffered
actual damages. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged
that the bulldozing was done without any permit from
the concerned public authorities.
 CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a
compromise agreement whereby CAI donated
parcels of land in consideration of the execution of
deeds of quitclaims and waivers.
 Despite the civil case, CAI went on with its project.
Meantime, the remaining plaintiffs entered into a
compromise agreement with CAI in which the latter
would execute Deeds of Donation in exchange for
128
their quitclaim. Thereafter, the plaintiffs and the CAI
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
 1991- TC granted the motion and dismissed the
complaint.
 However, the project was again opposed by another
group of farmers claiming that since 1961, they had
been occupying a parcel of public agricultural
land. They tilled the said agricultural lands and
planted it with rice, corn, vegetables, root crops, fruit
trees and raised small livestock for daily survival.
The petitioners requested that the DAR order an
official survey of the aforesaid agricultural
lands. Pending resolution of their petition, the
petitioners and twenty (20) others banded together
and formed a group called Pasong Bayabas Farmers
Association, Inc. (PBFAI) affiliated with Kalipunan ng
Samahan ng Mamamayan, Inc. (KASAMA).
 1994- Domingo Banaag, in his capacity as President
of PBFAI, filed a petition for compulsory coverage of
a portion of the CAI property under Rep. Act No.
6657.
 The PBFAI-KASAMA, representing the farmers-
tenants, filed a complaint for Maintenance of
Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages
with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and PI before
the DAR Adjudication Board Reg. IV against CAI et
al.
 DARAB granted the TRO.
 CAI admitted that the CAI was the registered owner
of the property, but specifically denied that the
plaintiffs were recognized by the CAI as tenants-
occupants of the aforesaid property since
1961. They asserted that the CAI did not consent to
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the cultivation of the property nor to the erection of
the plaintiffs’ houses. They further averred that the
CAI had entered into a compromise agreement with
the occupants of the property. They also alleged that
they secured a permit from the Municipal Planning
and Development Offices before bulldozing activities
on the property were ordered.
 The defendants raised the following as their special
and affirmative defenses among others: (a) the
plaintiffs’ action is barred by the dismissal of their
complaint; (b) the plaintiffs had waived their rights
and interests over the property when they executed
deeds of waiver and quitclaim in favor of CAI; (c)
then Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella had issued an
Order dated July 3, 1979, converting the property
into a residential area and withdrawing the property
from the coverage of the CARL. Finally, the
defendants contended that the property had an 18%
slope and was undeveloped; as such, it was exempt
from the coverage of the CARL, under Section 10 of
Rep. Act No. 6657.
 1996- PARAD dismissed the complaint and found
that the plaintiffs abandoned and renounced their
tenancy rights over the land in question and barred
from instituting the instant complaint on the ground
of Res Judicata; that the remaining 29 other plaintiffs
were not bonafide tenants but mere interlopers on
the land in question and consequently not entitled to
security of tenure. It declined to resolve the issue
whether or not the property was covered by RA 6657
and on whether the conversion of the property to
non-agricultural was legal and efficacious.
129
 Petitioners appealed. The appealed was transmitted
to the DARAB. Meantime some of them executed
quitclaims waiving their rights from the property in
the suit. Thus CAI filed a Motion to
Lift Status Quo Order and Motion to Dismiss alleging
that the status quo order illegally extended the
restraining order issued on September 13, 1996. It
was also alleged that the complainants-appellants
were not qualified beneficiaries of the CARL. The
CAI asserted that the re-classification of the land use
was valid and legal, and concluded that since the
property was not agricultural, it was not covered by
the CARL and, thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the
DARAB.
 1997- DARAB reversed PARAD decision. MR
denied.
 CA- reversed DARAB and reinstated the PARAB
decision. The CA ruled that under RA6657, sec. 10,
all lands with 18% slope and over, except those
already developed, shall be exempt from the
coverage of the said Act. The CA noted that the
exception speaks of “18% in slope and undeveloped
land.” Per report of the PARAD, the property subject
of the suit has an 18% slope and was still
undeveloped; hence, it falls within the exemption.
And that as early as 1976, the land was already
classified by the Municipality of Carmona as
residential.
 Petitioners: the property subject of the suit is
agricultural land; hence, covered by the CARL. They
assert that the reclassification of the property made
by the Municipal Council of Carmona was subject to
the approval of the HSRC, now the HLURB, as
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
provided for by EO648, sec. 5 but since there was no
such approval, the said resolution was ineffective.
They argue that RA6657 sec. 65, the DAR is vested
with exclusive authority to reclassify a landholding
from agricultural to residential. The petitioners submit
that the exclusive authority of the DAR is not
negated by RA7160, sec.60 (LGC). They also insist
that the conversion of the property under
Kapasiyahang Blg30, was subject to the approval of
the DAR, conformably to DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series
of 1990. Moreover, the development of the property
had not yet been completed even after RA6657 took
effect. Hence, it was incumbent upon the respondent
to secure an exemption thereto, after complying with
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994.
 CAI: the property was validly reclassified by the
Municipal Council of Carmona pursuant to its
authority under RA2264 or Local Autonomy Act of
1959. Until revoked, the reclassification made by the
council remained valid. Per DOJ Opinion No. 40,
Series of 1990, the private respondent was not
required to secure clearance or approval from the
DAR since the reclassification took place on June
15, 1988, when RA6657 took effect. The respondent
asserts that it had complied with all the requirements
under PD 957, as amended. Morevore, other
agencies had already previously found the property
unsuitable for agricultural purposes. The respondent
asserts that the petitioners-individuals are mere
squatters and not tenants on the property of the
private respondent. Hence, the PARAD had no
jurisdiction over the petition of the PBFAI, as well as
the individual petitioners. Consequently, the DARAB
130
had no appellate jurisdiction over the appeals from
the decision of the PARAD.

ISSUE (with regard to eminent domain):
W/N the subject property is covered by RA 6657 or
the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
HELD/RATIO:
NO. RA6657 provides that the CARL shall “cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands.” As
to what constitutes “agricultural land” it is referred to as
“land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
“Agricultural lands” are only those lands which are
“arable and suitable agricultural lands” and “do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands.”
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the
undeveloped portions of the property cannot in any
language be considered as “agricultural lands.” These
lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to
be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in
the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the
areas in question continued to be developed as a low-
cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail’s pace. This
can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA
members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners
from continuing with such development. The enormity of
the resources needed for developing a subdivision may
have delayed its completion but this does not detract
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
from the fact that these lands are still residential lands
and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity
are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than
respondent DAR.
RA2264, sec. 3 amending the Local Government
Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or city
councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines,
and apportions a given political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future projection of
needs. The power of the local government to convert or
reclassify lands to residential lands to non-agricultural
lands reclassified is not subject to the approval of DAR.
RA6657, sec. 65 relied upon by the petitioner applies
only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for
the conversion of lands previously placed under the
agrarian reform law after the lapse of five years from its
award. It does not apply to agricultural lands already
converted as residential lands prior to the passage of
RA6657.
When Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella
confirmed the reclassification of the property by the
Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural land
when he approved, on July 3, 1979, the application of
the private respondent/LDC for the conversion of 35.80
hectares of the property into non-agricultural land, he
did so pursuant to his authority under RA3844, as
amended, by PD 815 and PD 946.
131
It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian
Reform Minister declared that the property was not
tenanted and not devoted to the production of palay
and/or corn, and that the land was suitable for
conversion to a residential subdivision. The order of the
Minister was not reversed by the Office of the President;
as such, it became final and executory. By declaring, in
its Decision of September 2, 1997, that the property
subject of the suit, was agricultural land, the petitioner
DARAB thereby reversed the Order of Agrarian Reform
Minister Estrella, issued almost eighteen (18) years
before, and nullified Resolution No. 30 of the Municipal
Council of Carmona, approved twenty-one (21) years
earlier, on May 30, 1976, as well as the issuances of the
NHA, the HSRC, the HLURB, the Ministry of Local
Government and the National Planning
Commission. Thus, the petitioner DARAB acted with
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction.
Dipdipio Earth-saver’s Multipurpose Association, Inc.
et al v Sec. Gozun, DENR, et al.
Chico-Nazario,J.
30 March 2006
FACTS:
 25 July 1987- Pres. Aquino promulgated EO279
which authorized the DENR Secretary to accept,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts of
agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent.
 1994- Pres. Ramos executed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining
Corp over areas in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino,
including Barangay Dipdipio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining
Limited to form a single company that now goes
under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining
Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of
stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
 1995- Pres. Ramos signed into law RA 7942 entitled,
"An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral
Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and
Conservation," otherwise known as the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995.
 2001- petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to
the DENR Sec. for the cancellation of the FTAA for
the primary reason that RA7942 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are
unconstitutional.
 2002- Panel of Arbitrators of the Mining and
Geosciences Bureau rejected the demand for the
cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.1avvphil.net
 Petitioners: They assert that public respondent
DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit
132
entry into a private property and allow taking of land
without payment of just compensation.
 Public respondents: Sec. 76 is not a taking provision
but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue
of which, the state may prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. This
government regulation involves the adjustment of
rights for the public good and that this adjustment
curtails some potential for the use or economic
exploitation of private property. Public respondents
concluded that "to require compensation in all such
circumstances would compel the government to
regulate by purchase."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the
CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust
and unlawful taking of property without payment of
just compensation, in violation of Section 9, Article
III of the Constitution.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The Mining Act was held to be valid. Sec. 76 of
the Mining Act as well as the DENR IRR provided for
just compensation.
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right
of the state (and of those entities to which the power
has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just
compensation. On the other hand, police power is the
power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
property. Although both police power and the power of
eminent domain have the general welfare for their
object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two
with the latter being used as an implement of the
former, there are still traditional distinctions between the
two.
A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence
leads to a cogent deduction that where a property
interest is merely restricted because the continued use
thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where
property is destroyed because its continued existence
would be injurious to public interest, there is no
compensable taking. However, when a property interest
is appropriated and applied to some public purpose,
there is compensable taking.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why said power may not be availed of
to impose only a burden upon the owner of the
condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement
right of way.
The requisites of taking in eminent domain
include (Castellvi v CA):
(1) the expropriator must enter a private
property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a
momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color
of legal authority;
133
(4) the property must be devoted to public
use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public
use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
As shown by jurisprudence, a regulation which
substantially deprives the owner of his proprietary rights
and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public
use amounts to compensable taking. In the case at bar,
the entry referred to in Sec. 76 and the easement rights
under Sec. 75 of RA 7942 as well as the various rights
to CAMC under its FTAA are no different from the
deprivation of proprietary rights. The CAMC FTAA
grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the
Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and
egress and the right to occupy the same. It also
bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry
into private lands by surface owners or occupants
thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting
minerals therein.
The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a
simple right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the
provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining
rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting
mining activities such as exploration, extraction and
processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine
infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels,
prepare tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots,
install their machinery, equipment and sewer systems.
On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are
accorded to them where they may build warehouses,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other
infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All
these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the
affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands.
Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations
commence.
While the Court declared that Sec. 75 is a taking
provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional
on the ground that it allows taking of private property
without the determination of public use and the payment
of just compensation. The taking to be valid must be for
public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is now
synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public
welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader
notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use
as traditionally understood as "actual use by the public"
has already been abandoned. Mining industry plays a
pivotal role in the economic development of the country
and is a vital tool in the government’s thrust of
accelerated recovery. Irrefragably, mining is an industry
which is of public benefit.
Republic of the Philippines
Panganiban, J.
2 December 1998
FACTS:
 Private respondent Helena Benitez is the registered
owner of 2 parcels of land in Cavite.
134
 1982- Philippine Human Resources Development
Center and the Japanese International Cooperation
Agency entered into an agreement which involved
the establishment of a Construction Manpower
Development Center.
 1983- MOA between Benitez and PHRDC by which
she would lease and/or sell for a period of 20 years
the subject property in favor of PHRDC. It was
granted permit by Benitez and the Philippine
Women’s University to undertake land development,
electrical and road network installations and other
related works necessary to attain its
objectives...’. Pursuant thereto, the CMDF took
possession of the property and erected buildings and
other related facilities necessary for its operations.
 After the lease contract expired, negotiations began
on the purchase of the property on a plain offer from
Benitez to sell the same. It was agreed that the
purchase price would be at P70 per sqm. In view of
this agreement, PHRDC prepared a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
 However, for reasons known only to her, Benitez did
not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale thus reneging on
her commitment to sell the lot in question.
 1995- She and PWU demanded payment of rentals
and to vacate the premises. It later filed an unlawful
detainer suit against petitioner.
 For failure to acquire the property, CMDF instituted a
complaint for eminent domain under EO1035. A writ
of possession was issued by the Court but later
quashed.
ISSUE:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
W/N the respondent judge may quash a writ of
possession on the ground that the expropriating
government agency is already occupying the property
sought to be expropriated.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. Sec. 7 of EO1035 (providing for the
procedures and guidelines for the expeditious
acquisition by the government of private real
properties or rights thereon for infrastructure and
other government development projects) provides
that when the government or its authorized agent
makes the required deposit, the trial court has a
ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. There
being a deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00
which is equivalent to the assessed value of the
property subject matter hereof based on defendant’s
1990 tax declaration, coupled with the fact that notice to
defendant as landowner has been effected, the Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Possession should be granted.
The expropriation of real property does not include
mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although
eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there
may also be compensable taking of only some, not all,
of the property interests in the bundle of rights that
constitute ownership. In this case, it is manifest that the
petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public
interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of
eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner
intended to acquire not only physical possession but
also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own
the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry
135
and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of
title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised
by an owner over the subject property. Its actual
occupation, which renders academic the need for it to
enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of
all the rights of ownership. Its right to possess did not
attend its initial physical possession of the property
because the lease, which had authorized said
possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted not
merely possession de facto but possession de jure as
well.
What will happen if the required writ of possession
is not issued? It would be absurd to require petitioner to
first vacate the property in view of the adverse judgment
in the unlawful detainer case, and soon afterwards,
order the trial court to issue in petitioner’s favor a writ of
possession pursuant to the expropriation
proceedings. Such a scenario is a bureaucratic waste
of precious time and resources. This precisely is the
sort of pernicious and unreasonable delay of
government infrastructure or development projects,
which EO 1035 intended to address by requiring the
immediate issuance of a writ of possession. Ineludibly,
said writ is both necessary and practical, because mere
physical possession that is gained by entering the
property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim
of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to
possess, the expropriated property. Clearly, an
ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the
State’s power of eminent domain.
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. CA
20 November 2000
Pardo, J.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
FACTS:
 Conrado Leviste filed with the RTC of Daet, CN a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and
foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter
Corp (PSC). PSC was declared in default and the
RTC found in favor of Leviste.
 A writ of execution was issued. Two parcels of land
in the name of PSC were sold at a public auction in
favor of Vines Realty Corp. A writ of possession was
issued in favor of VRC. The writ included the power
lines of CANORECO standing on certain portions of
the subject property.
 Later, VRC moved for the removal and demolition of
improvements on the land, including the electric
posts. CANORECO opposed on the ground, among
other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to the
case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the
trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way
agreements over said property.
 RTC issued writ of demolition.
 CANORECO filed with CA a petition for prohibition
with restraining order and preliminary injunction
which was eventually denied. Meantime, the sheriff
went through with the demolition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the
power lines located in the land sold at public
auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage.
HELD/RATIO:
136
YES. The trial court failed to appreciate the
nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities. Among
the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 269 (creating the National
Electrification Administration) includes the exercise the
power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law
for the exercise of such power by other corporations
constructing or operating electric generating plants and
electric transmission and distribution lines or systems.
Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with
the power of eminent domain. The acquisition of an
easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. In Republic vs. PLDT, it was
held that: “the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears
why said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be subjected
to an easement of right-of-way."
However, a simple right-of-way easement
transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty
retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the
use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to
do with the land, except those that would result in
contact with the wires.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is
not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the
land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons,
Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
compensation, which must be neither more nor less
than the money equivalent of the property.
Panganiban,
National Power
J. Corporation v Manubay Agro-Industrial easement
18 August 2004
Corporation
FACTS:
 1996- Napocor was to undertake an electrification
project in connecting Leyte to Luzon. In order to
carry out said project, it needed to build its
transmission lines across certain lands owned by
private individuals including private respondent.
 Napocor filed a complaint for expropriation before
the RTC in order to acquire easement of right of
way over the land which MAIDC owns.
 RTC issued a writ of possession and directed the
sheriff to immediately place Napocor in possession
of said land. In determining the fair compensation,
the court appointed 3 commissioners to survey the
land.
 Taking into consideration the condition, the
surroundings and the potentials of respondent’s
expropriated property, the RTC approved
Chairperson Minda B. Teoxon’s recommended
amount of P550 per square meter as just
compensation for the property. The trial court
opined that the installation thereon of the 350 KV
Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project
137
would impose a limitation on the use of the land for
an indefinite period of time, thereby justifying the
payment of the full value of the property.
 Further, the RTC held that it was not bound by the
provision cited by petitioner -- Section 3-A of
RA6395 (revising the Charter of the Napocor), as
amended by Presidential Decree 938. This law
prescribes as just compensation for the acquired
Developmentof a right of way over an expropriated
property an easement fee in an amount not
exceeding 10 percent of the market value of such
property. The trial court relied on the earlier
pronouncements of this Court that the
determination of just compensation in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. Thus,
valuations made by the executive branch or the
legislature are at best initial or preliminary only.
 CA: affirmed the RTC holding that RA 6395, as
amended by PD No. 938, did not preclude
expropriation. Section 3-A thereof allowed the
power company to acquire not just an easement of
a right of way, but even the land itself. Such
easement was deemed by the appellate court to be
a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. The
CA observed that, given their nature, high-powered
electric lines traversing respondent’s property
would necessarily diminish -- if not damage entirely
-- the value and the use of the affected property; as
well as endanger lives and limbs because of the
high-tension current conveyed through the lines.
Respondent was therefore deemed entitled to a
just compensation, which should be neither more
nor less than the monetary equivalent of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
property taken. Accordingly, the appellate found
the award of P550 per square meter to be proper
and reasonable.
ISSUE:
W/N the assessed compensation was just.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. An easement of a right of way transmits no
rights except the easement itself, and respondent
retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of
such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly
observed by the CA, considering the nature and the
effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on
the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive
respondent of normal use of the property. For this
reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less
than the monetary equivalent of the land.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but
the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey
thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings,
the just compensation to which the owner of a
condemned property is entitled is generally the market
value. Market value is "that sum of money which a
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
138
price to be given and received therefor." Such amount is
not limited to the assessed value of the property or to
the schedule of market values determined by the
provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these
values may serve as factors to be considered in the
judicial valuation of the property.
The nature and character of the land at the time of
its taking is the principal criterion for determining how
much just compensation should be given to the
landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, as well as its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In
fixing the valuation at P550 per square meter, the trial
court had considered the Report of the commissioners
and the proofs submitted by the parties. The price
of P550 per square meter appears to be the closest
approximation of the market value of the lots in the
adjoining, fully developed San Francisco Village
Subdivision. Considering that the parcels of land in
question are still undeveloped raw land, it appears to
the Court that the just compensation of P550 per square
meter is justified. Both the Report of Commissioner
Bulao and the commissioners’ majority Report were
based on uncontroverted facts supported by
documentary evidence and confirmed by their ocular
inspection of the property. As can be gleaned from the
records, they did not abuse their authority in evaluating
the evidence submitted to them; neither did they
misappreciate the clear preponderance of evidence.
The amount fixed and agreed to by the trial court and
respondent appellate court has not been grossly
exorbitant or otherwise unjustified.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
En Banc of the Philippines v PLDT
Republic
27 January 1969
FACTS:
 Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the
RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an
agreement whereby telephone messages, coming
from the United States and received by RCA’s
domestic station, could automatically be transferred
to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls
collected by the PLDT for transmission from the
Philippines to the United States.
 Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation
and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT to enable government offices to call private
parties. Its application for the use of these trunk lines
was in the usual form of applications for telephone
service, containing a statement, above the signature
of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules
and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with
the Public Service Commission. One of the many
rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished
the telephone subscriber for his private use. The
Bureau has extended its services to the general
public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned
by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its
(the Bureau’s) own schedule of rates. Through these
trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS)
subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in
139
the same way that the latter could make a call to the
former.
 1958- DoT entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications, Inc. for a joint overseas telephone
service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-
telephone overseas calls received by RCA’s station
to and from local residents. But PLDT complained to
the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau
was violating the conditions under which their Private
Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the
PLDT’s facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines,
for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for
the use of government offices but even to serve
private persons or the general public, in competition
with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that
if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12
April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone
connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the
Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was
the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone
services, from the rest of the world, except the
United States.
 On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit
against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, in CFI of Manila praying in its
complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to
execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau,
for the use of the facilities of defendant’s telephone
system throughout the Philippines under such terms
and conditions as the court might consider
reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the defendant company to restrain the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
severance of the existing telephone connections
and/or restore those severed.
 CFI rendered judgment that it could not compel the
PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau
because the parties were not in agreement; that
under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of
Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to
servicing government offices alone, nor was there
any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since
the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time
that their use by the Bureau was to be public
throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was
neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles
of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice
that would result from the disconnection of the trunk
lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent,
although it dismissed both the complaint and the
counterclaims.
ISSUE:
May the PLDT be compelled to enter into an
interconnection contract with the petitioner?
HELD/RATIO:
YES. Generally, parties cannot be coerced to enter into
a contract where no agreement is had between them as
to the principal terms and conditions of the contract.
Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the
essence of our contractual system, and by express
provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if
tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence. But
while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the
140
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by
the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent
domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of
right of way. The use of the PLDT’s lines and services
to allow inter-service connection between both
telephone systems is not much different. In either case
private property is subjected to a burden for public use
and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the
Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why
the State may not require a public utility to render
services in the general interest, provided just
compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the
beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
users of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.
Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu v Heirs of
Panganiban
20 June 2000
Pastor
FACTS:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 Petitioner filed before the MTC a Complaint to
expropriate property of the respondents.
 In an Order the MTC dismissed the Complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that
"eminent domain is an exercise of the power
to take private property for public use after payment
of just compensation”.
 The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed
before it, holding that an action for eminent domain
affected title to real property; hence, the value of
the property to be expropriated, Concluding that
the action should have been filed before the MTC
since the value of the subject property was less
than P20, 000.
 Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to the SC,
raising a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
Who has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain
or expropriation where the assessed value of the
subject property is P20,000?
HELD/RATIO:
RTC. An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. An expropriation suit does not involve the
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to
take private property for public use. True, the value of
the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary
terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just
compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental
to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is
determined only after the court is satisfied with the
141
propriety of the expropriation. In addition, The
government does not dispute respondents' title to or
possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question
of who has a better title or right, for the government
does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It
merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to
"appropriate and control individual property for the
public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or
welfare may demand." Remanded to RTC.
Panganiban,
Devorah J.
Bardillon v Barangay Masili
30 April 2003
FACTS:
Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna filed 2 complaints
for expropriation against Bardillon for the purpose of
erecting a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of
its constituents. The 1st complaint was filed before the
MTC following the failure of the parties to reach an
agreement on the purchase offer but the complaint was
dismissed for lack of interest for failure of the barangay
to appear at the pre-trial. The 2nd complaint was filed
before the RTC but Bardillon filed an MTD on the
ground of res judicata. The RTC judge denied the MTD
holding that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
proceeding so res judicata does not apply. The CA also
dismissed the petition on the same ground and ignored
the RTC’s writ of possession despite the pending MR of
the ruling dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Who had jurisdiction?
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HELD/RATIO:
RTC.An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction
of the RTC regardless of the value of the land because
the subject of the action is the government’s exercise of
eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction, res judicata
does not apply even if the order of dismissal may have
been an adjudication on the merits.
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of
possession in an expropriation case are found in
Section 2, Rule 67. For LGUs, expropriation is also
governed by Sec. 19 of the LGC. In expropriation
proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate
entry are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of
the amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of the
property to be expropriated based on its current tax
declaration. In this case, the issuance of the Writ of
Possession in favor the city after it filed the complaint
and deposited the amount required was proper because
it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue
of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly
addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation
proceedings.
Carpio, J. v CA, Pobre
NAPOCOR
12 August 2004
FACTS:
142
 Pobre was the owner of a parcel of land which he
developed into a resort-subdivision which he
named the “Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision.”
 1972- Pobre leased lots in the subdivision to NPC
 1977- NPC filed its expropriation case against
Pobre to acquire a portion of his property. CFI
ordered the expropriation upon payment of P25 per
sqm. While this first expropriation case was
pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the
site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The
dumping of waste materials altered the topography
of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act
on Pobre’s complaints and NPC continued with its
dumping.
 1979- NPC filed its second expropriation case
against Pobre for additional land are to be used for
its well site. It deposited 10% of the total market
value of the lots covered by the second
expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered
the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial court’s
issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.
 1984- Pobre filed MTD second complaint for
expropriation claiming that NPC damaged his
property. He prayed for just compensation of all the
lots affected by NPC’s actions and for the payment
of damages.
 1985- NPC filed MTD of the second expropriation
case on the ground that it had found an alternative
site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981
the project within the Property due to Pobre’s
opposition.
 CFI-granted NPC’s MTC but allowed Pobre to
adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
trial court admitted Pobre’s exhibits on the
damages because NPC failed to object. It denied
NPC’s motion to reconsider the submission of the
case for decision. It eventually found in favor of
Pobre and ordered NPC to compensate him. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
W/N NPC must pay just compensation for the entire
property.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case
restores possession of the expropriated land to the
landowner. However, when possession of the land
cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is
neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the
only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to
demand payment of just compensation. In this case, it is
no longer possible and practical to restore possession
of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer
habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is
worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC.
Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had
physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter
Property. The Court has ruled that if the government
takes property without expropriation and devotes the
property to public use, after many years the property
owner may demand payment of just compensation. This
principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate
that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
143
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation
when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation.
Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of
recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of
Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to
be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before
commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.
It has been held that the usual procedure in the
determination of just compensation is waived when the
government itself initially violates procedural
requirements. NPC’s taking of Pobre’s property without
filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and
paying him just compensation is a transgression of
procedural due process. From the beginning, NPC
should have initiated expropriation proceedings for
Pobre’s entire 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did
not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal
expropriation of the Property. Even as the second
expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well
aware of the damage that it had unleashed on the entire
Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to
Pobre’s repeated demands for NPC to abate the
damage that it had wrought on his Property. NPC
moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second
expropriation on the ground that it had found an
alternative site and there was stiff opposition from
Pobre. NPC abandoned the second expropriation case
five years after it had already deprived the Property
virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its utter
disregard for Pobre’s property rights. Thus the SC
computed the compensation for the entire property
based on the valuation of the commissioners at 6%pa
interest plus temperate and exemplary damages.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
MASIKIPDela
Lourdes v. Paz
CITY
Masikip
OFis the registered owner of a
parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to
PASIG
expropriate a portion thereof for the “sports
development and recreational activities” of the residents
of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994.
Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to
expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose
that it was “in line with the program of the Municipal
Government to provide land opportunities to deserving
poor sectors of our community.”
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial
court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to
Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court
on the ground that there was genuine necessity to
expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate
the property
HELD:
Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take
and appropriate private property to the public use,
whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be
done only on condition of providing a reasonably
144
compensation therefor.” It is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use
and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in
government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of
government. It delegates the power thereof to the
LGUs, other public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations.
LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and
may exercise it only when expressly authorized by
statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for
the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least 15% fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the property
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
There is already an established sports development and
recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig
City. Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify
the expropriation. The records show that the
Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council
which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance
No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowner’s Association, a private, non-profit
organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
REPUBLIC instituted
Petitioner v. expropriation proceedings over
544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated
CA
along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be
utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of
radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the
Philippines” project. Petitioner made a deposit of
P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the
reasonable value of the property.
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the
76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis
Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents,
which forms part of the expropriated area.
It would appear that the national government failed to
pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant
to the foregoing decision.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of
the expropriated property to the Bulacan State
University.
145
HELD:
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be
an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate
any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of
a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution,
whose provisions are taken as being merely
confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at
most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of
the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching
that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many
respects. It reaches to every form of property the State
needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all
separate interests of individuals in property are held
under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting
upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession
of the property whenever the public interest so requires
it.
The Municipality
JESUS of Pasig needed
IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL anFOUNDATION,
access road. INC. v. CITY OF PASIG
Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for
water and electricaloutlets. The municipality then
decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the property
of the Ching Cuancos.
The municipality filed a complaint, against the Ching
Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under
Section 19 of the Local Government Code. The plaintiff
alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter,
of its intention to construct an access road on a portion
of the property but they refused to sell the same
portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco.
ISSUE: W/N there was no due process?
HELD:
Petition is granted. However, as correctly pointed out by
the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an
ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at
all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the
subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not
notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived
of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an
ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is
thereby received and the parties are entitled to be
present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where,
as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any
ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of
the court based on the said inspection has no probative
weight. The findings of the trial court based on the
conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be
rejected.
IRONwas
ISA ANDcreated
STEELby PD
AUTHORITY
No. 272 in (ISA)
order,v.generally, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry.
CA
PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years
counting from August 9, 1973. When ISA’s original term
expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for
another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31,
1979.
146
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly
owned subsidiary of the National Development
Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the
National Government, embarked on an expansion
program embracing, among other things, the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The
construction of such steel mill was considered a priority
and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant
to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No.
2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on
November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement
a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and
reserving that land for the use and immediate
occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were
occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant
and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated
November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to
“negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf
of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC’s
present occupancy rights on the subject land.
Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.
ISSUE: W/N the Government is entitled to be
substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s
term.
HELD:
Yes. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers
or attributed normally associated with juridical
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No.
272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency
or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the
Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge
that other agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form,
that is to say, are incorporated agencies or
instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a
juridical personality distinct from the personality of the
Republic.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an
agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full
panoply of powers and attributes which are
compendiously described as “legal personality.”
When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency
expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the
assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and
are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition
thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers,
duties and functions, etc. to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the
consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the
first instance, in the charters and, by way of
147
supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation
Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-
incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic,
its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities
are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been
shown to have mandated succession thereto by some
other entity or agency of the Republic.
In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation
proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or
representative of the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to its authority under PD 272.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the
Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even
though the latter may be an ultimate user of the
properties involved.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the
Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA
having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of
ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or justify the
dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
Filstream is the
FILSTREAM registered ownerINC.
INTERNATIONAL of or parcels of land
v. CA
situated in Tondo Manila.
Filstream filed an ejectment suit before MTC Manila
against the occupants of the said property on the
ground of termination of the lease contract and non-
payment of rentals.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Judgment was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993
ordering private respondents to vacate the premises
and pay back rentals to petitioner.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1993, while the case is still
pending before the MTC, the private respondents filed a
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against
Filstream before RTC Manila. Subsequently on
November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved
Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to
initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation,
purchase, or other legal means the properties of
Filstream, among others. The said properties were to be
sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area
pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the
City of Manila.
City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain to
expropriate the aforecited parcels of land owned by
petitioner Filstream before RTC Manila. Pursuant to
this, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession which
ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed
premises to the City of Manila.
ISSUE: W/N the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis
whether or not the expropriation is valid.
HELD:
No. The City of Manila has the power of eminent
domain as expressly granted by the Local Government
Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
However, this power is not unlimited. The basic rules
still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no
148
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1,
1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section
9, 1987 Constitution)".
The governing law that deals with the subject of
expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and
housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 of which
specifically provide the order of lands to be acquired for
socialized housing which shows that private property is
the last one that should be expropriated. Moreover,
Section 10 the same law provides for the modes of
acquisition an states that the modes include "community
mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated
purchase, and expropriation. Provided, however, That
expropriation shall be resorted to only when other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted."
Upon examination of the records, the court found that
the City of Manila has not complied with Sections 9 and
10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's properties were
expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the
City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the
acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279
have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of
petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must
accordingly be rectified.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a
paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent
domain for the general good considering that the right of
the State to expropriate private property as long as it is
for public use always takes precedence over the interest
of private property owners. However we must not lose
sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the
exercise of such right are also entitled to protection,
bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right
cannot override the guarantee of due process extended
by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated.
In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due
process requirements is in order.
SAN
Certain ROQUE
parcels of REALTY
land were v. the subject of an
expropriation proceeding initiated by the then
REPUBLIC
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Judge Felix Martinez
ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00 as pre-condition
for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. A
Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land.
However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not
transferred to the government.
Eventually, the land was subdivided and new titles were
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels
were acquired by San Roque, which begun construction
of townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
Republic filed the present case alleging that it is the
owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the
1938 Decision in the expropriation case.
149
San Roque claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It
also claimed that there was no valid expropriation
because it was initiated by the executive branch without
legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation
was never consummated because the government did
not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any
compensation.
HELD:
EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed
against the expropriator. The payment of just
compensation for private property taken for public use is
an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's
sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe
this requirement renders the taking ineffectual,
notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To
disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental
power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private
rights.
Republic manifestly failed to present clear and
convincing evidence of full payment of just
compensation and receipt thereof by the property
owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually
made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary
course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of
title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the
government on the certificate of title.
The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the
Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's power
or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Registration Act. There is no showing that the Republic
complied with the aforesaid registration requirement.
From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent
upon the Republic to cause the registration of the
subject properties in its name or record the decree of
expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic
fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed
to do so for 56 years.
MUNICIPALITY
Philippine Pipes OF
and MEYCAUAYAN
Merchandising Corporation
v. filed
with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan,
IAC
Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of
land to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy
equipment.
In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan,
passed Resolution to expropriate same land. It hereafter
filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a special civil
action for expropriation.
Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the
market value of the land, with the Philippine National
Bank, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor
of the petitioner.
RTC issued an order declaring the taking of the property
as lawful. IAC affirmed.
HELD:
From the foregoing facts, it appears obvious to this
Special Committee that there is no genuine necessity
for the Municipality of' Meycauayan to expropriate the
aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and
Merchandising Corporation for use as a public road.
150
Considering that in the vicinity there are other available
road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as
the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot sought to
be expropriated which was found by the Committee to
be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy
equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining
vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does
not appear to be very imperative and necessary and
would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The
desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a
public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be
fully and better attained by acquiring the other available
roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without
causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate
business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to
expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity
offered for sale for a wider public road to attain
decongest (sic) of traffic because as observed by the
Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken
will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and
therefore, will not suffice to improve and decongest the
flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area. ...
Since there is another lot ready for sale and lying Idle,
adjacent and on the western side of the strip of land,
and extending also from Malhacan Road to Bulac Road
and most Ideal for a public road because it is very much
wider than the lot sought to be expropriated, it seems
that it is more just, fair, and reasonable if this lot is the
one to be expropriated.
BARDILLON v. BRGY
MASILI
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 151

2 Complaints for eminent domain were filed by the Brgy

Masili for the purpose of expropriating a (144) square
meter-parcel of land owned by Bardillon. Bardillon
acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation
the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Bardillon argues that the CA erred when it ignored the
RTC’s Writ of Possession over her property, issued
despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the
ruling dismissing the Complaint.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held:
SC not persuaded.
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of
possession in an expropriation case are expressly and
specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local
government units, expropriation is also governed by
Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly,
in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for
authorizing immediate entry are as follows:
(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance; and
(2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of
the fair market value of the property to be expropriated
based on its current tax declaration.
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of
Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the
Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount
required was proper, because it had complied with the
foregoing requisites.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a
matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of
the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to
the necessity of the takeover of her property, she should
say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has
the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of
the right of eminent domain and to determine whether
there is a genuine necessity for it.
Bardillon v Barangay Masili
152
Barangay Masili filed two complaints to expropriate a
144 sqm parcel of land owned by Bardillon for a multi-
purpose hall; their first offer was 200,000. The case was
dismissed for the failure of reopndent and counsel to
appear at pre-trial (MTC). The second complaint was
approved (RTC). The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction and the RTC
validly ruled.
ISSUE:
1. Could the MTC have jurisdiction over the case?
No, An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC regardless of the value of the land because the
subject of the action is the government’s exercise of
eminent domain – a matter incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
2. Did the CA err when it ignored the issue of entry
upon the premises?
No. The Writ of Possession was valid. The requirements
for the issuance of a writ of possession in an
expropriation case are governed by Rule 67, Section 2
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 19 of the
Local Government Code.
The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are 1) the
filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance 2) the deposit of the amount equivalent
to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be
expropriated based on its current tax declaration.
Held: Petition denied. The expropriation is valid.
Lagcao v Judge Labra
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Petitioners bought land from the City of Cebu. After
acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the
lot only to discover that it was already occupied by
squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted
ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu
City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the
squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed
the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and
order of demolition.
However, when the demolition order was about to be
implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two
letters4 to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the
demolition on the ground that the City was still looking
for a relocation site for the squatters.
An ordinance was soon passed, identifying lots for
socialized housing, including the contested lot. The
ordinance appropriated ~6M for the lot.
Petitioners filed an action for nullity of Ordinance 1843
for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Is Cebu City ordinance no. 1843 violative of
substantive due process
Yes. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be
of public character. Government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all
why petitioners’ property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity
impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance
153
No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’
property as the site of a socialized housing project.
Specifically, the ordinance is against the Constitution
and RAs that call for a particular order priority in
acquiring land and expropriating only when other modes
of acquisition have been exhausted. The singling out of
petitioner’s small property was plain oppression and
showed manifest partiality against petitioners as only
few squatters would benefit. The ordinance failed to
show any reasonable relation between the end sought
and means adopted.
HELD: PETITION GRANTED.
Manila v Chinese Community
FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for
the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the
conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff
claims that it is necessary that such public improvement
be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and
that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation
was not necessary because other routes were available.
They further claimed that the expropriation of the
cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to
them and to all those persons owing and interested in
the graves and monuments that would have to be
destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in
question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the
right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that
the courts have no right to inquire and determine the
necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and
hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.
HELD: The courts have the power of restricting
the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated
by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or
entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions accompanying the
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority
upon a municipal corporation toexercise the right
of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditionsimposed by the
general authority, is a question that the courts have the
right to inquire to.
FACTS: The
Republic v PLDTBureau of Telecommuncations set up a
Government Telephone System using its equipment but
renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government
offices to call private parties. PLDT complained that the
bureau was violating the conditions of the
interconnection referring to the rented trunk lines,
because the government used the liens not only for
154
government offices but even to serve private persons or
the general public, in competition with the business of
PLDT. They gave notice and disconnected the trunk
lines being rented by the Bureau.
Petitioner commenced a suit against PLDT praying for
the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to
demand interconnection between the Government
Telephone System and that of PLDT so that the
Government Telephone System could make use of the
lines and facilities. PLDT compels it cannot be
compelled to enter into this contract without any prior
agreement.
ISSUE:
Can an interconnection between PLDT and the GTS be
a valid object for expropriation?
HELD: Yes, in an exercise of eminent domain, the
Republic may require the telephone company to permit
interconnection as the needs of the government service
may require, subject to payment of just compensation.
The use of lines and services to allow inter-service
connection between the telephone systems is similar to
an easement of right of way.
Ayala de Roxas v City
FACTS:
Manila
Plaintiff wanted to construct a terrace on her property; it
would be over a 3m strip of land between her house and
the edge of the canal of Sibacon. Her application for
permit was denied because the City Engineer said the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
city wanted that 3m of land as a place of discharging
and landing goods and as a place of shelter for
shipwrecked persons and fishermen, and to be a
towpath
ISSUE: Did this constitute a deprivation of property?
HELD: Yes. No one shall be deprived of property until
after proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been
fulfilled the courts must protect and resotre possession
to the injured party. The easement intended would
amount to expropriating preventing exclusive use. The
question here is not the establishment of an easement
which might be objected by an action in court, but a
mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the
city of Manila because it is an attempt to suppress
without due process of law real rights attached to
ownership.
The City of Manila and City Engineer must issue a
license allowing her to construct her terrace.
People v Fajardo
FACTS: Fajardo and Babilonia were convicted for
violating Ordinance 7 of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, for constructing a building destroying
the view of the public plaza, without a permit. Fajardo,
the former mayor, built the property even after denial of
the permit because they needed a place of residence
very badly, their former house having been destroyed
by a typhoon.
ISSUE: Was the ordinance valid?
155
HELD: No. While the mayor has the authority to
regulate property in the interest of general welfare, the
state may not permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community. Every structure
that may be erected would interfere with the view. The
appellants would be constrained to let their land remain
idle.
Further, the power of the municipal council to require
building permits rests upon fire limts. There is no
showing of these fire limits. They had no authority to
promulgate the said ordinance.
NPC v Gutierrez
FACTS: NPC was a GOCC with the power of eminent
domain for the construction and operation of electric
transmission lines. NPC had to pass the lands of
Gutierrez, et al. The negotiations for easement were
unsuccessful and eminent domain proceedings were
started. They were paid P973.00.
ISSUE: Should NPC pay simple easement fee or full
compensation for the land traversed by its transmission
lines?
HELD: Full compensation. The transmission lines
perpetually deprive defendants of their proprietary
rights, as they will not be allowed to plant anything
higher than three meters; the high-tensino current also
poses a danger to life and limbs. The acquisition of
easement falls within the purpose of eminent domain,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
as it deprives defendants of ordinary use of their
property.
It must be noted that even if petitioner only sought an
easement of right of way, the power of eminent domain
may be exercised although title was not transferred to
the expropriator.
Republic v Castellvi
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has
been rented and occupied by the government (AFP) in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced
expropriation proceedings. During the assessment of
just compensation, the government argued that it had
taken the property when the contract of
leasecommenced and not when the proceedings begun.
If the time of taking was the government’s lease, the
price would be P.20/sqm, while if the time of taking
followed Castellvi’s interpretation the price would be
P15/sqm. The owner maintains that the disputed land
was not taken when the government commenced to
occupy the said land as lessee because the essential
elements of the taking of property under the power of
eminent domain namely (1) entrance and occupation by
condemnor upon the private property for more than a
monetary period and (2) devoting it to public use in such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
156
ISSUE:
1. WON the taking of property has taken place when
the condemnor has entered and occupied the
property as lessee.
No the property was deemed taken only when the
expropriation proceedings commenced.
The elements of taking are: Requisites for valid taking:
expropriator must enter a private property, entry must
be for more than a momentary period, entry must be
under warrant or color of authority, property must be
devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated, and utilization of the property must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, these elements were not persent
when the government entered and occupied the
property under a contract of lease.
2. What is just compensation?
It is to be deermined as of the date of filing the
complaint. In the instant case, the taking must be
reckoned when the complaint for eminent domain was
filed.
A price of P5/sqm is fair.
Keywords: Power of eminent domain; taking in the
Amigable v cuenca
constitutional sense
FACTS:
 Victoria Amigable owner of Lot in Banilad Estate,
Cebu City reflected no annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
appears at the back of the TCT. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government
used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167
square meters, for the construction of the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues.
 It appears that said avenues were already
existing in 1921 although they were in bad
condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and
beautiful avenues that they are now and that the
tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the
formal construction in
1925.
 1958, Amigable's counsel wrote the President for
payment of the portion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. The claim was
indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed
it.
 1959, Amigable filed against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity
as Commissioner of Public Highways for the
recovery of ownership, possession of the 6,167
square meters of land traversed by the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues and for compensatory
damages in the sum of P50,000.00.
 Defendants filed a joint answer 1) that the action
was premature, the claim not having been filed
first with the Office of the Auditor General; 2) that
the right of action for the recovery of any amount
which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had
already prescribed; 3) that the action being a suit
against the Government, the claim for moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid
basis since Government had not given its consent
157
to be sued; and 4) that it was the province of
Cebu that appropriated and used the area hence
Amigable has no cause of action against the
defendants.
 CFI ruled that it doesn’t have jurisdiction as the
government cant be sued without its consent;
Amigable appealed.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n Amigable may properly sue the government?
YES
 Where the government takes away property from
a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent. The
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. Had the government
followed the procedure indicated by the governing
law at the time, a complaint would have been filed
by it, and only upon payment of the compensation
fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may
it have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public
use defined in the judgment. It is not too much to
say that when the government takes any property
for public use, which is conditioned upon the
payment of just compensation, to be judicially
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
the jurisdiction of a court. Considering that no
annotation in favor of the government appears at
the back of her certificate of title and that she has
not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered
owner, she could bring an action to recover
possession of the portion of land in question at
anytime because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership.
 However, since restoration of possession of said
portion by the government is neither convenient
nor feasible at this time because it is now and has
been used for road purposes, the only relief
available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have
done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be
the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
 For damages, Amigable is entitled of legal
interest on the price of the land from the time it
was taken up to the time that payment is made by
the government.
Facts:
Velarma v Issue/Held/Ratio:
This case arose from an “ejectment suitfiled by
CA
Pansacola against Velarma before RTC which alleged:
(1) that sometime in May 1981, Velarma surreptitiously
built his dwelling on a portion of her land at Barangay
Lual, Quezon (2) that the matter was reported to the
Barangay Captain who conducted several conferences
but Velarma still refused to vacate (3) that Panascola
filed Criminal Case against Velarma in 1986 for violation
158
of P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the
trial court convicted petitioner of the offense and
imposed a fine of P 1,500.00 on him; (5) that, despite
such judgment and repeated demands to vacate,
Velarma continued occupying the property, compelling
her to bring the suit.
RTC: Ordered Velarma to vacate the property. Trial
court found that Panascola had satisfactorily
established her ownership over the parcel of land in
question and that Velarma occupied Panascola’s land
without authority of law and against the will of the owner
through strategy and stealth. The argument of Velarma
that Panascola has no cause of action against him since
it was already the municipality that owns the lot by virtue
of an agreement between the former owner Publio
(husband of Pansacola) to exchange the subject lot
with an abandoned road and bridge of the Municipality
of Mauban (recorded in the minutes of a meeting of
Sangguniang Bayan), failed. But trial court held that
Velarma’s claim was unwarranted as there was no deed
had ever been executed to perfect the deal between the
municipality and Publio therefore Panascola remained
the owner of the property. CA affirmed.
1. w/n Velarma’s agreement to sell the property to
the government as evidenced by the minutes of a
meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan, absent a
formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to
defeat a forcible entry suit? NO
Although Publio Pansacola signified before the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban his agreement to the
transfer of that portion of his land traversed by the new
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
provincial highway and its shoulder in exchange for a
corresponding portion of the old abandoned provincial
road, there was no execution of any deed to perfect the
agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the
old abandoned road, but this act does not in any
manner convey title over the abandoned road to the
Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over
the land. No evidence was introduced by Velarma to
show that the survey was actually undertaken and a
specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and
conveyed to the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that
the agreement to transfer the property was made in
1974. More than twenty years later, no actual transfer
had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer is
consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted
by the government, Panascola continues to retain
ownership of the land.
Keywords: Public benefit is now synonymous with
REYES
public V CAor public benefit; Relocation site for
welfare
informal settlers was converted into a low-cost housing
project.
Facts:
 1977, NHA filed separate complaints for the
expropriation of sugarcane lands in Dasmariñas,
Cavite belonging to the petitioners. The stated
public purpose of the expropriation was the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement
Project to accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from Metro Manila. TC granted the
expropriation and the payment of just
compensation.
159
 For the alleged failure of respondent NHA to
comply with the said order, petitioners filed a
complaintfor forfeiture of rights before RTC and
alleged that NHA had not relocated squatters
from the Metro Manila on the expropriated lands
in violation of the stated public purpose for
expropriation and had not paid the just
compensation fixed by the court.
 NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial
amount to herein petitioners and that the
expropriation judgment could not be executed in
view of several issues: 1) concerning capital
gains tax; 2) registration fees and other expenses
for the transfer of title to respondent NHA and for
attorney's fees of Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr.,
collaborating counsel for petitioners.
 Ocular inspections showed that: 1) only one of
the lots is already occupied by relocatees whose
houses are made of light materials with very few
houses partly made of hollow blocks. The
relocatees were relocated only in 1994; 2)most of
the area is almost occupied by houses and
structures, most of which are made of concrete
materials are not being occupied by squatters
 TC dismissed the complaint filed and held that:
(1) respondent NHA is not deemed to have
abandoned the public purpose for which the
subject properties were expropriated because the
relocation of squatters involves a long and
tedious process. It ruled that respondent NHA
actually pursued the public purpose of the
expropriation when it entered into a contract with
Arceo C. Cruz involving the construction of low
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to
qualified low income beneficiaries; (2) there is no
condition imposed in the expropriation judgment
that the subject properties shall revert back to its
original owners in case the purpose of
expropriation is terminated or abandoned; (3) the
payment of just compensation is independent of
the obligation of herein petitioners to pay capital
gains tax; and (4) in the payment of just
compensation, the basis should be the value at
the time the property was taken. CA affirmed.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n NHA failed to comply with the conditions and
in effect forfeited its right to expropriate? NO
 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain over
private properties upon payment of just
compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article
III states that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. The
constitutional restraints are public use and just
compensation. Petitioners cannot insist on a
restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of
the Constitution by contending that the contract
for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated
public use. It is now settled doctrine that the
concept of public use is no longer limited to
traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea
that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of
"use by the public" has been abandoned. The
term "public use" has now been held to be
160
synonymous with "public interest,""public
benefit,""public welfare," and "public
convenience."
 The act of NHA in entering into a contract with a
real estate developer for the construction of low
cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to
qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be
taken to mean as a deviation from the stated
public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has
it that the expropriation of private land for slum
clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to
private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other
private concerns.
 Moreover, the Constitution itself under Section 1,
Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that:
"SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good. To this end, the State shall
require the acquisition, ownership, use and
disposition of property and its increments."
 When land has been acquired for public use in
fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise
of eminent domain or by purchase, the former
owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
use may be abandoned, or the land may be
devoted to a different use, without any impairment
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to
the former owner."
Facts:
ESTATE OF JIMINEZ V PEZA
Issue/Held/Ratio:
 1981, PEZA filed an expropriation proceedings on
3 parcels of riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of
the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco
de Malabon Estate, is registered in the name of
Salud Jimenez. Jimenez contended that said lot
would only be transferred to a private corporation,
Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be
utilized for a public purpose. RTC then released
Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the
expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained.
PEZA then appealed to CA.
 Jimenez offered a compromise with PEZA
namely: 1) Withdrawal of PEZA’s appeal with
respect to Lot 1406-A in consideration of the
waiver of claim for damages; 2) swap of Lot 1406-
B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772
since PEZA has no money yet to pay for the lot.
The swap arrangement recognized the fact that
the lot 1406-B is considered expropriated in favor
of the government based on Order of the
Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However,
instead of being paid the just compensation for
said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid
with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. PEZA
approved the compromise agreement was signed
by Jadiniano.
161
 However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot
434 to Jimenez as PEZA was not the registered
owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but
Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March
13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to
Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993.
TC annulled the said compromise agreement and
directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A
to the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said order
PEZA movedfor its reconsideration but it was
denied.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. Having upheld the rescission of the compromise
agreement, what is then the status of the
expropriation proceedings? The situation of the
parties will revert back to status before the
execution of the compromise agreement, that is,
the second stage of the expropriation
proceedings, which is the determination of the
just compensation.
Expropriation proceedings involve 2 phases. The first
phase ends either with an order of expropriation (when
the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public
purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or
an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one
since if finally disposes of the case. The second phase
concerns the determination of just compensation to be
ascertained by 3 commissioners. It ends with an order
fixing the amount to be paid to the dependant.
In the case at bar, the first phase was concluded
already order of expropriation became final and the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
parties subsequently entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the mode of payment of just
compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the
terms of the compromise agreement trial court could
only validly order the rescission of the compromise
agreement anent the payment of just compensation
inasmuch as that was the subject of the compromise.
However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot
1406-B. It, in effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation
dated July 11, 1991 which was already final and
executory. The trial court gravely abused its discretion
by setting aside the order of expropriation which has
long become final and executory and by ordering the
return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its action was
clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final
and executory order. A final and executory order can
only be annulled by petition to annual the same on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdictionor a
petition for relief from a final order or judgment under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to
that effect was filed.
According to Jimenez, the appellate court erred in
interpreting "original demand" as the fixing of just
compensation. Jimenez claims that the original demand
is the return of Lot 1406-B as stated in petitioner's
motion to dismissthe complaint for expropriation
inasmuch as the incorporation of the expropriation order
in the compromise agreement subjected the said order
to rescission. Since the order of expropriation was
rescinded, the authority of respondent to expropriate
and the purpose of expropriation have again become
subject to dispute. Once the first order becomes final
162
and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be
questioned. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the
incorporation of the expropriation order in the
compromise agreement did not subject said to
rescission but instead constituted an admission by
Jimenez of Peza’s authority to expropriate the subject
parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was
expropriated. It is crystal clear from the contents of the
agreement that the parties limited the compromise
agreement to matter of just compensation to petitioner.
Said expropriate order is not closely intertwined with the
issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent
will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No
statement to this effect was mentioned in the
agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement
only to clarify what was subject to payment.
2. w/n PEZA expropriated for Public use? YES
Peza has the legal authority to expropriate the subject
Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public
purpose. The term "public use" has acquired a more
comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the
term signifying strict use or employment by the public
has been added the broader notion of indirect public
benefit or advantage. PEZA expropriated the subject
land for the construction of terminal facilities, structures
and approaches thereto. The authority is broad enough
to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for
what public use the expropriated property would be
utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, respondent
leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the
rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act No.
7916, a law amending respondent PEZA's original
charter.
Facts:
FILSTREAM V CA
 Filstream is the registered owner of or parcels of
land situated in A. Rivera St. in Tondo Manila. In
1993, Filstream filed an ejectment suit before
MTC Manila against the occupants of the said
property on the ground of termination of the lease
contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment
was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993
ordering private respondents to vacate the
premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. The
respondents appealed before the RTC and then
CA, which both affirmed the MTC decision.
 On May 25, 1993, while the case is still pending
before the MTC, the private respondents filed a
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange
against Filstream before RTC Manila. On
November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved
Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S.
Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation,
expropriation, purchase, or other legal means the
properties of Filstream, among others. The said
properties were to be sold and distributed to
qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land
Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
 On May 23, 1994, respondent City of Manila filed
a complaint for eminent domain to expropriate of
the subject land owned by petitioner Filstream
before RTC Manila. Pursuant to this, the trial
court issued a Writ of Possession which ordered
the transfer of possession over the disputed
163
premises to the City of Manila. Filstream filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint for eminent
domain and a motion to Quash the Writ of
Possession, which were denied by the RTC,
along with the 2 MR's subsequently filed.
Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
which was denied for procedural flaws.
 The decision of the MTC on the ejectment case
became final and upon motion of Filstream, the
MTC issued a Writ of Execution and Notice to
vacate the premises. Private respondents filed a
Motion to Recall/Quash the Writ of Execution and
Notice to Vacate alleging the existence of a
supervening event in that the properties subject of
the dispute have already been ordered
condemned in an expropriation proceeding in
favor of the City of Manila for the benefit of the
qualified occupants thereof, thus execution shall
be stayed. MTC denied the motion and upheld
the Writ and the Notice. On April 22, 1996, the
trial court issued an order commanding the
demolition of the structure erected on the
disputed premises, that prompted the private
respondents to file a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, which was granted. A Petition for
Certiorari was subsequently filed by City of Manila
in another RTC branch to reverse the MTC
decision denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution. Thereafter, the cases filed by the
respondent and the City of Manila were
consolidated and an injunction was issued
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
against the writ of execution. These cases were
however dismissed by RTC upon motion of
Filstream for violation of the SC Circular against
forum shopping. Thereafter, Filstream filed an Ex-
parte Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Demolition and Ejectment, which as granted.
 As a consequence of the dismissal of the
consolidated cases, private respondents filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the same
and directed the MTC of Manila to desist from
implementing the order of demolition dated
January 23, 1997, unless otherwise directed.
Thus, Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Supreme COurt seeking to nullify the
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals which
granted herein private respondents' prayer for a
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the same
being null and void for having been issued in
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis w/n the
expropriation is valid? NO
 The City of Manila has the power of eminent
domain as expressly granted by the Local
Government Code and the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila. However, this power is not
unlimited. The basic rules still have to be
followed, which are as follows: "no person shall
164
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1,
1987 Constitution); private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation
(Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)".
 The governing law that deals with the subject of
expropriation for purposes of urban land reform
and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992) and
Sections 9 of which specifically provide the order
of lands to be acquired for socialized housing
which shows that private property is the last one
that should be expropriated. Moreover, Section
10 the same law provides for the modes of
acquisition an states that the modes include
"community mortgage, land swapping, land
assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation
to the Government, joint-venture agreement,
negotiated purchase, and expropriation. Provided,
however, That expropriation shall be resorted to
only when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted."
 Upon examination of the records, the court found
that the City of Manila has not complied with
Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's
properties were expropriated and ordered
condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans
any showing that resort to the acquisition of other
lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved
futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner
Filstream's right to due process which must
accordingly be rectified.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has
a paramount interest in exercising its power of
eminent domain for the general good considering
that the right of the State to expropriate private
property as long as it is for public use always
takes precedence over the interest of private
property owners. However we must not lose sight
of the fact that the individual rights affected by the
exercise of such right are also entitled to
protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of
this superior right cannot override the guarantee
of due process extended by the law to owners of
the property to be expropriated. In this regard,
vigilance over compliance with the due process
requirements is in order.
Keywords: Public use; historical landmark of Felix
Manalo, founder of INC
Facts:
Manosca inherited a piece of land at P. Burgos Street,
Calzada, Taguig, (492 square meters) The parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of
Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo
anddeclared the land to be a national historical
landmark. Republic of Phil filed an urgent motion for the
165
issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate
possession of the property. Manosca argued that the
intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application
of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary
to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution.Manosca’s petition was denied hence this
certiorari.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n “public use” requirement of Eminent Domain
is present in the attempted expropriation by the
Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so
declared by NHI as a national historical
landmark? YES
 Eminent domain is an inherent power of
sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any
constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in
our Constitution on the subject are meant more to
regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the
power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion
over property within the state for public use or to
meet a public exigency.
 Manosca assert that the expropriation has failed
to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the
case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,
(a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large
number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of
social and economic reform.
 The V
MANOSCA CA
purpose in setting up the marker is
essentially to recognize the distinctive
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture
of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate
his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit
may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but
such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature.
MODAY V
Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit
CA
from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of
public use.
166
Keywords: Public Use; it is the Municipality of
Bunawan has the authority to expropriate not the Sang.
Panlalawigan
Facts:
 SB of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing
the Mayor to expropriate a hectare of land owned
by Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers
Center and Other Government Sports Facilities."
The resolution was approved by Mayor but later
disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
commenting that there are still available lots for
the establishment of the center. Despite this, the
municipality still filed a petition for Eminent
Domain.
 RTC granted municipality's motion to take
possession of the land. The lower court held that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare
the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added
that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is
merely to review the ordinances and resolutions
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section
208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government
Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is
not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19
thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 Municipality of Bunawan had erected three
buildings on the subject property: the Association
of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal
Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the
Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made
of concrete.
 Moday sought to reverse the decision and declare
Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of
Bunawan is null and void.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n the municipality may expropriate private
property by virtue of a municipal resolution which
was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan? YES, municipality can expropriate.
 Eminent domain, the power which the
Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant
case, is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's
right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose.
 The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise
the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is
expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, the local Government Code in force at the
time expropriation proceedings were initiated.
Section 9 of said law states: Sec. 9. Eminent
Domain. — A local government unit may, through
its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain
167
and institute condemnation proceedings for public
use or purpose.
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of
Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action
which does not render said resolution null and
void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of
B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal
resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or
the Mayor to issue.
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the
authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No.
43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has
the power to exercise the right of eminent domain
and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to
promulgate said resolution, pursuant to Section 9
of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that
Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and
could be used as lawful authority to petition for
the condemnation of petitioners' property.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Facts:
MUN. OF PARANAQUE V V.M. REALTY
Municipality
CORP of Paranaque issued SB Resolution for
complaint for expropriation against VM Realty Corp over
two parcels of land for the purpose of alleviating the
living conditions of the underprivileged by providing
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing
project. It was stated purpose that petitioner declined
the offer of negotiated sale by the Municipality. RTC
finding the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance granted it.
In 1994, respondent argued that (a) the complaint failed
to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by
RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the
cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment
or res judicata. TC denied the petition and the MFR
hence this appeal.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n resolution duly approved by the municipal
council has the same force and effect of an
ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation
case of a valid cause of action? NO
Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the
municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case “substantially complies with the
requirements of the law” because the terms “ordinance”
and “resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose of
bestowing authority on the local government unit
168
through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation
proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government, which may delegate
the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the
power to expropriate private property only when
authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s
control and restraints, imposed “through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.”In this
case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs
the power of eminent domain thus, the following
essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of
the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor
and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made
to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to
exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is
clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the
law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely
seeks to implement it.
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for
dismissal of case is not applicable when public
interest is primarily involved? NO
All the requisites for the application of res judicata are
present in this case. There is a previous final judgment
on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving
identical interests, subject matter and cause of action,
which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over it. Be that as it may, the Court holds that the
principle of res judicata, which finds application in
generally all cases and proceedings,cannot bar
the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an
inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to
exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by
a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent
domain is plenary and, like police power, can “reach
every form of property which the State might need for
public use.” Thus, the State or its authorized agent
cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by
reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal
requirement. While the principle of res judicata does
not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent
domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a
169
previous case (i.e. final judgment dismissing an
expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior
offer precludes another suit raising the same issue) it
cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from
thereafter complying with this requirement, as
prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its
power of eminent domain over the same property.
DAR
7. LA: v found
NLRCthemNovember
jointly and
11, severally liable with
1993
Sultan Security Agency for the payment of the
money claims. Since both didn't appeal, the decision
became final and executory. The LA then issued a
writ of execution commanding the city sheriff to
enforce the judgment against their property.
8. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction with the NLRC contending that the LA
didn’t acquire jurisdiction over DAR thus the decision
was null and void. Likewise, it pointed out that the
attachment or seizure of its property would hamper
and jeopardize DAR’s governmental functions to the
prejudice of the public good.
9. NLRC temporarily suspended the enforcement and
execution of judgment to enable DAR to source and
raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it.
It also dismissed the petition for injunction.
10. DAR filed a petition for certiorari claiming that
NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for
refusing to quash the writ of execution. It faults the
NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim
against DAR, which, it claims, falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
More importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of
the State.
11. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that
DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.
ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable
HELD: YES
9. Generally, the State can’t be sued without its
consent. The State’s consent may be given
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through general or special law.
10. The general law waiving the immunity of the state
from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
Philippine government "consents and submits to be
sued upon any money claims involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties."
11. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded
when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaimor when it enters into
a contract.
12. Here, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party
and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
However, not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must still be made between one which is
executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and
another which is done in its proprietary capacity
170
13. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture
has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character
14. The claims of private respondents arising from
the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money
claims. Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State
to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied but
the money claim first be brought to the Commission
on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No.
3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability
but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction
thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the
rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
amended by P.D. 1445.
15. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in
effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
16. The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit the claimant's
action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
5. These fees AIRPORTS
NATIONAL are said to have 
vs.
JOSE
been due and payable
CORPORATION
to the Capitol Subdivision Inc which owned the land
TEODORO
used by the NAC as airport, and thus the owner
commenced an action against PAL in 1951 to
recover the amount.
6. PAL countered with a third party complaint against
the NAC, which at that time had been dissolved thus
CAA was served with summons. The complaint
alleged that it had paid to the NAC the fees claimed
by Capitol Division.
7. Sol Gen: filed a MTD on the ground that the court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the TPC because NAC
has lots its juridical personality and because agency
of the Phils, unincorporated and not possessing
juridical personality under the law, is incapable of
suing and being sued.
8. E0 365, Sec 7: All records, properties, equipment,
assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities
and contracts of the National Airport Corporation
abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred
to, vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.All works, construction, and
improvements made by the National Airports
Corporation or any agency of the National
Government in or upon government airfields,
including all appropriations or the unreleased and
unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be
transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Sec 3 likewise empowers CAA to execute contracts
of any kind and to grant concession rights.
ISSUE: W/N NAC/CAA may be sued
171
HELD/RATIO: Yes. CAA should have been made the
defendant.
1. The above provisions confer upon the CAA the
power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be
sued is implied from the power to transact private
business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued
on its behalf, the CAA should have the power to
prosecute and defend suits for and against the
National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the
properties, funds and choses in action and assumed
all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the NAC’s
creditors access to the courts of justice against the
CAA is to say that the government could impair the
obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient
of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
2. Not all government entities, whether corporate or
non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from
suits is determined by the character of the
obligations for which the entity was organized
3. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters
in which they have assumed to act in private or
nongovernment capacity, and various suits against
certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of
the nature of ordinary business rather than functions
of a governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the state.
4. The CAA comes under the category of a private
entity. Although not a body corporate it was created,
like the NAC, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a
business, even if revenues be not its prime objective
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
but rather the promotion of travel and the
convenience of the travelling public.
5. The CAA can not, claim for itself the privileges and
immunities of the sovereign state.
6. PAL’s third party-complaint is premised on the
assumption that the NAC is still in existence, at least
for the limited object of winding up its affairs under
Section 77 of the Corporation Law. By its abolition
that corporation stands abolished for all purposes.
No trustees, assignees or receivers have been
designated to make a liquidation and, what is more,
there is nothing to liquidate. Everything the National
Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the
Civil Aeronautics Administration.
7. To all legal intents and practical purposes, the
National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil
Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal
representative, acting by the law of its creation upon
its own rights and in its own name. The better
practice then should have been to make the Civil
Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant
instead of the National Airports Corporation. The
error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue,
and may be corrected by amendment of the
pleadings if deemed necessary.
4. Theyv NLRC
Larkins filed aFebruary
complaint with the NLRC against
23, 1995
Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col
Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air
Force who were assigned to oversee the
dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment
of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by
LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the
172
employees and ordered reinstatement with full back
pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not
possible.
5. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor
Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person
because no summons or copies of the complaints,
both original and amended, were ever served on her.
Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with
notices of hearing were not in accordance with the
provisions of the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases
Agreement of 1947.
6. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: “In the
event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and
considering our finding that the real party respondent
is the United States Government through its Armed
Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such
execution be made subject to existing international
agreements diplomatic protocol”
ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins
Held: No
8. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America
Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the
R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the
rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by
Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S.
military bases in the country.
9. The Agreement mandates that summonses and
other processes issued by Philippine courts and
administrative agencies for United States Armed
Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the
Philippines could be served therein only with the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds
giving his permission, he should instead designate
another person to serve the process, and obtain the
server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court.
The labor arbiter didn’t follow the procedure and
instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and
NOT the Base Commander.
10. They contend, however, that they sent notices of
the hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not
summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without
the latter being served with summons. In the
absence of service of summons or a valid waiver
thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the
Labor Arbiter are null and void.
11. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and
participated in the oral argument before the said
body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of
summons and a voluntary submission of her person
to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have
raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in
relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of
jurisdiction. If an appearance before the NLRC is
precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said
agency over the person of the defendant, then this
appearance is not equivalent to service of summons
12. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US
is the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS
where the appellees previously worked as dormitory
attendants is just one of the various units of the
United States Armed Forces inside the said military
base.
173
13. Under the "Agreement Between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America
Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in
the United States Military Bases in the Philippines"
otherwise known as the Base Labor Agreement of
May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between
the United States Armed Forces and Filipino
employees should be settled under grievance or
labor relations procedures established therein (Art.
II) or by the arbitration process provided in the
Romualdez-Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement
dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement was
reached or if the grievance procedure failed, the
dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint
Labor Committee established in Article III of the
Base Labor Agreement.
14. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over
the case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is
void.
3. Sanders,
DALE SANDERS,special
AND services and
vs.
HON.
Director, JR,
A.S. MOREAU, Moreau, REGINO T. VERIDIANO II June 10,
commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing
1988
officer’s report and asked for the rejection as Mr.
Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most
coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be
difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath
not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed
the records in public places.
4. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages
against Sanders claiming that the allegations were
libelous imputations that had exposed them to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The
private respondents made it clear that the petitioners
were being sued in their private/personal capacity.
Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the acts complained of were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties thus the court
had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of
state immunity.
ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over
both petitioners NO
1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is
being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the
law of public officers and the doctrine of state
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of
official character will not suffice to insulate him from
suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his
authority.
2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldn’t have been denied
because it had been sufficiently shown that the act
for which he was being sued was done in his official
capacity on behalf of the American government. The
United States had not given its consent to be sued.
3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against
certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown
to be acting officially in the name of the American
government.
4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners
are being called to account were performed by them
in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as
director of the special services department of
174
NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel,
including the private respondents, and had a hand in
their employment, work assignments, discipline,
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed
that the letter he had written (which included the
libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request
from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
information regarding the case of the private
respondents.M
5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was
write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence
with the conversion of the private respondents' type
of employment even before the grievance
proceedings had even commenced. This act is
clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the
immediate superior of Sanders and directly
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving
the special services department of NAVSTA In fact,
the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary
problems of the department and contained
recommendations for their solution, including the re-
designation of the private respondents. There was
nothing personal or private about it.
6. Given the official character of the above-described
letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being
sued as officers of the United States government. As
they have acted on behalf of that government, and
within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that
is responsible for their acts.
7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved
that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
United States government as their principal. This will
require that government to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded,
thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.
8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau
director could be sued for damages on a personal
tort committed by him when he acted without or in
excess of authority in forcibly taking private property
without paying just compensation therefor although
he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was
not necessary to secure the previous consent of the
state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party
defendant, as it was not responsible for the
defendant's unauthorized act.
9. In the case at bar, the government of the United
States has not given its consent to be sued for the
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is
the American government itself that will have to
perform the affirmative act of appropriating the
amount that may be adjudged for the private
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of
the petitioners are protected by the presumption of
good faith, which has not been overturned by the
private respondents. Even mistakes concededly
committed by such public officers are not actionable
as long as it is not shown that they were motivated
175
by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
faith.
11. Since the questioned acts were done in the
Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the
performance of their official duties and the private
respondents are themselves American citizens, it
would seem only proper for the courts of this country
to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and
to treat it as coming under the internal administration
of the said base.
1. However,
Lagcao when
v Judge they
Labra GRtook possession of the lot, it
155746
was already occupied by squatters thus petitioners
instituted ejectment proceedings against the
squatters. MTC issued demolition order.
2. When it was about to be implemented, Mayor Garcia
requested the deferment on the ground that the City
was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters
thus the MTCC issued orders suspending the
demolition.
3. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension
period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as
a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
4. Then, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No.
1772 which included Lot 1029 among the identified
sites for socialized housing.
5. Ordinance No. 1843 was then enacted by the SP of
Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to
initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition
of Lot 1029 to be used for the benefit of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual
occupants thereof.
6. Petitioners then filed with the RTC then the CA after
it was dismissed, an action for declaration of nullity
of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional as
it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the
purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor
contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated
in the Constitution.They allege that it will benefit only
a handful of people
ISSUE: W/N this expropriation contravenes the
Constitution yes
1. Local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of
RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local
government units the power to expropriate.
Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to
Section 19 of RA 7160: Eminent Domain. “A local
government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power
of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws”
2. Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the
expropriation of petitioners’ lot was enacted by the
SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the
homeless and low-income residents of the City.
3. However, the local government units do not possess
unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent
domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
176
4. There are two legal provisions which limit the
exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws;and (2) private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
5. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the
power of eminent domain is not absolute. Section 19
of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise
must comply with the provisions of the Constitution
6. Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or
piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of
small lots to accommodate no more than a few
tenants or squatters is certainly not the
condemnation for public use contemplated by the
Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his
property for the convenience of a few without
perceptible benefit to the public.
7. RA 7279 is the law that governs the local
expropriation of property for purposes of urban land
reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof
provide the priorities in the acquisition of land. It shall
be made in the ff order:
a. Those owned by the Government or any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
b. Alienable lands of the public domain;
c. Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
d. Those within the declared Areas or Priority
Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
e. Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and
Services or BLISS which have not yet been
acquired; and
f. Privately-owned lands.
8. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate
petitioners’ property without any attempt to first
acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of
RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that
the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA
7279 were first exhausted (land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated
purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however,
That expropriation shall be resorted to only when
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted)
9. Prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there
was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy
petitioners’ property as required by Section 19 of RA
7160. petitioners had already obtained a favorable
judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of
their property. The judgment in this ejectment case
had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of
execution and an order of demolition.
National
1. In their
Power
answer,
Corporation
they pointed
v Spouses
outChiong
that NPC had
GRalready
152436entered and taken possession of a portion of
their realty with an area of 4,000 square meters,
more or less (Lot A) and wanted to occupy another
4,000 square meters of the adjacent property (Lot B).
Respondents said that the FMV for both properties
177
was P1,100.00 per sqm or a total of P8,800,000.00
and prayed that the trial court direct NPC to pay
them said amount.
2. Court then granted issuance of a writ of possession.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that
the controversy would be limited to determining the
actual land area taken by NPC and the just
compensation to be paid by NPC. TC appointed the
commissioners and they submitted their report
finding that the property classified as unirrigated
Riceland shall have a FMV of P500 per sqm
considering that the property is situated 900 meters
from the town proper.
3. TC appointed as commissioners, Atty. Alog, Atty.
Castillo, and Ms. Regadio, to determine the fair
market value of the land, as well as the total area
taken by NPC from respondents.
a. Atty. Castillo and Ms. Ragadio – the property
classified as unirrigated riceland shall have a
fair market value of P500.00 per square meter
b. Atty. Alog submitted his report recommending
that NPC pay the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles an
easement fee of P20,957.88 and the Spouses
Chiong be paid total easement fees of
P9,187.05.The affected properties of the Heirs
of Agrifina Angeles were assessed by Atty.
Alog to have a fair market value of P22.50 per
square meter, while those of the Spouses
Chiong were assigned a fair market value of
P15.75 per square meter.
4. Court then gave due course to the report of Atty
Castillo and Ms. Ragadio.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
5. Dissatisfied, NPC filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the appellate court: it alleged that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction when it:
(a) directed NPC to pay just compensation for the
land taken without first issuing an order of
expropriation; (b) adopted the compensation
recommended by the two commissioners without a
hearing; and (c) directed petitioner to pay the full
market value of the property instead of a mere
easement fee.
6. CA: dismissed. NPC moved for reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N full market value of the property instead of
easement fee should be paid
HELD: YES
1. A formal hearing or trial was not required for the
petitioner to avail of its opportunity to object and
oppose the majority report. Petitioner could have
filed a motion raising all possible grounds for
objecting to the findings and recommendations of the
commissioners. It could have moved the trial court to
remand the report to the commissioners for
additional facts. Or it could have moved to expunge
the majority report, for reasons petitioner could
muster. Petitioner, however, failed to seize the
opportunity to register its opposition.
2. The fair market value of the 4,000 square meters
occupied by the petitioner was fixed by the trial court
at P500.00 per square meter. The appellate court
affirmed the said valuation.
3. NPC the expropriation was not to be limited for the
purpose of easement of right-of-way. In fact, in their
178
Answer, the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, alleged that
petitioner had actually occupied an area of 4,000
square meters wherein it constructed structures for
its transmission lines and was seeking to occupy
another 4,000 square meters. Petitioner failed to
controvert this material allegation.
4. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the
general rule is that the just compensation to which
the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the
market value.
5. Market value is that sum of money which a person
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefor.
6. The rule, however, is modified where only a part of a
certain property is expropriated. In such a case the
owner is not restricted to compensation for the
portion actually taken. In addition to the market value
of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for
the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining
part of the property. At the same time, from the total
compensation must be deducted the value of the
consequential benefits
7. In fixing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter,
the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had
considered the reports of the commissioners and the
proofs which included the fair market value of
P1,100.00 per square meter proffered by the
respondents.
8. This valuation by owners of the property may not be
binding upon the petitioner or the court, although it
should at least set a ceiling price for the
compensation to be awarded.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
9. The trial court found that the parcels of land sought
to be expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal
improvements. It is the nature and character of the
land at the time of its taking that is the principal
criterion to determine just compensation to the
landowner. Hence, the trial court accepted not the
owners valuation of P1,100 per square meter but
only P500 as recommended in the majority report of
the commissioners.
Eslaban
1. Now, vDeDeOnorio
Onoriodemanded payment for the taking of
GRher property but when Eslaban refused, she filed a
146062
complaint against him before RTC praying for
compensation for the portion of her property used in
the construction of the canal.
2. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General,
filed an Answer, in which he admitted that NIA
constructed an irrigation canal over the property of
the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner
whose property had been taken for irrigation
purposes, but petitioner interposed the defense that:
the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal
was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters;
and respondent was not entitled to compensation for
the taking of her property considering that she
secured title over the property by virtue of a
homestead patent under C.A. No. 141.
3. TC: ordered the National Irrigation Administration to
pay de Onorio 107k as just compensation. Petitioner
appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision
hence this petition.
179
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST
COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM
THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF
THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.
1. the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the
contested property was built only on October 6,
1981, several years after the property had been
registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior
expropriation proceedings should have been filed
and just compensation paid to the owner thereof
before it could be taken for public use.
2. the rule is that where private property is needed for
conversion to some public use, the first thing that the
government should do is to offer to buy it.If the
owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on
the price and the other conditions of the sale, a
voluntary transaction can then be concluded and the
transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial
action. Otherwise, the government will use its power
of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just
compensation, to acquire private property in order to
devote it to public use.
3. it is the market value which should be paid or "that
sum of money which a person, desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
given and received therefor."
4. just compensation means not only the correct
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" for then
the property owner is made to suffer the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
consequence of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss.
5. In the Ansaldo case, there are instances where the
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to
the expropriation suit, in which case just
compensation shall be determined as of the time of
taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of
eminent domain.
6. It is now provided that ― SEC. 4. Order of
expropriation. ― If the objections to and the defense
against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party appears to
defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue
an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the
taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first.
7. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the
property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the
court from determining the just compensation to be
paid.After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff
shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the
proceeding except on such terms as the court deems
just and equitable.
8. Thus, the value of the property must be determined
either as of the date of the taking of the property or
the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."
180
9. In this case, the proper valuation for the property in
question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level
for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by
the commission (composed of the provincial
treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato)
constituted by the trial court to make an assessment
of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a
per hectare basis.14
1. For
CIR said taxable
v Central period,
Luzon Drug the corporation
Corporation reported
June 26, 2006 a
net loss of 20,963 in its corporate income tax return.
As a consequence, the corporation did not pay
income tax for 1995.
2. It then claimed the amount of 219,778 should be
applied as a tax credit, it filed a claim for refund in
the amount of 150,193. This amount represents the
tax credit allegedly due to the corporation under RA
7432.
3. CTA: even if the law treats the discounts granted to
senior citizens as a tax credit, it cannot apply when
there is no tax liability or the amount of the tax credit
is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax
credit will only be to the extent of the tax liability.
Likewise, no refund can be granted because there
was no tax which was erroneously or illegally
collected.
4. CA: the 20% discount given to senior citizens which
is treated as a tax credit is considered just
compensation and, as such, may be carried over to
the next taxable period if there is no current tax
liability.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount may be
claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross
sales
1. RA 7432 provides, “the grant of twenty percent
discount from all establishments relative ... purchase
of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided,
That private establishments may claim the cost as
tax credit.
2. The above provision explicitly employed the word
"tax credit." Nothing in the provision suggests for it to
mean a "deduction" from gross sales.
3. Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be
given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a
deduction from the gross sales of the establishment
concerned.
4. Accordingly, when the law says that the cost of the
discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means
that the amount -- when claimed – shall be treated
as a reduction from any tax liability.
5. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a
form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes
that were erroneously or illegally assessed and
collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax
liability is not a precondition before a taxable entity
can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be
availed of upon payment of the tax due, if any.
Where there is no tax liability or where a private
establishment reports a net loss for the period, the
tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the
next taxable year.
6. It must also be stressed that unlike in Sec. 229 of the
Tax Code wherein the remedy of refund is available
181
to the taxpayer, Sec. 4 of the law speaks only of a
tax credit, not a refund.
7. The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments
can be deemed as their just compensation for private
property taken by the State for public use. The
privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not
come directly from the State, but rather from the
private establishments concerned.
Panesa.v Visayas
Establish State
experimental
College offields
Agriculture
b. Construct
November 27, 1996 buildings laboratories and housing
facilities for the personnel of the Root Crops
Center; and
c. integrate and conduct country-wide
researches on root crops.
2. Respondent VISCA deposited the amount of
P74,050.00 with the Philippine National Bank
representing the assessed value of the lands for
taxation purposes as determined under PD No. 76.
3. VISCA prayed in its complaint that a writ of
possession be issued since P.D. No. 42 allows the
entity expropriating the land to take possession
thereof upon deposit with the PNB of the amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the subject
properties.
4. Petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. They
alleged that (1) the lands sought to be expropriated
were not within the area specified under PD No.
1107; (2) the amount of P74,050.00 did not
constitute just compensation; (3) P.D. No. 794
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
providing that the just compensation shall not be in
excess of the current and fair market value declared
by the owner or administrator, or such market value
as determined by the provincial assessor, which is
lower, was unconstitutional; (4) P.D. No. 1107 was
also unconstitutional for impairing the freedom of
contract and violating the equal protection clause;
and (5) there was no public necessity for the
acquisition by VISCA of petitioners' lands.
5. 1298 tenants filed a motion to intervene alleging that
they were tenant-tillers and occupants of the lands
involved in the expropriation proceedings, their
tenure of work as tenants being secured and
protected by law, they cannot be removed from their
landholdings through eminent domain. TC granted
the intervenors’ motion to which VISCA filed its reply.
It denied that they were tenants and that their
reliance to the decree was misplaced since the
proscription therein against the ejectment or removal
of tenants is applicable as regards landowners,
landholders and agricultural lessors and not as
regards the State or those acting for and in its behalf.
6. TC denied motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession because expropriation was not one of
the causes provided for in the agrarian laws. PD 42
was only applicable to untenanted private properties
and that there is doubt as to whether the lands to be
expropriated were indeed within the area indicated
by PD 1107 to be proper for expropriation.
7. CA: dismissed the expropriation case as it was
tainted with GAD when it denied immediate
possession of the properties. The authority of the
petitioner to take immediate possession of the
182
subject properties appear clear and explicit. The
contention of the petitioners that PD 42 applies only
to untenanted lands is not convincing for there is
nothing in PD 42 that indicates this.
8. Petitioners filed for petition of review and likewise
assailed the constitutionality of PD 1107 on the
grounds that it impairs the freedom of contract
guaranteed by the Constitution; it violates the equal
protection of law and the tenurial security guaranteed
by the Constitution and it runs counter to the
agrarian laws.
ISSUE: W/N VISCA is entitled to a writ of
possession NO
1. The finding of the CA insofar as it found that VISCA
has the right to a writ of possession upon compliance
with the requirements of P.D. No. 1533 in relation to
P.D. Nos. 1107 and 42, i.e., payment of an amount
equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation for
the property which is, under P.D. 42, the amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the subject
property for purposes of taxation, has been rendered
ineffectual by the ruling in Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay
2. P.D. No. 1533 determines the just compensation in
expropriation cases to be the fair and current market
value declared by the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Thus, the determination of just compensation, by
virtue of the enactment of P.D. No. 1533, was
converted from being a judicial prerogative to an
executive decision. Because the executive
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
determination of just compensation in eminent
domain proceedings renders the courts inutile in a
matter which under the Constitution is reserved to
them for final determination, SC declared P.D. No.
1533 to be unconstitutional and void.
3. In the instant case, VISCA deposited an amount with
the PNB representing the assessed value of the
lands for taxation purposes as determined under
P.D. No. 76. On the basis of this deposit, VISCA
prayed in its complaint that a writ of possession be
issued, the same being sanctioned under P.D. No.
42 which allows the entity expropriating the land to
take possession thereof upon deposit with the PNB
of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the subject properties for purposes of taxation.
4. In the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D.
No. 76, P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42 insofar as
they sanction executive determination of just
compensation in expropriation cases, it is imperative
that any right to the immediate possession of the
subject property, accruing to VISCA, must be firmly
grounded on a valid compliance with Section 2 of
Rule 67 – that there must be a deposit with the
National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the
subject property as provisionally and promptly
ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction
of the proceedings.
Belen
1. MTC:
v CA
ordered Juliano to vacate the property. He
March
appealed11,
to the RTC. RTC reversed the judgment.
2. RTC: PD No. 1670 has expropriated real property
1991
along the Estero de Sunog-Apog, Tondo, Manila
183
formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, Inc. Juliano
is a prospective beneficiary of the Bliss Project being
undertaken by the National Housing Authority at the
site in question. Therefore, when the complaint in
this case was filed on September 13, 1982, Manotok
Realty Services, Inc. was no longer the owner of the
premises in question and as correctly contended by
Juliano, the relation between Juliano and Belen were
also deemed terminated.
3. Belen appealed to the CA which was resolved
against him.
4. The Appellate Court took account of Presidential
Decree No. 1670 as the decisive factor in
determining the "pivotal and decisive issue —
whether Manotok Realty, Inc., Belen’s lessor, has
retained ownership of the lot in question, the
expropriating law invoked by Juliano (PD 1670)”.
5. The decision declared that by virtue of the decree,
Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the
land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not
interfere with the possession, administration, control
and disposition of the NHA; its only right being to
claim the just compensation thereof; that as a result,
Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in
question also ipso facto ended, as well as the
sublease between Belen and Juliano, since a
sublease can never extend beyond the duration of
the sublessor's lease of the sublessor. Belen
appealed by certiorari to the SC
ISSUE: W/N Manotok Realty was still the owner of the
land considering it didn’t receive money as payment for
the subject property yet
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HELD: yes
1. PD 1670 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
owners’ right to due process of law. The decrees do
not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or
procedure by which the petitioners can question the
propriety of the expropriation of their properties or
the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having
failed to provide for a hearing, the Government
should have filed an expropriation case under Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so.
2. But it did not deem it necessary because the
enactment of the questioned decrees which
rendered, by their very passage, any questions with
regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot
and academic. In effect, the properties under the
decrees were "automatically expropriated."
3. This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the
Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the
certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said
Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to
support its request.
4. The Court observed that contrary to Rule 67 and
established precedents, the decrees provided for the
determination of just compensation at a time earlier
than that "of the actual taking of the government or at
the time of the judgment by the court, whichever
came first."
5. Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property
was left by the decrees to the City Assessor.
6. In P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 464, P.D. No. 794, and P.D.
No. 1533, the basis for determining just
compensation was fixed at the market value
declared by the owner or the market value
184
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Here, there is no mention of any market value
declared by the owner. Sections 6 of the two decrees
peg just compensation at the market value
determined by the City Assessor.
7. PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance
thereon and in accordance therewith must also be
deemed void ab initio, including particularly the
taking of possession of the property by the National
Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the
same into a housing project and the selection of the
beneficiaries thereof.
Republic
1. The lands
(DAR)
werev CA
valued by Land Bank however, in the
Statement
October of Agricultural Landholdings which ACIL
30, 1996
corporation filed with DAR, a lower Fair Value
Acceptable to Landowner was stated and that based
on this statement, Land Bank valued the land
uniformly.
2. ACIL rejected the government’s offer, pointing out
that nearby lands planted to the same crops were
valued at the higher price per hectare.
3. ACIL then filed a Petition for Just Compensation in
the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. It
prayed that DAR be ordered to pay 24, 717.40
instead of the 15, 311 which was stated on the
statement ACIL filed with DAR.
4. RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that ACIL
should have appealed to the DAR Adjudication
Board. ACIL moved for reconsideration but its motion
was denied thus it filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA contending that a petition for just
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
compensation under RA 6657 falls under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. CA
granted his petition. It remanded the case to the RTC
for further proceedings.
5. In turn, DAR filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N in cases involving claims for just
compensation under RA 6657 an appeal from the
decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB
must first be made before a landowner can resort to
RTC
HELD: N
1. §50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform,"
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. However,
§57 provides: The Special Agrarian Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation
to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall
apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian
Courts, unless modified by this Act.
2. Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional
Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit:
a. (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and
b. (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under [R.A. No. 6657]."
185
3. The provision of §50 must be construed in harmony
with this provision by considering cases involving the
determination of just compensation and criminal
cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657.
4. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot
be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain
(for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over
criminal cases.
5. EPZA v. Duly - the valuation of property in eminent
domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot
be vested in administrative agencies
6. Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer
jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies —
rules of procedure cannot — it is noteworthy that the
New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was
adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the
event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of
an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the
matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as
Special Agrarian Court.
7. Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the
Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land
reform and the compensation to be paid for their
taking. Through notice sent to the landowner
pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes
an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a
summary administrative proceeding is held and
afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional
(RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the
case may be, depending on the value of the land,
fixes the price to be paid for the land.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
8. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he
may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special
Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for
the determination of compensation cases under R.A.
No. 6657.
Meralco
1. But despite
v Pineda
the opposition, the court issued an order
Febauthorizing
13, 1992 MERALCO to take or enter upon the
possession of the property. Private respondents then
filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that
they are entitled to be paid 40 pesos per sqm and
prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of
71k from MERALCO’s deposit account with the PNB.
This they did 3x and Judge Pineda then granted the
motion of withdrawal.
2. The court then stressed that it will appoint
commissioners to determine just compensation or
dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a
credible real estate broker, or the judge himself
would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his
own as to the value of the land in question.
Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he
must base it upon competent evidence."
3. The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent
court's act of determining and ordering the payment
of just compensation to private respondents without
formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the
reasonable value of the property constitutes a
flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to
due process.
4. It stressed that respondent court ignored the
procedure laid down by the law in determining just
186
compensation because it formulated an opinion of its
own as to the value of the land in question without
allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold
hearings for the reception of evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the court can dispense with the
assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an
expropriation proceeding and determine for itself
the just compensation
HELD: YES
1. Sec. 5 of Rules 67, ROC: Upon the entry of the order
of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more
than three competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court
the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken.
2. Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten days,
or even before the expiration of such period but after
all the interested parties have filed their objections,
the court may, after hearing, accept the report and
render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for
cause shown, it may recommit the same to the
commissioners for further report of facts; or it may
set aside the report and appoint new commissioners,
or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part;
and it may make such order or render such judgment
as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential
to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to
the defendant just compensation for the property so
taken.
3. Binan case: There are2 stages in every action of
expropriation.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
a. The first is concerned with the determination of
the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit.
b. The second phase of the eminent domain
action is concerned with the determination by
the Court of "the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." This is done by
the Court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners.
4. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis
of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally
dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave
nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the
issue.
5. Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the
valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property
declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per
hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement
on Subdivision and Housing Projects”. He arrived at
the amount of just compensation on its own, without
the proper reception of evidence before the Board of
Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners
have not proved by competent evidence the value of
their respective properties at a proper hearing.
6. Likewise, MERALCO has not been given the
opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have
been presented by private respondents.
7. In an expropriation case such as this one where the
principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is
187
indispensable to allow the parties to present
evidence on the issue of just compensation.
8. Contrary to the submission of private respondents,
the appointment of at least 3 competent persons as
commissioners to ascertain just compensation for
the property sought to be taken is a mandatory
requirement in expropriation cases.
9. While it is true that the findings of commissioners
may be disregarded and the court may substitute its
own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so
for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners
have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them or where they have disregarded a
clear preponderance of evidence, or where the
amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive
10. Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a
substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all.
11. Prior to the determination of just compensation,
the property owners may rightfully demand to
withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in
eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a
smaller amount by the court, the property owners are
subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the
award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a
judgment for the amount awarded by the court.
12. The respondent judge's act of determining and
ordering the payment of just compensation without
the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a
flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to
due process and is a gross violation of the mandated
rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 188
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.
MAURA SANTOS and 43 more claimants
G.R. No. 57524, January 08, 1986
1. 66,096 square meters of land in Parañaque and
Muntinlupa claimed by 44 persons is being
expropriated, for the widening and construction of
interchanges in the Manila South Diversion Road.
2. The Appraisal Committee of Rizal fixed at P40 per
square meter. The Government deposited that amount
with the provincial treasurer who deposited it in the
Philippine National Bank. Some respondents, including
Maura Santos, withdrew the amounts.
3. CFI Rizal granted the fiscal's motion fixing the
provisional value at P2,641,190.
4. A writ of possession was issued to the Republic of
the Philippines. 14 claimants did not object to the
valuation of P40 a square meter. They were paid the
amounts due to them at that price
Those sales were contemporaneous sales convincingly
indicative of the fair market value of the lands at the
time of the expropriation in the later part of 1968 or early
in 1969.
6. As to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a
square meter, the trial court, pursuant to section 5, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, appointed three
commissioners to determine the just compensation. The
commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970
recommended that the just compensation for the lands
should be P100 a square meter except the land of
Maura Santos with an area of 25,909 square meters
which should be evaluated at P60 a square meter.
7. May 13, 1972 - trial court fixed P100 a square meter
as the uniform price to be paid to the claimants
189
8. June 29, 1981 - CA modified the trial court's decision
and adopted the commissioners' report. It added 6%
legal rate of interest from February 7, 1969, the date of
the filing of the complaint.
9. Republic contends that CA erred in disregarding the
fact that 14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their
lots to the Republic at P40 a square meter.
Issue: What is the correct valuation of the expropriated
land - only P40 per square meter for the expropriated
lands.
1. We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court
erred in relying on the commissioners' report whose
recommendation was not substantiated by trustworthy
evidence.
2. Also, the appraisal of P100 a square meter for the
land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after the
filing of the instant expropriation case.
3. The statement in the 1970 report of the
commissioners that according to the owners of adjoining
lots the prices per square meter ranged from P150 to
P200 and that subdivision lots in the vicinity were being
sold at P85 to P120 a square meter was not based on
any documentary evidence. It is manifestly hearsay.
Moreover, those prices refer to 1970 or more than a
year after the expropriation was effected.
4. In the case of Maura Santos, it should be noted that
the expropriation undeniably increased the value of the
remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square
meters. She was already paid P1,036,360 for her
expropriated land.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 190

5. Furthermore, the commissioners should not have 4. However, the trial court dropped Sps Dela Cruz and
glossed over the undisputed fact that 14 claimants out their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in
of 44 had willingly sold their lands to the Government at view of the Motion to Intervene filed by
P40 a square meter as fixed by the provincial Appraisal respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed
Committee of which the provincial assessor was a ownership of the land sought to be expropriated from
member. Evidently, they were satisfied that that was a respondents spouses Dela Cruz. As to the just
reasonable price. compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in-
6. According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court ordered
bound by the commissioners' report. It may make such the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise
order or render such judgment as shall secure to the agreement.
plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right5. Meanwhile, trial court issued an Order directing the
of condemnation, and to the defendant just constitution of a Board of Commissioners with respect
compensation for the property expropriated. to the property of respondent S.K. Dynamics.
6. October 05, 1999. - commissioners recommended
that the fair market value of the real properties is
1. NAPOCOR
G.R. No. 156093,
decided
February
to acquire
2, 2007an easement of right- P10,000.00 per square meter. However, the
of-way overPOWER
NATIONAL portions CORP.
of landv.
SPOUSES
within the DELA
areas CRUZ,
of commissioners
METROBANK, did not afford the
Dasmariñas, parties the opportunity
Cavite
Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and
Branch, to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct
maintenance FERRER,
REYNALDO of the proposed
and S.K.Dasmariñas-Zapote 230
DYNAMICS MANUFACTURER hearings
CORP. before them. Upon the submission of the
kV Transmission Line Project. commissioners’ report, petitioner was not notified of the
2. November 27, 1998 - petitioner filed a Complaint for completion or filing of it nor given any opportunity to file
eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of its objections to it.
right-of-way against respondents as registered owners. 7. December 28, 1999 - RTC Order fixed the just
The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00
square meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square per square meter. Napocor filed Motion for
meters. Reconsideration claiming it is exorbitant, unjust and
3. NAPOCOR deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the unreasonable. RTC denied this MR, explaining that the
provisional value of the land in accordance with Section price for 1999 must be considered, which is the time
2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Then it filed an Urgent when the writ of possession was issued.
Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of 8. CA affirmed RTC: The nature and character of the
Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to
1999 Order, which was granted. determine just compensation to the land owner. CA
noted that since the property underwent important
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
changes and improvements, "the highest and most
profitable use of the property is good for residential and
commercial purposes.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
1) W the respondents were denied due process - Yes.
1. The fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to
afford the parties the opportunity to present their own
evidence should have impelled the trial court to
disregard the commissioners’ findings. The absence of
such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the
part of the trial court because the parties’ (in particular,
petitioner’s) right to due process was violated.
2. Based on Rule 67 Sec. 6-8, it is clear that in addition
to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2)
appointed commissioners in this case, they are also
required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine
just compensation; and to provide the parties the
following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the
opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to
introduce evidence in their favor during the said
hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue
their respective causes during the said hearings.
3. The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a
mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the
instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is
the determination of just compensation, a hearing
before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the
parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation. While it is true that the findings of
commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court
may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter
191
may only do so for valid reasons, that is, (1) where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, (2) where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or (3)
where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate
or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be
done away with capriciously or for no reason at all."
4. There are very specific rules for expropriation cases
that require the strict observance of procedural and
substantive due process because expropriation cases
involve the admittedly painful deprivation of private
property for public purposes and the disbursement of
public funds as just compensation for the private
property taken. Therefore, it is insufficient to hold that a
Motion for Reconsideration in an expropriation case
cures the defect in due process.
2) W the valuation of just compensation was correct -
No.
1. In this case, the commissioners arrived at the figure
of P10, 000 in question after their ocular inspection of
the property, wherein they considered the surrounding
structures, the property’s location and, allegedly, the
prices of the other, contiguous real properties in the
area.
2. It is settled that just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings. Where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation
is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
3. The commissioners’ report itself is flawed considering prior just compensation case involving a parcel of land
that its recommended just compensation was pegged
as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said report
was issued, and not the just compensation as of the
date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, or as
of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of
the filing of the complaint (when just compensation
should have been determined), and the time when the
commissioners’ report recommending the just
compensation was issued (or almost one [1] year after
the filing of the complaint), may have distorted the
correct amount of just compensation.
G.R. No. 170422, March 07, 2008
1. 7 August
SPS. EDMOND 2001LEE- Sps
andHuang
HELEN received
HUANG v. LAND proceedings
a notice
informing them that their landholdingis covered by the
PHILIPPINES
government’s compulsory acquisition scheme pursuant
to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657).
2. 1 June 2001 - Sps received from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) a copy of the notice of land
valuation and acquisition which contains an offer of
P315,307.87 as compensation for 3.195 hectares of the
property. Petitioners rejected the offer.
3. DARAB conducted a summary administrative
proceeding to etermine the valuation and compensation
of the subject property. DARAB ordered the LBP to pay
petitioners the original amount offered by DAR.
4. Aggrieved, Sps filed an original petitionfor the
determination of just compensation before the Regional
Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan. They offered the
appraisal report presented in Civil Case No. 7171, a
192
adjacent to the property subject of this case.
5. The Court of Appeals ruled that the SAC should have
refrained from taking judicial notice of its own decision
in Civil Case No. 7171 in resolving just compensation in
the present case, especially because it disregarded the
other factors set in RA 6657. According to the Court of
Appeals, the SAC should have judiciously made an
independent finding of fact and explained the legal basis
thereof, hence the CA remanded the case to the trial
court “for proper and judicious determination of just
compensation, appointing for that purpose a set of
commissioners.”
6. Sps allege that the remand of the case would give
LBP undue opportunity which it already had during the
BANK OF aTHE quo, and which opportunity it failed to
take advantage of. Also, it argues that R.A. No. 6657
does not at all require the SAC to consider all the seven
factors enumerated therein in its determination of just
compensation.
ISSUE: W remand of the case is proper for the
determination of proper valuation - YES.
1. SAC’s reliance on the valuation made by the
appraisal company is misplaced, since the valuation
was not arrived at using the factors required by the law
and prescribed by the AO No. 5.
2. Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which enumerates the
factors to be considered in determining just
compensation reads:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of
the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property
as well as the non- payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institutions on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to
determine its valuation.
These factors have already been incorporated in a basic
formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power
under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. This formula has to
be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors
referred to in Section 17 of the law.
3. We find that the factors required by the law and
enforced by the DAR Administrative Order were not
observed by the SAC when it adopted wholeheartedly
the valuation arrived at in the appraisal report. However,
this is not to say that the Court favors the valuation
given by LBP. We find that LBP’s valuation is too low
vis-á- vis the value suggested by the appraisal
company. All told, we find that the remand of the case is
in order to better determine the proper valuation of the
subject property.
RELEVANT:
4. We clarify, however, that we are not in accord with
the declaration of the Court of Appeals on the
193
appointment of commissioners in the instant case. CA,
in its decision, stated:
x x x Consequently, when the Regional Trial
Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court determines
just compensation, it is mandated to apply the Rules of
Court. xxx SAC should have appointed competent
and disinterested commissioners to assist it in
valuating the property in question.
The Court of Appeals seems to imply that the
appointment of commissioners is mandatory in
agrarian reform cases. We do not agree. While the
Rules of Court provisions apply to proceedings in
special agrarian courts,it is clear that unlike in
expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court the
appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is
discretionary on the part of the court or upon the
instance of one of the parties. And when the court does
resort to the commissioners-type of appraisal, it is not
circumscribed to appoint three commissioners, unlike
the modality under Rule 67.
With the remand of the case, it is now up to the SAC, or
to the parties, to determine if there is a need to avail of
commissioners to arrive at the proper valuation of the
subject land.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 194

G.R.Private
2. No. 118712,
respondents
October 6, 1995
are landowners whose the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of
landholdings
LAND BANKwereOF acquired
THE PHILIPPINES
by the DARv.and COURT
subjected AgrarianPEDRO
OF APPEALS, Reform,L.G.R.
YAP,No.HEIRS
78742,OFJulyEMILIANO
14, 1989 (175
F.
to transfer schemes
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
to qualified
MANAGEMENT
beneficiaries under
& DEVELOPMENT
the SCRA CORP.
343).Landbank declared that the issuance of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular
alleged
G.R. No.lapses
118745ofOctober
the DAR
6, 1995
and the Landbank with Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority
respect to the valuation
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
and payment
REFORMof compensation
v. COURT OF APPEALS,
where thePEDRO
words "reserved/deposited"
L. YAP, HEIRS OFwere EMILIANO
also used.
F.
for their landAGRICULTURAL
SANTIAGO, pursuant to the MANAGEMENT
provisions of RA 6657, 5. DAR/
& DEVELOPMENT Landbank
CORP., ET AL.maintain that the word "deposit" as
private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the
Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening
mandatory injunction. They sought to compel DAR to of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting
finally determine the just compensation of their for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable
properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9,
bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of
"reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private discretion since it merely exercised its power to
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the
3. Private respondents argued that Administrative Order declared policies of RA 6657.
No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits
the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of
depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land
before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as
provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private
respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the
Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or
"reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking
possession of the property, the compensation must be
depositedin cash or in bonds.
4. DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate
of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial
compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the
ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE/HELD:
(1) W the opening of trust account is acceptable form of
payment - NO.
1. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands —
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or
no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. .
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere
does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit
can be made in any other form. If it were the intention
to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of
deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from
which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is
allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e)
of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the
term "deposit".
(2) W the DAR Administrative circular is constitutional -
NO.
1. DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to
enact rules and regulations when it issued
195
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in
allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because,
as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is
very specific that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds".
(3) W private respondents are entitled to withdraw the
amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the
final resolution of the case -
1. DAR's contention is premised on the alleged
distinction between the deposit of compensation under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final
compensation as provided under Section 18 of the
same law. To further bolster the contention petitioners
cite the following pronouncements in the case of
"Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform:"
xxx The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either. xxx
The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized
the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be
undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation
from the traditional mode of payment of compensation
and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not,
however, dispense with the settled rule that there must
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
be full payment of just compensation before the title to
the expropriated property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit
of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and
determination of just compensation under Section 18 is
unacceptable.
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate
the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they
rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that
they have already been deprived of the possession and
use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of
eminent domain.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between
provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 for purposes of
exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the
same. The immediate effect in both situations is the
same, the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly
and immediately compensated.
RECKONING POINT OF MARKET VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY = date of filing the complaint, unless
filing came after actual taking
G.R.
2. NAPOCOR
No. 113194. alleged
March that
11, 1996
the land was until then
possessed and
NATIONAL POWER
administered
CORPORATION
by Marawi City,
v. soCOURT
that in
exchange for the city’s waiver and quitclaim of any right
MANGONDATO
over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a
‘financial assistance’ of P40.00 per square meter.
196
3. Mangondato demanded compensation from
NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate
insisting that the property is public land and that it had
already paid ‘financial assistance’ to Marawi City in
exchange for the rights over the property.
4. More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the
fact that the property belongs to Mangondato. On
August 14, 1990, NAPOCOR’s board passed
Resolution No. 90-316 resolving that Mangondato be
paid the base price of P40.00 per square meter for the
12,132 square meter portion (P485,280.00) plus 12%
interest per annum from 1978 (P698,808.00) pending
the determination whether P100.00 per square meter is
the fair market value of the property. So Mangondato
was paid P1,184,088.00.
5. March, 1992 - the parties executed a Deed of Sale Of
A Registered Property where NAPOCOR acceded to
Mangondato’s request of provisional payment of
P100.00 per square meter excluding interest and
without prejudice to Mangondato’s pursuance of claims
for just compensation and interest. Mangondato was
paid P1,015,412.00 in addition to the P1,184,088.00
earlier paid to him by NAPOCOR which payments total
P2,199,500.00 for the 12,995 square meter land.
6. However, Mangondato still demanded that he be
paid P300 oer square meter because his land was
classified as industrial.
7. July 7, 1992 - Mangondato filed before the lower
court Civil Case No. 605-92 against NAPOCOR seeking
OFto APPEALS
recover theandpossession
MACAPANTON
of the property and the
payment of a monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978
until the surrender of the property.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
8. July 27, 1992 - Napocor filed Civil Case No. 610-92
which is a Complaint for eminent domain against
Mangondato over the subject property
9. Mangondato answered that he treats the
P2,199.500.00 so far received by him as partial
payment for the rent for the use of his property.
Mangondato prayed that he be compensated in
damages for the unauthorized taking and continued
possession of his land from 1978 until the filing of the
Complaiant. Furthermore, he argues that should the
lower court order the expropriation of the subject
property, that the just compensation for the land be
reckoned from the time of the filing of the expropriation
case.
10. The lower court ordered NAPOCOR to deposit with
the Philippine National Bank the amount of
P10,997,500.00, provisionally fixing the value of the
land at P500.00 per square meter. NAPOCOR opposed
the provisional value quoted by the lower court saying
that the basis of the provisional value of the land should
be the assessed value of the property as of the time of
the taking which in this case is 1978.
ISSUE: What is the correct basis for the valuation of just
compensation: (1) 1992 or at the time of filing of
complaint for eminent domain, or (2) 1978 or at the time
of taking.
HELD: Here, SC followed the general rule (filing
complaint), because only in 1992 did petitioner manifest
its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain.
SC affirmed the CA when the latter held that: “If We
decree that the fair market value of the land be
197
determined as of 1978, then We would be sanctioning a
deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason
other than for eminent domain would occupy another’s
property and when later pressed for payment, first
negotiate for a low price and then conveniently
expropriate the property when the land owner refuses to
accept its offer claiming that the taking of the property
for the purpose of eminent domain should be reckoned
as of the date when it started to occupy the property
and that the value of the property should be computed
as of the date of the taking despite the increase in the
meantime in the value of the property.”
RATIO:
1. The general rule in determining “just compensation”
in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. Normally, the time of
the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for
expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have
equated just compensation with the value of the
property as of the time of filing of the complaint
consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too,
where the institution of the action precedes entry into
the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained
as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
2. The general rule, however, admits of an exception:
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the
date it was taken and not at the date of the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The
exception finds application where the owner would be
given undue incremental advantages arising from the
use to which the government devotes the property
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
expropriated -as for instance, the extension of a main
thoroughfare.
3. Side Issue: Where is there "taking" of property?
This Court has defined the elements of “taking” as the
main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent
domain in Republic v. Castelvi:
“A number of circumstances must be present in the
‘taking’ of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1)
the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the
entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should
be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.”
Here, in this case, the petitioner’s entrance in 1978 was
without intent to expropriate or was not made under
warrant or color of legal authority,for it believed the
property was public land covered by Proclamation No.
1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of
ownership sometime in 1979, the petitioner flatly
refused the claim for compensation, nakedly insisted
that the property was public land and wrongly justified
its possession by alleging it had already paid “financial
assistance” to Marawi City in exchange for the rights
over the property. Only in 1990, after more than a
decade of beneficial use, did the petitioner recognize
private respondent’s ownership and negotiate for the
voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Sale with
provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the
correct price was then executed. learly, this is not the
198
intent nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is
a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale.
Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to
exercise the power of eminent domain.
Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to
recover possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to
expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to
exercise the power of eminent domain.
G.R.
1. Clarita
No. 146062,
Vda. deJuneEnorio
28, 2001
is the owner of a lot in
Barangay M. Roxas,
SANTIAGO ESLABAN,
Sto. Niño,
JR. South
v. CLARITA
Cotabato. VDA. DE
2. October 6, 1981 - Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project
ONORIO
Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the
main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting
a 24,660 square meter portion thereof.
3. 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed
between respondent and the NIA. The NIA then paid
respondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way
damages. Respondent subsequently executed an
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she
waived any compensation for damages to crops and
improvements which she suffered as a result of the
construction of a right-of-way on her property
4.The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum
of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement.
5. Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her
property, but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly,
respondent filed on December 10, 1990 a complaint
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court,
praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of
P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
property used in the construction of the canal
constructed by the NI
WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST
COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM
THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF
THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION - TAKING!
1. There are instances where the expropriating agency
takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in
which case just compensation shall be determined as of
the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the
action of eminent domain.
Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, §4 provided:
Order of condemnation. When such a motion is
overruled or when any party fails to defend as required
by this rule, the court may enter an order of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint
upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. .
..
It is now provided that ―
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. ― If the objections to
and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party
appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court
may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the
199
taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first.
2. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the
property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the
court from determining the just compensation to be
paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not
be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding
except on such terms as the court deems just and
equitable.
3. Thus, the value of the property must be determined
either as of the date of the taking of the property or
the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."
4. Even before the new rule, however, it was already
held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgosthat
the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value
after the passage of time, represents the true value to
be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for
the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation
to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the
filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its
taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was
allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and
it was respondent who filed the complaint.
5. Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by
many factors. It may be enhanced on account of its
taking for public use, just as it may depreciate. As
observed in Republic v. Lara:
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the
condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the
entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a
natural increase in the value of the property from the
time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to
general economic conditions. The owner of private
property should be compensated only for what he
actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he
loses is only the actual value of his property at the time
it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be
paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the individual
whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to
pay for it" . . . .
In this case, the proper valuation for the property in
question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for
1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the
commission (composed of the provincial treasurer,
assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by
the trial court to make an assessment of the
expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per
hectare basis.
G.R.
1. March
No. 129998,
21, 1990December
- NPC originally
29, 1998instituted with RTC
for eminent domain,
NATIONAL POWER laterCORPORATION
amended on October v. LOURDES
11,
1990, for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of
HENSON
land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total
aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the
expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station.
2. Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of
the five (5) parcels of land sought to be expropriated,
situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga.
Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels
of land, comprising an aggregate area of 58,311 square
meters, for the expansion of its Mexico Subdivision.
200
3. July 10, 1990 - the court fixed the provisional value of
the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of
63,220square meters of respondents' property, to be
deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.
Petitioner deposited the amount on August 29, 1990.
4. September 5, 1990 - trial court issued a writ of
possession in favor of petitioner, and, on September 11,
1990, the court's deputy sheriff placed petitioner in
possession of the subject land
5. April 5, 1991 - the trial court issued an order
appointing three (3) commissioners to aid the court in
the reception of evidence to determine just
compensation for the taking of the subject property.
6. May 19, 1993 - the trial court rendered judgment
fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by
petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220
square meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal
interest thereon computed from September 11, 1990,
when petitioner was placed in possession of the land,
plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the
proceedings. Petitioner then appealed to CA, which
affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: W the valuation of the commissioners is correct
- No, because they based the valuation on adjacent
residential lots.
1. The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are
undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land,
bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson
family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer
beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has
been re-classified as residential. The nature and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
character of the land at the time of its taking is the
principal criterion to determine just compensation
to the landowner.
2. In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter,
which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully
developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village
Subdivision. The land in question, however, was an
undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in
character, though re-classified as residential.
3. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of
commissioners to help it determine the market value of
the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the
commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market
value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of
lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This
finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was
even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the
commissioners.
REPUBLIC v KER CO. [GR No. 136171 (July 2, 2002)]
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ker Company was
given a decision for fair just compensation.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the valuation for
the lot Sites are excessive and unreasonable.
Justcompensation cannot be measured by the
assessed value of the property as stated in the
tax declaration and schedule of market values. For the
purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the
property is taken into account and such value refers
to the highest price in terms of money which a
201
property will bring if exposed for sale in the public
market.
In computing just compensation for expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the
taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at
the time of the rendition of judgment which should be
taken into consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the
1997 Rules of CivilProcedure provides that
justcompensation is to be determined as ofthe date of
the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came
first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in
disregarding petitioner's claim.
CITY OFJR.,
DAVIDE, CEBU
C .J: vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA
FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of
DEDAMO
Cebu No.
[G.R. filed142971,
a complaint
May 7, 2002]
for eminent domain against
respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo.
The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for
a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public
road which shall serve as an access/relief road of
Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum
Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel
Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount
of just compensation at P20,826,339.50.
Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in
fixing the amount of just compensation at
P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be
based on the prevailing market price of the property at
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The petitioner did not convince the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision in
toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
HELD: NO. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to
the point of reckoning for the determination of just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which
expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking.
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National
Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not
categorically rule in that case that just compensation
should be determined as of the filing of the complaint.
We explicitly stated therein that although the general
rule in determining just compensation in eminent
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the
filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception:
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the
date it was taken and not at the date of the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
 Maria Paz v Nepomuceno
NEPOMUCENO CITY OF SURIGAO [GR No. 146091
filed a complaint to (July
2008)]recover a 652 sq. m. portion of her 50,000 sq. m.
lot which was occupied, developed and used as a
city road by the city government of Surigao. Maria
Paz alleged that the city government neither
asked her permission to use the land nor
202
instituted expropriation proceedings for its
acquisition.
 She wrote respondent (then Surigao City Mayor)
Salvador Sering a letter proposing an amicable
settlement for the payment of the portion taken
over by the city. They subsequently met with
Mayor Sering to discuss their proposal but the
mayor rebuffed them in public and refused to pay
them anything.
 A second letter was sent to sought the Mayor’s
reconsideration but they were again turned down.
 respondents admitted the existence of the road in
question but alleged that it was constructed way
back in the 1960s during the administration of
former Mayor Pedro Espina. At that time, the lot
was owned by the spouses Vicente and Josefa
Fernandez who signed a road right-of-way
agreement in favor of the municipal government.
However, a copy of the agreement could no
longer be found because the records were
completely destroyed and lost when the Office of
the City Engineer was demolished by typhoon
Nitang in 1994.
 RTC ordered the City to pay spouses
Nepomuceno the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, and the further sum of P3,260.00 as
28,
compensation for the portion of land in dispute,
with legal interest thereon from 1960 until fully
paid, and upon payment, directing her to execute
the corresponding deed of conveyance in favor of
the said City.
o The claims for moral and exemplary
damages are denied for lack of basis
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 CA modified the RTC decision and held that
petitioners were entitled to P30,000 as moral
damages for having been rebuffed by Mayor
Sering in the presence of other people. It also
awarded petitioners P20,000 as attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses considering that they were
forced to litigate to protect their rights and had to
travel to Surigao City from their residence in
Ormoc City to prosecute their claim. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other
respects.
 SPOUSES NEPOMUCENO claim that, in fixing
the value of their property, justice and equity
demand that the value at the time of actual
payment should be the basis, not the value at the
time of the taking as the RTC and CA held. They
demandP200/sq. m. or a total sum of P130,400
plus legal interest.
ISSUE:
WON, as alleged by spouses Nepomuceno, it is the
amount at time of payment which should be the basis.
HELD/RATIO:
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that
where actual taking is made without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and the owner seeks
recovery of the possession of the property prior to the
filing of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the
property at the time of taking that is controlling for
purposes of compensation.
203
As pointed out in Republic v. Lara, the reason for this
rule is:
The owner of private property should be compensated
only for what he actually loses; it is not intended
that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss
or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of
his property at the time it is taken. This is the only
way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e.,
"just" not only to the individual whose property is taken,
"but to the public, which is to pay for it."
Thus, the value of petitioners’ property must be
ascertained as of 1960 when it was actually taken. It is
as of that time that the real measure of their loss may
fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn
interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected,
conformably with other principles laid down by case law.
Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case
of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the
currency at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no
agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict
application only to contractual obligations. In other
words, a contractual agreement is needed for the
effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account
to alter the value of the currency.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v ANGAS [GR. Nos. 60225-26 (May 8,
FACTS:
1992)]
 On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974,
petitioner National Power Corporation, a
government-owned and controlled corporation
and the agency through which the government
undertakes the on-going infrastructure and
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
development projects throughout the country,
filed two complaints for eminent domain against
private respondents with the Court of First
Instance.
 Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of
the parties. On June 15, 1979, a consolidated
decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248 and 2277 was
rendered by the lower court, declaring and
confirming that the lots mentioned and described
in the complaints have entirely been lawfully
condemned and expropriated by the petitioner,
and ordering the latter to pay the private
respondents certain sums of money as just
compensation for their lands expropriated "with
legal interest thereon until fully paid." Two
consecutive motions for reconsideration of the
said consolidated decision were filed by the
petitioner. The same were denied by the
respondent court.
 Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid
consolidated decision, which became final and
executory.
 May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents
[Sittie Sohra Batara] filed an ex-parte motion for
the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision,
praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the
unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands
expropriated from her, including legal interest
which she computed at 6% per annum. The
said motion was granted by the lower court.
Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner
to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of
204
money as adjudged in the joint decision dated
June 15, 1979.
 Petitioner complied with said order and deposited
the sums of money with interest computed at 6%
per annum.
 February 10, 1981, one of the private
respondents [Pangonatan Cosna Tagol], through
counsel, filed with the trial court an ex-
parte motion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for
the first time, that the legal interest on the just
compensation awarded to her by the court be
computed at 12% per annum as allegedly
"authorized under and by virtue of Circular
No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to
PD 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court
that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the
courts, in the absence of express contract, shall
be computed at 12% per annum."
 February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the
said motion allowing 12% interest per annum.
 Subsequently, the other private respondents filed
motions also praying that the legal interest on the
just compensation awarded to them be computed
at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the
lower court issued on March 10, 1981 and August
28, 1981 orders bearing similar import.
 NPC moved for a reconsideration of the lower
court's last order dated August 28, 1981, alleging
that the main decision had already become
final and executory with its compliance of
depositing the sums of money as just
compensation for the lands condemned, with
legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
main decision can no longer be modified or
changed by the lower court; and that PD 116 is
not applicable to this case because it is Art.
2209 of the Civil Code which applies.
 January 25, 1982, the lower court denied
petitioner's, motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON in the computation of the legal rate of interest on
just compensation for expropriated lands, the law
applicable is Central Bank Circular No. 416 which
fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum.
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads:
By virtue of the authority granted to it under
Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the
Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated
July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of express contract as
to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent
(12%) per annum.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central
Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits. his has already been settled in
several cases decided by this Court. Private
respondents, however, take exception to the inclusion of
205
the term "judgments" in the said circular, claiming that
such term refers to any judgment directing the payment
of legal interest, which term includes the questioned
judgment of the lower court in the case at bar.
The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury
Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should
be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the
principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where
general terms follow the designation of particular things
or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will
be construed to comprehend those things or persons of
the same class or of the same nature as those
specifically enumerated.
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give
effect to both the particular and general words, by
treating the particular words as indicating the class and
the general words as including all that is embraced in
said class, although not specifically named by the
particular words.
Applying the said rule on statutory construction to
Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term
"judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases
involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits.
Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and
not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable
to the case at bar. Said law reads:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment
of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay,
the indemnity for damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six
percent per annum.
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions
requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in
connection with any delay in the performance of the
obligation arising therefrom other than those covering
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not
a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but
expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public
purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation
regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial
court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The
legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just
compensation for the properties expropriated is
manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the
delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind
of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower
court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by
way of damages, and not by way of earnings from
loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.
FACTS: v CASPILLO [GR No. 146733 (January 13, 2004)]
WYCOCO
 Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690
hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land
206
situated in the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and
Pinamunghilan, Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva
Ecija.
 In line with the CARP of the government, Wycoco
voluntarily offered to sell the land to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9
million.
 After the DAR’s evaluation of the application and
the determination of the just compensation by the
Land Bank of the Philippines, a notice of intention
to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for
P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco ( modified to
P2,280,159.82).
 The area which the DAR offered to acquire
excluded idle lands, river and road located
therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the
DAR to indorse the case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for
the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a
summary administrative proceeding.
 Pending litigation, DARAB requested Land Bank
to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco
and deposited the compensation offered by DAR.
In the meantime, the property was distributed to
farmer-beneficiaries.
 Wycoco decided to forego with the filing of the
required pleadings, and instead filed on April 13,
1993, the instant case for determination of just
compensation with the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City.
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present
evidence in support of the land valuation
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the
prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold
in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to
150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took
judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation
for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at
P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of
P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual
damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court,
validly acquired jurisdiction over the instant case for
determination of just compensation.
(2) Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, WON the
compensation arrived at is supported by evidence.
(3) WON Wycoco can compel the DAR to purchase the
entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell.
(4) WON the awards of interest and damages for
unrealized profits is valid.
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES.
The trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over
Wycoco’s complaint for determination of just
compensation. It must be stressed that although
no summary administrative proceeding was held
before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its
legal mandate of initially determining the value of
Wycoco’s land pursuant to Executive Order No.
405, Series of 1990. What is more, DAR and
LBP’s conformity to the pre-trial order which
limited the issue only to the determination of just
207
compensation estopped them from questioning
the jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. The
pre-trial order limited the issues to those not
disposed of by admission or agreements; and the
entry thereof controlled the subsequent course of
action.
Besides, the issue of whether Wycoco violated
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
was rendered moot and academic in view of the
DARAB’s dismissal of the administrative case to
give way to and in recognition of the court’s
power to determine just compensation.
2. NO.
In arriving at the valuation of Wycoco’s land, the
trial court took judicial notice of the alleged
prevailing market value of agricultural lands in
Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of
its intention to take judicial notice thereof.
Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of
Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the
trial court should have allowed the parties to
present evidence thereon instead of practically
assuming a valuation without basis. While market
value may be one of the bases of determining just
compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily
arrived at without considering the factors to be
appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of
the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the
current value of like properties, its size, shape,
location, as well as the tax declarations thereon.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Since these factors were not considered, a
remand of the case for determination of just
compensation is necessary. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution especially where the case involves a vast
tract of land. Care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved
in the negative.
3. NO.
The DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the
entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The
power to determine whether a parcel of land may
come within the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged
with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages
by the DAR’s non-acquisition of the approximately
10 hectare portion of the entire land which was
found to be not suitable for agriculture is no
justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole
area.
4. PARTLY MERITOUS
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed
an interest of 12% per annum on the just
compensation due the landowner. It must be
stressed, however, that in these cases, the
imposition of interest was in the nature of
damages for delay in payment which in effect
makes the obligation on the part of the
government one of forbearance. It follows that the
interest in the form of damages cannot be applied
208
where there was prompt and valid payment of just
compensation. Conversely, where there was
delay in tendering a valid payment of just
compensation, imposition of interest is in order.
This is because the replacement of the trust
account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso
facto cure the lack of compensation; for
essentially, the determination of this
compensation was marred by lack of due
process.
Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco
should bear 12% interest per annum from the
time LBP opened a trust account in his name up
to the time said account was actually converted
into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The
basis of the 12% interest would be the just
compensation that would be determined by the
Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the
instant case. In the same vein, the amount
determined by the Special Agrarian Court would
also be the basis of the interest income on the
cash and bond deposits due Wycoco from the
time of the taking of the property up to the time of
actual payment of just compensation.
The award of actual damages for unrealized
profits should be deleted. The amount of loss
must not only be capable of proof, but must be
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The
claim must be premised upon competent proof or
upon the best evidence obtainable, such as
receipts or other documentary proof. None having
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
been presented in the instant case, the claim for
unrealized profits cannot be granted.
DE KNECHT
Facts: The instant
v CAcase[GR isNo.an108015
unending
(May
sequel
20, to
several suits commenced almost twenty years ago
1998)]
involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the
south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City.
The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht
and her son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts
constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and
occupied one of them as their residence. In 1979, the
government filed for the expropriation of Knechts’
property. The government wanted to use the land for
the completion of the Manila Flood Control and
Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA
towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer
of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay
real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As
a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer
sold the property at public auction for the same amount
of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were
respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the
Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro
and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently,
Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent
Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983,
the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340
authorizing the national government to expropriate
certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension.
The property of the Knechts was part of those
expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave
out just compensation for the lands expropriated under
209
B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial
payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts
were demolished and the government took possession
of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Since
the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining
house, Salem filed a case against them for unlawful
detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of
the land and building. The Municipal Trial Court
however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their
residence was demolished.
The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the
property and allege that they must be given just
compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners
of the land at subject.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were
not the ownersanymore of the said land. The Knechts'
right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to
redeem it one year after the sale at public auction.
Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal
were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and
this Court, theorder of dismissal became final and res
judicata on the issue of ownership of the land.
Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of
their tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice
of the auction sale. However, this question has been
previously raised in the cases which have been already
set aside. The court is not a trier of facts. Res judicata
has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the
lawful owners of the land and are not any longer
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
accountable for just compensation given by the
government.
Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an
action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating
Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and
final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system
of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law — one,
public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit
to litigation; and another, the individual should not be
vexed twice for the same cause. When a right of fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial
has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To
follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public
peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals
and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of
the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility.
Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or
order is final; (2) the judgment or order is one on the
merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there is
between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
of subject matter and of cause of action.
 Sept.REFINING
VISAYAN 13, 1919: vthe
CAMUS [GR No. L-15870
Governor-General directed( December
1919)]the Attorney-General to cause condemnation
J. Street
proceedings to be begun for the purpose of
210
expropriating a tract of land of an area of about
1,100,463 square meters, commonly known as
the site of Camp Tomas Claudio. Said land is
located in the municipality of Parañaque,
Province of Rizal, and lies along the water front of
Manila Bay, a few miles south of the city of
Manila. It is stated in communication of the
Governor-General that the property in question is
desired by the Government of the Philippine
Islands for military and aviation purposes.
 Numerous persons are named in the complaint as
defendants because of their supposed ownership
of portions of the property intended to be
expropriated. In the list of persons thus impleaded
appear the names of the three petitioners herein,
namely, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean C.
Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, who are severally
owners of different portions of the property in
question.
 Visayan Refining, Worcester and Leas nterposed
a demurrer, questioning the validity of the
proceedings on the ground that there is no Act of
the Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise
of the power of eminent domain to acquire land
for military or aviation purposes.
 Contemporaneously with the filing of their
demurrer, the same parties moved the Court of
First Instance to revoke its order of September
15, giving the plaintiff provisional possession.
This motion is based substantially on the same
3,
ground as the demurrer, that is, the lack of
legislative authority for the proposed
expropriation, but it contains one additional
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
allegation to the effect that the deposit in
court of the sum of P600,000, had been made
without authority of law.
ISSUE:
WON title has passed to the Government.
HELD/RATIO:
The provisions which deal with the giving of immediate
possession when the Government of the Philippine
Islands is the plaintiff are found in Act No. 2826, which
is in part as follows:
SEC. 2. When condemnation proceedings are
instituted by or in favor of the Insular Government
. . . in any competent court of the Philippines, the
plaintiff shall be entitled to enter immediately
upon the land covered by such proceedings, after
depositing with the provincial treasurer the value
of said land in cash, as previously and promptly
determined and fixed by the competent court,
which money the provincial treasurer shall retain
subject to the order and final decision of the
court: Provided, however, That the court may
permit that in lieu of cash, there may be deposited
with the provincial treasurer a certificate of
deposit of any depository of the Government of
the Philippine Islands, payable to the provincial
treasurer on sight, for the sum ordered deposited
by the court. The certificate and the sums
represented by it shall be subject to the order and
final decision of the court, and the court shall
have authority to place said plaintiff in possession
211
of the land, upon such deposit being made, by the
proper orders and a mandate, if necessary.
SEC. 3. . . . Upon the payment by the plaintiff to
the defendants of the compensation awarded by
the sentence, or after the tender of said sum to
the defendants, and the payment of the costs, or
in case the court orders the price to be paid into
court, the plaintiff shall be entitled to appropriate
the land so condemned to the public use
specified in the sentence. In case payment is
made to the court, the clerk of the same shall be
liable on his bond for the sum so paid and shall
be obliged to receive the same.
In connection with the foregoing provisions found in
laws enact under the American regime is to be
considered the following provision of the Civil Code:
ART. 349. No one may be deprived of his
property unless it be by competent authority for
some purpose of proven public utility and after
payment of the proper compensation.
Unless this requisite has been complied with, it
shall be the duty of the court to protect the owner
of such property in its possession or to restore its
possession to him, as the case may be.
Taken together the laws mentioned supply a very
complete scheme of judicial expropriation, deducing the
authority from its ultimate source in sovereignty,
providing in detail for the manner of its exercise, and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
making the right of the expropriator finally dependent
upon payment of the amount awarded by the court.
While we bear in mind the cardinal fact that just
compensation must be made, the further fact must not
be overlooked that there is no organic or constitutional
provision in force in these lands Islands requiring that
compensation shall actually be paid prior to the
judgment of condemnation.
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the
preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be
apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in
this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute assurance
that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken
from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. It is
true that in rare instances the proceedings may be
voluntarily abandoned before the expropriation is
complete or the proceedings may fail because the
expropriator becomes insolvent, in either of which cases
the owner retains the property; and if possession has
been prematurely obtained by the plaintiff in the
proceedings, it must be restored. It will be noted that
the title does not actually pass to the expropriator
until a certified copy of the record of the judgment
is recorded in the office of the register of deeds
(sec. 251, Code Civ. Proc.). Before this stage of the
proceedings is reached the compensation is
supposed to have been paid; and the court is
plainly directed to make such final order and
judgment as shall secure to the defendant just
compensation for the land taken. (Sec. 246, Code
Civ. Proc.). Furthermore, the right of the expropriator is
212
finally made dependent absolutely upon the payment of
compensation by him. (Sec. 3, Act No. 2826; sec. 247,
Code Civ. Proc.).
REPUBLIC v SALEM INVESTMENT CORP. [GR No. 137569 (June 23,
FACTS:
 BP 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation
2000)]
of parcels of lands in the names of defendants in
this case, including a portion of the land,
consisting of 1,380 square meters, belonging to
Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama
 Five years thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De
la Rama entered into a contract with intervenor
Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Ramas
agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property.
 Guerrero file with the RTC of Pasay a complaint
for specific performance against De la Rama.
 While this case for specific performance was
pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the
present case for expropriation pursuant to BP
340. Among the defendants named in the
complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la
Rama as registered owners of Lot 834, a portion
of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated
property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00
representing 10 percent of the approximate
market value of the subject lands, a writ of
possession was issued on August 29, 1990 in
favor of the government.
 As already stated, the De la Ramas and Guerrero
entered into a contract to sell with respect to Lot
834. This lot has an area of 4,075 square meters.
This contract was executed on December 14,
1988, after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the
land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De
la Ramas. The only issue in this case is who,
between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are
entitled to receive payment of just
compensation for the taking of 920 square
meters of the land in question?
o The De la Ramas claim that they should
receive the amount of just compensation
because when they agreed to sell Lot 834
in 1988 to Guerrero, it did not include the
portion expropriated by the Republic since,
at that time, such portion had been
expropriated by the government by virtue of
B.P. Blg. 340, which took effect on
February 17, 1983.
o On the other hand, Alfredo Guerrero
argues that the title to the expropriated
portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass
to the government upon the enactment of
B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just
compensation was yet to be made before
ownership of the land was transferred to
the government. As a result, petitioners still
owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they
agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore,
since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot
834, including the 920 square meters
expropriated by the government, he has the
right to receive the just compensation over
the said property.
 Pasay City RTC, Br. 111, declared Guerrero the
rightful owner of the 920-square meter
213
expropriated property and ordered payment to
him of just compensation for the taking of the
land.
ISSUE: WON Guerrero is entitled to receive just
compensation.
HELD/RATIO:
YES.
Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by
legislation.[25] In both instances, just compensation is
determined by the courts.
The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. As
explained in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia:
The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the
action, "of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint". . . .
The second phase of the eminent domain
action is concerned with the determination
by the court of "the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken." This is
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
done by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. . . .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover,
it is only upon payment of just compensation that title
over the property passes to the government. Therefore,
until the action for expropriation has been completed
and terminated, ownership over the property being
expropriated remains with the registered owner.
Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights
pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of
his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately
to acquire it through expropriation.
In the case at hand, the first stage of expropriation
was completed when B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted
providing for the expropriation of 1,380 square meters of
the land in question. The constitutionality of this law was
upheld in the case of Republic v. De Knecht. In 1990,
the government commenced the second stage of
expropriation through the filing of a petition for the
determination of just compensation. This stage was
not completed, however, because of the intervention
of Guerrero which gave rise to the question of
ownership of the subject land. Therefore, the title to the
expropriated property of the De la Ramas remained with
them and did not at that point pass to the government.
As to the Contract to Sell
As the trial court in the case for specific performance
ruled, the contract to sell covered the entire Lot 834,
214
including the expropriated area, which was then owned
by the De la Ramas.
It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to
Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein.
However, it created an obligation on the part of the De
la Ramas to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of
the suspensive conditions therein stated. The
declaration of this contract’s validity, which paved the
way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of
the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of
Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed
ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero.
CITY OF MANILA v ROXAS [GR No. L-39671 (June 29,
FACTS:
 The City of Manila appeals from the orders of the
1934)]
Court of First Instance of Manila awarding to two
private property owners whose lands were taken
by expropriation proceedings, an allowance for
the taxes paid to the City of Manila under protest,
covering a period of time between the
dispossession of the owners and the taking of title
by the city.
ISSUE:
WON taxes paid by the owner after taking by
expropriator are reimbursable.
HELD/RATIO:
YES.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
While taxes are assessed against the holder of the title,
the owner of the property is entitled to the beneficient
use of his property until title changes. If pursuant to law,
immediate possession may be taken, the withholding
this right from the owner must be compensated for as
well as the formal taking.
In In re Mayor, etc., of City of New York it is said that:
Certainly it would not be "just compensation" to
take a man's land, and compel him to pay the
taxes and assessments thereafter levied on the
property, while at the same time withholding the
purchase price. . . . Upon the city's theory,
therefore, the owner must not alone be deprived
of the unrestricted use of his property and of
the ad interim use of his money, but he must also
compelled to pay for its police protection, and for
public movements charged against it as a benefit,
during all the period of delay, for which he is in no
way responsible, and which he is powerless to
shorten. It will be seen that, if this theory be
correct, the owners award would be constantly
diminished by each year's delay, until, if the
period were long enough, it would be entirely
wiped out. It can hardly be contended that a
theory which, logically followed out, would under
any possible circumstances produce such a
result, affords a satisfactory basis for an award of
"just compensation."
. . . The power may be allowed the unrestricted
use of the premises after taking, and the
premises maybe of such a character, and so
215
situated, that the income derivable therefrom is a
full equivalent for interest, taxes, and
assessments. Such is the case where the
property has been fully improved and rented, and
where there has been no loss of tenancy or
diminution of rental pending the condemnation
proceedings.
There is no error in a court's awarding, as part of the
just compensation required by law, the amount of taxes
and assessments paid covering the period where the
original owner had merely the naked legal title. Where
all benefits have been taken away, the corresponding
burdens should be assumed by the State.
Republic Republic
Petitioner of the Philippines
instituted expropriation
v Court of proceedings
in the RTC of Bulacan for the land situated along
Appeals
MacArthur
July 2, 2002Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for
the continued broadcast operation and use of radio
transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines”
project.
RTC condemned the land and had it expropriated upon
the payment of just compensation by the Republic.
The issue arose in relation 76,589-square meter
property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-
in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of
the expropriated area. They allege that after the lapse of
five years, the Republic failed to pay them their just
compensation for the expropriated area.
During this period, Pres Estrada also issued
proclamation No. 22 which transferred 20 hectares of
said property to Bulacan State University and another 5
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
hectares was dedicated for the propagation of Philippine
carabaos.
Petitioner filed its manifestation that it would be
depositing the amount equivalent to the just
compensation of the property. Respondent filed a
counter motion to raise the price of the property or an
option to have the property returned to them.
RTC issued the assailed order of returning the property
to the respondents. CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to the return of
the expropriated property for the failure of petitioner to
pay the just compensation for it.
HELD/RATIO:
No, The right of eminent domain is usually understood
to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty
for a public purpose
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property.
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession
of the property, and the defendant asserts title or
interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking. In arguing for the return of their property on the
basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that
the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of
an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy
of rescission might perhaps apply After condemnation,
the paramount title is in the public under a new and
216
independent title;] thus, by giving notice to all claimants
to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a
judicial process for securing better title against all the
world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
The court also cited Valedhueza v Republic, wherein it
was held that “both by virtue of the judgment, long final,
in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon
their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover
possession of their expropriated lots - which are still
devoted to the public use for which they were
expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value
of the same.”
The case cited by respondents which is Sorsogon v Vda
de Villaroya, wherein the court ordered the return of the
property does not apply in the case at hand. That case
involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to
which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but
merely delegated and of limited application.
Republic
The petitioner,
v Vicente
Republic instituted expropriation
proceedings with the CFI of Cebu for Lots 932 and 939
Lim
of the29,Banilad
June 2005 Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City
owned by the Denzons, for the purpose of establishing
a military reservation for the Philippine Army. RTC
ordered the land to be expropriated upon payment of
just compensation.
For failure of the petitioner to pay the just
compensation, in 1961, Valdehueza and Panerio, the
successor in interest of the Denzons filed a suit for
damages and recovery of possession of the land
against AFP. CFI ruled in favor of Valdehueza and
Panerio but held that they were not entitled to the return
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of the property because of the notation in the TCT which
stated that, “subject to the priority of the National
Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land,
Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a
reasonable market value.” They were ordered to
execute a deed of sale in favor the Republic.
In 1964, since the Republic still failed to pay the just
compensation Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged the
land to Vicente Lim, who later foreclosed the mortgage
in 1976 for the former’s failure to pay.
In 1991, Lim instituted a suit for quieting of title against
AFP and the Republic. The RTC held that Lim was the
absolute and exclusive owner of the property. This
decision was sustained by the CA.
A petition for certiorari was filed with SC but the SC
affirmed the CA decision. A second motion for
reconsideration was filed.
ISSUE: WON the Republic has retained ownership of
the land despite its failure to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation.
HELD/RATIO:
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court
mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16, 248.40 as
“reasonable market value of the two lots in question.”
Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several
decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate.
Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect
to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot
countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private
property.
217
While it is true that all private properties are subject to
the need of government, and the government may take
them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the
occasion demands, however, the Constitution
guarantees that when this governmental right of
expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by
compensation. From the taking of private property by
the government under the power of eminent domain,
there arises an implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss.
There are two stages in expropriation. The first stage
determines the authority to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. The second
phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with
the determination by the court of the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken. It is only upon the
completion of these two stages that expropriation is said
to have been completed.
The recognized rule is that title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the
justcompensation, and that “non-payment of just
compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does
not entitle the private landowners to recover possession
of the expropriated lots.” However, the facts of the
present case do not justify its application. It bears
stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice; the first was in the expropriation
proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven
(57) years have passed since then. We cannot but
construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation
as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
circumstance, recovery of possessionis in order. In
cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5)years from the finality
of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings,
the owners concerned shall have the right to
recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that “the government
cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.”
A fire vrazed
Belen CA their properties. Upon Juliano’s pleas, he
was allowed to build another house in the property for a
period of 2 ½ years. However, after the stipulated
period, he still refused to vacate and thus a suit was
filed against him wherein the court (MTC) ordered him
to vacate the premises.
In the appeal to RTC, the decision was reversed. Belen
appealed but this was dismissed upon the expropriation
of the said property by Presidential Decree No. 1670.
His appeal with the CA was also denied. The decision
declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty,
Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, including the lot
leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the
possession, administration, control and disposition of
the National Housing Authority (NHA); It also held that
Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in
question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease
between Belen and Juliano. Thus the appeal on
certiorari with the SC
ISSUE: WON there was valid expropriation of the
property
218
HELD/RATIO:
No. PD No. 1670, together with a companion decree,
numbered 1669 — which attempted to expropriate by
similar legislative fiat another property, the so-called
"Tambunting Estate" — was struck down by this Court
as "unconstitutional and therefore, null and void.
The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative
of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of law,"
failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally,
they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the
determination of just compensation."
PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance
thereon and in accordance therewith must also be
deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of
possession of the property by the National Housing
Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a
housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries
thereof.
Filstream International
Petitioner Filstream is vthe
CAowner of adjacent parcels of
land situated
January in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila.
23, 1998
On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit
before MTC of Manila against private respondents on
the grounds of termination of the lease contract and
non-payment of rentals. MTC ordered respondents to
vacate the premises and pay the back rentals. This
decision was affirmed by the RTC and CA upon which
the decision became final and executory.
However, pending the earlier a case, a negotiation has
already taken place between Mayor Lim of Manila and
Filstream for the acquisition by negotiation of said
property. The said properties were to be sold and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to
the Land Use Development Program of the City of
Manila. Thus the city of Manila filed a suit for eminent
domain with the RTC of Manila. Filstream filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
that this was filed only to circumvent the decision in the
ejectment suit and that the price offered was too low
and thus violative of the just compensation provision.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and held the land
expropriated upon payment of just compensation by the
public respondents. Appeal to the CA was denied for
failure to submit clearer and readable copies. Thus the
petition for review on certiorari with the SC.
During this period, Filstream filed for motion for
execution for the ejectment suit which became final. The
private respondents filed for a motion to quash or stay
the execution due to the supervening event which is the
expropriation the said property which was denied. Thus
private respondents filed for a writ of preliminary
injunction with the RTC which was granted. The case
for issuance of writ of execution and petition for
certiorari with RTC were consolidated. A motion to
dismiss was filed by Filstream for violation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 04-94 (forum shopping).
Filstream then filed for writ of demolition which was
granted. Private respondents then filed petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the CA which granted a
preliminary injunction. Filstream now files a petition
for certiorari with the SC to nullify the resolutions of
the CA. The two cases were consolidated.
ISSUE:
219
WON petitioners were denied due process of law by
the CA when it outrightly dismissed its petition for
failure to submit clear and readable copies.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural
rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the
ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the
substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal
filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their
property rights over the disputed premises which have
been expropriated and have in fact been ordered
condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the
dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation
proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law as it would automatically validate the
expropriation proceedings which the petitioner is still
disputing. Where substantial rights are affected, as in
this case, the stringent application of procedural rules
may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial
justice.
Rather than simply dismissing the petition summarily for
non-compliance with respondent court’s internal rules,
respondent CA should have instead entertained
petitioner Filstream’s petition for review on Certiorari,
and ordered petitioner to submit the corresponding
pleadings which it deems relevant and replace those
which are unreadable.
Biglang
The Awa v areJudge
Biglang-awa’s the registered owners of certain
parcels of land situated in Talipapa, Novaliches,
Bacalla
November 22, 2000
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Quezon City. The government needed to expropriate
part of the aforesaid property of petitioner for the
construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension
Petitioner received notice from the respondent Republic
to submit documents to determine just compensation of
the property and failure to do so would give rise to an
expropriation proceeding for said property. Petitioner
failed to submit the said documents and thus the
Republic through the DPWH filed with RTC an
expropriation suit for the said properties.
The respondent deposited the amount for the
compensation of the properties of the petitioners and
thus the RTC issued a writ of possession. An order to
vacate the premises was also issued to petitioners. The
petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that respondent failed to comply with the
provisions of E.O. 1035 (1985), relating to the conduct
of feasibility studies, information campaign, detailed
engineering/surveys, and negotiation prior to the
acquisition of, or entry into, the property being
expropriated. This was denied the RTC. Thus a petition
for certiorari was filed with the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the right to due process of the petitioners was
violated by respondent Republic
HELD/RATIO:
No. Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took
effect on July 1, 1997. The trial court may issue a writ of
possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property,
220
pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a
hearing to determine the provisional sum to be
deposited,
Thus, , the only requisites for authorizing immediate
entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the filing of a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance; and (2) the making of a deposit equivalent to
the assessed value of the property subject to
expropriation. Upon compliance with the requirements
the issuance of the writ of possession becomes
“ministerial.
The issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Rule
67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure alone
is neither “capricious” nor “oppressive”, as the said rule
affords owners safeguards against unlawful deprivation
of their property in expropriation proceedings, one of
which is the deposit requirement which constitutes
advance payment in the event expropriation proceeds,
and stands as indemnity for damages should the
proceedings fail of consummation.
Francia
RTC ruled
v Municpality
that the ofexpropriation
Meycauayan was for a public
purpose
March 24,and
2008that it would improve the flow of vehicular
traffic during rush hours. It ordered that writ of
possession be issued upon deposit of 15% of the fair
market value of the property.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC for failure to hold a hearing to determine the
existence of a public purpose. CA nullified the order of
expropriation but retained the writ of possession. Thus
the appeal to the SC.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE: WONprior determination of the existence of a
public purpose was not necessary for the issuance of a
writ of possession
HELD/RATIO:
Before a local government unit may enter into the
possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it
must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit
with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair
market value based on its current tax declaration. The
law does not make the determination of a public
purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ
of possession.
City of
The City
Manila
Council
v Serrano
of Manila enacted Ordinance no. 7833,
authorizing
June the expropriation of certain properties in
20, 2001
Manila’s first district in Tondo. One of the properties
sought to be expropriated was Lot 1-C belonging to
Felisa De Guia.
After her death, the estate of Feliza de Guia was settled
among her heirs by virtue of a compromise agreement,
which was duly approved by the regional trial court,
branch 53, manila in its decision, dated May 8, 1986.
The property was subsequently sold on January 24,
1996 to Demetria de Guia to whom TCT no. 226048
was issued.
Petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for
expropriation, with the RTC of Manila, against the
supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT nos.
70869 (including Lot 1-C),
221
Respondents allegethat they had been the bona fide
occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40
years; that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would result in
their dislocation, it being the only residential land left to
them by their deceased mother; and that the said lot
was exempt from expropriationbecause RA. No. 7279
provides that properties consisting of residential lands
not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized
cities are exempt from expropriation. Dividing the said
parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to
only about 50 square meters of land.
After petitioner had made a deposit, RTC issued a writ
of possession to petitioner. Respondents filed for a
petition for certiorari with the CA. CA held that said
properties were not exempt from execution.
Nevertheless, the other modes of acquisition of lands
enumerated in §§9-10 of the law must first be tried by
the city government before it can resort to expropriation
as was held in Filstream v CA. Thus petitioners were
enjoined from expropriating the said property. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it held that there had
been no compliance with §§9 and 10 of RA. no. 7279.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. The ruling in Filstream was necessitated because
an order of condemnation had already been issued by
the trial court in that case. Thus, the judgment in that
case had already become final. In this case, the trial
court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of
possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine
whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
requirements provided in RA. no. 7279. It is, therefore,
premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that
petitioner resorted to expropriation without first trying
the other modes of acquisition enumerated in §10 of the
law.
Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions
requires the presentation of evidence, although in its
amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had
complied with the requirements. The determination of
this question must await the hearing on the complaint
for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the
condemnation of the properties sought to be
expropriated
On 07
City of March
Iloilo v 2001,
Judgethe Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
Legaspi
City of Iloilo
November 25,enacted
2004 Regulation Ordinance No. 2001-
037 granting authority to its City Mayor to institute
expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in
the name of Manuela Yusay
On 14 March 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of
Manuela Yusay, through Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario,
Administratrix of the estate made a formal estate to
purchase the property for P250 per square meter for the
purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation
for the poor and landless residents of the city in line with
the city’s housing development program
Later Petitioner City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor
Jerry P. Treñas, filed an Amended Complaint for
Eminent Domain against private respondents.
On 11 April 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Possession alleging that since it has
deposited 15% of the fair market value of the property
222
may immediately take possession of the property in
accordance with Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160
Judge Legaspi held in abeyance the issuance of the writ
of possession until after the trial on the merits of the
case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied. Thus the filing of this petition.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: WON petitioner is entitled to the
writ of possession
Yes. The requisites for authorizing immediate entry in
an expropriation suit are as follows: (1) the filing of a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent
to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property to be expropriated based on its current tax
declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements,
the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial
In City of Manila v. Serrano this Court ruled that
“hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not
petitioner indeed complied with the requirements
provided in Rep. Act No. 7279. x x x The determination
of this question must await the hearing on the complaint
for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the
condemnation of the properties sought to be
expropriated.” From the foregoing, it is clear that an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted if compliance
with the requirements for socialized housing has been
made. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to
determine if a writ of possession is to be issued, but
whether there was compliance with the requirements for
socialized housing.
For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements
are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In
fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of
possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of
the complaint for expropriation can be determined by
the mere examination of the allegations of the
complaint.
WON there has been a waiver on the part of
petitioner to ask for immediate possession since it
took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12) days
from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and nine
(9) months and thirteen (13) days from the filing of
the Original Complaint, before it filed the Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession.
No, Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 does not put a time
limit as to when a local government may immediately
take possession of the real property. As long as the
expropriation proceedings have been commenced and
the deposit has been made, the local government unit
cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ
of possession.
NAPOCOR
Pobre is the
v Pobre
owner of a 68,969 square-meter land
("Property")
August located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of
12, 2004
Tiwi, Albay which he later began developing as a resort-
subdivision, which he named as "Tiwi Hot Springs
Resort Subdivision."
In 1965, NPC started to become interested in the
property after it was certified by the Commission on
223
Volcanology that the thermal mineral water and steam
suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial
or industrial use. NPC is a public corporation created to
generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other
power and to transmit electric power nationwide and is
authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the
right of eminent domain
Initially in 1972, it leased 11 lots from Pobre for a period
of one year. However, in 1975, it filed an expropriation
case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-
meter portion of the Property to which the court granted
upon payment of just compensation. NPC began drilling
operations and construction of steam wells. NPC
dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon
by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials
altered the topography of some portions of the Property.
NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC
continued with its dumping.
Thirdly, on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its
second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an
additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is
the property subject of the petition. NPC needed the lot
for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong
Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and
Republic Act No. 5092
Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for
expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his
Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the
lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of
damages.
On 1985, NPC also filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that it had found an alternative site and that it
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 224

had already abandoned the said project in Pobre’s

property.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss but without G.R. No. 139495.
Chiongbian filed aNovember
complaint27,for
2000
reconveyance of a
prejudice to Pobre’s allegation in relation to damages he parcel of land thatINTERNATIONAL
MACTAN-CEBU she sold by eminentAIRPORT
domain AUTHORITY
to the (MCIAA) v. COURT OF APPEALS
incurred. RTC later ruled in favor of Pobre and ordered government
VIRGINIA to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu. Since
CHIONGBIAN
NPC to pay the value iof the property and for Pobre to the project never pushed through, Chiongbian said that
execute the deed of sale upon full payment. she was assured by NAC that she or her heirs would be
Motion for reconsideration with the RTC was denied. CA given the right of reconveyance for the same price once
affirmed RTC decision. Thus petition with the SC. the land would no longer be used.

ISSUE: WON petitioner had the right to dismiss its ISSUE: WON the land can be reconveyed?
own complaint in eminent domain cases. HELD: NO
No, NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 171 The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal
of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the
under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition
the complaint once the defendant had served on the imposed to the effect that the lot would return to
plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to
before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was
the complaint. Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property
and served way ahead of NPC's motion to dismiss, was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.
takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu
same applies. International Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the
plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint existence of a written agreement containing the right to
precisely because the landowner may have already repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation
suffered damages at the start of the taking. The proceedings but a contract of sale. This Court
plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the consequently allowed the presentation of parol evidence
complaint has always been subject to court approval to prove the existence of an agreement allowing the
and to certain conditions right of repurchase based on the following ratiocination
CHIONGBIAN’s testimony shows that she had no
1 SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for
personal knowledge of the alleged assurance made by
summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that the Republic of the Philippines that Lot No. 941 would
a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in
a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or
compromised without approval of the court.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
be returned to her in the event that the Lahug Airport
was closed.
Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent,
the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer
and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which
are to constitute the contract.[26] A judicial compromise
has the force of law and is conclusive between the
parties[27] and it is not valid and binding on a party who
did not sign the same.[28] Since CHIONGBIAN was not
a party to the compromise agreements, she cannot
legally invoke the same.
AGAN JR. V.
FACTS:
PIATCO
1) 1989
May 5, 2003
August, DOTC engaged Aeroport de Paris
(ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the NAIA to
determine whether the present airport can cope with the
traffic development up to the year 2010.
2) ADP submits its Draft Final Report to the DOTC on
December 1989.
3) 1994 October 5, Asia’s Emerging Dragons Corp.
(AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government through DOTC/MIAA for the development
of NAIA Terminal III under a BOT agreement.
4) 1996 February 13, the NEDA passed Board
Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III
project.
5) 1996 July 23, the Prequalification Bids and Awards
Committee invited all bidders to a pre-bid conference on
Jul 29. Second pre-bid confe was held on August 29.
6) 1996 September 20, the Paircargo Consortium
(composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co.,
225
Inc., Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc., and Security
Bank Corp.) submitted their competitive proposal to the
PBAC.
7) 1996 October 2, PBAC notified AEDC that Paircargo,
had pre-qualified.
8) 1997 February 27, Paircargo Consortium
incorporated into PIATCO.
9) 1997 April 1, DOTC submitted the concession
agreement for the second-pass approval of the NEDA-
ICC.
10) 1997 July 9, the DOTC issued the notice of award
for the project to PIATCO. July 12, the Government and
PIATCO signed the 1997 Concession Agreement.
11) 1998 November 26, the Government and PIATCO
signed ARCA.
12) Government and PIATCO signed three
Supplements to the ARCA dated 27 Aug 1999, 4 Sept
2000, and 22 June 2001.
13) 2002 Sept 17, the workers of the international airline
service providers filed a petition for Prohibition. Other
petitioners followed filing.
14) 2003 March 6, PIATCO informed the Court that
PIATCO commenced arbitration proceedings before the
International Court of Arbitration pursuant to Sec 10.02
of the ARCA.
ISSUE :WON the Concession Agreement is
unconstitutional?
HELD: YES
Sec. 5.10 of the 1997 Concession Agreement violates
Article XII, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitutional provision allows for temporary
takeover of public facilities in times of national
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
emergency. Since the takeover is temporary and
extends only to the operation of the business and not
the ownership, government is not required to
compensate the owner. Neither can the owner claim just
compensation for the use of the business and its
properties because the takeover is in exercise of the
State’s police power and not of its power of eminent
domain.
The 1997 Concession Agreement, on the other hand,
says that in the event of a takeover, “Concessionaire
shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the
duration of the temporary takeover…”
“PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation,
contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary
government and obligate the government pay
reasonable cost for the use of Terminal and/or Terminal
Complex.
Police power is the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers. Its exercise must not be
unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of
obligation by the government in the absence of damage
due to arbitrariness of its exercise.
Also, The 1987 Constitution strictly regulates
monopolies. Art XII, Sec. 19 says: The State shall
regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest
so requires.
The 1997 Concession Agreement gave PIATCO the
exclusive right to operate a commercial international
passenger terminal within the island of Luzon, with the
exception of already existing terminals such as those in
the Subic Bay Freeport, Clark Special Economic Zone,
and in Laoag City. This privilege, however, is subject to
226
reasonable regulation and supervision and should not
violate the rights of third parties.
There are service providers at the NAIA I with existing
contracts with the MIAA valid until 2010; since the 1997
Concession Agreement says PIATCO is not bound to
honor existing contracts with MIAA, transferring
operations from NAIA I to NAIA III would unduly
prejudice them. “PIATCO cannot, by law and certainly
not by contract, render a valid and binding contract
nugatory. PIATCO, by the mere expedient claiming an
exclusive right to operate, cannot require the
Government to break its contractual obligations to the
service providers.”
G.R.
A Complaint
No. 146587,
was filed
July due
2, 2002
to the fact that a sum of 1m
remained unpaid
REPUBLIC v. CAby the government.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the property was taken under eminent
domain? YES
(2) WON the previous owner can recover the
property? NO
(3) WON interest should be paid by the Republic
along with the just compensation? YES
HELD:
(1) The right of eminent domain is usually understood to
be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty
for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent
existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the
Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
merely confirmatory of its presence and as being
regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In
the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its
scope matching that of taxation, even that of police
power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form
of property the State needs for public use and, , all
separate interests of individuals in property are held
under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting
upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession
of the property whenever the public interest so requires
it.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest
in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property.
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession
of the property, and the defendant asserts title or
interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking.
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits:
(1) the taking must be for public use,
(2) just compensation must be given to the private
owner of the property.
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the
recognition of the necessity for achieving balance
between the State interests, on the one hand, and
private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively
restraining the former and affording protection to the
latter.
227
In determining “public use,” two approaches are utilized
–
(1) public employment or the actual use by the
public, and
(2) public advantage or benefit.
It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to
constant growth, which is to say that as society
advances, its demands upon the individual so
increases, and each demand is a new use to which the
resources of the individual may be devoted.
In this case, the expropriated property has been shown
to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a
significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion
of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for
the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in
line with the requirements of public purpose.
Respondents question the public nature of the utilization
by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out
that its present use differs from the purpose originally
contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings.
The argument is of no moment. The property has
assumed a public character upon its expropriation.
Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner
of the property, is well within its rights to alter and
decide the use of that property, the only limitation being
that it be for public use.
(2)as ruled in Valdehueza v Republic, “plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots -
which are still devoted to the public use for which they
were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market
value”
In this case, petitioner has occupied, utilized an
exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
judgment. The right of the expropriatory authority is far
from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which
the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in
remproceeding, condemnation acts upon the
property.After condemnation, the paramount title is in
the public under a new and independent title; thus, by
giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process
for securing better title against all the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance.
(3) The constitutional limitation of “just
compensation” is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described to be the price fixed by the
seller in open market in the usual and ordinary
course of legal action and competition or the fair
value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value to be computed from
the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court.
In fine, between the taking of the property and the
actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place
the owner in a position as good as (but not better than)
the position he was in before the taking occurred.
In this case, the lower court was correct in imposing
interests on the zonal value of the property to be
228
computed from the time petitioner instituted
condemnation proceedings and “took” the property.
G.R. Rosa
Sta No. Realty
112526,was
October
the registered
12, owner of two
parcels of land that according to petitioner, were
2001
watersheds
STA ROSA REALTY
which respondents
v CA usurped its rights.
These respondents sought an easement of right of way
over the area and petitioned DAR for compulsory
acquisition, which Sta Rosa objected to since the area
was not appropriate for agricultural purposes.
DARAB however ruled in favour of the acquiisiton and
ordered payment to Sta Rosa.
ISSUE: WON the property is covered by CARP despite
fact that part of it is a watershed area?
HELD: remanded to DARAB
RA 6657 provides for two modes of acquisition: (1)
compulsory (2) voluntary.
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the
landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries
must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall
send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by
personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and
barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a
deed of transfer in favor of the government and
surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days
from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the
purchase price.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make
a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative
proceedings to determine just compensation for the
land. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding
payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response
from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation
in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The
DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and
cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall
then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries.
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two
notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and
letter of invitation
(2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of
coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference,
and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process. The implementation of the
CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and
the power of eminent domain.
POLICE POWER: To the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an
exercise of police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution.
EMINENT DOMAIN: But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a
taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking
contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the excess and all beneficial
229
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer
beneficiary
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the
property in question. However, payment of just
compensation was not in accordance with the
procedural requirement. The law required payment in
cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done
by DAR.
Furthermore, there is still uncertainty as to the proper
classification of the land. While The authority of the
municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning
classification is an exercise of its police power, due to
proof showing that the the disputed parcels of land may
be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage
of CARP because of its very high slopes, the Court
directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the
issue.
G.R. No. Paris
Florencia 139083,
is theAugust
registered
30, owner of a parcel of
land tenanted by respondents who are recipients of
2001
Emancipation
PARIS v ALFECHE
Patents. Paris argues that since she is
entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D.
27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her
children under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire
the subject land and the Emancipation Patents
precipitately issued to them are null and void for being
contrary to law.
She argues that her homesteads are exempt from land
reform. In support of her position, she cites the
cases Alita v. CA8 and Patricio v. Bayug,9 in which the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Court ruled that homesteaders had a superior right to
cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Paris’ lands are exempt from land reform? NO
(2)WON Paris’ is entitled to just compensation? YES
HELD:
(1)
PD 27, which provides the retention limit, states:
"In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not
more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is
cultivating such area or will now cultivate it."
Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is
not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the
landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained
or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law.
In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention
is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject
parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not
cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any
part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to
retain any portion of her landholdings
neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally cultivating
the subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found
that respondents were the ones who had been
cultivating their respective portions of the disputed
properties.
However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in
accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires
no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled
to retain such area. This ruling is in line with Association
230
of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, from which we quote:
". . . In any event, assuming that the petitioners have
not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under PD
No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new
retention rights provided for by RA No. 6657, which in
fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by
the decree."
Petitioner's heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of
three (3) hectares each, since they are not actually
tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm
(2)
Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already
deemed owners of the land they till, they are still
required to pay the cost of the land, including interest,
within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents
complied with the requirement of full payment of the
cost of the parcels of land. As they themselves
admitted, their value had not even been determined yet.
In the absence of such determination, the Court cannot
rule that just compensation has already been fully paid.
G.R. No.
The province
155746,
of Cebu
Octoberdonated
13, 2004
to the city of Cebu
parcels ofv LABRA
LAGCAO land which the petitioners purchased on
instalment basis. However, problems as to their
ownership ensued. First, the Province of Cebu tried to
reacquire the land from which the petitioners were able
to get a favourable decision from the court. Second, the
lot they purchased had squatters which they instituted
ejectment proceedings against but during a request of
deferment of the demolition by the City to find another
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 231

location for the squatters, the Sagguninang Panlungsod
of Cebu passed a resolution that identified Lot 1029 as
a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Thus the present petition by the petitioners alleging that
the expropriation of the property is unconstitutional?
exhausted all other modes of acquisition and made a
valid and definite offer.
The petition is therefore granted in favour of petitioners
to reacquire their land.

ISSUE: WON the property may be subject to G.R. No.

The City
137152,
of January
Mandaluyong
29, 2001 filed expropriation
expropriation? proceedings
CITY OFagainstMANDALUYONG
defendants for urbanv land reform
purposes. The respondents argued that they had no
FRANCISCO
HELD: NO right to expropriate due to the ff:
While housing is one of the most serious social (1) Not for a public purpose
problems of the country, local government units do not (2) Lots are too small and petitioner already has a lot
possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of of other lots for socialized housing
eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. (3) the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set
is (1) genuine necessity and (2) that necessity must be by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00
of public character. per square meter.
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation The TC ruled in the favour of respondents, stating that
of property for purposes of urban land reform and they were “small property owners” thus exempt from
housing. Sec 9 and 10 provide for (1) order in expropriation. This was affirmed by CA thus the present
acquisition of land (2) priority in modes of acquisition. petition.
In this case, the order was not followed. Private lands
rank last in the order of priority for purposes of ISSUE: WON the lands may be expropriated?
socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation HELD: NO
proceedings may be resorted to only after the other Due to the passage of the Urban Det and Housing Act,
modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with all city and municipal govts were
these conditions is mandatory because these are the (1) mandated to conduct an inventory of all lands and
only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private improvements within their respective localities
property against what may be a tyrannical violation of (2) identify lands for socialized housing and
due process when their property is forcibly taken from resettlement areas for the immediate and future
them allegedly for public use. needs of the underprivileged and homeless in the
The City of Cebu failed to establish that (1) no other urban areas,
land is appropriate for their housing projects and (2) (3) acquire the lands
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
(4) dispose of said lands to the beneficiaries of the
program
Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the
following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable
lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or
abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared
Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal
Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement
and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been
acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands.
They also may be acquired through the following
modes: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3)
land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5)
donation to the government; (6) joint venture
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8)
expropriation.
The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions:
(a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted;
(b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are
exempt from such acquisition.
In this case, the SC found that the respondents fell
under “small property owners” which is define: “those
whose only real property consists of residential lands
not exceeding three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.)
in highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square
meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban areas." The partition
of the property six months after the filing of the
expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership by
converting into certain and definite parts. Consequently,
the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300
square meter limit set in R.A. 7279
232
Tan v. Delseeks
Petitioner Rosario
declaration
(237 SCRA
of unconstitutionality of
RA7496 (also known as Simplified Net Income
324)
Taxation) due to violation of the following constitutional
provision:
Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal
protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one
who practice his profession and not to those who are
engaged to single proprietorship.
Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . .
. property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7496 violates the
aforestated provision of the constitution
HELD:
The SC ruled in the negative. The said law is not
arbitrary; it is germane to the purpose of the law and;
applies to all things of equal conditions and of same
class.
It is neither violative of equal protection clause due to
the existence of substantial difference between one who
practice his profession alone and one who is engaged
to proprietorship. Further, the SC said that RA 7496 is
just an amendatory provision of the code of taxpayers
where it classifies taxpayers in to four main groups:
Individuals, Corporations, Estate under Judicial
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Settlement and Irrevocable Trust. The court would have
appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA 7496
was an independent law. But since it is attached to a
law that has already classified taxpayers, there is no
violation of equal protection clause.
PASCUAL
Antonio Subdivision
v. SECRETARY
is owned by OF
the respondent,
PUBLIC Jose
Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines.
WORKS
Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to
the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by
the council, subject to a condition that the donor would
submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change
the names of two of the street.
However, the donation was not executed, which
prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer
calling attention the approval of RA 920.
The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse
the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question
were private property at the time of passage and
approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the
construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio.
Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void
and the alleged deed of donation be declared
unconstitutional.
Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ
of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: hether or Not the deed of donation and the
appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are
constitutional.
233
HELD: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is
without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised
for public purposes only and the money raised by
taxation can be expended only for public purposes and
not for the advantage of private individuals.
In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the
feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were
public or private property when the bill was passed by
congress or when it became effective. The land which
was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a
private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation
did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a
judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede
the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said
appropriation.
OSMENA v. ORBOS (220 SCRA
703)
Later, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability
account," by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) 1024, and
ordered released from the National Treasury to the
Ministry of Energy.
President Corazon C. Aquino, amending PD 1956,
promulgated Executive Order No. 137, expanding the
grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for
possible cost under recovery incurred due to the
reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the
amount of the under recovery being left for
determination by the Ministry of Finance.
Petitioner argues, among others, that "the monies
collected pursuant to P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or
a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall
'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the
purpose indicated, and not channeled to another
government objective." Further, that since "a 'special
fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing
power of a State, such amounts belong to the State,
although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created."
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the powers granted to the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under P.D. 1956, as
amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of
the State. NO.
HELD: The OPSF was established precisely to protect
local consumers from the adverse consequences that
such frequent oil price adjustments may have upon the
economy. Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as it
were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil
and petroleum products paid by consumers as well as
some tax revenues are inputted and from which
amounts are drawn from time to time to reimburse oil
companies, when appropriate situations arise, for
increases in, as well as underrecovery of, costs of crude
importation. The OPSF is thus a buffer mechanism
through which the domestic consumer prices of oil and
petroleum products are stabilized, instead of fluctuating
every so often, and oil companies are allowed to
recover those portions of their costs which they would
not otherwise recover given the level of domestic prices
existing at any given time.
234
In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, this Court upheld
the legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained
their nature and character, viz.: “The tax collected is not
in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the
stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily
in the exercise of the police power of the State.”
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may
be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise
of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the
OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special
treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the
general fund; and while it is placed in what the law
refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review
of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures
comply with the constitutional description of a "special
fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.
PUNSALAN v. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA
LLADOC v. CIR
GEROCHE v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA,
stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all
end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts
to taxation without representation for not giving the
consumers a chance to be heard and be represented.
ISSUE: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HELD: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax,
but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police
power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned
from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the
policies of the State regarding electrification. Moreover,
the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge
reasonably serves and assures the attainment and
perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal
charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the
country’s electric power industry), further boosting the
position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit
of the State’s police objectives
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax;
but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
imposition a tax.
The taxing power may be used as an implement of
police power. The theory behind the exercise of the
power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the
general welfare and well-being of the people.
PHYSICAL THERAPY ORGANIZATION v.
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA
235
The amount of the fee or charge is properly considered
in determining whether it is a tax or an exercise of the
police power. The amount may be so large as to itself
show that the purpose was to raise revenue and not to
regulate, but in regard to this matter there is a marked
distinction between license fees imposed upon useful
and beneficial occupations which the sovereign wishes
to regulate but not restrict, and those which are inimical
and dangerous to public health, morals or safety. In the
latter case the fee may be very large without necessarily
being a tax
Evidently, the Manila Municipal Board considered the
practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage not as a
useful and beneficial occupation which will promote and
is conducive to public morals, and consequently,
imposed the said permit fee for its regulation
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS v. CITY OF
ISSUE: Whether there is a distinction between
MANILA
Ordinance 3358 and Ordinances 3634, 3301 and 3816,
to prevent refund to the company.
HELD: Generally, the term “tax” applies to all kinds of
exactions which become public funds. Legally,
however, a license fee is a legal concept quite distinct
from tax: the former is imposed in the exercise of
police power for purposes of regulation, while the latter
is imposed under the taxing power for the purpose of
raising revenues. Ordinance 3358 prescribes municipal
license fees for the privilege to engage in the business
of selling liquor or alcohol beverages; considering that
the sale of intoxicating liquor is (potentially) harmful to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
public health and morals, and must be subject to
supervision or regulation by the State and by cities and
municipalities authorized to act in the premises. On the
other hand, Ordinances 3634 , 3301 and 3816 imposed
taxes on the sales of general merchandise, wholesale
or retail, and are revenue measures enacted by the
Municipal Board of Manila.
Both a license fee and a tax may be imposed on the
same business or occupation, or for selling the same
article, without it being in violation of the rule against
double taxation. The contrary view of the Treasurer in
its letter is of no consequence as the government is not
bound by the errors or mistakes committed by its
officers, specially on matters of law.
The company, thus, is not entitled to refund
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency
was estimated at P624 million.
The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer,
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the
real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition
for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary
236
injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition
sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing
real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for
public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local
Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of “government-owned and-
controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code. Respondents also argue that a
basic rule of statutory construction is that the express
mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others.
An international airport is not among the exceptions
mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government
Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim
that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from
real estate tax.
MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are
owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax
itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is
that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage,
since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax
creditor.
ISSUE:
WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt
from real estate tax under existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the
real estate tax assessments issued by the City of
Parañaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such
assessments, are void.
HELD:
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled
Corporation
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National
Government and thus exempt from local taxation.
MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no
capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no
stockholders or voting shares.
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has
no members. A non-stock corporation must have
members.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is
vested with corporate powers.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become
a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it
remains a government instrumentality exercising not
only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus,
MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent
domain, police authority and the levying of fees and
charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises “all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order.”
2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by
the Republic
a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of
public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines.
237
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion
mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports”
includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands
and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the
State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA
Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic
of the Philippines.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public
use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation.
The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other
charges from the public does not remove the character
of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for
public use.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine
the character of the property whether it is of public
dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines
property of public dominion as one “intended for public
use.” The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers,
as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines,
constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the
operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does
not change the character of MIAA as an airport for
public use. Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This
means taxing those among the public who actually use
a public facility instead of taxing all the public including
those who never use the particular public facility.
b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the
Commerce of Man
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The Court has also ruled that property of public
dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot
be the subject of an auction sale.
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are
not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through
public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on
execution or auction sale of any property of public
dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.
Essential public services will stop if properties of public
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures
and auction sale. This will happen if the City of
Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale
of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment
of real estate tax.
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic
MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and
Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter
12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows
instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties
owned by the Republic. n MIAA’s case, its status as a
mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is
clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the
deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the
President of the Republic can sign such deed of
conveyance.
d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a
Reorganization
The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the
Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to
transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the
Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely
238
toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air
Transportation into a separate and autonomous body.
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport
Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the
Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over
MIAA’s assets adverse to the Republic.
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned
by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has
been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person following are exempted from payment of
the real property tax.
However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings
that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from
real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by
hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is
subject to real estate tax.
Defensor-Santiago v Guingona GR No. 134577 (18
November 1998)
(political question)
Petitioners herein filed a petition for quo warranto calling
for the Court to annul the election of Senator Juan
Flavier as the Senate Minority Floor Leader and
declaring Senator Francisco Tatad as the rightful holder
of that position.
The Eleventh Congress was composed of 10
senators from LAMP, 7 senators from Lakas-NUCD-
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
UMDP, 2 independents, and 1 each from LP, Aksyon
Demokrasya, PRP, and Gabay Bayan. During its first
regular session, Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2.
Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of
Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of
the minority, he was assuming the position of minority
leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested
that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Party, numbering 7 and thus also a minority, had
chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that
he had received a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the Senate Minority Leader.
It is the petitioners' position that when the
Constitution says that the Senate President shall be
elected by “a majority” of its members, then those who
did not vote for the Senate President would constitute
the minority. Thus, by recognizing the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators as the minority block, the Constitution
has been violated.
ISSUE: (1) WON the Court has jurisdiction over the
case; (2) WON there has been a violation of Section
16(1), Article 16 of the Constitution.
239
HELD: The Court took cognizance of the case despite
protestations from the respondents of a political
question. Jurisdiction being determined by the
allegations in the pleading or petition, the Court said
that the allegation of petitioners of a violation of the
Constitution made for a case over which it had a prima
facie jurisdiction. The petition calls for an interpretation
or application of the Constitution and whether the
Senate President had correctly construed the meaning
of the words “minority” and “majority” which, under the
Court's expanded duty under Article VIII, falls within the
scope of the Court's jurisdiction.
The Court then observed that the Constitution did
not provide for the manner of selecting other officers of
Congress apart from the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House. All that the Charter says is that
'[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.' Thus, the method of selecting such
officers must be prescribed and is a prerogative of the
houses of Congress themselves. Notably, the Rules of
the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority
and minority leaders and neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices nor prescribing the
manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof. In the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of
the Senate relative thereto. This Court has no authority
to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles
that it is bound to protect and uphold.
Thus, while adherence to the Constitution is a
proper question for the Court, this case does not
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
actually present a question which the Court can pass
upon. Nonetheless, the Court, calling upon its duty “to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion,” declared that the Senate President did
not abuse his discretion in recognizing the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP senators as the minority block in view of
the fact that it is one of the minority groups in the
Senate. PETITION DISMISSED.
(Also see: Bagatsing v Committee on Privatization,
Sanidad v COMELEC 73 SCRA 333, and Romulo v
Yniquez 141 SCRA 263)
Jaworksi v PAGCOR GR No. 144463 (14 January
2004)
(delegation of powers)
Respondent PAGCOR was created by PD 1869 and
was granted a franchise “To establish and operate clubs
and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including
sports, gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.)
and such other forms of amusement and recreation
including games of chance.” On 31 March 1998, the
PAGCOR entered into an agreement with its co-
respondent SAGE Corporation whereby it granted the
latter authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting
station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet
Gaming facilities to service local and international
bettors.
Petitioner sought the nullification of the contract
claiming among other that PAGCOR had no power to
grant SAGE the authority to operate gambling activities
via the internet.
240
HELD: The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. A
legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the
state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern
which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but
should be reserved for public control and administration,
either by the government directly, or by public agents,
under such conditions and regulations as the
government may impose on them in the interest of the
public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on
which the grant of the franchise may be made.
In the case at bar, the agreement entered into by
PAGCOR and SAGE, in essence, gives SAGE the
privilege to actively participate, partake and share
PAGCOR’s franchise to operate a gambling activity.
The grant of franchise is a special privilege that
constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the
grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities
arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits
set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and
conditions. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter
to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it
is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or
share its franchise, much less grant a veritable
franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR
can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle
of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as
there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been
expressly authorized to do so.
(See also: Lim v Pacquing 240 SCRA 649)
Garcia v Executive Secretary 211 SCRA 219, GR No.
157584
(same; permissible delegation)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the
Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all
imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443
increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year,
EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty
except that crude oil and other oil products continued to
be taxed at 9%. Petitioner Garcian, avers that EO 475
and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of
Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: "All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments." He contends that since the
Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power of
issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in
the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: WON EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution,
the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills,
like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It
does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to
the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
241
Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI
of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government." There is
thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to
authorize the President "subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within
specific limits""tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . . ."
(See also: Philippine Interisland Shipping Association v
CA GR No. 100481, 22 January 1997 where the
Legislature delegated the power to fix rates to the
President who may then exercise such power directly
without first withdrawing the earlier delegation made to
the Philippine Ports Authority.)
Rodriguez v Gella 92 Phil 603, GR No. L-6266
(same; emergency powers delegated to the President)
On 16 December 1941, Congress, pursuant to Section
26, Article VI of the then Constitution, passed CA 671,
"declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war
involving the Philippines and authorizing the President
to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency." Subsequently, Congress filed HB 727
intending repeal CA 671 but which the President vetoed
on the ground that war was still subsisting as a fact due
to the Korean War.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Subsequently still, the President issued EO 545
and 546 appropriation funds for various purposes.
Petitioners seek to invalidate the issuances.
People v Vera 65 Phil 56, GR No. L-45685
(same; delegation to the people; delegation to local
ISSUE: WON the EO’s are valid.
governments)
HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the
EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered
ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual
emergencies or calamities emanating from the last
world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without
such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of
merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed
to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the
president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of
Congress must be given due weight. For it would be
absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be
able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other
words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its
powers than to take them back. This is not right and is
not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be
likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the
consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that
he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same
way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the
relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can
it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is
coupled with interest.
(See also David v Macapagal-Arroyo which
distinguishes the power of the President to declare a
“state of emergency” under Sec 18, Art VII and the
242
exercise of emergency powers under Section 17, Art
XII)
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in
Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated
to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower
court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of
the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the
Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge
Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor
countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because, among other things,
Act No. 4221, the Probation Law, is an undue
delegation of legislative power in that it subjects the
effectivity of the measure to the absolute discretion of
the provincial boards in Section 11 thereof: “This Act
shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer.”
ISSUE: WON there is an undue delegation of legislative
power.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as
pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition
of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because
there is no set standard provided by Congress on how
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the
doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a
violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction
of the Probation Office. This only means that only
provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation
officer may have a system of probation within their
locality. This would mean to say that convicts in
provinces where no probation officer is instituted may
not avail of their right to probation.
(Note: The decision said that Legislatures may validly
leave the determination of the applicability of measures
to the people [so-called option laws] but that such laws
can only be of local application. The effectivity of laws of
general application cannot without running afoul of non-
delegation and equal protection.)
(See also: Osmena v Orbos, Tablarin v Gutierrez 152
SCRA 730, Eastern Shipping v POEA 166 SCRA 533,
and, in contrapposto, Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center
v Garcia)
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v POEA 243
SCRA 666, GR. No. 114714
(same; delegation to administrative bodies)
243
Respondent POEA issued Board Resolution 1 in
January 1998, mandating the increase compensation
and benefits the provided for in POEA's Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers. Thus, the contract
now provides that:
 in case of death, the employer should pay the
beneficiaries in the amount of $50,000 and
additional $7000 to each child under 21 but not
more than 4 children;
 if done within war or warlike area, it should be
doubled.
Petitioners filed an action seeking to nullify the
resolution contending that the POEA does not have the
power and authority fix rates for compensation and
benefits as the same is a function of the Legislative.
HELD: The Court found the issuance of Board
Resolution 1 valid. While the making of laws is a non-
delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress,
the latter may nonetheless validly delegate the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to administrative
agencies in implementing a given legislation and
effectuate its policies. This is because the legislature
may sometimes find it impractical, if not impossible, to
anticipate all the situations that may be met in carrying
the law into effect. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and
purpose of the law and that the regulation is not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law. This is power of subordinate
legislation.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
(Note: It goes without saying that for there to be a valid
delegation of the rule-making power, the law effecting
such a delegation must be complete in itself and must
provide for sufficient standards that the administrative
agency can follow.)
U.S. v Ang
(same;
On
Ynot30vJuly
IAC 1919, the Philippine
148 SCRA Legislature
659, GR No. L-74457passed Act
No. 2868 authorizing the Governor General
(same; same; same; sufficient standards test) to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of rice, palay, and corn. Pursuant to this Act,
on 1 August 1919, the Governor General issued EO 53
fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Subsequently, respondent Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer,
sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of
eighty centavos, a price much higher than that
prescribed by the EO. He was thus charged and found
guilty of violating EO 53.
Respondent now challenges the validity of the
issuance.
HELD: The Court found in favor of respondent. Act No.
2868 is an invalid delegation of legislative power
because it is not a complete issuance in and of itself.
The completeness of a measure can be determined if,
upon leaving the hands of the Legislature, nothing is left
for the Executive and its administrative agencies but to
enforce the policy enunciated therein. In the case at bar,
it will be observed that what the respondent violated is
EO 53 and not Act 2868. As a matter of fact, the Act
244
does not penalize the sale of rice, palay, or corn at any
price. It is only the EO which provided for that. Thus, Act
2868 was incomplete when it was passed by the
Legislature as it did not state any clear cut policy which
the Executive was then to enforce. It left the
determination of the policy with the Executive.
(Note: In Tang Ho 43 vPhil
Calalang 1, GR No.
Williams, theL-17122
Court held that
same; tests for valid delegation;
something as general as “public interest” completeness test)
or “public
welfare” was sufficient as a policy statement.)
Then President Marcos issued EO 626-A, making the
interprovincial transport of carabaos and carabeef as
well as the slaughtering of caraboas in a manner not
complying with EO 626 illegal. Petitioner Ynot was
apprehended transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo and pursuant to EO 626-A, the animals were
summarily confiscated.
Petitioner challenges the validity of EO 626-A
insofar as it imposes a penalty without according the
ownder the right to be heard. Furthermore, petitioner
challenges the exercise by Persident Marcos of
legislative power under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution.
HELD: The Court struck down the measure because it,
among others, was an undue delegation of legislative
power. The Court observed that the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission or, as the case
may be, the Director of Animal Industrey were given
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
authority to dispose of the confiscated animals/meat
products by distributing them to charitable and similar
institutions ”as they may see fit.” The Court found this to
be a “roving commission” which provided the Executive
officers so empowered with a wide and sweeping
authority, unrestrained by the usual standard and
reasonable guidelines or limitations to be observed in
executing their mandate. Such authority, the Court said,
is too laden with danger of partiality, abuse, and
corruption. The Court said that the Executive's authority
had to be “canalized” within banks to keep it from
overflowing.
(See also: de la Llana v Alba 112 SCRA 294, Demetria
v Alba 148 SCRA 208, Lozano v Martinez 146 SCRA
323)
Section 13 of RA 6734 authorized the President to
merge existing administrative regions. Thus, President
Aquino issued EO 429, “Providing for the
Gerochi v Department
Reorganization of theof Energy GR No. Regions
Administrative 159796, 17in
July 2007
Mindanao.” Petitioners seek the nullification of the
(same;
subjectsame; same; same)
EO contending that the provision allowing the
President to merge existing administrative regions did
not provide for a sufficient standard by which the
President may exercise such power. Hence, the
provision was an undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. It said that
while RA 6734 does not explicitly provide for the
245
standard by which the President may exercise the
power to reorganize, such standard may nonetheless be
abstracted from other statutes which have been enacted
on the same subject. For example, in RA 5435, the
President was given the power to reorganize the
Executive Department “to promote simplicity, economy,
efficiency in government to enable it to pursue its
programs consisted with the national goals for
accelerated social and economic development.” The
Creation and subsequent reorganization of
administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to the authority granted to him by the law. The
choice of President is logical because the division
intended to facilitate the administration of executive
departments and local governments. It has been
traditionally lodged in the President. By conferring the
Chiongbian
President the v Orbos 245 SCRA
power 253, GR
to merge No. 96754
existing regions,
(same; same; same; same)
Congress merely followed a pattern set in previous
legislation. There is no abdication by Congress of its
legislative power in conferring on the President the
power to merge administrative regions
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001. On April
5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-
Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with
respondent ERC a petition for the availment from the
Universal Charge of its share for “Missionary
Electrification.” Subsequently, NPC filed another petition
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
praying for the proposed share from the Universal
Charge for the Environmental Charge be approved for
withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund manged by the
PSALM. The ERC approved the petitions, authorizing
that collection of the same from the end-users on a
monthly basis and, eventually, the withdrawal of up to
P70M from the STF. On the basis of the same, the
Panay Electric Company, Inc. charged petitioner and all
other end-users with the Universal charge which was
reflected in their monthly electric bills.
Petitioners now come before the Court to assail
the Universal Charge provided for in the EPIRA to be
implemented through the IRR in that the charge is in the
nature of a tax and the power of taxation is a strictly
legislative function. Thus, delegating the same to and
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional.
HELD: All that is required for the valid exercise of this
power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and
that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but
inconformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113, GR No. L-5
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
(doctrine
have to do of incorporation)
is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court
finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all
246
its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
sufficient standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides
that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved
by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-
users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount
to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount
nevertheless is made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover,
contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not
enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of
the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is complete and
passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative
power.
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others,
to ensure the total electrification of the country and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply
of electric powerand watershed rehabilitation and
management the requirements for valid delegation, as
they provide the limitations on the ERC's power to
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
C. THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during
the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila
and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had
invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without
an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (the Philippine government under the
Japanese).
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not judicial proceedings and
decisions made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the American
occupation; (2) Whether or not the October 23, 1944
proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared
that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal
effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and
judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; (3) And
whether or not if they were not invalidated by
MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue
hearing the cases pending before them.
HELD:Political and international law recognizes that all
acts and proceedings of a de facto government are
good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their
authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually
247
remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war,
for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did
not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the laws.”
And if they were not valid, then it would not have been
necessary for MacArthur to come out with a
proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on
the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other
government” and whether or not he intended it to annul
all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts
during the Japanese military occupation. If, according to
international law, non-political judgments and judicial
proceedings of de facto governments are valid and
remain valid even after the occupied territory has been
liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s
intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be
in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A
statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains.”
xxx xxx xxx
Annulling judgments of courts made during the
Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and
violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said
should not be construed to mean that judicial
proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of
any other governments.”
xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally
acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws
and courts of the Philippines had become courts of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in
force until now, it follows that the same courts may
continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases
pending therein before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are
repealed by the said government.
Pharmaceutical
Philippines v Duque GR No. 173034, 9 October the ICBMS
(same;
international law”) by 2/3 of all members of the Senate
PHAP filed this petition for certiorari seeking to nullify
the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code) claiming that the RIRR is
not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond the scope of the Milk
Code. The Milk Code was issued by President Cory
Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.
One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states
that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the
International Code of Marketing and Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA
also adopted severel resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH
issued the assailed RIRR.
248
Relevant ISSUE: WON the pertinent international
agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law
of the land and may be implemented by DOH through
the RIRR.
HELD: Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Constitution,
international law can become domestic law by
transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation)and
or incorporation (mere constitutional
Healthcare Association of the
declaration i.e treaties). Admittedly,
2007 and
WHA what
resolutions were“generally
constitutes not treaties as they
accepted have not
principles of
been concurred
as
required under Section 21, Article 8. However, the
ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through
a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code
is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
On the other hand, the Court ruled that DOH
failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA
resolutions are customary international law that may be
deemed part of the law of the land. For an international
rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states
because they consider it as obligatory to comply with
such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions,
although signed by most of the member states, were
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member
states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted
most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code,
the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for
exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding
up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for
breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as
domestic law nor are they followed in our country as
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of
their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be
classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms,
principles and practices that influence state behavior.
Soft law is not part of international law.
Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines without submitting to the required
bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that
he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino
parentage. He had taken and finished the course of
“Bachillerato Superior” in Spain and was approved,
selected and qualified by the “Insitututo de Cervantes”
for admission to the Central University of Madrid where
he studied and finished the law course, graduating there
as “Licenciado en derecho”. Thereafter he was allowed
to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that
under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic
Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is
entitled to the practice the law profession in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations.
ISSUE:WON a treaty can modify regulations governing
admission to the Philippine Bar
249
HELD: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The
provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by
the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern
Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain,
and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal
In re: Garciain2 the
profession SCRA 984 (15 August
Philippines. 1961)is a Filipino
Applicant
(same; in conflicts between international
citizen desiring to practice the legal profession law inand
the
municipal law, municipal law should be upheld)
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his
own country and is not entitled to the privileges
extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty
invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to
the laws and regulations of the contracting state in
whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could
not have been intended to modify the laws and
regulations governing admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines, for reason that the Executive
Department may not enroach upon the consitutional
prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines,
and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules
being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
Gonzales v Hechanova 9 SCRA 230, GR No. L-
21897
(same; same)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the requisite
of securing a certification from the Nat’l Economic
Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals.
Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000
tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local
planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive
agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because
RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by
"the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency.
ISSUE:Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2
executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The
former may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
Secretary of Justice v Lantion GR No. 139465, 18
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
January 2000
enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
(same; same)
indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between
a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of
time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the
contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive
250
agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances
which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an
international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts in “All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
or executive order or regulation is in question". In other
words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.
(See also: Ichong v Hernandez 101 Phil 115)
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United
States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for
various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance
with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Decree No. 1069, “Prescribing the Procedure for
Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in
a Foreign Country and the established Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and
the Government of the United States of America,” the
department proceeded with proceeded with the
designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a
technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in
the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent
requested for a copy of the official extradition request as
well as the documents and papers submitted therein.
The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such
information is confidential in nature and that it is
premature to provide such document as the process is
not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation.
Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are
not yet available.
ISSUE: (1)WON private respondent can be granted
access to the official extradition request and documents
with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition
thereto; (2) WON private respondent's entitlement to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the private
respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to give him a
reasonable period of time within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there
exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the
251
Philippine Government to comply with the
provisions of the treaty and its equally significant
role of protection of its citizens of its right of due
process. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the
presidential decree already pose an impending threat to
a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as the
evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his
liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand,
granting due process to the extradition case causes
delay in the process. The rule of pacta suntservanda,
one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep
their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals
are confronted with situations in which there appears to
be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state.
Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable
and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation
decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. In this case, there is no conflict between
international law and municipal law. The United States
and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the
suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord
common due process protection to their respective
citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 252

Law precludes the rights of due process from a
prospective extradite
(See also: Philip Morris, Inc v CA)
E. DUTY OF GOVERNMENT; PEOPLE TO DEFEND
THE STATE
Chavez v Romulo GR No. 157036 (9 June 2004)
(duty of government; people to defend state; right to bear
arms)
right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable
or absolute right. A license authorizing a person to enjoy
a certain privilege is neither a property nor property
right. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the
basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order
in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the
issuance of the Guidelines is the interest of the public in
general.

Pursuant to PGMA’s speech stressing the need for a

nationwide gun ban in all public places, PNP Chief
Ebdane issued the “Guidelines in the Implementation of
the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence.” It revoked all existing Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence(PTCFOR), subject to
renewal. Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to
whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG
to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. His request was denied. Thus, he went to
court to challenge the constitutionality of the guidelines.

ISSUES: (1) WON the revocation of the PTCFOR's

pursuant to the Guidelines is a violation of the people’s
right to property; (2) WON the issuance of the assailed
Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power

HELD: The Court ruled against petitioner. The right to

bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a
constitutional right. Being a mere statutory creation, the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
VI. BILL OF RIGHTS
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973)
PBMEO, a legitimate labor union, decided to stage a
mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969,
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to
be participated in by the workers in the first, second and
third shifts. PBM informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized,
however, that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company. It also warned the PBMEO representatives
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts,
who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report
for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike. Petitioners and their members numbering
about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite
the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and
third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration.
Hence, PBM with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in
relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all
of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for
253
'No Strike and No Lockout.'" The Court of Industrial
Relations found PBMEO’s officers guilty of unfair labor
v.
practice.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CIR. It
ruled that the demonstration held by petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their
employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of
their freedom of expression in general and of their right
of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in
particular before the appropriate governmental agency,
the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid and protection from
what they believe were police excesses.
It also ruled that while the Bill of Rights also protects
property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms
are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation only "with
narrow specificity."
Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights
229 SCRA 117 (1994)
Simon, Jr. (in his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City)
sent a "Demolition Notice" to respondents (officers and
members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Inc) in
which they were given a grace-period of three (3) days
within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the
private respondents were informed that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the "People's Park."
Afterwards, private respondents filed a letter-complaint
with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia
along North EDSA. Acting on the complaint, the CHR
directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order
would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." The
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil
and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated
in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their
privilege to engage in business." The CHR denied the
motion to dismiss.
The Court ruled that the extent of CHR's investigative
power is limited to “all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights."
The term "civil rights," has been defined as referring —
"(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the
state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants,
and are not connected with the organization or
administration of government. They include the rights of
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also
254
refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being
enforced or redressed in a civil action."
Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the
right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right
of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what
are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by private respondents on a land which is
planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More
than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon
City which is a busy national highway. The consequent
danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be
that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this
instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order
for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil
and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
407 SCRA 10 (2003)
The AFP Anti-Graft Board was created by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel. Based on its mandate, the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General
Josephus Ramas and his alleged mistress Elizabeth
Dimaano. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture
against Ramas, but the same was amended to implead
Dimaano as co-defendant. After so many
postponements due to inability of petitioner to show
further evidence, private respondents filed their motion
to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the Migrino
case, the Court held that the PCGG does not have
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers
by reason of mere position held without showing that
they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the amended complaint
and ordered the return of the confiscated items to
respondent Dimaano. It remanded the records of the
case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as
the evidence warrants and also referred the case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Dimaano.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Hence, this petition for review seeking to set
aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
The primary issue for resolution herein is whether
PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing
of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for
unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379. The other
issues involved the propriety of the dismissal of the
case before the presentation of evidence and the
legality of the search and seizure.
The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that the PCGG
had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas as he was not
255
a "subordinate" of President Marcos as contemplated
under EO No. 1, which created PCGG. Mere position
held by a military does not make him a "subordinate" as
this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any showing
that he enjoyed close association with former President
Marcos. The Court disagreed with the petitioner's claim
that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case
before the completion of the presentation of petitioner's
evidence. According to the Court, the petitioner had
almost two years to prepare its evidence; however, it
still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence
by filing numerous motions for postponements and
extensions. Based on these circumstances, obviously
petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete
presentation of its evidence. The Court also ruled that
the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized
the subject items. The search warrant did not
particularly describe the items seized. The seizure of
these items was therefore, void, and unless these items
are contraband per se, which they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding team
seized them.
Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City Mayor,
20 SCRA 849 (1967)
The City of Manila enacted an ordinance requiring
patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal
information such as name, gender, nationality, age,
address and occupation before they could be admitted
to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This ordinance was
enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful
to public morals. Petitioners challenged the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
constitutionality of the ordinance alleging that the
ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process. The City
answered that the challenged ordinance bears a
reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to
curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the
police power. The trial court ruled that the ordinance as
unconstitutional.
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the
Supreme Court held that the mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not
cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a
police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the
scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the
great public needs."
There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note
of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included as
annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the
existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit"
and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and
thrill seekers." The challenged ordinance then
"proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
256
transients and guests of these establishments by
requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby
open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to
shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
license fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the
income of the city government."
Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 124 (1919)
Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) filed an action for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus against Joaquin Natividad,
Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine
Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate of Philippine
registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato. The
Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his
reason that all the stock- holders of Smith, Bell & Co.,
Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of
the Philippine Islands. Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) argues
that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its
property without due process of law because by the
passage of the law the company was automatically
deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the
Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not
use. The issue is whether the Government of the
Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the
registry of vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations
having alien stockholders.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The Supreme Court ruled that the right to due process
is universal in their application to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences
of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes
aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons"
within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their
property is concerned.
However, the apparent purpose of the Philippine
Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping
act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to
encourage Philippine ship-building. Hence, while Smith,
Bell & Co Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders,
is entitled to the protection afforded by the-due process
of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of
the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations
such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to register
vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not
belong to that vicious species of class legislation which
must always be condemned, but does fall within
authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the
police power, and so does not offend against the
constitutional provision.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978)
The City of Manila enacted an ordinance which
prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or
participate in any position or occupation or business
enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or
casual, without first securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or
257
consular missions of foreign countries, or in the
technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of
religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination,
who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Respondents
challenged the constitutionality of said ordinance on the
ground that is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable,
being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of
their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore,
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution. The trial court held the ordinance as
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s
decision and ruled that the ordinance in question
violates the due process of law and equal protection
rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a
permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold
or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic
right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines
as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter
of protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
Buck v Bell, 274 US 200 (1926)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its
completeness free from dismemberment and extends to
the use of God-given faculties which make life
enjoyable.
Facts : Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who
was committed to a state mental institution. Her
condition had been present in her family for the last
three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the sexual
sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the
"health of the patient and the welfare of society." Before
the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing
was required to determine whether or not the operation
was a wise thing to do.
Issue: Did the Virginia statute which authorized
sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the
law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held: The Court found that the statute did not violate
the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's
challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved
but on the process of the substantive law. Since
sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had
occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be
present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and
the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if
so requested by the patient. Only after "months of
observation" could the operation take place. That was
enough to satisfy the Court that there was no
Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the
state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like
Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being
258
swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of
imbeciles are enough."
Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 Phil 660 (1919)
Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free
from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. It includes
the right to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways.
Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes in the
province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from
their native habitat and to established themselves on a
reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to
remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of
cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a
Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These
reservations, as appears from the resolution of the
Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares
of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which
about 300 Manguianes are confined.
One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial
sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because
he escaped from the reservation.
An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of
Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging
that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of
section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: "With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such
a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board,”
was challenged.
Issue: Whether or not the said law is constitutional.
Held: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. The reasons for the section
included (1) it was an attempt for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of the province (2) the only
successful method for educating the Manguianes was to
oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The
Solicitor-General added the following; (3) The protection
of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
Among other things, it was held that the term "non-
Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or a
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate
to degrees of civilization. The term "non-Christian" it
was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to
geographical area, and more directly to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the
other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine
Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the
Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its
Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police
power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the
259
public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the
law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police
power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt
registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes
an advancement of the public interests, for, besides
promoting peace and good order among landowners in
particular and the people in general, it helps increase
the industries of the country, and makes for the
development of the natural resources, with the
consequent progress of the general prosperity. And
these ends are pursued in a special manner by the
State through the exercise of its police power.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory
nor class legislation, and stated among other things: ". .
. one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class."
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923)
Property is anything that can come under the right of
ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents
more than the things it owns; it includes the right to
secure, use, and dispose of them.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Facts: US citizens wanted to lease their agricultural
land to Nakatsuka, a Japanese farmer. A Washington
statute disqualified aliens who had not in good faith
declared intention to become citizens of the United
States from taking or holding interests in land in the
State for farming or other purposes. It provided that
upon the making of such prohibited conveyance the
land shall be forfeited to the State and the grantors be
subject to criminal punishment, and the alien also, if he
failed to disclose the nature and extent of his interest.
Citizens owning land in Washington and an alien
Japanese, desirous of consummating a lease to the
alien for farming, sued to enjoin the state attorney
general from taking criminal and forfeiture proceedings,
as he threatened to prosecute them. Complainants
alleged that the restriction violated the federal and state
constitutions and conflicted with a treaty with Japan.
Issue: Is the act repugnant to the due process clause or
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Held: No. Appellants contend that the act contravenes
the due process clause in that it prohibits the owners
from making lawful disposition or use of their land, and
makes it a criminal offense for them to lease it to the
alien, and prohibits him from following the occupation of
farmer; and they contend that it is repugnant to the
equal protection clause in that aliens are divided into
two classes -- those who may and those who may not
become citizens, one class being permitted, while the
other is forbidden, to own and as defined.
260
The court disagreed with appellants and ruled that the
case involved the privilege of owning or controlling
agricultural land within the State. The quality and
allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the farm
lands within its borders are matters of highest
importance, and affect the safety and power of the State
itself. The Terraces, who are citizens, have no right
safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to lease
their land to aliens lawfully forbidden to take or have
such lease.
Nuñez v Averia GR No L-38415 (1974)
Public office is not property but one unlawfully ousted
from it may institute an action to recover the same,
flowing from the de jure officer’s right to office.
Facts: Nuñez contested the election results for the
Mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on the ground of fraud,
irregularities, and corrupt practices. The original
protestee was Edgardo Morales who was ambushed
and killed, hence succeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo
de Leon.
Nuñez’s protest was denied on the ground that it was
moot and academic, citing the Presidents General
Order 3&4 to remove from office all incumbent
government officials and employees.
Issue: Were the dismissal orders valid?
Held: The Court in its unanimous joint decision en
banc in the similar cases
of Paredes, Sunga and Valley has already declared
such dismissal orders as "clear error," ruling that "(I)t
must be emphasized that the `right' of the private
respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
only by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New
Constitution but principally from their having been
proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a
result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if
in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their
respective positions and consequently, have no right to
hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their
privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should
not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given
to them by said constitutional provision," and that "(I)t is
erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of
the New Constitution, the term of office of the private
respondents expired, and that they are now holding
their respective offices under a new term. We are of the
opinion that they hold their respective offices still under
the term to which they have been elected, although the
same is now indefinite."
The Court further stressed therein that "(T)he
Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as
in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who
had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the
herein private respondents to the respective offices
which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to
question would be tantamount to giving a stamp of
approval to what could have been an election victory
characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote
buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the
Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the
ballot."
Bince v COMELEC GR No 111624-25 (1995)
261
The court has recognized while public office is not
property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is
nevertheless a protected right.
Facts:
 The elections for the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of
Pangasinan, 6th District was composed of 10
municipalities.
 Private Respondent Micu objected to the
inclusion of the Certificates of Canvass for San
Quintin, on the ground that it contained false
statements.
 The Provincial Board of Canvassers ruled against
Micu. Micu appealed to the COMELEC which
credited Micu with 1,535 votes and Bince with
1,055 votes from San Quintin.
 Micu and the Municipal Board of Canvassers filed
petition for correction of votes. Bince ultimately
had 27,370 votes and Micu had 27,369 votes.
Bince was not proclaimed winner because of the
absence of authority from COMELEC and filed a
formal motion for such authority.
 COMELEC promulgated an order directing the
PBC to continue with the canvass and proclaim
the winning candidates.
 The PBC acted on the petitions for correction,
allowing such.
 Bince appealed arguing the PBC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 262

 MICU filed an urgent motion for the PBC to nevertheless, a protected right
reconvene and proceed with canvass. Bince filed (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the
a petition for preliminary injunction and alternative Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed.,
prayer for proclamation as winner. 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543
[1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432
 The PBC Chairman filed a petition with [1924]). Due process in proceedings before
COMELEC seeking a definite ruling as to who the respondent COMELEC, exercising its
should be proclaimed, as there were corrections quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice
already made in a separate sheet of paper of the and hearing, among others. Thus, although
Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate
of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan which cases, the power to annul or suspend the
corrections if to be considered by the Board in its proclamation of any candidate. We had
canvass and proclamation, Micu will win by 72 ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on
votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March
not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on
will win by one (1) vote. Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988)
and Gallardo vs. Commission on
 Bince was proclaimed winner. Micu filed an
Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989)
urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul
that the COMELEC is without power to
Proclamation. The COMELEC ruled in his favor
partially or totally annul a proclamation or
and annulled the proclamation of Bince.
suspend the effects of a proclamation
 Bince filed for certiorari, arguing the COMELEC without notice and hearing.
resolution was promulgated without prior notice  Micu filed a motion to hear the pending incidents
and hearing. The court ruled [relevant to left in court. Both parties filed their respective
syllabus] position papers. The COMELEC ruled that Bince
was to be proclaimed winner.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office
without due process of law. Although public  Micu filed an MR which was granted.
office is not property under Section 1 of the
Issue: Who was entitled to the seat?
Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III,
Held: Micu. In Tayug, the total votes received by
1987 Constitution), and one cannot acquire
petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486
a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A.,
when it should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince,
Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is,
in effect, was credited by 71 votes more.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes
but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV
reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the
other hand, the same SOV indicated that private
respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually
received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4
votes.
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private
respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of
Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption
into public office was therefore flawed from the
beginning, the same having been based on a faulty
tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the
illegal proclamation.
As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect
to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such
as the one at issue should not, as much as possible,
reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious
judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers' money, if
they can be settled below without prejudice to any party
or to the ends of justice.
Crespo v Provincial Board 160 SCRA 66 (1988)
Facts: Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On
25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed
against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for
harassment, abuse of authority and oppression.
As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to
why he should not be dealt with administratively,
with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance
with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185.
263
On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his
counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted
a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During
the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was
allowed to present evidence, testimonial and
documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence
presented, the responden t Provincial Board passed
Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner
from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva
Ecija.
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to
annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public
respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending
him from office and to enjoin public respondent from
enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive
suspension and from proceeding further with the
administrative case. According to petitioner, the order of
preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No.
51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-
handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a
hearing and investigation of the truth or falsity
of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In
issuing the order of preventive suspension, the
respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has
grossly violated the fundamental and elementary
principles of due process. On 3 May 1971, this Court
issued a preliminary injunction.
Issue: Was petitioner denied due process?
Held: Yes. In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc.
6 this Court held: It is a principle in American
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in
this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade
or calling is a "property right and the
wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.
The right is considered to be property within the
protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process
of law.
Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was
issued without giving the petitioner a chance to
be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he
was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing,
respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum,
contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for
the petitioner mayor made known by a request in
writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his
desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation
of the said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the
respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire
of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner
mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to
appeal." The contention of the Provincial Board cannot
stand alone in t he absence of proof or evidence to
support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on
15 February 1971, nothing therein can be gathered that,
in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation
submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The
assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the
evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.
In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said: From the
earliest inception of institutional government in our
country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been
fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice
264
would be impossible without the right to notice and to be
board. The emphasis on substantive due process and
other recent ramifications of the due process clause
sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget
that due process was initially concerned with
fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law
school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat.
518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the
land which means "The general law; a law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under
the protection of the general rules which govern
society. A sporting opportunity to be heard and the
rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a
coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements
of procedural due process.
The petition, however, has become moot and academic.
Records do not show that in the last local elections held
on18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public
office.
Republic v Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation GR No
A149927 (2004) license that contravenes a mandatory
mining
provision of law under which it is granted is void. Being
a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights
in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process
and teh non-impairment clauses of the Constitution it
can be revoked by the State in the public interest.
Facts: Four respondents were granted permission to
look for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Bato. When they discovered deposits in Mount Mabio,
they applied for and were granted such license, but it
was later cancelled.
The Trial Court opined that it was a property right
protected under due process, which required notice and
hearing. The cancellation therefore was held to be
unjust.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, and cited
the non-impairment of obligations and contracts.
Issue: Did the cancellation of license violate due
process for being without due notice and hearing?
The license can be revoked or rescinded by executive
action because it is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause. The
license itself provides such condition. It can be validly
revoked by the state in an exercise of police power in
accordance with the Regalian doctrine.
It also was not a bill of attainder, a legislative act
inflicting punishment without judicial trial. The
proclamation only declared the nullity of a license, not
guilt or punishment.
Even if it was an executive act by President Aquino, she
was validly exercising legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution of 1986.
C. Jian - minority report, submitted first, was received
93 - 3 cases (Pedro to Kwong Sin)
94- 4 cases (Yu Eng Cong to Javier)
SATURNINA GALMAN, et al, petitioners vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondents (1986)
Facts:
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
265
- On August 21, 1983, Ninoy Aquino was cold-
bloodedly killed while under escort away by
soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the
Manila International Airport. His brain was
smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the
back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by
airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and
"from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically
impossible to get inside (such) a cordon."
- The military investigators reported within a span
of three hours that the man who shot Aquino was
a communist-hired gunman, and that the military
escorts gunned him down in turn. Marcos
instantly accepted the military version and
repeated it in a nationally televised press
conference that he gave late in the evening of
August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to
induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the
killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate
Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
- Due to the public outrage that followed, Marcos
was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to
investigate the assassination. The Board
submitted their minority and majority reports to
the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. The
congenially and cordially by Marcos who treated
the report as if it were the majority report instead
of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it
to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution
through the legal system" and for trial in the
Sandiganbayan. In contrast, when the majority
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
report was submitted Marcos coldly received the
authors and could scarcely conceal his instant
rejection of their report with the grim statement
that "I hope you can live with your conscience
with what you have done."
- Both majority and minority reports were one in
rejecting the military version that Rolando Galman
was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the
evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando
Galman had no subversive affiliations." They
were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the
staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;"
that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the
assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT
troopers who gunned down Galman and the
soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the
service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with
one another, gave a perjured story to us
regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen.
Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman
himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was
the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot.
- The only difference between the two reports is
that the majority report found all the twenty-six
private respondents case headed by then AFP
Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the
military conspiracy, while the minority report
would exclude nineteen of them and limit as
plotters "the six persons who were on the service
stairs while Senator Aquino was descending, and
one General Custodio as the crime could not
have been planned without his intervention.
266
- Galman’s widow, et al filed the present action
alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people
of the Philippines to due process of law. They
asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent
the interest of the people when he failed to exert
genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and
important testimonial and documentary evidence
for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan
Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in
favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded
with the gravest doubts the sincerity of
government to find out the truth about the Aquino
assassination." They pray that the SC retrain the
Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan from rendering a
decision on the merits in the pending criminal
cases and that judgment be rendered declaring a
mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an
impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor.
- Although the SC initially granted a TRO, it later
withdrew the same. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability. It in
effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman
(who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy
contrary to the very information and evidence
submitted by the prosecution.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- In their second motion for reconsideration, they
included the revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan
Manuel Herrera as reported in the Manila Times
entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," where he revealed
that Marcos ordered the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan and the prosecution panel headed
by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases
(People v Custodio) against the 26 accused and
produce a verdict of acquittal.
- Respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy,
and invoked that the issues had become moot
and academic because of the rendition of the
Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all
respondents- accused on December 2, 1985,
- The SC appointed a 3-member commission to
hear and receive evidence of the charges of
collusion and other relevant matters, andsubmit
their findings to the Court. The Commission, upon
reviewing the evidence found that the
proceedings in the Aquino-Galman case had
been vitiated by lack of due process and
recommended that the prayer for declaration of
mistrial in people v Custodio be granted.
Issues:
1. W/N the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan should
be declared a mistrial.
2. W/N a retrial would constitute double jeopardy.
Held:
First Issue – YES, IT SHOULD BE
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and
verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The
267
courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and
justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if
they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render impartial
justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of aright or the prevention or redress of a
wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the
pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case
at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth and the integrity of our judicial system is
at stake. In life, as an accused before the military
tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he
was entitled to due process of law and trial in the
regular civil courts before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy is the victim of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination" and the
relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties
plead once more for due process of law and are trial
before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.
The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a
mock trial - the non-trial of the century -and that the
predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and
void ab initio
.Second Issue – NO, IT DOES NOT.
Ratio
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's
setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
process. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
due process is thereby violated. The cardinal precept is
that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.
Reasoning
- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. The lower
court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution
to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never
terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy,
and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.- More so does the rule against the invoking
of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we
have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the
authoritarian president ordered respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanod bayan to rig the trial and
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total
absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused.
Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera
which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from
the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution
268
was already foregone conclusion, they could not cope
with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers
of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate
and threaten its witnesses, secure the irrecantation or
prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the
prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and
overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear
and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a
"dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its
intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6
months time or less than a year, pursuant to the
scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the
Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards
(it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand
and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil
situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of
being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on
making assurances that if given a certain period, they
will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera
pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its
evidence" and cited other pending cases before
respondent court that were pending trial for a much
longer time where the" dizzying tempo" and "fast pace"
were no tmaintained by the court. Manifestly, the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due
process of law with a partial court and biased
Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive
monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian
President to assure the carrying out of his instructions.
A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal
such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In
legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible
and unspeakable affront to the society andthe people.
To paraphrase Brandeis: If theauthoritarian head of the
government becomes the law breaker, he breeds
contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a
law unto himself, he invites anarchy.
Dispositive
Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is
granted.
judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings
in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of
acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010and 10011
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther
Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and
with careful regard for the requirements of due process,
so that the truth maybe finally known and justice done to
all.
LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Facts:
respondents
- Marcos . instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay
FRANCISCO, J.:
directly to the president’s office and in cash what
the MIAA owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which
Tabuena replied, “Yes, sir, I will do it.” This order
was followed by a Presidential memorandum
repeating said order.
- Tabuena, caused the release of P55 Million of
MIAA funds through a manager’s check for said
amount payable to Tabuena, which was
269
encashed and delivered to Marcos’ personal
secretary. No receipt was issued.
- The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as
described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves,
“out of the ordinary” and “not based on the normal
procedure”. Not only were there no vouchers
prepared to support the disbursement, the P55
Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC
receipt for the P55 Million was presented. It was
even affirmed that were no payments made to
PNCC by MIAA.
- Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying
with the MARCOS Memorandum.
Issue:
W/N the Sandiganbayan violated Tabuena’s rights when
it propounded several questions to witnesses.
Held:
Yes IT DID
While going over the records, we were struck by the
way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
themselves.
Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the
Sandiganbayan. Atty. Andres asked sixteen (16)
questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes
only asked six (6) questions on cross-examination After
the defense opted not to conduct any re-direct
examination, the court further asked a total of ten (10)
questions Questions from the court after Tabuena’s
cross-examination totalled sixty-seven (67), more than
five times Prosecutor Viernes’ questions on cross-
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
examination (14), and more than double the total of
direct examination and cross-examination questions
which is thirty-one. The questions of the court were in
the nature of cross examinations characteristic of
confrontation, probing and insinuation.i[
This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to
question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind
upon any material point which presents itself during the
trial of a case over which he presides But not only
should his examination be limited to asking
“clarificatory” questions, the right should be sparingly
and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should
stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor
intervening in the conduct of the trial.
Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in
fact can one avoid the impression that the
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more
precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in
proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the
Justices cross-examined the witnesses supplementing
those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding
the latter’s questions in length.
The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of
due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta
when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the
dual role of magistrate and advocate.
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. The Honorable
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPINES, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
270
Facts:
- Imelda Marcos, was Minister of Human
Settlement while Jose P. Dans, Jr. was the
Minister of Transportation and Communication.
The two served as ex oficio Chairman and Vice-
Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail
Transport Authority (LRTA). Marcos was also
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc.
(PGHFI).
- Marcos, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI,
and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice Chairman of LRTA,
signed the Lease Agreement by virtue of which
LRTA leased to PGHFI a parcel of land.
- Marcos, as Chairman of PGHFI then signed a
Sublease Agreement with Transnational
Construction Corporation (TNCC).
- Marcos was subsequently charged for entering
into subject Lease Agreement alleged to be
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
- The Sandiganbayan convicted Marcos of the
charge after it found that the rental price
stipulated in the Lease Agreement was unfair and
unreasonably low in contrast to the rental rate in
the Sub-lease Agreement with the TNCC.
- It appeared, however, that during the deliberation
period the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
composed of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and
Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could
not agree on whether to convict or acquit the
petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending
against her. Unlike Garchitorena and Balajadia,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Atienza was in favor of exonerating Marcos. As
there was no unanimity of votes, Presiding
Justice Garchitorena formed a Special Division of
five (5) justices composed of himself, Balajadia,
Atienza, Amores, and del Rosario.
- It was found that Presiding Justice Garchitorena
and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario lunched
together in a Quezon City restaurant where they
discussed petitioner's cases in the absence of
Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence
of a non-member of the Special Division. Thereat,
Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices,
Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the
position of Justice Atienza to acquit Marcos in
some cases, and convict her in others. After the
meeting, Garchitorena dissolved the Special
Division.
Issues:
W/N Sandiganbayan violated Marcos’ right to due
process.
Held:
ABSOLUTELY.
First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides that
"sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or
division, shall be held in its principal office in the
Metropolitan Manila where it shall try and determine all
cases filed with it.
Second. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not allow
unscheduled discussion of cases.
271
Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not also allow
informal discussion of cases. The deliberations in case
at bar did not appear on record. The informal discussion
of the three justices came to light only when petitioner
moved to inhibit Presiding Justice Garchitorena after her
conviction.
Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the
presence of a non-member in the deliberation of cases.
Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the
exclusion of a member of a Division, whether regular or
special, in the deliberation of cases. Justices Atienza
and Amores were members of the Special Division but
were not present when petitioner's cases were
discussed over lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. In
effect, Atienza and Amores were disenfranchised. They
were denied their right to vote for the conviction or
acquittal of petitioner.
These irregularities violated the right of petitioner to be
tried by a collegial court. Pursuant to the rules of
Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot be convicted except
upon the vote of three justices, regardless of whether
her cases are before a regular division of three (3)
justices or a Special Division of five (5) justices. It is
indispensable that their vote be preceded by discussion
and deliberation by all the members of the division.
Before the deliberation by all, any opinion of a justice is
but tentative and could be changed. It is only after all
the justices have been heard should the justices reach a
judgment. No one opinion can be denigrated in
importance for experience shows that an opinion that
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
starts as a minority opinion could become the majority
opinion after the collision of views of the justices. The
right of the petitioner, therefore, is the right to be heard
by all the five justices of the Special Division. She is
entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members.
In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena had
already created the Special Division of five (5) justices
in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices
in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a
vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices,
especially the new justices in the persons of Justices
Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view
of the cases against her.
We reject the rationalization that the opinion of Justice
Amores was of de minimis importance as it cannot
overturn the votes of the three justices convicting the
petitioner. This is a mere guesswork. The more
reasonable supposition is that said opinion could have
changed the opinions of the other justices if it is based
on an unbiased appreciation of facts and an undistorted
interpretation of pertinent laws. That minority opinion
could sway the opinion of this Court towards the
acquittal of petitioner.
Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that
the decision of the First Division of the respondent
Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for
violating her right to substantive and procedural due
process of law.
272
As a general rule, a void decision will not result in the
acquittal of an accused. The case ought to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
for a void judgment does not expose an accused to
double jeopardy. But the present case deserves a
different treatment considering the great length of time it
has been pending with our courts.
More than six (6) years passed but petitioner's
prosecution is far from over. To remand the case to the
Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional
right to its speedy disposition. Section 16, Article III of
the Constitution assures "all persons shall have the right
to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of
Article III of the Constitution is the same, "justice
delayed is justice denied." Violation of either section
should therefore result in the acquittal of the accused.
Imelda R. Marcos is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
charged.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL
Facts:
COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
- George I. Rivera, the Manager of Corporate
respondents.
Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines
("LBP"), was charged by the LBP President with
dishonesty and violation of Anti-Graft laws on the
basis of affidavits by Lao and Perez.
- Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing
Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan
application with LBP, that he could facilitate the
processing, approval and release of the loan if he
would be given a 10% commission (which he
received). He also received from Lao, a Wynner
investor, P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to
the United States, as well as additional funds for
his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and
pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong.
- Rivera was further charged with having served
and acted, without prior authority required by
CSC Memo Circ. 1025 as the personal consultant
of Lao and as consultant in various companies
where Lao had investments. He drew and
received salaries and allowances approximately
P20,000.00 a month.
- After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera
guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the service in accepting
employment from a client of the bank and in
thereby receiving salaries and allowances in
violation of CSC Rules. He was also found to
have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3,
paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
273
SERVICE Practices Act. The penalty imposed was forced
resignation without benefits.
- On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit
Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which
reduced the penalty to suspension for 1 year.
- On appeal by Rivera and LBP to the CSC, the
CSC sustained the decision of the LBP.
- Rivera claims he was denied due process when
Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier
participated in her capacity as the Board
Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken
action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also
took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in
the resolution of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration with the CSC.
Issues:
W/N Rivera was denied due process.
Held:
YES, HE WAS.
In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of
Appeals, 8 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after
it had been established that the case concerned an
appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he
handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director
of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of
administrative justice," the Court said:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing
officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
different view or there would be no real review of the
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a
biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken
in his first view of the case.
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should
have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit
herself totally from any participation in resolving
Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning
and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due
process.
The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not
participate in MSPB's decision is unacceptable. It is not
denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in
MSPB's resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of MSPB's decision.
The case should be remanded to the CSC for resolution
without the participation of Commissioner Gaminde.
MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
Facts:
(PAL), respondents.was
- Singson employedby PALas Traffic
Representative Passenger, Handling Division.
His duty consisted of checking in passengers and
baggage for a particular flight. On June 7, 1991
he was assigned to serve the check-in counter of
Japan Air Lines (JAL) for Flight 742.
- Mrs. Lolita Kondo, a passenger of Flight 742 filed
a complaint alleging that Singson required her to
274
pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage
without issuing any receipt. A confrontation took
place where Singson was asked by the security
officer to empty his pockets. The dollars paid by
Ms. Kondo were not found in his possession.
However, when the lower panel of the check-in
counter he was manning was searched, $265
was found.
- Singson was administratively charged and
investigated by a committee formed by PAL,
which found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal. PAL dismissed Singson.
- Singson then lodged a complaint, which was
heard by the Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino who
found PAL’s evidence in terminating Singson’s
employment insufficient. Thus, he ordered
Singson’s reinstatement.
- On appeal to the NLRC (Raul Aquino was by this
time the presiding commissioner), the judgment
was reversed. Singson’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied (this time, Aquino
had no part).
- Singson assails the Resolution of the NLRC on
account of Commissioner Raul T. Aquino's
participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal
his own decision as labor arbiter
Issue:
W/N Singson was denied due process.
Held:
YES, HE WAS
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations
, the Court laid down the requisites of procedural due
process in administrative proceedings, to wit:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one's case and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have something to support itself;
(4) the evidence must be substantial;
(5) the decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate;
(7) the Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
In addition, administrative due process includes:
(a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the
institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's
legal right;
(b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his
rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence
in his favor;
(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality,
and one of competent jurisdiction; and
(d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by
substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at
275
least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the
parties.
Singson was denied due process when Commissioner
Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the
Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL's
appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former
labor arbiter.
Under Rules of Procedure of NLRC, litigants are entitled
to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial
right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered
impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case
under review. He should have inhibited himself from
any participation in this case.
The resolution of the respondent NLRC is void for the
Division that handed it down was not composed of three
impartial commissioners. The right of petitioner to an
impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he
filed his appeal. His right is to an impartial review of
three commissioners.
NLRC decision set aside and remanded.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIO
HERIDA y BERNABE @ “JUN TAGAY” and NONITO JAMILA,
JR., y CANTO accused,
Facts:
- During a barangay fiesta, witnesses heard
several gunshots. Shortly thereafter, they saw
Julio Herida, and Edmund and Rene Tracilla
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
stabbing and hacking Herlito Delara, who
eventually died.
- Herida and Jamila denied any participation in the
killing and claimed that it was Delara who
attempted to kill Herida when he started firing his
revolver at him, allegedly because of a
misunderstanding arising from carpentry job on
Delida’s house that Herida failed to do.
- The trial court acquitted Jamila but found Herida
guilty of murder.
- Among Herida’s assigned errors is that the trial
court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against
him. He points out that over seventy percent
(70%) of the testimonies of the prosecution’s
material witnesses were elicited by the judge,
while the cross-examination of the defense
witnesses was to a large extent conducted by the
judge himself. He submits that under these
circumstances, his right to a fair and impartial trial
was violated.
Issue:
W/N Herida’s right to a fair and impartial trial was
violated by alleged bias on the part of the judge.
Held:
NO
The transcripts of the proceedings show that the trial
court did intensively question the witnesses. For
instance, of the 182 questions asked of prosecution
eyewitness, 79 or roughly 43% of the total came from
the judge. However, we note that the judge also
intensively questioned witnesses of the defense. When
276
appellant took the stand, 63 questions were added, with
27 or approximately 43% asked by the judge.
The intensive questioning of the witnesses, however,
was necessary. The sworn affidavits of the material
witnesses were adopted as their direct testimonies,
subject to cross-examination. Since affidavits are
generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or
even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the
investigating officer, the trial court had to ask many
questions to clarify important matters. The judge’s
behavior under this circumstance cannot be considered
biased or prejudiced. Judges are, after all, not mere
referees in a boxing bout, whose only task is to watch
and decide the results.
Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly
and expeditious presentation of evidence and have the
duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the
issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by
witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked
by counsel.
Disposition: Proclamation 420 is valid, except for the tax
exemption.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MARIETO ADORA, accused-appellant.
Facts:
PANGANIBAN, J.:
- Marieto Adora was charged with the alleged rape
of Cecilia Cotorno, his brother-in-law’s daughter
who had been under his care and custody in
Rapu-Rapu, Albay since the latter was a child.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- Cecilia was raped by Adora on 4 occasions, and
always under the threat that Cecilia or her aunt
would be beheaded. Cecilia only broke her
silence about the rapes when it was discovered
that she was pregnant.
- Adora claims that the interventions of the trial
court showed that the judge had sided with the
prosecution; thus, he was denied his
constitutional right to a fair trial. He argues that:
1. the trial judge directed the prosecutor as to who
should be called in as witnesses;
2. he disallowed as misleading a question propounded
by the defense counsel, without waiting for an objection
from the prosecution;
3. the questions propounded by the court on witnesses
were not clarificatory, but were in the nature of a direct
examination.
Issue:
W/N such acts by the judge showed bias on his part.
Held:
NO
“Trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in
directing questions to witnesses as may be essential to
elicit relevant facts and to make the record speak the
truth. . In such an effort, a judge may examine or cross-
examine a witness. He may seek to draw out relevant
and material testimony though that testimony may tend
to support or rebut the position taken by one or the
other party This is not only the right but also the duty of
a trial judge. Under our system of legal procedure
where he is judge of both the law and the facts, it is
277
often expedient or even necessary in the due and
faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge,
in the exercise of sound discretion, to question a
witness in order that his judgment may rest upon a full
and clear understanding of the facts.
“We do not believe that the trial judge transgressed the
permissible limits of what questions he could propound
to a witness. The trial judge sought to elicit information
on whether appellant used sufficient “intimidation” on
the victim. He wanted only to elucidate how the witness
appeared to the court as she was testifying on the
stand. That the answers of the witness formed part of
the decision is not a proof of prejudgment or bias
towards the prosecution.
“We believe he merely performed his function to ferret
out the truth so his decision would be cogent and based
on facts. Thus, we hold that the scales of justice had
remained equal throughout the trial and appellant had
been given a fair hearing characterized by the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.”
People v. Castillo (1998)
Facts: Around 1AM on May 5, 1993, Eulogio Velasco,
floor manager of Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, was
sitting outside the pub while talking w/ his co-worker.
Soon, their customer Tony Dometita came out of the
pub and informed him that he’ll be on his way home.
However, when he was about an arm’s length from
Eulogio, appellant Robert Castillo came out from
nowhere and suddenly and w/o warning stabbed Tony
w/ a fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on
the left hand. Eulogio placed a chair between the two to
stop Castillo from further attacking Tony.
Tony ran away but appellant pursued him. Eulogio
came to know later that Tony had died. His body was
found outside the fence of Iglesia ni Cristo, EDSA.
Medico-legal officer testified that the proximate cause of
Tony’s death was the stab wound on his chest.
Appellant Robert Castillo claims that decedent Tony
was attacked by 2 malefactors as testified by one
Edilberto Marcelino, a tricycle driver, who saw men
ganging up on Tony by the compound of Iglesia ni
Cristo.
TC did not appreciate Castillo’s defense of alibi and
held that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior
strength, the accused having surprised and attacked w/
a deadly weapon. And although treachery was present,
it also held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior
strength.
Appellant declares that the trial judge was biased
against him, for propounding questions that were well
within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and
ask. He alleges that the trial judge took over from the
prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner,
interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness
give answers favorable to the prosecution, and asked
questions which pertained to matters of opinion and
allusions of bad moral character, which could not be
278
objected to by defense counsel, because they have
been ventilited by the judge himself.
HELD: Whether the judge was impartial. YES
The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It
is a judge’s prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory
questions to ferret out the truth. On the whole, the Court
finds that the questions propounded by the judge were
merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which merely
clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant
evidence are within judicial prerogative. Moreover,
jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the
part of the trial court should be received with caution,
especially when the queries by the judge did not
prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge’s
queries is determined not necessarily by their
quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the
test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such
questioning. In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions
propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such
questions and the answers thereto were eliminated,
appellant would still be convicted.
There was no showing that the judge had an interest,
personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at
bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly
and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the ‘cold
neutrality of an impartial judge’ implicit in the guarantee
of due process. That the trial judge believed the
evidence of the prosecution more than that of the
defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused.
People v. Larranaga (2003)
Facts:
Appellants assailed before the Supreme Court the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention committed
against the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong and
sentencing each of them to the penalties of two (2)
reclusiones perpetua. Among other things, the
appellants questioned the sufficiency of the evidence of
the prosecution.
Held: The Court reviewed the records exhaustively and
found no compelling reason why it should deviate from
the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the trial
court. There was a clear and overwhelming evidence
that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly
dragged the victims into the white car, beat them so
they would not be able to resist, held them captive
against their will, and raped them. Marijoy was thrown to
a deep ravine, resulting to her death, while Jacqueline
has remained missing until now. Discharged state
witness Davidson Valiente Rusia positively identified the
appellants as the malefactors. His detailed narration of
the circumstances leading to the horrible death and
disappearance of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of
truth. Despite the rigid cross-examination conducted by,
the defense counsel, Rusia remained steadfast in his
testimony. The details he supplied to the trial court were
279
of such nature and quality that only a witness who
actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish.
What is more, his testimony was corroborated as to its
material points by several disinterested witnesses who
also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither
friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victim's
family. As the Court reviewed closely the transcript of
stenographic notes, it could not discern any motive on
their part why they should testify, against the appellants.
In the same vein, it was improbable that the prosecution
would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to
destroy innocent lives. Thus, as between the appellants'
mere denial and the positive identification and
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court was
convinced that the trial court did not err in according
weight to the latter. Anent appellants' alibi, a thorough
examination of the evidence for the defense showed
that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of
time and place. They failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the
Chiong sisters were abducted. In view of the foregoing,
the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court but with
modifications as to the penalty imposed and the award
of damages. Considering that the victims were raped,
that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were
subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the
death penalty on the appellants was, according to the
Court, in order.
Topical: Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge
Ocampo when he asked questions and made
comments when the defense witnesses were testifying.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a
judge may properly intervene during trial to promote
expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of
time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities.
The test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to
prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the
ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he
interposes his questions or comments. Records show
that the intervention by way of comment of Judge
Ocampo during the hearing was not only appropriate
but was necessary. One good illustration is his
explanation on alibi. Seeing that the appellants' counsel
were about to present additional witnesses whose
testimonies would not establish the impossibility of
appellants' presence in the scene of the crime, Judge
Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants' counsel
of the requisites of alibi, thus: . . . Surely, we cannot
fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding
appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to ensure
that there will be an orderly and expeditious
presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be
no time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of
witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which
merely manifest a desire to confine the proceedings to
the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do not
constitute a rebuke of counsel.
CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2001)
FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the
Civil Service Commission that Paitim, Municipal
280
Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional
examination for Cruz after the latter had previously
failed in the said examination three times. The CSC
found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie
case exists against Paitim for DISHONESTY, GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering
a general denial of the material averments of the
"Formal Charge." They also declared that they were
electing a formal investigation on the matter. The
petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss
averring that if the investigation will continue, they will
be deprived of their right to due process because the
Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the
Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On
November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an
"Investigation Report and Recommendation "finding the
Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their
dismissal from the government service. Petitioners
maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction
to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in
accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A,
Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC
is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all
administrative cases where the penalty imposed is
removal or dismissal from the office and where the
complaint was filed by a private citizen against the
government employee.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process
was violated when the CSC acted asinvestigator,
complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time.
HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the
CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an
impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision
was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of
administrative bodies, being considered experts in their
field, are binding on the Supreme Court. The records
clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly
investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of
the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty
asc harged. The photograph pasted over the name
Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the
July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of
Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of
Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from
the signature of Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that
they were denied due process of law by the fact that the
CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and
judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is
untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is
mandated to hear and decide administrative case
instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal
including actions of its officers and the agencies
attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A,
Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.It can not be denied that
the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that
a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them.
They were properly informed of the charges.
Theysubmitted an Answer and were given the
281
opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can
not,therefore, claim that there was a denial of due
process much less the lack of jurisdiction on thepart of
the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
Tejano v. Ombudsman (2005)
Facts: A report of Philippine National Bank (PNB)
Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October
1992, discovered an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the
amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes
Subdivision (V&G). It implicated Vice President
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive
Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller
Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch,
including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of
V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of
P2.2 million of PNB funds. The resolution by the Graft
Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended
the filing of the proper information for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was affirmed by
the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, Office of the
Special Prosecutor, Deputy Special Prosecutor and
Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor. A
reinvestigation was granted. The Special recommended
the dismissal of the case, concurred by the Deputy
Special Prosecutor. On 10 December 1999,
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier
participated in the initial preliminary investigation as
Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation
for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note
“assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
case aggressively.” Petitioner attributes partiality on the
part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in
the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact
that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the same when he was a Special
Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the
filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether Desierto acted with grave abuse of
discretion
Ratio: Yes. Ombudsman Desierto, in this case,
committed grave abuse of discretion. The officer who
reviews a case on appeal should not be the same
person whose decision is under review. InZambales
Chromite Mining Company v. Court of Appeals, the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been
established that the case concerned an appeal of the
Secretary’s own previous decision, which he handed
down while he was yet the incumbent Director of
Mines. The SC has equally declared void a decision
rendered by the Second Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission, because one of its members,
Commissioner Raul Aquino, participated in the review of
the case which he had earlier decided on as a former
labor arbiter. Likewise, the SC struck down a decision of
Presidential Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a
resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he,
then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred.
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation
of the instant case and having recommended the filing
282
of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman
Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the
review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should
have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to
Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770
In earlier recommending the filing of information, then
Special Prosecutor Desierto was already convinced,
from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict
the accused. It becomes a farfetched possibility that in
a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman
Desierto would make a turnabout and take a position
contradictory to his earlier finding.
Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a
dispute may not review his decision on appeal. In order
that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be farce, the reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is
under review; otherwise, there could be no different
view or there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be the same view since being
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his
first view of the case.
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government concedes the applicability of the prohibition
on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier
decided, thus:
Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in
the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge
should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
His actuation must inspire that belief.
This is an instance when appearance is as important as
reality.
The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating
officer conducting a preliminary investigation. This is
the reason why under Section 1679 of the former
Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice,
who has supervision over the prosecution arm of the
government, is given ample power to designate another
prosecutor to handle the investigation and prosecution
of a case when the prosecutor handling the same is
otherwise disqualified by personal interest, or is unable
or fails to perform his duty.
The fact that the motion for reconsideration of
Ombudsman Desierto’s disapproval of the 03 November
1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
21654 was denied by another reviewing officer,
Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the infirmity of
Ombudsman Desierto’s actuation. As stressed
in Singson v. NLRC:
. . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the
fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner
was denied by two commissioners and without the
participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of
petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from
283
the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an
impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial
review of three commissioners. The denial of
petitioner’s right to an impartial review of his appeal is
not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due
process.
Samartino v. Raon (2002)
Facts: Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G.
Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse,
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo,
who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the
properties left by the deceased was her one-half share
in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite. On January
25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner
Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment. They
alleged that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo,
she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a
period of five years counted from 1986; that the said
lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that
petitioner refused to vacate the property despite
demands therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of
petitioner. At the time of service of summons at
petitioner’s house, he was not at home as he was then
confined at the National Bureau of Investigation
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC),
Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was
undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug
dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison
officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court
with a certification that petitioner will be unable to
comply with the directive to answer the complaint within
the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six
months for him to complete the rehabilitation program
and before he can be recommended for discharge by
the Rehabilitation Committee. The trial court, despite
the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted
respondents’ motion to declare petitioner in default and
ordered them to present evidence ex-parte.
Issue: Whether the summons were properly served to
Sarmartino
Held: No. n actions in personam, summons on the
defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it,
by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons
personally to defendant is impossible, service may be
effected by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or
by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons
upon the defendant shall be by personal service first
and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served
in person will substituted service be availed of. The
substituted service should be availed only when the
284
defendant cannot be served promptly in person.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by
stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be
made in the proof of service. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method
of service.
In the case at bar, the sheriff’s Return of Summons
simply states:
This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I
have caused the service of summons, together with the
attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above
entitled case upon defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO
thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant
acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing
his signature at the lower left portion of the original
summons hereto attached.
Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why
personal service could not be made. It failed to state
that prompt and personal service on the defendant was
rendered impossible. It was not shown that efforts were
made to find the defendant personally and that said
efforts failed; hence the resort to substituted service. As
stated above, these requirements are indispensable
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it
seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a
suit even though notice of such action is served not
upon him but upon another whom law could only
presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.
For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
comply with the requirements of substituted service
renders said service ineffective.
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in
the records of this case is it shown that petitioner’s
brother, on whom substituted service of summons was
effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion
residing at petitioner’s residence.
There being no valid substituted service of summons,
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of
summons is not only required to give the court
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to
afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim
made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules
regarding the service of summons is as much an issue
of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to
be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of his defense. It is elementary that before a
person can be deprived of his property, he should first
be informed of the claim against him and the theory on
which such claim is premised.
Delos Santos v. NLRC (2001)
Facts: On 3 May 1991 petitioner De los Santos (janitor)
was illegally dismissed for alleged frustrated qualified
theft when he was moving to the adjacent lot of the
company upon instruction of a certain Narciso. Narciso
Honrado admitted responsibility for the haul and his
285
error in declaring the electric cables as scrap. The
general manager, apparently appeased by Honrado’s
apology, issued a memorandum acknowledging receipt
of his letter of apology and exculpated him of any
wrongdoing. However, the company through its counsel
filed on 9 July 1993 a criminal complaint for frustrated
qualified theft against Honrado and herein petitioner De
los Santos. The complaint however was subsequently
dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig for lack
of evidence. On 23 August 1993, upon request of Top-
Flite, alleged manpower agency of De los Santos,
CAMARA STEEL terminated his services.
Aggrieved by his illegal termination, De los Santos
sought recourse with the Labor Arbiter who on 29 March
1994 rendered a decision ordering respondent
CAMARA STEEL to reinstate Delos Santos CAMARA
STEEL went to the NLRC for recourse. Top-Flite filed
a Motion for Intervention praying that it be permitted to
intervene in the appeal as co-respondent and,
accordingly, be allowed to submit its own memorandum
and other pleadings. Respondent CAMARA STEEL
empathically argues that Top-Flite, although impleaded
as respondent in NLRC-NCR Cases, subject of the
present appeal, was never summoned for which reason
it was deprived of procedural due process, therefore the
case should be remanded.
Issue:Whether jurisdiction over Top-Flit was acquired.
Yes.
Held: CAMARA STEEL obviously wants to impress
upon the SC that Top-flite, being a necessary party,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
should have been summoned and the failure to do so
would justify the remand of the case to the Labor
Arbiter. However, the records show that Top-Flite was
not only impleaded in the aforementioned case but was
in fact afforded an opportunity to be heard when it
submitted a position paper. This much was admitted by
Top-Flite in par. 5 of its Motion for Intervention where it
stated that "movant submitted its position paper in the
cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph but the
Presiding Arbiter ignored the clear and legal basis of
the position of the movant." In other words, the failure
of Top-Flite to receive summons was not a fatal
procedural flaw because it was never deprived of the
opportunity to ventilate its side and challenge petitioner
in its position paper, not to mention the comment which
it submitted through counsel before the SC. It moved to
intervene not because it had no notice of the
proceedings but because its position paper allegedly
was not considered by the Labor Arbiter. While
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired by service of summons, it can also be acquired
by voluntary appearance before the court which
includes submission of pleadings in compliance with the
order of the court or tribunal. A fortiori, administrative
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered
by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements subject
to the observance of fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases
presented before them. In labor cases, a punctilious
adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in
the interest of the workingman. A remand of the case,
as the NLRC envisions, would compel petitioner, a lowly
worker, to tread once again the calvary of a protracted
286
litigation and flagellate him into submission with the lash
of technicality.
Bautista v. CA (2004)
Facts: On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E.
Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles
filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills,
International, Inc., for quieting of title. This complaint
was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa
Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly
Javellana.
Petitioners alleged in their Amended Complaint that
they have been in actual and uninterrupted possession
of Lot 5753 of the Imus Estate; that they discovered that
the land was covered by a reconstituted title in the
name of respondents; and that the said title and the
derivatives thereof are spurious. Hence, they prayed
that they be declared the absolute owners of the land in
dispute.
After several delays spanning more than two years, the
case was finally set for trial. However, on May 2, 2002,
petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to
cancel the hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael
Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case was in the
United States attending to an important matter.
The trial court denied petitioners motion for
postponement and considered them as having waived
the presentation of their evidence. Petitioners claim that
the arbitrary acts of the trial court have resulted in the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
denial of their right to due process, and that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
challenged Orders.
Petitioners further aver that the trial judge displayed
“noticeable partiality and prejudice” in dealing with their
case, by granting several continuances to respondents
while denying petitioner’s Urgent Motion for
Postponement. They cite four instances wherein
respondents were granted extensions to file responsive
pleadings and two instances wherein respondents’
requests for postponement were similarly granted.
Issue: Whether the trial court acted arbitrarily. No.
Held: Far from being tainted with bias and prejudice, an
order declaring a party to have waived the right to
present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds
the court’s duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of
one party.
Petitioners’ contention that they were denied due
process is not well- taken. Where a party was afforded
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but
failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed
of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the
constitutional guarantee.
287
Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or
postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. Action thereon will not
be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear
and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of
substantial justice. In other words, we cannot make a
finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a
court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather
than postpone the hearing to another day, because of
the absence of a party. That the absence of a party
during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present
evidence and cross-examine the opponent’s witnesses
is firmly supported by jurisprudence. To constitute grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the
hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or
capriciousness.
Eastern Broadcasting v Dans, Carreon, et al.
Gutierrez, J.
19 July 1985
Facts:
 Petitioner is asking to reopen the Radio Station
DYRE which was summarily closed on grounds of
national security.
 The petitioner contended that it was denied due
process when it was closed on the mere
allegation that the radio station was used to incite
people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was
held and not a bit of proof was submitted to
establish a factual basis for the closure. The
petitioner was not informed beforehand why
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
administrative action which closed the radio
station was taken against it.
 No action was taken by the respondents (Minister
of Transportation and Communication,
Commissioner of National Telecomm, etc.) to
entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of
the closure action. The petitioner also raised the
issue of freedom of speech.
 Petitioner’s president subsequently filed a Motion
to withdraw petition since it had sold the station
and that the new owner was granted the requisite
license and franchise to operate said radio
station.
 However, the SC found the need to resolve the
issue for guidance of the lower courts.
Issue:
W/N due process was observed in the closure of
DYRE.
Held/Ratio:
NO. Guidelines laid down by the SC:
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative
proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations should be followed before a
broadcast station may be closed or its operations
curtailed. [a. the right to a hearing, which includes the
right to present one's cause and submit evidence in
support thereof; b. The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented; c. The decision must have
something to support itself; d. The evidence must be
substantial; e. The decision must be based on the
evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained
288
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; f.
The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its
own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate; g. The Board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.]
(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no
controlling and precise definition of due process, it
furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government
action must conform in order that any deprivation of life,
liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be
3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are
entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech
and expression clause. The test for limitations on
freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule — that words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to
prevent.
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does
not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies
have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast
corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain
frequency without regard for government regulation or
for the rights of others. All forms of communication are
entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
expression clause.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must
take the particular circumstances of broadcast media
into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether
by government or through self-regulation by the industry
itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated
handling.
The government has a right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to
organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread
uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be
informed. Radio and television would have little reason
for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland,
obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since
they are the most convenient and popular means of
disseminating varying views on public issues, they also
deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection
given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
Tatad v Sandiganbayan
Yap, J.
21 March 1988
Facts:
 Tatad, as Secretary of the Department of Public
Information, was charged with alleged violations
of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action
was taken on said report.
 Five years later, he resigned. Two months
thereafter, another complaint was lodged by
289
Antonio de los Reyes against him this time with
the Tanodbayan for the same charges.
 1980- The Tanodbayan referred the complaint of
de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) for fact-finding investigation. Roberto P.
Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and
Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation
Report recommending appropriate legal action on
the matter.
 Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against
him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue
of PD 1791, but the motion was denied. MR also
denied.
 By 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were
with the Tanodbayan for final disposition.
 1985- the Tanodbayan approved a resolution
recommending that informations be filed against
petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly,
five informations were filed against him.
 Petitoner filed with the Sandiganbayan a
consolidated motion to quash the informations on
the follow grounds:
1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due
process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of
the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of
jurisdiction to file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged 3 of the 5 cases;
3. The facts charged where he allegedly failed to file
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973 do
not constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged
resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash.
MR denied.
 Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably
violated the constitutional mandate of "due
process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in
unduly prolonging the termination of the
preliminary investigation and in filing the
corresponding informations only after more than a
decade from the alleged commission of the
purported offenses, which amounted to loss of
jurisdiction and authority to file the informations
Issue:
Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to
due process and the right to "speedy disposition"
of the cases against him as guaranteed by the
Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its
head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of
the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only
after the trial?
Held/Ratio:
YES. Antonio de los Reyes’ original complaint, which
was termed a report, was filed in 1974. Coming to the
case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on
record and are largely undisputed. The "report" was
made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of
1979 when it became widely known that Secretary
Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had
resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the
1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal
complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan
290
acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was
around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation
was accepted by Pres. Marcos. By October 25, 1982, all
affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was
already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it
was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved
by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the
corresponding criminal informations against the
accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations
were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all
against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the
impression that political motivations played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in
this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were,
only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits
and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan
referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for finding investigation and report.
There was such blatant departure from the established
procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve
an office directly under the President in the
prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion
that the prosecution was politically motivated.
Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving
the impression that their noble office is being used or
prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or
other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and
fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all
litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the
established procedure may the public's perception of
the of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under
preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the basis
of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911)
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve
a case under preliminary investigation by him from its
termination. While this period fixed by law is merely
"directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be
disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute
impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that the law
has included a provision that is deliberately intended to
become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
There was violation of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law
for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the
broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years
cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light
of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
291
Inocencio Gonzales v CSC
Puno, J.
2 September 1993
Facts:
 Gonzales was employed at the Agricultural
Training Institute of the Department of Agriculture
for 36 years. On his 25th year of service, he
received a merit award recognizing his
continuous, dedicated, and faithful service in the
government. On his 30th year, he repeated the
feat. His record of service is without any wart of
malfeasance or misfeasance in office.
 1990- He had to visit his children in the US so he
took several leaves of absences.
 On June 25, 1990, petitioner wrote to the Director
of ATI requesting approval of a leave without pay
starting from the second week of July to
December 31,1991. He cited as additional reason
his desire to take advantage of ". . . a physical
check-up free of charge due to my childrens'
medical plan benefits". The letter was personally
delivered by petitioner's wife. It carried his
address in US.
 For unknown reason, the Director of ATI did not
act on the letter-request. It was neither approved
nor disapproved. Three (3) months later, ATI
started acting adversely on petitioner's request.
 ATI's Assistant Director and OIC wrote to
petitioner declaring him absent without official
leave for more than thirty (30) days and warning
him that should he not report within five (5) days
from receipt of the letter, he would be dropped
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
from the rolls. The letter was addressed at
petitioner's house in QC. The letter, however, was
returned to sender (ATI).
 What ATI did was to publish a notice of similar
import in the October 4, 11 and 18, 1990 issues
of the Philippine Journal, a newspaper, of general
circulation. On October 24, 1990, ATI dropped
petitioner from its rolls. He was not furnished a
copy of the order.
 When he came back from the US and reported for
work on November 19, 1990, he found out that
Mercedes Puruganan had been appointed to his
position. By himself, he protested to the Civil
Service Commission on December 14, 1990. His
letter-protest was endorsed to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MPSB) for appropriate action.
On April 30, 1991, the Board ruled that petitioner
was duly notified before he was dropped from the
roll. His appeal was dismissed. His motion for
reconsideration was rejected. Petition to the CSC
was denied.
Issue:
W/N petitioner was accorded due process before he
was dropped from the rolls.
Held/Ratio:
NO. It ought to be self-evident that security of tenure
can not be a shield against absences without proper
approval by the authorities. Leaves are matters of
private convenience and cannot prejudice public
service. Their approval is discretionary as it depends on
the higher needs of public service.
292
Be that as it may, petitioner's third argument where he
invokes the protection of the due process clause of the
Constitution should be sustained.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1985 is the
governing rule on notice before an employee can be
dropped from the rolls due to absence without
leave, viz:
4. The agency should notify in writing the employee,
who is absent without leave (AWOL) for thirty (30) days,
to report within five (5) days from receipt of notice,
otherwise, he shall be dropped from the rolls.
The Circular does not specifically state where the notice
shall be sent. In the case at bar, ATI knew that
petitioner was staying in the US. The letter of June 25,
1990 of the petitioner requesting this leave clearly
carried his address in the United States. The records do
not show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of
petitioner's correct address. Despite this knowledge,
however, the letter of ATI's Asst. Director and OIC was
inexplicably mailed to his house in QC. The letter was
not received by petitioner per certification of the
Postmaster of the Bureau of Post of Quezon City.
The disputed ruling cuts too deeply on petitioner's right
to continue his employment in the government and
unduly dilutes the protection of due process. To be sure,
the cavalier attitude of respondent Commission is
deplorable considering that on line is the thirty six (36)
long years of faithful and dedicated, service to the
government of the petitioner. Nothing less than strict
compliance with the demands of due process should
have been demanded by the respondent Commission
from the officials of ATI in light of the equities of the
case. Nor can we give our concurrence to the further
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ruling of the respondent Commission that the denial of
due process to the petitioner was cured by the
publication of said notice in three (3) issues of the
Philippine Journal. Notice by publication might have
been proper if the address of petitioner were unknown.
Since the officials of ATI knew the whereabouts of
petitioner, they have no legal warrant to notify him thru
the newspapers.
There are other acts, both covert and overt, which show
that ATI officials did not accord fair treatment to the
petitioner. Petitioner filed his request for leave without
pay on June 25, 1990 while still in the United States.
Though petitioner has no right to presume that his
request would be granted, nonetheless it was no less a
duty on the part of officials ATI to act immediately on the
request, if only because petitioner was abroad and
needed reasonable time and resources to return to the
Philippine on a five (5) day call. The OIC did not explain
why all of a sudden the "exigencies of the service"
required the immediate return of the petitioner. If the
"exigencies of the service" were real why was he
allowed to go on leave. Worse still, the order dropping
petitioner from the rolls was never sent to him.
Petitioner did not also know he had been replaced till he
returned to the Philippines on November.
Alfredo Lim and Rafelito Garayblas v CA
Carpio, J.
12 August 2002
Facts:
 Bistro filed a petition before the RTC against
Mayor Lim who allegedly instructed policemen to
293
inspect and investigate its license as well as work
permits and health certificates of its staff,
 The inspection resulted in stoppage of work in the
night club and restaurant operations.
 Later, Mayor Lim refused to accept application for
business license and work permits for that year.
 Bistro interposes that municipal corporations
cannot prohibit operations of nightclubs. They
may regulate but not prevent.
 RTC- issued preliminary injunction.
 Lim, however, issued an order closing Bistro’s
operations.
 Bistro filed a contempt case against Lim which
was later withdrawn in exchange that the
preliminary injunction be respected.
 Lim- filed a motion to dissolve the injunction
alleging that the power of the mayor to inspect
and investigate commercial establishments and
staff is implicit in Manila’s revised charter and in
the LGC.
 RTC- denied motion
 CA- denied Lim’s petition. A writ of PI may issue if
the act sought to be enjoined will cause
irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the
status quo before a full hearing can be held on
the merits.
Issue:
W/N Bistro was denied due process.
Held/Ratio:
YES. Injunction proper.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
There was no due process in the order to close the
business. Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific
violation of conditions of its business licenses or
permits. He refused to grant the license even without
considering whether the legal prerequisites were met.
The authority of mayors to issue business permits is
beyond question (LGC and Manila Charter). The power
to refuse to issue such license and permits is premised
on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for issuance
of such license and permits. The mayor must observe
due process by giving the applicant notice and
opportunity to be heard.
The mayor indeed had authority to inspect and
investigate for violations of conditions but does not have
power to order a police raid on these establishments on
guise of inspection or investigation. Lim acted beyond
his authority.
Unicraft Industries v CA
Ynares-Santiago, J.
26 March 2001
Facts:
 Private respondents were employees of Unicraft
for at least over a year, performing work
necessary and desirable to its operation. Its
principal office was in Apao, Mandaue City and
when it opened a branch in Lapu-Lapu, private
respondents were transferred there.
 Unicraft however failed to comply with certain
requirements and it was ordered closed by the
local government thus effecting the mass
dismissal of private respondents.
 Private respondents: contended that they were
dismissed because of their union activities.
294
 Petitioner: no illegal dismissal, the closure of the
branch was virtue of a lawful order of the LG.
 Unicraft and its counsel failed to appear before
the Voluntary Arbitrator who found in favor of
private respondents.
 Unicraft filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals contending that they were denied
opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before
the voluntary arbitrator. CA remanded to the VA.
 Instead of conducting further proceedings,
however, the voluntary arbitrator filed a comment
praying, inter alia, that he be declared to have lost
jurisdiction over the case upon rendition of the
judgment
 CA re-examined the stipulation of the parties and
thereafter rendered the assailed resolution
allowing, among others, the partial execution of
the decision of the voluntary arbitrator with
respect to the award of separation pay and
attorney’s fees. MR denied.
Issue:
W/N Unicraft was denied due process.
Held/Ratio:
NO, it was not accorded due process at the VA level
because it was not able to present evidence as can
be gleaned from the stipulation entered into by the
parties before the CA. This is an acknowledgment by
both parties that the proceedings before the VA have
not been completed. Despite this, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed resolution ordering the immediate
execution of the award of separation pay and attorney’s
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
fees. Prior to that, the VA filed a comment contending
that he had lost jurisdiction over the case after he
rendered judgment. While under the law decisions of
voluntary arbitrators are accorded finality, the same may
still be subject to review, such as here where there was
a violation of petitioners’ right to due process and to be
heard.
In spite of statutory provisions making “final” the
decisions of certain administrative agencies, the SC has
taken cognizance of petitions questioning these
decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion, violation of due process, denial of
substantive justice, or erroneous interpretation of the
law where brought to our attention.
The right of due process is fundamental in our legal
system and we adhere to this principle not for reasons
of convenience or merely to comply with technical
formalities but because of a strong conviction that every
man must have his day in court. In its most basic sense,
the right to due process is simply that every man is
accorded a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Its very
concept contemplates freedom from arbitrariness, as
what is required is fairness or justice. It abhors all
attempts to make an accusation synonymous with
liability.
Jane Caras v CA and People of the
Philippines
Facts:
Quisumbing, J.
 Jane
2 October 2001Caras was charge in 15 related cases of
violation of the BP22.
 When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused
Caras pleaded “not guilty”. Thereafter, trial
proceeded.
295
 The evidence for the prosecution tends to show
that on or about February 18, 1992, up to May 31,
1992 at Quezon City, accused Jane Caras
obtained from complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza
on installment various gift checks and purchase
orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment
thereof, the accused issued to the complainant
the checks in question which were drawn against
Philippine Commercial Bank.
 When the checks were presented for deposit or
encashment, they were all dishonored for the
reason “Account Closed”. Despite repeated
verbal and written demands made on her to
replace the dishonored checks with cash, she
failed and refused to do so.
 The accused admitted that she issued the fifteen
(15) checks. She claimed, however, that they
were given to Marivic Nakpil,]alleged sister of the
complainant, as “guarantee deposit,” that is, for
every gift check and purchase order given to the
accused, she issued personal checks to
guarantee its payment. The checks are not to be
encashed nor deposited with any bank. With
regard to Check No. 017769 in the amount of
P540,316.35, accused claimed that she entrusted
the said check to Marivic Nakpil in blank, with her
signature but without any amount or numerical
figures on the face of the check.
 On May 13, 1994, the Court found her guilty of all
charges.
 MR denied by TC. CA affirmed.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 Petitioner denies having received any notice that
the checks she issued had been dishonored by
the drawee bank
Issue:
On due process, W/N failure to give notice of
dishonor is a denial of due process.
Held/Ratio:
YES. ). The absence of a notice of dishonor
necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice
of dishonor be actually served on
petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and
the basic postulates of fairness require - that the
notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received
by her to afford her the opportunity to avert
prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. (Lao v CA)
Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of
the dishonor of her checks and was given the
opportunity to make arrangements for payment as
provided for under the law, she cannot be convicted of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution
to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of
dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal.
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the
bank is presumed from the act of making, drawing, and
issuing a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented
within 90 days from the date of issue. However, this
presumption may be rebutted by the accused-
petitioner. Such presumption does not hold when the
296
maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the
payment of the check within five banking days after
receiving notice that such check had been
dishonored. Thus, it is essential for the maker or drawer
to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could
pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its
payment within the period prescribed by law.
The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of
Appeals, may be sent by the offended party or the
drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired
lawyers to prepare and send the demand letters. The
prosecution presented and marked in evidence two
letters demanding payment which were purportedly sent
to petitioner. However, the prosecution presented no
evidence that would establish petitioner’s actual receipt
of any demand letter which could have served as notice
to petitioner. None of the letters contained an indication
that they were actually received by petitioner. No
acknowledgement receipt or return card for the first and
second demand letters were offered in evidence. Such
omission and neglect on the part of the prosecution is
fatal to its cause.
Mariveles Shipyard v CA
Quisumbing, J.
11 November 2003
Facts:
 In October 1993, petitioner corporation, Mariveles
Shipyard Corp., engaged the services of Longest
Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to
render security services at its premises. Longest
Force deployed its security guards at petitioner’s
shipyard at Mariveles, Bataan. According to
petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of the security contract with Longest Force
(LF). However, it found the services
unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to
terminate its contract with LF. In turn, LF
terminated the security guards (private
respondents).
 Thus these private respondents filed a
complaintfor illegal dismissal, underpayment of w
ages, nonpayment of overtime pay, premium pay
forholiday and rest day, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay, and attorney’s fees against
LF and petitioner before the Labor Arbiter.
Meanwhile, LF filed a crossclaim against
petitioner. Petitioner denied liability on account
of illegal dismissal, stressing that no employer-
employee relationship existed between it and the
private respondents. They also wanted the cross-
claim be dismissed.
 The Labor Arbiter declared LF and petitioner
jointly and severally liable to pay the money
claims of complainants. It also ordered LF to
reinstate to former or equivalent positions the
respondents without loss of seniority rights and
privileges with full backwages.
 NLRC affirmed in toto. CA denied petitioner’s
special civil action for certiorari.
 Petitioner avers that there was denial of due
process of law when the Labor Arbiter failed to
have the case tried on the merits. Petitioner adds
that the Arbiter did not observe the mandatory
language of the then Sec. 5(b) Rule V (now
Section 11, per amendment in Resolution No. 01-
02, Series of 2002) of the NLRC New Rules of
297
Procedure which provided that: If the Labor
Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after
the parties have submitted their position papers
and supporting documents, he shall issue an
Order to that effect and shall inform the parties,
stating the reasons therefor…
Issue:
W/N petitioner was denied due process.
Held/Ratio:
NO, he was given ample opportunity to present his
side. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Not all cases require a trial-type
hearing. The requirement of due process in labor cases
before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are
given the opportunity to submit their position papers to
which they are supposed to attach all the supporting
documents or documentary evidence that would prove
their respective claims, in the event the Labor Arbiter
determines that no formal hearing would be conducted
or that such hearing was not necessary. In any event,
as found by the NLRC, petitioner was given ample
opportunity to present its side in several hearings
conducted before the Labor Arbiter and in the position
papers and other supporting documents that it had
submitted. We find that such opportunity more than
satisfies the requirement of due process in labor cases.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
VALLADOLID v. INCIONG
FACTS:
JRM owned Tropicana and Copacabana hotels.
However, it only had controlling interest in Tropicana, as
Copacabana was managed by its owners (siblings Yu).
The two hotels became direct competitors. Pertinent
financial and business information was being leaked
from Copacabana to Tropicana. Ricardo Valladolid (pet)
was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone
switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred
to the position of clerk-collector. He was suspected to
be the leak who sends important information to the
competitor.
Order of May 2, 1979 (December 26, 1979): In
response to the application for clearance and
Valladolid’s complaint for Illegal Dismissal, the Regional
director issued this order. The Deputy Minister of Labor,
in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding
“no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify,
much less reverse the Order appealed from”.
Contention c/o JRM: The order of Hon. Amado Inciong
(resp) failed to state the facts and conclusion of law
upon which it is based, thus unconstitutional.
Memorandum decision: Only dispositive portion is
authored by the SC. The rest is copied from the
decision of the lower court. Not prohibited, still valid, but
it is not encouraged.
HELD:
298
The fact that the Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor
issued on December 26. 1979 lacks a statement of facts
and conclusions of law does not equate to the violation
of the constitutional requirement set forth in Article 8,
section 14, which is required of decisions or courts of
record. However, the assailed order is not a decision of
a court of record. The Ministry of Labor is an
administrative agency with quasi-judicial functions, with
rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious,
summary, and non-technical. As the Deputy Minister
was in full accord with the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law drawn from shoes facts by the
Regional director, there was no necessity of discussing
anew the issues raised therein.
FERNANDEZ v. NLRC
FACTS:
Reynaldo worked as a bus driver for Nelbusco, Inc. On
February 28, 1993, the airconditioning unit of the bus
which Reynaldo was driving suffered a mechanical
breakdown. The company told Reynaldo to wait until
the airconditioning unit was repaired. No other bus was
assigned to Reynaldo to keep him gainfully employed.
Reynaldo continued reporting to his employer’s office
for work, only to find out that the airconditioning unit had
not been repaired. More than six months elapsed but
Reynaldo was not given work. He filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal. The NLRC ruled that there was no
illegal dismissal.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HELD:
As earlier noted, the essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, to explain one’s side, or to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. In the case at bar, private respondents
were given ample opportunity to do just that but they
failed, for unknown reasons, to avail themselves of such
opportunity. They themselves moved that they be
allowed to present additional affidavits on August 19,
1991, but they never did; no valid reason was given for
their failure to do so. Their contention that the labor
arbiter failed to rule on their motion deserves scant
consideration. It is axiomatic – in fact, it is plainly
commonsensical – that when a counsel asks for an
extension of time within which to file a pleading, he must
be ready with that pleading on the date specified in his
motion, even absent a resolution or order disposing of
his motion.
TORRES v. GONZALES
FACTS:
In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he
was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he
shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres
was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986,
Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’
pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that
the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating the
conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges
299
against him were not yet final and executory as they
were still on appeal.
ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a
court is necessary before Torres can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of
his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the
terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts, which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of
such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique
judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial
due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for
which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code;
or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who “having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
ZALDIVAR v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme
Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft
cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The
Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have
been superseded by the creation of the Office of the
Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special
Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an
investigation and file cases only when so authorized by
the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the respondent wherein he included statements
which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court.
This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by
a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go
slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That
he "was approached and asked to refrain from
300
investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in
the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;"
and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against two Members of the Court." Statements
of the respondent saying that the SC’s order '"heightens
the people's apprehension over the justice system in
this country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes
go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers.
Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to
explain in writing why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for making such public statements
reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the
resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked
the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the
Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot
expect due process from this Court, that the Court has
become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court
and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of
speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for
this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than
the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges."
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of the freedom of
speech/expression.
HELD:
There was no violation. The Court did not purport to
announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was
simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice."
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
"balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the
statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a
nature and were made in such a manner and under
such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the
authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent
a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction
of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also
the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of
the judicial system of a country and the destruction of
the standards of professional conduct required from
members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has
some implications to the society.
SEC OF JUSTICE v. JUDGE RALPH LANTION
FACTS:
Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging
from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to
301
defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US.
The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition
treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there.
Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against
him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The
DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising
that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a
preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to
receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and
the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE: W/N Jimenez is deprived of due process.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case
against Jimenez refers to an impending threat of
deprivation of one’s property or property right. No less is
this true, but even more so in the case before us,
involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty,
which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and
enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited
property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in
incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
GOV’T OF USA v. PURUGANAN
FACTS:
This petition is a sequel of the case of Secretary of
Justice v. Judge Lantion.
HELD: No Violation of Due Process
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the
conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We
iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same
time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition
case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard
is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given
full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.
Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process
and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by
(1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its
supporting documents after a determination that the
extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s
independent prima facie determination that his arrest
will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of
a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he
is under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an
exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings
had already been conducted in that country. But
because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state
302
before those proceedings could be completed, it was
hindered from continuing with the due processes
prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
process now has thus become hollow. He already had
that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of
taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the
government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his
personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to
resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed
immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process
that he had previously shunned pales against the
government’s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty
obligations and in cooperating with the world community
in the suppression of crime. Indeed, “constitutional
liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights
accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced
against exigent and palpable government interests.”
GOV’T OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA
FACTS:
The Philippines and Hong Kong signed an “Agreement
for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.
”Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the
Hong Kong Court. Department of Justice (DOJ)
received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent
Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The NBI
agents arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed a petition
for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr.
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private respondent is a high
“flight risk.” After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself
from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order denyinghis application for bail and this was
granted by respondent judge.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing
private respondent to bail?
HELD:
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
allowing private respondent to bail. Accordingly,
although the time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region it
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process
guaranteed by the Constitution. More so, where these
rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but
also by international conventions, particularly the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive
303
an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed
that a new standard which he termed “clear and
convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that he is not a flightrisk and will abide with all
the orders and processes of the extradition court.In this
case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is nota flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether privaterespondent may be
granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing
evidence.”
ROXAS v. VASQUEZ
FACTS:
Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a
Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-
INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five
units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee
voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd.,
manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract
was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co. The COA
subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy
in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
and the purchase order. Consequently, the DILG
Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman
against the respondents. After preliminary investigation,
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended
the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On
review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the complaints against
Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal
charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espeña
and Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal
information. Flores and Tanchanco moved for a
reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco.
In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor
made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and
Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.
ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the petitioners as accused
violated their right to due process.
HELD:
It appears that the charge against respondents was
previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no
motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said
respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the
mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those
previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of
the charge against the said respondents, could not and
should not be made the basis for impleading them as
accused in this case without violating their right to due
process.
304
Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived
of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated
the complaint against them without their knowledge.
Due process of law requires that every litigant must be
given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be
present and defend himself in person at every stage of
the proceedings.
Ortigas v Lufthansa
J. Barredo
Facts:
Francisco Ortigas, and defendant Lufthansa German
Airlines, appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, condemning the defendant to pay
plaintiff an indemnity for the former's failure to "comply
with its obligation to give first class accommodation to a
Filipino passenger holding a first class ticket," This was
due to giving of the space instead to a Belgian and the
improper conduct of its agents in dealing with him which
was filled with discrimination.
During the trial, there were several postponements of
the trial from both sides. Three hearings were
postponed on the request of the plaintiffs, 4 on the
request of both parties, and 10 on the request of
respondents.
Due to so many postponements made by the
respondent, including the no-show of their European
employees as witnesses, the case tilted out of their
favor. One of their witnesses was stricken from the list
due to his non-appearance in the day that the cross-
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
exam on him was to be finished and the judge moved
for a finality regarding the postponements (ie. no
postponements were to be made again)
Ortigas claimed that while in Rome, the discrimination
against him took place. Moreover, when he asked for a
seat change to first class during the stop overs, he
wasn’t given any. He was only given the option when he
was already in Hong Kong, about 3 hours only from
Manila.
Issues:
1. WON the lower court acted in grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion for
postponement on Sept 24, 1966.
2. WON the lower court erred in striking out the
testimony of one of the defendants witnesses even if his
testimony was not finished
3. WON the lower court erred in making the defendant
pay indemnities
Held: No to all. Judgment modified raising damages
from 100k to 150k.
Ratio:
1. The case had been pending for about three years
and had actually suffered during that period even more
than the usually permissible number of continuances,
quite often to suit the convenience of defendant's
counsel. Notice of the September 28, 1966 schedule
had been served on counsel the month previous. It must
be assumed that due preparations and arrangements
were to be made since the receipt of that notice to
insure the presence in Manila for the expected
305
witnesses on the date set. Under the circumstances, the
excuse given by defendant that the witnesses could not
leave their respective stations and places of work to
attend the trial is plainly unacceptable. There was
enough time and opportunity for defendant to have
made the corresponding adjustments in the
assignments of its personnel so as to enable its
witnesses to be in court.
As it is, there was actually no basis at all for the
exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge in a
manner favorable to it. Trials may be postponed
because of the absence of evidence only when such
absence is justified. Mere absence is not a justification
in itself. Section 4 of Rule 22 is sufficiently clear on this
point. It provides that "A motion to postpone a trial on
the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only
upon affidavit showing the materiality of evidence
expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has
been used to procure it." This means that it must be
shown to the court that due diligence had been
exercised in either securing the presence of the
evidence (witnesses) or preventing the absence thereof.
Indeed, even if such reason were given earlier on
September 24, 1966 the court would have been as well
justified in denying the requested postponement. We
cannot see any reason why, despite its having
knowledge of the date of the hearing about a month
before, defendant did not see to it that its expected
witnesses were not assigned to do duty on the day they
were supposed to appear in court. We cannot believe
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Lufthansa could be so undermanned that such a simple
adjustment of its personnel had to be "impossible."
2. The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of
his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil
cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal
cases. The express recognition of such right of the
accused in the Constitution does not render the right of
parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is
an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by
the fundamental law.
Subject to appropriate supervision by the judge in order
to avoid unnecessary delays on account of its being
unduly protracted and to needed injunctions protective
of the right of the witness against self-incrimination and
oppressive and unwarranted harassment and
embarrassment, a party is absolutely entitled to a full
cross-examination as prescribed in Section 8 of Rule
132 thus: "Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the
adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient
fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the
issue." Until such cross-examination has been finished,
the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as
complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form
part of the evidence to be considered by the court in
deciding the case.
306
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it
is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly
cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to
cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of
such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not
and cannot be done or completed due to causes
attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent.
In the case at bar, however, the Supreme Court has not
opted not to rely exclusively on the foregoing
considerations. In order to satisfy as to whether or not
defendant stands to be irreparably prejudiced by the
impugned action of the trial court relative to the
testimony of Lazzari, the justices have just the same
gone over the transcript thereof. After considering the
same, they claimed that even his direct testimony,
without taking into account anymore his answers to the
cross-examination questions of counsel for plaintiff,
cannot be of much weight in establishing the defenses
in defendant's answer.
However, the trial court's action cannot be categorized
as arbitrary or oppressive or as amounting to a grave
abuse of discretion. To be sure, this second order was
but a logical consequence of the previous order denying
defendant's motion for postponement. With such denial,
the next thing in order was to declare the presentation
of evidence of the defendant terminated. Accordingly, it
was necessary to determine what evidence could be
considered to be for the defendant. And so when
counsel for plaintiff asked the court to strike out the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
testimony so far given by Lazarri, there was practically
no alternative for the court but to grant the same.
Indeed, defendant's counsel could not and did not offer
any objection thereto.
3. In the light of all the foregoing, there can be no doubt
as to the right of Ortigas to damages, both moral and
exemplary. Precedents We have consistently adhered
to so dictate.
Lopez- According to the Court, such omission placed
plaintiffs in a predicament that enabled the company to
keep the plaintiffs as their passengers in the tourist
class, thereby retaining the business and promoting the
company's self-interest at the expense of,
embarrassment, discomfort and humiliation on the part
of the plaintiffs.
These precedents, as may be seen, apply four-square
to herein plaintiffs case. Defendant's liability for willful
and wanton breach of its contract of carriage with
plaintiff is, therefore, indubitable.
Emin v. De Leon
J. Quisimbing
Facts: Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers
for a change of status from provisional to permanent
under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were
submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at
307
Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to these
appointment papers were photocopies of certificates of
eligibility of the teachers.
Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the
certificates of eligibility were of doubtful authenticity.
The signature of Civil Service Commission Director
Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of
said certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed
initially forwarded five (5) appointments to Civil Service
Regional Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850
eligibilities and for appropriate action through an
indorsement letter dated September 26, 1991.
Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was
found that said applications for civil service eligibility
under R.A. 6850 were disapproved. However, the
certificates of eligibility they submitted were genuine as
their control number belonged to the batch issued to
CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office. But the
records showed that these certificates were never
issued to any one.
Two separate investigations were conducted by Director
Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil
Service Commission in Cotabato City: (1) on how the
R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from the
Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates,
The teachers concerned were asked to report to the
Office and bring the original copies of their certificates of
eligibility. On several dates, the teachers appeared and
gave their sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the
person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of
eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a
fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In his sworn letter dated April 8, 1992 to the CSC
Regional Director, petitioner denied the accusation. His
motion to dismiss was denied.
Teacher witnesses for the prosecution Alforjas and
Delgado identified petitioner and a certain Teddy Cruz
as the persons who facilitated their applications for R.A.
6850 eligibility. The other witnesses corroborated
Alforjas’ and Delgado’s testimonies. They all identified
petitioner as the person who helped them obtain the
fake certificates of eligibility.
In its resolution, the CSC found Emin guilty. In his
amended petition, he raised before the CA the twin
issues of (1) whether the CSC had original jurisdiction
over the administrative cases against the public school
teachers; and (2) whether petitioner was accorded due
process. The CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
(1) whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction over
the present case;
(2) whether or not petitioner was accorded due process.
Under Section 2 of R.A. 4670, the exclusions in the
coverage of the term “teachers” are limited to: (1) public
school teachers in the professorial staff of state colleges
and universities; and (2) school nurses, school
physicians, school dentists, and other school employees
under the category of “medical and dental personnel”.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, general words
following an enumeration of persons or things, by words
of a particular and specific meaning, are not to be
308
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.Had Congress
intended to exclude an NFE Division Supervisor from
the coverage of R.A. 4670, it could have easily done so
by clear and concise language.
As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the
Investigating Committee that should have investigated
his case conformably with Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now
being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS
Order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as the DECS
Rules of Procedure. However, at this late hour, the
proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC
can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under
the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now
barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his
case.
Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service
Commission had afforded petitioner sufficient
opportunity to be heard and defend himself against
charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities
of certain teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the
charges before the CSC Regional Office but he
participated in the hearings of the charges against him
to the extent that we are left with no doubt that his
participation in its proceedings was willful and voluntary.
Equally unmeritorious is petitioner’s contention that he
was denied due process. He avers that he was not
allowed cross-examination. It is well to remember that in
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative
due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Nothing on record shows he asked for cross-
examination as most of the submissions were written. In
our view, petitioner cannot argue that he has been
deprived of due process merely because no cross-
examination took place. The rule is well established that
due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy or given opportunity to move for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
In the present case, the record clearly shows that
petitioner not only filed his Counter-Affidavit during the
preliminary investigation, and later his Motion to
Dismiss. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of the Commission. The essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity
to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Neither is there merit in petitioner’s assertion that he
was denied the right to due process when the CSC
Regional Office, according to him, acted as investigator,
prosecutor, judge and executioner. The report submitted
by Atty. Rosell based on the hearing where Director
Buenaflor sat as hearing officer, was merely
recommendatory in character to the Civil Service
Commission itself. Such procedure is not unusual in an
administrative proceeding.
Petition is denied.
Rodson Phil. v. CA
Facts: On July 19, 1990, petitioners Rodson
Philippines, Inc., Eurasia Heavy Industries, Inc.,
Autographics, Inc. and Peter Y. Rodriguez, filed a
309
Complaint for damages against respondent Eastar
Resources (Asia) Corporation with the RTC Cebu. The
respondent in its Answer, denied all the material
averments of the complaint and interposed a
compulsory counterclaim amounting to P29,000,000.
After the presentation of witnesses, the petitioners filed
their formal offer of evidence. The petitioners rested
their case after their documentary evidence was
admitted by the court.
The respondent then presented one witness, Mary C.
Maquilan. On March 29, 1994, the respondent prayed
for time to make their formal offer of evidence. The court
granted the respondent’s motion and gave it a period of
fifteen (15) days to do so. The court then granted the
petitioners a period of ten (10) days from service of the
said formal offer within which to file their comment
thereon. The petitioners declared in open court that they
would be presenting rebuttal evidence, and prayed that
the hearing for the said purpose be set at 9:00 a.m. of
May 4, 1994. The case was reset to June 1, 1994.
The respondent filed its formal offer of evidence and
sent a copy thereof to the petitioners on June 1, 1994.
When the case was called for the presentation of the
petitioners’ rebuttal evidence on the said date, the new
counsel for the petitioners manifested her desire to
recall the respondent’s witness, Mary Maquilan, for
further cross-examination. She reasoned that she was
not satisfied with the cross-examination of the previous
counsel, and asked for time to file the necessary
motion. The court granted the same, and gave her
fifteen (15) days to do so. The court also gave the
respondent a period of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof within which to file its comment or opposition.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The court held in abeyance the resolution of the
respondent’s formal offer of evidence until such time
that the petitioners’ motion to recall Maquilan for further
cross-examination was resolved. On June 24, 1994, the
petitioners filed their motion to recall Maquilan as a
witness for further cross-examination.
In the meantime, Judge Juaban retired from the
government service. Judge Martin A. Ocampo was
appointed presiding judge of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 7. The hearing of the petitioners’ motion to recall
the witness was set for hearing on March 26, 1996.
During the hearing, the counsel for the petitioners called
the attention of the court to the fact that they had not yet
filed their comment on the respondent’s formal offer of
evidence.
After the hearing, the court issued an order denying the
petitioners’ motion to recall Maquilan as witness for
additional cross-examination, without prejudice to the
petitioners’ recalling the latter as a hostile witness on
the presentation of its rebuttal evidence.
In the meantime, the petitioners failed to file their
comment on the respondent’s formal offer of evidence.
The court, likewise, failed to resolve the said incident
despite the denial of the petitioners’ motion to recall
Maquilan for additional cross-examination.
On April 1, 1996, the trial court sent a subpoena to
Maquilan, requiring her to appear before the court and
to testify as a hostile rebuttal witness for the petitioners.
The respondent filed its urgent motion to quash the
subpoena on the ground that the witness was a resident
of Quezon City, which was more than fifty (50)
kilometers away and, as such, could not be compelled
310
to testify under Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
In its Order, Judge Martin A. Ocampo inhibited himself
upon motion of the petitioners from further hearing the
case. The case was re-raffled to Branch 11, presided by
Judge Isaias P. Dicdican. After a review of the records,
the trial court discovered that the petitioners’ motion to
recall Mary Maquilan had already been denied; that the
petitioners had not yet filed their comment on the
respondent’s formal offer of documentary evidence;
and, that the said formal offer of evidence had not yet
been resolved by the court. The TC issued an Order
admitting the respondent’s documentary evidence for
the purposes they were offered.
The petitioners filed a Motion to Defer the Hearing Set
and prayed that they be given a chance to file their
written objection to the formal offer of evidence filed by
the respondent. The trial court denied the motion and
ruled that the ten-day period given to the petitioners per
its Order of March 29, 1994 had long since elapsed. It
emphasized that the order holding in abeyance its ruling
on the respondent’s formal offer of evidence did not toll
the ten-day period for the filing of the petitioners’
comment thereon.
The petitioners, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court rendered its assailed Decision and dismissed the
petition for being devoid of merit.
ISSUE: WON the court erred when it resolved the
respondent's formal offer of evidence and admitted
such documentary evidence before they could file
their comment or opposition thereto.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Petitioners assert that during the hearing of March 26,
1996, the petitioners called the attention of the court to
the fact that they had not yet filed their comment on the
respondent’s formal offer of evidence, and that the court
declared that there was no need for them to do so as
yet because of the unresolved motion. They
emphasized that even after the court denied their
motion to recall Maquilan as witness and ordered them
to present her as a hostile witness on rebuttal evidence,
the court still failed to resolve the respondent’s formal
offer of evidence.
SC ruled that the petitioners were amply accorded the
chance and/or opportunity to register their objections to
the private respondent’s offer of evidence. For as early
as May 27, 1994, the petitioners were already charged
with knowledge or notice that they were being required
to file their comments and/or objection to the offer of
evidence. Nevertheless, it appears that action on the
offer was put on hold pending the resolution of the
motion to recall a witness. Resultantly, since the
disposition of the motion to recall was made the
condition sine quanon for further action on the private
respondent’s offer of evidence, the petitioners should
have lost no time in submitting their comment to the
offer once, or as soon as the court denied on March 29,
1996, their motion to recall Ms. Maquilan for further
cross-examination.
Even during the time that the petitioners were supposed
to file their motion to recall, they had already played fast
and loose with court processes. Even then, as correctly
argued by the respondent, there was actually no more
time to suspend, as it had long expired on June 12,
1997, for which reason the respondent’s formal offer of
311
documentary evidence was truly ripe for resolution.
Hence, We hold, that far from gravely abusing his
discretion, the respondent judge acted prudently and
judiciously.
The petitioners failed to append to their petition at bar a
copy of their motion for reconsideration of the July 17,
1997 Order of the trial court, admitting the documentary
evidence offered by the respondent. The said pleading
is very relevant in this case, because we could there
discern if the petitioners had prayed for a chance to file
their comment on or opposition to the admission of the
respondent’s documentary evidence, and incorporated
therein their objections to the said motion, if any.
Even considering the merits of the case, the petition
must still fail.
Irrefragably, the petitioners had until June 12, 1994
within which to file their comment on the respondent’s
formal offer of evidence. The ten-day period within
which to file such comment was not suspended by the
filing and, thereafter, the pendency of the petitioners’
motion to recall Maquilan as a witness for additional
cross-examination. What was merely suspended by
such motion was the trial court’s resolution of the
respondent’s formal offer of evidence. The petitioners
failed to file their comment within the period therefor.
Indeed, Judge Martin Ocampo erred in declaring that
the respondent’s formal offer of evidence was
prematurely filed, and that the petitioners need not yet
file their comment thereon because of the petitioners’
unresolved motion. The respondent had already
presented its lone witness, Maquilan, who already
testified on direct and cross-examination. Hence, the
respondent was obliged to formally offer its
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
documentary evidence as provided by Section 35, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
It bears stressing that the petitioners still have the right
to adduce rebuttal evidence to controvert or overcome
the probative weight of the respondent’s documentary
evidence. Moreover, since the petitioners were aware
that the respondent had a counterclaim of P29,000,000,
it behooved them to observe diligence and vigilance in
filing their comment without delay. However, by their
own negligence, the petitioners failed to file the said
comment. As such, the petitioners are not entitled to a
writ of certiorari to shield themselves from their own
omission and negligence. It must be stressed that he
who comes to court for equitable relief must do so with
clean hands.
AILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG
G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004
Facts:
Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the
civil case for injunction. The case was filed by Yasmira
Pangadapun questioning the legality of Marohombsar’s
appointment as Provincial Social Welfare Officer of the
DSWD-ARMM. Prior to his appointment, Pangadapun
used to occupy said position.
Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge
issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for
the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Summons,
together with a copy of the complaint and a notice, was
also served on both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex
parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun
was given the time to comment. Respondent judge
issued an order stating that a preliminary conference
312
had been held and that both parties had waived the
raffle of the case and reset the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of injunction. The
judge gave another time to file her comment again.
During the hearing on the application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers
appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it
submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary
injunction. Hence, this complaint for gross ignorance of
law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming a
judge.
Issues:
1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant
case.
2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due
process.
3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Held:
1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the
opposite party and is intended only as a restraint on him
until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can
be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the
status quo until that determination. Respondent judge
was justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his
assessment of the urgency of the relief sought.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual
requirement of prior notice and hearing before injunction
may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all
petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-
type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type
hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential
to due process.
In the present case, complainant was able to move for a
reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right
to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We
have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been
denied due process when he has availed of the
opportunity to present his position.
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. It is a
rule that a party cannot claim that he has been denied
due process when he was given the opportunity to
present his position.
3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his
official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action
even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts
in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or
any other member of the bench for that matter, is
presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner
that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.
313
QUINTOS v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo V. Quintos and private
respondent Jose T. Villarosa were candidates for
Governor of Occidental Mindoro in the May 14, 2001
elections. Private respondent was declared winner with
57,136 votes. Petitioner lost to private respondent by
1,093 votes.
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC an election protest
claiming that massive fraud and illegal electoral
practices were committed in the contested precincts
during the registration, the voting and the counting of
the votes.
On June 15, 2001, private respondent filed his Answer
with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim.
Private respondent’s counsel moved that the Regional
Trial Court of Mamburao be allowed to take first custody
of the Contested Ballot Boxes before their transmittal to
the COMELEC. The Comelec denied the motion.
From the COMELEC’s Order, private respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Private respondent stated that petitioner identified only
one (1) ballot box as subject of his protest. Private
respondent, however, identified thirteen (13) ballot
boxes from the same municipality in his counter-protest.
Thus, the total number of Contested Ballot Boxes, both
in the protest and counter-protest, is 14. Private
respondent explained that the Contested Ballot Boxes
were also the subject of two municipal election protests
both filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao,
and both handled by counsel of private respondent. The
RTC ordered them to be brought before the court the
Contested Ballot Boxes.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Private respondent averred that if COMELEC
Resolution No. 2812 were strictly implemented, the
resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of
Paluan would suffer undue delay. The COMELEC would
take first custody of the 14 Contested Ballot Boxes. The
resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of
Paluan would have to wait for the COMELEC to
complete its revision of the ballots in the Contested
Ballot Boxes.
On August 27, 2001, the COMELEC rendered the
Assailed Order granting private respondent’s
Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration
subject to guidelines.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of the COMELEC dated August 27, 2001.
On September 12, 2001, the COMELEC denied
petitioner's Motion.
TOPICAL ISSUE: Whether the failure to give petitioner
the opportunity to comment or oppose private
respondent’s Manifestation and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration is a denial of due process.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC issued the
Assailed Order of August 27, 2001 without giving him
the opportunity to comment or oppose the motion for
partial reconsideration. This, bewails petitioner, violates
his right to due process.
The Solicitor General correctly stated that there was no
denial of due process since petitioner subsequently filed
a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC
considered and acted on, albeit unfavorably, in the
Order dated September 12, 2001. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
314
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the assailed action or ruling.
Petitioner cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due
process since the COMELEC gave petitioner the
chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration.
The COMELEC, in issuing the Assailed Orders allowing
the Regional Trial Court to take prior custody of the
Contested Ballot Boxes, did not act without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
In giving the Regional Trial Court first access to the
Contested Ballot Boxes, the COMELEC sought to
prevent delay in the resolution of the two protest cases
pending before the trial court. However, first access by
the Regional Trial Court is only limited to the period of
time when the COMELEC is still revising other protested
ballot boxes. The primary concern for such arrangement
is the expeditious disposition of protest cases, which is
underscored in Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2812.
VILLARUEL, JR. v. FERNANDO
FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. is the former
Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation Office
(“ATO”), Department of Transportation and
Communication (“DOTC”).
Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E.
Abarca, Jr. (“Abarca”), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative
Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training
Center (“CATC”). The CATC is an adjunct agency of the
ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway
communicators and related civil aviation personnel for
the local aviation industry as well as for the Southeast
Asian and Pacific region.
Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995
addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the
Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal
effective 2 May 1995.
Respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia
and Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through
petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail
order. On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail
order, respondents reported to the Office of
Undersecretary Cal at DOTC.
Without acting on respondents’ request for
reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19
July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under
“preventive suspension” for 90 days without pay
pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary
Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to
their mother unit since more than 90 days had already
lapsed. Respondents also sought the intervention of the
Ombudsman in their case. Secretary Garcia replied to
the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum
dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall
respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia
declared that the law does not sanction the continuous
detail of respondents.
315
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner
failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their
mother unit.
Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and
Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against petitioner which the TC granted.
For petitioner’s continued failure to comply with the writ
of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to cite
petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to
declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer
within the period prescribed in the trial court’s order of
26 January 1996.
On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and
declared petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The trial
court issued a bench warrant against petitioner.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(“OSG”), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals assailing the trial court’s order finding
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt.
The TC declared petitioner in default for his failure to file
an answer to the petition for mandamus and
damages.The TC ordered Villaruel to pay.
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG,
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-
extendible extension until 13 December 1996 within
which to file petitioner’s memorandum. However, the
OSG failed to file the memorandum.
On 13 March 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution dismissing petitioner’s appeal for failure to
file the required memorandum. The OSG, through
Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
same. The Resolution became final and executory on
14 June 1997.
Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for
Execution with the trial court. Although served a copy of
the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any
opposition.
On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
and to Suspend Sheriff’s Sale. In his motion, petitioner
alleged that the trial court’s decision never became
final and executory as the trial court deprived him of
his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the
OSG failed to file petitioner’s memorandum in CA-G.R.
SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.
The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition
for certiorari and dismissed the same in the Decision
dated 30 September 1998. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the appellate court denied the
motion in a Resolution of 3 December 1998.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process.
The negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner
of the effects of such negligence and prevent the
decision of the trial court from becoming final and
executory. In short, the OSG’s negligence binds
petitioner.
The petition has no merit.
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be
heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner.
Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as
in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to
present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly,
petitioner’s former counsel, the OSG, was negligent.
This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and
316
appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of
the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such
negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court
from becoming final and executory.
In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner
suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the
general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the
client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the
respondents’ allegations in the petition for mandamus
and damages.
Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the
dismissal of his appeal. After the OSG’s failure to file
the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages
and to have the order declaring petitioner in default
lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG
with another lawyer.
BORROMEO BROS. ESTATE v. GARCIA
FACTS:
On August 17, 1938, Patricia Ruedas Vda. De Andrada
(Patricia) executed, for valuable consideration, a
document granting a road right of way to spouses Gil
Garcia and Teresa Escaño de Garcia (Garcia couple)
over Lot No. 6-H-2.
On September 28, 1938, Patricia sold the property to
petitioner. The Deed of Sale contained a provision that
“the purchase of Lot No. 6-H-2 was subject to the right
of way granted by me (Patricia Ruedas Vda. de
Andrada) to the spouses Gil Garcia and Teresa Escaño
de Garcia.”
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
On April 17, 1952, the Garcia couple went to the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu and moved for the
annotation of the August 17, 1938 document executed
by Patricia on TCT No. RT-3972.
Petitioner retained ownership over Lot No. 6-H-2
whereas the estate of the late Garcia couple (Garcia
Estate) was inherited by Vicente E. Garcia and Jose E.
Garcia from whom respondent acquired his title in 1996.
Sometime after acquiring the Garcia Estate, respondent
came across the 1952 documents that granted to the
deceased Garcia couple a road right of way through
petitioner’s Lot No. 6-H-2. Thus, on May 19, 1997,
respondent filed, before the RTC of Cebu, a cadastral
court, a petition captioned “Engineer Edgar John A.
Garcia v. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City
G.I.R.O. Rec. No. 5988, Lot No. 6-H-2.” They want to
inscribe and annotate in the TCT No. RT-3972 a road
right of way.
The cadastral court issued on June 6, 1997 an Order
requiring the Register of Deeds “to inform this [c]ourt
regarding the status of the aforementioned title.
In its Comment/Manifestation, the Register of Deeds
informed the cadastral court that Lot No. 6-H-2 covered
by TCT No. RT-3972 is registered under herein
petitioner’s name and that it “appears to be clean and
devoid of any encumbrance/annotations.”
On July 23, 1997, the cadastral court issued an Order
granting the petition of respondent. Petitioner received a
317
copy of the Order of July 23, 1997. Petitioner entered its
special appearance and filed a “Motion for
Reconsideration and Recall” and expressed “caution”
that it was not necessarily submitting itself to the
jurisdiction of the cadastral court. Petitioner contended
that the Order of the Court dated July 23, 1997 violated
its fundamental right to substantive and procedural due
process, that the petition of respondent was for specific
performance of a private agreement cognizable only by
an ordinary court and not a cadastral court, and that the
petition of respondent was a procedural shortcut to
enforce a stale order citing Rule 39, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court, the statute of limitations and
prescription.
The cadastral court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. The court held that firstly, there was no
violation of substantial or procedural due process as the
court furnished petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, it
heard petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in open
court, and allowed both parties to submit their
respective memoranda including documentary exhibits
prior to its ruling on the motion. Secondly, the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or The
Property Registration Decree of 1979 eliminated the
distinction between the general jurisdiction of the RTC
and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a Land
Registration Court.
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record
shows the existence of an easement of right of way in
favor of respondent.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
On July 9, 1999, petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration but the appellate court denied it in its
Resolution of August 9, 1999.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process. NO
The SC finds against petitioner.
The cadastral court did not deny petitioner of its right to
due process of the law. The essence of due process is
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence in support of one’s defense. What
the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be
heard.As long as a party is given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he would have no
reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard
that makes up the essence of due process.
The records reveal that the cadastral court furnished
petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, which reiterated its
previous order of April 17, 1952 through former Judge
Ignacio Debuque. More importantly, the cadastral
court heard petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
in open court wherein both parties presented their
respective arguments to defend their rights and the
court likewise allowed the parties to file their respective
memoranda prior to ruling on the motion for
reconsideration.
Indeed, deprivation of the right to due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a party was given the
chance to be heard on his Motion for Reconsideration[20]
as what happened in the instant case.
318
Suntay v. People
FACTS:
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia
Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint
against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney
of Quezon City, alleging that on June 21, 1954, the
accused took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design,
somewhere near the UP compound in Diliman and had
carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a minor of 16
years old
On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty
recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23
December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed
a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he
took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant
City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for
seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.
On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was
granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs
On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines
for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at
present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the
offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint
charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after
preliminary investigation had been conducted
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a
motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing
such government agencies as may be concerned,
particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having
the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law."
On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion
(Exhibit D). On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary
cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing
him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to
cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to
compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the
criminal charges against him.
However, this order was not implemented or carried out
in view of the commencement of the proceeding in
order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved.
On 5 July 1955 counsel for the petitioner wrote to the
respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken
by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a
motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its
order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955 the
respondent Secretary denied counsel's request and on
15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence this petition.
Petitioner’s Claim:
 while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion
in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot
be exercised until after hearing," because the right to
travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the
319
meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence
he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due
process of law.
Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior
hearing
Ruling:
The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The
petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of
the respondent Court directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the
accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not
beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. the respondent
Court did not specify what step the respondent
Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to
the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred
against him.
True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already
issued may not be exercised at whim. But here the
petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal
charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant
City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the
complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the
father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that
no final action had been taken by the City Attorney of
Quezon City as the case was still under study.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly
leaving the country in such a convenient time, can
reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate
attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore,
he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of
the law should join together to bring him back to
justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent
Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice
would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the
exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined
from carrying it out.
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the
reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport
were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a
passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and
left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his
discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot
be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in
withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing.
When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it
upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious
criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing
maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite
to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing
does not violate the due process of law clause of the
Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in
him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of
because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing
should always be held in order to comply with the due
320
process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of
preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative
of the said clause.
The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.
Co v Barbers 290 SCRA 717
1. Quirino Congressman Cua filed a complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman against Gov
Castillo-Co and Engr Ringor alleging that in the
course of its investigation in aid of legislation, the
HoR Committee on Good Government chaired by
him uncovered some irregularities in the purchase
of heavy equipment by the Governor & the
Provincial Engineer
2. The equipment purchased was not brand new as
required, there was overpricing, lack of public
bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment
prior to delivery and an attempt to cover up the
irregularities.
3. Co and Ringoer were then placed under
preventive suspension for 6 months, a week after
the complaint was filed. It was signed by the
director and approved by the deputy
Ombudsman. Both filed for motions for
reconsideration contending they were deprived of
due process because they weren’t afforded the
opportunity to controvert the evidence against
them before the suspension order was issued. It
was rejected thus this petition for review.
Issue: W/N they were deprived of due process NO
1. A preventive suspension, however, can be
decreed on an official under investigation after
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
charges are brought and even before the charges
are heard since the same is not in the nature of a
penalty, but merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation.
2. Lastimosa case: suspension was not a
punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive
measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
3. The immediate issuance of such order is required
in order to prevent the subject of the suspension
from committing further irregularities. Such
prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with
Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts the
Ombudsman to: xxx give priority to complaints
filed against high ranking government officials
and/or those occupying supervisory positions,
complaints involving grave offenses as well as
complaints involving large sums of money and/or
properties.
Equitable Banking Corporation v Calderon GR 156168 (DISHONOR
OF CALDERON’S CREDIT CARD, NOT TO EXCEED HIS
APPROVED CREDIT
1. Calderon, a LIMIT
businessman engaged in several
business activities here and a broad, and a
stockholder of PLDT is a seasoned traveler. He
was issued an Equitable International Visa card
which can be used for both peso and dollar
321
transactions. Credit limit: 20,000 pesos and 3000
US dollars
2. He went to Hong Kong in 1986 and bought
several Gucci items which amounted to 4,030 HK
dollars = 523 US dollars. He paid with his card.
3. The saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed
De Leon and other shoppers of different
nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was
blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of
the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but
the latter simply did not honor it and even
threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a
pair of scissors.
4. Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming
that he suffered much torment and
embarrassment on account of EBC’s wrongful act
of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card
while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon
filed a complaint for damages against EBC.
5. Answer: card in excess of credit limit already,
Calderon failed to settle said prior credit
purchase.
6. TC: "defendant bank was negligent if not in bad
faith, in suspending, or ‘blacklisting’ plaintiff’s
credit card without notice or basis, thus it was
ordered to pay damages. CA affirmed the
decision.
Issue: W/N EPB was negligent/in bad faith for
suspending the card without notice N
1. Question: Was moral damages proper despite its
finding that petitioner’s actions have not been
attended with any malice or bad faith? NO
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2. Moral damages - include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injury.
3. Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of
contract, moral damages are recoverable only if
the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligations.
4. Here, the CA ruled that no malice or bad faith
attended petitioner’s dishonor of respondent’s
credit card. For, as found no less by the same
court, petitioner was justified in doing so under
the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement with
respondent, paragraph 3 of which states:
a. xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to
exceed his/her approved credit limit,
otherwise, all charges incurred including
charges incurred through the use of the
extension CARD/S, if any in excess of
credit limit shall become due and
demandable and the credit privileges shall
be automatically suspended without notice
to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with
Section 11 hereof.
5. As to the suspension without notice, prior to the
incident, Calderon made credit purchases in
Japan and Hongkong in the previous year
amounting to 14 thousand US dollars while
having only a deposit of 3,639 US dollars but
even though they exceeded his limit, these
322
purchases were accommodated. He was even
late in his payment.
6. Although he deposited 14,000 US dollars the day
he left for Hong Kong, he did not bother to
request the bank for the reinstatement of his
credit card privileges for dollar transactions, thus
the same remained under suspension."
7. As issuer of the card, the bank has the option to
decide whether to reinstate or altogether
terminate a credit card previously suspended on
considerations which the bank deemed proper,
not the least of which are the cardholder’s
payment record, capacity to pay and compliance
with any additional requirements imposed by it.
That option, after all, is expressly embodied in the
same Credit Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of
which unmistakably states: “The issuer shall
likewise have the option of reinstating the card
holder’s privileges which have been terminated
for any reason whatsoever upon submission of a
new accomplished application form if required by
the issuer and upon payment of an additional
processing fee equivalent to annual fee”
8. tThe provision on automatic suspension without
notice embodied in the same Credit Card
Agreement is couched in clear and unambiguous
term, not to say that the agreement itself was
entered into by respondent who, by his own
account, is a reputable businessman engaged in
business activities here and abroad.
Housing Authority v Evangelista GR 140945 2005
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
1. Petitioner filed a case for recovery of real property
originally awarded to a certain Adela Salindon.
After Salindon’s death, her heirs executed an
extra-judicial settlement where the property was
transferred to the Florendos. However, the award
in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside for
having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion and thus petition
was declared the owner of the property.
2. Despite the decision, the property was auctioned
off by the QC Treasurer’s Office for unpaid real
property taxes by the Florendos. The highest
bidder was a certain Sarte.
3. Because the Register of Deeds refused to
register the final deed of sale issued by the City
Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition for issuance of
title and confirmation of sale, which was granted
by the RTC. Register of Deeds issued TCT in the
name of Sarte who divided the property into two
lots.
4. Now, petitioner filed a case against Sarte. While it
was pending, Sarte executed in favor of
Evangelista (respondent), a Deed of Assignment
covering the 1st lot. TCT was then issued in his
name.
5. Although it was annotated that there was an
adverse claim. Petitioner then filed a motion for
leave to file supplemental complaint seeking to
include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star
Agri-Business and BPI as defendants but the trial
court denied the motion. Thus it instead filed a
complaint for ANNULMENT of the Deed of
Assignment.
323
6. TC: auction issued in the name of Salindon where
Sarte was the buyer is null and void thus TCT in
favor of Sarte should be cancelled. Any transfer
(including any assignment) is also declared null
and void.
7. Evangelista (respondent/assignee) then filed with
the CA a petition for annulment of the trial court’s
judgment particularly the nullity of the transfer
alleging extrinsic fraud as ground. Since he
wasn’t a party to the civil case, he was prevented
from ventilating his cause, right or interest over
the property and thus the judgment was NOT
binding upon him.
ISSUE: W/N the judgment declaring void the
assignment bound Evangelista No
1. Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party
or over the subject matter of the claim, and in
either case, the judgment or final order and
resolution are void. A trial court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
either by his voluntary appearance in court and
his submission to its authority or by service of
summons.
2. In this case, it is undisputed that Evangelista was
never made a party to the Civil Case. It is basic
that no man shall be affected by any proceeding
to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case
are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.
3. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial court’s
decision decreed that “(A)ny transfers,
assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature
of the parcel of land subject of this case made by
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or
assigns before or during the pendency of the
instant case are hereby declared null and void.
4. , together with any transfer certificates of title
issued in connection with the aforesaid
transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause
the cancellation of such TCTs.”
5. It will be the height of inequity to allow
respondent’s title to be nullified without being
given the opportunity to present any evidence in
support of his ostensible ownership of the
property. Much more, it is tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law.
6. It was already after Evangelista acquired the
property and after TCT No. 122944 was issued in
his name that petitioner’s adverse claim (Entry
No. 7159) and a notice of lis pendens (Entry No.
1367) were annotated.
7. It should also be pointed out that it was in
petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim that Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071 was indicated, not the
judgment. As records show, at the time the
notice of lis pendens and adverse claim was
annotated, the Deed of Assignment has already
been entered into by respondent and Sarte, and
TCT No. 122944 was already issued in
Evangelista’s name on December 21, 1994.
Insular Life Assurance Co v Young GR 140964 2002
324
1. Young acquired by purchase Insular Savings
Bank from the Licaros family for 65,000,000.00.
Young et al obtained 55% equity while Jorge Go
et al owned 45%. The bank then granted them
loans (153000000) secured by promissory notes.
2. Araneta, a stockholder of the Bank, wanted to
purchase 99.82% of its outstanding capital stock
for 340M on the condition that the ownership of
the hsares will be consolidated in Young’s name.
Araneta paid Young 14M as downpayment.
Young then bought from Go et al their 45% equity
in the Bank for 153M. to pay this, he obtained a
short-term loan of 170M from the International
Corporate Bank to finance the purchase.
3. However, Araneta backed out and demanded the
return of the downpayment. Meanwhile, Young’s
loan from Interbank became due. Young entered
into a Credit Agreement with Insular Life for
200M. To secure the loan, he executed a deed of
Pledge of 1,324,864 shares which represented
99.82% of the outstanding capital stock of the
bank.
4. He likewise executed a promissory note in favor
of Insular Life in the same amount. The Credit
Agreement provides that Insular Life shall have
the prior right to purchase the shares owned by
young and those owned by other stockholders.
Thereafter, Insular Life and Insular Life Pension
Fund informed Young of their intention to acquire
30% (Young’s) and 12% (other SHs) of the
Bank’s outstanding shares
5. Insular Life and Young then entered into a MOA
where Insular Life and its Pension Fund agreed to
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
purchase common shares for a total
consideration of 198M. However, it had
discovered some irregularities in the Bank’s
“kiting operations”. Young took the responsibility
and offered to the bank the 45% of his holdings
as security.
6. Young admitted that due to business reverses, he
shall not be able to pay his obligations under the
Credit Agreement between him and Insular thus
he unconditionally and irrevocably waive the
benefit of the period of the loan. Thereafter,
Insular Life instructed its counsel to foreclosure
the pledge constituted upon the shares. IL then
informed Young. A public auction was conducted
wherein Insular Life appropriated to itself, not only
the original 1,324,864 shares, but also the
250,000 shares subsequently issued by the Bank
and delivered to Insular Life by way of pledge
because there only IL submitted its bid for the first
auction sale and a subsequent auction sale.
7. Young and his associates filed with the RTC a
complaint against the bank, IL for annulment of
notarial sale, specific performance and damages
alleging that the notarial sale conducted is void as
it does not comply with the requirement of notice
of the second auction sale.
8. RTC: dismissed the complaint and ordered the
respondents to pay the Bank their respective
loans. They appealed to the CA which reversed
the decision. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that the MOA
executed is not enforceable considering that
Young committed fraud, misrepresented on the
325
warranties and failed to comply with his
obligations. Dismissed. Hence this petition.
9. The CA reversed the decision ruling that the MOA
is binding because it was not validly rescinded.
Insular failed to notify Young in exercising its
option to rescind the MOA. The Appellate Court
then concluded that Young's loan with Insular Life
is deemed fully paid based on the representation
and warranty in the MOA that "the entire
proceeds of the sale shall be used to pay off the
outstanding debt of Robert T. Young to Insular
Life. Likewise, it also concluded that the loans of
the other respondents have been fully paid.
Issue: W/N the MOA was enforceable and that the loan
have been fully paid upon foreclosure of the pledge
NO.
1. The CA construed the MOA as a contract of sale.
But contrary to the findings of the CA, the MOA
provisions negate the existence of a perfected
contract of sale. The MOA is merely a contract to
sell since the parties therein specifically
undertook to enter into a contract of sale if the
stipulated conditions are met and the
representation and warranties given by Young
prove to be true. The obligation of petitioner
Insular Life to purchase, as well as
the concomitant obligation of Young to convey
to it the shares, are subject to the fulfillment of the
conditions contained in the MOA.
2. Once the conditions, representation and
warranties are satisfied, then it is incumbent upon
the parties to perform their respective obligations
under the contract. Conversely, in the event that
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
these conditions are not met or complied with, no
obligation on the part of either party arises.
3. Since no sale transpired between the parties, the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Insular
Life purchased 55% of the total shares of the
Bank under the MOA. Consequently, its findings
that the debt of Young has been fully paid and
that Insular Life is liable to pay for the remaining
45% equity have no basis. It must be
emphasized that the MOA did not convey title of
the shares to Insular Life. If ever there was
delivery of the said shares to Insular Life, it was
because they were pledged by Young to Insular
Life under the Credit Agreement.
4. The Court of Appeals also erred in declaring that
the auction sale is void since petitioners failed to
send a separate notice for the second auction.
Based on Article 2112 of the Civil Code, there is
no prohibition in the law against the sending of
ONE NOTICE for the 1st and 2nd public auction.
5. Petitioners contend that the CA likewise erred
when it declared in its decision that the
unpaid accounts of the other respondents
have been fully paid.
6. There is no showing how the CA reached such
conclusion. In doing so, the Court of Appeals
violated the constitutional mandate that "no
decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based."
7. Indeed, due process demands that the parties to
a litigation be informed of how it was decided with
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
326
that led to the conclusions of the court. It must be
observed that those respondents did not contest
petitioners' counterclaim against them.
Lorbes v CA GR 139884
1. petitioners mortgaged their land to the Carloses.
A year later, the mortgage obligation had
increased and fearing foreclosure of the property,
they asked their son-in-law for help. Delos Reyes
agreed to rdeem the property but because he
didn’t have money at the time, he asked his family
friend, Cruz, an employee of Land Bank for help.
2. It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of
sale conveying the mortgaged property in favor of
Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing
loan with Landbank using the subject property as
collateral.
3. Landbank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of
the Carloses informing them that the loan has
been approved. TCT was cancelled and
transferred in the name of Cruz. Years later,
petitioners notified delos Reyes that they were
ready to redeem the property but the offer was
refused. Thus it filed a complaint for reformation
of instrument and damages claiming that the
deed was merely a formality to meet the
requirements of the bank for the loan.
4. Summons and a copy of the complaint were
served upon private respondents on August 1,
1994. Cruz/Delos Reyes filed their answer
beyond the reglamentary period, or only on
September 1, 1994. Thus, on September 5,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
1994, petitioners filed a motion to declare private
respondents in default, which the trial court
granted in an order dated September 16, 1994.
On September 30 of the same year, petitioners
presented their evidence ex parte before the trial
court
5. TC: in favor of the petitioners upon finding that
the deed of absolute sale didn’t reflect the true
intention of the parties.
6. CA reversed the decision: Cruz/Delos Reyes
were denied due process by the refusal of the trial
court to lift the order of default against them, and
that the transaction between petitioners and Cruz
was one of absolute sale, not of equitable
mortgage. It also held the RTC decision to be
constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based. The reformation of the Deed of Absolute
Sale is improper because there is no showing that
such instrument failed to express the true
intention of the parties by reason of mistake,
fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident in the
execution thereof.
ISSUE: (topic) W/N there was denial of due process
YES
W/N there the deed of absolute sale is an equitable
mortgage YES
1. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be
liberal in setting aside orders of default for
judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in
cases where it clearly appears that the reopening
of the case is intended for delay.
327
2. The issuance of orders of default should be the
exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only
in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the
defendant to comply with the orders of the trial
court.
3. In this case, the RTC was indeed remiss in
denying private respondents’ motion to lift the
order of default and to strike out the evidence
presented by petitioners ex parte, especially
considering that an answer was filed, though out
of time.
4. The default order of the RTC was immoderate
and in violation of private respondents’ due
process rights. However, the violation was of a
degree as to justify a remand of the proceedings
to the trial court, first, because such relief was not
prayed for by private respondents, and second,
because the affirmative defenses and evidence
that private respondents would have presented
before the RTC were capably ventilated before
respondent court, and were taken into account by
the latter in reviewing the correctness of the
evaluation of petitioners’ evidence by the RTC
and ultimately, in reversing the decision of the
RTC.
5. Applying the foregoing considerations to the
instant case, the Court finds that the true intention
between the parties for executing the Deed of
Absolute Sale was not to convey ownership of the
property in question but merely to secure the
housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a
direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
be immediately applied to their outstanding
mortgage obligation to the Carloses.
6. Understandably, the Deed of Absolute Sale and
its supporting documents do not reflect the true
arrangement between the parties as to how the
loan proceeds are to be actually applied because
it was not the intention of the parties for these
documents to do so. The sole purpose for
preparing these documents was to satisfy Land
Bank that the requirement of collateral relative to
Cruz’s application for a housing loan was met.
Tanada v Tuvera (ratio copied from a digest! )
 On April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity
for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
 Respondents contend that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable
for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.
 The interpretation given by respondent is in accord
with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in
328
the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth
day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
 Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct
only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
fact of publication. Considered in the light of other
statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion
is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude
the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity
Issue: W/N publication is still required in the light of the
clause "unless otherwise provided"
1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.
2. The legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or
extended. Publication requirements applies to 1)
all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws; 2) presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 329

the exercise of legislative powers whenever the

same are validly delegated by the legislature or
directly conferred by the Constitution; 3)
Administrative rules and regulations for the
purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation; 4) Charter of
a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place; 5) Monetary
Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
3. Further publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.
4. The Supreme Court declared that all laws as
above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the OG, to become effective
only after 15 days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Republic v Express Telecommunications
1. On December 29, 1992 – BAYANTEL filed an
application with the NTC (Nati’l Telecomm
Comm) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or
Necessity to install, operate and maintain a digital
Cellular Mobile Telephone System. Prior to the
issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with
respect to Bayantel’s original application,
Bayantel filed an urgent ex-pate motion to admit
an amended application. Subsequently hearings
were conducted.
2. Before Bayantel could complete the presentation
of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order (Dec
1993) stating that in view of the recent grant of 2
separate Provisional Authorities in favor of
ISLACOM and GMCR Inc., which resulted in the
closing out of all available frequencies for the
service being applied for by Bayantel, and in
order that the case may not remain pending for
an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered
archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if
and when the requisite frequency becomes
available.
3. On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of
new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On
February 1, 2000, the NTC granted Bayantel’s
motion to revive the latter’s application and set
the case for hearings on February. EXTELCOM
filed an Opposition with Motion to Dismiss praying
for the dismissal of Bayantel’s application arguing
that Bayantel’s motion sought the revival of an
330
archived application filed almost 8 years ago thus
all evidence are outdated and should no longer
be used as basis of the necessity.
4. May 3, 2000 – NTC issued an Order granting
Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS
service applying Rule 15 Section 3 of its 1978
Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom then
filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking the annulment of the order
reviving the application of Bayantel and the Order
granting Bayantel a provisional authority to
construct, install, operate and maintain a
nationwide CMTS.
5. CA granted and dismissed Bayantel’s amended
application without prejudice to the filing of a new
CMTS application. MR filed by the NTC and
Bayantel. Meanwhile, Extelcom filed a motion for
partial reconsideration, praying that NTC Memo
Circular (allocating frequency bands to new public
telecommunication entities which are authorized
to install, operate and maintain CMTS) be also
declared void. CA dismissed all the motions.
6. In the present petition, Extelcom contends that
the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules
of 1993 because these Revised Rules deleted the
phrase “on its own initiative”, a provisional
authority may be issued only upon filing of the
proper motion before the Commission.
7. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification
to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised
Rules have not been published in a newspaper of
general circulation, the NTC has been applying
the 1978 Rules.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISSUE: W/N the 1993 Revised Rules should be applied
NO
1. The absence of publication, coupled with the
certification by the Commissioner of the NTC
stating that the NTC was still governed by the
1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993
Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of
the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel.
The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed
with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of
no moment.
2. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of
1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with
the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives
the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2,
Section 3 thereof merely states: Filing. --- (1)
Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of
every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the
date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months from the date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against
any party or persons.
3. The National Administrative Register is merely a
bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to
the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts, the National Library, other public
offices or agencies as the Congress may select,
and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover
publication and mailing or distribution costs.
4. The fact that the amendments to Administrative
Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and
published by the UP Law Center in the National
331
Administrative Register, does not cure the defect
related to the effectivity of the Administrative
Order.
5. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws.
6. The Administrative Order under consideration is
one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation.
7. Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition
sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations
can take effect.
8. This is explicit from Executive Order No. 200,
which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and
which states that:Laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided
9. Citing Tanada v Tuvera: Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is
to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation. The only exceptions are
interpretative regulations, those merely internal in
nature, or those so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
10. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be
published in the Official Gazette or in a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
newspaper of general circulation before it can
take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself
mandates that said Rules shall take effect only
after their publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
11. In the absence of such publication,
therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.
Tropical Homes Inc v NHA 152 SCRA 540 (appeal)
1. Tropical Homes entered into a contract with
Cordova for the sale to the latter of a lot at Better
Living Subdivision. A 10% downpayment upon
the execution of the contract was required and
the balance payable monthly. The contract
provided that upon default in payment of any
installment within 90 days from its due date, the
contract will be automatically cancelled.
2. Since there was non-payment for a period of 7
months already, the contract was cancelled and
all earlier payments were considered forfeited in
favor of the corporation. Cordova then filed a
letter complaint with the Investigating Committee
of the Dept of Trade asking for a refund
3. The case was then referred to the NHA which
issued the resolution: refund Cordova. MR filed
by Tropical, but denied.
4. In the meantime, PD 1344 was passed providing
that the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases covering unsound real
estate business practices, claims involving
refund, specific performance, etc. The decision of
332
the NHA shall be final after the lapse of 15 days
from date of receipt. It is only appealable to the
President and if there is no appeal within 30 days,
the decision is deemed affirmed.
5. Tropical, availing of this decree, appealed to the
President. No copy of the appeal was furnished to
respondent NHA.
6. Cordova then filed a motion for execution, to
which NHA issued a Writ of Execution. The
President failed to act on the appeal thus this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: W/N PD 1344 is unconstitutional on grounds
that it deprives Tropical access to courts of law and the
manner of appeal is violative of due process NO
1. The petitioner has not clearly shown how a ruling
upon the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344 will in
any way affect the correctness of the decision
rendered against him. There is no discussion
whatsoever on the merits of the original case. As
far as the records show, the NHA decision
appears to be fair and correct.
2. Moreover, the resolution promulgated by
respondent NHA, was issued before the passage
of the questioned decree. The writ of execution it
issued, as admitted by the petitioner in its
memorandum, did not in anyway rely upon P.D.
No. 1344.
3. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part
of due process, except where it is granted by
statute in which case it should be exercised in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
4. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and
not constitutional origin.
5. The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically
provide for judicial review of NHA decisions
affirmed or reversed by the President, does not
necessarily preclude judicial review.
6. On the issue of "affirmance-by-in action," failure
on the part of the President to act upon an appeal
does not necessarily mean that the appealed
decision automatically becomes final and
executory. Access to the courts of law may still be
made as mentioned above. Therefore, any such
decision is far from being final and executory.
DR. RAMON Y. ALBA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, CESAR
NITORREDA, et al., respondents.
Nature: motion for reconsideration
FRANCISCO, J.:
1. Respondents were among the twenty five (25)
graduating students of the Arriesgado Institute of
Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI). They
sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute
with the said school arising from the implementation of
certain school policies.
2. On their scheduled meeting, private respondents and
the other complaining students travelled all the way
from Tagum, Davao to the DECS Office in Davao City.
Their presence in the said office was duly noted by
DECS Administrative Officer V, Aquilina Granada who
advised them that petitioner will forthwith meet with
them. However, instead of conferring with the
aggrieved students, petitioner instead met with the
Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI - who admittedly
did not even have a previous appointment.
333
3. In view of this apparent discrimination, the students
contacted respondent Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao, Cesar E. Nitorreda who was impelled to
proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner for
not conferring with both parties at the same time in
order to hear both sides of the controversy. Thereafter,
petitioner presided over the conference between the
Arriesgados and the aggrieved students.
4. March 29, 1994 - petitioner submitted to the Office of
the Ombudsman a report wherein he claimed that he
had succeeded in facilitating an amicable settlement
between the parties. However, private respondents’
affidavit-complaintattested that as a result of the said
dispute, they were barred from taking the final
examinations and participating in the graduation rites.
Y. 5. The Office of the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty
of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713,
Complaints’ averments were confirmed by the school
itself, thru School Principal Ma. Clara Arriesgado, that
the complaining student were not allowed to take the
final examination until and unless they agree to the
withdrawal of the case they filed in this Office against
herein respondent .
6. When petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied, he filed an “Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or
Prohibition With Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction”
with this Court.
Issue:
W RA 6770 is unconstitutional for failure to provide the
right to appeal - NO.
Held/ Ratio:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
1. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 27 of
R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No.7 for their failure to provide for the right of
appeal in certain cases from the decision of the
Ombudsman, maintaining that the same is tantamount
to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
As regards this threshold matter, suffice it to say that
this Court has consistently held that:
“The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with” the provisions of the law.”
2. Apparently, therefore, the constitutional requirement
of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the
denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to
present evidence in support of one’s case.
The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with the
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and a
perusal of the said rules of procedure in administrative
cases manifest sufficient compliance with the
requirements of due process.
[G.R. No. 142888. June 6, 2001]
EVELIO P. BARATA, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN ABALOS, JR.,
OFFICEPetition
Nature: OF THEfor OMBUDSMAN and the COURT OF APPEALS,
Review in Certiorari
respondents.
1.GONZAGA-REYES,
Petitioner headsJ.:the San Miguel Bukid Homeowners'
Association, Inc. whose members have occupied a
certain parcel of land in Mandaluyong City.
2. Sometime in March 1995, the City Government of
Mandaluyong initiated the construction of medium size
condominiums and row houses for the benefit of
334
qualified members of the said homeowners'
association.
3. To give way to the construction, the members of the
said homeowners' association had to vacate the area
which they were occupying as the medium size housing
project and row houses were supposed to be completed
within 540 days from June 1995.
4. When the period for construction lapsed, petitioner
and the members of the homeowners' association
demanded the completion of the said housing project
but the same allegedly fell on deaf ears.
5. Alleging that the demands have been ignored,
petitioner filed on May 17, 1999 an administrative
complaint against Mayor Abalos, Jr. for violation of
Section 5 (a) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees) for failing
to act promptly on letters and requests sent by the
public.
6. July 21, 1999 - Office of the Ombudsman rendered a
Decision dismissing the administrative complaint "for
insufficiency of evidence."
7. September 10, 1999. - The Motion for
Reconsideration therefrom was likewise denied. The
order was received by petitioner on October 15, 1999.
8. November 4, 1999 - petitioner appealed by way of a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court in G.R.
No. 140272. The Second Division denied the petition in
the Resolution of November 24, 1999 in view of A.M.
No. 9-2-02-SCand the ruling in the case of Fabian vs.
Desierto.The resolution was received by petitioner on
January 18, 2000.
9. February 1, 2000 - petitioner filed a "Petition for
Review on Certiorari" with the CA which rendered a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Decision dated April 10, 2000 dismissing the petition on
the ground that the decision exonerating respondent
mayor of administrative charge is not appealable and
that the petition was filed out of time.
Issue:
W CA erred in ruling that the Ombudsman's decision of
an administrative charge is not appealable - NO.
1. Petitioner claims that respondent court erred in ruling
that it has no appellate authority to review the decision
of the Ombudsman arguing that pursuant to the
decision of this Court in Fabian vs. Desierto, decisions
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals. He insists that
the Ombudsman’s decision absolving respondent
Abalos of thecharge against him is appealable.
In his Reply, petitioner stresses that the Office of the
Ombudsman should not restrict the right of appeal
allowed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770 nor limit the power of
review of this Court. He contends that whether the
decision of the Ombudsman is for conviction or acquittal
of the respondent, it should be reviewed by this Court.
2. Section 27 of R.A. 6770 provides:
"SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All
provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially
affects the order, directive or decision;
335
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month's salary shall be final and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the
Office of the Ombudsman as the interest may require."
3. It is clear that any order, directive or decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of public
censure, or reprimand, or suspension of not more than
one month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
The last paragraph in Section 27 which provides that in
all administratively disciplinary cases, orders, directives,
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court was rendered invalid
and ofno effect in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto which
laid down the rule that said Section 27 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases without violating the proscription in Section 30,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without
its advice and concurrence.
Thus, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should
be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provisions
of Rule 43. The only provision affected by the Fabian
ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the
proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as
the proper mode of appeal; all other matters included in
said Section 27, including the finality or non-finality of
decisions, are not affected and still stand.
4. Pursuant to AO No. 7, where the respondent is
absolved of the charge, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. It is implicit in Section 27, and with
greater reason, that decisions of the Ombudsman
absolving the respondent of the charge, should be final
and unappealable.
Needless to state, in appropriate cases involving
oppressive or arbitrary action, the complainant is not
deprived of a legal recourse by certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court which apply suppletorily to the
Rules of Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman.
5. The same case teaches that the failure to provide
for the right of appeal in certain cases from the
decision of the Ombudsman is not a denial of due
process for the right to appeal is not a natural right
nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. It
should be recalled that the Second Division of this Court
in G.R. No.140272 denied the appeal by way of petition
for review on certiorari in its Resolution dated November
336
24, 1999 precisely in view of the ruling in the Fabian
case. Simply put, the correct recourse was to the Court
of Appeals and not to this Court.
This notwithstanding, even on the assumption that
appeal is allowed, the same can no longer prosper. As
correctly pointed out by private respondent, sincethe
Order dated September 10, 1999 of the Ombudsman
denying the motion for reconsideration was received by
petitioner on October 15, 1999, petitioner had until
October 25, 1999 to appeal in accordance with Section
27, R.A. 6770 or at the most, until November 24, 1999,
if he availed of the 30-day extension provided under
Section 2, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure. However, the petition was filed with the
Court of Appeals only on February 1, 2000, way beyond
the reglementary period.
[G.R. No. 109721. March 11, 1999]
FELIX A. SAJOT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLEpetition
Nature: OF THEto set aside a respondents
PHILIPPINES, resolution. of the Court of
Appeals
1. April 23, 1991 - RTC Branch 118, Pasay City,
convicted petitioner and Antonio Tobias in Criminal
Case NO. 97-12635, of estafa.
2. Antonio Tobias appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals,and, thereafter, filed an appellant's brief, which
appeal is now pending therein.
3. June 24, 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a
notice of appeal through Attorney Mariano Cervo.
Subsequently, the trial court elevated the records to the
Court of Appeals.
4. February 21, 1992 - petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a "Petition for Extension of Time to File Brief,"
asking for an additional thirty-day period to file
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
appellant's brief, which the court granted.On March 20,
1992, petitioner filed a "Petition for Second Extension of
Time to File Brief", which the court likewise
granted.Again, on May 14, 1992, he filed a "petition for
Third Extension of Time to File Brief." The court granted
the motion.
5. November 27, 1992 - CA resolved to dismiss
petitioner's appeal for failure to file his brief within the
third extension granted by the court. Petitioner could
not give any plausible explanation for his failure to file
brief.
6. March 12, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that his counsel, Attorney
Mariano H. G. Cervo, never submitted the brief because
of "utter and gross ignorance of procedure and/or
negligence or omission, intentional or otherwise, in the
performance of his avowed professional duty."
7. March 30, 1993 - CA denied the motion for being a
prohibited pleading. Petitioner received a copy of the
resolution on April 12, 1993.
Issue: W Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file
appellant's brief -
1. Rule 50, Section 1 (e) of the Revised Rules of Court
provides -
"Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal - An Appeal
may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
xxx
(e) Failure of appellant to serve and file the required
number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the
time provided by these Rules;"
337
2. In Sps. Lawa vs. Court of Appeals, we said:
"True, appeal is an essential part of our judicial system.
As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not
to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if
the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's
right, however, carries with it the correspondent respect
for the appellee's similar rights to fair play and justice.
The appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing
party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down
in the Rules of Court."
3. In Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
"Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while
the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances."
While litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a
truism that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.
4. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals denied
him the right to due process when it dismissed his
appeal because of his counsel's negligence.
We do not agree. Petitioner was himself guilty of
neglect. He was aware of his conviction and of the
requirement of filing an appellant's brief. His excuse
that he relied on the services of his counsel and that he
was busy is "flimsy". Were we to accept his excuse,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
this Court would have to open cases dismissed many
years ago on the ground of counsel's neglect. In many
cases, the fact is that counsel's negligence is matched
by his client's own negligence."
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
PHILIPPINE
Nature: NATIONAL
two petitions POLICE and
for certiorari DIRECTOR-GENERAL
a petition for
LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No.
26558 for SR.,
CALLEJO, plunder
J.: wherein petitioner is one of the
accused together with former President Joseph E.
Estrada, Jose “Jinggoy” P. Estrada and several others.
1. April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation,
received on its behalf a donation in the amount of P200
Million from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson
through the latter’s assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte.
2. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the
said amount to the Foundation’s treasurer who later
deposited it in the Foundation’s account with the
Equitable PCI Bank.
3. In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson
publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and
his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities,
including its operation on the illegal numbers game
known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the
Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints
including Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption,
versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al.,
docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft
338
Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as
OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De
Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus
Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,
Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma,
docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
4. Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit
dated February 21, 2001. The other respondents
likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The
Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary
investigation of the complaints and on April 4, 2001,
issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that
Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others be
charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
5. April 4, 2001 - the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan several Informations against former
President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his
post as President, including one for plunder.
6. April 5, 2001 - petitioner obtained a copy of the
Ombudsman’s Joint Resolution finding probable cause
against him for plunder. The next day, he filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation. This was
denied on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
amended Information charging petitioner with plunder
had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.
7. Also on April 5, 2001, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To
Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and
Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of
Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused’s Motion
for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of
the Charges against accused Edward Serapio.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding
probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of
arrest for the accused, including petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused,
including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on
June 27, 2001.
In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with
the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which
was set for hearing on May 4, 200. For his part,
petitioner’s co-accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed on
April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging
that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
8. May 4, 2001 - during the hearing for the Urgent
Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting
of the arraignment earlier than the June 27, 2001
schedule. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the
hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioner’s
petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
9. May 17, 2001 - four days before the hearing on
petitioner’s petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an
urgent motion for early arraignment of all three accused,
and a motion for joint bail hearings. Petitioner
questioned this in the hearing on his petition for bail. So
Sandiganbayan reset the hearing to enable the court to
resolve the prosecution’s pending motions as well as
petitioner’s motion that his petition for bail be heard as
early as possible, which motion the prosecution
opposed.
10. May 31, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioner’s April 6, 2001 Urgent
Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed
339
by petitioner had already been resolved in its April 25,
2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold
petitioner and his co-accused for trial.Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001
Resolution.
11. June 1, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well
as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558
during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain
of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan,
citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the
case in the manner it determines best conducive to
orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,
directed the other accused to participate in the said bail
hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is
adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial.
12. However, Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June
15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending
incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing
to June 26, 2001.
13. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again
proceed because on said date petitioner filed a motion
to quash on the grounds that as against him, the
amended Information does not allege a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as
against him, the amended Information does not allege a
pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in to have
been illegally received or collected does not constitute
“ill-gotten wealth” as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges
him of bribery and illegal gambling.
By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the
holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to
withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution
contended that petitioner’s motion to quash the
amended Information was antithetical to his petition for
bail.
14. The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of
accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001
to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the
motion to quash of petitioner. However, even before the
Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of
petitioner and the prosecution, petitioner filed with this
Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus
and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying
that the Court declare void the questioned orders,
resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his
claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right
to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be
declared to have waived their right to present evidence
in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on
the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of
petitioner’s guilt of plunder, that he be granted
provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings.
15. July 9, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash the
amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel,
received on said date a copy of said resolution. The
motion to fix bail filed by Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada was
also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
340
16. July 10, 2001 - just before his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to the
Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for
reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying
his motion to quash and for the deferment of his
arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared
that there was no provision in the Rules of Court or in
the Sandiganbayan’s rules granting the right to
petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of an
interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to
orally argue his motion for reconsideration. When
petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with
his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling
the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
19. July 20, 2001 - petitioner filed with the Court a
Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769,
alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its
July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash,
notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory
allegations of the amended Information against him do
not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is
charged, under the said amended Information, for more
than one offense.
20. August 9, 2001 - petitioner filed with the Court
another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution
dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001
Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001
Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its
May 31, 2001 Resolution.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
21. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion
to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause;
and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a
reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner
asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally
disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave
abuse of discretion in charging him with plunder. He
further argues that there exists no probable cause to
support an indictment for plunder as against him.
He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look
into the existence of probable cause to charge a person
for an offense in a given case, it may do so in
exceptional circumstances, which are present in this
case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority; and (4) where the charges are manifestly
false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.[36]
Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for a
reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the
questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman
disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the
charge of plunder and committed errors of law or
irregularities which have been prejudicial to his interest.
Issue:
W Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner’s omnibus motion - NO.
1. Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with
the Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of
341
preliminary investigations. Citing Raro v.
Sandiganbayan:
‘x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a
policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and leaves to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise
of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence
as will establish ‘probable cause’ for filing of information
against the supposed offender.”
2. Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their
resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner
failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding
probable cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither
did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation.
3. Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of
petitioner’s omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted
that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in
accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of
the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18,
23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman
Act of 1989); and that all the basic complaints and
evidence in support thereof were served upon all the
accused.It was in light of such findings that the
Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the
allegation that accused therein (including petitioner)
were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s Resolution dated April 4, 2001
finding probable cause to charge them with plunder
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
after the conduct of preliminary investigation in
connection therewith.
In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s resolution, but failed to show in his
motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or
that the preliminary investigation was tainted by errors
of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for
which a reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s resolution
may be granted.
4. It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary
investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a
right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render the same defective and
neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
case or constitute a ground for quashing the
Information. If the lack of a preliminary investigation
does not render the Information invalid nor affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason
can it be said that the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust
the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it
be said that petitioner had been deprived of due
process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute the
charges against him during the preliminary
investigation.
5. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely
to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the
person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for tria. As the Court held in Webb
vs. De Leon, “[a] finding of probable cause needs only
342
to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt."
6. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
said officer’s finding and determination of probable
cause, since the determination of the existence of
probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. The
Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner
failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with
irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint
resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the
facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
PEDRO E. BUDIONGAN, JR., Municipal Mayor; et. al petitioners,

vs.
HON. JACINTO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., Asst. Special Prosecutor
I; et al. respondents.
Nature: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing
the Memorandum J of the Office of the Special
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman
1. The Municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated the
amount of P450,000.00 for the purchase of a road roller
for the municipality. However, the Municipal
Development Council through Resolution No. 3
recommended that the amount of P450,000.00 be
realigned and used for the asphalt laying of Bernaldez
Street. Discussion thereon was deferred.
2. February 6, 2002 - Municipal Treasurer, Fulgencio V.
Paña, issued a Certificate of Availability of Funds for the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
project. Thereafter, the Office of the Municipal Engineer
prepared a Program of Works and Cost Estimates duly
noted/approved by Municipal Budget Officer Taciana B.
Espejo and Mayor Budiongan.
3. March 6, 2002 - Mayor Budiongan issued the Notice
of Award and Notice to Commence Work in favor of
Herbert Malmis General Merchandise and Contractor,
Inc, after public bidding. The Sangguniang Bayan
passed Resolution authorizing Mayor Budiongan to sign
and enter into contract with Malmis relative to the above
project in the amount of P339,808.00. So Malmis
commenced with the project.
4. Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no
ordinance approving the realignment of the funds.
Thus, on May 17, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan
passed Ordinance No. 8 approving the realignment of
the fund. On June 14, 2002, Malmis was paid the
contract price.
5. July 3, 2002 - respondents filed a complaint against
the petitioners before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the
conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence
work since there was no fund appropriated for the
purpose.
6. July 31, 2003 - the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
found probable cause and recommended the filing of an
information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code against the petitioners.
7. Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and
Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, issued the assailed Memorandum dated
April 28, 2004, modifying the charge. Thus, two
separate Informations were filed before the
343
Sandiganbayan (1) for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 against the petitioners docketed as Criminal
Case No. 28075 and (2) for violation of Section 3(h) of
R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan docketed as
Criminal Case No. 28076.
8. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the
information charging them with violation of Sec. 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. In a Resolution dated June 10, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quashand
remanded Criminal Case No. 28075 to the Office of
the Ombudsman for amendment of the Information. It
held that although Malmis benefited from the contract,
the same is not unwarranted considering that the project
was implemented, executed and completed.
9. June 27, 2005 - an Amended Information was filed
charging petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, alleging that petitioners, by prematurely
awarding to Malmis the project despite the absence of
funds specifically appropriated for such purpose, and
thereafter paying the contract price from the Municipal
Treasury which was originally appropriated for the
purchase of a road roller, caused damage and undue
injury to the government. The Sandiganbayan admitted
the Amended Information in its Resolution dated August
18, 2005.
10. On even date, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File
Motion for Reinvestigationarguing that the above
Informations were filed without affording them the
opportunity to file counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the
modified charges. On September 20, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the motion
insofar as Criminal Case No. 28076 is concerned. It
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
held that it is too late in the day to remand the case for
reinvestigation considering that Budiongan had already
been arraigned and the case had long been set for pre-
trial proceedings, with both parties having filed their
respective briefs. As regards Criminal Case No. 28075,
the Sandiganbayan noted that although the conduct of
the preliminary investigation was regular, petitioners
however were not given the opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the modified charges.Thus, it granted
leave to the petitioners to file with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration (not a
motion for reinvestigation) of the said office's
Memorandum dated April 28, 2004.
11. Petitioners maintain that the modification of the
charge from violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No.
3019 denied their rights to due process since they
were not given the opportunity to answer and present
evidence on the new charge in a preliminary
investigation.
Issue: W the Petitioners were denied the opportunity to
present counter-evidence in a new preliminary
investigation - NO.
1. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a
constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by
statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does
not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise
render the same defective. It does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a
ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a
preliminary investigation does not render the
Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the case, then the denial of a motion for
344
reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the
Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the
case.
2. Petitioners were not deprived of due process
because they were afforded the opportunity to refute the
charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The
modification of the offense charged did not come as a
surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the
same set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts.
Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered
evidence nor impute commission of grave errors or
serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to
warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case
as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.Thus, the
modification of the offense charged, even without
affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation,
did not amount to a violation of their rights.
3. Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is
deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in Criminal Case
No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned
together with the rest of the petitioners under the
Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on
December 2, 2005.
4. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely
to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the
person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed and was
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt."
5. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an integral
component of the Ombudsman and is under the latter's
supervision and control. Thus, whatever course of
action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to
approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his
discretionary powers based upon constitutional
mandate. Generally, courts should not interfere in such
exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review
the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it,
save in cases where there is clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman. Absent any
showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or
any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule
must defer to said officer's finding and determination of
probable cause, since the determination of the
existence of probable cause is the function of the
prosecutor.
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA,
1.SR.,December
PRESIDING 27, JUDGE,
1991 -REGIONAL TRIAL
Mrs. Imelda COURT
Marcos andOF
MANILA,
Messrs. BRANCH and
Benedicto 26, and PEOPLE
Rivera were OF THE for
indicted PHILIPPINES,
violation
respondents.
ofQUISUMBING,
Section 10 ofJ.: Circular No. 960 relation to Section 34
of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as
amended) in five Informations. Docketed as Criminal
345
Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets
alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their
foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to
register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the
Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular
No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical
persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts
abroad without prior authorization from the Central
Bank.It also required all residents of the Philippines who
habitually earned or received foreign currencies from
invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such
earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of
the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense
under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act.
2. (9) additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and
Benedicto with the same offense, but involving different
accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC.
3. January 3, 1992 - (11) more Informations accusing
Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the same offense, again
in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same
court. The Informations were similarly worded as the
earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates
of the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the
dummies used, the balances and sources of the
earnings, and the names of the foreign banks where
these accounts were maintained.
4. All of the aforementioned criminal cases were
consolidated before Branch 26 of the said trial court.
5. Meanwhile, Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318
which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign
exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20,
1992.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
6. August 24, 1992 - Central Bank, pursuant to the
government’s policy of further liberalizing foreign
exchange transactions, came out with Circular No.
1356 which amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No.
1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank
approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures
obtained from the banking system.
7. Both of the aforementioned circulars, however,
contained a saving clause, excepting from their
coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of
Circular No. 960 and, in the case of Circular No. 1353,
violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No.
1318.
8. September 19, 1993 - the government allowed
petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to the
Philippines, on condition that they face the various
criminal charges instituted against them, including the
dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter
cases.
9. February 28, 1994 - petitioners Benedicto and Rivera
were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the charges
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos
had earlier entered a similar plea during her
arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
10. August 11, 1994 - petitioners moved to quash all the
Informations filed against them. Their motion was
grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping,
extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular
No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central
Bank’s reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute
immunity as a result of a compromise agreement
entered into with the government.
346
11. September 6, 1994 - the trial court denied
petitioners’ motion. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this
motion on October 18, 1994.
12. November 21, 1994 - petitioners moved for leave to
file a second motion for reconsideration. The trial court
denied petitioners’ motion and set the consolidated
cases for trial on January 5, 1995.
13. Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition,
with similar prayers for temporary restraining orders
and/or writs of preliminary injunction were respectively
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge in denying petitioners’ respective Motions to
Quash, except that with respect to Criminal Case No.
91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
Issue:
(1) W the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to
Quash for absence of a valid preliminary investigation? -
NO.
1. Petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation
by the Department of Justice was invalid and in violation
of their rights to due process. Petitioners argue that
government’s ban on their travel effectively prevented
them from returning home and personally appearing at
the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera
further point out that the joint preliminary investigation
by the Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in
one set of cases before the Sandiganbayan for
violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set
before the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due
process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an inquiry
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is
personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and
can be waived, either expressly or by implication. The
waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary
investigation, where one was conducted.
3.Petitioners have expressly waived their right to
question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary
investigation or to ask for a new preliminary
investigation. Petitioners admit posting bail immediately
following their return to the country, entered their
respective pleas to the charges, and filed various
motions and pleadings. By so doing, without
simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary
investigation, they have waived any and all
irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. The trial court did not err in denying the
motion to quash the informations on the ground of want
of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation.
The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a
ground to quash the information.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
1. An information was filed charging herein petitioner
Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself
together with his two lawyers to the police upon
obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter.
However, he was immediately detained and denied his
347
right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes
and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
2. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on
recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary
investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest
was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was
conducted before the information was filed, which is
violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on
reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
3. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of the
lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was
valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed,
the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists
valid information for murder filed against petitioner.
4. Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
W the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful -
No.
W petitioner waived his right to preliminary
investigation - No.

RULING:
1. The general rule on arrest provides that the same is
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However,
there are instances specifically enumerated under the
law when a warrantless arrest may be considered
lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein
petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of
said rule.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2. The police were not present at the time of the
commission of the offense, neither do they have
personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or
has been committed not to mention the fact that
petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the
penal institution.
3. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution
that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a
preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless.
In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a
preliminary investigation to determine whether is
probable cause that a crime has been committed and
that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to
prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation
brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the
accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived
of.
4. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right
to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the
prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation
is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment.
The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his
right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment
and he, through his counsel denied answering
questions before the court unless they were afforded
the proper preliminary investigation.
5. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's
allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to
preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the
information charging the latter of the crime of murder.
G.R. Nos. 138859-60. February 22, 2001
ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP, petitioner, vs. The Honorable
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
348
Doctrine: The right of a person to preliminary
investigation is recognized by the law and is governed
by the Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord
this right does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of
the information; the case is merely suspended, and the
prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation.
Nature: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, assailing two Ordersof the Sandiganbayan
1. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an
Orderdated September 19, 1995, naming the following
as respondents: Benjamin Arao, Frederick Winters,
Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the
city jail warden of Pagadian City.
2. Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated January 15,
1998,recommending the prosecution of “the
aforenamed respondents” for violation of Article 269 of
the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to
Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.
Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop
was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted,
although he was not one of the original respondents
mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
recommendation.
3. April 16, 1998 - Order of Arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner,
however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On
the same day, he filed a “Motion To Remand Case To
The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary
Investigation.”
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
4. June 8, 1998 - Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of
petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the anti-graft court.
5. August 8, 1998 - petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation.
In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the
Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the
Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted
himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No.
24525 was concerned.
6. February 15, 1999 - On the scheduled arraignment,
petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been
accorded preliminary investigation.
7. The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s plea for
preliminary investigation.
Issue: W the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of
the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to
petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave
abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment -
YES.
Held:
1. Preliminary investigation is “an inquiry or proceeding
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial.”The Court explained that
the rationale of a preliminary investigation is to “protect
the accused from the inconvenience, expense and
burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the
reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first
ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a
competent officer."
349
2. The Rules of Court requires such investigation before
an information for an offense punishable by at least four
years, two months and one day may be filed in court.
The old Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary
investigation of an offense cognizable by the regional
trial court.
3. Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with
violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019. Such offense is
punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment
of six years and one month to fifteen years.Under the
aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised
version, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation.
4. It is undisputed, however, that before the Information
against petitioner was filed, no preliminary investigation
had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the
Ombudsman admitted that “petitioner was denied of his
right to preliminary investigation.”We find no basis for
the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that petitioner “had not
given timely notice nor any statement of the alleged
inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the
Information.”
5. First, there was no showing that petitioner was
notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. As earlier
noted, he had not been named as a respondent in the
September 19, 1995 Order. After learning of the filing of
the Information against him when he was served a
Warrant of Arrest, petitioner did not dally. He
immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted in regard
to him. Several months later, moments before his
arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the
preliminary investigation be conducted. In this light, the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Sandiganbayan erred in saying that he had not given
the court timely notice of this deficiency.
6. Even assuming that prior to the filing of the
Information, petitioner had known that the proceedings
and the investigation against his co-accused were
pending, he cannot be expected to know of the
investigator’s subsequent act of charging him.
Precisely, he had not been previously included therein
and, consequently, he had not been notified thereof.
7. In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that “the
right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment.” Conversely, if the
accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the
petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived.
8. Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver
of petitioner’s right to preliminary investigation. Under
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, “[a]n application for or admission to bail shall
not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or
from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence
of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea. x
x x.”
9. We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is
substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it
to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his
right to due process.Hence, preliminary investigation
with regard to him must be conducted.
10. We disagree with the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on
Section 27 of Republic Act 6770.This provision cannot
justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the
350
Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation.
The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it
deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the
deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary
investigation.
YUSOP v SANDIGANBAYAN
February 22, 2001
Facts:
Acting on an Affidavit-Complaintfiled by a certain Erlinda
Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued
an Orderdated September 19, 1995, naming the
following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck
Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay
and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order
also required respondents, within ten days from receipt
thereof, to submit their counter-affidavits and other
pieces of contraverting evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a
Resolution dated January 15, 1998, recommending the
prosecution of "the aforenamed respondents" for
violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act
No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of
Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the
persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of
the original respondents mentioned in the Order of
September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
approved the recommendation. Accordingly, two
Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrest
under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code).
On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner,
however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On
the same day, he filed a "Motion To Remand Case To
The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary
Investigation."
In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan
denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court.
On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation.
In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the
Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the
Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted
himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No.
24525 was concerned.
On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999,
petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been
accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed
Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim and
proceeded with the arraignment.
Hence, this recourse.
Issue :
351
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan, despite being
informed of the lack of preliminary investigation
with respect to petitioner, In Criminal Case No.
24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in
proceeding with his arraignment?
2. Is the filing of the bail bond constitutive of a
waiver for seeking the right of preliminary
investigation?
Held: Petition is partly meritorious remanded in
Sandiganbayan for conduct of Preliminary investigation.
Annent to the first issue. We disagree with the
Sandiganbayan's reliance on Section 27 of Republic Act
6770.This provision cannot justify the evasion of the
requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for
conducting preliminary investigation. The law does not
sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the
finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the
substantive right to a preliminary investigation.
Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by the
Ombudsman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which
recommended the filing of charges. He was not a party
to the case and was not accorded any right to present
evidence on his behalf.
In any event, even the Ombudsman agrees that
petitioner was deprived of this right and believes that
the basic rudiments of due process are complied with.”
For its part, the Sandiganbayan opted to remain silent
when asked by this Court to comment on the Petition.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Anent to the second issue:
In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "the right
to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment." Conversely, if the
accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the
petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived.
Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a
waiver of petitioner's right to preliminary
investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
"[a]n application for or admission to bail; shall not
bar the accused from challenging the validity of
his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided
that he raises them before entering his plea. xxx."
We stress that the right to preliminary investigation
is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To
deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full
measure of his right to due process.Hence, preliminary
investigation with regard to him must be conducted.
VICTOR JOSE TAN UY v OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN
July 27, 2008
FACTS:
charging former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
together with Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Charlie “Atong”
352
Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, John Does and
Jane Does, with the crime of Plunder.
The Ombudsman moved to amend the Information
twice - initially, to introduce changes in the Information
(including a change in the appellation of the
accused Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy to John Doe a.k.a. as Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy), and thereafter, to include Jaime
C. Dichaves as accused; the Sandiganbayan granted
the motions.
In the course of the proceedings, the Ombudsman filed
before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Motion
dated 8 January 2002[8] seeking, among others, the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Victor Jose Tan
Uy alias Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy. The Ombudsman alleged that no warrant of arrest
had been issued against the accused John Doe who
was designated in the Information as Eleuterio Tan,
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy; and that, in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice, a warrant of arrest should
issue against him after he had been identified to be also
using the name Victor Jose Tan Uy with address at
2041 M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. Allegedly, a
positive identification had been made through
photographs, as early as the Senate Impeachment Trial
against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, that
John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy and VICTOR JOSE TAN UY are one and the
same person.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The petitioner’s response was a Petition to Conduct
Preliminary Investigation[10] filed with
the Ombudsman. The petitioner argued that:
(1) he was not subjected to a preliminary
investigation or to any previous inquiry to
determine the existence of probable cause
against him for the crime of plunder or any other
offense, as:
a. he was not included as respondent in either
of the two Ombudsman cases – bases of
the criminal proceeding;
b. neither his name nor his address at No.
2041 M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City was
mentioned at any stage of the preliminary
investigation conducted in the criminal
cases;
c. the preliminary investigation in the cases
that led to the filing the case was
conducted without notice to him and
without his participation;
d. he was not served any subpoena, whether
at his address at No. 2041 M.J. Cuenco
Avenue, Cebu City or at any other address,
for the purpose of informing him of any
complaint against him for plunder or any
other offense and for the purpose of
directing him to file his counter-affidavit;
(2) dictates of basic fairness and due process of law
require that petitioner be given the opportunity to
avail himself of the right to a preliminary
investigation since the offense involved is non-
bailable in character.
353
ISSUE:
WON the Ombudsman complied with the basic
requirements of due process and the prevailing rules
and jurisprudence on preliminary investigation.
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is
placed on trial to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him
from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well
as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public
trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having
to conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right
is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component
of due process in administering criminal justice. The
right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound for trial and before being exposed to
the risk of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal
or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the
accused's claim to a preliminary investigation is to
deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
process.
Thus, as in a court proceeding (albeit with appropriate
adjustments because it is essentially still an
administrative proceeding in which the prosecutor or
investigating officer is a quasi-judicial officer by the
nature of his functions), a preliminary investigation is
subject to the requirements of both substantive and
procedural due process.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In light of the due process requirement, the standards
that at the very least assume great materiality and
significance are those enunciated in the leading case
of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. This
case instructively tells us - in defining the basic due
process safeguards in administrative proceedings -
that the decision (by an administrative body) must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected; only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to
the parties, can the latter be protected in their right
to know and meet the case against them; it should
not, however, detract from the tribunal’s duty to actively
see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to
use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence
and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy.
Mindful of these considerations, we hold that the
petitioner’s right to due process has been violated.
PEOPLE v VELASQUEZ
G.R. Nos. 132635 & 143872–75
MENDOZA; February 21, 2001
NATURE
- An appeal from the decision of the RTC of Angeles
City, convicting Lamberto Velasquez of (1) acts of
lasciviousness committed against his granddaughter
Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary
Joy Ocampo
FACTS
354
- Velasquez was charged with acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of AIRA VELASQUEZ, MARY JOY
OCAMPO and KIMBERLY VELASQUEZ; and rape of
MARY JOY OCAMPO. Velasquez pleaded not guilty to
the charges against him, whereupon the cases were
consolidated and jointly tried.
The evidence for the prosecution:
- In October 1994, Mary Joy (stepdaughter of accused),
then 13 years of age, slept in a room she shared with
Velasquez, her mother Angelina, and her two half-
brothers. When she woke up in the morning, she found
the accused beside her on the floor, her mother having
left for the market. He kissed her on the mouth and the
breasts. Then he raised her shirt, pulled down her
shorts and underwear, and kissed her private parts.
Afterward, he inserted his middle finger into Mary Joy’s
vagina. Mary Joy felt a sharp pain and tried to resist by
kicking him, which made the latter remove his finger
although he continued kissing her. He then left, but not
before warning her to keep quiet and not to tell anyone
what he had done to her.
- 2 weeks later, still in October, while Mary Joy was
watching television alone in the living room, Velasquez
approached her and, though she tried to evade him, he
succeeded in forcing her to their room. He lowered her
shorts and underwear, raised her shirt and bra, and
started kissing her. Then he inserted his middle finger
into her vagina and later had sexual intercourse with
her. Up to April 1997, Velasquez continuously molested
Mary Joy, sometimes forcing her to masturbate him and
at other times licking her vagina.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- Regail (daughter of accused) has a daughter named
Aira, 2 years old. On April 16, 1997, at 3PM, while
Regail was folding clothes, Aira walked into the room
crying. Aira complained that her grandfather did
something to her, which she demonstrated by opening
her right leg and moving one of her right fingers toward
her vagina. Regail did not want to believe her daughter
and thought that her father was just joking with the
latter. However, Aira started to cry. In the days that
followed, she noticed that Aira complained of pain in her
vagina while taking a bath. When Regail asked her why
her vagina hurt, Aira said it was because of the things
her grandfather had been doing to her vagina, showing
her mother what had been done to her.On vagina. She
also noticed that her daughter was running a fever, and
that her vagina was red and swollen. She took Aira to
Dr. Lydia Buyboy, who told her that her daughter had
lacerations in her vaginal area and that she had
probably been fingered. However, the doctor declined to
give a medical certificate as she did not want to get
involved in any case.
- Mary Grace Ocampo( stepdaughter of accused),
Angelina’s daughter, married Ranold, accused’s son by
first wife Caridad and Regail’s brother. Mary Grace
testified that she had been molested by her stepfather
when she was 9 years old. She recalled when, as a new
couple, Angelina and accused spent the night at an
aunt’s house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Mary Grace
was with them. According to Mary Grace, accused went
to her side, raised her clothes, and fondled her breasts.
His hands went lower. She was unable to resist
355
accused’s advances because of his strength and
threats. To prevent a recurrence of the event, Mary
Grace moved out of their house and went to live with
her aunt in Angeles City. Kimberly was around Aira’s
age, and Regail remembered hearing that pus had also
come out of the child’s vagina. When she told her about
Dr. Buyboy’s findings, Mary Grace lost no time and took
Kimberly to Dr. Buyboy, who made the same findings.
- Angelina and Loida went to the police station to make
a report and brought the children to the Ospital ng
Angeles for physical examination. They went back to
the Mabalacat Police Station and gave their statements.
They went to the NBI for another physical examination.
The evidence for the defense:
- Accused denied the allegations against him. He said
there were always several people in their house at any
time, and so it was impossible for him to have an
opportunity to molest any of the complainants. He
believed that Mary Joy had accused him because he
always noticed whenever she came home late and
scolded her. As for Mary Grace’s complaint, he claimed
he was in fact the one who caught Kimberly playing with
her organ and that he reported this to Kimberly’s
parents. He believes that Regail filed the complaint
against him because he had scolded her and punished
her when she went out on a date with a married man,
and again when she went out with her cousin after she
had married Meryll Robertson. As to Roan, he claimed
he never molested her. Of his granddaughter Aira,
accused-appellant said that she was a liar and a
naughty child.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- On April 30, 1997, during Loida Kellow’s despedida,
he was drinking with his friends when he developed a
headache and decided to sleep. At around 10PM, he
was awakened by his son Renel who gave him glass of
bitter liquid to drink. The drink contained sleeping pills.
After taking one sip, he set it aside. When he woke up
the next morning, he looked for his family, but they were
not around. He got home at 8PM, but there was still no
sign of them.
- The following day, he went to Manila. He pawned his
watch and ring and bought a ticket on the Super Ferry
10. At 9PM, he sailed for Cebu and stayed with his
eldest son, Rolando Velasquez. Three weeks later, he
learned of the cases filed against him from the
newspapers and television. However, because he had
no job and no money, he was unable to return to
Pampanga to clear his name. He was found in Cebu
and arrested in July.
- The accused presented several witnesses to testify
that he is a man of good repute, and to corroborate his
story.
TC RULING:
The accused was convicted of (1) acts of lasciviousness
committed against his granddaughter Aira Velasquez;
and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy Ocampo
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court erred in denying the accused
of his right to preliminary investigation. NO.
356
2. WON the trial court erred in admitting the testimony
of Regail Velasquez. NO.
3. WON the trial court erred in giving credibility to Mary
Joy Ocampo’s testimony. YES.
HELD
1. NO.
It is an established jurisprudence that the issue of lack
of or a defective preliminary investigation should be
raised before or during trial and such statutory right to
a preliminary investigation is deemed waived when
appellant, as in this case, failed to claim it before
plea.
Moreover, in appellant’s arguments, it is unclear
whether this alleged motion for preliminary investigation
which was denied by the trial court was anchored on the
lack of it or merely a defect thereon or a mere motion for
reinvestigation. When it does not appear from the
record that a preliminary investigation was not granted
the accused, it must be presumed that the proceedings
in the trial court were in accordance with law. So that
where no objection has been made at the trial, appellant
must be taken to have waived his right to a preliminary
investigation if in fact he was not given the benefit
thereof. Failing to raise the issue of lack of preliminary
investigation during the trial, appellant is now estopped
to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. At any
rate, absence of preliminary investigation merely affects
the regularity of the proceedings but does not affect the
trial court’s jurisdiction or impair the validity of the
information.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
JUDY ANN SANTOS v PEOPLE
August 26, 2008
FACTS:
BIR Commissioner Parayno, Jr. wrote DOJ Secretary
Gonzales a letter regarding the possible filing of criminal
charges against Judy Ann Santos. The letter read:
“I have the honor to refer to you for preliminary
investigation and filing of an information in court if
evidence so warrants, the herein attached Joint Affidavit
of RODERICK C. ABAD, STIMSON P. CUREG, VILMA
V. CARONAN, RHODORA L. DELOS REYES under
Group SupervisorTEODORA V. PURINO, of the
National Investigation Division, BIR National Office
Building, BIR Road, Diliman, Quezon City,
recommending the criminal prosecution of MS. JUDY
ANNE LUMAGUI SANTOS forsubstantial
underdeclaration of income, which constitutes
asprima facie evidence of false or fraudulent
return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC and
punishable under Sections 254 and 255 of the Tax
Code.”
In said letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno summarized
the findings of the investigating BIR officers that
petitioner, in her Annual Income Tax Return for taxable
year 2002 filed with the BIR, declared an income of
P8,033,332.70 derived from her talent fees solely from
ABS-CBN; initial documents gathered from the BIR
offices and those given by petitioner's accountant and
third parties, however, confirmed that petitioner received
in 2002 income in the amount of at least
P14,796,234.70, not only from ABS-CBN, but also from
357
other sources, such as movies and product
endorsements; the estimated tax liability arising from
petitioner's underdeclaration amounted to
P1,718,925.52, including incremental penalties; the
non-declaration by petitioner of an amount equivalent to
at least 84.18% of the income declared in her return
was considered a substantial underdeclaration of
income, which constituted prima facieevidence of false
or fraudulent return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC,
as amended; and petitioner's failure to account as part
of her income the professional fees she received from
sources other than ABS-CBN and her underdeclaration
of the income she received from ABS-CBN amounted to
manifest violations of Sections 254 and 255, as well as
Section 248(B) of the NIRC, as amended.
ISSUE:
WON the CTA First Division committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash.
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
The Petition for Review which petitioner intended to file
before the CTA en banc relied on two grounds: (1) the
lack of authority of Prosecuting Attorney Torrevillas to
file the Information; and (2) the filing of the said
Information in violation of petitioner's constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner's argument must fail in light of BIR
Commissioner Parayno's letter dated 19 May 2005 to
DOJ Secretary Gonzales referring "for preliminary
investigation and filing of an information in court if
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
evidence so warrants," the findings of the BIR officers
recommending the criminal prosecution of petitioner. In
said letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno already gave his
prior approval to the filing of an information in court
should the DOJ, based on the evidence submitted, find
probable cause against petitioner during the preliminary
investigation. Section 220 of the NIRC, as amended,
simply requires that the BIR Commissioner approve the
institution of civil or criminal action against a tax law
violator, but it does not describe in what form such
approval must be given. In this case, BIR
Commissioner Parayno's letter of 19 May 2005 already
states his express approval of the filing of an
information against petitioner and his signature need not
appear on the Resolution of the State Prosecutor or the
Information itself.
Still on the purported lack of authority of Prosecution
Attorney Torrevillas to file the Information, petitioner
asserts that it is the City Prosecutor under the Quezon
City Charter, who has the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses allegedly committed within the
jurisdiction of Quezon City, such as petitioner's case.
The Court is not persuaded. Under Republic Act No.
537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City, the City
Prosecutor shall have the following duties relating to the
investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses:
SEC. 28. The City Attorney - His assistants - His
duties. –
xxxx
358
(g) He shall also have charge of the prosecution of all
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city
ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the
municipal courts of the city, and shall discharge all the
duties in respect to the criminal prosecutions enjoined
by law upon provincial fiscals.
(h) He shall cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances
and have the necessary information or complaints
prepared or made against the persons accused. He or
any of his assistants may conduct such investigations
by taking oral evidence of reputable witnesses, and for
this purpose may issue subpoena, summon witnesses
to appear and testify under oath before him, and the
attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant
witness may be enforced by application to the municipal
court or the Court of First Instance. No witness
summoned to testify under this section shall be under
obligation to give any testimony which tend to
incriminate himself.
Evident from the foregoing is that the City Prosecutor
has the power to investigate crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of ordinances committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the city, and which can be
prosecuted before the trial courts of the said city. The
charge against petitioner, however, is already within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the CTA, as the
Information states that her gross underdeclaration
resulted in an income tax deficiency of P1,395,116.24,
excluding interest and penalties. The City Prosecutor
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
does not have the authority to appear before the CTA,
which is now of the same rank as the Court of Appeals.
In contrast, the DOJ is the principal law agency of the
Philippine government which shall be both its legal
counsel and prosecution arm. It has the power to
investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders and administer the probation and correction
system. Under the DOJ is the Office of the State
Prosecutor whose functions are described as follows:
Sec. 8. Office of the Chief State Prosecutor. - The Office
of the Chief State Prosecutor shall have the following
functions:
(1) Assist the Secretary in the performance of powers
and functions of the Department relative to its role as
the prosecution arm of the government;
(2) Implement the provisions of laws, executive orders
and rules, and carry out the policies, plans, programs
and projects of the Department relative to the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases;
(3) Assist the Secretary in exercising supervision and
control over the National Prosecution Service as
constituted under P.D. No. 1275 and/or otherwise
hereinafter provided; and
(4) Perform such other functions as may be provided by
law or assigned by the Secretary.[54]
As explained by CTA First Division in its Resolution
dated 11 May 2006:
359
[T]he power or authority of the Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuño, Jr. and his deputies in the Department
of Justice to prosecute cases is national in scope; and
the Special Prosecutor's authority to sign and file
informations in court proceeds from the exercise of said
person's authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Revised Quezon City
Charter which would suggest that the power of the City
Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute crimes,
misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the city is to the
exclusion of the State Prosecutors. In fact, the Office of
the State Prosecutor exercises control and supervision
over City Prosecutors under Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.
As regards petitioner's second ground, the Court is
unconvinced.
First, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in
the information which is evident on its face. The same
cannot be said herein.
Second, petitioner cannot claim denial of due process
when she was given the opportunity to file her affidavits
and other pleadings and submit evidence before the
DOJ during the preliminary investigation of her case and
before the Information was filed against her. Due
process is merely an opportunity to be heard. In
addition, preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether the respondent
therein is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties' evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor
is already satisfied that he can reasonably determine
the existence of probable cause based on the parties'
evidence thus presented, he may terminate the
proceedings and resolve the case.
Third, petitioner cannot likewise aver that she has been
denied equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
BAVIERA v PAGLINAWAN
February 8, 2007
Facts: SCB acted as a stock broker, soliciting from local
residents foreign securities called GTPMF. These
securities were not registered with the SEC and were
then remitted outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB-
Singapore. The Investment Capital Association of the
Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC
a complaint alleging that SCB violated the Revised
Securities Act, particularly the provision prohibiting the
360
selling of securities without prior registration with the
SEC; and that its actions are potentially damaging to the
local mutual fund industry. Notwithstanding the BSP
directive, SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF
securities in this country. Petitioner learned that the
SCB had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF
securities. Petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for
violation of Section 8.1 of the Securities Regulation
Code against private respondents but was denied
holding that it should have been filed with the SEC.
Issue: Whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. A criminal charge for violation of the
Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute.
Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative
agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine
a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction
of the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and
expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities
Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is
particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for
any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and
regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where
the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall
indorse thecomplaint to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation and prosecution.
AGUIRRE v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
March 3, 2008
FACTS:
On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a
criminal complaint for the violation of Revised Penal
Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation
to Republic Act No.7610 against respondents Pedro
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the
apparent instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre-
Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted,
prospected, facilitated solicited and/or procured the
medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr.
Agatep on the intended mutilation via bilateral
vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre.
Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted,
facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement
mutilated or abused his common law brother, Laureano
Aguirre. She further contends that his common law
brother went through a vasectomy procedure but that
does not amount to mutilation.
Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal
personality to file a case since she is only a common
law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the
person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that
Vasectomy does not in any way equate to castration
and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an
organ in the context of law and medicine.
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged
did not amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation
did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.
361
Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the
DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petition
stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio
dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any
reversible error in the questioned resolution.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the respondents are liable for the
crime of mutilation
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed
the public prosecutor’s finding of lack of
probable cause for respondents Pedro
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
to stand trial for the criminal complaints of
falsification and mutilation in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.
RULING:
1. No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that:
Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon any person who
shall intentionally mutilate another by
depriving him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Any other intentional mutilation shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium
and maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows
that the elementsof mutilation under the first paragraph
of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that
there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs
necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is
caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive
the offended party of some essential organ for
reproduction.
According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did
not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e. [t]he vasectomy operation did not
in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive
organ, which is still very much part of his physical self.
2. No. Probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term
does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is,
the belief that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
362
The executive department of the government is
accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its principal
obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the
land. A necessary component of the power to execute
the laws is the right to prosecute their violators, the
responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence,
the determination of whether or not probable cause
exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused
is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the
nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information
where he is not convinced that he has evidence to
prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence
at hand points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a
wide range of discretion, the discretion of whether,
what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are
best appreciated by (public) prosecutors. And this
Court has consistently adhered to the policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
and to leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of an information against the
supposed offender.
The court’s duty in an appropriate case, therefore, is
confined to a determination of whether the assailed
executive determination of probable cause was done
without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave
abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the
reversal of the finding of whether or not there exists
probable cause to file an information, the one seeking
the writ must be able to establish that the investigating
prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. Excess of
jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the
case but has transcended the same or acted without
authority.
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present
petition, the reasons of the Assistant City Prosecutor in
dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and
mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did – that no probable cause for
falsification and mutilation exists - the Assistant City
Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of
the case. He found that there was no sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case for the crimes
complained of as defined and punished under Articles
172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, respectively.
Concerning the crime of falsification of a private
document, the Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that
the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount
to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent
363
by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the
fact that the latter was not consulted. The lack of the
two preceding attendant facts do not in any way amount
to falsification, absent the contention that it was made to
appear in the assailed report that said consent was
obtained. That would have been an untruthful
statement. Neither does the fact that the Psychiatric
Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood
Disorder by the same token amount to falsification
because said report does not put forward that such
finding arose after an examination of the concerned
patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned
that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to
procreate, it was not the permanent damage
contemplated under the pertinent provision of the penal
code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the
Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown in the present
case.
ROQUE v OMBUDSMAN
May 12, 1999
Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process
of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands
the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on
complaints filed against public officials. Thus, the failure
of said office to resolve a complaint that has been
pending for six years is clearly violative of this mandate
and the public officials' rights. In such event, the
aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the
complaint.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
FACTS:
 Petitioners are Schools Division Superintendents
 COA conducted an audit on the P9.36 million
allotments released by the DECS Regional Office
No. XI to its division offices
 As a result of the audit, auditors found some
major deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019), violations of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and
85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of
PD No. 1445.
 affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against petitioners
 the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found
the complaints proper for a preliminary
investigation
 petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits
 Two Information for violation of Sec. 3(g) and
Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 were filed before the
Sandiganbayan, Manila. The Informations
charged several respondents, among whom was
petitioners.
 On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the
instant petition for mandamus premised on
the allegation that "[a]fter the initial Orders
finding the cases proper for preliminary
investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and
the subsequent submission of their counter-
affidavits, until the present[,] or, more than six
(6) years, no resolution has been issued by
the Public Respondent [and no] case [has]
364
been filed with the appropriate court against
the herein Petitioner"
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay
in resolving [the] complaints against petitioners
(respondents therein) which violated their constitutional
right to [a] speedy disposition of cases.
HELD/RATIO:
YES.
As a general rule, the performance of an official act or
duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of
discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled
by mandamus. This Court, however, has held that the
rule does not apply "in cases where there is gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable
excess of authority.” In First Philippine Holdings
Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained:
Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel
a discretionary act. But where there is "gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable
excess of authority" equivalent to denial of a
settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and
there is "no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, the writ shall issue.
Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the
ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the Constitution
and RA 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him.
More important, it violated the petitioners' rights to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
against them. Although respondents attempted to justify
the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to
review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman
Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost
six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints.
We are not persuaded by respondents' arguments that
the Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic
when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations were
filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court declared that long
and unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal
complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the
eventual filing of the Informations.
Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a
ruling directing the dismissal of Ombudsman cases, this
Court, in the interest of the speedy disposition of cases,
resolves to dismiss the above cases directly. This ruling
is in line with Angchangco, in which the Court dismissed
the complaints outright, although petitioner therein
sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so.
SOCRATES V SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioner is the incumbent governor of Palawan until
the respondent Rodriguez was appointed as Acting
Governor in his stead, after the EDSA Revolution in
1986. Two complaints for violation of RA 3019 was filed
by respondent Rodriguez and other provincial board
members of Palawan with the Office of the Tanodbayan.
365
The controversial act done was in relation to the
purchase and repair of a vessel which was also
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Note that
pending the case, he won the election and became the
incumbent governor once again.)
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend preliminary
investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground
that upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
present Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Of
the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his
power to conduct preliminary investigation.
Before his arraignment, petitioner also filed a motion to
quash the information in the cases filed against him
which was denied by the Sandiganbayan. He filed a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus
he filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with the
SC for being issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (G.R. Nos.
116259-60)
No TRO was issued for his petition, thus his
arraignment proceeded and the prosecution moved to
suspend him while the case is pending which was
initially opposed by petitioner but said opposition was
later withdrawn.
In the interim, petitioner also filed a motion to include as
principals other officers involved in the purchase of the
vessel in question. He argued that the non-inclusion of
these co-principals violates his right to due process and
equal protection of the laws which thus rendered the
informations null and void. The court without deciding
on his motion, granted the motion to suspend him
pendent lite for a period of 90 days.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
He filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
and he filed a petition for certiorari with the SC (2nd
certiorari) which was consolidated with his first petition
for certiorari.
In relation to G.R. Nos. 116259-60 his ,ain argument is
that the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of
six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the subsequent filing of the
informations against petitioner constitutes a violation of
his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the
case and due process of law pursuant to the Tatad
doctrine
Issues:
WON there was violation of due process due to the
6 year dea;ay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation?
Held/Ratio:
No, the record shows that delay in the filing of the
Informations in these cases was caused, not by inaction
of the prosecution, but by the following actuations of the
accused:
1) Initially preliminary investigation was held in
abeyance on account of the motion of petitioner,
entitled “Motion to Suspend Preliminary
Investigation.” Until an Ombudsman has been
appointed
2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when
private complainant, then Governor Victoriano J.
Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a letter-
manifestation correcting the complaint
3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in
these cases file with the Office of the
366
Ombudsman a reply to complainant’s
manifestation;
4) Thus preliminary investigation was started on
June 25, 1990. Respondents then, including the
accused herein, were required to submit counter-
affidavits;
5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again,
petitioner, on August 13, 1990, filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds:
(a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over the person of respondent; and
(b) That the complaint does not conform substantially
to the prescribed form.
The private complainant was, as a matter of right,
granted a period of time within which to oppose the
motion. The prosecution necessarily had to ponder on
the motion after protracted deliberations;
6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an
“Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to
File Appropriate Pleading.” Counsel prayed that
“respondents be granted an extension of twenty
(20) days within which to comply with the order of
March 11, 1991”;
7) The petitioner filed a motion to quash/dismiss on
December 17, 1991. This pleading was received
by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman only on
January 13, 1992. It took some time for the
prosecution to resolve the motion and there never
was any intimation on the part of the accused that
the accused was invoking his right to a speedy
disposition of the complaint against him. The
motion to quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the
prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed
thereafter, the Informations in these cases were
after all filed on September 16, 1992, but only
after the ruling of the prosecution on the motion to
quash/dismiss.
Thus, from the aforementioned sequence of events, it
can be gleaned that it was the petitioner’s delaying
tactics which caused the delay of the termination
of the preliminary investigation.
ANG TIBAY V CIR
February 27. 1940
J. laurel
Facts:
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. moved for
the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of
this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial. They argued that:
1) Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary
for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
union is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books
of Accounts of native dealers in leather;
2) That the supposed lack of leather materials
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
3) that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG
TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal; that the employer
Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice
367
for discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National
Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents
attached are inaccessible to the respondents
which are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.
ISSUE
WON the union was denied procedural due process
by the CIR
Held/Ratio:
Yes, motion for new trial granted
Indeed, CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedureand the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner
as it may deem just and equitable." HOWEVER this
does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. The
primary rights which should be respected are as follows:
1) The right to a hearing which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
3) The decision must have something to support
itself.
4) the evidence must be substantial.It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence.
5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
6) The CIR (any tribunal) or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
7) The CIR (any board or body) should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered.
8)
In the case at hand, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy
the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, , a
conclusion of law. The interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and
368
such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is
new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result.
NAMIL V COMELEC
October 28, 2003
J. Callejo Sr.
Facts:
On May 14, 2001, the election for the members of the
Sangguniang Bayan was held in Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat.
On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Palimbang issued Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation (COCVP) No. 80311083 which contained,
inter alia, the petitioners and the Sangguniang Bayan
winning candidates
The next day, May 21, 2001, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Palimbang issued COCVP No. 8031109
which listed the private respondents as winners,
Private respondent Kapina wrote the COMELEC
requesting that she and the others who were proclaimed
as winners on May 21, 2001 be recognized as the
winning candidates and the new members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang.
After receiving the comments and reports of the election
officers involved in the incident, Commissioner Mehold
Sadain submitted his recommendation to the
COMELEC that there was valid proclamation of private
respondents and that there being such, adjudication on
the matter is no longer required. This recommendation
was adopted by the public respondent COMELEC in its
Resolution 4615.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Thus, petitioners moved that Resolution No. 4615 be
declared null and void for being issued without
according them due notice and hearing. The petitioners
allege that they were never accorded the chance to
present their side in connection with the investigation
that was purportedly conducted by Commissioner
Sadain and on the memoranda/report of the public
respondent’s officers and only learned about the
controversy only when they were notified of the assailed
resolution of the public respondent
Issue:
WON petitioners were deprived of due process
Held/Ratio:
Yes,
While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a
broad power to enforce all election laws, the same is
subject to the right of the parties to due process.
Procedural due process demands prior notice and
hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that
the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its
ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party
be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to
support his side of the case and that the evidence
should be considered in the adjudication of the case.
The facts show that COMELEC set aside the
proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of
prior notice and hearing and it rendered the
questioned order based solely on private
respondent’s allegations.
Citing Binan v COMELEC, the court held that petitioners
cannot be deprived of office without due process of law.
Although public office is not property under Section 1 of
369
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot
acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless,
a protected right. The Court also cited the case of
Farinas v COMELEC where it ruled that that the
COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a
proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation
without notice and hearing.
VILLEGAS V HIU CHIONG
November 10, 1978
J. Fernandez
City Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municpal
Board of Manila and signed by mayor Villegas on March
27, 1968
Section 1 of said Ordinance prohibits aliens from being
employed or to engage or participate in any position or
occupation or business enumerated therein, whether
permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing
an employment permit from the Mayor and paying the
permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the
diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or
in the technical assistance programs of both the
Philippine Government and any foreign government,
and those working in their respective households, and
members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind
Respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was
employed in Manila, filed a petition before the CFI of
Manila to issue a writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order to stop the enforcement of said
ordinance. He argues that said ordinance is
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
discriminatory and violates the rule of uniformity in
taxation. He also states that as a police power measure,
it makes no distinctions between useful and non-useful
occupations in the collection of the permit fee. He finally
argues that it is oppressive and unreasonable being
applicable only to aliens.
CFI issued the writ prayed for. Petitioner Mayor Villegas
files this petition for certiorari with the SC.
Issue:
WON Ordinance 6537 is null and void.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process
of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely
tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is
regulatory in nature has no merit. There is no logic or
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have
been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the
purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the
guise of regulation.
Moreover, The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only
because it is excessive but because it fails to consider
valid substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who are required to pay it. The same
amount is being collected from every employed alien
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time
or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive .
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or
standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
370
standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses
no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit,
enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and
entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid,
being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to
allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
TAN v DEL ROSARIO
October 3, 1994
Facts:
J. Vitug
This case is about two consolidated petitions, the first of
which questions the constitutionality of RA 7496
Simplied Net Income Taxation Scheme(SNIT). The
petitioners state that the said statute violates Art VI Sec
28(1) which provides that the rule of taxation must be
uniform and equitable and that the Congress should
evolve a progressive system of taxation. The second
petition question validity of Section 6, Revenue
Regulations No. 2-93, promulgated by CIR in
accordance with RA 7496. The petitioners state that
CIR had exceeded its authority in applying SNIT to
professional partnerships.
Issue:
WON there was violation of the EPC
Held/Ratio: No
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal
protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both
in privileges and liabilities. It does not prohibit
classification so long as it is germane to the purpose of
the law and makes substantial distinctions. Such
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
classifications are valid so long as they are not arbitrary
and inappropriate.
The income tax is imposed not on the professional
partnership, which is tax exempt, but on the partners
themselves in their individual capacity computed on
their distributive shares of partnership profits. The law
did not intend to place in an unequal footing or in
significant variance the income tax treatment of
professionals who practice their respective professions
individually and of those who do it through a general
professional partnership.
Forbes v Chuoco Tiaco
July 30, 1910
Johnson J.
Facts:
On the 19th of August, 1909, under the orders of the
said W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, defendant Chuoco Tiaco was
deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China,
Later he was able to return to the Islands but he feared,
as that he should be again deported by the said
defendants,. Thus he filed with a petition that a
preliminary injunction should be issued against the
plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the
defendant.
This petition was granted. The defendants filed this
present petition with the SC and they argue that since
the power to deport foreign subjects of the Chinese
empire is a private one of the governor-general of these
islands, and the defendant A. S. Crossfield exceeded
these authority by trying the case and issuing the
371
injunction and refusing to allow the demurrer and motion
for the dismissal of the complaint
Issue:
WON it is within the power of the State to deport aliens
and whether doing such would be a violation of equal
protection and due process of law
Held/Ratio:
Yes. every government has the inherent power to expel
from its borders aliens whose presence has been found
detrimental to the public interest. . The international
community, as Martens says, leaves States at liberty to
fix the conditions under which foreigners should be
allowed to enter their territory. These conditions may be
more or less convenient to foreigners, but they are a
legitimate manifestation of territorial power and not
contrary to law. the expulsion of foreigners is a political
measure and that the executive power may expel,
without appeal, any person whose presence tends to
disturb the public peace.
The power to exclude or expel aliens being a power
affecting international relations is vested in the political
department of the Government. The power to exclude
aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one
foundation, are derived from one source, are supported
by the same reasons, and are, in truth, but the exercise
of one and the same power.
Thus, also, it has a right to send them elsewhere it if
has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners
of the citizens; that they will create religious
disturbances or occasion any other disorder contrary to
the public safety
It has been repeatedly decided when a government
is dealing with the political rights of aliens that it is
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
not governed by that "due process of law" which
governs in dealing with the civil rights of aliens. For
instance, the courts of the United States have
decided that in the deportation of an alien he is not
entitled to right of trial by jury, the right of trial by
jury being one of the steps in the "due process of
law" in dealing with civil rights
Peralta v COMELEC
March 11, 1978
J. Antonio
Facts:
Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978
Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. They were
assailing the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978
Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to
28, of the 1978 Election Code, which grants the voter
the option to vote either for individual candidates by
filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of
candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the
candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by
simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the
name of the political party, group or aggrupation.
Petitioners argue that the optional straight party voting
scheme is violative of the equal protection clause. They
argue that an independent candidate would be
discriminated against because by merely writing on his
ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have
voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage
which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In
effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a
party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the
372
laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to
Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal
protection clause in the 1978 Election Code and thus
invalid
Held/Ratio:
No. the 1978 Election Code is valid.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classifications. What is proscribes is a classification
which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by
a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the
purpose of the law and applies equally to all those
belonging to the same class. 14The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within the class and those who
do not. Exactness in division is impossible and never
looked for in applying the legal test. All that is required
is that there must be, in general, some reasonable basis
on general lines for the division
Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able
to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate
will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted
individually or as a candidate of a party group or
aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual
candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation.
The choice is his. No one can compel him to do
otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on
whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a
political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate
of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the
advantages under the law accruing to candidates of
a political party or group. If he wishes to avail
himself of such alleged advantages as an official
candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a
political party group or aggrupation. In other words,
the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be
assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and
considered the relative advantages and disadvantages
of either alternative. So long as the application of the
rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he
cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was
the victim of discrimination.
Ceniza v COMELEC
January 28, 1980
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Facts:
On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51 providing for local
elections on January 30, 1980. It was provided in said
BP that Section 4(1) of the Constitution. any city now
existing with an annual regular derived from
infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty
million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of the
approval of this Act shall be classified as a highly
urbanized city
To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC, for short) adopted Resolution No.
1421which enumerated the cities which are not entitled
to participate in the election of pro- provincial officials.
Included therein were Cebu City and Mandaue City.
373
The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and
registered voters in the Cities of Cebu and Mandaue.
They assail Section 3 of BP. 51, which uses the annual
income of a given city as the basis for classification of
whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city
whose voters may not participate in the election of
provincial officials of the province where the city is
geographically located and Republic Act No. 5519,
otherwise known as the Charter of Mandaue City, which
went into effect without the benefit of ratification by the
residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum
They argue that said law is inherently and palpably
unconstitutional in that such classification is not based
on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of
the law which in effect provides for and regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such
unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal
protection. They also state that Section 3 of Batas Blg.
885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu city as
highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its
electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently
and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification
is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the
purpose of the law which in effect provides for and
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and
therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a
denial of equal protection.
Issue:
WON, there has been a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
Held/Ratio:
No.
The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
autonomy of local government units and independence.
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant
loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs, more
particularly the selection of elective provincial officials
since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise
any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said
city
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities
and component cities on the basis of their regular
annual income is based upon substantial distinction.
The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is
capable of existence and development as a relatively
independent social, economic, and political unit. It would
also show whether the city has sufficient economic or
industrial activity as to warrant its independence from
the province where it is geographically situated
The practice of allowing voters in one component
city to vote for provincial officials and denying the
same privilege to voters in another component city
is a matter of legislative discretion which violates
neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in
the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted by
law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of
the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited
an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for
provincial officials while granting it to another individual
or groups of voters in the same city.
United Democratic Opposition v COMELEC
104 SCRA
(equal 17, G.R. No.
protection; 56515 of equality; political laws)
scope
374
In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973
Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a
plebiscite for the people’s approval. The YES vote was
being advanced by KBL – Marcos’ Party while the NO
vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity
and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469
w/c basically provided that there be equal opportunity,
equal time and equal space on media use for
campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos
campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from
9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by
26 TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide.
UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be
granted the same opportunity as Marcos has pursuant
to Res’ns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand.
UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal
protection before the laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal
protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their
request.
HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due
process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It
is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos
conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the
people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as
President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as
the head of any political party. Under the Constitution,
the ‘Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible
. . . for the program of government and shall determine
the guidelines of national policy’. In instances where the
head of state is at the same time the president of the
political party that is in power, it does not necessarily
follow that he speaks with two voices when he
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
dialogues with the governed. The president is accorded
certain privileges that the opposition may not have.
Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio
stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not
party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with
these TV stations and radio stations at their own
expense.
Gumabon v Director of Prisons
37 SCRA 420, G.R. No. L-30026
(same; same; political crimes)
Gumabon et al were charged for rebellion punished
under Art 134 of the RPC. Their offense was complexed
with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping.
They were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their
sentence had become final and executory when the
Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the SC.
Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot
be complexed to rebellion as it is necessarily absorbed
therein. Hence, the without such complexion the penalty
must be lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon
precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right,
namely, the denial of equal protection. The petitioners
were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for
which Hernandez and others were convicted. The law
under which they were convicted is the very same law
under which the latter were convicted. It had not and
has not been changed. For the same crime, committed
under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience,
allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others
can suffer only prision mayor?
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the
effects of the Hernandez Doctrine.
375
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The
continued incarceration after the twelve-year period
when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others
similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with
implications at war with equal protection. That is not to
give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory.
Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical
offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the
conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and
the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same
crime would be made to suffer different penalties. If
Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment,
then this would be repugnant to equal protection, people
similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.
What is required under this constitutional guarantee is
the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.
For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances,
which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within
a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding
on the rest.
Nunez v Sandiganbayan
Nuňez assails
111 SCRA the
433, G.R. No.validity of the PD 1486 creating the
L-50581-50617
Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was
accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
falsification of public and commercial documents
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all
public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuňez
that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due
process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of
the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan
proceedings violates Nuňez’s right to equal protection,
because – appeal as a matter of right became
minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law,
excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and
there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by
certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two
chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to
appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts
and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and
thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan
violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be
concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuňez. The 1973
Constitution had provided for the creation of a special
court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases
involving public officials charged with graft and
corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention
of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan,
precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of
which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public service. It follows that those who may thereafter
be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far
back as January 17, 1973, when the present
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure
for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as
376
petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth
met the standard requiring that it “must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not
be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class.” Further still,
decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a
unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that
decisions therein are more conceivably carefully
reached than other trial courts.
Mirasol v DPWH
G.R. No. 158793, 8 June 2006
(equal protection of laws; valid qualifications; substantial
qualifications)
On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of
the Department of Public Works and Communications
issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited
motorcycles on limited access highways. Accordingly,
petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8,
2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of
nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances.
Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South
Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Road) Toll Expressway under DO
HELD: The Court found that it is neither warranted nor
reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable
classification among modes of transport is that of
“motorized” against the “non-motorized.” Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler
truck is substantially different from other light vehicles.
The first may be denied access to some roads where
the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be
reasonably differentiated from newer models. The Court
found that real and substantial differences exist
between a motorcycle and other forms of transport
sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of
motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a
motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck.
The most obvious and troubling difference would be that
a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon
163 SCRA
(equal 386, G.R. No.
protection; 81958
substantial distinctions; requisites)
Department of Labor Secretary Drilon issued
Department Order No. 1, otherwise known as the
“Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household
Workers,” imposing, among other things, a ban on the
deployment of female domestic helpers and other
female workers of similar skill. Petitioner, a firm
377
215. engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas employment,
sought the nullification of D.O. No. 1 arguing, among
other things, that the same is violative of the equal
protection clause.
HELD: The Court agreed that there is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers,"but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitutiondoes not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and
women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1)
such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they
are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class. The
Court said that it is a matter of judicial notice that female
domestics and similar workers are subjected to
exploitative working conditions marked by physical and
personal abuse. On the other hand, there is no
evidence that male OCWs suffer from the same
predicament and that there is no showing that the
government should act in a similar manner with regard
to them. The Court here is not saying that there is a
superiority of men over women. All it is saying is that,
based on available evidence, there is a marked
distinction in their working conditions and predicaments.
(see also: Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v
POEA, 243 SCRA 666; JMM Promotion and
Management v CA; Dumlao v COMELEC; Tolentino v
Secretary of Finance; Inchong v Hernandez)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br.
11, Davao City, respondents.
Facts:
G.R. No. 113811
Himagan, wasOctober 7, 1994 that was implicated in the
a policeman
KAPUNAN, J.:
killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted
murder of Bernabe Machitar. The TC issued an Order
suspending petitioner until the termination of the case
on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known
as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of
1990, which provides:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal
Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of
the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed
by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject
to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis
ours).
Himagan questions the order stating that an imposition
of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to
the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: WON Himagan’s right to equal protection has
been violated? NO
RATIO:
HImagan misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous
reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the
lifting of preventive suspension in pending
378
administrative investigation, not in criminal cases. What
is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of
preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of
R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and
its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the
Department" simply means that the provisions of the
Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations are applicable to members of the
Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions,
rules and regulations are not inconsistent with
R.A.
6975.
Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which
limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days
cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47
of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years
shall continue until the case is terminated.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated
differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application
of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law
which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses
against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily
cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. 14
Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely
forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in
the instant case. If the classification is based on real
and substantial differences; 15is germane to the purpose
of the law; 16applies to all members of the same
class;
17
and applies to current as well as future conditions,
18
the classification may not be impugned as violating the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction
based on real and reasonable considerations related to
a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists
here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ,
NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE
Facts: CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED
CITIZENS,
The respondents.
Ombudsman received an anonymous letter alleging
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
that funds representing
MENDOZA, J.: savings from unfilled positions in
the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. Because of this,
the Ombudsman issued subpoena duces tecum to to
the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him
to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services
379
Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as
vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for
1988."
The petitioners contest this, stating that the
Ombudsman was doing indirectly what he could not do
directly, i.e., compelling them (petitioners Almonte and
Perez) to produce evidence against themselves.
ISSUE: WON it is within Ombudsman’s power to issue
the order of subpoena duces tecum? YES
RATIO:
At common law a governmental privilege against
disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This
privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending
the individual interests of a private citizen, even though,
as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce
his legal rights. 1
On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality
does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic
or other national security secrets but on a general public
interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts
have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute
privilege against a subpoena considered essential to the
enforcement of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Nor has
our attention been called to any law or regulation which
considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified
information. EIIB's function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national
economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting."18Consequently, while in cases which involve
state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters without compelling production, 19 no
similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on
other considerations.
Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal
protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all
forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
only hale respondents via their verified complaints or
sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,"
while in proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an
investigation.
First, there can be no objection to this procedure
because it is provided in the Constitution itself. Second,
it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints
"in any form and in a manner," the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence
of the people which keep them from complaining
against official wrongdoings. The Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory
and prosecutory agencies of the government because
those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who,
through official pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On
the other hand complainants are more often than not
poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
380
Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held
that testimony given at a fact-finding investigation and
charges made in a pleading in a case in court
constituted a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to
commence investigation, because a formal complaint
was really not necessary.
Rather than referring to the form of complaints,
therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI,
12 of the Constitution means any case concerning
official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient." The phrase "subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law" refers to
such limitations as may be provided by Congress or, in
the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be
imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well
include a requirement that the investigation be
concluded in camera, with the public excluded, as
exception to the general nature of the proceedings in
the Office of the Ombudsman. A reconciliation is
thereby made between the demands of national security
and the requirement of accountability enshrined in the
Constitution.
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the
subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right
against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the
documents required to be produced in this case are
public records and those to whom the subpoena duces
tecum is directed are government officials in whose
possession or custody the documents are.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is
directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents
be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and
with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC.,
petitioners, 
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
.G.R. No. 132922
Petitioners, anApril 21, 1998
organization of lawyers of radio and
MENDOZA, J.
television broadcasting companies, challenge the
validity of BP Blg No. 881, which requires radio and tv to
give free broadcast to electoral candidates. They base
their challenge on the ff. grounds:
(1) that it takes property without due process of law and
without just compensation;
(2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws; and
(3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media of communication or information during the
period of election.
ISSUES:
WON it is violative of their due process and just
compensation? NO
WON it is violative of their right to equal protection? NO
RATIO:
(1)
SPetitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates
the due process clause 6 and the eminent domain
provision 7 of the Constitution by taking air time from
radio and television broadcasting stations without
payment of just compensation.
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting,
whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by
the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to
381
broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other
things, to amended by Congress in accordance with
the constitutional provision that "any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress
when the common good so requires." 10
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies,
which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves
and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast
signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise
is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service.
In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast
stations and thereafter supervising radio and television
stations, the state spends considerable public funds in
licensing and supervising such stations. 18It would be
strange if it cannot even require the licensees to render
public service by giving free air time.
the COMELEC however, does not take over the
operation of radio and television stations but only the
allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose of
ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time,
and the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution.
23
(2)
Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles out
radio and television stations to provide free air time.
They contend that newspapers and magazines are not
similarly required as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute
v. COMELEC, 27 we upheld their right to the payment of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
just compensation for the print space they may provide
under §
The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the
fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same
treatment under the free speech guarantee of the
Constitution as the print media. There are important
differences in the characteristics of the two media,
however, which justify their differential treatment for free
speech purposes.
(1) Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast
spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate
broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them.
There is no similar justification for government allocation
and regulation of the print media.
(2)
Government spends public funds for the allocation
and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does
not do in the case of the print media. To require the
radio and television broadcast industry to provide free
air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for
what the industry gets.
(3) The broadcast media have also established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
Newspapers and current books are found only in
metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular
transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines
beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and
shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found
everywhere. The television set is also becoming
universal. Their message may be simultaneously
received by a national or regional audience of listeners
382
including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be
within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The
impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate.
Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience
has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject
the utterance.
Petitioners' assertion therefore that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881
denies them the equal protection of the law has no
basis. In addition, their plea that §92 (free air time) and
§11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid political ads)
should be invalidated would pave the way for a return
to the old regime where moneyed candidates could
monopolize media advertising to the disadvantage
of candidates with less resources. That is what
Congress tried to reform in 1987 with the enactment of
R.A. No. 6646. We are not free to set aside the
judgment of Congress, especially in light of the recent
failure of interested parties to have the law repealed or
at least modified.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs.THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO
FACTS:
MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
The
ROMEO caseM.stems from FRANCISCO
ACOP AND the chargeG.against petitioner
ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-
intervenors.
Panfilo Lacson, and 11 others, for the murder of the
G.R. No. 128096
Kuratong January
Baleleng 20, 1999
Gang. The case was first under the
MARTINEZ, J.:
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon the contention of Lacson that the RTC
has the proper jurisdiction to thresh the matter since RA
7975 limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher, it was
transferred to RTC-QC.
the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain
with the Sandiganbayan. TWhile these motions for
reconsideration were pending resolution, , House Bill
No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11 as well as Senate Bill No.
844 12 were introduced in Congress, defining expanding
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the
said bills sought, among others, to amend the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.These
bills were consolidated and later approved into law as
R.A. No. 8249 .
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section
4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 which provides
that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any
court over which trial has not begun as to the approval
hereof."
ISSUES:
(1) WON it violates Lacson’s right to equal protection?
NO
(2) WON it is an ex post facto law? NO
RATIO:
(1)
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
383
argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the
invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it.
That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly
discharged in the present case.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249
reveals that to fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019,
as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
(b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31
or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes;
(2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b),
(c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any
of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4;
and
(3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are
being charged with murder which is a felony punishable
under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the
governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph
a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249..
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7
of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed
only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the
Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department as
unconstitutional.
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,
35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed
to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and
reasonables of the questioned provisions. The
classification between those pending cases involving
the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected
by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on
substantial distinction that makes real
differences.Evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses
and presented documents.
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in
384
"any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng
cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover,
those cases where trial had already begun are not
affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of
the new law.
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified,
heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad
faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner further contends that the
legislature is biased against him as he claims to have
been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos
as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in
paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and
of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices
allegedly had against petitioner during the committe
hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient
justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their
presence and participation in the legislative hearings
was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter
before the committee involves the graft court of which
one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a
member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative
powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to
invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
(2)
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of
penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. Penal laws
are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
provide dor their punishment.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In this case,.R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of
procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it
does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It
does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not
come within the prohibition. 5Moreover, the law did not
alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has
been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the
time of their passage. 54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's
right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate
review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of
review to determine if he presumption of innocence has
been convincing overcome. 56
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7
of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
G.R. accused-appellant,
The No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000 F. Jaloslos is a full-
Romeo
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
pledged member of Congress who is now confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness
on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
The primary argument of Jalosjos is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate
of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him
385
as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform
the functions of a Congressman
ISSUE: WON membership in Congress exempt an
accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general? NO
RATIO:
The Constitution guarantees the equal protection of
laws.This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.7 The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be
displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one
or a few of its members. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law. A strict scrutiny of classifications is
essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups
or types of individuals.
The SC finds that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
(ISAE), petitioner, 
vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in
his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Facts:
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in
The International
his capacity School is of
as the Superintendent a International
domestic educational
School-Manila;
institution establishedSCHOOL,
and INTERNATIONAL primarily
INC.,for dependents of
respondents.
KAPUNAN,
foreign J.:
diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. It hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of the faculty.
The foreign hires are granted certain benefits not given
to local hire such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance.
Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five
percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School
justifies the difference on two "significant economic
disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely:
(a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
The discrepancy between the salary of local and foreign
hires was brought up by the ISAE,, "a legitimate labor
union and the collective bargaining representative of all
386
faculty members"4 of the School, contested the
difference in salary rates between foreign and local-
hires.
ISSUE: WON the salary discrepancy is based on a
reasonable distinction? NO
RATIO:
the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent
School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires and
local-hires. The practice of the School of according
higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy
and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this
Court.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract
foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-
hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and
they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter.
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the
foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid
bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation
factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded
them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home
leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights
of workers and promote their welfare," to afford labor full
protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty
to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts,
collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to
the common good. Should such contracts contain
stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will
not hesitate to strike down these stipulations
In the workplace, where the relations between capital
and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality
and discrimination by the employer are all the more
reprehensible.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned
upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, There is no
evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups
have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-
hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction
in salary rates without violating the principle of equal
work for equal pay.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City
Branch, petitioner, vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS,
respondent.
FACTS:
CARPIO, J.
July 10, 1983 - Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas
Montesclaros married Milagros Orbiso on 10 July 1983.
Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married
Milagros who was then 43 years old.
January 4, 1985 - Nicolas filed with the GSIS an
application for retirement benefits effective 18 February
1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977
(“PD 1146”). In his retirement application, Nicolas
387
designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary.
Nicolas’ last day of actual service was on 17 February
1985.
January 31, 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas’ application
for retirement “effective 17 February 1984,” granting a
lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and
a monthly annuity thereafter
April 22 1992- Nicolas died. Milagros filed with GSIS a
claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146.
June 8 1992, - GSIS denied the claim because under
Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no
right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on
10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on “17 February 1984.”
Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for
declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18
of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship
pension.
TC: rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension.
CA: agreed with the trial court that the retirement
benefits are onerous and conjugal because the pension
came from the deceased pensioner’s salary
deductions.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the prohibition is based on reasonable
classification? NO
(2)WON the prohibition under PD 1146 is a denial of
due process? YES,
RATIO:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
(1)
A statute based on reasonable classification does not
violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law.The requirements for a valid and
reasonable classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
class.
Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class
differently from another class provided there are real
and substantial differences to distinguish one class from
another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these
requirements. The proviso discriminates against the
dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension.[31] Under the proviso, even if
the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than
three years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent
spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within three years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose
intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or
purpose for such a prohibition. The classification does
not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the
classification lumps all those marriages contracted
within three years before the pensioner qualified for
pension as having been contracted primarily for
financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
388
(2)
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the
government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD
1146 mandates the government to include in its annual
appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the
contributions. It is compulsory on the government
employer to take off and withhold from the employees’
monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the
same to GSIS. The government employer must also
remit its corresponding share to GSIS. Considering the
mandatory salary deductions from the government
employee, the government pensions do not constitute
mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that
marriages contracted within three years before
retirement or death of a member are sham marriages
contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present
GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship
pension of the surviving spouse who contracted
marriage to a GSIS member within three years before
the member’s retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship
benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer
prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly
prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats
the purpose for which Congress enacted the social
legislation.
In PD 1146, There is outright confiscation of benefits
due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving
spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso
undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
insurance benefits to government employees and their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death,
and retirement of the government employees. Where
the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that
is protected by the due process clause. No law can
deprive such person of his pension rights without due
process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to
be heard.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit.
People v. Cayat
Facts: “Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian
tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink,
any intoxicating liquors of any kind.” The law, Act No.
1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors
which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed to take.
Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection
to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said
law.
Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid
classification, one of which is that the classification
under the law must rest on real or substantial
distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification
between the members of the non- Christian and the
members of the Christian tribes is not based upon
389
accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of
civilization and culture. The term ‘non-Christian tribes’
refers to a geographical area and more directly to
natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization
usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act
was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in
the non- Christian tribes”
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It
is designed to insure peace and order in and among the
non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness
and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the
government
Ormoc Sugar v. to raiseof Ormoc
Treasurer their City
standards of life and
civilization. This law is not limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as long as those
conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all
members of the class. That it may be unfair in its
operation against a certain number of non- Christians by
reason of their degree of culture is not an argument
against the equality of its operation nor affect the
reasonableness of the classification thus established.
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed
Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any and all productions
of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent
to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and
other foreign countries.” Payments for said tax were
made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of
Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and
Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause and the
rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a
decision that upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power
of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and
rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?
Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation,
and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based
upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to
the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not
only to present conditions, but also to future conditions
substantially identical to those present; and 4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the
same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central for
the coverage of the tax
Philippine Judges v. Prado
Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular
No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354
withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA,
390
RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration
Commission and with certain other government offices.
It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue
while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it
retains the same for the President & Vice-President of
the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC, National Census &
Statistics Office and the general public. The
respondents counter that there is no discrimination
because the law is based on a valid classification in
accordance with the equal protection clause.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is
constitutional.
Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a
separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the
Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared
unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho
Facts: On December 15, 1992, Baclaran Credit
Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member
Roger de Leon, charged petitioner Parañaque Mayor
Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue
a mayor's permit
Held: Petitioner's suspected partiality may be gleaned
from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the
unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by
the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so
many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it
could be granted the same permit. Worse, petitioner
failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to
equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified
Baclaran-based vendors' associations were not similarly
situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the
apparent haste with which said executive order was
issued. It would seem that if there was any interest
served by such executive order, it was that of herein
petitioner.
Facts: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the
employment of aliens in any occupation or business
unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of
391
Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien,
employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment
from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void.
HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a
flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial
differences in situations among aliens and for that
reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It also
lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and
therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by
the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due
process and the equal protection of the laws
Facts: On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval
of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled “An
Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations
Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority for this
Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes.” Section 12 thereof created the Subic
Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special
privileges.
then the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A
(EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-
duty-free privilege was operative, viz.:w
“Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the
presently fenced-in
Tiu vs. Court of Appealsformer Subic Naval Base shall be
the only completely tax and duty-free area in the
SSEFPZ [Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone].
Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to
import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and
consumer items tax and duty-free. Consumption items,
however, must be consumed within the Secured Area.
Removal of raw materials, capital goods, equipment and
consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-
SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the
usual taxes and duties, except as may be provided
herein”
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that
the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2)
the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area
formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However,
EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area
within which the special privileges granted to the entire
zone would apply to the present “fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base” only. It has thereby excluded the residents
of the first two components of the zone from enjoying
the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively
discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid
standards, in contravention of the equal protection
guarantee.
Held: We first determine the purpose of the law. From
the very title itself, it is clear that RA 7227 aims primarily
to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into
productive uses. Obviously, the “lands covered under
the 1947 Military Bases Agreement” are its object
From the above provisions of the law, it can easily be
deduced that the real concern of RA 7227 is to convert
the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases
392
into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such
objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend
economic incentives to attract and encourage investors,
both local and foreign. Among such enticements
are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2)
tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income
tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no
foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on
banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status
to certain investors and of working visas to certain
foreign executives and workers.
We believe it was reasonable for the President to have
delimited the application of some incentives to the
confines of the former Subic military base. It is this
specific area which the government intends to transform
and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned
naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and
commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local
investors to use as operational bases for their
businesses and industries. Why the seeming bias for
big investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can
pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the
country and to generate employment opportunities for
the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for
such conversion. The classification is, therefore,
germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal
maxim goes, “The intent of a statute is the law.”[
Certainly, there are substantial differences between the
big investors who are being lured to establish and
operate their industries in the so-called “secured area”
and the present business operators outside the
area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso
investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 393

hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the contributing directly to the achievement of the end
economic impact will be national; in the second, only purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead,
local. Even more important, at this time the business they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted
activities outside the “secured area” are not likely to and in obligations required.
have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law,
which is to turn the former military base CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine GOVERNMENT
economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis Facts:
to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded -Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as
in RA 7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals taxpayer, citizen and a former government
pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor the official) initiated this original action seeking (1) to
activities within the “secured area,” which is already prohibit and “enjoin respondents [PCGG and its
fenced off, to prevent “fraudulent importation of chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or
merchandise” or smuggling. executing any agreement with the heirs of the late
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and
does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand
there are actual and material differences between Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad —
territories, there is no violation of the constitutional including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to
clause. And of course, anyone, including the “compel respondent[s] to make public all
petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital negotiations and agreement, be they
can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to
or her resources or business operations into the fenced- or relating to such negotiations and
off free port zone. agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos
We believe that the classification set forth by the heirs."
executive issuance does not apply merely to existing -PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make
conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to public any and all negotiations and agreements
establish a “self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses'
financial and investment center” in the area. There will, ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
therefore, be a long-term difference between such compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
investment center and the areas outside it. involves an issue of "paramount public
Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the
resident individuals and businesses within the “secured country's economy" that would be greatly
area.” The residents, being in like circumstances or prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Hence, the people in general have a such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal
right to know the transactions or deals being contrived
and effected by the government.
-PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of
the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
Issue:Whether the compromise agreement entered into
between PCGG and the Marcoses violate equal
protection? YES
Ratio:
Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG
commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties
to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear
violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to
grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to
a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies.[58]
Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically
provides: “No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.” The PCGG has absolutely
no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover
of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting
the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties,
394
protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special
grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs
will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the
constitutional rule that “taxation shall be uniform and
equitable.
Moncado v. People’s Court
THE CASE IN IN SPANISH!! Sorry.
Stonehill v. Diokno
FACTS: Stonehill et al and the corporation they form
were alleged to have committed acts in “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” By the
strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued
against their persons and their corporation. The warrant
provides authority to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and
loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
The documents, papers, and things seized under the
alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into (2) major groups, namely:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were
not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to
be disposed of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado
doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners’ consent; and that, in any event,
the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just
because the government blunders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issue is
valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC
emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail
the validity of the search warrant issued against their
corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence
has no cause of action. It should be raised by the
officers or board members of the corporation. The
constitution protects the people’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that
395
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar,
none of these are met. The warrant was issued from
mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code.”
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to
the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case
do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest
order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the
effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit
and loss statements.”
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of the
Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The
Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right
of the accused against a defective search warrant is
emphasized.
PEOPLE VS. MALASUGUI (2007)
FACTS:
March 5, 1935 – Tan Why, a merchant, was found with
several head wounds and a fractured skull on a path
leading to a barrio in Cotabato, and situated within the
property of Yu Enching Sero. Tan Why merely
responded “Kagui” when he was asked who had
attacked him. Tan Why was brought to the hospital, but
he died shortly afterwards.
Lt. Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered the immediate
arrest of Kagui Malasugui.
396
Lt. Jacaria had been informed that Malasugui had just
redeemed 2 pairs of bracelets from some pawnshops
and was carrying money, and so when Malasugui was
brought to him, he asked the latter for the bracelets and
he then voluntarily gave them. After this, Lt. Jacaria
asked him if he had anything else, he “tremblingly”
answered in the negative.
He was later searched, without his opposition, and the
following were found: Tan Why’s pocketbook, P92 in
bills, Tan Why’s ID, and a memorandum of amounts.
Malasugui was charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide. He was convicted by the CFI-Cotabato.
Malasugui testified at trial that he was forced to produce
the bracelet, pocketbook and money, and that the rest
were all fabricated.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/N the articles taken are admissible in evidence –
YES.
RATIO:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to
have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded
from later complaining thereof.
The right to be secure from unreasonable search may
be waived, and such waiver MAY BE MADE expressly
or impliedly.
Also, Malasugui was legally arrested without a judicial
warrant because there were facts personally known to
Lt. Jacaria (p.226, middle part) which gave him reason
to believe or suspect that a crime had in fact been
committed and that Malasugui was responsible.
When the search of the person detained or arrested and
the seizure of the effects found in his possession are
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
incidental to a lawful arrest, they cannot be considered
unlawful or unreasonable.
The Constitution only prohibits those arrests, searches
and seizures without judicial warrant which are
unreasonable.
(OLD) Sec. 105 of General Orders, No. 58 reads: “A
person charged with a crime may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the crime.”
People v. Damaso
Facts: Accsused-appellant charged in an information of
violation of PD 1866 in connection with the crime of
subversion assailed the legality of a search and seizure
conducted at his house at night time when he was not
around, on the ground that it violated constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue: Whether or not a search on a house of a person
without the owner’s presence is valid.
Held: No. The search in the dwelling of the accused-
appellant without his knowledge is a violation of the
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs [GR L-27968, 3
December 1975]
Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict
surveillance by the combined team of agents of the NBI,
PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its
apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao
City. M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt.
Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas
397
Velasco.
At about 3:00 p.m. of the said day, when the vessel was
searched and after Captain Pantinople informed the
team that Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other
documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia
carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined team
of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center
operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent
of Davao, proceeded to the Velasco’s room at the
Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said document.
Velasco was not inside the hotel room when they
entered the room. There are conficting claims whether
the manicurist Teofila Ibañez or whether Velasco’s wife,
who was allegedly inside the room at that time,
voluntarily allowed the police officers to enter
Held: Issue: Whether there was consent on the part of
the person who was the occupant of the hotel room then
rented by Velasco.
Held: There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and
Velasco to counteract the force of the recital of the
written statement of Teofila Ibañez (allegedly wife of
Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of one Corazon Y.
Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of
Velasco, and another by Velasco himself; reiterating
that the person who was present at his hotel room was
one Teofila Ibañez, “a manicurist by occupation.” If such
indeed were the case, then it is much more easily
understandable why that person, Teofila Ibañez, who
could be aptly described as the wrong person at the
wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified
her consent readily and immediately. Under the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
circumstances, that was the most prudent course of
action. It would save her and even Velasco himself from
any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law
be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There
was a person inside who from all indications was ready
to accede to their request. Even common courtesy
alone would have precluded them from inquiring too
closely as to why she was there. Under all the
circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded
that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with
the need for a search warrant
People v. Marti
Facts:
- The appellant Andre Marti had a package
delivered w/ Manila Packaging & Export
Forwarders to a certain Walter Frierz in Zurich
Switzerland.
- Upon final inspection by the proprietor of the
forwarder Job Reyes he notice a peculiar smell
emanating from the package and proceeded to
investigate.
- He then gave a sample to the NBI narcotics lab
and later brought along 3 NBI agents to his office
to have them look at the packages: he personally
opens the packages and allows them to be
viewed by the officers.
- After Marti was located and invited for questioning
the results of the tests came revealing that the
sample of the content of the packages was
indeed ganja “the devil’s lettuce”.
- Thus Marti was charged and convicted for
violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
398
- On appeal Marti alleges that the ganja
confiscated should not be held as admissible
evidence against him since the procurement of
the same went against his right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
W/N: the right against unreasonable search and seizure
may be invoked against private individuals.
Held: No, both American and Philippine jurisprudence
as well as the records of the code commission attest
that the Bill of Rights can only be invoked against the
State and not against private entities. In the instant case
the search and seizure was effected by Job Reyes the
proprietor of the delivery service on his own initiative. As
such the authorities had no involvement and the right
against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked to
render such evidence inadmissible. The bill of rights
was established to regulate the disparate powers of the
State in administering justice in order to safeguard
individuals from abuses as such they were never
intended to be operative against private individuals.
Valmonte v. De Villa
Facts
1. The NCR District command was created to
conduct security operations within the Metro
Manila Area to maintain peace and order.
However, petitioners aver that because of the
installation of checkpoints, residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of
their safety being placed at the arbitrary
disposition of the military. Cars and vehicles were
being subjected to regular searches and check-
ups especially at night or at dawn without the
benefit of a search warrant or court order.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2. The fear increased when one time at dawn,
Parpon, a supply officer of Valenzuela, was shot
to death after refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and continuing to speed off despite
warning shots fired.
3. Petitioners further contend that the said
checkpoints give the respondents a blanket
authority to make searches and/or seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation
of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been
harassed.
4. Petitioner Valmonte said that he has been
stopped and searched without a warrant.
Issue: W/N there was a violation of the constitutional-
protected right against unlawful search and seizures
NO
Ratio:
1. The constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been
infringed, or threatened to be infringed
2. Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the
effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating
the details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his right against unlawful search and
seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
399
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.
3. Where, for example, the officer merely draws
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds or simply looks
into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do
not constitute unreasonable search.
4. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures
to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in
the interest of public security
5. etween the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search
which is howeverreasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
6. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military
is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
2. SOME PROCEDURAL RULES
(Macri p. 112-113)
3. ONLY A JUDGE MAY VALIDLY ISSUE A WARRANT
Harvey v Santiago
Aberrant case; upheld validity of arrest of pedophiles on
order of the Immigration Commissioner Santiago
because there was probably cause based on months of
surveillance. The requirement that probable cause is to
be determined by a judge does not extend to
deportation because it is not criminal but administrative.
The existence of photographs justified the arrest and
the seizure without warrant. Pedophilia, though not a
crime, was offense to public morals.
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioners are the following: American nationals
Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72. Dutch
Citizen Adrian Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at
Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam
Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences. The
―Operation Report‖ read that Andrew Harvey was
400
found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman
was found with two naked boys inside his room. While
Van Den Elshout in the ―after Mission Report‖ read
that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his
care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime
now.
Seized during the petitioner‘s apprehension were rolls
of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys
and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other
literature advertising the child prostitutes were also
found.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien
pedophiles. They were apprehended
17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of
the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens
opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of
evidence, another charged not for pedophile but
working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation
proceedings were instituted against aliens for being
undesirable aliens under Sec.
69 of Revised Administrative Code.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against
petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of
Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative
Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed
11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners
filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court
heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the
power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of existence of probable cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches
and seizures by CID agents. (3) Whether or Not the writ
of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised
Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and
social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners
was based on the probable cause determined after
close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of
probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of
articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized
as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles
401
are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules
on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by
a valid warrant of arrest is
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions
to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.)
Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in
plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done
was incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a
waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and
estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore,
the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas
corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has
become legal, although such confinement was illegal at
the beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner
of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69
of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a)
provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported
upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for
deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and
never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court
proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a
specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested
and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted
with assistance of a counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the
State and done under the authority of the sovereign
power. It a police measure against the undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found
to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the
people.
4. REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT Alvarez vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
402
Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient
to undicue a cautious man to rely on them and act in
pursuance thereof.
Facts: On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez
David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas issued
a search warrant on the basis of affidavit of Agent
Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had
no personal knowledge but through information from a
reliable source. In other words, the applicant‘s
knowledge of facts is based on a mere hearsay. In the
affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as
follows:"That there are being kept is said premises
books documents, receipts, lists chits, and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as
money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests,
in violation of the law."At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of
the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board
entered the store and residence of Narciso Alvarez
seized some articles such as internal revenue license,
ledger, journals, cash bonds, check stubs,
memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories,
bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt
books, promissory notes and checks. On July 8, Alvarez
filed a petition alleging that the search was illegal based
on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was made at
night and for non compliance in the particularity
description rule in issuing warrant. On September 10,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez
and upheld the validity of the search warrant.
Issues:
(1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is
based on hearsay.
No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the
affidavits based on mere hearsay. The general rule is
that when the affidavit of the applicant or complainant
contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that
there exists probable cause. But when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of
one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of
facts is necessary. The Court held that the warrant is
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
illegal because it is based on the affidavit of an agent
who had no personal knowledge of the facts. The true
test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
caused.
403
2) W/N a search warrant can be made at night.
Yes, the search can be made at night. Section 101 of
General Order‘s number 58 authorizes search made at
night when it is positively asserted that the property is
on the person or in the place ordered tube searched.
However, since the search warrant is declared illegal
(RULING 1), such search could not be legally made at
night.
(3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of
description as required by the law.
Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of
description. Article III of the Constitution and section
97 of General Orders Number 58 requires that the
affidavit must contain a particular description of the
placed to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized. But, where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that technical description be given, as this
would mean that no warrant could issue. Based on the
description of the affidavit, and taking into consideration
the nature of the articles as described it is clear that no
other more adequate and detailed description could
have been given, particularly because it is difficult to
give a particular description of the contents thereof. The
description so made substantially complies with the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
legal provisions because the officer of the law who
executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles in question, which
he did.
Asian Surety vs. Herrera
Must refer to one specific offense.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Facts: On October 1965, upon a sworn application of
NBI agent Celso Zoleta Jr. supported with the
deposition of witness Manuel Cuaresma, the
respondent Judge Jose Herrera, issued a search
warrant against the petitioner for criminal case of
Estafa, falsification, insurance fraud and tax evasion. By
virtue of the search warrant, NBI agents seized the
place in the office of the petitioner in Republic Market
and carried away two car loads of documents, papers
and receipt. The petitioners, then filed a suit assailing
the validity of the SW, contending that it does not follow
the Constitutional and statutory requirements of a valid
SW.
404
Issues:
1) Was the warrant valid?
No. It violated the single warrant single offense rule
because it was a general warrant.
The constitution requires that a SW should be issued
upon a probable cause in connection with one single
offense. In the case at bar, the SW was issued for four
separate and distinct offenses. Estafa, falsification,
tax evasion and insurance fraud. Therefore it is invalid
for it is a general warrant.
It also failed to particularly describe the objects to be
seized.
The constitution mandates that objects to be seized
should be couched not on generic but specific terms.
Section 2 provides that a search warrant may be issued
for the search and seizure of the following personal
properties.
a) Property subject to the offense
b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or
fruits of the offense
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 405

c) Property used or intended to be used as the means from the time when the affidavit was made or the search
of committing the offense warrant issued but generally speaking, a lapse of time
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 of less than three weeks will be held not to invalidate
the search warrant, while the lapse of four weeks will be
held to be so.

In the case at bar, the respondent judge used all three

of the description in relation to the things to be seized in
the petitioner. Thus, they are all couched in generic
terms. The respondent judge did not bother to specify
the things to be seized that would be admitted as
evidence to the offense charged.
It also violated the rule that it should be served in the
day. In the case at bar, the
SW was conducted evening of Oct 27, 1 965 at 7:3 0
pm until morning.
Thus, the nearer the time at which the observation of an
offense is alleged to have been made, the more
reasonable the conclusion of establishment of a
probable cause. In the case at bar, the alleged
commission of the crime is from 1961 To
1964 and the application for search warrant was made
in 1965.
Thus, there can be doubt as to the establishment of a
probable cause because of the remoteness of time.
Petition granted.

The gap between the offense and application for search

warrant was remote. The rules for affidavit are
1 ) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense
must be clear and definite and must not be toor emote 20th Century Fox v CA
from the time of the making of the affidavit and issuance PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of the search warrant

2) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the

stated time of observation of the offense id too remote
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In cases involving violation of PD 49, a basic
requirement for validity of the search warrant is the
presentation of the master tape of the copyrighted films
from which the pirated films are supposed to have been
copied.
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint to conduct searches
and seizures in connection with the NBI‘s anti-film
piracy campaign. NBI conducted surveillance and
subsequently filed three applications for search
warrants, eventually isused by the lower court. Private
respondents filed and were granted a motion to lift.
Issue: WON the judge property lifted the search
warrants issued earlier on
application of NBI on basis of petitioner‘s complaint
Ruling: The main issue hinges on the meaning of
"probable cause" within the context of the
constitutional provision against illegal searches and
seizures (Section 3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution,
now, Section 2, Article Ill, 1987
Constitution.
406
The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the
questioned search warrants after finding the existence
of a probable cause justifying their issuance. According
to the petitioner, the lower court arrived at this
conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant
NBI's two witnesses which were taken through
searching questions and answers by the lower court.
The lower court held that the allegation that master
tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to
the purchased and seized video tapes from the
respondents' establishments was not persuasive. They
were never shown to the court. The case should be
dismissed as the allegation was not supported by
competent evidence and for that matter the probable
cause hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone
between black and white resolvable in favor of
respondents herein.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Placer v Villanueva
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial
function of the judge. He is not reliant on the findings of
the fiscal..
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court
and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie
cases have been found. Upon receipt of said
informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the
criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of
warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued
an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court
affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations to
aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of
the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners
petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel
respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended
that the fiscal‘s certification in the informations of the
existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient
justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may,
for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel
the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits
and other documentary evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation.
407
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal‘s certification for
the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification
does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant.
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial
function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on
the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112
of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the
judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal‘s certification and require submission of the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the
conclusion as to existence of probable cause.
Petition dismissed.
Soliven v Makasiar
It is not necessary that a judge personally examine
the complainant and his witness. It is sufficient the
judge personally determine probable cause.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He
together with others was charged for libel by the
president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against
him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a
complaint affidavit because this would defeat her
immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a
president would sue then the president would allow
herself to be placed under the court‘s jurisdiction and
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back.
Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a
witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked
by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
408
from requiring all of the office-holder‘s time, also
demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
in the President‘s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran
et al, in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if
so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court‘s
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President‘s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
Cruz v Judge Areola
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
FACTS: On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the
filing of an Information for Estafa against Marilyn
Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation
Office, based on the complaint filed by herein
complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found
no cogent reason to reverse, modify, or alter the
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and
recommended that the case be set for trial.
Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both
respondent Judge and his Branch Clerk of Court with
ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of the
fact that although respondent Judge already issued a
warrant of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to
giveaway to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of
the accused. They believe that there is no longer any
reason why the respondent Judge should withhold the
issuance of a warrant of arrest considering that the
Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that
there exists probable cause to indict the accused. In
their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that
the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial
function of a judge as he is mandated to determine the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant.
Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand,
claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release
duly signed orders, resolutions and decisions of the
presiding judge of her branch.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
409
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring
the implementations of the warrant of arrest
HELD:
NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Preliminary investigation
should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground
for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for
the determination of a probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the
prosecution‘s job. The second kind of preliminary
investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the
judge. In making the required personal determination, a
judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence
earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of
reliance depends on the circumstances of each case
and is subject to the judge‘s sound discretion. It is not
obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused, even after having personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. For the determination of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
whether probable cause exists and whether it is
necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or
discretion. It appears from the records that the
challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge
were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely
exercised his sound discretion in not immediately
issuing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further
proceedings pending reinvestigation of the case. On her
part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be
faulted for performing a ministerial function, that is,
releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge.
Sales v Sandiganbayan
Determination of probable cause is exclusive province
of the judge.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Facts: The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of
Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot the former mayor and his
political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the shooting, he
surrendered himself and hence the police inspector and
wife of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder
against him. The judge after conducting the
410
preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity) found probable
cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after
conducting the preliminary investigation (p.i. for brevity),
he issued a resolution forwarding the case to the
prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a
subpoena directing him to filehis counter affidavit,
affidavit of witnesses and other supportingdocuments.
He did it the following day. While proceedings are
ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with
the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and void
because the judge who issued it was a relative by
affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the
p.i. were illegal and irregular as the judge doesn‘t have
jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the petition
holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd
degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he
conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper.
The proceeding now consists only of one stage. He
conducted the requisite investigation prior to the
issuance of warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not
complete it. He only examined the witness of
the complainant. But the prosecution instead of
conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the
Ombudsman (OMB for brevity) for the latter to conduct
the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his
counter affidavit, but he did not comply with it finding the
same superfluous. The graft investigator recommended
the filing of information for murder which the OMB
approved. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution
but prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed
a motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest
pending the determination of probable cause. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. This is now a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
petition for review on the decision of
Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in
conducting preliminary investigation.
(2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to
submit controverting
evidence.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Held: The proper procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation was not followed because of
the following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary
investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators,
none of whom completed the preliminary investigation
There was not one continuous proceeding but rather,
cases of passing the buck, the last one being the OMB
throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the
charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity
of the offense alone should have merited a deeper and
more thorough preliminary investigation. The OMB did
nothing of the sort but followed the resolution of the
graft investigator. He did a worse job than the judge, by
actually adopting the resolution of the graft investigator
411
the without doing anything and threw everything to the
Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person
under preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to
a motion for reconsideration, as maintained by the
Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion
for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary
investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to
the denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
This fact alone renders preliminary investigation
conducted in this case incomplete. And lastly, it was
patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely
on the OMB‘s certification of probable cause given the
prevailing facts of the case much more so in the face of
the latter‘s flawed report and
one side factual findings.
The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayan‘s assertion
of having found probable cause on its own, considering
the OMB‘s defective report and findings, which merely
relied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the
defense.
Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash
the warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for
completion of the preliminary investigation.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Lim v Felix
If the judge relied solely on the certification of the
prosecutor he cannot be said to have personally
determined probable cause.
Facts: The petitioners. Lim et al, was charged of the
crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of
Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others.
Private respondent, Alfane was designated to review
the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. 56 of the
respondent judge, Nemesio Felix. After transmittal of
the case, the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest
against the accused by virtue of the prosecutor‘s
certification in each submitted information
recommending the existence of a probable cause.
Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of
arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions
certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists.
412
Held: Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come
out with the warrant of arrest. Issuance of warrants calls
for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the
issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied from the
preliminary examination conducted by him or by the
investigating officer than an offense complained of has
been committed and that there is a reasonable grounds
to believe that the accused has committed it, he must
issue a warrant or order for an arrest. A judge is not
required to personally examine the complainants and
witnesses, what the constitution mandates in satisfying
the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either;
1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue
arrest warrant and 2. If there is no sufficient
establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the
prosecutor‘s certification and require the submission of
the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusions to the existence of probable
cause.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also
mandates that ³x x x probable cause should be
personally determined by the judge x x´. This means
that
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 413

1. The determination of probable cause is a function of

the judge.2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor Distinguished.
does not bind the judge
The former is executive in nature and part of a
3. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the ROSECU TOR‘S JOB. While the latter aka preliminary
preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the the JUDGE.
preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or release.
In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent
judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the
certification of the prosecutor, without personally
examining the information (which still in Masbate, and
wherein the respondent denied the motion for
transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground Okabe v Judge Gutierrez
that certification id enough ground for the determination PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of probable cause and issuance of warrant ).Thus, there
is no personal examination conducted by the judge to
establish the existence of probable cause, thereby, the
respondent committed abuse of discretion. The judge committed GAD in finding probable cause
because the investigating prosecutor submitted the only
the resolution of the preliminary investigation and the
complainant‘s affidavit. The witnesses and reply
affidavits were not presented.
Note:

Preliminary investigation for the determination of

sufficient ground for filing of information and
investigation for the determination of a probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging
Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe,
a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged,
that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000
with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door
delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged
that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed
upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but
later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant
submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other
documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J.
Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable
cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was
subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial
court then issued a warrant of arrest with a
recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a
personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left
the Philippines for Japan on June 17,
2000 without the trial court‘s permission, and returned to
the Philippines on June
28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000,
and returned on July 12,
2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an
urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold
departure order. Trial court approved the same.
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only
documents appended to the Information submitted by
the investigating prosecutor were respondent
Maruyama‘s affidavit-complaint for estafa and the
414
resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits
of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent‘s
counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the
parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the
petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall
Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow
her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she
have 3 minor children residing
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
there relying on her for support. Petitioner also
questioned the irregularity of the determination of
probable cause during the preliminary investigation
however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of
bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the
petitioner from questioning the same. Upon
arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/
leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA
a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure
order however all the other motions were denied, hence
this case.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a
reversible error in determining existence of probable
cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of
respondent Maruyama and the latter‘s documentary
evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the
petitioner.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded
in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides that:
SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the
information or complaint. An information or complaint
filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and
counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses,
together with the other supporting evidence and the
resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby
DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence
of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based
on the complete records, as required under Section
8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
C.Jian
- arrested. The group interviewed a certain Luzviminda
118 - 3
cases
119 4 surveillance. When they reached the house, the group
cases
415
120 -
4cases
D. PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
People v. Damaso 212 SCRA 547 (1992), Supra
Philippine Constabulary officers and personnel were
sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in
Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In
said place, the group apprehended several people
including Berlina Aritumba. When interrogated, the
persons apprehended revealed that there was an
underground safehouse in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
After coordinating with the Station Commander of
Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in
Urdaneta were they found subversive documents, a
radio, and several firearms. After the raid, the group
proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under
surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie
Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier
Morados, an alleged househelper of Bernie Mendoza,
who pointed the location of the house under
saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the
area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados
she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon
entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay
Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled 'Ang Bayan',
xerox copiers and a computer machine. The group
requested the persons in the house to allow them to
look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the
rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation,
one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood
radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines,
Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They
confiscated the articles and brought them to their
headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought
the persons found in the house to the headquarters for
investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was
the lessee of the house and owned the items
confiscated therefrom Hence, Basilio Damaso (alias
Bernie Mendoza), was charged and convicted in an
information filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion. Damaso
contends that the search conducted by the PC officers
were illegal. The Solicitor General counters that a
search may be validly conducted without a search
warrant with if the search was conducted with the
consent of the person searched and since the evidence
seized was in plain view of the authorities.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
416
In reversing his conviction, the Court said that the law
enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of
a valid search and seizure proceedings. The
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived
by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded
or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf. In the case at bar, the records show that
appellant was not in his house at that time Luz
Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter it. The Court found no
evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados
was indeed the appellant's helper, or if it was true that
she was his helper, that the appellant had given her
authority to open his house in his absence. The
prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco
has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot
be given any color of legality.
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. As a consequence, the search
conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would
have been different if the situation here demanded
urgency which could have prompted the authorities to
dispense with a search warrant.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Tambasen v. People 246 SCRA 184 (1995)
A police officer applied for the issuance of a search
warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he received
information that petitioner had in his possession at his
house in Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags &
Ammos), Hand Grenades,
.45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and
Subversive Documents,"
which articles were "used or intended to be used" for
illegal purposes. On the same day, the application was
granted by the MTCC with the issuance of a search
warrant, which allowed the seizure of the items
specified in the application. On another date, a police
team searched the house of petitioner and seized two
envelopes containing P14,000.00 and various
communication equipment. Hence, petitioner filed
before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and
seizure be
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned
to him. His motion was granted by the MTCC which
opined that any seizure should be limited to the specific
items covered by the warrant and that the money could
not be considered as "subversive documents"; it was
neither stolen nor the effects of gambling. However,
the RTC reversed the MTCC decision, saying that the
any illegality in the search involves matters of defense
which should be properly raised at the criminal action or
417
actions that may be filed against Tambasen. Petitioner
contends that the search warrant covered three
offenses: "(1) illegal possession of armalite rifle and .45
cal. pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand grenade and
dynamite sticks; and (3) illegal possession of subversive
documents" in violation of Section 3 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court (now Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
In attributing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC, the
Court said that, on its face, the search warrant violates
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for
more than one specified offense. The caption of the
search warrant reflects the violation of two special laws:
P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the
Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was
therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and
void.
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in
the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search warrant.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
that a search warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized. Clearly then, the money which was
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally
seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the
police team were doing their task of pursuing subversive
is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The
presumption juris tantum of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail
against the constitutionally protected rights of an
individual.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Pangandaman v. Casar 159 SCRA 599 (1988)
A shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao
del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two
others wounded. The relatives of the victims, filed a
letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi
City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of
the incident. The letter adverted to the possibility of
innocent persons being implicated by the parties
involved on both sides — none of whom was, however,
identified — and promised that supporting affidavits
would shortly be filed. Afterwards, a criminal complaint
for multiple murder was filed with respondent Judge
Casar. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint
and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest" against
the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the
witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does." The lawyer for the
victims' relatives filed a motion for reconsideration
seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent
holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that
the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and
418
manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions"
having been propounded. Said motion was denied by
the trial court.
While the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
arrest of petitioners, it said that the warrant issued by
the trial court was in the nature of a general warrant,
one of a class of writs long proscribed as
unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally
subversive of the liberty of the subject. The warrant in
question was issued against fifty (50) "John Does", not
one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or
would identify. Clearly violative of the constitutional
injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describe the person or persons to be seized, the
warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided.
Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals 262 SCRA 219 (1996), Supra
An intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory
Board (VRB), received information that private
respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated
videotapes, posters, advertising materials and other
items used or intended to be
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
used for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition of the said pirated
videotapes. Said officer then filed a verified Application
for Search Warrant with prayer for the seizure of
the properties described in the search warrant. After
the issuance of the warrant, this was served on private
respondents which led to the seizure of the properties
described in the warrant. Private respondent then filed
an Urgent Motion To Lift the Search Warrant and For
the Return of the Seized Articles alleging that the
search warrant violates the constitutional requirements
of particularity of the description of the warrant, being a
general warrant and thus, null and void. The RTC
granted the motion in which the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
The Court found respondent‘s contention untenable.
The Court said that a search warrant may be said to
particularly describe the things to be seized 1) when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow;
2) or when the description expresses a conclusion of
fact — not of law — by
which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure; or when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued. If the articles
419
desired to be seized have any direct relation to an
offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the
said offense; and the articles, subject of search and
seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen
such evidence.
The Court said that search warrant authorized only the
seizure of articles used or intended to be used in the
unlawful sale, lease and other acts in violation of Sec.
56 of P.D. 49. The search warrant ordered the seizure
of the following properties:
"(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion
pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the
attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, brochures,
invoices, journals, ledgers, and books of accounts
bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles
(as per attached list);
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
(c) Television sets, video cassettes records,
rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment
and other machines and paraphernalia or material used
or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease,
distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease,
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the above-
mentioned pirated video tapes which he is keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described."
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Clearly, the above items could not be any more specific
as the circumstances will allow since they are all used
or intended to be used in the unlawful sale or lease of
pirated tapes. Therefore, the finding of the appellate
court that the Search Warrant is a "general" warrant is
devoid of basis.
Kho v. Makalintal 306 SCRA 70 (1999), Supra
In this case, petitioners sought to restrain the
respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from
using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in
any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and
to return immediately the said items, including firearms,
ammunition and explosives, radio communication
equipment, handsets, transceivers, two units of
vehicles and motorcycle. The search warrants were
applied for after teams of NBI agents had
conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in
the two houses of Kho on the basis of confidential
information they received that the said places were
being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms
and "chop-chop" vehicles. Armed with search warrants,
the NBI recovered various high-powered firearms and
thousands of rounds of ammunition from the two
houses. Then, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
420
Search Warrants contending that the subject search
warrants are general warrants prescribed by the
Constitution. According to them, the things to be seized
were not described and detailed out, i.e. the firearms
listed were not classified as to size or make, etc.. The
MTC denied the motion, hence, this petition for
certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the MTC decision. It ruled
that a description of the property to be seized need not
be technically accurate nor necessarily precise;
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether
the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter
of concern. Further the description is required to be
specific only so far as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow.
Records on hand indicate that the search warrants
under scrutiny specifically describe the items to be
seized thus:
Search Warrant No. 90-11
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
"Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as
transmitters, transceivers, handsets, scanners,
monitoring device and the like."
Search Warrant No. 90-13
"Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as
transmitters, transceivers, handsets, radio
communications equipments, scanners, monitoring
devices and others."
Subject Search Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to:
"Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and
ammunitions for the said firearms." Search Warrant No.
90-14 states:
"Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts."
The Court held that the said warrants comply with
Constitutional and statutory requirements. The law does
not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities.
Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know
exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since
the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the
effort and time spent in researching on the details to be
embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of
the search nugatory.
421
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could
not have been in a position to know beforehand the
exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized.
Although the surveillance they conducted did disclose
the presence of unlicensed firearms within the premises
to be searched, they could not have known the
particular type of weapons involved before seeing such
weapons at close range, which was of course
impossible at the time of the filing of the applications for
subject search warrants.
Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue 344 SCRA 36 (2000)
Based on a complaint filed by a certain Rodrigo Abos,
former Operating Chief of Unifish Packing Corporation,
to the BIR that said company and Frank Uy were
engaged in activities constituting evasion of tax
payments, the BIR applied for search warrants for the
search of the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation
which the RTC judge issued. The Court of Appeals
found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC judge in issuing the search warrants. Petitioners
filed the instant petition for review assailing the validity
of the warrants issued, based on the following: there
was no probable cause for the judge to issue the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
warrants; and the warrants did not particularly describe
the things to be seized.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that before issuing
the warrants, the respondent judge took the deposition
of Abos, who had access to company records showing
the illegal activities and even showed the issuing judge
photocopies thereof. Most of the items listed in the
warrants, however, failed to meet the test of
particularity, thus, items not particularly described were
ordered to be returned to petitioners. However, the
warrants authorizing the seizure of unregistered delivery
receipts and unregistered purchase and sales
invoices remain valid since no other more adequate
and detailed description could be given precisely
because they are unregistered.
Furthermore, the general description of most of the
documents listed in the warrants does not render the
entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts
and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the
warrants remain valid. The search warrant is severable,
422
and those items not particularly described may be cut
off without destroying
the whole warrant.
People v. Salanguit 356 SCRA 683 (2001), Supra
Accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko was found
guilty of violation of Section
16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and of §8 of the same law and sentencing
him for such violation to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00. In
his appeal before the Court, appellant contested his
conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as
evidence against him on the ground that the warrant
used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the
admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly
seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain
view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary
force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision
of the trial court finding appellant guilty of possession of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
marijuana under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6425. The Court
ruled that the seized marijuana brick is inadmissible in
evidence against appellant. First, the warrant
authorized only the seizure of shabu, and not marijuana.
Secondly, the seizure of the marijuana brick could not
be justified under the "plain view doctrine" because the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of appellant
was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not
being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped
in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as
marijuana. The Court, however, affirmed the decision
of the trial court finding appellant guilty of possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
"shabu" under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425. The Court
held that with respect to the seizure of shabu from
appellant's residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was
properly issued, such warrant
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
being founded on probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the
deposing witness and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized. With
respect to appellant's claim that there was undue and
unnecessary force employed by the searching party in
effecting the warrant, the Court found no evidence to
support the allegation. Appellant did not present any
affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons,
like the barangay officials or neighbors, to attest to the
truth of his claim.
423
Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines v. Asuncion
307 SCRA 253 (1999)
Police Chief Inspector Pascua applied for a search
warrant with the Regional Trial Court presided by the
herein respondent, Hon. Asuncion, against the
management, represented by petitioners, of Paper
Industries Corporation, allegedly in possession of
several high-powered firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. Although it was supported by depositions of
two police officers "no license" certification from the
Firearms and Explosive Office of the PNP was however
attached. At the hearing for the issuance of search
warrant Inspector Pascua did not testify but merely
introduced as witness Police Officer Bacolod who stated
that, from information gathered from reliable sources, he
"believed" that PICOP security guards had no license to
possess subject firearms. Thereafter, Search Warrant
No. 799 (95) was issued. It identified only one place —
"Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines located
at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur" as the place to be searched. However, PICOP
has 200 office/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
depots/quick service outlet and 800 miscellaneous
structures spread over 155 hectares of land. Searches
were made by the police who recovered several
armalites, grenade launcher, 38 caliber revolvers, 45
caliber pistols, hand grenades and ammunitions kept
inside the ammo dam and security headquarters or
office of PICOP. The PNP then filed with the
Department of Justice a complaint for illegal possession
of firearms against petitioners who moved to quash the
search warrant
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
on the ground of its illegality. The motion and a
subsequent motion were denied, hence, resort to this
petition.
The requisites for a valid search warrant are: 1)
probable cause present; 2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; 3) the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under
oath or affirmation; 4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and 5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. In the case at bar the
search warrant was issued based solely on affidavits.
The trial judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and the witnesses, witness Bacolod had no
424
personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to
possess the subject firearms and the place to be
searched was not described with particularity.
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed
to describe the place with particularity. It simply
authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises,"
but it did not specify such premises. The warrant
identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at
PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao
del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is made up
of "200 offices/ buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 pier/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
depots/quick service outlets and some 800
miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out
over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." Obviously,
the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus
illegal authority to search all the structures found inside
the PICOP compound.
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms,
explosives and other materials seized were
"inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Since
these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
inadmissible, the complaint and the proceedings before
the State Prosecutor have no leg to stand on.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
People v. Court of Appeals 291 SCRA 400 (1998)
A search warrant was served against Azfar Hussain
which resulted in his arrest together with 3 other
Pakistanis and in the seizure of their personal
belongings, papers and effects, i.e. dynamite sticks,
plastic explosives, fragmentation grenade and high
powered firearms and ammunitions. Charged in court,
they pleaded not guilty and submitted their "Extremely
Urgent Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Declare
Evidence Obtained Inadmissible" on the ground that the
place searched, in which the accused were then
residing, was Apartment No. 1, a place other than and
separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit
adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in
the search warrant. The trial court granted the Motion to
Quash which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on
special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General
now seeks reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision
alleging that the police officers had satisfactorily
established probable cause before the judge for the
issuance of a search warrant.
425
The Supreme Court held that while their contention may
be conceded, the trouble is that the place described in
the search warrant, which is the only place that may be
legitimately searched in virtue thereof, was not that
which the police officers who applied for the search
warrant had in mind, with the result that what they
actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was
a place other than that stated in the search warrant. It
does not suffice for a search warrant to be deemed
valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath,
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly
describe the place to be searched, the manifest
intention being that the search
be confined strictly to the place so described.
People v. Tiu Won Chua 405 SCRA 280 (2003)
Appellants were convicted for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No.
7659. On appeal, they assailed the legality of the search
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
warrant and the search and arrest conducted pursuant
thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of
conviction.
The Supreme Court held that a mistake in the name of
the person to be searched does not invalidate the
warrant, especially since in this case, the authorities
had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of
the accused because of the test buy operation
conducted before obtaining the search warrant. In fact,
a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long
as it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable
the officer to identify the accused. It also held that a
mistake in the identification of the owner of the
place does not invalidate the warrant provided the
place to be searched is properly described. Thus, even
if the search warrant used by the police authorities did
not contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the name of
Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it because the
place to be searched was described properly.
However, the search conducted on the car parked
away from the building, however, was illegal because
it was not part of the place described to be searched
and it was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
426
5. PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO SEIZURE Burgos v.
Chief of Staff
Facts:
- Judge Cruz-Pano issued 2 search warrants, by virtue
of which the premises of the
―Metropolitan Mail‖ and ―We Forum‖ newspapers
were searched.
- Police seized printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in
the printing, publication and distribution of the
newspapers as well as numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession of publisher-editor Jose Burgos, Jr.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
- Burgos filed for writ of mandamus and prohibition for
the return of the materials seized and to enjoin
respondents from using said materials from being used
as evidence against him.
- One of Burgos‘ many arguments against the search
warrants is that although the warrants were directed
against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles belonging to his
co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and
the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Issues: (topical only)
W/N it is necessary that property to be searched is
owned by the person against
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
whom the warrant is issued.
Held:
NO, OWNERSHIP IS NOT NECESSARY, ONLY
POSSESSION
Under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the
following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or
fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means
of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be
seized should be owned by the person against whom
the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be
owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the
above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may
be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen
property must be owned by one other than the person in
whose possession it may be at the time of the search
427
and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession
of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles
and property seized under the warrants.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
6. CONDUCT OF THE SEARCH
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. YOLANDA GESMUNDO, accused-
appellant.
PADILLA, J p:
Facts:
- After having allegedly witnessed accused sell
marijuana outside her house, police
investigators procured a search warrant to search
accused‘s house for marijuana.
- Accused claims that while she was seated in the sala,
Sgt. Yte, one of the officers conducting the search, was
showing her something which the latter claimed to be a
search warrant when someone uttered the following
words "ito na" coming from the direction of the kitchen.
She, together with Sgt. Yte proceeded to the kitchen
and saw PFC Luciano holding a plastic bag with four
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
other companions who entered the house through the
back door which was opened at that time.
- She claims that the marijuana supposedly seized by
the raiding police team in her possession, was planted
by the police officers.
Issue:
W/N police complied with the proper procedure for
conducting a search by virtue
of a warrant.
Held:
NO THEY DID NOT
The search of the accused-appellant's house was
conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which specifically provides that no
search of a house, room or any other premise shall be
made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure
regularity in the execution of the search warrant.
Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article
130 of the Revised Penal Code. 19
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
428
As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National
Bureau of Investigation, et al. 20 a procedure, wherein
members of a raiding party can roam around the raided
premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only
witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to
witness a search conducted by the other members of
the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative
of both the spirit and the letter of the law.
Furthermore, The police authorities in the case at bar
testified that they submitted an inventory to the court
without the marijuana, the latter having been turned
over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Having made no return or inventory to the warrant-
issuing court, there is no proof that the police really
found marijuana in the house of the accused. It is also
required that the marijuana received be presented as
evidence. The identity of the marijuana which
constitutes the corpus delicti must be established before
the court.
Accused is acquitted.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 429

Chinese currencies, typewriters, and even the Toyota

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENNY Corolla (good lord)
GO, appellant.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.: Issues:

W/N the manner of conducting the search and seizure
was proper.

Facts:

- A search warrant was issued by the RTC Pasay Held:

commanding a search of Go‘s
residence and to seize Shabu, weighing scales and NO, NOT AT ALL.
other drug paraphernalia.
- In order to gain entry into Go‘s house, they sideswept
(sinagi) Go‘s Toyota Corolla GLI which was parked
outside. Jack Go, accused‘s son and the only one
present at the house at the time, thereupon opened the A search warrant must conform strictly to the
door of the house and the policemen at once introduced requirements of the constitutional and statutory
themselves, informed him that they had a warrant for provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is
the search of the premises, and promptly handcuffed void. An examination of the testimonies of the police
him to a chair. officers brings to light several irregularities in the
- Barangay Kagawads were later called to be manner by which the search of appellant‘s residence
witnesses to the search and to afterwards sign the was conducted.
inventory receipt and affidavit of orderly search.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

In order to enter the premises to be searched, the police

- Police officers then seized a plastic bag containing a officers deliberately side- swiped appellant‘s car which
yellowish substance, a weighing scale, various was parked alongside the road, instead of following the
documents, bank books, money in Philippine and regular ―knock and announce‖ procedure as outlined
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
in Section 7, Rule 126. Since the police officers had not
yet notified the occupant of the residence of their
intention and authority to conduct a search and absent a
showing that they had any reasonable cause to
believe that prior notice of service of the warrant
would endanger its successful implementation, the
deliberate sideswiping of appellant‘s car was
unreasonable and unjustified.
In explaining why they handcuffed jack to a chair while
they conducted their search, the police explained that
not only was he unfamiliar with Jack Go and unsure of
how the latter would react, but it was a standard
operating procedure. There is no showing, however, of
any action or provocation by Jack Go when the
policemen entered appellant‘s residence. Considering
the degree of intimidation,
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
alarm and fear produced in one suddenly confronted
under similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of
Jack Go all the more was unjustified as was his
continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads
Lazaro and Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible
restraint.
430
Also, despite the warrant‘s limiting the search and
seizure to shabu and drug paraphernalia, the police
seized numerous other items, which are clearly
unrelated to illegal drugs or illegal drug paraphernalia.
Furthermore, the inventory made was not detailed, as
was required. Neither was the accused nor the
barangay officials issued an inventory receipt.
The raiding team‘s departure from the procedure
mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
taken together with the numerous other irregularities
attending the search of appellant‘s residence, tainted
the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus
compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule and
declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence.
Benny Go is ACQUITTED. Motion For Return of
Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia is
GRANTED IN PART, and the trial court is hereby
ordered to return to him those items seized from the
subject premises which belong to him as listed in said
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Motion. The subject shabu is ORDERED forfeited in
favor of the State.
7. WARRANTLESS ARREST
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL
and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and
NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA,
BRIG.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-
CAPCOM) received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad)
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who
was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
431
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2
CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31
January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat,
or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the
hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the
2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as
T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a
consequence of this positive identification, Dural
was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information
charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
crime of ―Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority.‖ (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail
recommended). On 15
February 1988, the information was amended to
include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the
filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of
Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva.
The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9
February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato
de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen.
Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12
February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on
15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil
and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 432

Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need
they were accordingly released. not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 offenses which requires the determination by a judge of
the existence of probable cause before the issuance of
a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
any warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion. persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but equally
in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or
capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
situation that involves the very survival of society and its
Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested government and duly constituted authorities.
while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor
was he arrested just after the commission of the said
offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a (http://mclairgarcia.wordpress.com/2011/04/01/umil-vs-
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed ramos/)
subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), respondents.
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved
in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements,
or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than
for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
PUNO, J.:
Facts:
- Patrolman Fulgencio was instructed by his station
commander to monitor the activities of Sucro, following
information that Sucro was selling marijuana.
- Pat. Fulgencio hid himself under a house 2 meters
away from an adjacent chapel. From there, he observed
Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned
out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart
found inside the chapel, and then return to the street
where he handed the same to a buyer. This was done
three times, and every transaction was reported by
Fulgencio to his superior.
- Police officers then intercepted the 3rd buyer, who
threw a tea bag containing marijuana to the ground. The
buyer admitted that he purchased the bag from
Sucro.
- Police then arrested Sucro and recovered 19 sticks
and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the
chapel.
Issue:
W/N the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful
and consequently, W/N the
evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
Held:
433
YES, IT IS
―Section 5, Rule 113. Arrest without warrant, when
lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; ―
An offense is committed in the presence or within the
view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to
the scene thereof.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw
Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro
talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to
them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did
three times during the time that he was being
monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going
transaction to his superiors.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ARMANDO DE LARA Y GALARO, accused-
appellant.
QUIASON, J.:
Facts:
- A buy-bust operation was conducted outside De Lara‘s
house to entrap De Lara, a suspected drug dealer.
During the transaction, De Lara sensed the presence of
police officers and so ran into his house. He was later
subdued by the police.
- De Lara denied having sold marijuana to anyone and
claimed that the arresting officers merely planted the
marijuana on his person. He claims that as he was
returnig home after fetching his son, he was arrested by
police who then proceeded to dearch his house without
a warrant.
Issue:
W/N De Lara‘s arrest was legal.
W/N the seizure of prohibited drugs from inside his
house was legal.
434
Held:
YES, THE ARREST IS LEGAL
―Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person;
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense…‖
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin
foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer.
Applying the aforementioned provision of law,
appellant's arrest was lawfully effected without need
of a warrant of arrest. "Having caught the appellant in
flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
policemen were not only authorized but were also under
obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a
warrant of arrest".
We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of
prohibited drugs found inside appellant's house. The
seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs
was the result of appellant's arrest inside his
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted
upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate
vicinity where the arrest was made.
However, the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill,
the Receipt of Property Seized, and the booking sheet
are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there
was no showing that appellant was then assisted by
counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing.
Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would
not affect the conviction of appellant in view of the
abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RICARDO BOHOL,
accused-appellant. QUISUMBING, J.: Facts:
- Acting on information that Bohol was engaged in the
illegal drug trade, police officers conducted a buy-bust
operation to entrap him.
- P02 Estrada handed Bohol a marked P100 bill and
Bohol, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline granules which p02 Estrada suspected
to be shabu. Police officers then emerged from their
hiding places and arrested
Bohol.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
435
Issue:
W/N Bohol‘s arrest, and the search on his person are
legal.
Held:
YES
The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes
unreasonable arrests and provides in the Bill of Rights
that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without
a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority.
However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an
arrest made after an entrapment operation does not
require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is
considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure:
―Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.–A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;‖
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Considering the legality of Bohol‘s warrantless arrest,
the subsequent warrantless search that resulted in the
seizure of the shabu found in his person is likewise
valid. In a legitimate warrantless arrest, the arresting
police officers are authorized to search and seize from
the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the
things which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. This Court has ruled that the following
instances constitute valid warrantless searches and
seizures: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain
view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6)
stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ENRIQUE HINDOY
and BELLA B. NEGROSA, accused-appellants.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
436
Facts:
- a woman informant went to the polce station and
reported that a certain ―Bella‖ would be receiving a
shipment of illegal drugs that day at a certain address.
Acting on the information, police went to the address to
conduct a buy-bust operation.
- They knocked on the door of the accused and
pretended to buy marijuana. After an exchange of
P1000 in marked bills and a brick (1 kilo) of marijuana
was made, police arrested the accused and searched
their house where they found even more bricks of mary
jane.
- The accused, live-in partners, maintain that they could
not have committed the crimes charged in the
informations because they were sleeping at the time
said crimes were allegedly perpetrated. Consequently,
the search conducted by the police officers was not
incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest. The
confiscated contraband was, therefore, inadmissible in
evidence against them.
Issue:
W/N the arrest and search were legal.
Held:
YES
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond
reasonable doubt the elements necessary to
successfully prosecute a case for the illegal sale of a
prohibited drug, namely, (a) identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the things sold and the payment therefor.
It is true that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, ―The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.‖ It is equally true that
any evidence obtained in violation of such right shall be
inadmissible in evidence. This right, however, is not
without exceptions, as in instances of searches
incidental to lawful arrests. Under paragraph (a),
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a peace
officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in
his presence the person to be arrested has committed,
437
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. LI YIN
CHU alias ROBERT LI, appellant.
CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
- A man showed up at the PNP station at Camp Crame
and reported that Robert Li was engaged in illegal drug
activity in Metro Manila. The police then planned to
conduct a buy bust operation on the basis of the report.
- the informer called up appellant and made
arrangement for the purchase of five to ten kilos of
shabu to be delivered between 4 to 5 p.m. that same
day (July 4,
1999) in front of Iceberg Food House along Banawe
Street, Quezon City.
- Around 5 o‘clock in the afternoon, appellant arrived on
board a blue Honda Civic
car with plate number WBY 852. He was approached by
the informer and both conversed in Chinese since
appellant could not speak English or Tagalog. The
informer then called SPO1 delos Santos, who was just
about two meters away, to approach. The informer
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
introduced SPO1 delos Santos as "Mr. Nueva" to
appellant. The informer told appellant that Mr. Nueva
wanted to buy shabu. After shaking hands with SPO1
delos Santos, appellant opened the left rear door of the
car and showed the shabu to SPO1 delos Santos by
pointing to the plastic bag on top of the back seat of the
car. SPO1 delos Santos opened the plastic bag and
saw a transparent self-sealing plastic bag inside. He
removed the seal and felt the substance inside the bag
with his fingers. Convinced that the substance inside the
self-sealing bag was shabu, he gave a pre-arranged
signal to SPO1 Pastrana, who immediately rushed to
the scene. SPO1 Pastrana and SPO1 delos Santos
identified themselves as police officers and placed
appellant under arrest. With the informer doing the
interpretation in Chinese language, appellant was
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
informed of his constitutional rights. The police officers
thereafter confiscated the shabu and the Honda Civic
car.
Issue:
W/N Bohol‘s arrest, and the search on his person are
legal.
Held:
YES
438
Appellant contends that the arresting officers merely
framed him up. The Court is aware that in drug-related
cases, frame-up and "hulidap" are common and
standard line of defenses. However, like alibi, frame-up
is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. For this defense
to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and
convincing.11 In this case, appellant has gravely failed
to substantiate his allegations of a frame-up. Appellant‘s
claim that the police merely planted the shabu deserves
scant consideration. It is incredible that the police
officers would plant a very large quantity of shabu when
a few sticks of marijuana could have been used, with
great ease, to frame-up appellant. Records also show
that appellant and the police officers are strangers to
each other. Nothing in the records explains why the
prosecution witnesses would fabricate their
testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious
crime.
Appellant then harps on the poseur-buyer‘s failure to
present to appellant the buy- bust money in exchange
for the shabu. No law or rule of evidence requires the
simultaneous exchange of the buy-bust money and the
shabu. The well-entrenched principle is that the
accused commits the crime of illegal sale drugs as soon
as he consummates the sale transaction, whether
payment precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
True, Delos Santos, as poseur buyer, failed to show
appellant the buy-bust money. However, Delos Santos
satisfactorily explained that he was unable to give
appellant the buy-bust money because he immediately
signaled Pastrana, his back- up, to arrest appellant so
as "to evade any commotion or any armed back-up."
Delos Santos also testified that the buy-bust money,
consisting of genuine and boodle money, existed and
was at the car which he and the other police operatives
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
boarded en route to Banawe Street. Therefore, while
the payment for the shabu sold was not simultaneous
with the delivery of the shabu, there was definitely
money, both genuine and boodle, to pay for the sale of
the shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Facts: Another buy-bust operation with facts of similar
import to those of the immediately preceding cases.
Except in this case, the police officer acting as poseur
439
buyer did not immediately arrest the suspect but
returned to the station to make a report. It was only in
the evening of the same day that the police, without a
warrant, arrested the accused.
Issue:
W/N the arrest was legal.
Held:
NO
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed
by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in
flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in
flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer
must be caught redhanded in the act of selling
marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or
posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by
the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification.
Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the
alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana
leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant
Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo
that the supposed sale of
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the
natural course of things and inconsistent with the
aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather
absurd on his part to let appellant escape without
having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law.
It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY",
accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts:
- SP01 Paguidopon received information that a drug
pusher was in Davao. As Mula was passing by on his
motorcycle,t he informant pointed Mula out as the
alleged drug pusher to SP01 Paguidopon.
- The following month, SP01 Paguidopon received
information that Mula would be passing through NHA,
Ma- a, Davao City. Paguidopon then intercepted Mula
440
and Molina as they were riding on a ―trisikad‖ and
demanded that they open the
black bag they were carrying.
- The bag was revealed to contain dried marijuana
leaves. Mula and Molina were
thereafter handcuffed. (note: Paguidopon and the police
did not know Mula‘s
name until after they were arrested)
Issue:
W/N Bohol‘s arrest, and the search on his person are
legal.
Held:
YES
to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no
outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants
could not be said to be committing, attempting to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 441

commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that

accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible
we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to
open the bag. Such response which allegedly Accused are therefore acquitted.
reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers
that accused- appellants were committing a crime, is an
equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto
arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but
merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting
officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of People v Francisco Antinero Beriarmente
any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
25 September 2001
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants
waived their right against unreasonable searches and Ynares-Santiago, J.
seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Facts: Sinarlo was the poseur-buyer while Francisco

Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-
appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by
the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person
was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized
by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence
against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left
with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
Antinero was the target in a buy-bust operation.
Together they rode in a tricycle to one Boy Bebelone‘s
house followed by policemen. In front of Boy
Bebelone's house, accused Beriarmente handed over to
Randy Sinarlo a straw sack that Beriarmente had picked
up from a house along Sawang Street. As soon as the
policemen saw the sack change hands, they arrested
accused Beriarmente. They examined the contents of
the sack and concluded that it contained marijuana
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
plants, prompting them to confiscate the same. They
then brought accused Beriarmente to the police station.
The prosecution witnesses identified accused Francisco
Beriarmente in open court as the person who sold and
handed over the sack of marijuana plants to witness
Randy Sinarlo. The latter also identified the sack and its
contents, which SPO2
Caballero had placed inside a plastic container, as
the very same sack and marijuana plants that the
accused sold and gave to him.
The version of the accused: he was instructed to get a
sack along Sawang Street and to deliver said sack to
the NFA Milling. He and Randy Sinarlo then rode a
tricycle and he fetched the sack from Rosita as
instructed. Without knowing the contents of the sack, he
gave the same to Randy Sinarlo. On the way to the NFA
area, they were intercepted by the police and he was
arrested, while Randy Sinarlo was not apprehended. He
was brought to the municipal building where the police
tried to interrogate him. However, since the lawyer they
assigned to him did not show up, the investigation did
not push through. Thereafter, he was incarcerated in the
municipal jail.
442
Issue:
W/N guilt of the accused sufficiently established.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Held/Ratio: YES. There is no question that the buy-bust
operation conducted by the police in the case at bar
was proper. There is no showing of irregularity in the
conduct of the same. Consequently, the arrest of
accused-appellant, though warrantless, falls squarely
under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court,
which provides that a peace officer or private person
may make an arrest, without a warrant, when the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense, in his presence. The
accused-appellant was caught inflagrante delicto as a
result of a buy-bust operation conducted by the police
on the basis of information received from a police asset
that the accused- appellant was looking for a buyer. His
arrest, therefore, was lawful and the sack of marijuana
plants confiscated from him were admissible in
evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
Accused: there was no trial buy-bust operation because:
(1) there was no trial buy- bust operation to validate the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
suspicion that accused was really engaged in the sale
of illegal drugs; (2) the poseur-buyer used his own
money to purchase the marijuana plants, not marked
money; and (3) no marked money was presented as
evidence in court.
In the prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs, what is
important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the
goods from the accused-appellant and the same was
presented as evidence in court. Neither is there a rule of
law which requires that there must be a simultaneous
exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.
There is also no rule that requires the police to use only
marked money in buy-bust operations. In fact, this Court
has ruled that the failure to use marked money or to
present it in evidence is not material since the sale
cannot be essentially disproved by the absence thereof.
The non-presentation of the marked money does not
create
a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as
the sale of the illegal drugs is
adequately established and the substance itself is
presented before the court.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
443
There is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-
bust operations. It is of judicial notice that drug pushers
sell their wares to any prospective customer, stranger or
not, in both public or private places, with no regard for
time.
People v Antonio Enrile
Cruz, J. Facts:
The buy-bust plan was made on the strength of a tip
given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who was
himself to pose as the buyer.
Prosecution witnesses (2 policemen) allege that on the
occasion they saw Polines hand over to accused
Abugatal the marked money representing payment for
the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and
returned ten minutes later with a wrapped object which
he gave Polines. The two policemen then approached
Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time
confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory
examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering
tops weighing 22 grams.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The prosecution also showed that, upon providing
Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De Vera
Street, also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City,
where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out
and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as
the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen
immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the
right front pocket of his trousers the marked money
earlier delivered to Abugatal.
At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn
confession affirming the above narration. Enrile refused
to make any statement pending consultation with a
lawyer.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money
was "planted" on him by the police officers, who he said
simply barged into his house without a warrant and
arrested him. He stoutly denied any knowledge of the
marijuana.
Issue:
444
W/N Enrile’s guilt established beyond reasonable doubt.
Held/Ratio: NO.
Re credence of Abugatal’s sworn statement.
It was made without compliance with the requisites of a
custodial investigation, including the right to the
assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly
inadmissible. It was not enough then to inform the
suspect of his constitutional rights. The trial court had to
ascertain for itself that the accused clearly understood
the import and consequences of his confession and had
the intelligence and mental capacity to do so. There is
no showing in the record that this was done, short of the
statement in the decision that Abugatal had been
informed of his rights and had validly waived the
assistance of counsel.
If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible
against him, much less was it admissible against Enrile.
Re warrantless arrest
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a
peace officer or a private person may make a
warrantless arrest only under any of the following
circumstances :
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable.
Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the
policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no
personal knowledge that he was the source of
marijuana.
445
According to the policemen themselves, what happened
was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the
marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this
reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and
immediately arrested him.
What the policemen should have done was secure a
search warrant on the basis of the information supplied
by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded
to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile.
They had no right to simply force themselves into his
house on the bare (and subsequently disallowed)
allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the
police station as if he had been caught in flagrante
delicto.
The discovery of the marked money on him did not
mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The
marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it
were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the
warrantless search and seizure.
People v Joselito del Rosario
Belosillo, J.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Facts: Joselito del Rosario et al. were charged with
special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia
Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00
in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
shot and killed her. Joselito was the alleged driver of the
getaway tricycle involved in the incident.
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, the
police proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the
barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was
summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name
and was invited for interview. The driver was accused
Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his
passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police
station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch
kit's location and the place where the hold- uppers may
be found and they reported these findings to their
officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they
proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed
men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00
to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter,
they went inside the house where they found Marquez
dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these
were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back
of the school, after which they went back to
446
the police station. The investigator took the statement
of the accused on May
14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All
the while, he was detained in the police station as
ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed
on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his
detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera
Joselito: contends that the lower court erred in: (1) Not
finding the presence of threat and irresistible force
employed upon him by his co-accused; (2) Not
considering his defense that he was not part of the
conspiracy among co-accused; (3) Not considering the
violations on his constitutional rights as an accused;
and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule
113, of the Rules of Court.
Issue: W/N Del Rosario’s arrest proper.
Held/Ratio:
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to
be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from penal
establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by
SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of
"Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. The
SC has previously held that when a police officer sees
the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to
the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since
the offense is deemed committed in his presence or
within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113,
requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto
or caught immediately after the consummation of the
447
act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the
purview of the rule since he was arrested on the day
following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113,
necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense
has just been committed; and (2) the person making the
arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed
it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy
between the time the offense was committed and the
time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable
lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of
the crime, a warrant of
arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of
immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making
the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain
facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody
has committed the crime. Again, the arrest of del
Rosario does not comply with these requirements since,
as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the
consummation of the crime and not immediately
thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just
committed" at the time the accused was arrested.
Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
offense since they were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of
his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only
during the custodial investigation.
However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's
arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo
because even in instances not allowed by law, a
warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any
objection thereto is waived when the person arrested
submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this
case.
People v Fidel Cubcubin
Mendoza, J.
Facts: The accused, armed with an unlicensed
homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .38
revolver, with no serial number shot Henry Piamonte,
hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in
the head which caused the latter‘s instantaneous death.
448
Prosecution: At about 3:30 in the morning the desk
officer of the Cavite City police station, received a
telephone call that a person had been shot near the
cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio,
Cavite City. For this reason, a police team responded
to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead
on his tricycle which was then parked on the road. A
tricycle driver told the police that accused and the victim
were last seen together coming out of the Sting Café
about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene.
Forthwith the police interviewed people at the café.
They found out from a tricycle driver where he lived so
they proceeded there. The policemen knocked on the
door for about three minutes before it was opened by a
man who answered the description given by the tricycle
driver and who turned out to be the accused. The police
operatives identified themselves and informed him that
he was being sought in connection with the shooting
near the cemetery.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Accused-appellant denied involvement in the
incident. The police asked permission to enter and
look around the house. He was brought to the Sting
Cafe for purposes of identification. There, he was
positively identified as the victim‘s companion. The
police investigators asked accused-appellant where the
fatal gun was. But he refused to tell them so his
permission was sought to go back to his house to
conduct a further search. They later found the gun. The
accused was then taken to the police station, where he
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
was photographed along with the things seized from
him.
Issue:
W/N arrest proper.
Held/Ratio: NO.
Under ROC113 §5(b), two conditions must concur for a
warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just
committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace
officer or private person has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. It has been held that ―‗personal
knowledge of facts‘ in arrests without a warrant must be
based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.‖
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was
effected shortly after the victim was killed. The
question, therefore, is whether there was ―probable
cause‖ for the arresting officers to believe that accused-
appellant committed the crime. There was none. The
two did not have ―personal knowledge of facts‖
449
indicating that accused- appellant had committed the
crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from
which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant
was probably guilty was based entirely on what they
had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called
the PNP station; by an alleged witness who saw
accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the
Sting Cafe; by the waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
that the man last seen with the victim was lean,
mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a
white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a
tricycle driver who told them that the physical
description given by the waitress fitted accused-
appellant and who said he knew where accused-
appellant lived and accompanied them to accused-
appellant‘s house. Thus, they merely relied on
information given to them by others.
Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had
probable cause to believe accused-appellant to be guilty
of the killing of the victim because they found a
bloodstained t-shirt, a .38 caliber revolver, and two
spent .38 caliber shells in his house. At the time
accused-appellant was arrested, he was not doing
anything overtly criminal. The alleged discovery
of the gun came after his arrest. Moreover, as
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 450

will presently be explained, the objects allegedly seized

from accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a
search warrant. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant
who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of
the house and they introduced themselves as
policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and
found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried
People v Gabriel Gerente leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were
sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
Grino-Aquino, J. 10 March 1993 examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be
marijuana.

Facts: Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police

Station received a report from the Palo Police Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was Echigoren, are still at large.
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that
the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and
heavy object. Right away,
Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Issue:
Lima and Patrolman Alex
Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling W/N the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana
incident took place. There they found a piece of wood leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right
with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the
marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers.
and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three
men who killed Clarito.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held/Ratio:
NO. The search of appellant's person and the seizure
of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid
because they were incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest.
ROC 113.5 provides: Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3)
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when
they
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete
hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him
451
to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed
her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under
those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they
could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they
had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
The search conducted on Gerente's person was
likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest. ROC113.12 provides: Search incident to
lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his
arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person
who is about to be arrested may be armed and might
attack them unless he is first disarmed.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 452

waist. Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua

and warned him not to move. He then frisked Cadua
Edwin Cadua v Court of Appeals and found in his possession a .38 caliber ―paltik‖
revolver. PO3
Quisumbing, J. 19 August 1999 Reynoso Bacnat then apprehended Cadua‘s
companion, who was later identified as
Joselito Aguilar. In Aguilar‘s possession was found a
fan knife.

Facts: The police were dispatched to where a mother

and daughter were allegedly held up and in need of
police assistance. At the address given, the police found
the complainants who stated that the alleged Issue:
holduppers had just fled. Then, the police officers
requested the complainants to board the patrol unit in W/N Cadua’s his right to be protected from any unlawful
order to facilitate the search. As they were patrolling warrantless arrest
around the area, complainants informed the police has been violated.
officers that one of the suspects was dressed in jeans
and a t-shirt while the other was dressed in a black top
and black pants. The police officers then noticed two
(2) men walking alongside the street and as the officers
slowed down the mobile Held/Ratio:
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
NO. Through police dispatch to the scene of a crime
report and in the presence of complainants, it was
ascertained that a robbery had just been committed,
unit to get a closer look, the complainants identified the and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that
men as the alleged holduppers, one of which is the petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect. As
petitioner in this case. The police officers slowed down explained by a respected authority on criminal
to a stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the procedure:
suspects. As Burdeos was approaching the suspects,
he noticed that petitioner Cadua was about to pull
something which was tucked at the right side of his
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
―It has been ruled that ‗personal knowledge of facts‘,
in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. . . . Peace officers may pursue
and arrest without warrant any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances
reasonably tending to show that such person has
committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach
of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without
warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing
the accused to be guilty. Besides reasonable ground of
suspicion, action in good faith is another protective
bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if
the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the
peace officer is not liable. The cases hold that a peace
officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination
persons
walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable
ground to suspect of felony,
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
although there is no proof of a felony having been
committed; but the arrest would be illegal if the person
so arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable
grounds of suspicion to mislead the officer. The reason
of the rule is
453
apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about the
streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens
must be protected from annoyance and
crime. Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as
the capture of
criminals. Surely the officer must not be forced to await
the commission of robbery or other felony. The rule is
supported by the necessities of life.‖
The incidental search and subsequent seizure of the
unlicensed firearm in question is likewise lawful and
valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
―Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.‖
Noteworthy, among the exceptions to the necessity for a
search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be
made either while a crime is actually being committed,
or soon after its
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
commission. The right to search includes in these
instances that of searching the person of one who is
arrested, in order to find and seize things connected
with the crime as its fruits or as the means for its
commission.
When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with
the arrest, the ―paltik‖ was found in his possession,
and seized. Such seizure cannot be considered
unlawful nor unreasonable. Moreover, at that moment
of search and seizure, there was in the mind of the
arresting officer more than a mere suspicion that
petitioner was
armed. Petitioner‘s movements clearly suggested the
presence of a weapon tucked at the side of his waist.
The fact that Burdeos made an immediate draw for his
service revolver was an instinctive response to
petitioner‘s actions which, under
the circumstances, indicated a high probability of an
offensive attack with a lethal weapon.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
People v Datukon Bansil
10 March 1999 Quisumbing, J.
454
Facts:The accused was arrested upon an informer‘s tip
that appellant was one of
the suspects in the killing of three persons some weeks
before in Quiapo, Manila.
Responding to the information, Sub-station Commander
Jaime Ortega, PO3
Liquido Delgado, Mario Montes and SPO4 Oscar V.
Clemente proceeded to the Muslim area where they
saw several persons conversing at the corner of
Elizondo St.. One of said persons had a suspicious
bulge in his stomach, and when frisked, a
.45 cal. pistol with an extended magazine and six (6)
live bullets was recovered
from the center front of his waist line. Major Ortega took
the gun and brought appellant to the sub-station. SPO4
Redolfin Coloma notified SPO3 Jaime D. Mendoza of
the WPD Homicide Division to take custody of the
appellant. That same day, SPO3 Mendoza received the
person of the accused and the subject firearm for
safekeeping.
Issue:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
W/N the testimony of the prosecution’s witness was
sufficient.
Held/Ratio:
NO. The testimony of SPO4 Clemente is full of
inconsistencies on material points, such as how the
arresting team was able to single out appellant as the
suspect, and among them who actually recovered the
firearm from appellant. Initially, SPO4
Clemente testified that they were able to identify
appellant because the informant told the desk officer the
attire of the accused, yet upon further questioning, he
could not even remember the supposed attire of the
appellant used in identifying
the latter at the time of arrest. Further, on direct
examination, SPO4 Clemente initially testified that he
was the one who recovered the subject firearm from the
appellant; however, on cross-examination, he testified
that it was actually another operative whose name he
can no longer recall who recovered the firearm from the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
appellant. Considering that there were only four
members of the arresting team, including himself, his
memory lapses renders his credibility suspect.
455
While a police officer is not expected to remember every
single detail regarding the arrest, he is supposed to
remember the important details relating to the
commission of the crime, most especially when such
incident occurred in his presence and with his active
involvement. Further, no seizure receipt was issued by
the arresting team for the gun, if indeed it was taken
from the accused. Receipts for seized items are
mandatory on the part of apprehending and seizing
police officers.
While the trial court found that appellant was lawfully
arrested without a warrant since he was actually
committing a crime in the presence of a peace officer
under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure based on the informant‘s tip and the
―bulging waistline‖ of the appellant, we find that there
was no probable cause for the arrest of the appellant.
The arresting team was only armed with the knowledge
of the suspect‘s ―attire‖ which the prosecution witness
admitted during trial he cannot even remember. The
team did not have a physical description of the suspect
nor his name. They were not even given a specific place
within which to target their search of the suspect, only a
vicinity of the Muslim
Area in Quiapo, near the Muslim Mosque. Yet the
arresting team directly zeroed in on the accused and his
companions who were only eating halo-halo at a small
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
restaurant, surely not a crime in itself. While SPO4
Clemente claims that accused
had a ―bulging waistline‖, this alone, in the light of the
availing circumstances, is insufficient to constitute
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
Roger Posadas, et al. v Ombudsman
Mendoza, J. 29 September 2000
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Facts: UP Diliman Chancellor Posadas asked the
assistance of the NBI I determining the persons
responsible for the killing of Dennis Venturina in a frat
rumble in 1994.
The NBI, on the basis of the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses attempted to
arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as
suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the
two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police
456
Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the
Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario
Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor,
counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that
the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them.
Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the
suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of
their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested
by the NBI agents on that day. However, criminal
charges were filed later against the two student
suspects.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu,
Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security
Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with
violation of P.D.
1829, which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
Issue:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by
the NBI could be validly made without a warrant.
Held/Ratio:
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
NO. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is
that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after examining the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
after finding probable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions
when an arrest may be made even without a warrant
are provided ROC113.5:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
457
There is no question that this case does not fall under
paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this
case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither
are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who
had escaped from confinement. The question is whether
paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been
committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were
probably guilty.
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal
knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of
their investigation indicating that the students sought to
be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. The NBI
agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and
Taparan four days after the commission of the crime.
They had no personal knowledge of any fact which
might indicate that the two students were probably guilty
of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is
insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the
NBI.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a
warrant under ROC113.5 must be based upon
"probable cause" which means an "actual belief or
reasonable grounds
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these
agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime.
When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to
arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not
committing a crime nor were they doing anything that
would create the suspicion that they were doing
anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag,
under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking
part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence
on the campus.
458
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make
without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant
the courts. The determination of the existence of
probable cause that the persons to be arrested
committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law
authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to
arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing
or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot
leave to the police officers the determination of whom to
apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is
evident from a consideration of the requirements before
a judge can order the arrest of suspects.
People v Peralta, et al. Panganiban, J. 30 March 2004
Facts: On November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central
Bank of the Philippines (now BSP) went to the Theft and
Robbery Section of Western Police District Command
(WPDC), and filed a complaint for Qualified Theft
against Santiago
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito
de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the
investigating officer at WPDC, punctured currency notes
in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of
Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered
by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting
of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks
to the latter. The punctured bills were rejected by the
BSP money counter machine and were later submitted
to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department.
As a result of the investigation, it was determined that
said rejected currency bills were actually punctured
notes already due for
shredding. These currency bills were punctured
because they were no longer intended for circulation.
Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen
from the BSP by the above-named accused.
On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita,
Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of Golden
Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while he was waiting
for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was
brought to the police station for investigation.
On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of
the police officers, Garcia gave three separate
459
statements admitting his guilt and participation in the
crime charged. He also identified the other named
accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated
the participation of each and everyone of them.
On the basis of Garcia‘s sworn statements, the other
named accused were invited for questioning at the
police station and were subsequently charged with
qualified theft together with Garcia.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated
currency notes allegedly confiscated from Garcia after
his arrest were ―fruits of the poisonous tree‖ and,
hence, inadmissible in evidence.
The solicitor general evades the issue and argues,
instead, that appellants waived the illegality of their
arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends
that the exclusion from the evidence of the three
punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of
the trial court.
Issue: W/N illegality of arrest waived. Held/Ratio:
YES.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he
had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after
being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of
the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not
committed, was not committing, and was not about to
commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner
that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect
that he was committing a crime. None of the
circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant
under Section 5 of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court was present.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless,
not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he
is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest.
Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It
does not extend to the search made as an incident
thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence
allegedly found during the search.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature. Without a judicial warrant,
these are allowed only under the following exceptional
460
circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest,
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a
moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and
frisk situations, and (6) consented search.
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that
the subsequent search was similarly illegal. Any
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule. In the present case, the perforated
P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a
search made without a warrant subsequent to an
unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in
evidence.
Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general‘s argument
that Appellants De Leon, Flores and Loyola waived the
illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising
objections thereto, they entered a plea of guilty. It was
Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched, not
the aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an
arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby. Objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal, and third parties
cannot avail themselves of it.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 461

further reinvestigation of the cases. But the City Fiscal

did not. On the other hand the Fiscal appeared at the
Callanta v Villanueva proceedings to prosecute the petitioner, indicating that
he was in agreement with the complaint already filed

Fernando, J. 20 June 1977

After the issuance of the warrants of arrest with the bail
fixed in the amount of P600.00, petitioner posted such
required bail bonds, thus obtaining her provisional
liberty.
Facts: Judge Villanueva denied the motions to quash
the two complaints for grave oral defamation against
petitioner and thus issued the warrants of arrest. The
warrants are being contested on the ground that it
should have been the City Fiscal who should have Issue:
conducted the preliminary examination.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 May the petitioner question validity of arrest.

Petitioner: After conducting his preliminary examination

and after acquiring jurisdiction over the petitioner the Held/Ratio:
respondent Court referred the complaints to the City
Fiscal. So that on March 4, 1965, the arraignment and NO. [BUT take note of ROC114.26]
hearing of the cases were postponed because the City
Fiscal was investigating them. It may also be noted that
at the proceedings in said criminal cases on April 20,
1965, the Fiscal entered his appearance for the
government and manifested that he was ready for trial. With the express admission by petitioner that she had
If the Fiscal did not agree with the Judge in the latter's posted the required bail to obtain her provisional liberty,
investigation of the case, he would have asked for a it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the warrants of arrest. Zacarias v Cruz: Posting of a bail
bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the
arrest of a person, stop him from discussing the validity
of his arrest. Luna v Plaza: where petitioner has filed an
application for
bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he
waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary examination conducted... prior to the
issuance of the warrant of arrest.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
At any rate, it cannot be denied that the City Fiscal of
Dagupan City had been quite active in the investigation
and thereafter in the prosecution of petitioner. The
matter was referred to his office. It was he who
appeared at the hearing and
manifested his readiness to proceed with the trial. It
would be then to pay an undue premium to
technicalities to assert that under such circumstances
the procedural requisite, assuming that the contention of
petitioner is correct, of such official conducting the
preliminary examination was not in fact complied with.
Francisco Juan Larranaga v CA, supra
462
Puno, J.
Facts: September- the police were to carry out the
arrest of Larranaga (in connection with the Chiong
sisters murder case) but his counsel remonstrated
against the warrantless arrest so the police were not
able to arrest him. His counsel, Atty. Armovit, assured
that he would bring Larranaga for preliminary
investigation.
Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of
Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a
regular preliminary investigation. The motion was
denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that
Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner,
hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty.
Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in person.
He was warned that his failure would be treated as
waiver of his client‘s right to a preliminary investigation
and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armovit‘s verbal
motion for reconsideration was denied by the city
prosecutor.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Larranaga‘s effort to stop the filing of a criminal
information against him failed. It turned out that on
September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an
information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga
with kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. The prosecutors
recommended no bail.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
On September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental
Petition with the CA impleading the RTC to prevent
petitioner‘s arrest. The move again proved fruitless as
Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22,
1997 by virtue of a
warrant of arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the
RTC of Cebu City. A second Supplemental Petition was
filed by Larranaga‘s counsel in the Court of Appeals
bringing to its attention the arrest of Larranaga. CA
denied petitions.
Issue:
W/N Larranaga was lawfully arrested.
463
Held/Ratio:
NO. The records do not show that petitioner was
"lawfully arrested‖. For one, the
petitioner was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as
his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he
would instead be presented in the preliminary
investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on
September 17, 1997. For another,
the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a
warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime
committed some two (2) months before
It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular
preliminary investigation pursuant to section 3 of Rule
112 cannot stand any
diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital
offense – kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his
arrest and incarceration as in all probability he would
not be allowed bail. His conviction will bring him face to
face with the death penalty. Thus, petitioner‘s counsel
was far from being unreasonable when he demanded
from the city prosecutors that he be furnished copies of
the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be
given a non- extendible period of twenty (20) days to
submit defense affidavit. As well pointed of his motion
―x x x prevented petitioner from preparing and
submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 464

teachers, proctors and security guards who had G.

previously made known their willingness to testify. BJ
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 130 - last case; De
Garcia v Locsin
131 - 3
cases
Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a 132 - 2
chance to be heard in a capital offense case should cases
have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. Webb 133 -3
vs. de Leon: that ―attuned to the times, our Rules have cases
discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary 134 - 1 case ( Veroy v Layague)
investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-
judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by
one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. As this
Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals,
‗the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted MANALILI v. CA
before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some Facts: Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas
other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City
a substantive right.‘ A preliminary investigation should Cemetery due to reports of drug addicts roaming the
therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the area. They chanced upon a male (who turned out to be
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to be
be protected from any material damage.‖ ´highµ on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When Manalili tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and asked what
he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but
the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet
which they examined and found to contain crushed
8. WARRANTLESS ARREST marijuana residue. Further examination by the Forensic
Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of violation of
Section 8, Article II, of RA
6425. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.(In his defense, Manalili
claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a
tricycle until the three policemen ordered the driver of
the tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger
were allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He
claimed that he was searched and his pants were
turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some
extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his
entity was framed up by the policemen.)
Issue: W/N the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk
operation is admissible. Held: Yes
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be
validated by a previously secured judicial warrant.
However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been
contemplated by the law:
1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest
2. Search of moving vehicles
3. Seizure in plain view
4. Customs search
5. Waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
465
In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made
only with probable cause as essential requirement.
Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure):
Existence of such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item,
article, or object sought in connection with said offense
or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the
place to be searched. A stop-and-frisk operation is
another exception to the general rule. In this case,
probable cause was established with Manalili·s
suspicious behaviour.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
PEOPLE v. SY CHUA
Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged
with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of
Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two
separate Informations.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from
their confidential informant that accused-appellant was
about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn
Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief
formed a team of operatives. The group positioned
themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai
Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as
their back up.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by
accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near
the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant
alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box,
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him
and introduced themselves as police officers. As
accused- appellant pulled out his wallet, a small
transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance
protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2
Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded
twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from
his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into
the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained
a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly
confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-
O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm
bullets and the car used by accused- appellant. SPO2
Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the
466
scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col.
Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito,
Angeles City.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal
Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal
Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this
appeal to the Court.
Held:
The arrest of accused-appellant was unlawful.
The trial court confused the concepts of a ―stop-
and-frisk‖ and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may
be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as
a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
law requires that there first be arrest before a search
can be made— the process cannot be reversed.
Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the
case at bar. Accused- appellant did not act in a
suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there
was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime. ―Reliable information‖ alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise
in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
With regard to the concept of ―stop-and frisk‖: mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a ―stop-and-
frisk‖. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer‘s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a ―stop-and-
frisk‖ serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest
467
of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also
be emphasized that a search and seizure should
precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The
foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at
bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested
before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal
items found in his possession. The apprehending police
operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-
appellant‘s business in the vicinity or the contents of the
Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending
police officers only introduced themselves when they
already had custody of accused-appellant.
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the
―stop and frisk‖ principles is applicable to justify the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure
made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
MALACAT v. CA
Facts: In response to bomb threats reported seven days
earlier, Police officer Yu and company were on foot
patrol (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store
at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of
Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of
three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner
of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store.
These men were acting suspiciously with "their eyes. . .
moving very fast." Yu and his companions
positioned themselves at strategic points and
observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The
police officers then approached one group of men, who
then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave
chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner.
468
Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line.
Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were
then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an
"X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter
gave it to his commander. The trial court then ruled that
the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental
to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily
admitted such fact to the police investigator for the
purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store,"
concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish
petitioner'sguilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: W/N there was a valid warrantless arrest. Held:
The arrest and search of petitioner were invalid.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the
concepts of a "stop-and- frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected
and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made ³ the
process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person
of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in
the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or
that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence. Here, there could have been no
valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding
the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical
act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had
just been committed, was being committed or was going
to be committed.
PEOPLE v. ESTELLA
469
Facts: Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the
conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of
appellant.
On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw
appellant sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2)
meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella,
brother of appellant, and being rented by appellant‘s
live-in partner, named Eva. They approached appellant
and introduced themselves as police officers. They
showed appellant the search warrant and explained the
contents to him. SPO1
Buloron asked appellant if indeed he had in his
possession prohibited drug and if
so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser
penalty.
While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team
two cans containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One
can contained twenty (20) bricks of fruiting tops. The
team searched the hut in the presence of appellant and
his live-in partner.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
They found a plastic container under the kitchen table,
which contained four (4) big bricks of dried marijuana
leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the
revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed
a receipt for the seized items and arrested appellant.
Held:
The Constitution bars the admission of evidence
gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug
was searched for and found in a hut that has not been
proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for
residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be
held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found
therein.
PEOPLE v. NUEVAS
Facts: Police officers Fami and Cabling, during a
stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking in Olongapo City, came across Jesus
Nuevas, who they suspected to be carrying drugs. Upon
inquiry, Nuevas showed them a plastic bag which
contained marijuana leaves and bricks wrapped in a
470
blue cloth. He then informed the officers of 2 other
persons who would be making marijuana deliveries.
The police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas
said his associates, Reynaldo Din and Fernando
Inocencio, could be located. Din was carrying a plastic
bag which contained marijuana packed in newspaper
and wrapped therein. When the police officers
introduced themselves, Din voluntarily handed the
plastic bag over to them. After the items were
confiscated, the police officers took the three men to the
police office.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Police officer Fami then revealed that when the receipt
of the evidence was prepared, all 3 accused were not
represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he
was the one who escorted all the accused during their
physical examination. He also escorted all 3 to the
Fiscal‘s office where they were informed of the charges
against them.
Issue: W/N Din and Inocencio waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 471

illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to

show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the
contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to
Held: possess the illegal items.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
NO. The search conducted in Nuevas‘ case was made
with his consent. However, in Din‘s case, there was
none. There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed
willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating
contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his
desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any
criminal liability, he cooperated with the police, gave
them the plastic bag, and even revealed his associates,
offering himself as an informant. His actuations were
consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find PEOPLE v. MONTILLA
excuses, blame others, and save oneself even at the
cost of others‘ lives. Thus, the Court would have
affirmed Nuevas‘ conviction had he not withdrawn his
appeal. On the other hand, with respect to the search
conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no Facts: Police officers Talingting and Clarin were
such consent had actually been given. The police informed by an asset that a drug courier would be
officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies arriving from Baguio to Dasmariňas carrying an
regarding the manner by which they got hold of undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the
the plastic bag. Neither can Din‘s silence at the time be informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was
construed as an implied acquiescence to the waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmariňas.
warrantless search. Thus, the prosecution failed to Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in
clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right possession of a bag and a carton worth
against unreasonable searches. On the other hand, 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and
Inocencio‘s supposed possession of the dried marijuana he said he came to Cavite
leaves was sought to be shown through his act of from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects
looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. The with him at that time except for some pocket money. He
act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the
illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
no warrant and that he should have been given the
opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that
if the informant has given the cops the information about
his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension,
the cops should have ample time to secure a search
warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted
is legal. Held:
The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal. Sec 2
Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented
searches;
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) ―stop and frisk‖ measures have been invariably
recognized as the traditional
exceptions.
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the
information relayed by informant to the cops was that
472
there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay
Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the ―early
morning‖ of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the
policemen were not pressed for time, this would be
beside the point for, under these circumstances, the
information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed
enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or
search warrant. While there is an indication that the
informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal
that he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could
not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that
they could readily have access to a judge or a court that
was still open by the time they could make preparations
for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence
presented by the defense. In determining the
opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the
intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and
ambient circumstances should be considered,
especially in rural areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above
contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the
offender
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense.
PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZ
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Facts: After receiving a confidential report from Arnel,
their informant, a ―buy-
bust‖ operation was conducted.
At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first
negotiated with on the purchase and when Arcoy told
De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00 worth of
marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to
give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got
from his pants‘ pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After
ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was
really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to
his teammates by scratching his head and his
teammates who were strategically positioned in the
473
vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves
as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la
Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by
Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz
together with two aluminum foils and containing
marijuana.
Issue: W/N the warrantless seizure incidental to the
buy-bust operation violates
Beltran‘s constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Held:
A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace
officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the
peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused
to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of
such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal
intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way
of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission
of the offense. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust
operation, there is seizure of evidence from one‘s
person without a search warrant, needless to state a
search warrant is not necessary, the search being
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without
a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is
a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust
operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red-
handed. There being no violation of the constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure, the
confiscated articles are admissible in evidence
PEOPLE v. ARUTA
Facts: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that
a certain ―Aling Rosa‖ will be arriving from Baguio City
with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a
team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal
they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the
informer pointed out who ―Aling Rosa‖ was, the team
approached her and introduced themselves as
474
NARCOM agents. When Abello asked ―aling Rosa‖
about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to
the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in
a plastic bag marked
―cash katutak‖.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a
demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search
and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused
claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre
where she watched a movie
―Balweg‖. While about to cross the road an old
woman asked her for help in
carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested
by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of
the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be
found. Also, no search warrant was presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the
dangerous drugs of 1972
Issue: W/N the police correctly searched and seized the
drugs from the accused.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held:
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can
be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime,
she was merely crossing the street and was not acting
suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she
was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to
effect a warrantless arrest of the accused‘s bag, there
was no probable cause and the accused was not
lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search
warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana
was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
475
PEOPLE v MALMSTEDT
Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of
the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at
Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint in the said area was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by
the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their
inspection from the front going towards the rear of the
bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus
was seated at the rear thereof.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on
accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's
waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's
passport and other identification papers. When
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
accused failed to comply, the officer required him to
bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist.
The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and
when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the
officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to
open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects
turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the
luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the
officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the
officer noticed that there were bulges inside the
same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was
only after the officers had opened the bags that accused
finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the
NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for
further investigation. At the investigation room, the
officers opened the teddy bears and they were found
to also contain hashish. Representative samples were
taken from the hashish found among the personal
476
effects of accused and the same were brought to the
PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the
objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which
is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was
filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Accused argues that the search of his personal effects
was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
discovered during the illegal search are not admissible
as evidence against him.
Held: It was a lawful arrest.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in
flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of
the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the
smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned
by the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
PEOPLE v. SUCRO
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado‘s house at
C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO
(accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana
477
at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado‘s house.
Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged
things three times. These activities are reported through
radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was
transacting with appellant and was
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante.
From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area.
While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in
Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept.
Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama
crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante
saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the
ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from
Sucro in front of the chapel.
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the
corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19
sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the
chapel and another teabag from Macabante.
Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant
of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant
stems from the fact that their knowledge required from
the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements
for its issuance. However, warantless search and
seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE
existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of
the actual commission of the crime from the
surveillance of the activities of the accused. As
police officers were the ones conducting the
surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in
performance of their duties.
People Vs. Tangliben
[184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990]
Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were
conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory
Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a
person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who
acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his
bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The
accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for
further investigations. The
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
478
TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2
of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due
to lack of search warrant.
Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer
or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person
when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have
been committing possession of marijuana and can be
therefore searched lawfully even without a search
warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency
on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found
out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the
policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana.
The police officers had to act quickly and there was not
enough time to secure a search warrant.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
People Vs. Malmstedt
[198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991]
Facts: In an information filed against the accused-
appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the
RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4,
Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered
the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a
tourist. He had visited the country sometime in
1982 and 1985.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio
City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the
479
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in
that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning
of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus
stop in Sagada.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day
(11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding
Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM)
stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay,
Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order
to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted
by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of
seven (7) NARCOM officers, in
coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection
from the front going towards the rear of the bus.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on
accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's
waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's
passport and other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be
a pouch bag and when accused opened the same
bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-
looking objects wrapped in
brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one
of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out
to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the
luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the
officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the
officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same
which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the
officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
480
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the
NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for
further investigation. At the investigation room, the
officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to
also contain hashish. Representative samples were
taken from the hashish found among the personal
effects of accused and the same were brought to the
PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the
objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which
is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was
filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
ACCUSED‘S DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not
guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal
search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the
hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
pouch bag and that the two
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
(2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were
merely entrusted to him by an
Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more
seats available in said bus, they decided to take the
next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags,
and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa
Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael
Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court
finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues
that the search of his personal effects was illegal
because it was made without a search warrant and,
therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered
during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence
against him.
481
Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is
valid, and therefore the RTC
ruling be reversed.
Held:The Constitution guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A
lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person under the following
circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in
flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of
the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is
true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
482
accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the
smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned
by the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.
POSADAS v. CA
188 SCRA 288
Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police
(INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat.
Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes
Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal
MemorialColleges they spotted petitioner carrying a
"buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri"
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
bag of the petitioner where they found one (1)
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No.
770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a
.38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two
(2) live ammunitions for a .22
caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the
police station for further investigation. In the course of
the same, the petitioner was asked to show the
necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do
so.
He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and
the prohibited articles recovered from him were
indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He
was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
Issue: Whether or Not the warantless
search is valid.
Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri
bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under
483
Section 12, Rule 136 of theRules of Court a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of
an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged
that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was
lawful under the circumstances.
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is
reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis
of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when
the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers
to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner
only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for
the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless,
futile and much too late.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be
sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed,
and hence, the constitutional guarantee against
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been
violated.
People v. Hindoy
G.R. No. 132662 (May 10, 2001)
FACTS: A woman informant came to the station and
reported that a certain "Bella" of 248 Sto. Rosario St.,
Mandaluyong, would be receiving a shipment of illegal
drugs that day. On the strength of that information,
Antiojo organized a team that would conduct a buy-bust
operation. At around 3 a.m., the team, headed by
Antiojo himself and guided by the woman informant,
went to said address. Eugenio and Cariaga acted as
poseur-buyers, while SPO4 Rolando Cruz, SPO3
Antonio Nato, and Prianes served as backup. They
knocked on the door and
BELLA's live-in partner ENRIQUE opened it.
Eugenio said, "May bagong dating, kukuha kami (If
there's new stuff, we'll get some)," referring to
marijuana. ENRIQUE answered, "Meron" (Yes, there is)
so Eugenio gave him one P500.00 and five P100.00
marked bills. After counting the money, ENRIQUE
asked BELLA to get the stuff. She complied and brought
a brick of marijuana, with an estimated weight of one
kilogram, which was wrapped in newspaper. ENRIQUE,
in turn, handed it over to Eugenio. That was when they
484
identified themselves as police officers. After giving the
prearranged signal to the backup operatives, he and
Cariaga entered the house then announced that they
were going to conduct a search. Under a table, they
found a bag made of abaca
containing twelve more bricks of marijuana. The
evidence was marked then turned over to Prianes, who
transmitted the same to the NBI for chemical analysis.
HELD: The identity of ENRIQUE and BELLA as the
sellers and possessors of
the seized marijuana cannot be doubted, for they were
caught in flagrante delicto in a standard police buy-bust
operation. Such positive identification prevails over
their feeble denial and declaration that the abaca bag
which contained twelve blocks of marijuana was only
left to their custody by a certain Marlyn.
Moreover, under the circumstances, it was the duty of
the police officers to
conduct a more thorough search of the premises after a
successful entrapment, then make the necessary arrest
of the suspects and seizure of suspected contraband.
The search, being incident to a lawful arrest, was valid
notwithstanding the absence of a
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
warrant. In fact, the warrantless search and seizure, as
an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surrounding under his immediate control. In
the case at bar, upon consummation of the illicit sale,
PO3 Eugenio introduced himself and SPO1
Cariaga as police officers. ENRIQUE and BELLA were
apprised of their constitutional rights. Thereafter, the
officers searched the room where BELLA supposedly
got the first block of marijuana. There, they found an
abaca bag under a folding table. Upon inspection, the
bag yielded twelve more blocks of
compressed marijuana inside a plastic bag. The trial
court, therefore, was correct in admitting all thirteen
blocks of marijuana in evidence.
People v. Cubcubin, Jr.
G.R. No. 136267. (July 10, 2001)
FACTS: Witnesses identified Accused-Appellant as the
last person to have been seen together with the
murdered victim. Policemen went to his house and
asked permission to search. They found a bloodied
white shirt and two .38 caliber shells. The policemen
asked him to go with them to the café where he was last
seen with the victim where the witness positively
identified him. The Policemen asked for his permission
to go back to the house to search for the gun. They
found the weapon and arrested Accused-Appellant.
485
HELD: The arrest without warrant was illegal because
the police officers did not have personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the accused-appellant had
committed the crime. Their knowledge of the
circumstances was based entirely on what the
witnesses had told them. The police officers did not
have probable cause either because at the time of his
arrest, accused-appellant was not doing anything
overtly criminal. However, accused-appellant cannot
question the validity of his arrest without warrant
because he pleaded not guilty when arraigned. He also
did not move to quash the information for lack of
jurisdiction due to the illegal arrest.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
The bloodied shirt, shells, and firearm are inadmissible
as evidence for being the product of an illegal search.
The search was illegal because it was not proven that
the accused-appellant gave his consent to the search.
Even assuming that the arrest was valid, the search
cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest because
the items that were seized were not within the
immediate control of the accused. In fact, the
policemen seized the firearm only after going back
to the house of accused-appellant. Neither can the
plain view doctrine apply in this case since the
policemen did not come upon the objects inadvertently.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 486

Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their

PITA v. CA
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-
Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special
Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau,
Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police
Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to
be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later
burned the seized materials in public at the University
belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence
of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members
of various student organizations.
agents from confiscating plaintiff‘s magazines or from
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that
the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that
the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against
indiscriminateseizure, confiscation and burning of
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"Magazines, pending hearing
on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court
granted the temporary restraining order. The case was
set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that
the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Among the publications seized, and later

burned, was "Pinoy Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the
Playboy"magazines published and co-edited by freedom of expression of the petitioner.
plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the state has the right to protect society from
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals,
superintendent of Western Police District of the City of as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 487

publishers and sellers of obscene publications. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the
pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's
sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures
are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using
the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is 2. The judge must determine whether or not the same
to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a
such immoral influences and into whose hands a case-to-case basis and on the judge‘s sound discretion.
publication or other article charged as being obscene
may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately
"whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend
upon the circumstances of the case and that the HON. ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., and THE PHIL.
question is to be decided by the "judgment of the NAVY, vs. HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, and MORABE,
aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The DE GUZMAN & COMPANY
government authorities in the instant case have not
shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them FACTS: Respondent company filed a case against
to carry out a search andseizure, by way of a search Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex
warrant. The court provides that the authorities must VI which had been seized and impounded by petitioner
apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and The CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company
that; took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.

1. The authorities must convince the court that the

materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend
clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively
to warrant State interference and action; called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act. On
August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually
seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.
ISSUE: WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment
and dynamites therein was valid.
HELD: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant
of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs
laws have been the traditional exception to the
constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because
the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be
sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it
is not practicable to require a search warrant before
such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing
vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually
equipped with powerful motors that enable them to
elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast
Guard.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
488
Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private
individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a)
who has committed, is actually committing or is about to
commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is
reasonably believed to have committed an offense
which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a
prisoner who has escaped from confinement while
serving a final judgment or from temporary detention
during the pendency of his case or while being
transferred
from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, the
members of the crew of the
two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with
dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their
apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure
of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was
equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
People Vs. Amminudin
[163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]
Facts:Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested
on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
because of a tip from one their informers simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what
looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was
found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed
as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner.
An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
was filed against him. Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also
been arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss
the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement
of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." The motion was granted, and trial
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was
eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin
disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his
bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts
and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
489
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit
he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting
him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as
he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked
like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his
allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during
that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the
injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendant‘s bag is
legal.
Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not
caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow
warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his
arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he
about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances,
he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana
therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against
the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the
crime as charged.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
People Vs. Saycon
[236 SCRA 325; G.R. No. 110995; 5 Sept 1994]
Facts: On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the
morning, the Coastguard personnel received
information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that
a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro
Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was
arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon
receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer
CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. A
combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a
certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben
Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted
themselves at the gate of Pier 1. The MV Doña Virginia
docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in
Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat
carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint
manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was
identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM.
Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard
490
Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with
them.
At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to
open his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were
personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that
maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing the
suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble
asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the
suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his
head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu"
were brought to the NARCOM office
for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the
NARCOM agents did not have
a warrant of arrest. The PNP's Forensic Analyst
declared in court that she had conducted an
examination of the specimens and found out that the
specimens weighed 4.2 grams in total, consisted of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known
as "shabu."
Issue: Whether or Not the warrantless search was
valid.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held: The warrantless search was valid, as the
accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle. There
was probable cause to believe that the accused was
carrying prohibited drugs. Three weeks earlier, agents
of the Narcotics Command bought methamine
hydrochloride from him. An agent of the Narcotics
Command reported that the accused would be arriving
on board the vessel and carrying methamphetamine
hydrochloride with him. Drug couriers do not go about
their trade with some external sign indicating that they
are transporting prohibited drugs. This must be taken
into account in determining probable cause.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
People v. Ayangao
FACTS: Policemen received information that a woman
would be traveling with marijuana from
Mountain Province to Pampanga.
The informant went with them in the place pointed and
he personally identified the woman. They approached
the woman. The policemen noticed protruding
marijuana leaves from the sacks of sweet potatoes.
491
The policemen identified themselves and asked the
woman to put out the contents of the sack. The sack
contains sweet potato with a bricklike substance packed
with a masking tape. In plain view of the policemen it
was identified to be marijuana. She was arrested
and was convicted in the trial court.
She argued that the marijuana is inadmissible since
the warrantless search is invalid, not having been
pursuant to lawful arrest.
ISSUE: WON the arrest was lawful. YES
WON the warrantless search was permissible. YES
HELD: The Court finds that the arrest was lawful
as appellant was actually committing a crime when
she was arrested — transporting marijuana, such is an
act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made,
the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also
valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the
arresting police officers to validly search and seize from
the offender.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
This Court has already ruled that tipped information is
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search.
Although the apprehending officers received the tip
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted
for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the
exact date of appellant‘s arrival was not known by the
informant. AFFIRMED.
VALMONTE v. DE VILLA
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
Facts
the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP,
with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
492
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and
political development of the National Capital Region
As part of its program to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that the
residents are worried about their safety and about being
harassed especially when Parpon, a supply officer, was
gunned down allegedly by NCRDC officals.
Valmonte claims that he himself had been searched
without a warrant by the military manning the
checkpoint.
ISSUE: W/N the checkpoints are valid as they are
considered reasonable searches
YES
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at
being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints
are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the
Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks,
the military indeed committed specific violations of
petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or
other rights
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a
light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
search
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort
and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community.
493
RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002
Caballes was charged with theft for stealing cable
conductors belonging to
NAPOCOR. These conductors were found in his jeep. It
was alleged that while he was driving his jeepney, two
officers flagged down his jeepney and searched the
insides without a warrant. The police officers claimed
that while they were on a routine patrol, they saw his
jeepney being unusually covered with kakawati leaves.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
valid NO
Section 2, Article III: ―no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge‖. Exceptions: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving
vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
Search of a moving vehicle: One such form of search of
moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without
warrant at military or police checkpoints which has
been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it
may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable search. The
search which is normally permissible in this instance is
limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply
looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without
opening the car's doors; (4) where the occupants are
not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where
the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine
check is conducted in a fixed area.
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the
case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a
visual search or inspection of petitioner's vehicle. They
had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves
and look inside the sacks before they were able to see
the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple
routine check.
The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious doesn‘t
constitute probable cause
as to justify the search without warrant.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
494
PEOPLE v. LIBNAO
G.R. No. 136860 January 20, 2003
The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in
Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on
suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from
their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and
a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal
drugs once a month in big bulks They received a tip that
the drug pushers would be transporting the drugs, riding
a tricycle. Thus they set up a checkpoint. At about 1:00
o‘clock in the morning of the following day, the police
Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two
female passengers seated inside, who were later
identified as Libnao and her co-accused Nunga. In front
of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag
and the two‘s uneasy behavior when asked about its
ownership and content, the officers invited them to
Kabayan Center. They brought with them the black bag.
The bag was opened as soon as the barangay captain
arrived in the presence of Libnao and Nunga. Inside
were bricks of marijuana leaves.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
illegal NO
Libnao contends that at the time she was apprehended
by the police officers, she was not committing any
offense but was merely riding a tricycle
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Peace officers are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains as item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction
Jurisprudence: There‘s probable cause in the following
instances: (some
examples)
where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated
from the plastic bag carried by the accused;
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
where an informer positively identified the accused who
was observed to be acting suspiciously;
where the accused who were riding a jeepney were
stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports
that said accused would transport a quantity of
marijuana;
where Narcom agents had received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present
his passport and other identification papers where
police officers received an information that the accused,
495
who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage
bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila;
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not
bereft of a probable cause. The Police Intelligence
Division had been conducting surveillance operation for
three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the
information that once a month, Libnao and Nunga
transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October
19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will
be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely,
the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a
tricycle and carrying a suspicious- looking black bag,
which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they
were asked who owned it and what its content was,
both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the
warrantless search and seizure of appellant‘s bag was
not illegal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICTOR
DIAZ VINECARIO [G.R. No. 141137. January 20,
2004]
15 police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas,
Davao City pursuant to the COMELEC gun ban when a
car sped by past them thus they were ordered to go
back to the checkpoint.
When asked by the law enforcers to produce an
identification card, they could not offer any. The police
officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung
over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed,
as were the others, to be afraid and acting suspicious.
Suspecting a bomb might be
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
inside, they ordered Vinecario to open the bag which he
did. They notice a small package wrapped in paper and
asked him to take it out. One of the police officers tore
the paper and the smell of marijuana then was
noticeable. They were then brought to the police station.
Vinecario and his companions were then charged and
convicted for violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972) for having possessed, transported and
delivered marijuana
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
valid YES (probable cause found)
Although the general rule is that motorists and their
vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through
checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine
inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively
searched when there is probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
496
the place sought to be searched. The required probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure
is not detemined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
accused has been declared as valid, because of
existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
and attempted to flee
In light then of appellants‘ speeding away after noticing
the checkpoint and even after having been flagged
down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous
gestures when interrogated on the contents of the
backpack which they passed to one another, and the
reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-
appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was
a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an
attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with
their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a
reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that
appellants were
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack
were instruments of some offense.
People v. BALINGAN
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
G.R. No. 105834 February 13, 1995
the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio
City Police Station received a telephone call from an
unnamed male informant. He passed the information
that Balingan was going to Manila with a bag filled with
marijuana. Acting on the information, P/Lt. Manuel
Obrera formed a surveillance team monitor appellant's
movements. The team was deployed at different places
in Baguio City, including Balingan‘s house on Brookside
and bus stations
Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from
her residence at Brookside and board a taxicab which
proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio Street. Balingan
was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray luggage
(like a "maleta") with orange or yellow belts. She then
boarded the bus.
When the bus passed by the checkpoint, Lt. Obrera
announced a routinary
check-up identified himself as a policeman to Balingan
and asked her permission to check her luggage; she did
not respond and just looked outside the window. He
opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and
above Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it.
He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt.
Obrera. Lt. Obrera tries to arrest Balingan but the latter
resisted and tried to bite his hand and furthermore held
tightly onto the window pane.
Balingan was then charged and convicted for having
violated RA 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act)
497
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure on
board the bus was valid YES Witness Obrera clearly
set forth the events that led to appellant's arrest,
starting from the receipt by him of an informant's
tip. He was able to establish that: appellant had
physical possession of the subject gray luggage bag
from the time she left her house at Brookside until she
boarded and sat
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
on the third row behind the driver of Dangwa bus with
plate number NTU-
153 bound for Manila; conducted a search of the same
bus at the Kennon Road checkpoint, they found the
subject gray bag on the overhead luggage compartment
corresponding to appellant's seat; upon inspection, the
bag was found to contain suspected marijuana
flowering tops which even during preliminary tests
yielded positive for the presence of THC, an active
component of marijuana.
The search and seizure in the case at bench happened
in a moving, public vehicle. The search was made
pursuant to a tip received from an informant. Their
surveillance operations revealed that appellant, whose
movements had been previously monitored by the
Narcotics Division boarded a Dangwa bus bound for
Manila carrying a suspicious looking gray luggage bag.
When the moving, public bus was stopped, her bag,
upon inspection, yielded marijuana
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Bagalihog v Fernandez
G.R. No. 96356 June 27, 1991
On March 17, 1989, Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to
death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate Airport.
Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle.
Two days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the
Philippine Constabulary seized the petitioner's
motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in
Masbate. They had no search warrant. The motorcycle
was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the
vehicles used by the killers.
Issue: W/N the seizure WITHOUT A WARRANT and
eventual impounding of the motorcycle was valid
NO.
SC: ―We do not find that the importance of the
motorcycle in the prosecution of the criminal cases
excused its seizure without a warrant. The authorities
had enough time to comply with the required procedure
but they did not do so, preferring the unconstitutional
shortcut. The crime was committed on March 17,
1989, and the motorcycle was seized only on
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
498
March 19, 1989, or two days later. During that period,
the private respondent had all the opportunity to apply
for a search warrant and establish probable cause in
accordance with the Bill of Rights and the Rules of
Court. He did not.‖
The mere mobility of the motorcycle did not make the
search warrant redundant for it is not denied that the
vehicle remained with the petitioner until it was forcibly
taken from him. The fear that it would be dismantled or
hidden was mere speculation that was not borne out by
the facts. The necessity for the immediate seizure of the
motorcycle without the first obtaining a warrant has not
been established.
There was no waiver. The petitioner merely agreed to
cooperate with the investigators and to produce the
vehicle when needed, but he did not agree to have it
impounded. The record shows that he expressed
reservations when this was suggested and said he
needed the motorcycle for his official duties as a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and in his
private business
PEOPLE V MUSA
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
T/Sgt. Belarga, leader of a NARCOM team instructed
Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on
a certain Mari Musa. Information received from civilian
informer was that Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Sgt Ani then went to the house Mari Musa and
approached him when he
came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted.
Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari
Musa the P20 marked money. After receiving the
money, Musa went back to his house and came back
and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers
containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that
the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards
his companions and raised his right hand.
The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went
inside the house and made the arrest. The agents
searched the appellant and unable to find the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
marked money, they asked him where it was. The
appellant said that he gave it to his wife. They then
found drugs in the kitchen and confiscated them.
Defense: While he was being manicured at one hand,
his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting
their child to sleep. 3 NARCOM agents, who introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian
clothes, got inside Musa's house whose door was open.
The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter
the house but simply announced that they were
NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari
Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a
search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent.
The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag
whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He
499
also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his
brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father,
who was living in another house about ten arms-length
away.
W/N the search and seizure inside his house (the
kitchen to be exact) was valid
NO
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the
person of the appellant after arresting him in his house
but found nothing. They then searched the entire house,
in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in
a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect's lawful
arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to
launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence
of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for
an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
The "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of
the object where the incriminating nature of the object is
not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. There
are 4 elements of valid seizure based on the plain view
doctrine:
Prior valid intrusion based on the warrantless arrest in
which the police are
LEGALLY present in the pursuit of their official duties
The evidence was INADVERTENTLY discovered by the
police who have the right to be where they are
The evidence must be immediately apparent
PLAIN VIEW justified the seizure of the evidence
without further search.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his
person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve
the marked money which they hoped to find, the
NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found
the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was,
therefore, not within their "plain view" when they
arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The
NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the
house to another before they sighted the plastic bag.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic
bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no
500
clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant
what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
PEOPLE V FIGUEROA
[G.R No. 134056. July 6, 2000]
Accused was charged with violation of the Dangerous
Drug Act of 1927 for manufacturing, producing,
preparing or processing methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug amounting to a
2.4 liters, directly by means of chemical synthesis
Special Investigtor Palencia testified that they received
a call from their informant, a woman, who reported that
a certain Obet was allegedly engaged in large-scale
drug trafficking in Makati City. He then instructed
their informant to establish contact with Obet for a buy-
bust operation. After several hours, the informant
reported that Obet was already waiting for her,
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
with instructions for her to come alone as soon as she
was ready with P150,000. Palencia then caused the
dusting of fluorescent powder over ten pieces of
authentic P100 bills as buy-bust money and gave them
to the informant
Palencia then saw the informant hand over the money
to Obet. While counting the money, Obet sensed the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
presence of other people in the area. Obet, who was in
possession of a .45 caliber pistol, fired it twice toward
the direction of Palencia, while hurrying towards the
house. Obet then held hostage his mistress, Estrella
Brilliantes, and her 2 children for the next 3 hours until
the arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom Obet
surrendered. Palencia then brought OBET, his firearm
and the recovered buy-bust money to the WPD
Headquarters.
Obet then volunteered the information that his source
was Betty thus he, accompanied by Palencia went to
her house. Betty denied being the source. Once inside
the house, Obet went to the kitchen and pointed to what
he termed as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with
other drug paraphernalia, such as a beaker spray. The
investigator then seized the items. Palencia said that
when he searched Betty‘s house, he didn‘t have a
warrant but it was with Betty‘s consent but he never saw
Obet nor Betty manufacture the shabu.
DEFENSE: Obet said he was approached by a certain
Eva wanting to buy
drugs. He told her he wasn‘t selling. He noticed that
someone was peeping from the dark thus he got his
gun. While he was locking the door, he accidentally
fired it as he forgot it was cocked. He was then arrested.
Eva, in front of the police insisted that they go to Betty‘s
(his former live-in-partner) house. They searched the
place without Betty‘s consent and without a warrant
and found drugs inside the kitchen. Betty denied they
were hers.
501
Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
valid NO
a warrantless search and seizure is not unreasonable
and offensive to the
Constitution if consent is shown.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it
is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right.The third condition
does not exist in the instant case. The fact is, Betty
asked for a search warrant
Neither can the search be appreciated as a search
incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of either Betty or
OBET as intimated by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest
did not precede the search. Second, per the
prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for
possession or sale of regulated or prohibited drugs as
a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He
surrendered after taking hostage Estrella and her two
children, although he was thereafter held in custody for
further questioning on illegal drugs.
OBET was held in custody and investigated or
interrogated about the source
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of the shabu, none of which was found during the buy-
bust operation. In short he was held in custody as a
consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a
follow-up to link him to the source and establish a
conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu.
PEOPLE v NUEVAS
G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007
PO3 Fami testified that while conducting a surveillance
and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, he received a
tip that a certain male person, more or less 5‘4" in
height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the
upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and
maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried
leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person
who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later
identified as Nuevas alight from a motor vehicle
Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the
possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two
other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily
pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when
opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks
wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape
charges, Nuevas disclosed where the 2 other male
persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing
more or less 5 kilos
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
502
Nuevas with the officers proceeded to a certain place
where Din and Inocencio, the 2 other male persons
would be making their delivery. They found Din, who
was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din
disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then
took the bag and upon inspection found inside it
"marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein.
Fami testified that the search was done with their
consent.
They were then found guilty of illegal possession of
marijuana.
Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
valid NO
The searches and seizures conducted do not fall under
the first exception, warrantless searches incidental to
lawful arrests. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence
holds that the arrest must precede the search; the
process cannot be reversed as in this case where the
search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not
committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. The police officers did
not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the persons to be arrested had committed an offense.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The searches conducted on the plastic bag then
cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful
arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule
113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
neither could the searches be justified under the plain
view doctrine. An
object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight.
Where the object seized was inside a closed package,
the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot
be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain
view and may be seized. In other words, if the package
is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then
the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
immediately apparent to the police that the items that
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure. Records show that the
dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags
that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily
apparent or transparent to the police officers.
However, in Nuevas‘s case, the Court is convinced
that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating
503
bag to the police officers. It can be seen that in his
desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any
criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police,
gave them the plastic bag and even revealed his
‗associates,‘ offering himself as an informant.
People v Salanguit
[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]
Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant to search the
residence of Robert Salanguit He presented as his
witness SPO1 Badua, who testified that as a poseur-
buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu
from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salanguit‘s room,
and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salanguit
from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted
a group of 10 policemen, along with one civilian
informer, went to the residence of Salanguit to serve the
warrant. The police operatives knocked on accused-
appellant‘s door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The
police operatives then forced the door open and entered
the house.
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of
the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching
the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a
paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and 2 bricks of dried leaves which appeared
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint. Note that
marijuana wasn‘t indicated in the search warrant, only
shabu.
Defense: As they were about to leave their house, they
heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their
house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate
and descended through an opening in the roof.
When Salanguit demanded to be shown a search
warrant, a piece of paper
inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-
appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper
was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.
ISSUE: W/N the search and seizure was illegal despite
the issuance of a warrant
YES
w/n marijuana found inside the house is admissible in
evidence NO
The warrant authorized the seizure of ―undetermined
quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.‖ Evidence
was presented showing probable cause of the existence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. None was
shown showing the existence of drug paraphernalia.
Salanguti said the warrant was void.
504
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to
support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not make the search warrant is void.
This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia
was in fact seized by the police. None was taken by
virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore,
the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized
the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to
its existence.
The search warrant authorized the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not
marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being
justified on the ground that the drug was seized within
the
―plain view‖ of the searching party
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the
warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is
reasonable to assume that the police found the packets
of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search
warrant has been executed, the ―plain view doctrine‖
can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other
items subsequently found.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
What the ‗plain view‘ cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for
an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
prior justification whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused
and permits the warrantless seizure.
THE extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the
‗plain view‘ doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating
at last emerges. However, a search incident to a lawful
arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and
the premises within his immediate control. The rationale
for permitting such a search is to prevent the person
arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence,
or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the
marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with,
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on accused-appellant‘s person or in an area
within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested
to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
People v Pasudag
G.R. No. 128822 May 4, 2001
505
SPO2 Calip went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-
jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo
fence behind the public school. About (5) meters away,
he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There
were marijuana plants in between corn plants and
camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as
to who owned the house with the garden. The
storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
He reported it back to the police station and they
assembled a team who went to the house of Pasudag.
When they went to his house, he asked Pasudag to
bring him to the backyard.
Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called
for a photographer, who took pictures of accused
Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants.
They uprooted seven marijuana plants. The team
brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to
the police station
W/N the search and eventual confiscation of the
marijuana plants was valid NO
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant
is required before a law enforcer may validly search or
seize the person, house, papers or effects of any
individual. The Constitution provides that "the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained in violation
of this provision is inadmissible.
In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample
opportunity to secure
from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip
inquired as to who owned the house. He was
acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately
recognized that some plants in the backyard of the
house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the
essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were
three months old and there was no sufficient reason to
believe that they would be uprooted on that same day.
"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more that mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee."
Even if the confession or admission were "gospel
truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and
without a valid waiver of such assistance, the
confession is inadmissible in evidence.
United Laboratories, Inc. – Petitioner vs
G.R. No. 163858
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
506
Ernesto Isip and/or Shalimar Philippines and/or
Occupants, June 28, 1985
Shalimar Building, No. 1571, Aragon St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila-Respondents
FACTS:
Rolando H. Besarra of the National Bureau of
Investigation filed for search warrant concerning the
first two floors of Shalimar Building owned and operated
by Ernesto Isip and for seizure of UNILAB particularly
Revicon multi vitamins, Disudrin, sundry items that are
unauthorized production/ manufacture of the said drugs
after surveillance of an asset of Armadillo Protective
and Security Agency. After which the search warrant
was served on respondent building. The search and
seizure was able to produce 792 bottles of Disudrin and
30 boxes each containing
100 pieces of Inoflox. When the seized objects was to
be turned over to the Bureau of Food and Drugs,
respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the
Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence assailing that
the searching team searched from first to fourth floors
and the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta.
Cruz, Manila while what is indicated on the search
warrant is the first and second floors of Shalimar Bldg.
located at No. 1571, Aragon St. Sta. Cruz thus all those
that was seized were fruit of a poisonous tree thus
inadmissible for evidence. On March 11,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2004 the RTC granted the respondents motion
contending that ground used by respondents to quash
the search warrant was not invoked and that the seizure
of the items was based on the ―plain view doctrine.‖
On the other hand the respondents assailed that it
should be the BFAD and not the petitioners who should
apply the search warrant. BFAD submitted the result of
its examination on the seized materials and found it to
be substandard. On May 28, 2004 the RTC rendered its
decision noting that the search warrant is only for the
counterfeit products of Revicon and not the actual
products seized.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the bottles of Disudrin and boxes of
Inoflox are inadmissible as evidence against the
respondents.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Whether or not the seizure of the same counterfeit
drugs is justified and lawful under the plain view
doctrine hence can be admitted as evidence.
HELD:
507
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been
likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to
procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of
a criminal process, restricted to cases of public
prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon,
issued under the police power. A search warrant must
issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of
the Philippines.
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The officers of the law are to seize only those things
particularly described in the search warrant. A search
warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a
raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize
and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as
not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
The immediate requirement means that the executing
officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the
facts therein available to him, determine probable cause
of the object‘s incriminating evidence. In other words, to
be immediate, probable cause must be the direct result
of the officer‘s instantaneous sensory perception of the
object. The object is apparent if the executing
officer had probable cause to connect the object to
criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the
evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It
must be apparent at the moment of seizure.
Since the articles allegedly seized during the
implementation of the search warrant
– Disudrin and Inoflux products – were not included in
the search warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully
seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per se,
as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or
shabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful
search, or being in plain view or some such. No need
whatever for some public assay.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it
cannot tell without proper examination or assay that the
Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from
respondent‘s place were counterfeit. All the relevant
presumptions are in favor of legality.
The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is
applicable in this case because the boxes were found
outside the door of the respondents‘ laboratory on the
garage floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the
members of the raiding team – precisely because these
were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The
boxes in which the items were contained were
themselves so designated to replicate true and
original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on
the left hand corner of one side of some of the boxes
the letters ―ABR‖ under the words
508
―60 ml,‖ appeared to describe the condition/quality of
the bottles inside (as it is
with genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the
same brand). The petitioner pointed out that ―ABR‖ is
the acronym for ―amber bottle round‖ describing the
bottles in which the true and original Disudrin (for
children) is contained.
Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant
but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized
by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant
cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must
adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the confluence of the essential requirements for the
doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law
enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial
intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which
he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must
discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c)
it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
PEOPLE V. GUZMAN
GR 117952-53; Feb.14,2001
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The accused was found guilty by the trial court of
violating RA 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972).
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HELD: The accused is GUILTY. The accused was
caught in flagrante delicto, possessing an unlicensed
firearm. The search conducted thereafter was valid. It
was within the immediate control of the arrested person.
Likewise, the drugs and paraphernalia obtained where
in plain view of the police when the accused was
arrested. Quoting PEOPLE v. Khor, the elements of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: 1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified as a prohibited drug; 2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and 3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. All elements
concurring, the accused is thus guilty. Lastly, the
accused failed to quash the information against him
before arraignment thus he is estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest.
PEOPLE v DE GRACIA
233 SCRA 716 (July 6, 1994)
509
Facts: The incidents involved in this case took place at
the height of the coup d‘état staged in December,
1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was
charged in two separate informations for illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance
of rebellion, and for attempted homicide. Appellant was
convicted for illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of
attempted homicide. Surveillance was undertaken by
the military along EDSA because of intelligence reports
about a coup. Members of the team were engaged by
rebels in gunfire killing one member of the team. A
searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They
were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of
different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of
the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De
Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano,
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door.
The team arrested appellant. They were then made to
sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives
and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No
search warrant was secured by the raiding team.
Accused was found guilty of illegal possession of
firearms. That judgment of conviction is now challenged
before us in this appeal. Issue: Whether or not there
was a valid search and seizure in this case. Ruling: YES
It is admitted
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar
Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at
that time. The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men
coming from the Eurocar building.
GUANZON v DE VILLA
181 SCRA 623 [GR No. 80508 (January 30, 1990)
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the
"saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that
were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no
specifictarget house to be search and that there is no
search warrant orwarrant of arrest served. Most of the
policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards. The residentswere
rudely rouse from their sleep by banging
on the walls andwindows of their houses. The
residents were at the point of high- powered guns
and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down
to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo
marks. The residentscomplained that they're homes
were ransacked, tossing their belongings and
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and
valuables had disappeared after the operation. The
510
residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-
beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained
also suffered mental and physical torture to extract
confessions and tactical informations. The respondents
said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents
contends that the Constitution grants to government the
power to seek and cripple subversive movements for
the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial
target zoning were intended to flush out subversives
and criminal elements coddled by the communities
were the said drives were conducted. They said that
they have intelligently and carefully planned months
ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign
media joined the operation to witness and record such
event.
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Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed
consisted of violation of human rights.
Held: It is not the police action per se which should be
prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods
which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on
the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have
been no impediment to securing search warrants or
warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or
individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no
showing that theobjectives sought to be attained by the
"aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of the squatters and low income families are fully
protected. However, the remedy should not be brought
by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and
not one violator is properly charged. In the
circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring
soldier or policeman whom the court can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent
relief can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some
abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint
the alleged violations which are shocking to the
senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.
ROAN v GONZALES
145 SCRA 687 (1986)
F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on
5/10/84. The petitioner''s house was searched 2 days
later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. The officers conducting the search found 1
colt Magnum revolver &
18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now the
bases of the charge against the petitioner. RULING:
Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby
declared null and void and accordingly set aside. The
petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the
511
resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the
ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were
taken of the complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the
affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however,
that the complainant himself was not subjected to a
similar interrogation. By his own
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt.
Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to
ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the
same," and only bec. "the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he
would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit
had already been completed when it was submitted to
him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching
questions. He limited himself to the contents of the
affidavit. He did not take the applicant''s deposition in
writing and attach them to the record, together w/ the
affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non- existence of
the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was asking for
the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay
and not of info. personally known to him. His
application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify
the issuance of the warrant sought.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 512

agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by

It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses the military authorities, who practically coerced the
themselves, by their own personal info., to establish the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guarantee.
applicant''s claims. Even assuming then that it would
have suffied to take the deposition only of the
witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is
still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. A E. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS VS. CA1
study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be
"intelligence informers," shows that they were in the G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
main a mere restatement of their allegations in their
affidavits, except that they were made in the form of Rule involved: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. debemos. Where the law makes no distinctions, one
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. does not distinguish.
judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even
as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the
window, or whether it was on the first floor or second
floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the
acts related were really done openly, in the full view of Issue: Does the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow
the witnesses, considering that these acts were against parties to a conversation to tape it without the consent
the law. These would have been judicious questions but of all those involved?
they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration
of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant
sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN ARGUES
THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER
DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY What was construed:
SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED
HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not The word ―any‖ in Sec. 1 of RA 4200: It shall be
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 unlawful for ANY person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph
or detectaphone or walkie- talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by
Ester Garcia inside Garcia‘s office. Ramirez taped the
conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for
insulting and humiliating her, using as evidence the
transcript of the conversation, based on the tape
recording.
1 By Dana Batnag
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for
violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it was done
without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed
that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are not
part of the conversation, to record it using the
instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier
513
case that was dismissed because the instrument used
was not mentioned in the law).
The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a
motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals
reversed it.
Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it
clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record a
conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.
―The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication.‖
The congressional records also showed that the intent
was that permission must be sought from all parties in
the conversation. ―This is a complete ban on tape
recorded conversations taken without the authorization
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of all the parties,‖ Sen. Tanada said during the
deliberations.
―The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to
the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.‖
Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed.
Costs against Ramirez.
ZULUETA v CA
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
253 SCRA 699 (1996)
The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise
514
as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor
of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private respondents
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting
cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other
materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from
unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court
regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.
HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or
which public safety or order require otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."
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The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right
to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received
515
in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.
WATEROUR DRUG CORPORATION v NLRC
GR No. 113271 (October 16, 1997)
Facts: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15
August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received
a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-
General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to
dispense medicine toemployees chargeable to the
latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited
practice. On the same date, Co issued another
memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate
with suppliers of medicine without consulting the
Purchasing Department, as this would impair the
company's control of purchases and, besides she was
not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny
her responsibility but explained that her act was "due
to negligence," since fellow employee Irene
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and
through misrepresentation when she claimed that she
was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico
then asked the company to look into the fraudulent
activities of Soliven.
In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989,
WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned
Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without
the proper documents." On 29 January 1990,
WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co
that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and
Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January
1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four
hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico
asked for additional time to give her explanation, and
she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was
informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March
516
1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to
protect the interests of the company.
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested
access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for
her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In
said letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her
privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed
to Catolico.
In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico,
through her counsel, explained that the check she
received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a
"refund of overprice." She also averred that the
preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang
from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary,
Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda
Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her
termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the
Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension.
In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex
Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor
practice against
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of
Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what
alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that
any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal
was without just cause and due process. He thus
declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement.
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and
urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor
Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due
process and that there was no just cause to terminate
her services.
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC
affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground
that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for
Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found
that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check
of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which
her co-employee saw when the latter opened the
envelope. But, it declared that the check was
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1
and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded:
517
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being
rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional
right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls
apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as
a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the
appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal
suspension as the same was already included in the
computation of the aggregate of the awards in the
amount of P35,401.86.
Issue: Whether or Not the dismissal of the private
respondent is in violation of the
Constitution, under the Bill of Rights.
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Held: As to the first and second grounds, petitioners
insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions"
from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the
check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the
first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico
occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity
to violate company rules," constituted breach of
confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC,
Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her
side of the controversy.
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners'
evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The
check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to
turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not
prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients,
and there is no indication in the contentious check that it
was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines.
Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the
constitutional provision on the right to privacy and
communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it
was inadmissible in evidence.
Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due
process requires that an employee be apprised of the
charge against him, given reasonable time to answer
the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and
defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the
employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every
kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his
defense, including legal representation. In the case
at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to
explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in
518
the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her
counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the
issues were joined through said letters.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled
that the burden is on the employer to prove just and
valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure
to discharge that burden would result in a finding that
the dismissal is unjustified. It clearly appears then that
Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information.
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Catolico'sdismissal then was obviously grounded on
mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of employment; and even the dismissal of
an employee for loss of trust and confidence must
rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's
arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides,
Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee,
to which class of employees the term "trust and
confidence" is restricted.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which
the NLRC anchored its decision, that the Bill of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 519

Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
searches and seizures perpetrated by private communication and against unreasonable searches and
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, seizures which is hereby set aside.
that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits,
such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities.
March 12, 1987 Per Curiam
In re Wenceslao Laureta
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor
Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the
best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded
separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for
every year of service. In this case, however, Labor
Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half Facts: Almost identical letters were personally sent to
month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not Justices Narvasa, M. Herrera, and Cruz, and a fourth
oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice
the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Feliciano, all members of the First Division of the
Arbiter. Supreme Court, in a stance of threats to effect a change
of the Court‘s adverse resolution (in GR 68635: Eva
Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC being dismissed),

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution
of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30
September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in In said letter, it stated that petitioner intended to hold
NLRC-NCR CA No. responsible members of the First Division who
005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for participated in the promulgation of the three minute-
upholding the Labor resolutions in question.
Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Indeed,, Maravilla-Ilustre filed an Affidavit-Complaint
before the Tanodbayan, charging some Members of the
Supreme Court with having knowingly and deliberately
rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute
Resolution
―making‖ her opponents the ―illegal owners‖ of vast
estates; charging some
Justices of the Court of Appeals with knowingly
rendering their ―unjust resolution‖
―through manifest and evident bad faith‖; and charging
Solicitor General Sedfrey
A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of the Supreme
Court with having used their power and influence in
persuading and inducing the members of the First
Division of the Court into promulgating their ―unjust
extended Minute Resolution of 14
May 1986.‖
Atty. Laureta reportedly circulated copies of the
Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in
almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any
copy furnished to the Supreme Court nor the
members.Thus, the SC in its resolution petitioner Eva
Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, why she should not be
held in contempt for her statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Supreme Court and/or official
actions of the Justices concerned, which statements,
unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the
permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and
degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty.
Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show
cause, , why no disciplinary action should be taken
520
against him for the statements, conduct, acts and
charges against
the Supreme Court and the official actions of the
Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in
anonymity behind his client‘s name, in an alleged quest
for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the
Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence
in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice.
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Issue: Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme
Court justices are matters covered by the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and right to privacy.
Held/Ratio:
No. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in
connection with the performance of their judicial
functions become part of the judicial record and are a
matter of concern for the entire Court. The
contumacious character of those letters constrained the
First Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en
consults and so that the Court en banc could pass upon
the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the
exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained
from issuing immediately a show cause order in the
expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the
Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
realize the unjustness and unfairness of
accusations.
The fact that said letters are not technically considered
pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after
the main petition had been finally resolved does not
detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The
constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to
privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous
acts against the Court. Also, Atty. Laureta has
committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for
his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to
the ―proper forum‖ to effect a change of the Court‘s
adverse Resolution; Atty. Laureta has committed acts
unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of
dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper
forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse
Resolution; and for authoring, or at the very least,
assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the
contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious
charges of his client, respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding
his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with
them, which we find disputed by the facts and
circumstances of record as above stated; for totally
disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal
considerations set forth in this Court's Resolutions of
the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last
resort;
521
their
F. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
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Nov 26 1970 J. Fernando
Mutuc v COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Mutuc after setting forth his residency
in Pampanga filed for candidacy as a member of the
Constitutional Convention. His petition was granted y
COMELEC but he was prohibited from using taped
jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems
and loud speakers.
He filed this petition for prohibition to assail said ruling
of COMELEC as being violative of his constitutional
right to freedom of speech.
Issue:WON the ruling of the COMELEC prohibiting
petitioner from using taped jingles is a form of
censorship and thus a violation of his freedom of
speech.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held/Ratio: Yes. In unequivocal language, the
Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or
a free press. It has been a constant holding that this
preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost
respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful
the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent
Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on
petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right
is directed. The constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say,
but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape
or other
mechanical contrivances
February 15, 2008 CJ Puno
Chavez v Gonzales
The case involves the Garci tapes which on June 7,
2005 Atty Alan Paguia had released in the media. On
June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that
those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be
held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. On june 11,
2005, NTC issued a press release which stated that the
Garcia tapes were fraudulent and warned that the
522
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation by the media shall be just cause for
the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.
Thus this petition for certiorari was filed by Franks
Chavez alleging that such issuances by respondents
violated the freedom on expression and of the press,
and the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern,
WON the regulations and issuances made by the NTC
were violations of the freedom of speech
Held/Ratio:
Yes. All speech are not treated the same. Some types
of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the
State under its pervasive police power, in order that it
may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those
of the community or society. Thus the tests applicable to
each type also differ.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The general tests are: a) the dangerous tendency
doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a
rational connection has been established between the
speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when
courts need to balance conflicting social values and
individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation of type of situation; and
(c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the
premise that speech may be restrained because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an
evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ―extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high.‖
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To determine which test to apply, a distinction also has
to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-
neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the
time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. As regards the latter,
it is the clear and present danger rule which should be
applied.
523
In the case at bar what applies is the clear and present
danger rule, as they questioned issuances were
content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents
focused solely on but one object—a specific content—
fixed as these were on the alleged taped conversations
between the President and a COMELEC official.
Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations
as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of
speech or expression.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines v
COMELEC
April 21 1988 J. Mendoza
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc (TELEBAP). is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens,
taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner is
GMA Network Inc.
They are challenging the validity of §92 on the ground
that:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
it takes property without due process of law and without
just compensation;
it denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws; and
it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to
supervise or regulate
the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election.
Issue: WON Sec 92 of BP 881 is unconstitutional
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Held/Ratio:
No.
Regulation of the use and ownership of
telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the
plenary police power of the State for the promotion of
the general welfare.
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are
524
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege
subject, among other things, to amendment by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision
that ―any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires. What
better measure can be conceived for the common good
than one for free air time for the benefit not only of
candidates but even more of the public, particularly the
voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in
an election? ―[I]t is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount.‖
As regards the argument that petitioners should be
compensated for the airtime, the court held that Under
§92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not take over
the operation of radio and television stations but only
the allocation of air time to the candidates for the
purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal
opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by
the Constitution.
Finally, as regards the differential treatment between
print and broadcast media, the court held that there are
important differences in the characteristics of the two
media, which justify their differential treatment for free
speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of
the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of
necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those
wishing to use them
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Philippine Press Institute v COMELEC
May 22, 1995 J. Feliciano
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Facts: PPI assails the constitutionality of Resolution
2272 which grants free print space called ―COMELEC
space‖ to be provided by at least one newspaper of
general circulation in every province or city. PPI argues
that this violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its
agencies, against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. Moreover, the
requirement that publishers give free "Comelec Space"
and at the same time process raw data to make it
camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary
servitude. Finally they argue that said resolution is a
violation of the freedom of speech, of the press and of
expression.
Issue: WON Resolution 2272 is unconstitutional
525
Held/Ratio: Yes. To compel print media companies to
donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in
Resolution No. 2772 amounts to "taking" of private
personal property for public use or purposes. The taking
of private property for public use is, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment
of "just compensation" There is nothing at all to prevent
newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily
giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes
contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against
their
will, in the kind of factual context here present, to
provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
March 31, 1992 J. Gutierrez
Adiong v COMELEC
Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347
which provided for an enumeration of lawful forms of
proganda as well and Prohibited forms of propaganda
for the elections. It provides:
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 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following
are lawful election propaganda:
Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten
or printed letters, or other written or printed materials
not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width
and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof.
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly
exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether
public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the
COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at
the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political
party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's
own residential house or one of his residential houses, if
he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by
three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
526
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in
the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the
COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the
posting of
decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and
other moving vehicles.
Issue:
WON the prohibition provided in Resolution 2347 is
unconstitutional
Held/Ratio:
Yes The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
Constitution. There is no clear public interest threatened
by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the
cherished citizen's right of free
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
speech and expression. Under the clear and present
danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's
mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
When faced with border line situations where freedom
to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know
on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions
intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the
police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in
favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the
freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate
are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest
elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom
to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches
in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place,
including mobile places whether public or private except
in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle. The prohibition would not only
deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the
decals and stickers the use of his property but more
important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of
his right to free speech and information
527
Tolentino v Secretary of Finance
October 30, 1995 J. Mendoza
Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of
our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases
for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No.
7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law.
Petitioners reiterate their previous claims that R.A. No.
7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the
Constitution. They complain that the Senate did not
pass it on second and third
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readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its
own version (S. No. 1630)
which it approved on May 24, 1994.
They also argue that said act discriminates against the
press and religion. PPI argued that by removing the
exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining
those granted to others, the law discriminates against
the press.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Issue: WON RA 7716 is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory against the press
Held/Ratio: No. The Court held that as a general
proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing
power of the State and that what the constitutional
guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single
out the press or target a group belonging to the press
for special treatment or which in any way
discriminate against the press on the basis of the
content of the publication.
Since what the law granted to the press was a privilege,
the law could take back the
privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution.
The reason is that by granting exemptions, the State
does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. In withdrawing the exemption, the law
merely subjects the press to the
same tax burden to which other businesses have long
ago been subject.
July 22, 1985 CJ Fernando
528
Facts:
Gonzales v Katigbak
The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez,
President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit
duly registered as a single proprietorship with the
Bureau of Domestic Trade. The issue being raised is in
relation the classification of the film Kapit sa Patalim as
―For Adults Only" by the Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television (BRMPT).
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Initially, the sub-committee decision was to classify
said film as ―For Adults Only‖. It was only in the
motion for reconsideration that it was allowed to be
shown without any deletions or cuts. However, BRMPT
held that there remains deficiencies in the application so
it will withhold the showing of the film until the
deficiencies were filled up. Thus this petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
WON there has been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of BRMPT and whether or not said
classification was valid
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 529

That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent

Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail
undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was
classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion
Held/Ratio: or cut. Moreover its perception of what constitutes
obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. This
Yes, there was an abuse of discretion, but it was not PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
grave

The court held that in order to avoid an unconstitutional

taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is Court concluded that there was an abuse of discretion.
limited to the classification of films.This is not to deny Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain
that equally basic is the other important aspect of that such an abuse can be considered grave
freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of
this litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on freedom
from censorship.

Viva Productions v CA and Hubert Webb

March 13, 1997 J. Melo

The test, to determine whether freedom of expression

may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil Facts: The case revolves around the film the Jessica
of a substantive character that the State has a right to Alfaro Story which depicts the life of Ms. Alfaro, part of
prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also which her involvement with the Vizconde Massacre.
present. There should be no doubt that what is feared Private respondent Hubert Webb sent a letter to Viva
may be traced to the expression complained of. The Productions warning them that the projected showing of
causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be said movie on the life story of Alfaro would violate the
reasonable apprehension about its imminence sub judice rule and his rights as
an accused.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Since said warning went unheeded, respondent filed a
petition for contempt complaining that the acts of
petitioner and Alfaro concerning movie were
contumacious, within the contemplation of Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
A cease and desist order was issued was RTC of
Paranaque. Respondnet also filed a petition for
injunction and damages with the RTC of Makati which
granted injunction. The appeal by Viva Production to the
CA was denied. Thus this petition before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
whether or not the the lower court erred in granting the
injunction sought for.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. The court took note of the rather unreasonable
period that had elapsed from the time of the issuance of
the restraining order by the Parañaque court up to the
writing of this decision. The Court also notes that the
order of the said court
530
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specifically failed to lay down any factual basis
constituting a clear and present danger which will
justify prior restraint of the constitutionally protected
freedom of speech and expression save its plea for time
to hear and resolve the issues raised in the petition for
contempt.
MTRCB v ABS-CBN
ABS-CBN aired ―Prosti-tuition,‖ an episode of the
television (TV) program ―The Inside Story‖ produced
and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to
pay for their tuition fees. Some of the students were
named by the segment as belonging Philippine
Women‘s University and this caused a great uproar in
the PWU.
Thus a petition was filed with the MTRCB alleging that
said episode besmirched the name of the PWU and
resulted in the harassment of some of its female
students. MTRCB initiated a complaint in the MTRCB.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Respondents‘s defense was that ―The Inside Story‖ is
a ―public affairs program, news documentary and
socio-political editorial,‖ the airing of which is protected
by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression
and of the press. Thus petitioner has no power,
authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior
restraint upon respondents
The MTRCB Investigating Committee ordered
respondent to pay P20,000 for failing to ask for a
permit to show the episode of the said program. Said
decision was affirmed on Appeal with the MTRCB. Thus
a petition for certiorari was filed with the RTC which
set aside said decision. Motion for Reconsideration
by MTRCB was denied. Thus this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
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WON MTRCB had the power to review the program
―The Inside Story‖.
531
Held/Ratio:
Yes. Section 3 of P. D. No. 1986 provides the power of
MTRCB. It states:
―SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The BOARD
shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
x x x x x x
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as
herein defined, television programs, including publicity
materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills,
whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be
for theatrical or non- theatrical distribution, for television
broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced
in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether
they be for local viewing or for export
The law gives the Board the power to screen,
review and examine all
‘television programs.’ By the clear terms of the law, the
Board has the power to
‗approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x
exhibition and/or television
broadcast of x x x television programs x x x.‘
. Thus, when the law says ―all television programs,‖
the word ―all‖ covers all television programs, whether
religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc.
Respondents claim that the showing of ―The Inside
Story‖ is protected by the constitutional provision on
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
freedom of speech and of the press. However, there
has been no declaration at all by the framers of the
Constitution that freedom of expression and of the
press has a preferred status.
The only exception to power of MTRCB to review are
those exhibited the Philippine Government and its
departments/agencies and newsreels. Thus respondent
argues that said program is a newsreel and thus
belongs to the exception.
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The MTRCB Rules and Regulations implementing
P. D. No. 1986 define newsreels as ―straight news
reporting, as distinguished from news analyses,
commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given
issue are not considered newsreels.‖ Clearly, the ―The
Inside Story‖ cannot be considered a newsreel. It is
more of a public affairs program which is described as a
variety of news treatment; a cross between pure
television news and news-related commentaries,
analysis and/or exchange of opinions
532
ABSCBN v COMELEC
January 28, 2000 J. Panganiban
An information was received by COMELEC from a
reliable source stated that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group)
has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit
survey of the vote during the elections for national
officials particularly for President and Vice President,
results of which shall be broadcast immediately." Thus it
issued a resolution which restrained ABSCBN from
conducting said survey. COMELEC argues that said
project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as
well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). Comelec
justifies its Resolution as having been issued pursuant
to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly,
honest, credible and peaceful election
ABSCBN filed for TRO before the court which was
granted. This petition for certiorari was filed to assail the
resolution of COMELEC
Issue:
WON COMELEC has the power to ban ABSCBN from
holding and reporting exit polls.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
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Held/Ratio:
No.
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted
by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the
purpose of determining the probable result of an
election by confidentially asking randomly selected
voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they
have officially cast their ballots.
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press. The Court has always ruled in favor of the
freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an
exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not
to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its
validity. To justify a restriction, the promotion of a
substantial government interest must be clearly
shown. When faced with borderline situations in
which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or
the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against
actions allegedly made to assure clean and free
elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom.
533
In the case at hand, by the very nature of a survey, the
interviewees or participants are selected at random,
so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or
view of the community or group polled. Moreover, the
survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with
the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the
opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in
general has probably voted for, based on the limited
data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at
stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the
elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine
those of the elections, since the former is only part of
the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
indicative of the other.
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The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the
more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is
the dissemination of information meant to add meaning
to the equally vital right of suffrage.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Social Weather Station v COMELEC G.R. No. 147571,
5 May 2001
Petitioners wanted to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections and release to
the media the results of such survey as well as publish
them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on
the publication of election survey results constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint.
HELD: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of
expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at
other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.‖
Chavez vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 162777, 31 August
2004
534
Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution
No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an
ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the
assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable
for an election offense for not removing such
advertisement, even if at the time the said
advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly
legal.
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HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature,
defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said
offense. Laws of this nature must operate
prospectively, except when they are favorable to the
accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense
defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of
"propaganda materials such as posters, streamers,
stickers or paintings on walls and other materials
showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television
showing the image or mentioning the name of a person,
who subsequent to the placement or display thereof
becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it
prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts
for such propaganda materials by an individual who
subsequently becomes a candidate for public office.
One definitely does not commit an offense by entering
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
into a contract with private parties to use his name and
image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming
a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly
prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non- removal
of the described propaganda materials three (3) days
after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If
the candidate for public office fails to remove such
propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be
liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it
indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in
this case.
LIBEL
Alonzo v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 110088, 1
February 1995
Petitioner, as Field Operations Officer of the Philippine
Medical Care Commission, filed a report with their head
office concerning the non-compliance of the Sto. Nino
Medical Clinic and the Our Lady of Fatima Medical
Clinic. The report noted the several violations committed
by the clinics. In her closing statement, petitioner made
mention that, ―This particular clinic should be closely
monitored because, aside from the above mentioned
violations, the husband is a judge and it gives them a
certain amount of 'untouchability.' In fact, they make
535
court suits their pasttime.‖ Upon such statement,
petitioner was charged and convicted of libel.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
HELD: The Court acquitted the petitioner. It said that
while the statements of Dr. Alonzo could indeed be
considered defamatory, it nonetheless fell within the
exceptions provided for by the first paragraph of Article
354. Consequently, the presumption of malice or malice
in law was negated by the privileged character of the
report. The privilege may only be lost by proof of malice
in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection
which the law throws over privileged communications.
The ultimate test is that of bona fides."
Baguio Midland Courier v Court of Appeals G.R. No.
107566, 25 November
2004
Private respondent Labo was a mayoralty candidate for
Baguio during the 1984 elections. The Baguio Midland
Courier published election-related articles, several of
which cast respondent Labo in an unfavorable light (e.g.
That he did not pay his debts, that he is illiterate, etc). A
charge of defamation of character was filed against
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
petitioner and one of its columnists, Afable. As a
defense, petitioners invoked public interest as a
defense saying that the public has a right to know those
running for public office. The CA denied this argument
saying that the public interest and ―fair comment‖
principles did not apply to the private respondent as he
was, as yet, not a public officer and was thus a private
citizen.
HELD: Concededly, private respondent was not yet a
public official at the time the 10 January 1988 article
was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove
said article from the mantle of protection guaranteed by
the freedom of expression provision of the Constitution;
this Court had recognized the public‘s right to be
informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of
candidates for public office. Plainly, the rule only applies
to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair
comment being that which is true, or which if false,
expresses the real opinion of the author based upon
reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds.
While the law itself creates the presumption that
every defamatory imputation is malicious,
nevertheless, the privileged character of
communication destroys said
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
536
presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall
then rest on the plaintiff, private respondent herein. In
addition, the Court ruled that petitioner Afable‘s article
constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest
as it dealt with the character of private respondent who
was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at
the time. Considering that private respondent assured
his would-be constituents that he would be donating
millions of his own money, petitioner Afable‘s column
with respect to private respondent‘s indebtedness
provided the public with information as regards his
financial status which, in all probability, was still
unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the
information might have dissuaded some members of the
electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but
such is the inevitable result of the application of the law.
The effect would have been adverse to the private
respondent but public interest in this case far outweighs
the interest of private respondent.
Fernando v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 159751, 6
December 2006
a Petitioners here were charged for the sale and
distribution of pornographic materials. Upon a valid
search warrant, the police searched the premises of the
store Music Fair where they found 25 VHS tapes and 10
different magazines which they deemed were
pornographic. At trial, the accused were convicted of the
crime charged.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Upon appeal, petitioners argue that the prosecution
failed to prove that the materials confiscated from the
store were indeed pornographic and insist that the
materials were covered by the freedom of speech for
being expressions of artistry.
HELD: As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the
State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its
mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from
obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify
the regulation or limitation. Necessarily, that the
confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
There is no perfect definition of ―obscenity‖ but the
latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit:
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
(a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
537
But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to
conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled
discretion in determining what is ―patently offensive.‖
No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or
exposure of obscene materials unless these materials
depict or describe patently offensive ―hard core‖
sexual conduct. What remains clear is that obscenity is
an issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judge‘s
sound discretion. In this case, the trial court found the
confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals
affirmed such findings. Findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded
great respect, even by this Court, unless such findings
are patently unsupported by the evidence on record or
the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of
facts.
OBSCENITY
U.S. v Kottinger 45 Phil 352
The accused Kottinger's camera store was raided.
Among the photos found were pictures that showed
native Filipino inhabitants in their native garb. He was
thus charged with violating Section 12 of Act 277, the
Philippine Libel Law. The photos were used as
postcards.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HELD: Although Philippine laws do not define what
obscenity means, the Court defined the obscene or
obscenity as ―something offensive to chastity,
decency, or delicacy.‖ There are two tests to
determine whether something is obscene: 1) whether it
corrupts the minds of the viewer of such materials; 2)
whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of
men as an indecency. In the case at bar, it only
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
portrayed the inhabitants in their native attire. Moreover,
there are foreign publications of a similar nature
which are imported and circulated in the Philippines,
such as a book about the Ifugaos. As such, the pictures
were not considered obscene within the meaning of the
law.
CRITICISMS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT People v
Alarcon 69 Phil 265
After the court handed down its decision in this main
case and while appeal was
then pending, one Luis M. Taruc caused the publication
of a letter addressed to the President. The letter was a
rebuke of the decision of the court and the magistrates
who passed upon the case. Taruc was ordered to show
cause why he should not be cited in contempt for what
he said. In response, Taruc argued for his absolution by
invoking, among others, that what he published was
538
protected by the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of
the press.
HELD: The Court dismissed. Newspaper publications
tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is
otherwise after the cause is ended. It must, however,
clearly appear that such publications do impede,
interfere with, and embarrass the administration of
justice before the author of the publications should be
held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-
important duty of the court to administer justice in the
decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to
speak of when and once the court has come upon a
decision and has lost control either to reconsider or
amend it. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here
we have a concession that the letter complained of was
published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in
band, and after that decision had been appealed to the
Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider
its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein
was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the
important consideration is that it was then without power
to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered
upon the merits of the case, and could not have been
influenced by the questioned publication.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 79690-707
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme
Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft
cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The
Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, respondent‘s powers as Tanodbayan have
been superseded by the creation of the Office of the
Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special
Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an
investigation and file cases only when so authorized by
the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the respondent wherein he included statements
which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court.
This include: (a) That he had been approached twice by
a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go
slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That
he "was approached and asked to refrain from
investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in
the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;"
and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against two Members of the Court." Statements
of the respondent saying that the SC‘s order '"heightens
the people's apprehension over the justice system in
539
this country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes
go scot-free‖ was publicized in leading newspapers.
HELD: There was no violation. The Court did not
purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible
tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes
a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice."
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
"balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the
statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a
nature and were made in such a manner and under
such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the
authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
prevent a "substantive evil"
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair
hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of
the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system
of a country and the destruction of the standards of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
professional conduct required from members of the bar
and officers of the courts, which has some implications
to the society
Estrada v Evardone G.R. No. 175147. 6 December
2007
Petitioners allege that respondent made derogatory
remarks against the Supreme Court and then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban after the former handed out
its decision in the Lambino case. It was reported in the
PDI that Evardone asserted that the then Chief Justice
had intended to run for the Senate which precipitated
junking of the initiative. Thus, petitioners allege that the
Evardone meant to undermine the Court and show that
its decision was tainted with partiality.
HELD: After a careful consideration of the parties'
arguments, we do not find respondent's statements
contemptuous. The Court finds sufficient and
acceptable the explanation of respondent that he had
no intention to undermine the integrity of the Chief
Justice, much less that of the Court so as to degrade
the administration of justice. There is nothing in his
statements that insinuate or suggest that the Court was
susceptible to influence in Lambino. Neither is there
anything in his statements that can be considered as a
540
malicious attack on the proceedings of the Court as to
cast doubt on the integrity of the Court. To be sure,
respondent even stated that he abides by, and respects,
the decision of the Court, and was willing to go through
the usual remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration,
or simply to push anew for the third mode to amend the
Charter. His remarks about the Chief Justice eyeing a
Senate seat were mere speculations/personal
observations based on a precedent not derogatory or
contumacious enough to warrant sanction from the
Court.
We have held that the power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts, as it is essential to their right of
self-preservation. Courts are universally acknowledged
to
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
be vested, by their very creation, with the power to
impose silence, respect and decorum in their presence,
and submission to their lawful mandates, and as
corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and
their officers from the approach of insults and pollution.
Judges are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously
and sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the
end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court and not for
retaliation or vindication. Thus, being a drastic and
extraordinary remedy, the power of contempt should not
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
be exercised unless clearly necessary in the interest of
justice.
Miriam College Foundation v Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 127830. 15
December 2000
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam
College Foundation‘s school paper were subjected to
disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline
Committee after letters of complaint were filed before
the Board following the publication of the school paper
that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit
contents. The Committee found the defendants guilty
and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions.
Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with
preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over
the defendants.
HELD: Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes
the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some
541
restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to
discipline its students and inculcate upon them good
values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free
speech in school is not always absolute. The court
upheld the right of students for the freedom of
expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of
the school on the conduct of their students. Further,
Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides
that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely
on the basis of the articles they write
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class
work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power
of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
environment conducive to learning. That power, like the
power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that
Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the
cases filed against respondent students
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 542

Sam because it was done without trial thus violating their

155 - last right to due process of law.
two cases PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
156 - 4
cases
157 - 4
cases Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts,
on matters of religious intramurals?

Ray
158 -2
cases Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a
159 - 2 religious institution/organization is a matter best left to
cases the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons,
160 - 3 of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to
cases exercise control over church authorities in the
161 3 cases performance of their discretionary and official
functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church
regulations.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz (2005)

Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine

Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop ―Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a
de la Cruz declared petitioners religious organization except for the protection of civil or
expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine property rights. Those rights may be the subject of
Independent Church. Because of the order of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction possession of church property.‖
against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial
Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal 3. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE German vs. Barangan
(1985)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Facts: German et al went to JP Laurel St to pray and
worship in St Luke Chapel. But they were barred by
General Barangan and his underlings from entering the
church because the same is within the vicinity of the
Malacanang. And considering that German‘s group is
expressively known as the August Twenty One
Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench
fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there
to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the
ongoings within the Malacanang.
Issue: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to
worship and pray at St. Luke is a violation of their
freedom to worship and locomotion.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Held: No prohibition. Petitioners' intention was not really
to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an
anti-government demonstration since they wore yellow
T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti-
government slogans. While every citizen has the right to
religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good
faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was
designed to protect the lives of the President and
his family, government officials and diplomatic and
foreign guests transacting business with
Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to
secure the executive offices within the Malacanang
543
grounds from possible external attacks and
disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for
a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the
freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden
to show the existence of grave and imminent danger
lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners.
Respondents were in full control and had the capability
to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and
present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the
security of Malacanang.
Estrada vs. Escritor (2003)
Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the
RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than
twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent‗s husband died a year before she entered
into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to
another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the
Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According
to complainant, respondent should not be allowed
to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act. Respondent claims that their
conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
Jehovah‗s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness‗ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible
for a couple to legalize their union.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize
respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for
she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The
free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one
of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of
human rights. The State‗s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in
order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or
her partner. Thus the State‗s interest only amounts to
the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public
and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only
to public and secular morality. The Court further states
that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of
544
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed
any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to
the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Centeno vs. Villalon (1994)
Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic
organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng
Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of
renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and
solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is
admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit
from the DSWD. As a consequence, an
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
information was filed against Centeno, for violation of
PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
filed a motion to quash the information on the ground
that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an
offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers
solicitations made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose
such as the construction of a chapel.
Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be
construed in its broadest sense so as to include a
religious purpose?
Held: No and that legislative enactments specifically
spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564
merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes,"
only goes to show that the framers of the law in
question never intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there
is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to
proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police
power. However, in the case at bar, considering that
solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as
earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.
545
Tolentino vs. Sec. Of Finance (1995)
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale,
barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H.
No. 11197 and S. No.
1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did
not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI,
Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives as required
by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear
analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue
bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must substantially be the same as
the House bill would be to deny the Senate‘s power not
only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members
of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to
the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so
long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill.
546
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No.
1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and
third readings were done on the same day. But this was
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as
urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a
bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can
be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
H. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Caunca vs.
Salazar (1949)
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by
Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores
who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment
Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An
advanced payment has already been given to Estelita
by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid.
However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
residence, which was disallowed by the employment
agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the
advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be
paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the
right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the
amount it may advance to a prospective employee or
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
movement. The fact that no physical force has been
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does
not make less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
place to another, freedom to choose one‘s residence.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion,
to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to
cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place
a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to
the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or
physical coercion.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
547
Macros vs. Manglapus (1989)
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel
documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation
of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the
Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair
the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a
court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor
the President impair their right to travel because no law
has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their
right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
Philippines.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right
involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what
the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially,
the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return
to one's country, a distinct right under international law,
independent from although related to the right to travel.
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within
the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and
the right to enter one's
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
country as separate and distinct rights. What the
Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each
state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by
laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others.
548
However, right to enter one's country cannot be
arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate
to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones
country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the
right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the
right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of International Law and under our
Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court
held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the
Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino
has determined that the destabilization caused by the
return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years after the Marcos
regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious
threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Manotoc vs. CA (1986)
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted
bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to
the United States, "relative to his business transactions
and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied
the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26,
1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as
well as the communication-request of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel
abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration
Commissioner
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as
a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him
bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which
has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him
from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
549
Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel
has been violated
Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a
bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to
leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may
be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has
not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is
no indication that the business transactions cannot be
undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
I. RIGHT TO INFORMATION Chavez vs. PEA and
Amari (2002)
Facts: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates
Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on
PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal
Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for
brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition
further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new
agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA
asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the right
to information is limited to "definite propositions of the
government." PEA maintains the right does not include
access to "intra-
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or
are in the
'exploratory stage'."
Issue: Are negotiations leading to a settlement with
PIATCO within the scope of the constitutional guarantee
of access to information?
Held: Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution
explains the people's right to information on matters of
public concern: ―…Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Further, The
State policy (Sec 28, Art II) of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public
concern.
550
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to
promote transparency in policy- making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise effectively other
constitutional rights.
Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids
or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or
review committee is not immediately accessible under
the right to information. While the evaluation or review is
still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or
decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official recommendation, there
arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government.
Garcia vs. BOI (1990)
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Facts: The case involved the application by a
Taiwanese private corporation, the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), for registration as a
new producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. The
Philippine Board of Investments (BOI) approved the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 551

application, giving various fiscal incentives owing to the
pioneering status of the investment. The application as
approved specified the province of Bataan as the site
for the proposed investment. However, news broke out
that the investor amended its application to change the
investment site from the province of Bataan to the
province of Batangas. The Congressman of Bataan (the
original site) who opposed the change in location of the
investment, requested the BOI toprovide a copy of the
original application, the amended application, and the
supporting documents to each. The BOI denied the
request, stating that the investor (BPC) refused to give
consent to the release of the requested documents,
relying on Section 81 of the Omnibus Investments
Code, which states: ―Confidentiality of Applications.
All applications and their supporting documents filed
under this Code shall be confidential and shall not be
disclosed to any person, except with the consent of the
applicant or on orders of a court of competent
jurisdiction.‖
mentioned Article 81 may be disclosed upon the
consent of the applicant, or by order of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
The Court ordered that the petitioner could have access
to BOI‘s records on the original and amended
applications for registration excluding, however, papers
containing trade secrets and other business and
financial information.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
The documents were used by the Congressman to
support his opposition to the change of location of the
proposed investment. Unfortunately, the court did not
articulate a test or definition of what is a commercial or
trade secret.

Decision

The Congressman filed a case before the Supreme

Court, which ruled that the requested copies of certain
documents may not be denied, as it is the constitutional 3.TEST OF VALID GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE
right of a citizen to have access to information on issues
of public interest under Article III, Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution. The confidentiality of the records on BPC's
applications is not absolute and based on above
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-
27833; 18 APR 1969]
Facts:
RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting
the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the
period of election campaign or partisan political activity
was challenged on:
(1) constitutional grounds - the basic liberties of free
speech and free press, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.
(2) the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of
period of election campaign are matters of political
expediency and convenience which only political parties
can regulate or curtail by and among themselves
through self-restraint or mutual understanding or
agreement
(3) the regulation and limitation of these political matters
invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and
present danger to the state, would render the
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and
without effect.
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as
amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred
rights of speech and press, of assembly and of
association. He did justify its enactment however under
552
the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the
substantive evil of elections, whether for national or
local officials, being debased and degraded by
unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and
undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Respondents contend that the act was based on the
police power of the state. Issue: Whether or Not RA
4880 is unconstitutional? NO, but only because they
were unable to get the required 2/3 vote.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are
two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction on freedom of speech.
―clear and present danger‖ rule - evil consequence of
the comment or utterance must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented.
It has the advantage of establishing according to the
above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It
provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
established.
'dangerous tendency' rule - ―If the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable.‖ It is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent.
In this case, the clearand present danger rule was
applied:
The term clear seems to point to a causal connection
with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the
utterance questioned.
Present refers to the time element. It used to be
identified with imminent and immediate danger. The
danger must not only be probable but very likely
inevitable.
In considering the constitutionality of the law, the Court
took into account that this was in response to a serious
substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not
merely in danger of happening, but actually in
existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or
remedied
This is not to say, that once such a situation is found to
exist there is no limit to the allowable limitations on such
constitutional rights. The clear and present danger
doctrine rightly viewed requires that not only should
there be
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
553
an occasion for the imposition of such restrictions but
also that they be limited in scope.
There are still constitutional questions of a serious
character then to be faced. The practices which the act
identifies with "election campaign" or "partisan
political activity" must be such that they are free from
the taint of being violative of free speech, free press,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. What
removes the sting from constitutional objection of
vagueness is the enumeration of the acts deemed
included in the terms "election campaign" or "partisan
political
activity."
They are: "(a) Forming organizations, associations,
clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a candidate or party;(c) making speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding interviews
for or against the election or any party or candidate for
public office; (d) publishing or distributing campaign
literature or materials; (e) directly or indirectly soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda
for or against any party; (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
contributions for election campaign purposes, either
directly or indirectly." 45 As thus limited the objection
that may be raised as to vagueness has been
minimized, if not totally set at rest. 46
However, the challenged statute could have been more
narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional
requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and
present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly
explained, such provisions were deemed by the
legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary
and appropriate response not merely to a clear and
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave
and substantive evil of excessive partisanship,
dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of
late has invariably marred election campaigns and
partisan
political activities in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form,
implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs
and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case
of freedom of expression, this
right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
554
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against
the election of any party or candidate for public office
and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of
campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation
of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking
of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against
any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional
command.
.Unfortunately, the necessary two-third vote, however,
not being obtained, there is no occasion for the power to
annul statutes to come into play.
Such being the case, it is the judgment of this Court that
Republic Act No.
4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 123881 March 13, 1997
VIVA PRODUCTIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND HUBERT J.P.WEBB, respondents.
MELO, J.:
FACTS:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
RTC-Paranaque restrained the exhibition of the movie,
the Jessica Alfaro Story. RTC-Makati also issued a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner further
proceeding, engaging, using or implementing the
promotional advertising and marketing programs for the
movie entitled "The Jessica Alfaro Story" and from
showing or causing the same to be shown or exhibited
in all theaters in the entire country UNTIL after the final
termination and logical conclusion of the trial in the
criminal action now pending before the Paranaque
Regional Trial Court
ISSUE: WON both courts acted with grave abuse of
discretion in restraining the exhibition of the film? YES
RATIO:
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
The order of RTC-Paranaque specifically failed to lay
down any factual basis constituting a clear and present
danger which will justify prior restraint of the
constitutionally protected freedom of speech and
expression save its plea for time to hear and resolve the
issues raised in the petition for contempt. (read the
whole case, yun lang relevant for clear and present
danger test :/)
G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983
555
JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES
COALITION (ABC), petitioner,
vs.
RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of
Manila, respondent.
FERNANDO, C.J.
FACTS:
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the
Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting
from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the
United States Embassy,
it was stated that after the delivery of two brief
speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on
the last day by the International Conference for General
Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All
Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be
presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of
its personnel who may be there so that it may be
delivered to the United States Ambassador. The march
would be attended by the local and foreign participants
of such conference. There was likewise an assurance in
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional
rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary
steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march
and rally." 4
The City of Manila however rejected their petition filing
due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate
against the advisability of issuing such permit at this
time and at the place applied for." 6
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
The Mayor suggested, however, in accordance, that "a
permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the
Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the
safety of the participants themselves and the general
public may be ensured."
ISSUE: WON the order of the mayor to refuse the
petition and to change the venue is constitutional? NO
Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public concern without censorship or punishment. It is
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except
on a showing, as 's the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 18
There are of course limits to its exercise.What is
guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not
556
advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less
preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The
Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a
rally or assembly. resort to force is ruled out and
outbreaks of violence to be avoided.For the.
constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury
to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided,
In this case, what is at issue are the places for the
assembly. The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of
the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required
. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit
or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification
that the clear and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is
such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse,
must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority
In these cases:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
(1) Luneta - There can be no legal objection, absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
peace rally would startWhenever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.
(2) US Embassy –
A novel aspect to this case is the fact that the
Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations which states that ―. The
receiving State is under a special duty to take
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any
disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of
its dignity‖
However, they were unable to prove the presence of
clear and present danger. To repeat, it is settled law
that as to public places, especially so as to parks and
streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit,
whether an individual or a group. There was also
557
assurance that all steps for the safety of the rally were
to be made.
Wherefore the mandatory injunction to the petitioner is
granted.
G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon,
and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality,
became engaged in a discussion regarding the
administration of Governor-General Wood, which
resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The
Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Wood's
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
head for having recommended a bad thing for the
Filipinos, for he has killed our independence."
He was thus charged and convicted in the lower court
for a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to
do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other
persons in authority
ISSUE: WON the conviction of Perez is valid? YES
RATIO:
The provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted
so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is
permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within
the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and
effect be seditious.
But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious,
the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
press and of assembly and petition must yield to
punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution
and the laws, and the existence of the State.
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief
Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position,
like the Presidency of the United States and other high
offices, under a democratic form of government,
558
instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous
comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in
this instance, the attack on the Governor-General
passes the furthest bounds of free speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words
used, which could easily produce disaffection among
the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious
words. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings
of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a
violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
.G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999
DE LA CRUZ v CA
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Petitioners are public school teachers from various
schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously
charged, preventively suspended, and eventually
dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D.
Cariño of DECS.
The CSC ordered their automatic reinstatement without
backwages which petitioners questioned. In the CA,
their petitioners were dismissed for lack of merit.
Thus the present petition were petitioners contend they
were merely exercising their right to peaceably
assemble and should therefore be entitled to
backwages.
ISSUE: WON petitioners‘ actions fall under peaceful
assembly? NO RATIO:
As ruled in previous cases, the petitioners‘ actions
"amounted to a strike in every sense of the term,
constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of or absence from work which it was said
teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for
essentially economic reasons — to protest and pressure
the Government to correct their grievances, the strikers
perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation
of
the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the
mass actions by the conventional term "strike" did not
erase the true nature of the mass actions as
unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which
was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers'
economic grievances.
559
The the teachers were penalized not because they
exercised their right to peaceably assemble but
because of the manner by which such right was
exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral
absences thus disrupting
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
classes in various schools in Metro Manila which
produced adverse effects upon the students for whose
education the teachers were responsible.
Petitioners contend that classes were not actually
disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately
appointed by Secretary Cariño. Besides being a purely
factual assertion which this Court cannot take
cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the
prompt remedial action taken by Secretary Cariño might
have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass
protests did not erase the administrative liability of
petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which
were the very reason why such prompt remedial action
became necessary.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED and the
assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 1995 and 24 April 1996 are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27
JAN 1948]
Facts:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal
of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a
public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of
grievances to the government. The reason alleged by
the respondent in his defense
for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and
upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the
losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the
faith and confidence of the people in their government,
and in the duly constituted authorities, which might
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of
public order."
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was
violated.
Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec.
1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1)
the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit
for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade,
or procession in the streets and other public places of
560
the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject
to reasonable discretion to
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
determine or specify the streets or public places to be
used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping,
to secure convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
favored the second construction. First construction
tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use
of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government no such unlimited power may be validly
granted to any officer of the government, except
perhaps in cases of national emergency.
The Mayor‘s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious
injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech
and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech
is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is
likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-65695 December 19, 1983
HECTOR S. RUIZ, as coordinator of the Olongapo
Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD GORDON, as City Mayor of Olongapo
City, respondent.
FERNANDO, CJ.:
Petitionr Hector Ruiz, the Coordinator of Olongapo
Citizen‘s Alliance for National Reconciliation wrote to
Respondent Richard Gordon for a permit to hold a
prayer- rally at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City on
December 4,1983 from 1:00 P.M. until it will be finished
in the early evening. It was also requested that a
parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle
starting at 1:00 P.M will be held.
Due to misunderstandings and lack of initiative by
petitioner to check if his petition was granted, he filed a
petition with the SC in order for their rally to be
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
allowed. Unbeknownst to him, Gordon already granted
the rally on the following conditions:
1. The parade/march and rally will be peaceful and
orderly;
561
2. Your organization will be responsible for any loss or
damage to government property and for the cleanliness
of the Rizal Triangle;
3. The parade/march shall proceed from the corner of
Gordon Ave., and
Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal Ave., thence to the Rizal
Triangle
Even as there was no controversy to speak of, the SC
held it best to reiterate the following doctrine with regard
to freedom of assembly:
"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the timewhen it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or
the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
application should be filed well ahead in time to enable
the public official concerned to appraise whether there
may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification
that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. Thus if so
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 562

minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial

authority.

Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the

other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so
than on the other departments — rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and
deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula,
no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with
what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes
'as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.' Nonetheless,
the presumption must be to incline the weight of the
scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as
they do precedence and primacy.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, this case is dismissed.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
FACTS:
Three sets of petitioners question the constitutionality of
BP 880
They argue among
others that (1) B.P. No. 880 requires a
permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger.
(2) It curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the
time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message for which the expression is sought.

(3) it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass

actions in support of the government.

ISSUE: WON BP 880 is

constitutional? YES

NC
RATIO:
G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably
BAYAN v ERMITA assemble and petition for redress of grievances is,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of
the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the
very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.
. But it is a settled principle growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise
of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of
the community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
A test has thus been laid down: There is no
previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a "clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a
right to prevent."
In this case, BP 880 was made due to the Court‘s ruling
in Reyes v Bagatsing It is very clear, therefore, that B.P.
No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but
a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in
Osmeña v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as
563
a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and
manner of holding public
assemblies.21
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22
that would use public places. The reference to "lawful
cause" does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words "opinion,""protesting"
and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly
content based, since they can refer to any subject. The
words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution,
so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists
and is independent of the content of the expressions in
the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the
ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly.
The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade,
procession or any other form of mass or concerted
action held in a public place." So it does not cover any
and all kinds of gatherings.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of
the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the
extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of
the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of
the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law
provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear
and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The
reference to "imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the
same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to
whether respondent Mayor has the same power
independently under Republic Act No. 716024 is thus
not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was
not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of
the law provides for an alternative forum through the
creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is
needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time.
The Court noted however that every city and
municipality MUST set aside a freedom park
considering that the existence of such freedom parks is
an essential part of the law‘s system of regulation of the
people‘s exercise of their right to peacefully assemble
and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after
thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior
564
permit may be required for the exercise of such right in
any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until
that city or municipality shall have complied with Section
15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to
deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right.
Advance notices should, however, be given to the
authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part,
and respondents, more particularly the Secretary
of the Interior and Local Governments, are
DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or
plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
SUBAYCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (1996)
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Facts: twenty (20) demonstrators were killed and
twenty-four (24) others were seriously wounded by
gunshots during the Welga ng Bayan held on
September 20,
1985 at Escalante, Negros Occidental. Twenty (20)
counts of Murder and twenty- four (24) counts of
Frustrated Murder were filed with respondent
Sandiganbayan
against those allegedly responsible for the death
and injuries of the victims. Charged were several
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
civilian government officials, personnel from the
Philippine
Constabulary and the Integrated National Police, and
from the para-military group
Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF)
The rally was without permit from the local authorities,
although the plan was not kept secret from them.
The Welga ng Bayan started as scheduled on
September 18, 1985.
At around noontime on that day, there were speeches
delivered by speakers from among the demonstrators
using the public address system on an improvised
platform, addressing the crowd assembled in front of the
Rural Bank. The crowd also shouted anti-Marcos and
anti-Military slogans, among others.
After a last-ditch effort to peacefully disperse the crowd
by Ponseca through a letter to the demonstrators in
front of the Rural Bank had failed, the dispersal
operation by Capt. Sanson began. Four firetrucks were
dispatched to the crowd of demonstrators, two of them
— the Cadiz and Escalante firetrucks — towards the
demonstrators massed in front of the Rural Bank of
Escalante. These hosed the demonstrators with water
but even after the water from them had been exhausted,
the demonstrators stayed put. Capt. Sanson then
ordered the throwing of teargas to the demonstrators by
565
two of his men, Amar and Mercado. The tear gas
caused the demonstrators to lie face down on the
ground; they persisted in their places rather than
disperse. Then, a single shot rang out followed by
successive gunfire from different directions. As one
witness had described it, it was like New Year‘s Eve.
This firing lasted for a few minutes.
Capt. Sanson had been heard by some of the witnesses
to have shouted ―Stop firing‖ repeatedly and, after
some time, the firing had stopped, but not soon enough
for men and women from the rallyists‘ group who died
and others who were wounded as a result of the gunfire
HELD: The use of bullets to break up an assembly of
people petitioning for redress of grievance cannot but
be bewailed. It is bound to happen again for as long as
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
abuses in government abound. Precisely to help put a
brake on official abuses, people empowerment was
codified in various provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It
is high time to remind our officials that under our
Constitution power does not come from the barrel of a
gun but from the ballots of the people. It is thus
important to know the unexpurgated will of the people
for in a republican government, it is the people who
should truly rule. Consequently, the right of the people
to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of
grievance should not be abridged by officials
momentarily holding the powers of government.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
BANGALISAN vs. CA
Facts: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among
the 800 public school teachers who staged ―mass
actions‖ on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their
grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure
of the public authorities to implement in a just and
correct manner certain laws and measures intended for
their material benefit.
On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to
comply with said order, hence they were charged by the
Secretary with ―grave misconduct; gross neglect of
duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and
regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to
perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
absence without official leave in violation of PD 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines.‖ They were simultaneously placed under
preventive suspension.
Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their
answer to the complaint. On October 30, 1990, the
DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners
guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service
effective immediately.
566
Held: As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, ―It is
not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional
right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the
manner in which they exercised such right which
resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service and classes in various public schools in
Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient but non-
disruptive avenues, other
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
than the mass actions in question, whereby
petitioners could petition the
government for redress of grievances.‖
It bears stressing that suspension of public services,
however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the
public, which is one of the reasons why the right to
strike is denied government employees. It may be
conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and
noble intentions in staging the ―mass actions,‖ but that
will not justify their absences to the prejudice of
innocent school children. Their righteous indignation
does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
GSIS v. Kapisanan ng Manggagawa ng GSIS
Facts: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October
7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel,
among them members of the herein respondent
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS ("KMG" or
the "Union"), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file
employees. Contingents from other government
agencies joined causes with the GSIS group. The mass
action's target appeared to have been herein petitioner
Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of
Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence
of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by
a prior approved leave.
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS
Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131
union and non-union members to show cause why they
should not be charged administratively for their
participation in said rally.
Held: The mass action was held to be invalid because
of a contract stipulation stating that: ―The GSIS
Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to
promote the principle of shared responsibility … on all
matters and decisions affecting the rights, benefits and
interests of all GSIS employees …. Accordingly,
… the parties also mutually agree that the KMG shall
not declare a strike nor stage any concerted action
which will disrupt public service and the GSIS
567
management shall not lockout employees who are
members of the KMG during the term of this agreement.
GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the
employees to air their sentiments through peaceful
concerted activities during allowable hours, subject to
reasonable office rules ....‖
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at
someone for non-exhaustion of less confrontational
remedies, it should be at the respondent union
for spearheading a concerted mass action without
resorting to available settlement mechanism.
MALABANAN VS RAMENTO
FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme
Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a
meeting to protest the merger of two units of the
university. On the scheduled date, the students
continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time
and held it in a different place from that indicated in
the permit. They expressed in a vehement language
their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes
and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed
under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were
found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
defamation. They were suspended for one academic
year. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and
academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC
allowed the students to enroll. But there is a need to
pass squarely on the constitutional question. Respect
for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and
free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of
suspension. Suspending them for one year is out of
proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of
views was expected. The excitement of the occasion,
the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the
exuberance of the youth should be taken into
consideration.
ALCUAZ v. PSBA
FACTS: On May 2, 1988, the Second Division rendered
a decision in the instant case which prodded the
Intervener Union to file a motion for reconsideration, its
arguments hinges the pronouncement that: Likewise it
is provided in the Manual, that the written contact
required for college teachers are for one semester. It is
thus evident that after the close of First Semester. The
PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either
with the students, or with the intervening teachers. Such
being the case, the charge of denial of due process in
untenable.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
568
ISSUE: Whether or not a written contract between the
school and its employees and students are valid only for
one semester.
HELD: The motion was denied. Furthermore, in
conclusion, the court reiterates that while we value the
rights of students to complete their in the school or
university of their choice and while We fully respect their
right to resort rallies and demonstrations for the redress
of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of
speech and their right to assemble, still such
rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always
be conducted peacefully, without resort to intimidation,
coercion, violence. Academic freedom in all forms,
demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise
would be subvert freedom into degenerate license.
AGLIPAY v. RUIZ
Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of
prohibition against respondent
Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner
contends that such act is a violation of the
Constitutional provision stating that no public funds
shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result
of the principle of the separation of church and state, for
the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state
will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to
further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that
such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052,
providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for
the production and issuance of postage stamps as
would be advantageous to the government.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the
freedom to religion. NO
violation
Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious
freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however
not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion
and is not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt
and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No.
4052 ―advantageous to the government‖ does not
authorize violation of the
Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not
inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denomination. They were not sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
569
chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words
―Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.‖ The
focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress
but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress.
This was to ―to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourists,‖ the officials merely took
advantage of an event considered of international
importance. Although such issuance and sale may be
inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any
benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it
was no the aim or purpose of the Government.
EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
Facts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed
suit challenging the ability of the Respondent to
reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students
for the transportation of their children to and from
school. The Petitioner brought suit alleging that the New
Jersey reimbursement statute respects the
establishment of religion, by allowing the parents of
parochial school students to benefit from the
reimbursement scheme. The New Jersey Court of
Appeals held that the statute did not violate the
Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United
States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to consider
the issue.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Issue. This case considers whether the parents of
parochial school children can benefit from the same
services afforded to the parents of public school
children.
Held. Affirmed.
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court found the statute was not
unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a
benefit to the parents of all school children, distinct from
any religious function in which the children engaged
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al
(2003)
FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates
under DSWD, is a non- governmental organization that
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions
petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal
certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the
Philippine Halal
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office
on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation.
570
Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive
authority to issue halal certificates and perform other
related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the
subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State and that it is
unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies
and guidelines on the halal certification scheme
because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly
perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional
provision as to freedom of religion. YES
RULING: Without doubt, classifying a food product as
halal is a religious function because the standards used
are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as
halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret
for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the
task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect
forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention
of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement
of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion
is constitutionally unacceptable.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
RAUL GONZALEZ v. ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA.
Facts: Gonzalez brought the suit against the archbishop
in the CFI of Manila and prayed for judgment declaring
that he, the lawful heir to the chaplaincy and its income;
establishing the right of the petitioner and his
successors to be appointed to and receive the income
of the chaplaincy during their infancy whenever it may
be vacant and, pending such appointment, to receive
the income for their maintenance and support. The trial
court directed the archbishop to appoint Gonzalez as
chaplain; and ordered payment to him the sum being
the aggregate net income of the chaplaincy during
the vacancy, less the expense of having the
prescribed masses celebrated in each year. It reserved
to the petitioner any legal right he may have to proceed
in the proper court for cancellation of the certificate of
registration of the property in the name of the
archbishop.
Issue: Is the Gonzalez legally entitled to be appointed
the chaplain?
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Ruling: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
reversed the judgment and absolved the archbishop
from the complaint, 'without prejudice to the right of
proper persons in interest to proceed for independent
relief,' in respect to the income accrued during the
571
vacancy, or in respect to the reformation of the
certificate of registration so as to show the fiduciary
character of the title. Without deciding whether such
disposition of the surplus was proper or what should be
its disposition in the future, that a son of the last
incumbent, who was properly refused appointment as
chaplain because he had not the qualifications
prescribed by the Canon Law, was not entitled, as the
nearest relative, to the accrued surplus.
Austria vs. NLRC
Facts: Private Respondent Central Philippine Union
Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists
(hereinafter referred to as the "SDA") is a religious
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
law and is represented in this case by the other private
respondents, officers of the SDA)
The records show that petitioner Pastor Dionisio V.
Austria worked with the SDA
for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991.
Thereafter, on 16 October 1991, at around 7:30 a.m.,
petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, the
president of the Negros Mission. During said call,
petitioner tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the
Executive Committee for the purpose of settling the
dispute between him and the private respondent, Pastor
David Rodrigo. The dispute between Pastor Rodrigo
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
and petitioner arose from an incident in which petitioner
assisted his friend, Danny Diamada, to collect from
Pastor Rodrigo the unpaid balance for the repair of the
latter's motor vehicle which he failed to pay to Diamada.
29 October 1991, petitioner received a letter of
dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross
and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an
offense against the person of employer's duly
authorized representative, as grounds for the
termination of his services.
HELD: The case at bar does not concern an
ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the
State from taking cognizance of the same. An
ecclesiastical affair is
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
"one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of
worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful
laws and regulations for the government of the
membership, and the power of excluding from such
associations those deemed unworthy of membership.
Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair
involves the relationship between the church and its
572
members and relate to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.
While the matter at hand relates to the church and its
religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a
religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an
employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely
secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice
of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this
case, petitioner was not ex- communicated or expelled
from the membership of the SDA but was terminated
from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an
employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different
from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from
the religious congregation.
K. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
1. Scope
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Assoc., Inc.
v. Sec. of DILG
403 SCRA 558 (2003)
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
Sections 193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, for being
violative of the equal protection clause and non-
impairment clause of the Constitution because of the
withdrawal by the said Code of the tax exemptions
previously enjoyed by petitioners.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no
violation of the equal protection clause. The equal
protection clause under the Constitution means that no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place in like
circumstances. The guaranty of the equal protection of
laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable
classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1)
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of
the same class. The Court held that there is reasonable
classification under the Local Government Code to
justify the different tax treatment between electric
cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended,
and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.
The Court likewise ruled that there was no
violation of the non-impairment clause. The
constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the
obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in
existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change
must not only impair the obligation of the existing
contract, but the impairment must be substantial. What
constitutes substantial impairment was explained by this
Court in Clemons v. Nolting: A law which changes the
terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the
time or mode of performance, or imposes new
conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from
that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the
obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect
573
a change in the rights of the parties with reference to
each other and not with respect to non-parties.
Clemons v. Nolting
42 Phil. 702 (1922)
Clemons, an American citizen, agreed to be
employed as an electrical engineer for the government
at the sum of $4,000 per annum. The government
promised to pay to the petitioner his salary in "dollars ;"
the contract was made in the United States; the
Government offered to pay the petitioner in "Philippine
currency" at the rate of two to one which Clemons
refused; at the time the payment in question was
offered, Philippine currency was at a discount; two
pesos in Philippine currency was not equivalent to one
"dollar" and the petitioner insisted that his salary should
be paid in "dollars" or their equivalent value.
The issue in this case was whether the
Government of the Philippine Islands, when it enters
into a contract with an officer or employee under a
promise to pay his salary in "dollars," pay such salary in
Philippine currency at the rate of two to one if the officer
or employee insists that his salary should be paid in the
terms (specie) of his contract. Respondent Auditor
General contends that under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands a debt of the Government, payable in
"dollars," may be paid in Philippine currency at the rate
of two to one even though the debt grew out of a special
contract which provided that the same should be paid in
"dollars."
The Court said that the right of the legislative
department of the state to adopt legislation changing or
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
altering the obligation of contract has been answered in
the negative so many times that it scarcely merits the
citation of authorities now in its support. A law which
changes the terms of a legal contract between parties,
either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes
new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from
that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the
obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect
a change in the rights of the parties with reference to
each other and not with respect to non-parties.
2. Limitations
a. Police Power
Philippine National Bank v. Remigio
231 SCRA 362 (1994)
Respondent obtained a loan from PNB and
mortgaged five parcels of land as security. Respondent
defaulted on said loan; hence, PNB extra-judicially
foreclosed the properties in question. Respondent made
partial payments to his indebtedness. Meanwhile, P.D.
No 72 was enacted that mandated agrarian reform.
Under said law, lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not
be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the
promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972.
Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer
Program" was launched; among the areas it covered
were the parcels of land. PNB offered to sell the land to
respondent at a much higher price as to which he
refused since he reasoned that he had already paid
more than double of his previous indebtedness. So,
574
respondent filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale
and breach of contract. While the case was yet pending
with the trial court, petitioner additionally received from
the Land Bank of the Philippines cash and Land Bank
Bonds in payment of the foreclosed parcels. The trial
court ruled against respondent which the Court Appeals
reversed.
The Court ruled that the parcels of land in dispute
were clearly still subject to private respondent's right of
redemption. It said that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of
impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage
contracts affecting said lands. There is no question,
however, that the land reform program of the
government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and
mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12),
was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of
the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the
Supreme Court that the Constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the state. One limitation
on the contract clause arises from the police power, the
reason being that public welfare is superior to private
rights.
Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations
17 SCRA 25 (1966)
Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and
Teresa Ilusorio, are co-owners of a parcel of land
situated in the Barrio of Bantug, Municipality of San
Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The main respondents
herein — i.e. the fifteen (15) winning tenants named in
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the dispositive part above-quoted — have for years
worked on said land under the share tenancy system.
Before the beginning of the agricultural year 1960-1961,
they gave notice to the petitioners, in conformity with the
provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, that they (respondents) wanted to change
their tenancy contract from share tenancy system to
leasehold tenancy. Petitioners filed suit alleging that the
aforesaid section of said law is unconstitutional on the
ground that it violates the freedom of contract and
impairs property rights, as well the obligation of
contracts.
In upholding the constitutionality of the law, the
Court said that the purpose of the law in question is to
maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and
cultivation of the land or afford them protection against
unjustified dismissal from their landholdings. Republic
Act No. 1199 is unquestionably a remedial legislation
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of
the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power
of the State to promote the common weal. It is a statute
relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the State and involving the
public rights and public welfare of the entire community
affected by it. Republic Act No. 1199, like the previous
tenancy laws enacted by our law-making body, was
passed by Congress in compliance with the
constitutional mandate that 'the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
all the people should be the concern of the State' (Art.
II, sec. 5) and that 'the State shall regulate the relations
between landlord and tenant . . . in agriculture . . ..' (Art.
XIV, sec. 6)."
575
Ganzon v. Inserto
123 SCRA 713 (1983)
Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings
to extra-judicially foreclose a real estate mortgage
executed by the private respondents in his favor. The
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed between
private respondents Randolph Tajanlangit and Esteban
Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo
Ganzon as mortgagee on the other hand was to secure
the payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note
amounting to P40,000.00 in favor of Ganzon. A day
before the scheduled public auction, the private
respondents filed a civil action for specific performance,
damages, and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the petitioners with the respondent court. Then,
private respondents filed a "Motion For Release Of Real
Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or
Cash In Lieu Thereof," which the trial court granted
notwithstanding the opposition of private respondents.
The issue in this case is whether or not the trial
court may order the cancellation of a mortgage lien
annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the
payment of a promissory note and substitute such
mortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the same
court to secure the payment of the promissory note.
The Court said that the questioned orders violate
the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed
under the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with
a surety bond to secure the payment of the P40,000.00
note would in effect change the terms and conditions of
the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has
directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its
efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition.
b. Eminent Domain
Kabiling v. National Housing Authority
156 SCRA 623 (1987)
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1808, a law authorizing the expropriation of
properties in favor of qualified squatter families, on the
ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition
against impairment of the obligation of contracts.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of said
decree. The stated objective of the decree, namely, to
resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza
area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive
development plans for this depressed community,
provides the justification for the exercise of the police
power of the State. The police power of the State has
been described as "the most essential, insistent and
illimitable of powers." It is a power inherent in the State,
plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state
and imposing upon the government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure
to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and
welfare.
The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No.
1808 impairs the obligations of contract is without merit.
576
The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the
exercise of the police power of the State in the interest
of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
c. Taxation
La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco
39 Phil. 567 (1919)
A contract was entered into between La Insular
and the two defendants, Manuel Nubla Co-Siong and
Rafael Machuca Go-Tauco (as surety), whereby the
plaintiff became obliged to supply cigarettes daily to
Manuel Nubla Co-Siong in a quantity of not less than
two nor more than five boxes of two thousand packages
each at a fixed price of P172 per box. When the
contract was executed, cigarettes were subject to a
specific tax of one peso for each thousand cigarettes
which liability incurred to the manufacturer, plaintiff-
appellee La Insular. A new law was passed which
increased the specific tax on cigarettes from P1 to
P1.20 per thousand cigarettes. The monthly statements
thereafter submitted to the purchaser by the plaintiff
showed this increase. Defendant was not able to pay its
purchases to which La Insular filed suit for specific
performance. The trial court acted favorably to La
Insular.
The dispute is upon the point of liability for the
increased tax imposed by Act No. 2432. Defendant Co-
Siong contends that said law increases from P172 to
P182 per box the price which he was obligated to pay
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
for the cigarettes, which alteration in the contract has
the effect of releasing the surety.
The Court held that that in order to effect a
release of the surety, the change in the contract must,
as a general rule, be made by the principal parties to
the contract. A recognized exception — more apparent
than real — is found in cases where sureties on official
bonds have been held to be released as a result of
changes effected by the Legislature in the duration of
the official term or in the duties of the officer whose
fidelity is intended to be secured by the bond.
In the case at bar the Government of the
Philippine Islands was in no sense a party to the
contract of July 15, 1913, between the plaintiff and the
defendants; and it is readily seen that when the
Legislature of these Islands increased the internal
revenue tax upon cigarettes, this was an act done by a
stranger to the contract, and not by any person in privity
therewith. The consequence is that, properly speaking,
the legislative fiat, placing the burden of the tax on the
purchaser, did not in any wise affect the obligation of
the contract as between the parties. It was merely an
external factor which, supervening upon the situation
created by the contract, made it impossible for the
purchaser to realize the benefit which would have
accrued to him if the seller had been required to pay the
tax. Nearly all changes in taxation affect existing
contracts in some way or other, but this does not
necessarily change such contracts in a legal sense.
Hence, where an Act of the Legislature imposes a
new or additional tax upon goods contracted to be sold
and places the burden of paying said tax upon the
purchaser, the obligation of the contract between the
577
contracting parties is not thereby changed in the sense
necessary to release the surety upon the obligation for
the purchase price of the goods.
3. Franchises, privileges, licenses, etc., do not come
within the context of the provision.
C & M Timber Corp. v. Alcala
273 SCRA 437 (1997), Supra
C & M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification
of the order of the Office of the President, declaring as
of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA)
No. 106 issued to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No.
106, with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680
hectares of forest land in the municipalities of Dipaculao
and Dinalongan in the Province of Aurora and the
Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province. The
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
revoked said license on the grounds of gross violation of
its terms and conditions. It also did not reinstate their
TLA saying that it might negate efforts to enhance the
conservation and protection of our forest resources. On
appeal, petitioner points out that there is no total log ban
in the country; that Congress has yet to make a
pronouncement on the issue; that any notice to this
effect "must be stated in good form, not implied"; and
that in any case, any new policy consideration should
be prospective in application and cannot affect
petitioner's vested rights in its TLA No. 106.
The Court said that the cancellation of its license
does not constitute an impairment of the obligation of its
contract. It cited the case of Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: "while the
administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation
of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . .
More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a
private logging company are pitted against that of the
public at large on the pressing public policy issue of
forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause."
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections
289 SCRA 337, Supra
Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 prohibits the sale
or donation of print space or air time for political ads,
except to the Commission on Elections. Petitioners
challenge the validity thereof on the ground (1) that it
takes property without due process of law and without
just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
578
and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media of communication or information during the
period of election.
Radio and television broadcasting companies do
not own the airwaves and frequencies through which
they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege of using them or
franchise, the exercise of the which may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
form of public service, such as providing print space or
air time to Comelec. Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must
be deemed incorporated in R.A. No. 7252 granting GMA
Network, Inc. a franchise and does not constitute denial
of due process and that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an
invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the
enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner
in accepting a public grant of privilege.
An administrative agency cannot, in the exercise
of lawmaking, amend a statute of Congress. Therefore
§2 of Resolution No. 2983-A of the Comelec providing
for payment of just compensation is invalid.
B.P. Blg. 881, §92 does not single out radio and
television stations in providing free air time. There are
important differences in the characteristics of the
broadcast media and the print media, which justify their
differential treatment for free speech purposes.
The freedom of television and radio broadcasting
is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded
to newspaper and print media.
What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or
regulate by Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, among
other things, is the use by media of information of their
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the
COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print
space or air time for political ads. In other words, the
object of supervision or regulation is different from the
object of the prohibition.
L. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS
Art. III, Sec. 11
M. MIRANDA DOCTINE
Art. III, Sec. 12
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
The U.S. Supreme Court, through Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, held that statements obtained from
defendants during incommunicado interrogation in
police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of
constitutional rights, were inadmissible as having been
obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
It laid down procedural rules which the police and
the prosecution should follow when a person is under
custodial investigation. 1) Prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of defendant
unless it demonstrates use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure privilege against self-incrimination. 2)
“Custodial interrogation”, within rule limiting admissibility
of statements stemming from such interrogation, means
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
579
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
3) Unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused person of the right to silence and to
assure continuous opportunity to exercise it, person
must, before any questioning, be warned that he has
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has
right to presence of attorney, retained or appointed. 4)
Defendant may waive effectuation of right to counsel
and to remain silent, provided that waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 5) There can be
no questioning if defendant indicates in any manner and
at any stage of interrogation process that he wishes to
consult with attorney before speaking. 6) Police may not
question individual if he is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated. 7)
Mere fact that accused may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of right to refrain from answering
any further inquiries until he has consulted with attorney
and thereafter consents to be questioned. 8) Coercion
can be mental as well as physical and blood of accused
is not the only hallmark of unconstitutional inquisition. 9)
Incommunicado interrogation of individuals in police-
dominated atmosphere, while not physical intimidation,
is equally destructive of human dignity, and current
practice is at odds with principle that individual may not
be compelled to incriminate himself.
People v. De la Cruz
279 SCRA 245 (1997)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless
bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr. and his children, 12-
year old Karen Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John
Lester D. Laroya, were discovered in their residence by
their horrified neighbors. They were all bloodied
consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of
them had a knife still embedded in and protruding from
their bodies when found. Karen Verona also bore
external signs of sexual assault. None of their
neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders.
On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended
appellant. They interrogated appellant regarding the
crimes on the same day that he was arrested. The
investigation commenced at around 9:00 A.M. at the
police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal at the time when
appellant was still without counsel.
Appellant, who was afflicted with a problem in
expressing himself and with an impediment in his
speech (ngo-ngo) and who only reached the fourth
grade of elementary schooling, was charged with
multiple murder. Appellant's defense was that he was
not fully apprised of his constitutional rights prior to and
while undergoing custodial investigation. Appellant
testified that although he was conversant with Tagalog,
he is unable to read and write, although he can sign his
name. He bluntly repudiated his extrajudicial confession
and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel
of his choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza
Bernardino-Villanueva, his supposed counsel. Record
shows that his answers to the questions appearing in
his extrajudicial confession are in fluent, flawless and
expressive Tagalog. Appellant further claimed that he
was tortured by the police authorities into signing the
580
same. While he admits having been at the residence of
the victims on the night that they were murdered, he
flatly denied having killed them as he left the trio well
and alive that same night when he proceeded to his
brother's place in Fort Bonifacio. The trial court
rendered judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse.
The Supreme Court held that the accused under
custodial interrogation must continuously have a
counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Prior
to the commencement of the investigation, the accused
must be informed, on top of all his other rights
enumerated therein, that where he lacks a counsel of
his choice because of indigence or other incapacitating
cause, he shall be provided with one. Appellant's
conviction must be set aside for his extrajudicial
confession obtained without assistance of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence against him; that the Bill of
Rights treats of both "confessions" and "admissions" in
the same light. With the exception of appellant's
putative extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of
his alleged guilt has been presented by the People.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-
appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J
Facts:
- Two men and a woman were seen grappling for
possession of a bag. After taking possession of the
bag, the 2 armed men shot the woman in the head.
They then boarded a tricycle driven by Del Rosario
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
and sped away. Witnesses took note of the tricycle’s
plate number.
- The police then located Del Rosario and invited him
for interview. Del Rosario then gave statements
concerning the locations and identities of the
gunmen. (He even went with them to the location of
the gunmen but one of the gunmen was found dead
after a shootout that had taken place earlier) He was
thereafter detained in the police station as ordered by
the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on a later
date. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His
Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance
of Ex-Judge Talavera. He was later charged with
Robbery with Homicide.
- Transcripts reveal that del Rosario was handcuffed by
police because allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him and they were afraid
that he might attempt to escape.
Issues:
W/N Del Rosario’s Miranda rights were violated.
Held:
YES, THEY WERE
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it
encompasses any question initiated by law enforces
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprive of his freedom of action in any significant way.
581
41
This concept of custodial investigation has been
broadened by RA 7438 42to include "the practice of
issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides
that —
. . . . Any public officer or employee, or
anyone acting under his order or in his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates
any person for the commission of an
offense shall inform the latter, in a
language known and understood by him, of
his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at
all times be allowed to confer privately with
the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the
investigating officer.
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was
deprived of his rights during custodial investigation.
From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the
house of the baranggay captain, he was already under
effective custodial investigation, but he was not
apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating
officers. The police already knew the name of the
tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the
robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since
the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions
on his participation in the crime even before his actual
arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same
transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the
Bill of Rights.
His warrantless arrest was also illegal as it was not
among those permitted by Rule 113.
Dispositive
ACQUITTED and RELEASED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BENITO BRAVO, accused-appellant.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Facts:
- Nine year old Len-len Antolin was found dead, an
apparent victim of rape with homicide. Bravo was seen
talking to Len-len on the day of her disappearance,
inviting her to an alleged birthday party and to a treat
of balut and Coke. He was then seen to be leaving
with Len-len.
- The police found Bravo at his work place and invited
him for questioning after informing him that he was a
suspect for Len-len’s killing. At the police station,
Bravo admitted that he was with Len-len but he was
too drunk on the night in question that he could not
remember what he did to her. The police did not
inform Bravo of his Miranda rights because, according
to them, he was only being informally interviewed.
Issues:
W/N Bravo’s Miranda rights were violated.
582
Held:
YES, THEY WERE
The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of
Juanita Antolin and any statement allegedly made by
him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime
without prior notification of his constitutional rights is
inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent
attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the
admission was made during an "informal talk" prior to
custodial investigation proper is not tenable. The
appellant was not invited to the police station as part of
a general inquiry for any possible lead to the
perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time
the alleged admission was made the appellant was in
custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in
the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary
rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced,
the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of such
presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial
confession to that effect and the appellant's denial in
court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged
admission should be struck down as inadmissible.
Dispositive
ACQUITTED and RELEASED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. VALERIANO AMESTUZO y VIÑAS, FEDERICO
AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO BAGAS y
DALUHATAN and DIASCORO VIÑAS y ODAL,
accused
KAPUNAN, J.:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Facts:
- At 9:30 in the evening a group of eight armed men
wearing masks entered a house in Caloocan where
they robbed the premises and gang raped the owner’s
niece and employee.
- Bagas, one of the accused, claims that police (with
Ampatin, one of the accused) one day had barged into
the handicrafts factory in Pasay where he was
employed as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking
for a certain “Mario” and searched the building.
Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the
back of his neck with a gun and uttered, “Niloloko lang
yata tayo ng taong ito” and “Magturo ka ng tao kahit
sino.” It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to
Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to
look upon.
- Bagas was then brought to the police station where he
faced the victims of the crime face to face. He was
asked if he knew the co-accused and replied in the
negative. The policemen then told the told the
complainants that accused-appellant was one of the
suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional
frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped
when one of the policemen intervened.
Held:
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation.ii[6] Custodial investigation starts when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
583
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to
elicit incriminating statements.iii[7] Police line-up is not
part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage.iv[8] This was settled in the case of
People vs. Lamsingv[9] and in the more recent case of
People vs. Salvatierra.vi[10] The right to be assisted by
counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and
cannot be claimed by the accused during identification
in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
investigation process. This is because during a police
line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatoryvii[11] and it is usually the
witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who
gives a statement in the course of the line-up.viii[12]
Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke
his right to counsel when he was presented for
identification by the complainants because the same
was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover,
there was no showing that during his identification by
the complainants, the police investigators sought to
elicit any admission or confession from accused-
appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not
at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented
before the complainants. The alleged infringement of
the constitutional rights of the accused while under
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession
extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
conviction.ix[13] In the present case, there is no such
confession or extra-judicial admission.
As regards the manner of identification, there is no law
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification.x[14] The fact that he was brought out of
the detention cell alone and was made to stand before
the accused by himself and unaccompanied by any
other suspects or persons does not detract from the
validity of the identification process.
However, we agree that complainants’ out-of-court
identification of accused-appellant was seriously flawed
as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications,
we have applied the totality of circumstances test
enunciated in the case of People vs. Teehankeexi[15]
which lists the following factors:
xxx (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at
the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification process.
The out-of-court identification of herein accused-
appellant by complainants in the police station appears
to have been improperly suggestive. Even before
complainants had the opportunity to view accused-
appellant face-to-face when he was brought our of the
584
detention cell to be presented to them for identification,
the police made an announcement that he was one of
the suspects in the crime and that he was the one
pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits.
Also, Bagas had a credible alibi. He was locked in his
place of employment in Pasay during the night in
question.
Dispositive
BAGAS ACQUITTED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ANTHONY ESCORDIAL, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
- Escordial was charged with robbery with rape after
allegedly breaking into a ladies’ boarding house one
evening, robbing the inhabitants of their money and
raping on of them.
- Escordail, while watching a basketball game, was
invited to the police station where he was asked to
take off his shirt. The rape victim positively identified
him through a rough projection, or a keloid, on the
back of his neck and his voice.
- The other inhabitants of the boarding house identified
him through a police line up.
Held:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was
deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his
custodial interrogation, the police obtained any
statement from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory
- which was used in evidence against him. The records
do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him
guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact,
accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when
subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit
committing the crime with which he was charged. In
other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained
from accused-appellant which should have been
excluded as evidence against him.
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of
counsel in a police line-up considering that such is
usually not a part of the custodial inquest.42 However,
the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-
appellant, having been the focus of attention by the
police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie
as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already
under custodial investigation when these out-of-court
identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be
made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone
is brought face to face with the witness for identification,
while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a
witness from a group of persons gathered for that
purpose.43 During custodial investigation, these types of
identification have been recognized as "critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which
585
necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused.
This is because the results of these pre-trial
proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."44 We have
thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for
that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation
is inadmissible as evidence against him.45
Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle
Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by Erma
Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark
Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his
arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did
not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court
identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him.
Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses
regarding these identifications should have been held
inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal
lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary]
illegality.'"46
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object
immediately when these witnesses were presented by
the prosecution or when specific questions regarding
this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule
132, §36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant
must be deemed to have waived his right to object to
the admissibility of these testimonies.47
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court
identifications does not render the in-court identification
of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of
the poisonous tree."48 This in-court identification was
what formed the basis of the trial court's conviction of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from
the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a
consequence thereof,49 it is admissible as evidence
against him. However, whether or not such prosecution
evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.
ERNESTO NAVALLO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Facts:
- An audit examination revealed that Navallo, Collecting
and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National
Vocational School, had a shortage of P16,483.62.
- Navallo claims he was deprived of his rights according
to II, 12 of the Constitution when he was “pressured”
to sign the examination report.
Held:
Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his
constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the
1987 Constitution. 3Well-settled is the rule that such
rights are invocable only when the accused is under
"custodial investigation," or is "in custody
investigation,"4which we have since defined as any
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."5A person under a normal audit examination is not
under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself
586
can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer
contemplated in the above rule.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
AUGUSTO MANZANO y REYES, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
- Manzano was arrested following a buy-bust operation
where he was caught selling 4 tea-bag sized plastic
bags filled with marijuana.
- Manzano claims he has been "investigated,
interrogated and made to sign an accomplished
booking sheet and arrest report without the benefit of
counsel."
Held:
This Court has already emphasized that "(w)hen an
arrested person signs a booking sheet and arrest report
at a police station, he does not (thereby) admit the
commission of an offense nor confess to any
incriminating circumstance." 2 The booking sheet is no
more than a record of arrest and a statement on how
the arrest is made. It is simply a police report, and it has
no probative value as an extrajudicial statement of the
person being detained. 3The signing by the accused of
the booking sheet and arrest report is not a part of the
custodial investigation which would otherwise require
the presence of counsel to ensure the protection of the
accused's constitutional rights.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
alias TOTO, accused. GERRY GALGARIN alias
TOTO, accused-appellant.
Bellosillo, J.:
Facts:
- Endino and Galgarin stabbed and shot Dennis Aquino
in front of his girlfriend in Puerto Princesa City. Aquino
then died.
- Galgarin was arrested in Antipolo and was set to be
transported to Palawan to stand trial. On the way to
the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television
station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by
reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken
showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to
his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. His
interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news
program TV Patrol.
- Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he
made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced
by the threats of the arresting police officers. He
asserted that the videotaped confession was
constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the
Constitution.
Held:
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-
appellant's videotaped confession, we find such
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video
and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of
newsmen. Such confession does not form part of
587
custodial investigation as it was not given to police
officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit
sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if
he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could
have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all
likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of
television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the
recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases,14 it is
prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme
caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the
connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions
and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having
an accused admit an offense on television. Such a
situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights
of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
system.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC
GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
- Guillermo, an employee of Keyser plastics,
approached the company guard and calmly told him
that he killed Victor Keyser and requested for help in
carrying the body to the garbage dump so that he may
burn it.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- Once police arrived at the premises, a half-naked
Guillermo told them” Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko
ako, haharapin ko ito.” They then found Keyser’s
dismembered limbs and chopped torso. Keyser’s head
was found in a cement bag.
- When the police asked how he did it, according to the
prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed
the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after
Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a
carpenter’s saw. He then mopped up the blood on the
floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to
the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of
coconut lumber and a carpenter’s saw. When asked
as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that
Keyser had been maltreating him and his co-
employees.2[17] He expressed no regret whatsoever
about his actions.
- The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP
Station for further investigation, which was conducted
without apprising the appellant about his constitutional
rights and without providing him with the services of
counsel.
- Guillermo, who was in police custody, was
subsequently interviewed by Gus Abelgas of ABSCBN
and Kara David of GMA 7 where he admitted
committing the crime and expressed no remorse. He
described how he committed the killings as well as his
motive (he was treated like an animal, being made to
work for years without being paid and was improperly
fed).
2 3
588
Held:
The confession appellant made while he was under
investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of
Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the
protective standards laid down by the Constitution.
Under Article III of the Constitution,3[43] a confession to
be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a)
the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession
must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (c) the confession must be
express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.
Even if the admission or confession of an accused is
gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the
appellant’s confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo
PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to
his acquittal. The facts in this case clearly show that
appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just
to the police but also to private individuals.
Appellant’s spontaneous statements made to a private
security guard, not an agent of the State or a law
enforcer, are not covered by the Miranda principles and,
as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him.
Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the
media, appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by
the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the
commission of the crime
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. LINDES PAYNOR, accused-appellant.
Regalado, J.:
Facts:
- Aquinaldo, a middle-aged teacher was stabbed and
killed inside her classroom. Witnesses saw a man in
blue maong pants, and white T-shirt printed in front,
using slippers and a brown hat, and with a green towel
wrapped around his neck.
- When police went to Aguinaldo’s family to inquire for
possible suspects, they pointed to appellant, the “jilted
boyfriend” of the victim’s sister, as a possible suspect.
- Policemen went to Paynor’s workplace and found him
wearing maong pants, white T-shirt with markings in
front, with a yellow towel wrapped around his neck
and a brown hat on his head. He was brought to the
station where he was positively identified by
witnesses.
- Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation
of his rights while under custodial investigation, in light
of the Miranda doctrine, when allegedly the police
investigators unceremoniously stripped him of his
clothing and personal items, and the same were later
introduced as evidence during the trial.
Held:
The Court is not persuaded. The protection of the
accused under custodial investigation, which is invoked
by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion. Section
12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such
589
accused shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to
waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel,
and that any confession or admission obtained in
violation of his rights shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him. As held in People vs. Gamboa, this
constitutional right applies only against testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may
validly be compelled to be photographed or measured,
or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to
move his body to enable the foregoing things to be
done, without running afoul of the proscription against
testimonial compulsion
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
Sarmiento, J.:
Facts:
- Usman Hassan, an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart
cargador, was accused of murder for stabbing to
death Ramon Pichel solely on the basis of one
witness’s testimony, which was taken only 2 days after
the incident and sworn to 4 days after the killing and
was practically forced out by the police. Witness said
victim was stabbed only once, which was disputed by
the medico-legal report which found the victim tabbed
6 times.
- Hassan was also “presented” alone to the witness by
the police and the relatives of the victim in the Funeral
Parlor.
Held:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to
confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral
parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was
"pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where
there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all
told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This
unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of
Identification, which revolts against the accepted
principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the
esteem of every just man, and commands neither our
respect nor acceptance."20
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police
investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness
and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to
counsel in all stages of the investigation into the
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial
stage — the Identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became
just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive
moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against
the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The
police procedure adopted in this case in which only the
accused was presented to witness Samson, in the
funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving
relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled
confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the
constitutionally entrenched protection. For this
infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be
acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T.
ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL
590
DOE and SEVERAL OTHER DOES (at large),
accused, DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T.
ITAAS, accused-appellants.
De Leon Jr, J.:
Facts:
- Continente et al were charged with the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder in connection with the
ambush of US Col. James Rowe’s (JUSMAG
Commander) car in the corner of Tomas Morato and
Timog, which led to his death.
- Central Intelligence Service (CIS) agents established
through a confidential intelligence information the
involvement of Continente, an employee of the U.P.
Collegian in U.P. Diliman.
- Continente was taken into custody where he admitted
to his participation in the ambush as a member of the
surveillance unit under the Political Assassination
Team of the CPP-NPA. Documents were confiscated,
including a letter which had the acronyms "STR
PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng
Rebolusyon" and "Political Assassination Team,
Regional Command".
- Itaas was likewise arrested following intelligence
information. He likewise admitted his participation in
the ambush as member of the NPA’s Sparrow unit.
- Continente and Itaas insisted on making extrajudicial
confessions to the police despite the absence of
counsel. They were nevertheless provided with
counsel by the police, who assisted them.
Held:
Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly
repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
assistance during their respective investigations as
biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized that
both appellants never signified their desire to have
lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it has been
ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases
where a person under custodial investigation cannot
afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in
the police investigators, the accused really has the final
choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and
ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where
he never raised any objection against the former's
appointment during the course of the investigation and
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer.xii[57]
If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against
advising the appellants notto give their statements
involving the ambush, the said lawyers were merely
complying with their oaths to abide by the truth. The
counsel should never prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth.xiii[58] Whether it is an
extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the
purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.xiv[59] What
is sought to be protected with the constitutional right to
counsel is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts. The right is guaranteed merely to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to provide him with the best
defense.
People v Hatton
16 June 1992
591
Medialdea, J.
Facts:
Faustino Algarme and 3 friends were walking down
the street when Hatton allegedly stabbed Faustino.
Hatton and his companion fled while Algarme was
rushed to the hospital where he died.
One of Algarme’s companions reported the incident
to the police headquarters. Three policemen, one of
whom was identified as Titing Varela, accompanied him
to the scene of the crime where they beamed their
flashlights towards the house of Nonong Hatton where
he believed the tall man and his companion entered.
According to Algarme’s companion, the day after the
incident when he went to the Police station to shed light
on the incident, he narrated to the police officers what
really transpired. He told them that the features of the
assailant was still in his memory and that if they can
show or present a person who will fit his description, he
can identify him. He waited at the police station but the
police failed to present any person to him. On the
second day after the incident, he was picked-up from
his office and made to identify their suspect who turned
out to be the accused-appellant. The latter was sitting
on a bench in the police station and a policeman
pointed to him as their suspect.
Hatton interposed the defense of alibi. He testified
that on that same night, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m.,
he was in the house of his friend to celebrate the
baptism of a friend’s child. During the entire period, he
got up only twice to go to the comfort room.
Issue:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
1. W/N Hatton was properly identified in a police
line-up.
2. W/N he was deprived of his right to be
represented by counsel.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
The prosecution through its witness, made it appear
that the latter identified the accused-appellant in a
police line-up. The details however, showed otherwise.
From his testimony, it is clear that he did not positively
identify the accused-appellant. At the time of the
incident he made a very fleeting glance on the person
who stabbed the victim. At that moment, he had the
impression that the assailant was a mestizo. During the
proceedings in the police station where he was
supposed to identify the assailant, he identified the
accused-appellant as allegedly the person who stabbed
the deceased, not because he was certain that the
accused-appellant was really the assailant but because
he was the only mestizo in the station and because he
was pointed to the policemen as their suspect. The fact
is that the accused-appellant was not identified in a
police line-up. He was pointed to by the police as their
suspect. He being the only mestizo in the station, the
witness pointed to him as "the man." From all
indications, the identification of accused-appellant by
Ongue was suggested by the police and this is
objectionable.
2. NO.
Hatton argued that when he was presented in a line-
up of sorts he was not represented by a counsel. This
592
allegedly violates his constitutional right to counsel
during custodial investigation.
This argument raised by appellant has no merit. The
doctrine enunciated in the case of U.S. v Wade is that
the presence of counsel is indispensable in a post-
indictment line-up. In this case, the accused had already
been arrested and a lawyer already appointed to
represent him. It was fifteen days after his arrest and
the appointment of a lawyer to represent him when he
was presented in a police line-up to be identified by the
prosecution witness.
In the instant case, Hatton was brought to the police
station only to be identified by a witness to the killing of
Algarme. Technically, he was not yet under custodial
investigation.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation. i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point
or stage. the person being interrogated must be
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admission or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for
the commission of an offense.
People v De Guzman
Melo, J.
30 June 1993
Facts:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
De Guzman et al fired at a family in a jeepney hitting
the passengers and killing the father. They later
hijacked another jeepney and rode away.
The accused were identified from a group of 15
persons who were presented to 3 of the victims.
During the joint trial of the cases, they were again
positively identified the as the perpetrators of the
crimes. Particularly, Lorna Carteciano further testified
that Victor Nuñez was the gunman who shot her
husband, Major Carteciano, in the head.
(Topical) It is alleged that the accused-appellant was
deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when he
was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance
of counsel.
Issue:
W/N accused was deprived of his constitutional
right to counsel.
Held/Ratio:
NO.
He was not then under custodial investigation. The
right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an
investigation, that is, when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the accused. At such
point or stage, the person being interrogated must be
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation the
right is likewise not violated where during a police line-
up where the accused was identified by the victim,
593
because he was not, at that moment, under custodial
investigation.
People v Ordono and Medina
Per Curiam
29 June 2000
Facts:
The decomposing body of a young girl was found in
the bushes. She was identified as Shirley Victore, who
was reported missing 3 days before. The NBI
examination revealed that she was raped and strangled
to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to the accused who
were invited by the police for questioning. However, for
lack of evidence linking them to the crime, they were
allowed to go home.
They returned a few days later and acknowledged
having committed the crime. Acting on their admission,
the police immediately conducted an investigation and
put their confessions in writing. The investigators
however could not at once get the services of a lawyer
to assist them in the course of the investigation because
there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of
Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be
that as it may, the statements of the two accused where
nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused
were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional
right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent
counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and
assurance that they understood their rights and did not
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
require the services of counsel, the investigation was
conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor,
the Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La
Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving
of their voluntary statements.
They were thereafter detained. A local radio host
visited them to interview them. A few days later, they
were brought to the PAO for assistance and counseling.
The PAO lawyer, Atty. Corpuz, apprised each of the
accused of his constitutional rights and, even though
their confessions were already written in their dialect,
explained to them each of the questions and answers
taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them
to ponder the consequences of their confessions,
leading them to defer the affixing of their second
signature/ thumbmark thereon.
After a week or so, the two separately went back to
Atty. Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to
affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second
time in their respective confessions. Once again Atty.
Corpuz apprised them of their constitutional rights,
explained the contents of their respective statements,
and finally, accompanied them to Judge Fabian M.
Bautista, MTC judge who further apprised them of their
constitutional rights and asked them if they had been
coerced into signing their confessions. They assured
Judge Bautista that their statements had been given
freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they
had not been coerced into giving and signing their
confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked the accused
Ordoño and Medina to affix their signatures/
thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to
subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then
594
signed their statements as their assisting counsel,
followed by a few members of the MTC staff who
witnessed the signing.
During arraignment, they retracted their statements and
pled not guilty.
Issue:
W/N their right to counsel was violated.
Held/Ratio:
YES.
Custodial investigation began when the accused
Ordoño and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police
Station to confess and the investigating officer started
asking questions to elicit information and/or confession
from them. At such point, the right of the accused to
counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly,
after informing the accused of their rights the police
sought to provide them with counsel. However, none
could be furnished them due to the non-availability of
practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the
remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of
Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be
found. At that stage, the police should have already
desisted from continuing with the interrogation but they
persisted and gained the consent of the accused to
proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the
police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest
and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the
relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of
coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the
accused of their statements before the police.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence
of a lawyer during the investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial
confession the accused's parents, older brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal
judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of
the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present,
RA 7438 does not propose that they appear in the
alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any
condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that
before the above-mentioned persons can appear two
(2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused
must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be
executed. RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally
and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of counsel but
underscores its importance by requiring that a
substitution of counsel with the above-mentioned
persons be made with caution and with the essential
safeguards.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the
Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the
relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other
police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu
of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two
(2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of
no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in
writing and with the assistance of counsel.
Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2)
accused emanating from such uncounselled
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to
eight (8) days later does not remedy this omission
595
either. Although there was a showing that the PAO
lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the
accused, enlightened them on the possible
repercussions of their admissions, and even gave them
time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable
advice given by counsel still came several days too late.
It could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the
absence of counsel during the custodial investigation
when the extrajudicial statements were being taken.
The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks
of the accused on their confessions a few days after
their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the
presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the
PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make
their admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained
during custodial investigation without the benefit of
counsel although reduced into writing and later signed
in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution. If the lawyer's role is diminished to being
that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared
document albeit an indication therein that there was
compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused,
the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12,
par. (1), are not met. The standards utilized by police
authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the
accused in the instant case therefore fell short of the
standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.
People v Bagnate
Per Curiam
20 May 2004
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Facts:
The accused was turned over to the police for
custodial investigation. Without asking the name of
appellant, the police officer informed him in the Bicol
dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by
counsel, that whatever he says may be used against or
in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or molested.
Asked if he is willing to cooperate, the accused
assented and gave his name as Amado Magnate. It was
later learned that appellant’s real name is Amado
Bagnate. When appellant told the police of his
willingness to confess, he was again informed of his
rights, and was asked if he wanted to be assisted by
counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in
Manila. The police offered the services of Atty. Paterno
Brotamonte, which appellant accepted. Before
proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte
asked the policemen to leave the investigation room
and conferred with appellant. He introduced himself to
appellant and informed him of his rights. He also asked
and examined appellant to see if he was physically
harmed by the policemen and found none although Atty.
Brotamonte noticed that appellant’s left hand was
handcuffed to the table. Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte
that he is willing to give a statement. The investigation
was then conducted in the Bicol dialect, with the police
asking the questions. It was translated thereafter into
English with the help of Atty. Brotamonte, for the
purpose of putting it into writing. After typing the first
page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte translated and
explained the contents thereof to appellant, then Atty.
Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon.
596
After appellant’s confession was typed and signed,
Atty. Brotamonte left the police station and went back to
his office. As far as he could recall, the entire process
took more than an hour.
The next day, the accused was brought before
Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested the presence of
Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently examined the
voluntariness and veracity of the confession as well as
the authenticity of the signatures of the accused and
Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to the accused the
consequences of his confession to the crimes charged
and asked him if he was coerced into admitting them.
Judge Base inspected his body and asked him if he was
forced or coerced. Judge Base then asked him if he was
still willing to sign it again and he answered in the
affirmative saying that his conscience bothered him.
Judge Base asked him to sign the confession again in
the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which the
accused affixed his signature.
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the
extra-judicial confession of appellant showed how the
crimes were committed by him.
Later on, the accused repudiated his extra-judicial
confession before the trial court and assailed its
admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of
his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a
competent and independent counsel of his own choice;
and that he was not fully apprised of the consequences
of his confession.
Issue:
W/N his right to counsel was violated.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held/Ratio:
NO. To be considered competent and independent
for the purpose of assisting an accused during a
custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to
be “willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of
the accused, as distinguished from one who would
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless
recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. In People
v. Basay, the Court stressed that an accused’s right to
be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
contemplates the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle."
The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might incriminate
him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The counsel,
however, should never prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. In the present case, the
assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than
perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation, Atty.
Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to
ascertain the voluntariness of his confession and to
make sure that no force or duress was employed by the
police authorities on the latter to make him admit the
crimes charged. He informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him
the questions propounded by the police. Also, it was
shown that he signed the confession with the assistance
of a competent and independent counsel, Atty.
597
Brotamonte, and it was also sworn to by him before
Judge Base, who, before administering the oath to
appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his
rights and the consequences of his confession.
The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant
of the imposable penalty of the crimes he was to admit
is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellant’s
extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution regards
as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an
accused without having been informed of his right to
remain silent, or, without having been given competent
and independent counsel, preferably his own choice, or
if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not
provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in
writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he
was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by
violence or any other means that vitiated his free will.
There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a
counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for
the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption
arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent
just because he failed to apprise the accused that the
imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit
is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally
immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt
in the commission of a crime.
People v Lucero
Puno
29 May 1995
Facts:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Lucero et al were charged with the crime of robbery
with homicide. They ambushed the complainant and
took with them cash and jewelry. Killed in the incident
was the driver of the complainant.
Lucero and the Echavez brothers were apprehended
by the Special Operations Group of the Central
Intelligence Service (CIS) and brought to their
headquarters. Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to
conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared
that even before the investigation started, Lucero
verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that
he was the one who shot the driver. In any event, Pfc.
Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He
informed Lucero of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had
no lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department
about Lucero's need for a lawyer. In due time, Atty.
Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at
around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the lawyer
who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about
the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where
Lucero was.
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised
Lucero of his constitutional rights. He explained to
Lucero that he has the right to remain silent, that he is
not obliged to give any statement to the investigators,
and that even if he has already given a statement, he
may refuse to sign it. He observed no reaction from
Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the
impression that Lucero understood his advice.
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down
Lucero's statement. When the investigator started
asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to
598
attend the wake of his friend. He gave word that in case
of need, he could be reached at his residence.
The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two
CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial
statement of was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was
already signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two
CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined the document and
explained to Lucero its legal implications. He asked
Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily.
Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then
signed the statement.
Issue:
W/N Lucero was denied the right to counsel.
Held/Ratio:
YES.
There was no "substantial" compliance with the
requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the
intent of the Constitution. The records show that Atty.
Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of
appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second night
of appellant's detention. More exactly, he arrived at the
CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with appellant
about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he
received no reaction from appellant although his
impression was that appellant understood him. Worse,
Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS
agents when his real interrogation started. He said he
had to attend the wake of a friend. His attitude did not
speak well of the importance he gave to his role as
counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the
commission of a very serious offense. It was during his
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
absence that appellant gave an uncounselled
confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled
confession for the next day, appellant was brought by
two CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence
of these agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he
understood the statements he gave and if he signed it
voluntarily. However, the Constitution requires the right
to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel
but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in
the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant
received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta.
People v Bandula
Bellosillo
27 May 1994
Facts:
The accused were found guilty for robbery with
homicide after killing a lawyer and ransacking his
house.
Among the evidence admitted were the alleged
extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and
Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in
the commission of the crime by "Boy Tall" and "Boy
Short.""These extrajudicial confessions made by
accused Teofilo Dionanao and Aurelio Bandula
extracted during custodial investigation," the trial court
ruled, "have all the qualities and have complied with all
the requirements of an admissible confession, it
appearing from the confession itself that accused were
informed of their rights under the law regarding
599
custodial investigation and were duly represented by
counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna)."
On appeal, appellant Bandula argues that the
extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao
executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence,
inadmissible in evidence considering that they were
extracted under duress and intimidation, and were
merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney
who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an
independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.
Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the
prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict
him of the crime charged.
From the records, it was shown that when accused-
appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were
investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no
counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day
after the custodial investigation with respect to accused
Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant
Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both
accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney
of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
violence was used against the accused.
Issue:
W/N there was a violation of the rights of the
accused.
Held/Ratio:
YES. The Constitution requires that counsel be
independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the
police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty.
Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when
they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions,
still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence
considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an
independent counsel. As a legal officer of the
municipality, he provides legal assistance and support
to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the
delivery of basic services to the people, including the
maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously
doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of
interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who
cannot represent the accused during custodial
investigations.
(Morales v Enrile) At the time a person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone
if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this
is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not
be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
600
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
People v Hernandez
Puno
4 December 1997
Facts:
Hernandez et al were arrested, one by one, as suspects
in the kidnapping of Sharleen Tan. The first to be
apprehended was accused Hernandez. He was
arrested on February 5, 1992 by the Central Police
District (CPD) in connection with another crime. When
the CPD learned that Hernandez was a suspect in the
Tan kidnapping case, he was turned over to the CIS for
investigation.
In the CIS, Hernandez waived his rights to remain
silent and to counsel in the presence of one Atty.
Solomon Villanueva and voluntarily admitted his
participation in the crime. In his extrajudicial
confession, Hernandez confirmed that in January 1992,
his friend, accused Lorenzo, asked him to join his group
to kidnap Sharleen Tan. He revealed their individual
participation. He stated that accused Bolante
and Jacob were the ones who abducted
Sharleen. Accused Mansuer drove the taxi carrying
Bolante, Jacob and Sharleen. They dropped off
Sharleen at a house in John Kennedy Street, Project 8,
Quezon City. It was Jacob who got in touch with
Sharleen's family to demand for ransom. Mansuer and
Jacob were the ones who picked up the ransom. After
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
three days, Jacob gave Hernandez P15,000 as his
share of the ransom money. The confession of
Hernandez led to the apprehension of the other
accused.
When arrested, accused Lorenzo and Tumaneng
waived their right to counsel and agreed to execute
extrajudicial confessions in the presence of Atty.
Villanueva. Accused Jacob also executed an
extrajudicial confession and waived his right to counsel
in the presence of Atty. Solomon Villanueva and his
common-law wife Margarita Albiso. Meantime,
accused Famodulan, was invited by the CIS operatives
to shed light on the kidnapping of Sharleen Tan. He
executed a sworn statement where he waived his rights
to remain silent and to counsel in the presence of Atty.
Solomon Villanueva.
For their defense, appellants simply denied
complicity in the kidnapping of Sharleen. Appellants
Lorenzo and Tumaneng claimed that their extrajudicial
confessions were elicited under duress. Appellant
Famodulan maintained that he merely picked up the
money as directed by accused Hernandez.
Issue:
1. W/N the extrajudicial confessions are admissible
in evidence.
2.(MAIN) W/N Atty. Villanueva not an independent
and competent counsel. ( They insist that Atty.
Solomon Villanueva who was provided by the CIS
operatives to assist them in the waiver of their rights to
silence and to counsel is neither an independent nor a
competent lawyer. They argue that since Atty.
Villanueva was once a member of the Judge Advocate's
601
Office, his sympathies are suspect. They also assail the
competence of Atty. Villanueva to assist them during the
custodial investigation. Allegedly, at no instance did
Atty. Villanueva prevent appellants from incriminating
themselves.)
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary
for no sane person would confess to a crime unless he
has committed it. Thus, the burden is on the accused to
prove the involuntariness of his confession. In the case
at bar, appellants did not satisfactorily discharge this
burden.
Their accusation lacks proof and is belied by the
records. No medical certificate was presented to prove
their maltreatment. Neither did they exhibit any physical
marks of violence. The records reveal that appellants
did not file an administrative or criminal complaint
against their alleged torturers. During the preliminary
investigation, appellants even subscribed their
confession before Fiscal Reynaldo Lugtu who certified
that he personally examined appellants and was fully
convinced that they voluntarily executed and
understood their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the
trial court rightly rejected appellants' allegation of
maltreatment.
2. ATTY. VILLANUEVA IS AN INDEPENDENT AND
COMPETENT LEGAL COUNSEL.
The fact that Atty. Villanueva is a retired member of
the Judge Advocate's Office should not cast doubt on
his impartiality in assisting appellants during their
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
custodial investigation. There is no concrete evidence
of bias on the part of Atty. Villanueva. Appellants'
charge is specious and speculative. (People v Aquino)
The right to counsel is designed to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something which is false. It ought to follow that a lawyer
should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth whether in an extrajudicial
statement or testimony in open court. While our
litigation is adversarial in nature, its purpose is always to
ascertain the truth for justice is not justice unless
predicated on truth. The accused under investigation is
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from them.
In the case at bar, appellants waived their rights to
remain silent and to counsel in the presence and with
the assistance of Atty. Villanueva. Atty. Villanueva
cannot be faulted when he did not prevent appellants
from truthfully answering the questions propounded by
the investigators. For allowing the free flow of truth,
Atty. Villanueva cannot be deemed as an incompetent
counsel. A lawyer's oath binds him to prevent
falsehood and not to suppress truth.
People v Barasina
Melo
21 January 1994
Facts:
602
The accused shot and killed Fiscal Mayo. He was
apprehended while trying to escape.
(Relevant to topic) On appeal, the accused-appellant
makes reference to the manner the extrajudicial
confession and waiver were extracted from him in the
absence of a lawyer of his own choice. He maintains
that he procured the services of Atty. Romeo Mendoza
in the course of the custodial investigation but it was
turned out that it was Atty. Abelardo Torres who
assisted during the interrogation upon the directive of
P.Lt. Surapa. Accused-appellant concludes that the
extrajudicial statement can not thus be utilized against
him for want of competent, independent counsel of his
own choice.
Issue:
W/N his right to counsel as provided in the
constitution was violated.
Held/Ratio:
NO.
Quoting the CA, the SC held that the claim of the
appellant that he was assisted by counsel, not of his
own choice, is belied by records. During the custodial
investigation, he failed to indicate in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney of his own preference before speaking or
giving any statement. Indeed, there is no showing that
he manifested any resistance when he was assisted by
Atty. Torres. The hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as
counsel by the appellant after the custodial investigation
is an afterthought.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12[1],
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling his
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of
the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one
reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated
by the framers of the charter.
People v Jerez
Romero
29 January 1998
Facts:
The accused were charged with the crime of robbery
with double homicide.
Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines
Norte Integrated National Police testified that upon
appellant’s arrest, the latter was apprised of his
constitutional rights. In the presence of Atty. Augusto
Schneider, an investigation conducted by the police
ensued and statements therein were reduced to writing,
signed and sworn to before Jose Panganiban Municipal
Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise inquired whether or
not appellant understood the consequences of his
confession.
603
Appellant, on the other hand, proffered alibi as his
defense and that the extra-judicial confession was
allegedly obtained through the use of physical violence,
coercion and intimidation.
Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight
and credence to the extra-judicial statement, stating that
at the time of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an
ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his
constitutional rights and interests.
Issue:
W/N he was assisted by an ineffectual counsel
rendering his extrajudicial confession inadmissible.
Held/Ratio:
NO. EJ admissible.
When appellant executed the extrajudicial
confession, it was done in the presence of his counsel,
Atty. Schneider, and sworn to before Mayor Arenal. If
indeed his confession were obtained as a result of
coercion and intimidation by policemen at the police
station, he could have informed the Mayor of the
maltreatment he suffered. Having failed to convince the
authorities, the extra-judicial confession voluntarily
made by Jerez is admissible in evidence. “The
presumption, therefore, of spontaneity and
voluntariness stands unless the defense proves
otherwise.
Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it
denied his right to have an independent counsel of his
own choice. The records show that at the time the
extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant
disclosed to the police officers that his counsel of choice
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
was Atty. Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be
available as he is due to depart for Manila on the same
day. Subsequently, Major Rosales suggested that Atty.
Schneider, supposedly the only lawyer available,
appear as the counsel of appellant during investigation
and the latter answered in the affirmative.
While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where
a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the
services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is
unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in
the police investigators, the accused has the final
choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and
ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where
he never raised any objection against the former’s
appointment during the course of the investigation and
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer. Thus, “once the
prosecution has shown that there was compliance with
the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation
advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary
and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his
confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on
the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession
is admissible until the accused successfully proves that
it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat
or promise of reward or leniency.
Although appellant thereafter claimed that the
confession he gave was made under duress, there is,
however, no evidence on record to support the
same. In People v. Villanueva, the Court declared that
“voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
language such that if upon its face the confession
604
exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to
cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details,
which could possibly be supplied only by the accused,
reflecting spontaniety and coherence which
psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to
which violence and torture have been applied, it may be
considered voluntary.” A scrutiny of the sworn statement
discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the
commission of the offense charged which the accused
himself could only have known.
People vs. Niero Suela (2002)
Facts:
3 armed men (Niero Suela, Edgar S. and Edgardo
Batocan) rob the house of Rosas. They took tv, cash,
jewelries etc amounting to P657K and stabbed & killed
Gabilo. Edgar Suela contacted Rosas’ secretary, telling
her that if Rosas will agree, he will relay information as
to the identity and whereabouts of those responsible for
Gabilo’s death for P200K. An entrapment ensued and
this effected his arrest. While under detention, the
Suelas expressed their desire to give an extrajudicial
confession. Hence, they were brought to the IBP for the
taking down of their confessions. In the extra judicial
confession of the Suelas they also impleaded Edgardo
Batocan who also participated in the crime. A warrant of
arrest was issued against Batocan, during his custody
he also expressed his desire to give an extrajudicial
confession. The trial court held that the appellants
had been assisted by competent and independent
counsel during the execution of their extrajudicial
confessions. The letter of Nerio Suela addressed to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Director Rosas asking him for forgiveness as well as the
discovery of the stolen TV set and knife in the former’s
house, further convinced his guilt. Finding the presence
of one aggravating circumstance (disguise) with no
mitigating circumstance, the trial court sentenced them
to death. Hence, this automatic review of the Decision.
Issue:
1. w/n batocan’s extrajudicial confession as
admissible evidence against him? No
2. w/n extrajudicial confessions of the Suelas as
admissible against them? No
Held:
1. With respect to Batocan, he did not finish first
year high school. He was interviewed before he
gave his confession for around five minutes. After
this initial interview with Atty. Rous, counsel just
listened nonchalantly to the
questions propounded by the police and to the
answers given by Batocan. Atty. Rous’ attention
even seemed divided for while hewas attending
the custodial investigation, he was also looking
over another paperwork on his desk. In view of
these, the court is not convinced that Batocan’s
extrajudicial confession was obtained without
violating his constitutional rights.
2. As to the Suelas, Atty. Sansano did not
understand the exact nature of appellants’ rights
to counsel and to remain silent during their
custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to
answer as an obstruction in the
605
investigation. Moreover, when he interviewed
appellants, he did not even bother to find out the
gist of their proposed statements in order to
apprise them of the nature and consequences of
their extrajudicial confessions. Clearly and sadly,
appellants were not accorded competent and
independent counsel whom they could rely on
to look after their interests. As to the admissibility
of the wristwatch, it is of limited probative value
as it was taken without a search warrant and not
as an incident of a valid arrest. It is clearly a fruit
of a poisonous tree and as such, could not be
admitted and appreciated against the accused.
a. As to Nerio Suelas’ letter to Director Rosas,
this was written while Nerio was no longer
under custodial investigation. In open court,
he admitted having written it. The fact that
he was not assisted by counsel when he
wrote it will not make the letter inadmissible
in evidence. Even excluding the wristwatch
and the written extrajudicial confessions,
there is still material evidence on
record which prove beyond reasonable
doubt the commission of robbery with
homicide. While under the new rules,
an aggravating circumstance that is NOT
alleged in the information CANNOT be
appreciated in determining the criminal
liability of the accused, the rules do not
prevent its appreciation for the purpose of
determining civil liability.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Aquino vs. Paiste
Aquino, Garganta, and Adeling went to the house of
Paiste to convince her respondent to buy a gold bar
owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot. After Paiste was
shown a sample of the gold bar, she agreed to go with
them to a pawnshop in Tondo to have it tested. She was
told that it was genuine. However, she told the three
that she had no money.
Regardless, petitioner and Garganta went back to the
house of respondent the following day. The two
convinced her to go with them to Angeles City,
Pampanga to meet Arnold and see the gold bar. Arnold
informed her that it was worth PhP 60,000. After
respondent informed them again she had no money,
petitioner continued to press her that buying the gold
bar would be good investment. Due to their insistence
Paiste bought the gold bar for Php 50,000. Paiste had
the gold tested but it turned out to be fake; Paiste then
proceeded to petitioner's house to inform the latter that
the gold bar was fake. Petitioner replied that they had to
see Garganta, and that she had nothing to do with the
transaction.
Paiste brought petitioner to NBI in the presence of a
certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably
promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and
the document they both signed would be disregarded
should they locate Garganta. Subsequently, Paiste filed
charges against Aquino for Estafa. RTC held petitioner,
Garganta et. al. guilty as charged, CA affirmed.
606
Issue: w/n the amicable settlement executed in the NBI
is admissible as evidence? YES
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way. It is only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lend
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule
begins to operate.
In CAB, petitioner was brought by respondent before
the NBI to be investigated, she was already under
custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee
for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since
she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with
one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.
However, it can be gleaned from the amicable
agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the
custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for
the crime was either aborted or did not push through as
the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to
amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a
waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with
both parties affixing their signatures on it in the
presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.
It is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in
the person of Atty. Uy, which was not objected to .
Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The lawyer, however, should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling
the truth."An amicable settlement is not and does not
partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or
admission but is a contract between the parties within
the parameters of their mutually recognized and
admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of
Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner's rights even if the
custodial investigation did not push through and
precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or
intimidation.
People vs. Judge Ayson (2009)
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It
was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him
of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation
was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his
willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The
findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he
refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He
proffered a compromise however this did not ensue.
Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against
Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
607
prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and
statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not
admit those stating that accused was not reminded of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: 1. w/n respondent Judge correct in making
inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement
of accused? No
Held: It should at once be apparent that there are two
(2) rights
1) right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence,
whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled
to be a witness against himself"
It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a
party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular
incriminatory question. However, the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be
claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the
right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear
before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena
must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be
sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular
question is addressed to him, the answer to which may
incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is
presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law
excuses no one. The right against self-incrimination is
not self- executing or automatically operational. It must
be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness,
the protection does not come into play. It follows that
the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
2) Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also
treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights.
These rights apply to persons "under investigation for
the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what
makes these rights different from that embodied in the
first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as
aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under
investigation for an offense was not in the 1935
Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, "
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense"--
608
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him;
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the
procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as
the commencement of an adversary proceeding against
the suspect.24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise
those rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given,
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree
to answer or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement
without full warnings of constitutional rights."
Not every statement made to the police by a person
involved in some crime is within the scope of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial
interrogation," or "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," the statement is not
protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to
a police precinct and before any sort of investigation
could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself
up for the killing of an old woman because she was
threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this
Court ruled that such a statement was admissible,
compliance with the constitutional procedure on
custodial interrogation not being exigible under the
circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime
and subsequently charged with its commission in court,
has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or
producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with
the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but
after having been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on
being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these
rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by
such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution;
609
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific
question which tends to incriminate him for some crime
other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that
respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and
import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them
as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one
with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be
sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by
arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis
was however so far divorced from the actual and correct
state of the constitutional and legal principles involved
as to make application of said thesis to the case before
him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or
capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be
as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
In CAB Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative
inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in
which he appeared to have had a hand. It is also clear,
too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions
posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal
action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just
as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K)
that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the
day before the investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded
on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had
not been accorded to Ramos.
Magtoto vs. Manguera (1975)
*case did not discuss the facts of the case, it focused on
a discourse of the history of the Right Against Self
Incrimination. (Lifted relevant text from case)*
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence, and specifically, the
portion thereof which declares inadmissible a
confession obtained from a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense who has not been
informed of his right (to remain silent and) to counsel.
We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional
mandate has and should be given a prospective and not
a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession
obtained from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, who has not been informed
of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in
evidence if the same had been obtained after the
effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence
against the accused, if the same had been
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution,
610
even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he
had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no
law gave the accused the right to be so informed before
that date.
The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated
on Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution was
aware of the Escobedo and Miranda rule which had
been rejected in the case of Jose. That is the reason
why the Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included
as a new right granted to a detained person in the
present provision of Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution.
When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of
this Section 20, Article IV to the October 26, 1972
meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering
Council, Delegate Leviste (O) expressly made of record
that "we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme
Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases." And We cannot
agree with the insinuation in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Castro that the Delegates did not know of the
existence of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section
20, Article IV of the New Constitution, in Our considered
opinion, clearly shows that the new right granted therein
to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of
such right under pain of his confession being declared
inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a
prospective and not a retroactive effect. It did not exist
before its incorporation in our New Constitution, as We
held in the Jose and Paras cases, supra.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The authors of the dissenting opinions ignore the
historical fact that the constitutional and legal
guarantees as well as the legal precedents that insure
that the confession be voluntary, underwent a slow and
tedious development. The constitutional guarantee in
question might indeed have come late in the progress of
the law on the matter. But it is only now that it had come
under Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
That is all that our duty and power ordain Us to
proclaim; We cannot properly do more.
People v Tunday (1988)
Facts:
Jarolan Lawre, who was convicted of qualified theft and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua on the basis mainly of
his extrajudicial confession. Lawre and 2 others illegally
took an Isuzu truck loaded with 14 rolls of iron rod while
it was parked in the corner of Tondo. En route the truck
collided with a jeep and Lawre's companions fled,
leaving him alone at the wheel. Sulit who was directing
traffic, approached Lawre and asked him why he did not
stop at the timely traffic signal but all the latter did was
scratch his head. Then he suddenly ran away. Abad,
the owner of the truck, reported the incident to the
police which, on the basis of the Identification furnished
by Sulit, arrested Lawre and his co-accused Alfredo
Tunday. Lawre gave a statement in which he admitted
stealing the truck with its contents, but Tunday refused
to submit to any interrogation. Tunday was eventually
acquitted for insufficient evidence, but Lawre was found
guilty despite his defense of alibi and his allegation that
the extrajudicial confession was illegally obtained.
611
Issue: w/n the extrajudicial admission of Tunday is
admissible? No, not admissible.
Held:
Examination of the extrajudicial confession shows
it is lacking with details that according to the trial court
bespeak the guilt of the accused as no one but the
actual perpetrator of the offense could have described it
with such particularity. As convincing as it appears to
be, however, it must still be rejected for violation of the
Constitution.
“In Galit, we held that a confession must be made with
the assistance of counsel unless the right to counsel is
waived with the assistance of counsel. Under Article III,
Section 12 of the new Constitution, it is not only
provided that the right to the assistance of counsel, to
be validly waived, must be made in writing but that it
must also be done in the presence of counsel. These
requirements have not been met."
Apart from this, it is clear from the said sworn
statement that the accused-appellant was not properly
informed of his constitutional rights. Typically, the
interrogation began with the standard sacramental
recital of such rights, but without any effort to explain
them, and ended with the mechanical question of
whether he understood the notification, followed by the
usual docile "Opo" from the suspect. There is now a
long list of cases that have outlawed this unfeeling
procedure as not sufficient to satisfy the imperative
requisites laid down by the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the person under custodial
investigation. The confession having been obtained in
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
violation of the Bill of Rights, it is not admissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant.
Still and all, the conviction can be sustained, but
on another basis. The evidence shows conclusively that
the authorized driver of the truck Cabilto, who parked
the same in the corner of Rodriguez and Patria streets
when the period of the truck ban began. When the truck
collided with the jeep, it was already in the comer of
Lopez and Rodriguez streets, and the person at the
wheel was the accused-appellant. He was caught red-
handed. When questioned, he simply scratched his
head, and the next instant he had already bolted. The
accused-appellant was positively Identified as the
person in possession — of and actually driving — the
stolen truck. But all he pleaded in his defense was his
feeble alibi.
Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan263 SCRA 222 (1996)
Facts: Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police
investigator of the Western Police District inMetro
Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected
criminals. A recipient of various awards and
commendations attesting to his competence and
performance as a police officer, he could not therefore
imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other
side of the investigation table as the suspected
mastermind of the armed hijacking of apostal delivery
van. Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and
pointed to three other soldiers, namely,
Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles
(who turned out to be a discharged soldier), as his
confederates. In May 1982, petitioner executed a sworn
612
statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos
and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero. Peitioner however sought
later that his confession be inadmissible evidence,
saying that the law should favour him as an accused.
Issue:
w/n A A3.12 1987 Constitution shall be given a
retroactive effect and petitioner’s extrajudicial
confession be held as in admissible evidence? No
Held:
Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in
admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding
uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that
he was made to sign the same through torture,
maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and
intimidation and without the presence and assistance of
counsel. He also claims that in executing the
extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to
counsel in the same way that his waiver of the said right
was likewise without the benefit of counsel.
The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the
1973 Constitution reads as follows:
“No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.”
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused
under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
are, inter alia, as follows:
“(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices and their families.”
In Magtoto case itheld that the provisions of the
1973 Constitution (which were not included in the 1935
Charter) must be prospectively applied. By parity of
reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987
Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his
right to counsel during custodial investigation must be
613
made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied
retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial
confession was made prior to the effectivity of said
Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to
counsel during custodial investigation without the
benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution should, by such argumentation, be
admissible.
Definitive ruling in Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile issued the
guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during
custodial investigation. The court specifically ruled that
“(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel.” Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, “x x
x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right
to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a
judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April
1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March
1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part
of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine
affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the
requirements and restrictions outlined
in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do
not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date
of promulgation ofMorales.”Pursuant to the above
doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of
the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his
extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to
counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Petitioner’s contention that Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect
for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be
sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that “(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony
who is not a habitual criminal,” what is being construed
here is a constitutional provision specifically contained
in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal
statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration
of the individual rights and privileges which the
Constitution is designed to protect against violations by
the government, or by individuals or groups of
individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual
and a limitation upon the power of the state. Penal laws,
on the other hand, strictly and properly are those
imposing punishment for an offense committed against
the state which the executive of the state has the power
to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes
punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a
crime or offense against its law.
People v. Jara (1986)
Facts:
Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide fo
r the killing and robbery of Ampara on June 9, 1978. In
another case, two of the appellants were found guilty of
homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara
while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the
deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the
appellants, Raymundo Vergara and
Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions
614
implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions
were taken while the two were held incommunicado in
the presence of five policemen and after two weeks of
detention.
Issue: there was a valid waiver of right to counsel
during extrajudicial confession? No
Held: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights
appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions
which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a
legal form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and
artificial style does not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the
accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever
a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the
person entitled to that protection, the presumption is
always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strong, convincing
evidence that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in
having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that
confession and such proof was absent here.
People vs. Mahinay(1999)
Facts: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of
a 12 year old girl. He assailed the court decisions
contending that his conviction was based on
circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and that an extrajudicial
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
confession was taken from him in violation of his
constitutional rights on custodial interrogation.
Issue: w/n court erred in convicting the accused merely
on ground of circumstantial evidence and not beyond
reasonable ground? No
w/n his rights to lawful custodial investigation was
violated?
Held:
The court held that absence of direct proof does not
necessarily absolve him from any liability because
under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled
jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2). the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3). the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support
conviction must be consistent with each other which
were proven in the case. The extrajudicial confession
taken from the accused was within the requirement of
Miranda rights and within lawful means where his
confession was taken in the presence of his lawyer.
Miranda Rights include:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under
custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a
615
language known to and understood by said
person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent and that any statement he makes may be
used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be
assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of
his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or
cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a
lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted
except in the presence of his counsel or after a
valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at
any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means - telephone,
radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either
retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or
minister chosen by him or by any one from his
immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited
by/confer with duly accredited national or
international non-government organization. It
shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure
that this is accomplished;
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
7. He must be informed that he has the right to
waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure
that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right
to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be
done in writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is
void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses
to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that
he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate him if
the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that
his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar
him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some
statements;
11. He must also be informed that any
statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
616
People vs. Fabro (1997)
Facts: Nicomedes Fabro, and four others were charged
with murder of a certain Dionisio Joaquin. RTC found
them guilty. In Fabros’ appeal, he contends that his
defense of alibi should be considered and that
his extrajudicial confession must be deemed
inadmissible for the following reasons: (1) appellant’s
confession was extracted under threat and intimidation;
(2) the lawyer's (Atty. Jungco’s participation was only as
a witness during the signing of the prepared confession
and not during the investigation or interrogation itself;
and (3) appellant was made to sign the confession
without having read it and without the presence
of counsel.
Issue: w/n the appellant’s confession admissible? YES
Held:
A confession is defined in jurisprudence as a
declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or
inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that
he has committed or participated in the commission of a
crime. In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted
in evidence unless it is given: 1. Freely and voluntarily,
without compulsion, inducement or trickery 2. Knowingly
based on an effective communication to the individual
under custodial investigation of his constitutional rights;
and 3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its
importance and comprehension of its consequences.
When all these requirements are met and the
confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof
that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
intimidation rests upon the accused. This adherence to
the Constitution is further confirmed by the confession
itself. It starts off with a Pasubali wherein appellant was
informed of his constitutional rights and a Pagpapatunay
which confirmed that he understood said rights. Both
parts also serve as a written proof of appellant’s waiver
in fulfilment of the requirements of the Constitution.
Confession - It is a declaration made voluntarily and
without compulsion or inducement by a person
acknowledging that he has committed or participated
in the commission of a crime. Confession or admission
obtained in violation of SEC. 12 and SEC. 17 ART. III
shall be inadmissible in evidence, because a confession
of guilt constitutes formidable evidence against the
accused, on the principle that no one will knowingly,
freely and deliberately admit authorship of a
crime unless prompted by truth and conscience,
particularly where the facts given could have been
known only by accused.
People vs. Alicando
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four
years of age, choking her with his right hand. The
incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A
neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim’s body
and the parents and police were informed. Appellant
was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length
from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and
interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed
his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis
of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up
617
interrogations, the police came to know and recovered
from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a
pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence
for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the
assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO.
Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him.
Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death
penalty.
Issue: w/n death penalty proper? No
Held: The records do not reveal that the Information
against the appellant was read in the language or
dialect known to him. The Information against the
appellant is written in the English language. It is
unknown whether the appellant knows the English
language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood
by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the
Information couched in English was translated to the
appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The
RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule
implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional
right to due process of law. It is urged that we must
presume that the arraignment of the appellant was
regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot
lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no
presumption. The court must be sure.
The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it
accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The
trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical
marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when
he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he
was interrogated, whether he was medically examined
before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its
efforts trying to discover late body marks of
maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical
abuse alone.
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie
was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains
in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused
colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These
physical evidence are evidence of the highest order.
They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa
Rebada that the victim was raped.These are
inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3
Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial
interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the
crime without the benefit of counsel.
People vs de Lara (1994)
Facts:
After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation
was conducted by the police, as a consequence of
which, accused was arrested. The accused already
pocketed the marked money and handed two foils to the
police when he sensed the presence of police
618
operatives. He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was
prevented from doing so. He tried to escape by running
inside his house. The police pursued him and were able
to subdue him. The accused admitted that he kept
prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed the
arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing
prohibited drugs. The team, together with the accused,
proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation.
During the investigation, accused was apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the
assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to
give a written statement, he refused to do so pending
arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his arrest
and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs
was null and void. He also contends that he was not
assisted by counsel during custodial investigation,
where he was forced to sign the photocopy of the
marked money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the
Booking and Information Sheet.
Issue:
1. w/n the arrest of the accused and the seizure of
the plastic bag were valid? Yes
2. w/n the documents (photocopy of the marked
twenty-peso bill, Receipt of Property Seized, and
the Booking and Information Sheet) signed by
the accused during the investigation were
admissible in evidence? No
Held:
1. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result
of a buy-bust operation. There was no need for a
warrant. The policemen were not only authorized
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
but were also under obligation to apprehend the
drug pusher even without a warrant. The
policemen’s entry into the house of the accused
without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
person caught committing an offense in flagrante.
The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid.
The seizure of the plastic bag was the result of
the accused’s arrest inside the house. A
contemporaneous search may be conducted
upon the person of the arrestee and the
immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.
2. There was no showing that accused was then
assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into
writing. (The rejection of these evidence would
not affect the conviction of the accused in view of
the abundance of other evidence establishing his
guilt.)
PEOPLE V LINSANGAN
Facts:
The accused appealed to this Court alleging that the
lower court erred in not holding that when the policemen
required him to initial the P10-bills, they violated his
constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not
to incriminate himself while under custodial
investigation.
Held:
The court's assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses is entitled to great respect
unless and until they are clearly shown to be arbitrary,
which the defense failed to do. The appellant was not
denied due process during the custodial investigation.
619
Although he was not assisted by counsel when he
initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his
waist, his right against self-incrimination was not
violated for his possession of the marked bills did not
constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was
his act of selling marijuana cigarettes. His conviction
was not based on the presence of his initials on the
P10-bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the
testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while
he was actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes
to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave
more credence to their categorical declarations than to
the appellant's denials. That is as it should be for as law
enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their
official duties in a regular manner. Their task of
apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade
is difficult enough without legal and procedural
technicalities to make it doubly so.
PEOPLE V MORICO
Facts:
Appellant claims that his signatures on the Receipt of
Property Seized from him, the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report and the
"PansamantalangPagtalikodsamgaKarapatansaArtikulo
125” were obtained in violation of his constitutional right
to counsel during custodial investigation.
Held:
With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report,
[t]he Court reiterates its ruling in People v. Rualo, 152
SCRA 635, that when an arrested person signs a
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station, he
does not admit the commission of an offense nor
confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking
Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being
booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of
an arrest. It is a police report and maybe useful in
charges of arbitrary detention against the police
themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and
cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction".
However, we sustain appellant's contention that his
signature on the Receipt of Property Seized is
inadmissible as evidence, as it was given without the
assistance of counsel. In People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA
732 (1992), we stated that appellant's signature on this
document is a declaration against his interest and a tacit
admission of the crime charged. Any admission taken
from appellant, as a result of a violation of his
constitutional right, is inadmissible in evidence against
him. But even disregarding this exhibit, the remaining
evidence on record is sufficient to sustain appellant's
conviction.
PEOPLE V LUVENDINO
Facts:
Luvendino contends that the "demonstration" or re-
enactment and his extrajudicial confession were
effected and secured in the absence of a valid waiver by
him of his constitutional rights and that the re-enactment
and the confession should be held inadmissible in
evidence because they had been involuntarily made.
Held:
620
Luvendino validly waived his right to counsel so far as
his extrajudicial confession was concerned, although he
was not assisted by counsel when he initially signed his
confession at the police headquarters (disregarding for
present purposes only, the subsequent events in the
office of the Provincial Fiscal). At the time the
extrajudicial confession and waiver were first executed
(i.e., 10 February 1983), there was no rule of doctrine
prescribing that waiver of the right to counsel may be
validly made only with the assistance of counsel. It is
scarcely necessary to add that we are here referring
only to extrajudicial confessions and waivers which
were made voluntarily and intelligently.
PEOPLE v. DY
Facts:
Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island
and was sentenced with murder before the trial court for
shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused
contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of
the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police
officer and made a confession on the crime and
informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a
statement the accused denied to have done. They
assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that
such statement was not made in writing and is in
violation of the due process required in custodial
investigation.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the
prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the
accused.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held:
In view of the documentary evidence on record the
defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral
confession made by the accused to the officer and
telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to
surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence
against him. This is because such confession was made
unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was
not under investigation when he made the oral
confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke
compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial
investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES
GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the
confession is competent to satisfy the substance of
what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral
confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a
case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral
confession made by the accused outside the ambit of
custodial investigation can be admissible in court and
was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the
accused being guilty of the crime.
PEOPLE V SAMUS
Facts:
Appellant claims that his alleged confession to the
media while in police custody cannot be admitted in
evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings,
the turnover receipt, as well as the testimonies of
Pontaños and Bitos, relative thereto should be excluded
for being “fruits of the poisonous tree.”
621
Held:
While it is true that the confessions of appellant were
made without benefit of counsel, they are still
admissible in evidence because of appellant’s failure to
make timely objections before the trial court. If only the
defense had proffered them on time, the prosecution
could have been warned of the need to present
additional evidence to support its case. To disregard a
major portion of the prosecution’s case at a late stage
during an appeal goes against the norms of
fundamental fairness. Indeed, justice is dispensed not
only for the accused, but also for the prosecution. Be
that as it may, and even if we now affirm appellant’s
conviction for murder, we do not, however agree with
the trial court’s imposition of the death sentence,
because the proven aggravating circumstance of
dwelling was not alleged in the Information.
N. RIGHT TO BAIL
PEOPLE V FITZGERALD
Facts:
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting
respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact
that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua(rape of a 13 year old girl) and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Held:
It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds
other than those stated in the Motion filed by
respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere
claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical
care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is
not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for
courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.
There may also be an existing proposition for the
"selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on
findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
increases. But, in this particular case, the CA made no
specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment
of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in
danger. It merely declared respondent not in the best of
health even when the only evidence on record as to the
latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate
stating thatrespondent's condition required him to "xxx
be confined in a more sterile area xxx." That medical
recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself
when, in its Resolution, it held that the physical
condition of respondent does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison.
ENRILE V SALAZAR
Facts:
In February 1990, SenEnrile was arrested. He was
charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan
for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their
failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp
Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging
that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent.
That he was charged with a criminal offense in an
information for which no complaint was initially filed or
622
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was
denied due process; denied his right to bail; and
arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant
issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the
Hernandez ruling.
HELD:
Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied
bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would
entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged
against him however is complexed with murder and
multiple frustrated murders – the intention of the
prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious
form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum.
The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile
et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion
because other crimes such as murder or all those that
may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is
absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC
however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not
the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step
that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a
petition to be admitted for bail. He should have
exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas
corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other
crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed
absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a
need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being
used by a lot of opportunists to attempt to grab power.
LAVIDES V CA
Facts:
ManoletLavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child
abuse under R.A. No. 7610. His arrest was made
without a warrant as a result of an entrapment
conducted by the police.
Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against
him and asked the trial court to suspend the
arraignment scheduled.
Trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner’s
motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations,
and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was
arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the
charges against him and then ordered him released
upon posting bail bonds.
Held:
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted
before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there
would then be no need for the arraignment of the
accused. In the second place, the trial court could
ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at
any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment.
Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the
accused shall appear before the proper court whenever
623
so required by the court or these Rules," while under
Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon
valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.
CARPIO V MAGLALANG
Facts:
An information for murder was filed against Escaño and
ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in
the Regional Trial Court of Bataan at Balanga. Four
days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court
issued an order of arrest against Escaño recommending
no bail for his provisional liberty.
In opposing said application, the public prosecutor
averred that the accused was charged with a capital
offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the
reasons advanced in said application would be
overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that
during the custodial investigation, he was represented
by counsel.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held:
A reading of the April 2, 1987 order convinces us that
the court below was remiss in its duty as enunciated in
People vs. San Diego. Without summarizing the factual
basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated
the number of prosecution witnesses but not their
respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence
presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently
strong" to deny bail to Escaño. On this point alone, the
order granting bail to Escaño should be invalidated.
COMMENDADOR V DE VILLA
Facts:
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on
June 5, 1990, but the application was denied. He filed
with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the
provisional liberty. However he was not released
immediately. The RTC now declared that even military
men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right
to bail.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the
accused right to bail.
Held:
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in
the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial
624
is given more emphasis in the military where the right to
bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after
more than one year from their arrest, there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due
process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special
Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-
charge investigation only after one year because
hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men
were involved in the failed coup.
BAYLON V SISON
Facts:
Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in
granting bail to the accused charged with double
murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3
days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of
Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of
petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from
the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution
also assails that they were not given the chance to
present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the
accused. Respondent judge justifies not having
committed grave abuse of discretion since the
prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders
and the lack of previous notice was cured with the filing
of motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised
abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to the accused.
Held:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the
discretion of the judge in granting bail to the accused
considering that the motion for bail was filed on a
Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted
on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make
an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule
embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a
well established rule of law that bail is not a matter of
right and requires a hearing where the accused is
charged with an offense which is punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent
judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of
petition for bail before making an outright grant of this
motion.
A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:
. . The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to present evidence because by the very
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis
of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed
against in determining whether the guilt of the accused
is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised
regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural
due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the
absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.
BASCO vs. RAPATALO
269 SCRA 220
625
FACTS: An information for murder was filed against
Morente. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail.
The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995
by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent
Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995
but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22,
1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not
materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and
trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard
on said date as the prosecution’s witnesses in
connection with said petition were not notified. Another
attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
Complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La
Union on July 3, 1995 and later learned that the
accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition
had not been heard at all. Upon investigation,
complainant discovered that bail had been granted and
a release order dated June 29, 1995was issued on the
basis of a marginal notedated June 22, 1995, at the
bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Oliva
which stated: “No objection: P80,000.00,” signed and
approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by
respondent Judge. Note that there was already a
release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the
marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June
22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail petition was
aborted and instead arraignment took place) when
another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.
Respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition
based on the prosecutor’s option not to oppose the
petition as well as the latter’s recommendation setting
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred
that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the
petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to
approve it or not. He further declared that when he
approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the
prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more
familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary
investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was
not around at the time the public prosecutor
recommended bail. Respondent Judge stated that in
any case, the bailbond posted by accused was
cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on
account of complainant’s motion for reconsideration.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently
conformed to and approved the motion for
reconsideration.Accused is confined at the La Union
Provincial Jail. On August 14 1995, in a sworn letter-
complaint, complainant Basco charged respondent
Judge Leo M. Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful
disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to
an accused in a murder case without receiving evidence
and conducting a hearing.
ISSUE: CAN A JUDGE SET BAIL EVEN W/O
CONDUCTING A HEARING OR RECEIVING
EVIDENCE? NO.
HELD: If the denial of bail is authorized in capital
offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong,
the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity,
rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the
exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should
be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of
626
evasion of the prosecution.In practice, bail has also
been used to prevent the release of an accused who
might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the
judges might not want to release.
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of
bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the
person is charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article
114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
states, “No person” charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall
be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal action.”
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court,it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of
cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, “is not
absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion,
by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge’s
individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that
its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of
his own individual views, prevent them from getting out
of control.
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person
charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court, must actually be conducted to determine whether
or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered
and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination. If a party is denied
the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation
of procedural due process.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses
627
to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to
the discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required
if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for
bail is required, as can be gleaned from the Tucay v.
Domagas, is for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This Court, in a
number of cases held that even if the prosecution fails
to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for
bail of an accused, the court may still require that it
answer questions in order to ascertain not only the
strength of the state’ s evidence but also the adequacy
of the amount of bail.
After hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail
must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate
the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting
or denying the application for bail may be invalidated
because the summary of evidence for the prosecution
which contains the judge’s evaluation of the evidence
may be considered as an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals
that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused
without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt
of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the
procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-
94.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never
a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the court’s
determination after a hearing that the guilt of the
accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting
bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on
the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should
have ascertained personally whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the
prosecutor’s recommendation.
In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the
jurisprudential principles , SC reiterated the duties of the
trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court as amended);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise
its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution (Baylon v. Sison);
628
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19,
supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.
The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no
room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases
of bail applications.
PEOPLE v CABRAL
303 SCRA 361
ROMERO; February 18, 1999
FACTS
- Roderick Odiamar was charged with the rape of 15
year old Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary
liberty, the accused filed a motion for bail which was
opposed by the petitioner.
- The lower court grated the motion on the ground that
despite the crime alleged to have been committed is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence thus far
presented is not strong enough to warrant denial of the
bail. The judge in concluding thus cited the fact that the
girl went with the offender voluntarily and did not resist
during the commission of the rape. In addition, the judge
quoted the medico legal report as not conclusion that
rape was in fact committed consideration that the
lacerations on the victim may have been weeks or
months old when the medical examination was
performed six days after the offense occurred.
- The CA affirmed the decision saying that there was no
abuse of discretion in this case. “There is grave abuse
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of discretion where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of the law.” The
People filed the appeal on the ground that while the
judge had discretion on the grant of bail, he had abused
this discretion.
ISSUE
- WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
despite a showing by the prosecutor that there is strong
evidence proving respondent’s guilt for the crime
charged.
HELD
YES
- The SC held that the CA and the lower court failed to
mention and include some facts which are significant
factors and circumstances which are strong, clear, and
convincing. Consideration of the said factors and
circumstances would have resulted in the denial of bail.
Reasoning
- Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:
“All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. the right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
629
- Section 7 Rule 4 of the Rules of court provides:
“No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when the evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
criminal prosecution.”
- In the case at bar, bail is discretionary and not a
matter of right considering that the punishment for the
offense is reclusion perpetua. the grant of the bail is
dependent on the evidence of the guilt which should
which should be strong to justify denial. this
determination is a matter of judicial discretion.
- By judicial discretion, the law mandates the
determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or evident
proof is this connection, has been held to mean clear,
strong evidence which leads a well guarded
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that an
offense has been committed as charged, that the
accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be
punished capitally if the law is administered.
Presumption great exists when the circumstances
testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally
to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to
an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable
probability of any other conclusion.
In other words, the test is not whether the evidence
establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather
whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of
guilt.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- In the case of an application for bail, the duties of the
judge are as follows:
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise
its discretion
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bail bond.
Otherwise the petition should be denied.
- Based on the duties, the court’s order granting or
denying bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a
comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a
test or statement. HENCE, THE SUMMARY SHOULD
NECESSARILY BE A COMPLETE COMPILATION OR
RESTATEMENT OF ALL THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DURING THE HEARING PROPER. The
Lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to
what pieces of evidence should be included in the
summary. Otherwise, the same will be considered
defective in form and substance which cannot be
sustained or be given a semblance of validity.
SEPARATE OPINION
630
VITUG [dissenting]
- The extraordinary remedies under Rule 65 of the rules
of Court are not open when the question is whether the
trial judge has erred in the exercise of sound discretion.
These special reliefs are available only when the judge
has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in his decision or order
such as by arbitrarily ignoring the evidence or
completely acting on bias and whim.
CORTES VS CATRAL
279 SCRA 1
(1997)
FACTS: Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral
for granting bail without hearing.
1. Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, a
crime that is supposedly not bailable without hearing.
Catral says that in one of them, the case was frustrated
homicide, and the prosecutor recommended bail of
200K, plus the circumstantial evidence were weak. In
the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, for murder,
the inquest judge issued a warrant of arrest for the
accused with no bail recommended.
When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court
upon information filed by the provincial prosecutor, the
information made no mention of a bailbond. In the
hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, the fiscal opted not to
introduce evidence and recommended bail in the sum of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge ‚acting on the
said recommendation and again guided by the provision
of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in
conjunction with the evidence extant on the record
approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar
Carrao.
A duplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar Carrao‚
letter dated September 3, 1996 addressed to the
provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented
by the respondent to disprove the accusation that he
granted bail to the accused without conducting any
hearing.
2. Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegal
possession of firearms case from 180K (recommended
by prosecutor) to 30K without hearing. Catral says that
bailbond recommended was 180K. Accused filed for
reduction and there was no opposition from prosecutor.
3. Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide
case was granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by
Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is
because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio
Bong Decierto. Catral averred that he was acting on the
recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor and
mindful of the guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount
of bailbond coupled by the fact that the evidence on
record is merely circumstantial and there was no
eyewitness to the commission of crime granted bailbond
in the sum of P14,800.00.
631
4. Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong
Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted by
Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban
appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the
sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral
acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that
the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban
house to get an envelope.
ISSUE: WON the allegations of the complainant would
warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against
respondent judge. YES.
HELD: Bail should be fixed according to the
circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should
be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at
the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the
constitutional provision that bail should not be
excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to
be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must
be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the
amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account
a number of factors such as the applicant‚ character and
reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a
fugitive from justice.
When the accused is charged with an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, not only to take into account the
guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of
strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the
accused.
Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an
accused charged with murder, without having
conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong.
The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in
cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application of bail to the sound
discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The
importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a
few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
searching questions from which it may infer the strength
of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the
accused.
The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since
the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and
since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly
exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that
a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
632
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner
having the right of cross examination and to introduce
evidence in his own rebuttal.
The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated
by the fact that even though the accused in Criminal
Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet
to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum
of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew that the
accused were still at large as he even had to direct their
arrest in the same order where he simultaneously
granted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to
reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only
be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be
premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for
bail for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
Trillanes IV v. Pimentel
G.R. No. 179817,
June 27, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in
relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007
elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year
term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner
now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all
official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his
case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case,
there was already conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not valid classification between
petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case
and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that
former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already
convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal,
when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus
Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention
prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and
political rights since the presumption of innocence is still
in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged
with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of
statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness,
whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded
as a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the
presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized
practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
xxx
633
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise,
however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in
in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime
is taken into custody for purposes of the administration
of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. (Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup
d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties,
there is clearly no distinction as to the political
complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's
application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court's
judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of
the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage
of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement
with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
xxx
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who
attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he
voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and
such can be proven by the numerous times he was
allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The
assailed Orders augured well when on November 29,
2007 petitioner went past security detail for some
reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh
hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed
634
this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," proves that
petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he
would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in
fact, the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight
find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable
amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of
bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence
of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail
shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.
PEOPLE VS. FORTES
223 SCRA 619
25 JUN 1993
Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan,
Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,
accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the
police station of the said municipality to report a rape
committed against the latter by the accused. Following
this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A
bond of P25000 was granted for accused’s provisional
release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC
was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied.
Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that
the same amounted to an undue denial of his
constitutional right to bail.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Issue: Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail
violated.
Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before
conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua
bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If
an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a
matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion on the part of the court.
DE LA CAMARA V. ENAGE
41 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Ricardo de la Camara, Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis
Oriental, was arrested and detained in Agusan, for his
alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the
wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador
635
Logging Co., at Agusan del Sur. Thereafter, the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed a case for multiple
frustrated murder and another for multiple murder
against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo.
Then came an application for bail filed by petitioner with
the lower court, premised on the assertion that there
was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident. At
the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not
presented its evidence.
Respondent Judge issued an order granting de la
Camara's application for bail, admitting failure on the
part of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara
would flee even if he had the opportunity,but fixed the
amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00 ( P840,000.00 for the multiple murder
and P355,200.00 for multiple frustrated murder).
Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being
informed sent a telegram to Judge stating that the bond
required "is excessive" and suggesting that a
P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be
reasonable.
ISSUE: W/N the amount of for bail is reasonable?
HELD: YES.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except
if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of
guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption
of innocence in favor of every accused unless his guilt
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless,it is
not beyond the realm of probability that a person
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
charged with a crime, especially where his defense is
weak, would make himself scarce and frustrate the
hearing of his case. Thus, a bail is a "mode short of
confinement which would, with reasonable certainty,
insure the attendance of the accused" for the
subsequent trial.
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered
nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. If the
Constitution did not prohibit this, the right to bail
becomes meaningless. The sole permissible function of
money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial,
and declared that bail set at a higher figure than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill thus purpose is
"excessive",
Therefore, that fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as
the bail is clearly violative of the Constitution. Under the
circumstances, there being only two offenses charged,
the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated
murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the
Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of
P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
Guidelines in the fixing of bail:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail
(2) nature of the offense
(3) penalty for the offense charged
(4) character and reputation of the accused
(5) health of the accused
(6) character and strength of the evidence
636
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial
(8) forfeiture of other bonds
(9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when
arrested
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases
Discretion is with the court to rule upon the
question of bail. We must stress, however, that where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail
would amount to a refusal and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, SC will not hesitate to
exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required
remedy. There is grim irony in an accused being told
that he has a right to bail but at the same time being
required to post such an exorbitant sum.
However, because petitoner escaped from jail, no
ruling can be had on his plea to nullify the Judges order.
Government of the US vs. Judge Puruganan
GR No 148571
Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
United States Government, through diplomatic channels
requested the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also
known as Mario Batacan Crespo. A Petition for
Extradition was filed with the RTC, but before the court
could act, Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that
petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
hearing. This was granted. After the hearing, Jimenez
submitted a required Memorandum, which sought an
alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue,
he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing and the court directing the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixed bail for his temporary
liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Issue:
WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.
Held:
As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a
case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
637
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct
from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged.
He should apply for bail before the courts trying the
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition
court.
GOV’T. OF HONG KONG V. OLALIA & JUAN MUNOZ
(April 19, 2007)
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez
Facts: Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong
Court with 3 counts of the offense of “accepting an
advantage as agent,” in violation of Section 9 (1a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. He also faced 7
counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of
arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faced a
jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each
charge
As early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the extradition of private
respondent. For his part, private respondent filed, in
the same case a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner. After hearing on October 8, 2001, Judge
Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail
in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high “flight risk.” Muñoz filed an MR questioning the
Order denying his application for bail. This was granted
by subsequent respondent Judge Olalia in an Order
dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent
to post bail (P750K).
On December 21, 2001, petitioner government filed an
urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge.
Issue:
W/N trial court committed GAD amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to
bail for there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory
law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings?
Ratio:
Private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh
process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s
liberty.
The US v. Purganan ruling (bail granted only to crim
proceedings) applies squarely to private respondent’s
case. However, the SC cannot ignore the following
trends in international law
The modern trend in public international law is the
638
primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the
recognition that the individual person may properly be a
subject of international law is now taking root.
On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
which the right to life, liberty and all the other
fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed.
While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, the
SC, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held
that under the Constitution,the principles set forth
in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In
1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which the Philippines signed and ratified.
The Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited
the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties
giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination
of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation
and quarantine,have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the UDHR
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why
it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for
bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in
favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see
to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
639
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced
to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the
length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that Munoz had been detained for over
two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental
right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation
of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant
him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant
of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right
to due process under the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda
demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under
the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations
and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More
so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to
which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for
bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing
evidence.”
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO
198 SCRA 130
5 JUN 1991
Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were
charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts
committed before and after February 1986. Private
respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that:
(a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the
Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c)
the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished. This was denied.
May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which
was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under
PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC.
640
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order
No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
amendatory decrees.
Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at
P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report
to the court once every two months within the first ten
days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly
asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable
probability that the accused will not comply with this
main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen
years and was an escapee from detention when
arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no
known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado
Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's
License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite,"
turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private
vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January
1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid
for his arrest.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the
right to bail.
Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It
is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense,
therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence.
It is only when it is a capital offense that the right
becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the
Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K
without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990,
providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of
rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not
favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another
case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were
made therein: accused to remain under custody,
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released immediately, with a
condition that they will submit themselves in the
jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was
dismissed.
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We
hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
641
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.
PEOPLE v MANES
303 SCRA 231
PARDO; February 17, 1999
FACTS
- July 12, 1991, Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo Province
filed with RTC Iloilo City, an INFORMATION charging
the accused with MURDER:
"That on or about the 23rd of June, 1991, in the
Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another to
better realize their purpose armed with a knife and a .38
caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, stab and shot
Nicanor Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver
with which they were then provided, inflicting upon the
said Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot
wounds on the different parts of his body which caused
his death immediately thereafter."
- prosecution recommended NO BAIL for the provisional
liberty of the accused.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- July 22, 1991 - TC issued a WARRANT OF ARREST
against the accused
- October 18, 1991 – TC ordered the case ARCHIVED
for failure to locate the two accused
- June 24, 1992 - Sergon and Ramil Manes were
ARRESTED in Romblon, Romblon
- September 17, 1992 - Upon ARRAIGNMENT, both
accused pleaded NOT GUILTY to the information
- August 25, 1992 - accused filed a PETITION FOR
BAIL which was opposed by the prosecution. TC did not
hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke
the right to bail at any stage of the trial.
- January 13, 1995 - TC convicted the accused of
murder
- February 10, 1995 - both accused appealed to SC
where accused questioned TC’s failure
(a) to hear the petition for bail
(b) to consider defense of relative in favor of Ramil
Manes and
(c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of
Tamorite's unlawful aggression
According to the prosecution
> June 23, 1991 – 5 in the afternoon, ALAN Catequista
with NICANOR Tamorite and JOSE Cubita, went to see
a basketball game at the barangay plaza. When the
642
game was over, Alan approached and invited Nicanor to
go home; at that time, he was still seated. Accused
RAMIL Manes approached Nicanor and pointed a 38
caliber revolver at him, saying "It is a bad luck you did
not kill me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan.
Now I will be the one to kill you." Nicanor ran to Alan
and used him as a shield from Ramil. At that point, Alan
heard a thud and as he looked back, he saw accused
SERGON Manes with a gory knife and he also saw
Nicanor running away, with blood on his back.
Ramil Manes pursued Nicanor and shot him hitting him
at the back, just above the waistline. Both accused
continued to chase Nicanor who ran towards the
premises of the house of ADING Ablado. Ramil Manes
fired two more shots. It could not be determined
whether those shots hit Nicanor as he and the accused
were already inside the premises of the fence of Ading.
Jose who was near Nicanor when the two accused
chased him did not render assistance to him. After Alan
heard the two shots, he and Jose ran home. Alan told
his father and uncle that Sergon stabbed Nicanor and
that Ramil shot him. Alan, his father, uncle, Jose and
the mother of Nicanor then went to where the body of
Nicanor was in the downhill portion of the premises of
the house of Ading. Nicanor was lying on his back, with
2 wounds on the breast, 1 gunshot wound and 1 stab
wound.
According to the accused(Ramil)
> June 23, 1991 – in the afternoon, he was at home
cooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts
coming from the direction of the barangay basketball
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
court, which was about ten (10) meters away from his
house. He went to the window to check what it was. He
saw his younger brother Sergon lying on the concrete
pavement and several persons were ganging up on him,
three of whom he identified as Nicanor, Alan and Jose.
They kept on boxing and kicking his brother prompting
him to come to the latter's aid. On his way out, he saw a
gun on top of the table and brought it with him to the
basketball court.
> While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a
warning shot to prevent Nicanor from stabbing his
brother Sergon. Nicanor persisted in the pursuit of
Sergon, with a knife in his hand. Sergon was about
three meters ahead of Nicanor who was about ten
meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil fired another
shot that hit Nicanor who fell to the ground. Meanwhile,
Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also fled to the direction
of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired the second
shot because he saw the group of Alan approaching
armed with guns .12 Ramil and his brother Sergon went
into hiding and only surfaced a year later when they
were arrested in Romblon.
- prosecution’s set of facts was favored by the court
ISSUE
WON petitioner has a right to bail
HELD
NO
Ratio When an accused is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is
643
strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of
right nor of discretion
Reasoning
- In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death, the accused has no right to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a
petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of
guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the
accused. While the accused can apply for bail and
have the court hear his application summarily and
promptly, such right may be waived expressly or
impliedly. In this case, the trial court proceeded to try
the case without resolving the petition for bail that
appellants filed.
However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial
court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only
in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure
to bring to the attention of the trial Court at the earliest
opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived
their right to bail.
- the defense of relative FAILED TO PROSPER
because:
1) unlawful aggression, the essential element to
defense of relative is absent because if it were true that
Sergon was being attacked, he would have suffered
injuries.
2) if indeed he acted in defense of his younger brother
Sergon who was then under attack, he would not harbor
any fear in presenting himself to the proper authorities.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- even though prosecution failed to show evident
premeditation, trial court correctly considered treachery
as qualifying the killing of the victim to murder.
Dispositive we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial
court convicting accused-appellants Sergon Manes
and Ramil Manes of murder and sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with the accessory penalties of the law and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor
Tamorite in the amount of P50,000.00, plus
P21,250.00, as actual damages.
PEOPLE v HOLGADO
GR No. L-2809 (March 22, 1950)
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the
court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a
private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable
motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the
house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby
depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.
He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he
was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence
was presented to indict the latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the
proceedings in the trial court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the
defendant appears without attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
644
being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the
aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney
de oficio todefend him. A reasonable time must be
allowed for procuring attorney.” This was violated.
Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no
person shall be held to answer for a
criminaloffense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to
be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of
the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show
whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was
real and whether it had reference tothe commission of
the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No
investigation was opened by the court on this matter in
the presence of the accused and there is now no way of
determining whether the supposed instruction is a good
defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the
confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with
the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr.
Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with
this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the
simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was
not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the
accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it
that the accused be assisted by counsel especially
because of the qualified plea given by him and the
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the
court.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
PEOPLE v SANTOCILDES
GR No. 109149 (December 21, 1999)
Facts: On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged
with the crime of rape of a girl less than 9 years old.
Appellant contends that he was represented
during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong,
who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel
and even conducted the direct examination and cross-
examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however,
appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty.
Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C.
Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Appellant
therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to
counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,
maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's
counsel during trial was not a member of the bar,
appellant was afforded due process since he has been
given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal
that said person "presented the evidence for the
defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in
general handled the case of appellant in a professional
and skillful manner."
Issue: Whether or not the accused was deprived,
though no fault of his own, to be defended by a person
authorized to practice law amounting to denial of
due process.
Held: The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in
Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987
645
Constitution. Such right is guaranteed to minimize the
imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused
is pitted against the awesome prosecutorymachinery of
the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a
person must be heard before being condemned. The
due process requirement is a part of a person's basic
rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed
with or performed perfunctorily.
Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of
conviction and ordered the remand of the case to
the trial court for new trial.
The Supreme Court also directed the IBP to investigate
Ompong's unauthorized practice of law.
PEOPLE v AGBAYANI
GR No. 122770 (January 16, 1998)
Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-
year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of
rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court
by the new counsel of the accused assailing the
irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the
accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the
violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation
for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to
disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the
case back for a new trial.
Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to
disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to
reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court
must be presumed to have complied with the procedure
prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and
that such a presumption can only be overcome by an
affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been
held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or
that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to
inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be
presumed that the accused was informed by the court of
such right.
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides
that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to
two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good
cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out
that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when
so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible
error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may
be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case,
appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence,
he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to
believe that the counsel whorepresented the appellant
was not prepared during the trial as records showed he
was able to cross-examine the complainant and there
was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent
the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
646
PEOPLE v MAGSI
GR No. L-32888 (August 12, 1983)
Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on
August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before
the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union.
The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6)
times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that
date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario
Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing
was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty.
Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of
accused desire to be represented by a de parte
counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to
withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably
acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the
second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the
de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a
second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the
next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador
Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third
hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio
counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed
that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes
only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty
butqualified it with the allegation that he committed the
crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the
other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder
and made to suffer the death penalty.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights
of the accused.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of
cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic
rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55
SCRA 243-244): the trial courts
shouldexercise solicitous care before sentencing the
accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses
by first insuring that the accused fully understands the
gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences
attached thereto as well as the meaning and
significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent
and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take
testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not
misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty.
Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who
fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused,
resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of
evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory
queries addressed to the accused whether he
understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty,
are not sufficient compliance.
PEOPLE v MALUNSING
GR No. L-29015 (April 29, 1975)
Facts: It was the failure of the lower court to respect the
constitutional right to counsel, so it is alleged, that is
the basis for seeking the reversal of a conviction for
murder of appellant Manuel Villegas. The appellant is a
very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the entire
proceeding in the case, the appellant while present did
not know what was going on; the trial court never
apprised the appellant of his fundamental right to be
647
assisted by a lawyer; the trial court did not even bother
inquiring why the appellant Manuel Villegas did not take
the witness stand. Attorney Geronimo Pajarito explicitly
manifested in the opening of the trial that appellant
intimated to him that he had his own lawyer. There was
an admission that he did appear for him in the
preliminary investigation but only because there was no
other counsel. Parenthetically, it may be observed that
while in the original complaint there were two other
accused with the same surname as the lawyer,
Geronimo Pajarito and Samuel Pajarito, after such
preliminary investigation, no doubt due to the efforts of
Atty. Geronimo Pajarito, possibly a kinsman, they were
both discharged for lack of probable cause, the court
ask the appellant if he has a lawyer; after answering in
the negative, the Court then appointed Atty. Pajarito as
counsel de oficio for the defendant. After marking it of
record that he was appointed as counsel de oficio, the
Attorney was ask whether he wanted to confer with the
appellant. This was answered with: “I think I know the
case.” The Court then immediately proceeded with the
hearing. In the decision itself, there is this meaningful
admission by the court: “No evidence was presented for
and in behalf of appellant Manuel Villegas.”
Issue: Whether or not the appointed counsel de oficio
Atty. Geronimo Pajarito lacks candor in the exercise of
his profession.
Held: It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was
appointed, were the accused has indicated that he
wanted a lawyer of his own choice, a decision prompted
moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
number of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest
respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named,
instead of conferring with the accused, would just
blithely inform the judge that he was already fully
prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was
unintended but the result could not rightly be
distinguished from pure travesty. Appellant could then
rightfully invoke this constitutional guarantee of right to
counsel.
PEOPLE v CUIZON
GR No. 109287 (April 18, 1996)
FACTS: Cuizon, Pua, and Paul Lee are found guilty of
transporting, without legal authority, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, also known as shabu.
However, Appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or
understand a word of English or Filipino and only knows
Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness
stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his
testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28,
1992, the last trial date allotted to the defense for the
reception of Lee’s testimony, his counsel, although
notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the
trial court deemed him and Pua to have waived their
right to present additional evidence, and the case was
considered submitted for decision after the filing of
memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask
for the reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he
submit any memorandum. Only accused Cuizon, who
was assisted by another counsel, was able to submit his
memorandum.
648
ISSUE: WON the trial court violated Paul Lee's
constitutional right to due process.
RULING: YES. The SolGen was right in saying that the
trial judge did not exert sufficient effort to make
available compulsory process and to see to it that
accused appellant Lee was given his day in court. It is
clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right
to counsel, for although he was provided with one, he
could not understand and communicate with him
concerning his defense such that, among other things,
no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was
denied his right to have compulsory process to
guarantee the availability of witnesses and the
production of evidence on his behalf, including the
services of a qualified and competent interpreter to
enable him to present his testimony. In sum, he was
denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the
case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of
origin for a re-trial.
PEOPLE v SERZO
GR No. 118435 (June 20, 1997)
FACTS:Alfredo (victim) together with his wife Adelaida
Alcantara were staying inside their house comfortably
watching television when Susana Serzo mother of the
accused and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking at
their doorsteps and pleading for help to bring out her
grandchildren who were being held inside their house
by her son (Mario Serzo Jr) the accused in this case.
The spouses were able to rescue the grandchildren and
to bring them to a safer place. When returning to their
house, Alfredo Alcantara who was walking just
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
armslength ahead of his wife, was attacked by accused
Mario Serzo from behind. Accused stabbed Alfredo at
his back forcing the latter to scamper for his dear life
and was declared dead on arrival in the hospital.
Appellant was charged with murder filed by Rizal
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata.
Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case
proceeded to trial on the merits. After arraignment and
trial, accused was found guilty of the crime charged.
The accused contends that he was denied his right to
counsel, a narration of the proceedings before the trial
court, arraignment was set by the trial court during
which appellant appeared without counsel.
Consequently, the trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo
Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the arraignment only.
The presentation of evidence for the defense was reset
as appellant was not ready to testify and he manifested
his intention to secure the services of a counsel de
parte hence Atty. Lina-ac was relieved as counsel de
oficio as a consequence Appellant appeared without
counsel, forcing the trial court to appoint another
counsel de oficio, respectively Bella Antonano and Atty.
Bonifacia Garcia. The trial court convicted the accused
of the crime of murder. Hence, appealed was made to
the SC.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in not giving the
defendant-appellant time to engage counsel of his own
choice.
RULING:
NO, SC affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the
649
Constitution. The right covers the period beginning from
custodial investigation, well into the rendition of
judgment and even on appeal however right to counsel
de parte is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance
the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the
states's and the offended party's equally important right
to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may
restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte
if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or
the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the
attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid
reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.
In this case, appellant had been given ample time
to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his
subsequent appearances in court without such counsel
and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the
presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention
to do so. It even appears that he was merely delaying
his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the
prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the
orderly administration of justice. Furthermore, appellant
did not demonstrate in what way the services of his
counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite
any instance substantiating his claim that he was not
effectively represented. In short, he was afforded a
chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by
his own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such
right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two years
since appellant first invoked his right to be represented
by counsel de parte, he still could not find one who
would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he
cooperate with his court-named lawyers.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Therefore, it do not constitute a deprivation of
appellant's constitutional right to counsel because he
was adequately represented by three court-appointed
lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty. Garcia.
Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure
and convenience of the accused as they are also
mandated to promote the speedy and orderly
administration of justice. Nor should they countenance
such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public
policy requires that the trial continue as scheduled,
considering that appellant was adequately represented
by counsels who were not shown to be negligent,
incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.
AMION v JUDGE CHIONGSON
AM No. RTJ-97-1371 (January 22, 1999)
FACTS: The allegations against respondent judge are
premised on his appointment of a counsel de oficio for
accused-complainant despite the latter’s objection
thereto on the ground that he had his own retained
counsel in the person of Atty. Depasucat.
Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge
appointed another lawyer in the person of Atty. Ong of
the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the
scheduled hearing of the criminal case. He further avers
that his retained counsel was ready for hearing but on
the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed
that Atty. Depasucat was ill.
It was for this reason that accused-complainant was not
represented by his defense lawyer in the scheduled
hearing which prompted respondent judge to appoint
650
Free Legal Aid lawyer Atty. Ong. Notwithstanding
complainant-accused’s vehement opposition,
respondent judge proceeded with the trial with Atty. Ong
representing the complainant-accused as counsel de
oficio. He also claims that Atty. Ong did not have
sufficient knowledge of the case and that no prior
conference was held between said counsel de oficio
and himself.
ISSUE: WON there is a violation of the accused
constitutional rights.
RULING: NO. An examination of related provisions in
the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will
show that the “preference in the choice of counsel”
pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under
investigation rather than one who is the accused in
criminal prosecution.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of
his substantive and constitutional right to due process
as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his
defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in
court together with his counsel at the scheduled
hearings.
Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and
every available opportunity to present his side which
would have led to the expeditious termination of the
case. A party cannot feign denial of due process when
he had the opportunity to present his side.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel
where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the
absence of the accused’s counsel de parte pursuant to
the court’s desire to finish the case as early as
practicable under the continuous trial system.
ANDRADA v PEOPLE
GR No. 135222 (March 4, 2005)
Facts: - On September 24, 1986 at about 1:15 am, Sgt
Sumabong, Sgt Gaces and Cpl Aresinio Ugerio were
eating at the Marlow’s Restaurant in Baguio City. When
Cpl Ugerio talked to a woman who passed by their
table, petitioner Peter Andrada, approached him and
scolded him. Sgt. Sumabong advised Andrada to pay
his bills and go home as he was apparently drunk.
- As Sumabong was paying the bills, he heard
Ugerio moan in pain. He then saw Andrada hacking
Ugerio with a bolo. Sumabong approached them but
Andrada ran away. Andrada was then arrested in a
waiting shed at the corner of Camdas Road and
Magsaysay Ave.
- Andrada invoked self defense claiming that
Ugerio and Sumabong slapped his face and pointed
their guns to his head. He also said that he ran away to
his house in Camdas Subd. He checked to see if his
mother was around to accompany him to surrender, but
nobody was home. On his way to surrender, he say his
mother with a policeman. They proceeded to the police
station in Magsaysay Ave where Andrada surrenderd.
The RTC however ruled against Andrada.
651
Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender can be invoked by Andrada
Held: No
Ratio: - Evidences showed that Andrada, after attacking
the victim, ran away. However, he was apprehended by
the policemen who were in the waiting shed.
- For voluntary surrender to be accepted as a
mitigating circumstance, it should be spontaneous and it
must show that Andrada has the real interest to
surrender unconditionally to the police authorities.
- In this case however, surrender was not
spontaneous.
PEOPLE v VALDESANCHO
GR No. 137051-52 (May 30, 2001)
FACTS: Two counts of the crime of rape was charged
against Vicente Valdesancho. It was alleged that the
rape was committed against Elvie Basco on August 15
and 16 1994, respectively. All evidence of the
prosecution tried to prove that the victim was raped by
the accused on these dates.
The accused interposed the defense of alibi. He
contends that Elvie together with her mother, Leonida,
filed the instant cases against them because of the
serious quarrel between Erlinda (wife of the accused
and the older sister of the victim) and Leonida because
of the latter's relationship with a lesbian. He also said
that he had no misunderstanding or quarrel with Elvie.
He proved that on these dates he was in the town of
Sta. Maria helping Ka Usting prepare for the town fiesta.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
He also proved that on said dates, the victim, Elvie,
was no longer living with them in Mabitac, Laguna. She
already transferred to Minayutan, Famy, Laguna where
she was in Grade 2.
The accused was convicted for two counts of rape
committed on August 15 and 16, 1993 when the
informations filed against him alleged August 15 and 16,
1994 as the dates when the crimes were committed. He
contends that he was denied due process to defend
himself. His whole defense of alibi centered around
August 15 and 16, 1994, the alleged dates of the rape
incidents.
ISSUE: WON the accused was denied of his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.
RULING. YES. Article III, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution mandates that no person shall be held
liable for a criminal offense without due process of law.
It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel. Similarly, the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, it is the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. To convict an accused for an offense not
alleged in the complaint or information violates such
right.
652
The rationale behind informing the accused in writing of
the charges against him was explained by this Court as
early as 1904 in U.S. v. Karelsen,[27] viz:
"First. To furnish the accused with such a description of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction
or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution
for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must
be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made
up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in
the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant),and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstances
necessary to constitute the crime charged."
PEOPLE v CRISOLOGO
GR No. 74145 (June 17, 1987)
FACTS:
Zosimo Crisologo alias “Amang”, a deaf-mute,
was charged for robbery and homicide committed on 1
May 1976 in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao
del Sur. Accused was allegedly informed of the charged
against him through sign language but apparently no
sign language expert or representative was available.
The accused through a counsel de oficio waived the
reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
proceeded without any evidence being presented on his
part. Finally, without the services of an expert in sign
language ever being utilized at any stage of the
proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and
sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency
was recommended, however, in view of the accused's
infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a suspect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was given due
process of law and the insufficiency of the purely
circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence be in his favor.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the absence of an
interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed
to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense
with which he was charged and who could also have
communicated the accused's own version of the
circumstances which led to his implication in the crime,
deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the
accused's final plea of not guilty can excuse these
inherently unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign
language and of any other means, whether in writing or
otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against
him denied the accused his fundamental right to due
process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual
process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused
was determined was not safeguarded. The accused
could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the
653
nature and cause of the accusation against him in the
proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an
accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel,
also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation;
against him, and, further to be confronted by the
witnesses, who are to testify against him. In
constructing this constitutional provision it needs no
discussion in deciding that all this must be done in a
manner by which the accused can know, the nature and
the cause of the accusation he is called upon to answer,
and all necessary means must be provided, and the law
so contemplates, that the accused must not only be
confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must
be accorded all necessary means to know and
understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and
must be placed in a condition where he can make his
plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of
the transaction upon which the accusation is based.
PEOPLE v QUITLONG
GR No. 121502 (July 10, 1998)
FACTS
- Calpito was a student from Baguio city. One time, he
wanted some fishballs so he and Gosil bought some
fishballs worth P15. When Calpito counted his change,
he found out that he only received P35 for his P100.
Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the fishball vendor
would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito. The
3 men kept arguing. Moments later, Soriano saw eight
men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito. Calpito got
stabbed and fell to the ground.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong
and Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing of
Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly after the
filing of the information, submitted a motion for
reinvestigation alleging that “it was a certain Jesus
Mendoza who stabbed the victim. The trial court acted
favorably on the motion. The City Prosecutor filed a
motion to admit an amended information on the basis of
affidavits. The information, as amended, included
Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. But unlike
accused-appellants who were immediately arrested
after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza
remained at large. At their arraignment, the detained
accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
- On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his
evaluation of the respective submissions of the
prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and
sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed
decision.
ISSUES
1. WON the RTC abused its discretion and/or acted
in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that there
was conspiracy between and among the accused-
appellants
2. WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion
and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in
finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of
Murder instead of Homicide
HELD
1. YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2 are
only accomplices.
654
2. NO, the crime was qualified The crime committed
was qualified by abuse of superiority. While superiority
in number would not per se mean superiority in
strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show
that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to
secure advantage of their superiority in strength
certainly out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked.
- Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in
particular, mandates that no person shall be held
answerable for a criminal offense without due process
of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The right to be informed of any
such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules.
- object of informing an accused in writing of the
charges against him: First. To furnish the accused with
such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this requirement
may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions
of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff
and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
DISPOSITION appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty
of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito.
Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,
are found guilty as accomplices in the commission of
the crime.
People v Marcelo
March 22, 1999
J. Vitug
Facts:
Carmelita lives with her two daughters Josefina and
Jaezel. Not far from their residence is the store owned
by accused Ernesto Marcelo. The children grew fond of
Ernesto because he usually gives them candies and in
time Carmelita felt at ease with him and would leave the
children under his care when she is away.
On March 8, 1993, Josefina would complain to her
mother about a pain in her vagina and Carmelita would
even notice her daughter inserting her hand in her panty
to prevent it from touching her vagina. When this
strange behavior recurred, she confronted her daughter
who admitted that accused, would insert his finger, and
then later on his penis into his vagina. An information for
rape was then filed against Ernesto. RTC convicted him.
Ernesto argues that the information averred to have
taken place on 11 March 1993 and 06 March 1993,
pointing out that the trial court convicted him in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-51492 despite its opinion that rape had
been committed not on 06 March 1993 but in the
morning of 08 March before Carmelita arrived to fetch
her children. He thus argues that the allegation in the
information, not being sufficiently definite on the date of
655
the commission of the crime, has violated the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him so as to
give him the full opportunity to prepare for his defense.
Issue:
WON the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusations against him was
violated when the information failed to state the exact
date the rape was committed.
Held/ Ratio:
No. Section 6, Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in relation to Section 11 thereof, provides
that the complaint or information would be sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. With respect particularly to the time of the
commission of the offense, it “is not necessary to state
in the complaint or information the precise time at which
the offense was committed except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed as
the information or complaint will permit.”
People v Ambray
February 25, 1999
J. Gonzaga-Reyes
Facts:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Melenia Hernandez, the victim, was a grade three
student at the time of the alleged rape. She was the
daughter of the common law wife of the accused
Ambray. On March 13, 1996, she said that at around
2am, the accused woke her up and brought her to bed
and inserted his penis on her vagina and sexually
abused her. She was not able to see her mother
immediately, thus she revealed the incident to her aunt
which led to the filing the information against accused.
RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
WON the penalty imposed against the accused should
have been reduced
Held/Ratio:
Yes. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 which
amended Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code to which
the accused is charged provides for attendant
circumstances for which the imposable penalty is death.
The first circumstances provides: “1. When the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.”
Although it was shown that the accused is the common-
law spouse of the victim’s mother, the first special
qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned. The failure to
allege the fact of relationship between the accused and
the victim in the information for rape is fatal and
consequently bars conviction of its qualified form which
656
is punishable with death. Qualifying circumstances
must be properly pleaded in the indictment in order not
to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be
properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him
People v Paglinawan
January 31, 2000
J. Mendoza
Facts:
The Senados were sleeping in their household when
suddenly they heard a gunshot which hit their light
which thus causing the room to be covered in total
darkness. Afterwards, four bursts of gunfire were
subsequently heard. When the firing ceased, she saw
accused Paglinawan holding an M16 rifle looking at
their house which was lighter because of a bulb. He
found and his wife and children injured, and another
child, Jerry, dead. An information was filed against
appellant accusing him of murder. RTC convicted only
convicted him for murder qualified with treachery.
Issue:
WON, accused can also be found guilty for the injuries
suffered by the wife and children
Held/Ratio:
No. the information filed in this case is only for the
murder of Jerry Senados, the seven-year old child of
Segundino and Millianita Senados. Though the
prosecution established in the testimony of its witnesses
that Millianita Senados and Junior Senados were
injured, the court cannot hold accused-appellant liable
for said injuries since he was not properly charged
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
therefore. The Constitution is clear that an accused has
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Hence, a person cannot be
convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged,
otherwise, he would be denied the due process of law
People v De Vera
June 9, 1999
J. Vitug
Facts:
At around midnight of December 31, 1993, while they
were playing with fireworks, Neil saw accused go under
a mango tree. After a short while, he heard a gun shot,
which was followed by the falling body of his brother
Gerardo. When he looked around, he saw the accused,
whom he clearly recognized, holding a long-barreled
gun, about one meter long, also locally known as
"sumpak." Just as he started to assist his brother, he
heard shouts, about 40 to 50 meters away, that her
sister Perlita was also dead. He speculated that that the
shooting was an offshoot of the land dispute between
his father and the accused. Three informations were
filed against the accused, one for the murder of Gerardo
Valdez, the second for homicide for the death of Perlita
Ferrer, and the third for illegal possession of firearms.
RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Murder with Homicide and of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death
Issue:
657
WON accused can be tried and held liable or convicted
for two or more criminal cases at the same time
Held/Ratio:
No. while the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or
more criminal cases and can render a consolidated
decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex
crime consisting of the various crimes alleged on the
two informations. Thus appellant cannot be held liable
for the complex crime of murder with homicide but
should be held liable separately for these crimes. To do
so would deprive the accused of their constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them.
Romualdez v Sandiganbayan
July 29, 2004
J. Panganiban
Facts:
The People of the Philippines through the PCGG filed
an information before [the anti-graft court] charging the
accused, Alfredo Romualdez with violation of Section 5,
Republic Act No. 3019. The information provided that
the accused, being the brother-in-law of President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, and therefore, related to him by
affinity within the third civil degree, for the purpose of
promoting his self-interests and/or that of others,
intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a
government-owned and controlled corporation and the
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO),
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is
owned by Pres. Marcos.
Petitioner claims that the phrase “to intervene directly or
indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or
application with the Government” is vague and violates
his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the
accusation against him. He further complains that the
provision does not specify what acts are punishable
under the term intervene, and thus transgresses his
right to be presumed innocent
Issue:
WON Section 5 of RA 30194 was unconstitutional for
being void for vagueness.
Held/Ratio:
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth and
the vagueness doctrines have special application only
to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for
testing the validity of penal statutes.
Nonetheless, the term intervene should be understood
in its ordinary acceptation, which is to “to come
between.” Criminally liable is anyone covered in the
enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who
4
“Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the
spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of
the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the
Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or
indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of
office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with
the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or
application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office,
nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part
of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites
provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully
performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.”
658
intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the government. It is
impossible for the law to provide in advance details of
how such acts of intervention could be performed. But
the courts may pass upon those details once trial is
concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is
not a ground to quash the information prior to the
commencement of the trial.
People v Bryan Ferdinand Dy
January 16, 2003
J. Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by accused Dy
for the decision finding him guilty of rape and acts of
lasciviousness. One of their main contentions is that the
right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are
susceptible to waiver or estoppel, thus the lack of
arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their
participation in the trial;
Issue:
WON there has been a violation of the rights of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against them.
Held/Ratio:
NO. Indeed, the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation may not be waived and indeed,
the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let
the court enter a plea of “not guilty” in their behalf.
However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the
accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them. The defense
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the
reading of the complaint or information.
Abalos v People
September 17, 2002
J. Quisumbing
Facts:
On November 11, 1994, an Information for Falsification
of Private Documents was filed against the accused–
appellant Braulio Abalos in the MTC of Dagupan City.
On December 12, 1994, another Information for
Falsification of Private Document was filed against the
accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On June 5, 1995, during his arraignment before the
Dagupan Municipal Trial Court, the accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. On August 7, 1995, he filed
a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Municipal Trial
Court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Initially, the motion to quash was granted, but this was
later reversed in a motion for certiorari filed in the RTC.
On the MTC Lingayen, he also filed a motion to quash
but this was also denied. He appealed in both cases,
which was consolidated by the CA who later decided to
dismiss his appeals, Thus the petition on certiorari.
Primarily, petitioner assails the assumption of
jurisdiction over the criminal cases for falsification by the
MTCC-Dagupan and the MTC- Lingayen. He argues
that both courts could not have simultaneous jurisdiction
over his case. He avers that only one crime was
committed pursuant to the unified and indivisible nature
of the criminal intent proved
659
Issue:
WON the informations filed in Lingayen as well as in
Dagupan, MTCC, were dismissible for multiplicity of
offenses merged in one information.
Held/Ratio:
No. there was a waiver of his right.
The Rules of Court, particularly Rule 110, Section 13,
indeed frowns upon multiple offenses being charged in
a single information. However, petitioner failed to
raise this issue during arraignment, in Lingayen as
well as in Dagupan. His failure to do so amounts to
a waiver and his objection on this point can no
longer be raised on appeal. In his Motion to Quash
filed in Dagupan City, petitioner alleged lack of
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in his Motion to Quash
filed in Lingayen, petitioner alleged forum-shopping,
double jeopardy, lack of jurisdiction, and that the facts
do not constitute an offense. He only raised the issue of
“multifariousness of offenses alleged” in his petition
before this Court. By this time, his objection is belated,
and obviously to no avail.
People v Palarca
May 29, 2002
J. Ynares-Santiago
Private complainant, a 70 year widow was tending to
her sari-sari store, while accused, who was a frequent
buyer in the store, was finishing his two bottles of beer.
While complainant was drinking her pills for her
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
insomnia, accused entered the kitchen and forcibly
raped her. An information was filed against him for rape
through force and intimidation. RTC found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and imposed upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus the appeal to the
SC.
Issue:
WON an information lacking certain material allegations
may still sustain a conviction.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, the accused-appellant failed to interpose any
objection to the presentation by the prosecution of
evidence which tended to prove that he committed the
rape by force and intimidation. While generally an
accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not
clearly charged in the complaint or information, this rule
is not without exception. The right to assail the
sufficiency of the information or the admission of
evidence may be waived by the accused-appellant. In
People v. Lopez, we held that an information which
lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a
conviction when the accused fails to object to its
sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured
by competent evidence presented therein. Thus -
Failure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation. It is competent for a person to waive a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action
which would be invalid if taken against his will.
660
Acebedo v Sarmiento
December 16, 1970
J. Fernando
Facts:
On August 3, 1959, a criminal information for damage to
property through reckless imprudence against petitioner
and a certain Chi Chan Tan with the CFI Pampanga. As
there were no further proceedings, petitioner on May 19,
1965 moved to dismiss the criminal charge. Respondent
Judge denied this on July 10, 1965. After two more
years, came the trial with the complainant having
testified on direct examination but not having as yet
been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the
trial set for June 7, 1967 such witness did not show up.
The provincial fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel
for petitioner, however, not only objected but sought the
dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused
to speedy trial.
Initially, respondent judge granted the dismissal, but he
later reversed himself and proceeded with the trial.
Issue:
WON the right of the accused to a speedy trial was
violated.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. The right to a speedy trial means one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary
objective being to assure that an innocent person may
be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation
or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he
may interpose.The remedy in the event of a non-
observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the
accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the
case
In the case at hand, Petitioner not once but twice did
seek to have the prosecution for damage to property
against him terminated as the matter was pending for at
least six years, the first time he sought to put an end to
it. When at last, the trial stage was reached, the
complaining witness testified on direct examination but
made no appearance when his cross-examination was
to be continued. A clear case of a denial of the right to a
speedy trial was thus made out. There was an order of
dismissal that amounted to an acquittal. No
reconsideration could therefore be had without
offending the provision on double jeopardy.
People v Ginez
May 27, 1991
J. Paras
Facts:
An information for libel was filed on January 27, 1987
before the RTC of San Fernando, La Union against
Ramon Labo, Jr., Francis Floresca and Perfecto
Manaois as editor/publisher of the "People's Bagong
Taliba" in connection with the publication of the article
captioned "Inihablang Ex-Justice" in its August 3, 1986
issue.
On April 13, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for
joint hearing and at the same time asked the court to
661
defer the hearing already scheduled for April 20 and 21,
1987, on the ground that the other accused, Manaois,
had lately been arrested and filed bond for his
provisional liberty. The motion was granted and the
court reset the case for the arraignment and pre-trial of
the case with respect to the accused Manaois for May
18, 1987.
On June 11, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for
postponement on the ground that he has a serious eye
ailment (cataract in both eyes) that needs immediate
medical attention. In an order dated June 16, 1987, the
Court granted the said motion and reset the hearing of
the case to July 30, 1987. This was also postponed
when counsel for the accused failed to appear during
the hearings. When the RTC on September 16, 1987
reset the hearing to October 15, 1987 private
complainant was in Manila recuperating from a second
eye operation.
On September 25, 1987 private complainant filed with
the Fiscal's Office a complaint for libel against private
complainant Esquivel, the person identified by Manaois
as the editor of the August 3, 1986 issue of the People's
Bagong Taliba, for his possible inclusion as one of the
accused
On October 15, 1987, the respondent court issued an
Order dismissing the case as against respondents Labo
and Floresca for failure of private complainant Justice
Guerrero to appear. The motion for reconsideration was
denied and thus this instant petition.
Issue:
WON the rights of the accused to a speedy trial had
been violated.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held/Ratio”
No. the court held that said right has not been violated
and held that the dismissal of the case as regards
private respondents Labo and Floresca is premature
and erroneous. "The right of an accused to a speedy
trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the
same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It
secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude
the rights of public justice."
Private complainant's absences at the hearings of the
case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and
meritorious reasons therefore. Said absences are
evidently not capricious, oppressive, nor vexatious
to the two accused who had waived their
appearance at the trial of the case. It should be
remembered that the right to a speedy trial is
relative, subject to reasonable delays and
postponements arising from illness, medical
attention, body operations, as in the instant case
where it was satisfactorily proven that private
complainant had to undergo eye operations,
hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad.
The subject case for libel was dismissed on October 15,
1987, some eight and a half months after the
information was filed. This period is not such an
extended, prolonged or lengthy duration as to cause
capricious and vexatious delay. While accused
persons do have rights, many of them choose to
forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights
UY v ADRIANO
662
G.R. No. 159098. 27 October 2006.
(right to speedy trial; purpose; factors)
Petitioners were charged for the violation of Article 188
of the Revised Penal Code for manufacturing and
selling soy sauce using the name and trademark of
“Marca Pina Soy Sauce,” passing off their product as
the genuine article. For various reasons, the
prosecution of the case stalled (delay in the
presentation of witnesses, a statutory change in the
court with jurisdiction over cases with the same subject
matter, petitioners filed motions instead of responsive
pleadings, etc.) and the proceedings lasted for six
years. Thus the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the
information (at the RTC) claiming that their right to
speedy trial had been violated by the lackadaisical
attitude of the public attorney in prosecuting the case.
HELD: The Court ruled against the petitioners. It ruled
that the right to speedy disposition of cases was for the
benefit and protection of the accused in criminal cases
in order that: (1) oppressive pre-trial incarceration would
be prevented; (2) the anxiety and concern of the
accused would be minimized; and (3) the possibility of
the defense being impaired would be limited. As such,
the factors to be examined in disposing claims of
speedy trial are the following: (a) length of delay (not
really indicative of a violation, it is merely a trigger for
the analysis); (b) reason for the delay (it must be
demonstrated that the delay was capricious, oppressive,
unreasonable, and vexatious; or it must be due top
unjustifiable causes; delay due to the ordinary course of
justice is not a violation); (c) assertion of the right (the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
accused must assert the right at the soonest possible
instance); (d) prejudice to the accused (the accused
must specifically allege how their rights as enumerated
above had been violated).
DACANAY v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 101302. 25 January 1995
(right to speedy trial; right to separate trial)
The government levied a charge of economic sabotage
against the principal officers of the National Sugar
Trading Corporation through smuggling with regard to
the importation of raw sugar in 1986. The case
remained pending until 1991 herein petitioner filed a
Motion for Immediate and Separate Trial invoking his
right to speedy trial.
HELD: The Court ruled for petitioner. A separate trial is
in consonance with the right of an accused to a speedy
trial as guaranteed to him by the 1987 Constitution. As
defined in the case of Flores v. People, 61 SCRA 331
(1974), a speedy trial is one “conducted according to
the law of criminal procedure and the rules and
regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.” The primordial purpose of this
constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an
accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an
indefinite period of time. Likewise, it is intended to
prevent delays in the administration of justice by
requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable
dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions. The main
objection of respondent People of the Philippines to he
separate trial asked by Petitioner is that such a
663
procedure would entail a repetitive presentation of
evidence but such inconvenience and expense on the
part of the Government cannot be given preference over
the right to speedy trial and the protection to a person’s
life, liberty or property accorded by the Constitution.
This is particularly true in the case of petitioner where
the prosecutors’ opposition to the request for separate
trial was based on the ground that the principal accused
in the case, the former President of NASUTRA, was
abroad and was not yet arrested. If an accused cannot
be placed under arrest because he remains outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more
reason should his co-accused, who are under arrest, be
entitled to a separate trial.
PEOPLE v OPIDA
G.R. No. L-46272. 13 June 1986
(right of the accused; impartial judge; appearance of
impartiality)
This is a criminal case on automatic review by the
Supreme Court of the imposition of the death penalty
upon the two accused. The case stems from the killing
of one Fabian Gaban. Allegedly, the accused and
several others ganged up on him, hitting him with beer
bottles and fist blows until one among them, Mario del
Mundo, took out a knife and killed the victim. Del Mundo
is still at large, however the two defendants herein were
charged as co-conspirators. During trial, the judge
questioned and interrogated the accused and defence
witnesses in a very disrespectful and mocking manner
going so far as to comment on the infidelity of one of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
accused’s mother and to insinuate that Opida is
mentally ill.
HELD: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and
ordered their release. It said that it was not enough for
judges to be impartial, they must moreover appear
impartial. The Court said that the judge in this case
failed miserably. Given the obvious hostility of the judge
toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the
protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as
they in fact were, dismissed. The accused are
admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even
proud of their membership in the Commando gang even
as they flaunted their tattoos as a badge of
notoriety. Nevertheless, they were entitled to be
presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and
had a right not to be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law. The judge
disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too
eager to convict the accused, who had manifestly
earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of
the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" he
was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and
obviously waiting only to be formalized. Considering the
way they were tried, we now declare that they should
not be detained in jail a minute longer. While this is not
to say that the accused are not guilty, it does mean that,
because their constitutional rights have been violated,
their guilt, if it exists, has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt and so cannot be pronounced. Due
process has stayed the uneven hand of the quick
condemnor and must set the defendants free.
664
PEOPLE v CASTILLO
G.R. No. 120282. 20 April 1998
(right of the accused; impartiality of the judge;
clarificatory questions)
Defendant was accused of the killing of Tony Dometita.
During trial, the judge of the trial court propounded upon
the defendant several clarificatory questions. The trial
court convicted. Upon automatic appeal to the SC,
defendants charge the trial judge with impartiality
alleging that he took over the work of the prosecution by
asking questions which were well-within the
responsibility of the prosecution. Specifically, defendant
alleges that the judge took over from the prosecution
and asked questions in a leading manner, interrupted
the cross-examination when the answer would be
beneficial to the prosecution, asked questions alluding
to the character of the defendant which the defense
could not object to.
HELD: No merit. The allegation of bias and prejudice is
not well-taken. It is a judge’s prerogative and duty to
ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth.
Questions which merely clear up dubious points and
bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial
prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that
allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be
received with caution, especially when the queries by
the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety
of a judge’s queries is determined not necessarily by
their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by
the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by
such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such
questions and the answers thereto were eliminated,
appellant would still be convicted.
As correctly observed by the solicitor general, “there
was no showing that the judge had an interest, personal
or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He
is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the
manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the ‘cold neutrality
of an impartial judge’ implicit in the guarantee of due
process (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18).” That the
trial judge believed the evidence of the prosecution
more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he
was biased. He simply accorded greater credibility to
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that
of the accused.
PEOPLE v SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 121038-45. 25 January 1999.
(impartial trial; media publicity)
This is the rape-slay case of Allan Gomez and Eileen
Sarmenta for which former Mayor Antonio Sanchez of
Calauan, Laguna was convicted. Defense claims that
they were denied the right to an impartial trial because
of the pervasive media coverage of the case which
characterized the defendants as being guilty of the
crime.
HELD: Denied. Citing the case of People v Teehankee,
the Court said that, “Pervasive publicity is not per
se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
665
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-
day, gavel-to-gavel coverages does not by itself prove
that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial
judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench
from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch
with the world. Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does
not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
“At best, appellant can only conjure possibility or
prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation
and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejsndro, et
al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice
as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.” The
Court also said that in fact, media enhances the rights
of the accused as it brings to the public’s eye possible
violation of such rights.
GARCIA v DOMINGO
52 SCRA 143 (1973)
(rights of the accused; public trial)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
For the convenience of the parties, the respondent
judge held hearings in the comfort of his airconditioned
chambers instead of in the courtroom. No objection was
made by anyone by this arrangement. After judgment
was rendered against the accused, counsel for the
defense sought to invalidate the proceedings as being
violative of the accused’s right to public trial.
HELD: Denied. The Constitution guarantees an
accused the right to a public trial. It possesses that
character when anyone interest in observing the
manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his
courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no
moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.
The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief
that thereby the accused is afforded further protection,
that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and
not tainted with any impropriety. Here, it was undeniable
that even if the hearings were not held in its usual place
(i.e. the courtroom), the same was still open to the
public and whoever wished to observed the proceedings
were free to do so.
PEOPLE v MONJE G.R. No. 146689. 27 September
2002
(rights of the accused; right to meet witnesses face to
face; cross-examination; purpose)
Accused herein were charged and convicted of the rape
and murder of a 15-year-old girl. The prosecution’s case
was woven completely upon the testimony of one
666
Michael Cordero who testified that he saw the accused
with the victim and three others walking to the ricefield
where the victim’s body was later found. During trial,
however, and after a short initial cross-examination,
Cordero refused to return to court so that he may be
questioned by the defense witness more fully.
Notwithstanding this repeated refusal and despite the
court warning that his testimony would be stricken from
the record, the court nonetheless convicted the accuse
based mostly on such testimony.
HELD: The Court reversed the conviction and ordered
the immediate release of the accused. It bears stressing
that the cross-examination of a witness is an absolute
right, not a mere privilege, of the party against whom he
is called. With regard to the accused, it is a right
guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due
process. Article III, Sec. 14, par. (2), of the 1987
Constitution specifically mandates that "the accused
shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face,"
and Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f), of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
trial. Cross-examination serves as a safeguard to
combat unreliable testimony, providing means for
discrediting a witness' testimony, and is in the nature of
an attack on the truth and accuracy of his testimony.
The purpose of cross-examination, however, is not
limited to bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a
leading and searching inquiry of the witness for further
disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by
him in his direct examination, and it serves to sift,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
modify, or explain what has been said, in order to
develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the
cross-examiner. The object of cross-examination
therefore is to weaken or disprove the case of one’s
adversary, and break down his testimony in chief, test
the recollection, veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias or
prejudice of the witness, his source of information, his
motives, interest and memory, and exhibit the
improbabilities of his testimony. In other words, the
ultimate purpose of cross-examination is to test the
truth or falsity of the statements of a witness during
direct examination. Unfortunately, for the accused,
these objectives of cross-examination were never
attained in this case because of the continued failure
and refusal of witness Cordero to appear for his cross-
examination.
CAAMIC v GALAPON
A.M. No. MTJ-93-887. 7 October 1994
(subpoena; nature; purpose)
In a letter addressed to the Court Administrator,
petitioner sent complaint charges for grave coercion
against respondent judge. She alleged that she
received a subpoena from the respondent ordering her
to appear in court. When she did, she claims that she
was threatened, berated, and coerced by respondent
into giving him P8,000.00 to the judge which
represented the amount that she received as death
benefit resulting from the death of her common-law
husband. Respondent filed a comment materially
denying the allegations in the complain saying that the
subpoena was issued upon the request of one
667
Generosa Sandagan who, as it turns out, is the mother
of petitioner’s common-law-husband and who was
merely seeking the recovery of the proceeds of the
death benefits of her son.
HELD: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and
fined the judge with further admonition. Asubpoena "is a
process directed to a person requiring him to attend and
to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any
investigation conducted under the laws of the
Philippines, or for taking of his deposition." Although the
subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in a
form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not,
in fact, issued in connection with a criminal case or for
any other pending case in his court nor for any
investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to
law or by direction of this Court. It was designated for a
specific purpose, viz.,administrative conference. That
purpose was, in no way connected with or related to
some of his administrative duties because he knew from
the beginning that it was for a confrontation with the
complainant as solicited by Generosa Sandagan for the
latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo
Sandagan which was received by the complainant.
Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's court
for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's
court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa
wanted was for respondent to act as mediator or
conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the
complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and
absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or
remotely related to his official functions and duties,
accommodating the request and using his official
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
functions and office in connection therewith was, by any
yardstick, improper. The public trust character of his
office would have been enough reason for him to
decline the request. And, there being no case in his sala
in connection with which complainant could be
subpoenaed, respondent then had absolutely no power
or authority to issue one to the complainant. He thus
exhibited his ignorance of the elementary rule on
issuance of subpoenas.
There is something more, however, in this case. In
using the subpoena form for criminal cases, which was
never explained by respondent, nothing could have
been intended but to sow fear in the mind of the
complainant and compel her attendance, for her failure
to do so would have subjected her to "the penalty of
law." There was, therefore, some element of
intimidation, oppression or abuse of authority, which
aggravates his apparent ignorance of the law on
issuance of subpoenas. Considering that it was done
upon request of a party which has no case before his
court, he invited legitimate criticism against his office as
an instrument of oppression.
GIMENEZ v NAZARENO
160 SCRA 1
(rights of the accused; trial in absentia; requisites)
Respondent de la Vega, along with five others, was
charged with murder. He was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty. Before the scheduled date of the first
hearing, he escaped from detention. Prosecutors file a
motion to proceed with the hearing in absentia, invoking
Sec 19, Art IV of the 1973 Constitution:
668
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified.
The lower court proceeded with the trial. The case was
dismissed against the five accused, while proceedings
against de la Vega were held in abeyance. The
defendant sought reconsideration of the abeyance but
was denied.
ISSUE 1: WON court loses jurisdiction over an accused
who escapes from detention after arraignment
HELD 1: NO. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for
voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary
appearance is accomplished by appearing for
arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in
this case. Where the accused appears at the
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged,
jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
this continues until the termination of the case,
notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
ISSUE 2: WON an accused who has been tried in
absentia retains his right to present evidence and cross
examine witnesses
HELD 2: NO. The requisites for a trial in absentia are:
(1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the
accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to
appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. The right
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses is a
personal right and can be waived. Failure to appear
during trial, after due notice, constitutes a waiver of
these rights. Thus, rendering judgment for a trial in
absentia is not a violation of the right to be presumed
innocent. The accused is still presumed to be innocent,
and his conviction must be based on evidence showing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE v MACARAEG
CONCEPCION; January 14, 1986
FACTS
Private Respondent Vasco Valdez was charged with
Homicide before the CFI of Pangasinan for the death f
one Severs Paulo and posted bail for
h i s provisional release. Attached to the bail bond was
awaiver stipulating that the trial may proceed in
hisabsence.- When the case was called for trial, the
prosecutionpresented Welino Paulo, as its 1st witness,
who when asked if he could identify the accused,
answered in the affirmative.
669
Since the accused was not present in court, the
prosecution asked the court to order the
presence of the accused so that he
c o u l d b e identified. Counsel for accused
o b j e c t e d t o t h e motion by invoking the waiver in
the bail bond and contended that the absence of the
accused is part of his defense. R e s p o n d e n t J u d g e
D a n i e l M a c a r a e g o f t h e C F I , invoking the case
of Aquino v Military CommissionNo.2 denied the
motion:
“The issue at bar was one of those squarely raised in
the Aquino case where six out of ten Justices
voted that the accused may not be compelled to
be present during the trial when he is to
b e identified by the witnesses of the
prosecution w h i l e f o u r v o t e d t h a t t h e
accused may be compelled in this
instance. The reason of the m a j o r i t y i s
t h a t t h e a c c u s e d m u s t n o t b e compelled
to assist the prosecution in proving its case.”
The prosecution moved for reconsideration but
respondent Judge denied the motion. Prosecution
then filed this petition with prayer for a TRO. The SC
granted the petition and issued a TRO,
restraining the respondent Court from further
proceeding with the criminal case.
ISSUE
WON the accused, despite having
w a i v e d h i s presence at the trial, may still be
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
compelled to bepresent in the same trial when he is to
be identified
HELD
YES. Stare Decisis.
Reasoning-
The rule adopted by the Court in the case of Aquinovs.
Military Commission No. 2 (supra) is that while the
accused may waive his presence at the trial of the
case, his presence may be compelled when he is to be
identified.
The Court said: “Since only 6 Justices are of the view
that petitioner may waive his right to be present at all
stages of the proceedings while Justices are in
agreement that he may so waive such right,
except when he is to he identified, the result is
that the respondent Commission's Order
requiring his presence at all times
d u r i n g t h e proceedings before it should be
m o d i f i e d , i n t h e sense that petitioners presence
shall be requiredonly in the instance just indicated.
Petition GRANTED, orders of respondent Judge
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Judge is ordered
toi s s u e the necessary process to
c o m p e l t h e attendance of the accused at
the hearing of thec r i m i n a l case for
p u r p o s e s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Temporary TRO
lifted and set aside
670
G.R. No. 92415 May 14, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. OMAR MAPALAO and REX
MAGUMNANG, defendants-appellants.
GANCAYCO, J.:p
Rex Magumnang was charged with highway robbery
with homicide along with the other accused. However
After arraignment and during the trial, he escaped from
confinement and had not been apprehended since then.
The trial court found him guilty. He therefore seeks to
appeal the conviction.
ISSUE: WON he may appeal his conviction? NO
. Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of
the appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang
remained at large even as his appeal was pending.
Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed.
The reason for this rule is because once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court
and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction
of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.
Thus when as in this case he escaped from
confinement during the trial on the merits and after his
arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and
the judgment against him was promulgated evenas he
remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to
appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction
of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15)
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
days from the notice of the judgment against him. While
at large, he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is
deemed to have waived the same and he has no
standing in court.
By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of
an information, is at large and has not been
apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be
granted any other relief by the courts until he submits
himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested.
The jurisdiction of the court once acquires, is not lost
upon the instance of parties but continues until the case
is terminated. Where the accused appears at the
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged,
jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and
this continues until the termination of the case,
notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
A trial in absentia will thus occur when the following
requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment;
(2) that the accused has been notified; and
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is
unjustified.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has
the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court.
To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to
render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia.
ON PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: He is still
presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still
be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such
evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable
671
doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process
since the accused was given the opportunity to be
heard
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so
hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in
absentia waives his right to present evidence on his
own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him.
P. HABEAS CORPUS
G.R. No. 122954 February 15, 2000
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs.THE
COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU
OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA
(IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA
CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE
CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under
detention since May 21, 1981, up to present1 by reason
of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
He was requesting transfer from Manila City Jail to the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,2 but the Jail
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding
Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer
cannot be effected without the submission of the
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or
Mittimus, Decision, and Information.3 It was then
discovered that the entire records appear to have been
destroyed due to a fire.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
He filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpusdue to his continued detention without any valid
judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right
to due process.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner should be released under writ
of habeas corpus? NO
RATIO: was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.13 It secures to a prisoner the right to
have the cause of his detention examined and
determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful
authority.
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as
a consequence of a judicial proceeding,
(a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person,
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence,
or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess.15
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint
by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks
such restraint.The petition does not make out a case.
The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner under
process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a
lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits
the legality of his detention. The mere loss or
destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate
the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the
prisoner's release.
672
Also, in order that a judgment may be subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for
lack of jurisdiction.The proper remedy in this case is for
either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the
reconstitution of the judgment of the case
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit,
and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR
[82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]
(Sorry couldn’t find the original case!)
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by
Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores
who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment
Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An
advanced payment has already been given to Estelita
by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid.
However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
residence, which was disallowed by the employment
agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the
advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be
paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the
right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount
it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
movement. The fact that no physical force has been
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does
not make less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion,
to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to
cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place
a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to
the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or
physical coercion.
RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, vs. HON. FLORITO
S. MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,
Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the Philippine National Police
filed an application with RTC-Pampanga for the
issuance of a search warrant against petitioner
Raymond M. Jackson, an American citizen, a.k.a. Allen
Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for the search of the articles
673
The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
Court on June 28, 1999 against the Commissioner of
the CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and on the same
date, the Court issued a resolution (a) directing the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the
respondents to make a return of the writ on or before
July 2, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; After the return of the
respondents, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing
the petition of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ
of habeas corpus.[22]
ISSUE: WON petition for habeas corpus should be
granted? NO
RATIO:
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, provides that “except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.” The ultimate purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from
unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is
granted to test the right under which he is detained.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening
events may bar his release or discharge from
custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if
the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of same supervening events such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application. Any such supervening events are the
issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge
of the detained person
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal
restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who
attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth
process where on its face shows good ground for the
detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to
allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the
apparent effects of such process.
In this case, based on the return of the writ by the
respondents, the petitioner was arrested and detained
at the CID detention center at Bicutan, Parañaque City,
under a Mission Order. Records show that the U.S.
passports which were confiscated from the him when he
was arrested by PNP and purportedly issued to
Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator
have been determined to have been tampered. As a
consequence, said passports were cancelled by the
U.S. Embassy.
It has been ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the
passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid
passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain
in the country.
674
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Paredes v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 89989, January 28, 1991
Facts:
In January 1976, Paredes, provincial attorney of Agusan
del Sur was granted land through free patent. Eight
years later, Paredes was charged with perjury by the
provincial fiscal requested by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur.
A former Mayor of Agusan filed a criminal complaint
charging Attorney Paredes with having violated section
3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.
3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial
Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando
Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in
Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent
application.
Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary
examination of the complainant and his witnesses
without the presence of accused because the summon
was erroneously served. Fiscal found a prima facie case
against Paredes.
His motion for reconsideration was denied, assailing
validity of the preliminary investigation that it was
conducted without his notice. In the meantime, Paredes
was elected Governor of Agusan del Sur and the free
patent was reverted back to public domain.
Information was filed and warrant of arrest was issued
against Paredes. He refused to post bail in protest
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
against the injustice to him as Governor•. A petition for
habeas corpus was filed by the wife of Paredes, alleging
that the warrant for her husband’s arrest was void
because the preliminary investigation was void, and,
that the crime charged in the information against him
had already prescribed.
ISSUE: WON a writ of habeas corpus is proper?NO
RATIO:
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not
affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective
The petitioner alleges that the information against
Governor Paredes is invalid because the preliminary
investigation was invalid and the offense charged has
already prescribed. Those circumstances do not
constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus
The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the
attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary
investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one
be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the
information, should merely suspend the trial and order
the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation
MANALO v PNP CHIEF CALDERON
(Reyes, J/2007)
FACTS:
675
A fire broke out in a polling area in an elementary
school due to five malefactors bearing firearms who
poured gasoline over a ballot box and set it ablaze,
causing the death of two people and injuriesto nine
others.
In the investigation that ensued, several eye-witnesses
identified some of petitioners as the perpetrators of the
school burning.[3] The investigation also yielded that all
six petitioners, who are all members of
the PNP Regional Special Operations Group (PNP-
RSOG), failed to timely respond to the incident at
the Pinagbayanan Elementary School.[4]
A PNP memorandum was thus passed, that required
the monitoring of the petitioners in their camp base as
well as escorts when they leave the premises.
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging
that the monitoring was an illegal deprivation of their
liberty.
ISSUE: WON a writ of habeas corpus should be
issued? NO
RATIO:
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best
and efficient defense of personal freedom.
The main thrust of the special proceeding of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
detention. More specifically, its vital purpose is to
obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to
liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause and to deliver them from unlawful custody.[21]
Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is
unlawfully restrained of his liberty will a petition
for habeas corpus be granted and the person detained
released from confinement.[22] If respondents are not
detaining nor restraining the applicants or the person in
whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus is filed, the
petition should perforce be dismissed.[23]
In this case, no illegal deprivation of liberty is shown
to exist:
(1) the assailed memoranda decreeing the
monitoring of their movements cannot be
considered as a form of curtailment of their
freedom guaranteed under our Constitution.
It is evident that petitioners are not actually detained or
restrained of their liberties. What was ordered by
the PNP is that their movements, inside and outside
camp be monitored. Even petitioners themselves
admit they are not actually detained or
imprisoned.[30]
(2) the “restrictive custody” complained of by
petitioners is, at best, nominal restraint which is
beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither
actual nor effective restraint that would call for the
grant of the remedy prayed for.
676
(3) petitioners’ reliance on Moncup ] is misplaced. In
said case, petitioner was ordered released by
respondent but his release was saddled with
restrictions. There, petitioner was required to
secure prior approval for:
(a) any travel outside Metro Manila; and
(b) a change in residence. His freedom of
speech was likewise muffled by a
prohibition on granting interviews to local or
foreign media. He was likewise ordered to
report regularly to respondent]
In the case at bench, no restrictions in the nature
of those imposed in Moncupa exist. To reiterate,
petitioners are merely held to account for their
movements inside and outside the camp’s
premises. They are not required to secure prior
approval before they can move out of the camp,
only that each of them be accompanied by an
escort and their time of departure and arrival
noted.
(4) members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of
the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law
enumerates the disciplinary actions, including
restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly
designated supervisors and equivalent officers of
the PNP as a matter of internal discipline,
(5) although the PNP is civilian in character, its
members are subject to the disciplinary authority
of the Chief, Philippine National Police, under the
National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by
injunction, review, overrule or otherwise interfere
with valid acts of police officials. The police
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
organization must observe self-discipline and
obey a chain of command under civilian
officials.[35]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-59118 March 3, 1988
JUAN DIZON AND SOLEDAD RAMOS, petitioners, vs.
BRIG. GEN. VICENTE EDUARDO AND COL. TEDDY
CARIAN, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, C. J.:
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the parents of
two young persons, Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos
who werevarrested with others by the military, detained
in the military camp, and then claimed by the military to
have been released after nine days. But they were not
released to their parents, who had been visiting them,
nor to any other responsible person — and were never
seen or heard from by anyone since then.
Alleging that the signatures of the desaparecidos on
their release papers were falsified and thus, they were
never released by the military said release being a
scheme of the respondents to prolong their detention,
torture and interrogation, the petitioners-parents filed
the petition at bar on December 17,1981.
ISSUE: WON habeas corpus may be issued? NO
RATIO:
The release of a detained person renders the petition
for habeas corpus moot and academic.. Where,
677
however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the
alleged release of the detainees, which we share,
particularly, where the standard and prescribed
procedure in effecting the release has not been
followed, then the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence the alleged release is shifted to the
respondents. Release is an affirmative defense and
"each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations," 13 just as the burden of proof of self-
defense in a killing rests on the accused
In this case, respondents were unable to prove that the
alleged release occurred.
(1) The signatures of the detainees on their release
papers were falsified.
(2) Respondents did not follow the prescribed standard
procedure for releasing detainees:
(3) The inherent implausibility of respondent Carian's
reason for supposedly releasing the detainees — that
they had agreed to act as spies.
(4( What is likewise difficult of comprehension is that
according to the affidavits of Major Cabauatan and Lt.
Maranon, elements of their command after encountering
a group of "heavily armed men" captured the detainees
with other alleged Comminist Terrorists; with one
casualty on the latter's side, yet all of them except the
two detainees "were released on or before September
23, 1981, having been found out that no sufficient
evidence would be established to warrant their further
detention"
However, the Court regrets that it cannot grant the relief
sought by petitioners. It is not the repository of all
remedies for every grievance.. It is not a trier of facts,
nor does it have the means and facilities to conduct
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
such investigation of the grave charges at bar as well as
of the whereabouts and fate of the desaparecidos.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to refer this case
to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation
and appropriate action as may be warranted by its
findings, and to furnish the Court with a report of the
outcome of its investigation and action taken thereon.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
. in substance. In the negative, the courts to which the
January 4, 1995
G.R. No. 117568
ROLANDO ANGELES y BOMBITA, petitioner, vs.
DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISON, respondent.
Vitug, J.:
Rolando Angeles y Bombita was charged and
sentenced to life imprisonment for the illegal possession
of shabu. He has now lodged a petition for habeas
corpus, invoking
(a) Republic Act No. 7659, which has reduced the
penalties prescribed under the original provisions of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, and
(b) the recent ruling of this Court in People vs. Martin
Simon y Sunga, 3 which has confirmed the retroactive
application of the above-numbered amendatory law.
ISSUE: WON the petition of habeas corpus may
prosper? NO
RATIO:
All courts of competent jurisdiction mat entertain
petitions for habeas corpus to consider the release of
678
prisoners convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act who have served the maximum of the applicable
penalties newly prescribed by Republic Act No. 7659.
In this regard, the formalities required for petitions
for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and such
petitions, although deficient in form (e.g. in letter-petition
forms), may be entertained so long as they are sufficient
petitions are filed may refer the matter to the
Commission on Human Rights or to the Public
Attorney’s Office for possible assistance to the prisoners
concerned
The foregoing notwithstanding, Angeles’ petition
for habeas corpus cannot be granted. Petitioner, it
appears, has only served the minimum of his
sentence; however, he may, if qualified, be released
on parole pursuant to Section 5 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law which reads:
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus,
being still premature, is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,
(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo
Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA
R. TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R.
TORRES), petitioners, vs.THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS,
MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife and
children of Wilfredo Torres. A conditional pardon was at
first granted to Torres but the Board of Pardons and
Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted because
he had been charged with twenty counts of estafa
before, and convicted of sedition.
Thus, the Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the
President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment 7 against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to
serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
ISSUE: WON the petition for habeas corpus is valid?
NO
RATIO:
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a
person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or
unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of
Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the
grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked
because of a breach thereof, the determination of which
is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his
final sentence for his first conviction until November 2,
2000.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in
the first place was the exclusive author of the
conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary
prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own
judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the
subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the
679
same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the
grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted
criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final
judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is
not a requirement for the President to determine
whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of
a conditional pardon
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to cost
CONTADO v. TAN
FACTS: This petition for habeas corpus was flied on
November 20, 1978 by Nora Contado, Adelina Razon
and Nena Tizon in behalf of their spouses Crispo
Contado, Cesar Razon and Jimmy Tizon. The
respondents are Rufilo L. Tan, the then Municipal Mayor
of Llorente, Eastern Samar
Petitioners alleged that on September 13,1978, their
spouses were arrested by members of the Integrated
National Police of Llorente, Eastern Samar,
In their separate amended returns, respondents denied
the material allegations of the petition stating that they
(respondents) merely invited the three missing persons
for questioning and reiterated that they had been
released on the same day on September 13, 1978 at
8:00 p.m. Respondents prayed that the petition be
dismissed for being moot and academic.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Petitioners, in their reply to the separate amended
returns, stated that the subject persons were never
released on September 13,1978 or on any day
thereafter as shown by the affidavits of one Diosdado
Camora and one Diomedes Bono.
HELD: The Sandiganbayan decision, lenient as it was,
proves beyond per adventure the falsity of the incredible
claim by res respondents in their returns and amended
returns in the case at bar that they released the three
detainees-victims on the very same night of their arrest
on September 13,1978. They thereby flaunted the
authority of this Court; brazenly perjured themselves in
swearing to their false returns; failed to give respect due
to justice and truth and created and placed obstacles to
the administration of justice and prevented the
resolution of this case with the promptness which its
very nature required, involving as it did, the liberty and
lives of the three victims.
It is beyond doubt the bounden duty of respondents
having custody of a detained person to respect and
obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by a court or judge
having jurisdiction in the premises and properly served
upon them, and every person who unlawfully disobeys
the Court's commands or unlawfully resists or counsels'
resistance to its execution is in contempt of court and
may be summarily punished therefor. Disobedience to
the writ may take the form of neglecting or refusing to
produce the person whose presence is sought by the
writ, of failing to make a return, of making a false or
evasive return, or of refusing to obey the final order or
judgment entered in the proceedings.
680
The Court herein exercises this power on a corrective
and not a retaliatory or vindictive principle (though it
could impose a heavier penalty and order respondents"
imprisonment for a substantial period of time) and
therefore finds respondents guilty of contempt of court
and sentences each of them to pay a fine of One
Thousand Pesos (P l,000.00) as hereinbelow ordered.
But the respondents must face criminal charges for their
perjured returns to the writ, as set forth hereinabove.
Q. SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
CADALIN v. POEA ADMINISTRATOR
FACTS: On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin,
Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their
own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas
contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing
an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims
arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment
by BRII, a foreign corporation engaged in construction.
The claimants say that they were deprived by NLRC
and the POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of
their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed
private respondents to file their answers in two years
(on June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original
complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total
disregard of its own rules
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HELD: It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy
disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a
case may demand expeditious action on all officials who
are tasked with the administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153
SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is a
relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal
proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution
prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
delays which render rights nugatory.
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient
definiteness and clarity of some facts, the claimants
were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a
bill of particulars. When claimants filed their
"Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike
out the complaint from the records for failure of
claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the
POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike out the
complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the
deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response
to the complaint, the records of employment of the more
than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from various
countries in the Middle East. Some of the records dated
as far back as 1975.
681
SAMBANG v. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL
Facts: Petitioner, then a constable 2nd class (C2C) in
the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and his brother
Vicente Sumbang, a civilian, were accused with the
killing of Joemarie Bedia and Joey Panes committed on
May 29, 1988 in Bo. Obrero, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City.
Upon his arraignment on November 20, 1989, petitioner
entered a plea of "not guilty". The prosecution started
presenting its witnesses on January 21, 22, and 23,
1991. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss or Demurrer
to Evidence on February 27, 1991. On the other hand,
Vicente Sumbang was convicted of Homicide by the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City on March 27, 1991.
On January 14, 1992, Republic Act No. 6975 otherwise
known as the "Philippine National Police (PNP) Law"
took effect. The PNP law provides among others for the
integration of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police (PC-INP) into the PNP including its
functions, officers and other enlisted personnel and also
provides for the continuation of court-martial
proceedings against PC-INP criminal offenders already
arraigned prior to its effectivity. The composition of the
general court-martial RECOM 6 was also subjected to
changes and petitioner's criminal case remained
pending and unresolved.
On February 17, 1999 and August 4, 1999, respectively,
Letter Order Nos. 80 and 436 of the National
Headquarters, Philippine National Police (NHQ-PNP)
were issued by the PNP Director General constituting
general court-martial PRO 6, Iloilo City which took over
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
petitioner's criminal case. The respondent general
court-martial then scheduled the dates for the
continuation of the hearing of petitioner's case.
On September 29, 1999 hearing, petitioner moved for
the dismissal of the case alleging among others that
there was inordinate delay in the trial of his case which
is in violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial
and disposition of his case
HELD:"It must be here emphasized that the right to a
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length
of delay, reason for the delay, defendant's assertion or
non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, are considered."
Although it is unfortunate that it took about eight years
from 1991 before the trial of this case was resumed, in
1999, we do not find such delay as amounting to a
violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial considering
that such delay could not be attributable to the
prosecution. The cases cited by petitioner upholding
the right of the accused to a speedy trial are not in point
682
since the delay therein complained of was due to the
vacillation and procrastination of the prosecuting officers
and their lack of conscientiousness in the discharge of
their duties, which circumstances do not obtain in the
case at bar. The prosecution in the instant case had
already presented its four witnesses, all of whom,
except for the fourth witness, were cross-examined by
petitioner's counsel on January 21, 22, and 23, 1991,
respectively.
LICAROS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the
Central Bank was robbed and divested of cash in the
amount of P19,731,320.00.
In the evening of June 6, 1982, Modesto Licaros (no
relation to herein petitioner), one of the principal
accused, together with four companions, delivered in
sacks a substantial portion of the stolen money to the
Concepcion Building in Intramuros, Manila where Home
Savings Bank had its offices, of which herein petitioner
was then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The delivery
was made on representation by Modesto Licaros to
former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, Sr.,
then Chairman of the Bank and father of herein
petitioner, that the money to be deposited came from
some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the
deposit kept secret;
As of this writing, and more than ten (10) years after the
case submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not
rendered the Decision.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
HELD: On June 20, 1990, Criminal Case No. 6672 was
deemed submitted for the decision of the
Sandiganbayan. Since then, no action has been taken
by the anti-graft court. On March 23, 2000, petitioner
filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, grounded on the
violation of his right to a speedy
disposition. Unfortunately, even this Motion has not
been ruled upon by public respondent.
Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the
Sandiganbayan has only 90 days to decide a case from
the time it is deemed submitted for
decision. Considering that the subject criminal case
was submitted for decision as early as June 20, 1990, it
is obvious that respondent court has failed to decide the
case within the period prescribed by law. Even if we
were to consider the period provided under Section
15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is 12
months from the submission of the case for decision,
the Sandiganbayan would still have miserably failed to
perform its mandated duty to render a decision on the
case within the period prescribed by law. Clearly then,
the decision in this case is long overdue, and the period
to decide the case under the law has long expired
As earlier discussed, more than ten years has lapsed
since the subject case has been deemed submitted for
decision. The delay cannot at all be attributed to
petitioner, who has neither utilized dilatory tactics nor
undertaken any procedural device to prolong the
proceedings. As a matter of fact, he has been
continuously pushing for the resolution of his case even
during the early stages of the prosecution. Moreover, it
is undeniable that such delay has caused much
683
prejudice, distress and anxiety to herein petitioner,
whose career as bank executive and businessman has
suffered the stigma of being shackled to an unresolved
criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles’
sword over his head for more than a decade. We need
not stress the consequences and problems inherent in
this pending litigation and/or criminal prosecution which
include the prospects of unrealized business
transactions, stagnant professional growth, hampered
travel opportunities and a besmirched
reputation. Furthermore, it is worth noting that petitioner
has been charged merely as an accessory after the fact
due to his being a senior executive of the bank where
the principal accused tried to deposit the stolen
money. Clearly then, the dismissal sought by herein
petitioner is justified under the circumstances and in
accordance with the guidelines set forth in the above-
cited case.
TILENDO vs. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 165975
Facts:
Tilendo is President of the Cotabato City State
Polytechnic College (CCSPC).
CCSPC had an appropriation of P6 million for the
construction of its Agriculture Building and Science
Academic Building.
Concerned Faculty Members of the CCSPC filed before
the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for
violation of RA 3019. Complaint basically alleged that
Tilendo enriched himself and his family while he was
President of the CCSPC, using government funds for
personal purposes. The complaint likewise accused
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Tilendo of diverting and misusing the funds allocated for
the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building.
The Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed the
anonymous complaint to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Region XII for the conduct of a fact-
finding investigation.
NBI conducted investigations pertaining to the case.
Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao received the NBI report
charging accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019, and Articles 217, 218, and 219 of the RPC.
OMB found probable cause and ordered filing of
information.
Tilendo opposed raising right to speedy disposition of
cases, the case having dragged for years.
HELD: In this case, there was no unreasonable delay
to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage
officially began when the NBI filed before the
Ombudsman a complaint against Tilendo for violation of
the relevant provisions of RA 3019 and the
RPC. Contrary to Tilendo’s view, the preliminary
investigation did not automatically commence upon the
filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman
Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 7), as amended, or
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
outlines the procedure applicable to all criminal and
administrative complaints cognizable
by the Ombudsman. Section 2, Rule II of AO 7 clearly
states that “upon evaluating the complaint, the
investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:
(a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; (b)
referred to respondent for comment; (c) endorsed to the
684
proper government office or agency which has
jurisdiction over the case; (d) forwarded to the
appropriate office or official for fact-finding
investigation;
Even assuming there was delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation, Tilendo is deemed to have
slept on his right to a speedy disposition of
cases. From 22 October 1999, when he submitted to
the NBI his counter-affidavit, after asking for several
extensions of time, Tilendo did nothing until December
2002. It seems that Tilendo was insensitive to the
implications and contingencies of the projected criminal
prosecution posed against him. He did not take any
step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the
matter. Tilendo’s inaction gives the impression that he
did not object to the supervening delay, and hence it
was impliedly with his acquiescence
ROQUE v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Facts: On January 14, 1991, Laura S. Soriano and
Carmencita Eden T. Enriquez of the COA, by virtue of
COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91-174
dated January 8, 1991, conducted an audit on the P9.36
million allotment released by the DECS Regional Office
No. XI to its division offices
As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez
found some major deficiencies and violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019)
In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints proper for
a preliminary investigation. The case involving petitioner
Mabanglo was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0201 while
that involving petitioner Roque was docketed as OMB-
MIN-91-0203
On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant
petition for mandamus premised on the allegation that
‘[a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases proper for
preliminary investigation were issued on June[,] 1991
and the subsequent submission of their counter-
affidavits, until the present[,] or more than six (6) years,
no resolution has been issued by the Public
Respondent [and no] case [has] been filed with the
appropriate court against the herein Petitioner
HELD: We find the long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of
the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to
the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law
for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the
broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of ‘speedy disposition’ of cases
as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in
the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
delay is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
685
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative
assumption that ‘delay may be due to a painstaking and
grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official.’ In the first place, such a statement
suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five
charges against the petitioner were for his alleged
failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
required by Republc Act 3019, which certainly did not
involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such ‘painstaking and grueling scrutiny’ as
would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation.
GUIANI v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: After the creation of the Autonomous Region
for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the regional Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH-ARMM) began
the implementation of regional, provincial and district
impact projects to be funded from the infrastructure
seed money of P615 Million from the Office of the
Regional Governor of ARMM.
On October 15, 1992, the Commission on Audit-
Special Audit Office (COA-SAO) conducted a physical
inspection of the impact projects and found several
irregularities therein. More specifically, the COA-SAO
found that in relation to the concreting of the Cotabato-
Lanao Road, the contractors bloated the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
accomplishment reports. This enabled them to claim on
their progress billings, resulting in an overpayment by
the government of P4,164,000.00, and concealed the
negative slippage incurred by said contractors. It also
discovered that mobilizations fees advanced to
contractors amounting to P15,798,675.00 remained
unrecouped, when these were supposed to be deducted
from contractors’ progress billings.
On December 8, 1992, the Office of the President,
through then Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante,
asked the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary
investigation. Thus, the Commission on Audit,
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, instituted a
complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) against regional
officials of Cotabato City and DPWH-ARMM. The
complaint was docketed as Case No. OMB-0-92-2771.
On July 31, 1998, Graft Investigation Officer II Gay
Maggie F. Balajadia-Violan recommended the
indictment of petitioners, among others, for various
violations of RA 3019. The recommendation was
approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao
Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. on October 8, 1998, and by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on October 16,
1998.[1]Immediately thereafter, 21 criminal informations
were filed against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan
as Criminal Cases Nos. 24963-24983
Petitioenrs say that the DELAY OF ALMOST SIX (6)
YEARS TO RESOLVE THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION DISREGARDED THE
OMBUDSMAN’S DUTY, AS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770
686
violated their constitutional rights.
HELD: As meticulously detailed by the Ombudsman
above, the period of time that elapsed during the
conduct of the preliminary investigation in this case was
warranted by the sequence of events. Because of the
complexity of the transactions complained of which
were contained in a two-page report from the COA, the
Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) sought further
substantiation of the allegations therein and requested
for the complete report of the COA Special Audit
Office. The authenticated SAO Report No. 93-04 was
received by the GIO on November 16, 1994. It was only
then that the GIO required all forty-one respondents to
file their counter-affidavits.
Most of the respondents, including some of
petitioners herein, moved for extensions of time. All the
counter-affidavits were received in August 1995, owing
to the number of respondents. Thereafter, the COA
filed reply-affidavits on February 24, 1996 and May 29,
1996. It was only after the submission of the last
pleading, i.e., the reply-affidavits, that the preliminary
investigation can be said to have been concluded. The
time to resolve the cases commences from this date.
In the application of the constitutional guaranty of
the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. Well-settled is the rule that the
right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delay. In the determination of whether or
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are: the length of delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by
the delay
The records of this case show that petitioners raised
their objections to the perceived delay in the resolution
of the complaints against them only on September 27,
1999, when they filed their Omnibus Motion with the
Sandiganbayan. It would appear, therefore, that
petitioners impliedly acquiesced in the delay in the
proceedings.
ABADIA v. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan
was arrested on April 27, 1990 in connection with the
December 1989 coup attempt. He was brought to the
ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati where
he was detained for nine months without charges. On
January 30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against
private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate
General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th
Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively.
HELD: In the context of the constitutional protection
guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals
particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot
accept petitioners’ submission that the absence of any
specific provision limiting the time within which records
of general courts martial should be forwarded to the
687
appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing
authority to decide on the case would deny private
respondent – or any military personnel facing charges
before the General Courts Martial, for that matter – a
judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a
speedy trial. What petitioners suggest is untenable. In
the case at bench, the records of the case may
indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and
our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules,
cannot be called upon to ascertain whether certain
substantive rights have been or are being denied in the
meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of
the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which mandates the “duty of the Courts of
Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government
As admitted by counsel for respondents, there is no
time frame within which to transmit the records of the
case to the reviewing authority as well as time limitation
within which the Chief of Staff must act on the
recommendation of dismissal However, it must be
stressed that the absence of a rule does not give to the
Chief of Staff indefinite time within which to act at the
expense of the constitutional right of a citizen to enjoy
liberty and to be protected from illegal or arbitrary
detention.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Respondent court, therefore, did not commit an abuse
of discretion in ordering the petitioners to act with
dispatch in dealing with the private respondent’s case.
Over three years have elapsed since the respondent’s
arrest. To this day, there is no indication – and it has not
been alleged – that records of the case have been
forwarded to the appropriate military appellate authority.
This case does not even involve complex issues of fact
and law. The central issue which the appropriate military
appellate authority will have to review is whether or not
the General Court Martial was correct in dismissing the
case on grounds of prescription under Article 38 of the
Articles of War.
DIMAYACYAC v. JUDGE ROXAS
Facts: An information for falsification of public
documents docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037
at the RTC of Quezon City was filed against petitioner
along with some others.
Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the
information on two (2) grounds. First, that the officer
who filed the information had no legal authority to do so,
and second, that more than one offense was charged in
the information.
RTC granted motion to quash
More than two (2) years after the quashal of the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 or on
October 19, 1993, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed
688
against the same accused including petitioner two (2)
informations for falsification of public documents
docketed at the Quezon City RTC as Criminal Case
Nos. Q-93-49988 and 49989
The SOolicitor General then invoked the right to speedy
disposition of cases for the accused
HELD: As to the length of delay, it is established that
the prosecution did not take any action on petitioner’s
case for two years. From the time that Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18037 was dismissed on August 23, 1991, the
prosecution failed to effect the very simple remedy of
filing two separate informations against petitioner until
October of 1993. Indeed, there was a delay in the
refiling of the proper informations. However, the
prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain
the circumstances that may have caused such delay
precisely because petitioner never raised the issue of
the length of time it took the prosecution to revive the
case. There is nothing on record to show what
happened during the two-year lull before the filing of the
proper informations. Hence, it could not be ascertained
that peculiar situations existed to prove that the delay
was vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and
therefore, a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases.
What the records clearly show is that petitioner never
asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The only ground he raised in assailing the subsequent
filing of the two informations is that he will be subjected
to double jeopardy. It was only the OSG that brought to
light the issue on petitioner’s right to a speedy
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
disposition of his case, and only when the case was
brought to the appellate court on certiorari. Even in this
petition before us, petitioner did not raise the issue of
his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
R. SELF-INCRIMINATION
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for
prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It
was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for
complainants announced that he would present as his
first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner,
through counsel, made of record his objection, relying
on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a
witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to
compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of
Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse
of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the
facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness
stand and interrogate him, the right against self-
incrimination being available only when a question
calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness.
They likewise alleged that the right against self-
incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative
hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea
689
that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of
the complainants, he being the party proceeded against
in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this
appeal by respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the
first witness of the complainants violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative
hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners
cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause,
compel the person proceeded against to take the
witness stand without his consent. The Court found for
the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled
principle that "the accused in a criminal case may
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but,
also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be
compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not
the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his
license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional
guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The
accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his
silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It
is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own
free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that
while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not
be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the
human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual
even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is
given due weight. The constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government ...
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
People v. Rondero (Scope of Right Against Self-
Incrimination)
The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice
pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9
year old victim was later found dead and half naked with
lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was
convicted of homicide only.
Held: Guilty of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. The absence of sperm does not negate the
commission of rape since the mere touching of the
pudenda by the male organ is already considered as
consummated rape. The presence of physical injuries
on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force
on her person. Contusions were found on Mylene’s
face, arms and thighs. Hence, death is the appropriate
penalty.
690
People v. Gallarde(Scope of Right Against Self-
Incrimination)
FACTS: Accused was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide. The trial court convicted him of murder
only. The trial court rejected the photographs taken of
the accused immediately after the incident on the
ground that the same were taken when the accused
was already under the mercy of the police.
HELD: The taking of pictures of an accused, even
without the assistance of counsel, being purely a
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional
rights against self-incrimination.
Villaflor v. Summers(Scope of Right Against Self-
Incrimination)
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of
adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject
herself into physical examination to test whether or not
she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of
adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused
to such physical examination interposing the defense
that such examination was a violation of her
constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a
violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights against
self-incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights.
The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary
to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the
body of the accused is permissible.
Page 218
Regala v. Sandiganbayan (Scope of Right Against
Self-Incrimination)
Facts: Clients consulted the petitioners, in their capacity
as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in
question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional
advice in the form of, among others, the deeds of
assignment covering their client's shareholdings.
Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice
had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
1. July 31, 1987 – complaint before the Sandiganbayan
of PCGG vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., (principal
defendant) et al. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth,
i. e., shares of stocks in named corporations in PCGG
Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "R. P. v.
Cojuangco, et al."
2. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners
(plus private respondent Raul S. Roco) - then partners
of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and
Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm).
3. ACCRA Law Firm – acquired info on assets of clients,
personal and business circumstances; assisted in
organization and acquisition ofbusiness associations
691
and/or organizations (companies listed in CivilCase
0033), where its members acted as incorporators, or
simply, asstockholders etc; delivered documents which
substantiate the client'sequity holdings, i.e., (1) stock
certificates endorsed in blankrepresenting the shares
registered in the client's name, and (2) ablank deed of
trust or assignment covering said shares; acted
asnominees-stockholders of the said corporations
involved insequestration proceedings (as office practice)
4. August 20, 1991 - respondent PCGG’s "Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended
Complaint" excluded private respondent Raul Roco
from complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 because of his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in
the companies involved in
PCGG Case No. 33.
5. Third Amended Complaint – said defendants
conspired in helping set up, through the use of the
coconut levy funds, UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CIC, and more than 20 other coconut
levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of
San Miguel Corporation shares
6. ACCRA Investments Corporation - became the
holder of approximately 15 million shares (roughly
3.3%) of total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of
31 March 1987; 44 among the top 100 biggest
stockholders of UCPB (about 1,400,000 shareholders);
a wholly-owned investment arm
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately 3,744
shares as of February, 1984 of UCPB
8. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA – said that
is only in legitimate lawyering; became holders of
shares of stock in the corporations listed but do not
claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of
stock; said Avelino V. Cruz an incorporator in 1976 of
Mermaid Marketing Corporation but for legitimate
business purposes and already transferred shares
9. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini - denied being onvolved in
the alleged ill-gotten wealth
10. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October
8, 1991 with Counter-Motion of ACCRA – moving that
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded
Roco.
11. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely (PCGG’s Comment): (a) the
disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c)
deeds of assignments petitioners executed for clients
covering shares
12. PCGG’s supposed proof to substantiate compliance
by Roco: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of his the
counsel reiterating previous request for reinvestigation;
(b) Affidavit as Attachment; (c) Letter of the Roco,
Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting
692
the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence of
PCGG against Roco
13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he
did actually not reveal identity of the client, nor
undertook to reveal the identity of the client for whom he
acted as nominee-stockholder.
14. March 18, 1992 - respondent Sandiganbayan
promulgated Resolution herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners for their refusal to comply with
the conditions by PCGG
15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict
application of the law of agency; absolutely no evidence
that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to
reveal, disclosure not constitute a substantial distinction
or equal protection clause, favoritism and undue
preference; not holding that, under the facts of this
case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the
PCGG; unreasonable or unjust
ISSUE: Privileged Information
Whether or not the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei
fidei) may be asserted in refusing to disclose the identity
of clients [name of petitioners' client(s)] under the facts
and circumstances obtaining in the instant case
HELD: The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not
to reveal the identityof their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to theirclients, because
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the facts of the instant case clearly fall withinrecognized
exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not
privileged information. Sandiganbayan resolution
annulled and set
aside. Petitioners excluded from complaint.
1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of this client. Reasons:
1. Court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh
and blood.
2. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established. The attorney-
client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3. Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
4. Due process considerations require that the
opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary.
2. BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the
client's name itself has an independent significance,
such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences
1. A strong probability exists that revealing the client's
name would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer's advice. (Baird exception
for freedom of consultation)
2. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability.
(case at bar)
3. Government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
693
individual of a crime. (case at bar – BAIRD
EXCEPTION)
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem
on which the client seeks legal assistance (case at
bar)
5. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been
previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential
3. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as co-
defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their
clients, after the "bigger fish" as they say in street
parlance — the names of their clients in exchange for
exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera Farms, Inc., et
al. vs. PCGG Mario Ongkiko) - "so called client is Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients)
4. No valid cause of action. It would seem that
petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as
defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers.
5. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised
on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one
person lets his services and another hires them without
reference to the object of which the services are to be
performed. Their services may be compensated by
honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of
agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be
placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
that he gained by the contract to the person who
requested him.
6. OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws
Applicable
a. Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383
"forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal
any communication made by the client to him or his
advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment."
b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: “Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. — The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases: “An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of…”
c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: “duty
of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence,
and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of
his client, and to accept no compensation in connection
with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.”
d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.”
694
e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The
lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability,"
7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides
a wall of protection against uneven application of status
and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee
operates against uneven application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be
accorded the same treatment.
8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right
against self-incrimination and subverts the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege.
SEPARATE OPINIONS (THREE OTHER JUSTICES:
VITUG, DAVIDE AND PUNO)
VITUG, J., concurring:
1. Confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship -
allows the lawyer and the client to institutionalize a
unique relationship based on full trust and confidence
2. A situation of what it could elicit from a counsel
against his client, unreasonable and with thinly
disguised threat of incrimination.
DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting
1. Court must confine itself to the key issue, issue
burried: whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
defendants, the petitioners herein, from the Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033.
2. Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners'
prayer to exclude them. The prerogative to determine
who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially
vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case.
3. If Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a
lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely
answerable therefor to his principals/clients and,
probably, to this Court in an appropriate disciplinary
action if warranted.
4. They have no right to make such a demand for until
they shall have complied with the conditions imposed
for their exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by
way of a motion to dismiss. The rule ofconfidentiality
under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause
toexclude a party. It is merely a ground for
disqualification of a witness.
5. The revelation is entirely optional, discretionary, on
their part. The attorney-client privilege is not therefor
applicable. The lawyer-client privilege provides the
petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal
defendants for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.
6. Wrong use of American jurisprudence in ponencia:
1. Issue of privilege contested therein arose in grand
jury proceedings on different States.
695
2. In the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers
concerned were merely advocating the cause of their
clients but were not indicted for the charges against
their said clients. Here, the counsel themselves are co-
defendants duly charged in court as co-conspirators.
7. Lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the
commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the
lawyer therefor.
8. As a general rule, the identity of a defendant in a
criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and,
thus, not covered by the attorney-client privilege.
Identity of a client is not within the lawyer-client privilege
in this manner because every litigant is in justice entitled
to know the identity of his opponents.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
1. MAIN POINT OF PUNO: Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated the
metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by
failing to recognize the exceptions. But petitioners need
to prove that prove they fall within the exceptions to the
general rule. Needs factual basis.
2. REASON: Attorney-client privilege is not a magic
mantra whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure
drape he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly put, it
is not enough to assert the privilege.
3. Legal advice exception may be defeated through a
prima facie: in furtherance of present or intended
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
continuing illegality, as where the legal representation
itself is part of a larger conspiracy. [like this case]
4. Atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue
involves the applicability of attorney-client privilege:
petitioners included as defendants and conspirators.
5. The issue of attorney-client privilege arose when
PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the complaint
on condition they reveal the identity of their client.
6. The issue poses a trilemma: need for courts to
discover the truth, need to protect adversary system of
justice, need to keep inviolate the constitutional right
against self-incrimination and effective counsel in
criminal litigations.
7. Attorney-client privilege can never be used as a
shield to commit a crime or a fraud.
8. PCGG relented on its original stance as spelled out in
its Complaint that petitioners are co-conspirators in
crimes and cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege.
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. FELIX
SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and
FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of
Isabela, respondents.
(Scope of Right Against Self-Incrimination)
Facts: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein
the petitioner complains that the respondent judge
696
ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to
take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the
purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order violates the
petitioner's right against self-incrimination.
HELD: Yes. The constitutional inhibition is directed not
merely in giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well
the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word
of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the
accused has a right to hold secret.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical
act, because it requires the application of intelligence
and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that
the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier.
For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is
a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
The present case is more serious than that of
compelling the production of documents or chattels,
because here the witness is compelled to write and
create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
does not exist, and which may identify him as the
falsifier.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit
A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained
herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal
right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that
in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the
hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do
not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
innocent persons.
Note: Measuring or photographing the party is not within
the privilege. Nor is the removal or replacement of his
garments or shoes.
p. 218
Galman v. Pamaran (Immunity)
Facts: In order to determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a
free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all
aspects of the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886
was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board
aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public
hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and
697
testified and/or produced documentary and other
evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in
response to an invitation issued by the board. Among
those who testified and produced evidence before the
board are the respondents in this petition.
Respondents contend that their individual testimonies
before said board should not be admitted in evidence
and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for
the prosecution. However, said prayer was denied by
the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies
could not be excluded because the immunity was not
available to them because of their failure to invoke their
right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact
Finding Board.
Issue: 1. WON the testimonies given by the 8
respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-
incrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in
evidence.
Held: 1. NO. The Board is in truth and in fact, and to all
legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only
with the function of determining the facts and
circumstances surrounding the killing, but more
importantly, the determination of the person or persons
criminally responsible therefore so that they may be
brought before the bar of justice.
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other
similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment
and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their
consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned
to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also
those suspected as authors and co-participants in the
tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and
called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is
one where the person testifying or producing evidence
is undergoing investigation for the commission of an
offense and not merely in order to shed light on the
facts and surrounding circumstances of the
assassination, but more importantly, to determine the
character and extent of his participation therein.
This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886
denied them the right to remain silent. They were
compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves.
Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They
have to take the witness stand, testify or produce
evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or
refused to do so. The jeopardy of being placed behind
prison bars even before conviction dangled before their
very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to
be a witness against themselves, both of which are
sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our
fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to
remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by
P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced
evidence as ordered, they were not immune from
prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.
698
Issue: 2. WON the right against self incrimination
extends to testimonies given before the Agrava board
and not to an investigating officer
Held: YES. The privilege has consistently been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all
cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon
a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture
case where only property rights were involved, "the right
not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is
secured in favor of the defendant, then with more
reason it cannot be denied to a person facing
investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life
and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by
him, hang on the balance.
The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes
no other import except to make said provision also
applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then,
the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself"
applies to the herein private respondents
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava
Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case.
Immunity Statutes:
1. One which grants “Use Immunity” - prohibits use of
witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of
the witness.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2. One which grants “Transactional Immunity” - grants
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense
to which his compelled testimony relates.
It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first
type of immunity statutes (Use Immunity). It grants
merely immunity from use of any statement given before
the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason
or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or
producing evidence do not render the witness immuned
from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the
right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from
the use against him of such statement and nothing
more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being
prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-
incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the
hallmark of due process, demands that private
respondents should have been informed of their rights
to remain silent and warned that any and all statements
to be given by them may be used against them. This,
they were denied, under the pretense that they are not
entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so
inform them.
The provision on self incrimination renders inadmissible
any confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein
earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only
to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by
a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a
criminal proceeding or any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense.
Summary:
699
As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right
renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion,
meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer
UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of
IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive
compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be
offered to the witness before he can be required to
answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional
right. But in this case, the compulsion has already
produced its desired results — the private respondents
had all testified without offer of immunity. Their
constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only
way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to
construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact
been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the
potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to
answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the
testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized
under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the
immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to
depend on a claim of the privilege against self-
incrimination which the same law practically strips away
from the witness.
S. NON-DETENTION BY REASON OF POLITICAL
BELIEFS OR ASPIRATIONS
T. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Caunca v. Salazar (Involuntary servitude)
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by
Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin
Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far
Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already
been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for
her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to
transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by
the employment agency. Further she was detained and
her liberty was restrained. The employment
agency wanted that the advance payment, which was
applied to her transportation expense from the province
should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed
to leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the
right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount
it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
movement. The fact that no physical force has been
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does
not make less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion,
to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to
cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place
a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to
the protection of courts of justice as much as the
700
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or
physical coercion.
People v Lagman and Zosa, et. Al, 66 Phil. 13
(Service in defense of the State)
Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and
45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and
Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section
60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National
Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants,
being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty
years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register
in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of
said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been
required to do so. The evidence shows that these two
appellants were duly notified by the corresponding
authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in
order to register for military service in accordance with
law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these
notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the
information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege
in defense that they have not registered in the military
service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has
a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and
Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no
military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of
First Instance to one month and one day of
imprisonment, with the costs.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense
Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is
impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in
so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does
not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of
the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would
be to make this duty of the Government excusable
should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
enlist therein.
The right of the Government to require compulsory
military service is a consequence of its duty to defend
the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the
life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if
need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests,
and even against his religious or political convictions, to
take his place in the ranks of the army of this country,
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In
the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it
was also said that this is not deprivation of property
without due process of law, because, in its just sense,
there is no right of property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws
701
enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does
not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the
last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service
is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in
preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.
The circumstance that the appellants have dependent
families to support does not excuse them from their duty
to present themselves before the Acceptance Board
because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for
deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events,
they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to
attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69
of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
Robertson v. Baldwin (1897) (Naval enlistment)
The Court refused to apply the 13th Amendment to
merchant seamen who had jumped ship, been caught,
and been impressed back into maritime service without
due process. The Court explained that 13th
Amendment's ban on involuntary servitude, even
though absolute on its face, contained various implicit
exceptions. In support of the finding of an exception to
the 13th Amendment, the Court argued that the Bill of
Rights also contained unstated exceptions:
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten
Amendments to the constitution . . . [are] subject
to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from
the necessities of the case. . . . Thus, the freedom
of speech and of the press (article 1) does not
permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or
indecent articles, or other publications injurious to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
public morals or private reputation; the right of the
people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not
infringed by law prohibiting the carrying of
concealed weapons; the provision that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy (art. 5) does not
prevent a second trial, if upon the first trial the jury
failed to agree, or the verdict was set aside upon
the defendant's motion. . . .
In 1897, state laws which barred individuals from
carrying concealed weapons were common, and usually
upheld by state supreme courts; the laws did not forbid
state militias from carrying concealed weapons. The
prohibitions on concealed carry are the exceptions that
prove the rule. Only if the Second Amendment is an
individual right does the Court's invocation of a
concealed carry exception make any sense.
Kapisanan ng Manggagawa v. Gotamco Saw Mill
(GR No. L-1573, 29 March 1948)
(Return to work order in industries affected with public
interest)
Facts: The Kaisahan ng Manggagawa ng Kahoy sa
Pilipinas declared a strike against Gotamco Saw Mill
because the latter did not accede to the former’s
request of a salary increase. While the case was being
heard by the Court of Industrial Relations, the parties
reached a temporary wage arrangement and the
workers were ordered to go back to work while the saw
mill was ordered to increase the salaries of the workers
by P2.00, let them take home small pieces of lumber to
be utilized as firewood, and was enjoined from laying-
702
off, suspending, or dismissing any laborer affiliated with
the petitioning union. Conversely, the workers were
enjoined from staging walk-outs or strikes during the
pendency of the hearing.
Gotamco Saw Mill subsequently filed an urgent motion
asking that the petitioning union be held in contempt of
court for having staged a strike during the pendency of
the main case, for picketing on the premises of the saw
mill, and for grave threats which prevented the
remaining laborers from working. The union alleged that
one of its representatives conferred with the
management of the saw mill, but instead of entertaining
their grievances, the saw mill ordered the stoppage of
the work and employed four new Chinese laborers
without express authority of the court and in violation of
Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The CIR
ruled that there was a violation of the previous order of
the CIR by the union, which warranted the
commencement of contempt proceedings and that the
saw mill did not violate Section 19 of CA 103.
Issue: W/N Section 19 of CA 103 is unconstitutional for
being in violation of the organic proscription of
involuntary servitude.
Ruling: NO. Section 19 of CA 103 does not offend
against the constitutional inhibition proscribing
involuntary servitude. The provisions of CA 103 were
inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the
concern of the State to promote social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people.
In order to attain this object, Section 19 was
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to
capital and denies to labor what it denies to capital.
Among other things, Section 19 lays down the “implied
condition that when any dispute between the employer
or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has
been submitted to the CIR for settlement or arbitration,
pursuant to the provisions of the Act, and pending
award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer
shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so
joined by the court after hearing and when public
interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that
he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court,
which shall be issued only after hearing when public
interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its
opinion, be promptly decided or settled.” Thus, the
voluntariness of the employee’s entering into such a
contract of employment—he has a free choice between
entering into it or not—with such an implied condition,
negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude
ensuing.
Issue: W/N the previous order of the CIR, which ordered
the union laborers to go back to work, is unconstitutional
for being in violation of the organic proscription of
involuntary servitude.
Ruling: NO. The order of the court was for the
striking workers to return to their work. That order was
made after hearing, and Section 19 of CA 103
authorizes such order when the dispute cannot in its
opinion be promptly decided or settled. The very
impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the
dispute confers upon the CIR the power to issue the
703
order for the reason that the public has an interest in
preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the
wheels of industry.
 Several laws promulgated which apparently
infringe the human rights of individuals were
“subjected to regulation by the State basically in
the exercise of its paramount police power.”
 From Justice Perfecto’s concurring and dissenting
opinion: If the laborers should feel that they are
compelled against their will to perform something
which is repugnant to their conscience or dignity,
they need not resort to any court action to seek
judicial settlement of the controversy, as they can
resign from their work and there is no power that
can compel them to continue therein.
U. PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS
People
ISSUE: v. Dionisio or not the penalty applied to his
Whether
offense infringes the Constitutional provision that
“Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted.” (Art III Sec. 1 clause 19,
of the Constitution of the Phils)
RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in
themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the
Constitutional structure has been interpreted as
referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous,
or shocking to the conscience and fines or
imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor
does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
“The Social Scourge of Gambling must be stamped out.
The laws against gambling must be enforced to the
limit.” (Peo v. Gorostiza, 77 Phil 88)
DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON (PROHIBITED
PUNISHMENTS)
Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act
6675 was published in two newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30
March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in
Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative
Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76
dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990
the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for
violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of
the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the
Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical
Association, the national organization of medical
doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional
brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class
suit requesting the Court to declare some provisions
(specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the
implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant
thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The
petition was captioned as an action for declaratory
relief, over which the Court does not exercise
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest
involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for
prohibition instead.
Petitioners have assailed Section 12, paragraphs b, c
and d, of the Generics Act prescribing graduated
penalties (ranging from a reprimand to a fine of not less
704
that P10,000 and the suspension of the physician's
license to practice his profession for one [1]) year or
longer, at the discretion of the court) for violations of its
provisions.
Held: Petitioners' allegation that these penalties violate
the constitutional guarantee against excessive fines and
cruel and degrading punishment, has no merit. Penal
sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed.
They are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law
would be toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on,
for physicians, dentists and veterinarians may freely
ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of
suspension or cancellation of the physician's license is
neither cruel, inhuman,or degrading. It is no different
from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that this
Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or
violate the laws and the Codes of Professional and
Judicial Conduct.
People v Dacuycuy(Prohibited punishments)
Facts: Private respondents were charged with violation
of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be
punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than
P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel
and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled
that the said section is a matter of statutory construction
and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Issue:
W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power and is valid.
Held:
NOT VALID. The duration of penalty for the period of
imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if
the judicial department was a legislative dep’t. The
exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use
legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is
an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of
existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said
section violates the rules on separation of powers and
non-delegability of legislative powers.
Harden v. Director of Prisons(Prohibited
punishments)
On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred to
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and
the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, both
in Hongkong, over P1, 000,000 in cash. Mrs.
Harden filed to the court a motion to order Mr. Harden to
return all the amounts mentioned to re deposit them
with the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China with respect to their conjugal
partnership. Mr. Harden failed to comply, wherein, he
was committed to jail for an indeterminate period of time
until he complies with the court’s orders.
Contention of the State: The petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus by the petitioner was denied based on the
following arguments. The term of imprisonment by the
petitioner in this case in indefinite and might last through
705
life, but the terms of the sentence is left open for him to
avoid more years by just complying with the courts
orders. His imprisonment for more than six months is
not excessive or unjust since he was given the right to
comply with said orders. The imprisonment is but a pure
remedial measure to coerce the petitioner to act and
perform the orders.
Contention of the Accused:Mr. Harden contends that he
has no means to comply with the court’s orders since he
was committed to jail.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in committing
the petitioner in jail for an indeterminate period of time
until complying with the court’s orders for a mere reason
of disobedience.
Ruling: The penalty complained of is neither cruel,
unjust nor excessive since it is the outcome of the act of
the petitioner. The petitioner was given the choice to
prevent his more time of detention in jail by just
complying with the said orders, but he did nothing. The
court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the
party who is charged, its judgment, order or decree is
not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.
Whether the act charged has been committed or can
still be performed is already determined by the order or
judgment of the trial court wherein the petitioner for
habeas corpus is adjudged in contempt. The petition is
denied.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
U. Prohibited Punishments
Art. III, Sec. 19
People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo
The SC upheld the validity of the Death Penalty law
against the challenge that there are no compelling
reasons for the enactment of the same. The Court also
rejected the contention that the death penalty is cruel,
degrading, or inhuman punishment, and said that the
US Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia did not
categorically rule on such issue; what was in use was
the arbitrariness pervading the procedure by which the
death penalty was imposed.
Per Curiam
Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case
affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime
having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during
which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly
known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the
supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of
the alleged false accusation of rape against the
accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found
no substantial arguments on the said motion that can
disturb the verdict.
706
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the
defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the
Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by
the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the
reversal of the death sentence.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is
unconstitutional
Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration &
supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for
lack of merit.
 Accused-appellant first claims that the death
penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state,
however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty
is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is
misleading and inaccurate.
o The issue in Furman was not so much
death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the
death penalty was imposed on the accused
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
theory in Furman centered not so much on
the nature of the death penalty as a
criminal sanction but on the discrimination
against the black accused who is meted out
the death penalty by a white jury that is
given the unconditional discretion to
determine whether or not to impose the
death penalty.
o Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death
penalty because it was cruel and unusual
per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court
nullified all discretionary death penalty
statutes in Furman, it did so because the
discretion which these statutes vested in
the trial judges and sentencing juries was
uncontrolled and without any parameters,
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen,
if not altogether eliminate, the intervention
of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial
judges and sentencing juries.
 The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing
 Accused-appellant maintains that the death
penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment for the crime of rape mainly because
the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the
taking of life.
707
o In support of his contention, accused-
appellant largely relies on the ruling of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia::
"Rape is without doubt deserving of serious
punishment; but in terms of moral depravity
and of the injury to the person and to the
public, it does not compare with murder,
which does involve the unjustified taking of
human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by
definition does not include the death of or
even the serious injury to another person.
The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not. Life is over for the
victim of the murderer; for the rape victim,
life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
but it is not over and normally is not beyond
repair. We have the abiding conviction that
the death penalty, which 'is unique in its
severity and irrevocability' x x x is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as
such, does not take human life"
ruling on two grounds:
1) That the public has manifested its rejection of
the death penalty as a proper punishment for
the crime of rape through the willful omission
by the state legislatures to include rape in their
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of
Furman;
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see
how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our
own culture.
2) That rape, while concededly a dastardly
contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual
integrity, physical privacy, and psychological
balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Phil. SC: We disagree with the court's
predicate that the gauge of whether or not a
crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the
attendance of the circumstance of death on
the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact
an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive
justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth".
 The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in
specified crimes under specific circumstances.
As early as 1886, though, capital punishment
had entered our legal system through the old
Penal Code, which was a modified version of the
Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
 Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the
penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence
with the enemy during times of war, qualified
piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping,
708
rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons resulting in
insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson
resulting in death.
 The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took
the form of a constitutional question of whether or
not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive
or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment.
o Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty
complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S.,
436, the United States Supreme Court said
that 'punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.
o People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a
number of people who honestly believe that
the supreme penalty is either morally wrong
or unwise or ineffective. However, as long
as that penalty remains in the statute
books, and as long as our criminal law
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
provides for its imposition in certain cases,
it is the duty of judicial officers to respect
and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions,"
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
simply states that congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose
the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty
bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form
of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the
suspension of the death penalty. Neither does
the said provision require that the death penalty
be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society
o What R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the
Congress, in the interest of justice, public
order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal
sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death
penalty for said crimes.
o Heinous crime is an act or series of acts
which, by the flagrantly violent manner in
which the same was committed or by the
709
reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a
patent disregard and mockery of the law,
public peace and order, or public morals. It
is an offense whose essential and inherent
viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence,
shock the moral self of a people.
 The right of a person is not only to live but to live
a quality life, and this means that the rest of
society is obligated to respect his or her individual
personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or
her own physical body, and the value he or she
puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological,
material and social preferences and needs.
o Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim
or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected
to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in the death of
the victim in the case of other crimes; as
well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention
where the victim is detained for more than
three days or serious physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him
were made or the victim is a minor, robbery
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed
or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by
their very nature.
 SC: The death penalty is imposed in heinous
crimes because:
o The perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal
acts with severely destructive effects on the
national efforts to lift the masses from
abject poverty through organized
governmental strategies based on a
disciplined and honest citizenry
o They have so caused irreparable and
substantial injury to both their victim and
the society and a repetition of their acts
would pose actual threat to the safety of
individuals and the survival of government,
they must be permanently prevented from
doing so
 People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation
of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does
injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds
710
the respect, freedom, and physical and moral
integrity to which every person has a right. It
causes grave damage that can mark the victim for
life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an
outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not
only the victim but the society itself.
Francis v Resweber
Where a mechanical failure in the electric chair
prevented the execution of the convict and another
execution date was scheduled by the warden, the US
Supreme Court denied the plea of the convict that he
was being subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment
– as there is no intent to inflict unnecessary pain or any
unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution.
The situation of the victim is just as through he has
suffered the anguish in any other occurrence, such as a
fire in the cellblock.
January 13, 1947
Facts: Francis was convicted of murder and was
sentenced to electrocution. The electric chair sent out a
current but failed to cause his death because of some
mechanical difficulty. He was removed from the chair
and returned to prison. A new death warrant was
issued.
Francis argued that a new execution would constitute
double jeopardy (5th Amendment) and cruel and
unusual punishment (8th Amendment).
Issue: Was an order for re-execution tantamount to
cruel and unusual punishment?
No. There is no cruel and unusual punishment. The fact
that Francis has already been subjected to a current of
electricity does not make his subsequent execution any
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
more cruel in the constitutional sense than any other
execution. The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish human
life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident
prevented consummation does not add an element of
cruelty to a subsequent execution.
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel
within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.
Dispositve: Petition denied. Re-execution is ordered.
Dissent (Burton, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge):
Subjecting Francis to the electric chair again is a cruel
and unusual punishment. In determining whether the
proposed procedure is unconstitutional, we must
measure it against a lawful electrocution. The contrast is
that between instantaneous death and death by
installments -- caused by electric shocks administered
after one or more intervening periods of complete
consciousness of the victim. Electrocution, when
instantaneous, can be inflicted by a state in conformity
with due process of law. The all-important consideration
is that the execution shall be so instantaneous and
substantially painless that the punishment shall be
reduced, as nearly as possible, to no more than that of
death itself. Electrocution has been approved only in a
form that eliminates suffering.
Echegaray v Secretary of Justice
711
The SC said that the suspension of the execution of the
death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial
power, as an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve,
although its effect is the same; the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. It
cannot be denied however that Congress can amend
RA 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect is a commutation of sentence.
Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO
staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the
rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the
case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction
over the case
Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the
SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of
the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. Even after
the judgment has become final, the SC retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision
is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. The
important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is
the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of
the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust
the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is
because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the
inherent and necessary power of control of
its processes and orders to make them conform to law
and justice.
The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention
that by granting the TRO, the Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function
under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death
convict who becomes insane after his
final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of
insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is
indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though
its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of
the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it
cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend
the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death
to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment
is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise
of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot
be considered as a violation of the power of the
712
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only
the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of
the government.
Pagdayawon v Secretary of Justice
The mere pendency in the two houses of Congress of a
bill seeking the repeal of RA 7659 should not per se
warrant the outright issuance of a temporary restraining
order to stay the execution of a death sentence that has
become final. In fact, being speculative, it is not and
should not be considered as a ground for the stay of a
death sentence.
Facts: Thirty death row inmates sought to enjoin the
execution of their death sentences in view of a possible
repeal of laws authorizing the imposition of death
penalty.
The SC has the power to control the enforcement of its
decisions, including the issuance of a TRO to stay the
execution of a death sentence which is already final.
Issue: Can a TRO be issued for the death sentences?
No. The mere pendency of a bill in either or both houses
of Congress should not per se warrant outright issuance
of a temporary restraining order to stay the execution of
a death sentence that has become final. In fact, being
speculative, it is not and should not be considered as a
ground for a stay of a death sentence. While newspaper
reports indicate the supposed acquiescence of a
number of senators and congressmen to the abolition of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
the death penalty, such is by no means an assurance
that these same legislators will eventually vote for the
modification or repeal of the law.
V. Non-imprisonment for Debt
Art. III, Sec. 20
People v. Nitafan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
- Betty Sia Ang received in trust from Allied Banking
Corp “Gordon Plastics, plastic sheeting and Hook
Chromed, in the total amount of P398,000.00,
specified in a trust receipt”, under the obligation on her
part to sell the same and account for the proceeds of
the sale or return the same to Allied Bank if unsold.
- However, she later paid only P283,115. Allied Bank
thus charged Betty Sia Ang with estafa.
- On motion, Judge Nitafan quashed the information on
the ground that a trust receipt transaction is an
evidence of a loan being secured so that there is, as
between the parties to it, a creditor-debtor relationship.
The penal clause of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) is
inoperative because it does not actually punish an
offense mala prohibita. The law only refers to the
relevant estafa provision in the Revised Penal Code.
- Betty Sia Ang asserts that P.D. 115 is unconstitutional
as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. She argues
that where no malice exists in a breach of a purely
commercial undertaking, P.D. 115 imputes it.
Held:
PD 115’s penal clause is valid
713
A trust receipt arrangement does not involve a simple
loan transaction between a creditor and debtor-importer.
Apart from a loan feature, the trust receipt arrangement
has a security feature that is covered by the trust receipt
itself.That second feature is what provides the much
needed financial assistance to our traders in the
importation or purchase of goods or merchandise
through the use of those goods or merchandise as
collateral for the advancements made by a bank. The
title of the bank to the security is the one sought to be
protected and not the loan which is a separate and
distinct agreement.
The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and
abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods
to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the
latter is the owner or not. The law does not seek to
enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no
violation of a right against imprisonment for non-
payment of a debt.The misuse of trust receipts therefore
should be deterred to prevent any possible havoc in
trade circles and the banking community .
The offense is punished as a malum
prohibitum regardless of the existence of intent or
malice. A mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the
sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a criminal
offense that causes prejudice not only to another, but
more to the public interest.
The enactment of P.D. 115 is a valid exercise of the
police power of the State and is, thus, constitutional.
W. Double Jeopardy
Art. III, Sec. 21
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
1. Requisites
a. Valid complaint or information
b. Filed before a competent court
c. To which the defendant has pleaded
Icasiano v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
- In 1987, Romana Magbago filed an administrative
complaint with the Supreme court against MTC Judge
Icasiano for grave abuse of authority, manifest
partiality and incompetence for issuing orders of
detention against Magbago for contempt of court. The
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit in 1988.
- Magbago, had apparently filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, also in 1987, a complaint charging
Judge Icasiano with a violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). This was likewise
dismissed during the preliminary investigation stage.
- A similar complaint, however, appeared to have been
filed with the office of the Tanodbayan which was
transferred to the (then) newly-created Office of the
Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor working on the
case was not aware of the previous complaint and
dismissal thereof, and thus filed an information against
Judge Icasiano with the Sandiganbayan.
- Judge Icasiano asserts that the information should be
quashed because he would be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense.
714
Held:
To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is
fundamental that the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a
valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Double jeopardy does not apply in the present
controversy because:
1. the Supreme Court case was administrative in
character while the Sandiganbayan case also against
said petitioner is criminal in nature.
2. the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first
complaint with the Ombudsman cannot bar the present
prosecution because it was dismissed in the preliminary
investigation stage. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et
al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the
Philippines, a preliminary investigation is not a trial to
which double jeopardy attaches.
People v Grospe
Facts:
- Manuel Parulan was charged with B.P. 22 involving a
check with the amount of P86K and with estafa for a
check with an amount of P11k. The two cases were
tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and
defense being the same for the two suits.
- The trial court dismissed the two cases on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, saying that the two essential
elements that make up the offenses involving
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
dishonored checks, did not occur within the territorial
jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in
Bulacan where false assurances were given.
- The People filed a petition for certiorari challenging the
dismissal as being issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
- Parulan argues that the order of dismissal was, in
effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and
that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the
merits, would subject him to double jeopardy.
Held:
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside
the void decision of the trial court does not place
Parulan in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will
be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an
adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon
Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his
Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases.
Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a
decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a
subsequent case based on the same offense.
The dismissal being null and void (as it was erroneous),
the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said
to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no
second proceeding which would subject the accused to
double jeopardy.
Gonzales v Court of Appeals
Facts:
- Gonzales was charged with qualified seduction with
the MTC, to which he pleaded “not guilty”. The
715
prosecution had already concluded the presentation of
its evidence and the defense was about to finish theirs
when the prosecution filed a motion to charge
Gonzales with rape since the evidence submitted
indicated that the crime evidently committed was rape
and not qualified seduction.
- The trial court thus dismissed the case for qualified
seduction and the prosecution filed 6 informations for
rape with the RTC. Gonzales entered a plea of not
guilty to the charges.
Held:
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The requisites for double jeopardy:
(1) The previous complaint or information or other
formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction;
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to
the charge; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
dismissed without his express consent.
When all the above elements concur, a second
prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt
to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the
said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily
includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense
charged, can be rightly barred.
There is no question that the Municipal Trial Court did
not have the requisite jurisdiction to try the offense of
rape, a crime that lies instead within the province of the
Regional Trial Court.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Moreover, the dismissal of Criminal Case for qualified
seduction by the Municipal Trial Court not only was
provisional but likewise with the express consent of the
accused.
(Note: Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense. — When it becomes manifest at any
time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be
convicted of the offense charged, or of any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall
not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause to
detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the
accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss
the original case upon the filing of the proper
information.)
Joan Flores v Hon. Francisco Joven, RTC-Surigao
del Sur, Emmanuel Navarro
Austria-Martinez
27 December 2002
Facts:
Flores caused the filing of a criminal against Navarro
and 9 other persons for rape. Before the accused were
arraigned, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint did not sufficiently describe
the crime of rape and in any of its forms. The trial court
716
re-set the arraignment as the prosecution intended to
file several other cases of rape against the accused.
An amended information for rape was later filed
against Navarro, as the principal accused. He filed a
motion to quash the amended information. RTC granted
the motion finding that Navarro was not one of those
identified by petitioner to have abused her, and that the
Information failed to show his particular participation in
the crime. Navarro, however, was not released from
detention as there were still pending cases against him.
MR was denied. Hence this case for certiorari.
Meanwhile, Navarro’s other co-accused were
arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to the charges
against them. Trial commenced as regards their
respective cases. Later, Navarro escaped from
detention and has remained at large.
Before presentation of evidence, it dropped the
infromations against the other 6 principal accused for
insufficiency of evidence which was granted by the trial
court
Issue:
W/N the RTC erred in quashing the information.
Held/Ratio:
YES. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the
records of this case adequately show that respondent
Navarro was identified as one of those who sexually
abused petitioner. In the Flores’ sworn statement, she
stated that she knew the perpetrators by face and
further declared under oath that she was able to identify
them later at the police station during line-up
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The offended party has the right to appeal an order
of the trial court which deprives them of due process,
subject to the limitation that they cannot appeal any
adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in
double jeopardy. However, in this case, double
jeopardy does not apply. The requisites that must be
present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or
the case dismissed or terminated without the express
consent of the accused. The third requisite is not
present in the instant case. Private respondent Navarro
has not been arraigned
People v Aurelio Balisacan
Bengzon
31 August 1966
Facts:
Balisacan was charged with homicide. To this charge
the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of
guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At
his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was
allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating
circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the
effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense
because the latter was strangling him. And he further
stated that after the incident he surrendered himself
voluntarily to the police authorities. RTC acquitted him.
717
Issue:1. W/N the RTC was correct in acquitting the
accused despite his plea of guilty when arraigned.
2.W/N the appeal placed the accused in
double jeopardy.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of
guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses
the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves
the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty
fixed by law under the circumstances. In this case, the
defendant was only allowed to testify in order to
establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of
fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not
be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. In deciding the case upon
the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not
only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of
its day in court and right to be heard.
2. NO. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an
essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present
case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the
course of being allowed to prove mitigating
circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense.
Said testimony, therefore — as the court a
quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of
vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should
have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at
least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for
him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
having been no standing plea at the time the court a
quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no
double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a
quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the
prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or
even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing
so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for
lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is
perforce null and void.
d. Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
People v Hon. Gregorio Pineda, CFI Rizal and
Consolacion Naval
Melo
16 February 1993
Facts:
Consolacion Naval was accused of having committed
the crime of estafa before the CFI of Rizal, Branches 19
and 21. She moved for the quashal of the second
charge on the supposition that she was in danger of
being convicted for the same felony. Judge Pineda of
Branch 21 found in her favor.
Issue: W/N the court was correct in granting the
motion to quash.
Held/Ratio:
718
NO. The mere filing of two informations charging the
same offense is not an appropriate basis for the
invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy
has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or
termination of the case without the consent of the
accused. Moreover, it appears that private respondent
herein had not yet been arraigned in the previous case
for estafa. Thus, there is that other missing link, so to
speak, in the case at bar. Legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Where there is no former conviction, acquittal, dismissal
or termination of a former case for the same offense, no
jeopardy attaches.
People v Hon. Martin Villarama, and Jaime Manuel
Medialdea
23 June 1992
Facts:
Jaime Manuel was charged with violation of Section
16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having in
his possession 0.08 grams of shabu. During the
arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued after which the prosecution
rested its case. Counsel for Manuel verbally manifested
in open court that private respondent was willing to
change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No.
6425, as amended. That same day, the respondent
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Judge issued an order directing Manuel to secure the
consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set
the promulgation of the decision. The prosecutor filed
his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution
already rested its case; (2) the possibility of conviction
of private respondent of the crime originally charged
was high because of the strong evidence of the
prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court
and the prosecutor had expended would be put to
waste. Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave
of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging
therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal
Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an
accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
Subsequently, respondent Judge rendered a decision
granting the accused's motion. MR of prosecution was
denied.
Issue:
W/N it was proper for the RTC to grant the request
to plead to a guilty to a lesser offense without the
prosecutor’s and the offended party’s consent.
Held/Ratio:
YES. Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval. It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or
some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return
for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial
719
stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still
permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his
plea thereafter.
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
to a lesser offense under Rule 116.2 is not demandable
by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court.
In the case at bar, Manuel moved to plead guilty to a
lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested
its case. The trial court need not wait for a guideline
from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on
the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the
fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against
the said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as
all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
change of plea to the end that the interests of justice
and of the public will be served. A reading of the
disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt solely on
only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable
time already spent by the court and prosecution)
interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive.
It must be recalled that the other two grounds of
objection were that the prosecution had already rested
its case and that the possibility of conviction of the
private respondent of the crime originally charged was
high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution.
Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in
hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private
respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The counsel for the private respondent argues that
only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes
involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because
there is no offended party to speak Of and that even the
latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before
the trial court could allow the accused to change his
plea.
However, the provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is
clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended
party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to
a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious. The
Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal.
Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the
evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.
It would not also be correct to state that there is no
offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended.
While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in
themselves, they are made so by law because they
infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by
drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society
is malevolent and incessant. Such pernicious effect is
felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their
families. As a result, society's survival is endangered
because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim
of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the
offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of
the people, the government files the criminal action in
the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal
who represents the government is duty bound to defend
the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point
that it is as though he were the person directly injured
by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the
720
offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured
from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government.
No Double Jeopardy
Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent
maintains that the private respondent's change of plea
and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of
Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open
to review otherwise his constitutional right against
double jeopardy will be violated.
Such supposition has no basis. The right against
double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both
the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private
respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the
situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this
privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable
provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which
states: Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double
jeopardy. xxx However, the conviction of the accused
shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information under any of the
following instances: c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and
of the offended party…Under this rule, the private
respondent could still be prosecuted under the original
charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as
amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal
who also represents the offended party,i.e., the state.
More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change
of plea was irregular and improper.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Gorion vs. RTC of Cebu (1992)
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Estafa
involving the amount of P50, 000. Upon his
arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and the
court set the pre-trial and trial of the case on Apr 17,
1990. The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what
transpired on Apr 17, 1990. However, it appears that
hearing was again scheduled for Sept 27 and
28 1990. When the case was called for hearing on Sept
27, neither the petitioner nor his counsel was present.
Not wanting to take advantage of their absence, and
considering that there were other cases to be heard, the
prosecutor moved for the cancellation of the hearing on
that date as well as the hearing to be held on the
following day, which the court granted. The hearing was
reset, unfortunately the case was still included in the
trial calendars of the court for Sept 28. When the case
was called for the hearing on that date, only the fiscal
appeared for prosecution. The court then issued an
order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. On
Jul 2, 1991, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging
therein that the dismissal of the case by the
court on Sept 28 1990 without his consent amounted to
his acquittal; hence, he would be placed in
double jeopardy if the case were to be reopened or cont
inue. The trial court set aside the dismissal order of
Sept 28 1990 in its Order of Aug 9 1991 on the ground
that the court was only misled in issuing the same due
to the stenographers’ failure to transcribe the order
given in open court issued the previous day, hence, it
was issued without due process. Also on the same day,
721
the court denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss on
the ground that the order of dismissal of 28 September
1990was set aside in the aforesaid order. Petitioner filed
a motion to reconsider the other denying his motion to
dismiss, alleging that he cannot be blamed or faulted for
a.) the failure of the stenographer b.) any error in the
dismissal of the case c.) the inclusion of the case in the
calendar of Sept 28 1990.
Issue/held/ratio:
1. w/n an order dismissing a criminal case after
accused had been arraigned, issued in open
court through inadvertence or mistake during a
hearing that had already been cancelled, be set
aside by the court and the case tried without
placing the accused in double jeopardy? No
Double Jeopardy yet.
The erroneous dismissal order of Sept 28 1990
was then issued capriciously and arbitrarily; it
unquestionably deprived the State of a fair opportunity
to present and proved its case. Thus, its right to
due process was violated. The said order is null and
void and hence, cannot be pleaded by the petitioner to
bar the
subsequent annulment of the dismissal order or a re-
opening of the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
The dismissal of Sept 28 1990, being null and
void because the trial court lost its jurisdiction to issue
the same and violated the right of the prosecution to
due process. The three requisites of double jeopardy
are: 1.) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second 2.) The first jeopardy must have been validly
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
terminated and 3.) A second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only; a. upon a valid
indictment b. Before a competent court c.
after arraignment d. when valid plea has been entered
e. when the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
It having been shown that in this case, the requisites of
a valid termination of the first jeopardy are not present,
the petitioner cannot hide behind the protective mantle
of double jeopardy. The petition is dismissed
Cuison vs. CA (1998)
Facts:
RTC found Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double
homicide, sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 6
years and 1 day to 12 years and 1 day. He was also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Sapigao P30,000.00
and heirs of Castro P30,000.00. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision with the modification that civil indemnity was
increased to P50,000.00 In a petition for review in SC it
was remanded to RTC for promulgation of decision.
However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4,
1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with
respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but
did not commit the accused to jail to commence service
of his sentence.
OSG filed for motion for clarification of the
aforementioned decision, On Aug 17, 1995, CA
rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent portions
thereof: ‘In the dispositive portion of this Court’s
decision, We simply modified the appealed decision of
722
the court a quo in one respect only - the increase of the
indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the
victims from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in
various cases including that cited in Our decision…”
SC, acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision
declared that this Court had affirmed the decision of the
court a quo with regard to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed in the said trial court’s decision.’
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the
decision anew.
The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside
Promulgation.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n petitioner’s right against double jeopardy
was violated? NO
To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the
following must be proven:
“ x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a
frustration thereof (citations omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.”
Petitioner contends that “the promulgation by Judge
Ramos on Apr 4, 1995 of the Respondent Court’s
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
decision of Jun 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive
portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases
against the petitioner x x x.”
As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil
action for the recovery of indemnity.Hence, a decision in
such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the
civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court
promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not
the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA
Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the
promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also
void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge
rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on
April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April
12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of
discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial
court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been
terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet
attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a
defense.
We must stress that Respondent Court’s questioned
Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991
Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction and the full execution of the
penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.
PS Bank vs. Spouses Bermoy (2005)
Facts:
Petitioner charged spouses Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy
with estafa through falsification of a public document.
Upon arraignment, the spouses pleaded not guilty to the
723
charge. Upon hearing, private prosecutor and defense
counsel admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the
identities of the accused. Initial hearing was set. During
the hearings, the prosecution presented its witnesses
and rested its case after the presentation of the
testimonies. However, instead of presenting evidence,
the defense filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground
that the prosecution failed to identify the spouses as the
accused. The case was dismissed and the spouses
Bermoy were acquitted. Upon appeal to the CA, the
ruling was affirmed. It held that even assuming that the
trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no
longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for
certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused
against double jeopardy.
Issue/held/ratio:
1. w/n double jeopardy has attached in the case?
NO
For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 of Rule 117 of
the 1985 Rules on Crim Pro requires the following
elements in the first criminal case:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge
was sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
and
(d) He was convicted oracquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the
express consent or upon motion of the accused
does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is
subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is
based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of
the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon demurrer to
evidence falls under the first exception. Since such
dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to
an acquittal. All the elements were present in the
criminal case. Thus, the Information for estafa through
falsification of a public document against respondent
spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the
case and the persons of respondent
spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during
which they entered “not guilty” pleas. Finally, the case
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became
vested on respondent spouses.
Dismissal of action
Paulin vs. Gimenez (1993)
Facts:
Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep,
were smothered with dust when they were overtaken by
the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such,
Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the
gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby
security guard for the identity of the owner of the
vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties,
724
petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he
immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police
and block road to prevent the petitioners’ escape. Upon
the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down
and were immediately apprehended.
A complaint “grave threats” was filed against the
petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed
by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners.
Mabuyo filed a MFR thus the dismissal was reversed.
Thereafter, petitioners filed for “certiorari, prohibition,
damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the
issuance of a TRO” (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed
for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and
ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this
instant petition.
Issue/held/ratio:
1. w/n dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of
acquittal? NO
2. w/n the judge ignored petitioner’s right against
double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207? NO
For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case
must be without the express consent of the accused.
Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with
the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to
have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In
the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion
of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an
acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not
guilty. While the former, in the case at bar, terminated
the proceedings because no finding was made as to the
guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside
the order of dismissal for the reception of further
evidence by the prosecution because it merely
corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and
dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the
right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The
rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.
When the ground for the motion to dismiss is
insufficiency of evidence
PEOPLE v. CITY COURT OF SILAY
Facts:
Respondents were charged with "falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified document."
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and
rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss
the charge against them on the ground that the
evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Acting on this motion, respondent court dismissed the
case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that
the acts committed by the accused as narrated above
do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged.
Held:
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case
against the private respondents was erroneous.
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was
dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was
725
a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case,
calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and
its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.
We cannot but express Our strong disapproval of the
precipitate action taken by Judge Alon in dismissing the
criminal case against the private respondents at that
stage of the trial. A thorough and searching study of the
law, the allegations in the Information, and the evidence
adduced plus a more circumspect and reflective
exercise of judgment, would have prevented a failure of
justice in the instant case.
When the proceedings have been unreasonably
prolonged as to violate the rights of the accused to
speedy trial
ESMENA v. POGOY
Facts:
Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in
the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas
Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from
the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a
game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners
pleaded “Not Guilty”. No trial came in after the
arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it on
another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an
order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal
informed the court that it received a telegram stating
that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked
their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed
the case because the trial was already dragging the
accused and that the priest’s telegram did not have a
medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid in order
to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the
fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the
medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the
priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979,
accused Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Held:
The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on
their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal
was not ready because his witness was not in court.
Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally
dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly
manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal.
Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy.
Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a
speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and,
therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place
them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional"
would not change the legal effect of the dismissal. If the
defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a
speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for
the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for
postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of
the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his
evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the
defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion
shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an
acquittal of the defendant.
PEOPLE v. TAMPAL
Facts:
Tampal et al were charged of robbery with homicide and
multiple serious physical injuries. The case was set for
726
hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement
due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The
case was reset without any objection from the defense
counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991
but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent
judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as
unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to
prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, claiming that his absence was because
such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the
Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The
motion was denied by respondent judge.
Issue: Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of
the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their
cases.
Held:
In determining the right of an accused to speedy
disposition of their case, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy
trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial
for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above,
there was no showing that there was an unjust delay
caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge
should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to
prosecute its case.
The private respondents cannot invoke their right
against double jeopardy. In several cases it was held
that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is
equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another
prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
does not apply, considering that the rights of the
accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State.
Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the
case is remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
Revival of the criminal cases provisionally dismissed
PEOPLE v. LACSON
Facts:
Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal
laws should also cover procedures, and that these
should be applied only to the sole benefit of the
accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was meant to
reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line
with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy
trial.
Held:
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though
procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should
not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve
intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be
construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would
be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge
dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New
rule took effect on Dec1,2000, it would only in effect
give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2
years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said
rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that.
“Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance;
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone.”The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for
the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should
not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate
727
retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided
merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an
injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect
the administration of justice.
Appeal by the prosecution
People v. Maquiling
Doctrine: The rule against double jeopardy proscribes
as appeal from a judgment of acquittal.
Facts:
According to witnesses, Ramil Maquiling boxed the
deceased Pacasum who was compelled to box back.
When Ramil fell, appellant, elder brother of Ramil
helped him and tried to pacify. They ran out of the disco
but when the deceased and his companions followed
outside, Ramil Maquiling and his companions were
waiting and another fist fight ensued.
During the fight, appellant went to his car and got a
pistol. He fired a warning shot and then shot deceased
twice on the left thigh. Appellant then fired another shot
and hit the deceased on the chest. He died due to the
gun shot wounds. Another person, Jojo Villarimo
suffered gunshot wounds on his upper right leg which
required medical attendance.
On June 13, 1988, Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao
charged Respondent Casan Maquiling with homicide
and frustrated homicide. Acting on the petition of the
private complainants, the Department of Justice
subsequently directed the upgrading of the charge of
homicide to murder.
To both charges, Respondent Maquiling, assisted by
Counsel de Parte Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of
not guilty upon his arraignment on June 5, 1989. Trial
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
ensued. The trial court rendered its Decision convicting
private respondent of homicide and serious physical
injuries.
The CA reversed and accepted the claim of self-
defense. When the accused-appellant tried to pacify
and stop Frederick from inflicting further harm on his
brother, he was instead boxed on the right cheek by
Frederick. Hence accused had opted to leave the disco
but was followed to his car by Frederick with a shotgun
[i]n hand.The deceased Frederick not only aimed the
shotgun [at] him but actually fired at the accused. And
the accused shot at the deceased only after he was
himself injured by the deceased who fired a shotgun at
him. He likewise shot at Olegario ‘Jojo’ Villaremo to
disarm him as he likewise took possession of the
shotgun.
ISSUE:
WON the appeal is proper. NO
The petition is not meritorious.
Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is
to appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of
Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In such cases, this tribunal is limited to the
determination of whether the lower court committed
reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes of
judgment. A direct review by the Supreme Court is the
728
normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, prohibits the
state from appealing or filing a petition for review of
a judgment of acquittal that was based on the
merits of the case. Thus, Section 2, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court reads:
"Sec. 2. Who may appeal. -- Any party may appeal
from a final judgment or order, except if the accused
would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
This rule stems from the constitutional mandate stating
that “no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense.
U.S. v. Kepner: the United States Supreme Court,
reviewing a Philippine Supreme Court decision,
declared that an appeal by the prosecution from a
judgment of acquittal would place the defendant in
double jeopardy.
Elements of Double Jeopardy:
 the accused individuals are charged under a
complaint or an information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain their conviction;
 the court has jurisdiction;
 the accused have been arraigned and have
pleaded; and
 they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is
dismissed without their express consent.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the
existence of the first, third and fourth elements.
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the
agency exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions, the
remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases
must clearly show that the public respondent acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals shows no patent and gross error
amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it
show an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power arising
from passion or hostility.
PETITION is DENIED.
People v. Hon. Perlita Tirona
[G.R. No. 130106. July 15, 2005]
Facts:
Petitioner for review on certiorari seeking annulment of
decision of Judge Tirona acquitting accused private
respondent Chief Inspector Renato A. Muyot.
The NBI, w/ 2 search warrants, conducted a search of
Muyot’s house. They allegedly found 498.1094 grams
of shabu which led to the filing of an information
charging private respondent with Violation of Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7659.
729
The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent --
Branch 102 of the QC RTC
Accused pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits,
Tirona acquitted private respondent on grounds of
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner now contends that public respondent, in
acquitting private respondent, committed GAOD in
ignoring material facts which if considered would lead to
a finding of guilt. Petitioner posits that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does permit a review of acquittals
decreed by trial magistrates where, as in this case, no
retrial will be required even if the judgment should be
overturned. It thus argues that appealing the acquittal
of private respondent would not be violative of the
constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy.
Issue: W/n the decision of the respondent court
acquitting Muyot can be reviewed on a petition for
review on certiorari?
Ratio:
In PP v. Velasco, the Court ruled that as mandated by
the Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence, an acquittal
is final and unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or
before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that
a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal
brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot
be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. Only when
there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as
represented by the prosecution, were denied due
process.
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this
jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is
immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground
of double jeopardy. The only exception where double
jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding
of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
The fact that the petition was given due course does not
necessarily mean we have to look into the sufficiency of
the evidence since the issue to be resolved is the
appealability of an acquittal. We have categorically
ruled in People v. Velasco that, except when there is a
finding of mistrial, no appeal will lie in case of an
acquittal. There being no mistrial in the case before us,
we find no need to reexamine the evidence, because if
we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made on
an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of the
accused’s right against double jeopardy.
People v. Navarro
G.R. No. L-38453-54 March 25, 1975
FACTS:
Catuday was charged before Municipal Court of Makati
with crime of light threat allegedly committed against
Henry Dioquino. While the case was pending, he was
also charged with frustrated theft.
730
The CFI of Rizal acquitted Jaime Catuday.
In the hearings after March 25, 1970, it was always the
theft case which was heard. Sometime in December
1972, upon retirement of Judge Flores of Branch XI,
respondent District Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over in
the two cases. The theft case was then in the rebuttal
stage. On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed,
and upon order of the court, the parties filed their
respective "offer and submission of exhibits", and
submitted the theft case for decision. On July 20, 1973,
respondent Judge rendered one decision,
acquitting Catuday of both charges for lack of proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Notably, the decision also stated that "these (light threat
case and frustrated theft case) were tried jointly."
The provincial fiscal, together with the private
prosecutor, filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
proving that respondent Judge's decision be annulled
for lack of due process insofar as the light threat case
was concerned. On April 17, 1974, the Court (Second
Division) issued a resolution to the effect that
"considering the allegations contained, the issues raised
and the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari,
the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of
merit."
ISSUE:
WON this case is proper. YES.
This petition for certiorari is granted.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Respondents here have not pointed to any court order
for joint trial, as indeed there is none. Joint trial is not
called for in the two criminal cases. It is true that the
accused in the two cases is only one person, but there
are two different complainants: Henry Dioquino, in the
threat charge, and Commonwealth Foods, Inc., in the
theft case. The threat was supposed to have been
made on March 5, 1968; the theft was allegedly
committed on January 31, 1969, almost a year
thereafter. Also, the charges are different. They do not
even belong to the same class of crimes. Light threat is
a crime against personal liberty and security; frustrated
theft is a crime against property. So, We cannot say the
charges are for offenses founded on the same facts or
form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or
similar character. Consequently, the court had no power
to try them jointly.
Going to the matter of the captions in the pleadings,
subpoenas, court orders, transcript of stenographic
notes, etc., it has been argued that since most of the
captions include both Criminal Case No. 20145 (light
threat) and Criminal Case No. 20146 (frustrated theft),
there was joint trial of the cases, and the court properly
treated the hearing as joint and acted accordingly with
respect to the two cases. It has been held, however,
that a mistake in the caption of an indictment in
designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal
defect, for it is the sufficiency of the averments of the
charging part that is the gist of the accusation.
Evidently, the State had been deprived of due
process, which act was an abuse of discretion on
the part of the herein respondent Judge, tantamount
731
to excess or lack of jurisdiction, rendering the
judgment of acquittal of the accused Jaime
Catuday, in Criminal Case No. 20145 for light threat,
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases,
that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its
evidence in support of the charge. The Court has
always accorded this right to the prosecution, and
where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled
the offending court action. We have heretofore held that
a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives
the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it
denies the prosecution its day in court.
For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal)
without due process, and, therefore, null and void. Such
dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental
prerequisite, that is, due process, and,
consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for
the claim of double jeopardy.We have likewise held
that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and
well-founded motion of the prosecution for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and
that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set
aside to give the State its day in court and an
opportunity to prove the offense charged against the
accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice,
especially when no substantial right of the accused
would be prejudiced thereby.
In the present case, the respondent Judge, in rendering
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
his judgment of acquittal of private respondent JAIME
CATUDAY in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light Threat
which was never tried in the respondent Judge's court
nor in Branch XI of the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse of
discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
PEOPLE V TAC-AN
CALLEJO; February 27, 2003
FACTS
- Mario Austria is the Officer-in-Charge Provincial
Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail.
- He falsified a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment
Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable Property, , a
public/official document, by stating that certain firearms
are a property of the provincial; government of
Batangas and issued it to Mr. Alberto Tesoro, a civilian
agent, for his own use in connection with the
performance of his official duties and functions
- Out of the 11 witnesses listed in the information, only 3
were notified. When the case was called for pre-trial,
the 3 did not appear and the RTC dismissed the case.
- The public prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order, contending that the trial
court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it
dismissed the case simply because three of its
witnesses who were notified failed to appear at the
initial pre-trial.
- CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition on the
ground that the errors committed by the trial court were
mere errors of judgment which are not correctible by a
writ of certiorari.
732
- Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present petition for the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case simply because three witnesses of
its eleven witnesses failed to appear at the initial pre-
trial of the case
HELD
YES
- Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any
witness for the prosecution listed in the Information,
whether or not said witness is the offended party or the
complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the
dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law,
pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of
the private complainant or the complaining witness is
however not required. Even the presence of the
accused is not required unless directed by the trial
court. It is enough that the accused is represented by
his counsel. Indeed, even if none of the witnesses
listed in the information for the State appeared for the
pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all,
the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The trial
court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed
the case merely because none of the witnesses notified
by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial.
- The State, like the accused is also entitled to due
process in criminal cases. The order of the trial court
dismissing the criminal case deprived the State of its
right to prosecute and prove its case. Said order is,
therefore, void for lack of jurisdiction, and is of no effect.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
- The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the
reinstatement of the case does not place the private
respondent in double jeopardy.
Ratio The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
of their jurisdiction.
- to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three
requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the
first.
- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused
Petition GRANTED
Gorion v RTC of Cebu 1992
1. an information against Gorion was filed in Court
for Estafa. However, on the hearing date for Sept
27, Gorion wasn’t there thus the prosecutor
suggested that it be moved to another date for the
accused to be able to defend himself. Thus the
Judge approved the resetting of the Sept 27
hearing as well as the Sept 28 hearing to October
4.
2. But on the 28th, the case was still called for
hearing as it was included in the calendar. But
without any witnesses or evidence presented by
the prosecutor, the case was dismissed.
3. Counsel for Gorion, Atty. Bilocura, received a
copy of this order on 4 October 1990. However,
733
he received a copy of the 27 September 1990
Order only on 15 June 1992.
4. The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what
actually transpired on 4 October 1990. In any
event, the case was called again on 31 May
1991, but the Court reset the hearing to 18, 22,
23 and 25 July 1991 on the ground that it had not
yet received from the Chief Justice of this Court a
reply to the Presiding Judge's request for an
extension of the trial dates.
5. On 2 July 1991, Gorion filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging therein that the dismissal of the case by
the court on 28 September 1990 without his
consent amounted to his acquittal; hence, he
would be placed in double jeopardy
Issue: W/N there is double jeopardy involved in this
case NO
1. It is obvious to this Court that the trial court was,
on 28 September 1990, divested of jurisdiction,
pro hac vice, to issue any order, much leas one of
dismissal, in Criminal Case No. CBU-16727 for
the simple reason that said case was already
effectively removed from its trial calendar for that
date in view of the previous day's order cancelling
the hearing of the case on 27 and 28 September
1990
2. The Judge, Clerk of Court and the prosecution
should shoulder the blame because unless
amnesia suddenly struck all of them
simultaneously, it cannot be imagined that in a
brief span of about twenty-four hours, they had all
forgotten about the order dictated in open court
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
cancelling the hearing for 27 and 28 September
1990.
3. The erroneous dismissal order of 28 September
1990 was then issued capriciously and arbitrarily;
it unquestionably deprived the State of a fair
opportunity to present and prove its case.
4. Thus, its right to due process was violated. The
said order is null and void and hence, cannot be
pleaded by Gorion to bar the subsequent
annulment of the dismissal order or a re-opening
of the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Summerville General Merchandise v Eugenio
August 7, 2007
1. The president and general manager of
Summerville accused several persons
(incorporators of AROTECH Corp) of
unauthorized manufacturing, distribution and sale
and unfair competition of Royal brand playing
cards, the design and mark of which are claimed
to have been duly patented/copyrighted and
registered.
2. After due investigation, the City Prosecutor’s
Office of Manila recommended the prosecution of
respondents for unfair competition. Thus an
information for unfair competition was filed
3. Arraignment was scheduled for July 13, 2000;
however, on June 22 of the same year, private
respondents filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice assailing the May 31, 2000
Resolution of the City Prosecutor’s Office
4. Undersecretary Puno affirmed the resolution of
the Prosecutor however DOJ Secretary Perez
issued his Resolution which recalled and set
734
aside the Resolution of Undersecretary Puno, but
without however issuing a ruling on the propriety
of the complaint and merely indicated that the
case would be further reviewed and the
corresponding resolution would be issued.
5. DOJ then issued a Resolution dismissing both the
complaint filed by petitioner and the counterclaim
filed by private respondents. This was done after
the arraignment which the accused refused to
enter a plea. Feeling aggrieved, Summerville
immediately filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Secretary’s ruling.
6. the prosecution filed with the trial court a Motion
to Withdraw Informationon the basis of the
Resolution issued by Secretary Perez. The next
day, the RTC issued the order dismissing the
case. MR filed by Summerville.
7. trial court issued an Orderholding in abeyance all
pending incidents to await the final resolution of
the motion filed before the DOJ. Respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
the trial court has all the facts necessary to
resolve the pending incidents and also filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: w/n double jeopardy already attached in this
case NO
1. First, in Santos v Orda: The trial court is not
bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it
may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice would be an abdication of the trial
court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case
2. In this case, it can be readily seen from the Order
of Judge Eugenio, granting the withdrawal of the
Information, that the trial court glaringly failed to
conduct its own determination of a prima facie
case, and simply adopted the Resolution issued
by the Secretary of Justice.
3. This failure of Judge Eugenio to independently
evaluate and assess the merits of the case
against the accused violates the complainant’s
right to due process and constitutes grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
4. Thus, it is only but proper for this Court to remand
the case to the trial court to rule on the merits of
the case to determine if a prima facie case exists
and consequently resolve the Motion to Withdraw
Information anew.
5. Since the order granting the withdrawal of the
Information was committed with grave abuse of
discretion, then the accused was not acquitted
nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or
termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite
(that the accused has been convicted, acquitted,
or the case has been dismissed or terminated
without the express consent of the accused) was
not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in
Martinez v Court of Appeals
1. Martinez was accused by VP Laurel for libel
arising from the allegedly derogatory and
scurrilous imputations and insinuations against
735
Laurel contained in Martinez' article entitled "The
Sorrows of Laurel" published on January 8, 1990
in his Manila Times column Narrow Gate
2. Laurel filed a motion to set the case for
arraignment and pre-trial. Action on the motion
was held in abeyance by the pairing judge, Hon.
Gerardo Pepito, pending assumption of duty of
Judge Yuzon's successor. (Yuzon retired earlier)
1. In the meantime, Martinez filed a petition with the
DOJ seeking review of the resolution of the City
Prosecutor finding a prima facie case of libel
against him. Accordingly, 3rd Asst. City
Prosecutor Tabanag filed before the trial court on
a motion to suspend proceedings pending
resolution by the DOJ of Martinez' petition for
review, which was granted by Judge Pepito
2. then Acting Justice Secretary Bello declaredthat
while the language used in the article may be
unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the
same was not actionable as libel, as if embodied
merely an opinion protected as a privileged
communication under Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code. The appealed resolution was
therefore set aside and the City Prosecutor was
directed to cause the dismissal of the information
filed against Martinez. Thus a MTD was then
filed.
3. At the hearing, upon manifestation of Laurel’s
counsel, as private prosecutor, that he had
received no copy of the motion to dismiss, the
trial court directed the case prosecutor to furnish
said counsel the desired copy, giving the latter
ten days to respond.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
4. The prosecutor didn’t comply with the trial court's
order; this notwithstanding, said court, through
Presiding Judge Roberto A. Barrios, issued an
order dismissing the case. (note: no arraignment
was held)
5. Laurel appealed arguing that the order of
dismissal was void because it was only based on
the Secretary’s Opinion. CA granted the appeal
thus it remanded the case to TC for arraignment.
6. Martinez went up to the SC contending that his
right against double jeopardy has been violated
Issue: W/N double jeopardy attaches in this case NO
1. Appeal against the order of dismissal was not
foreclosed by the rule of double jeopardy, said
order having issued before arraignment. Legal
jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered,
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused
2. Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a
final judgment or order in a criminal case is
granted to "any party", except when the accused
is placed thereby in double jeopardy.
3. As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, in failing to make an independent finding
of the merits of the case and merely anchoring
the dismissal on the revised position of the
prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the
discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In
effect, it was the prosecution, through the
736
Department of Justice which decided what to do
and not the court which was reduced to a mere
rubber stamp
4. The dismissal order having been issued in
violation of private complainant's right to due
process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of
judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err
in setting aside said dismissal order.
Discharge of co-accused
Bogo-Medellin Milling v Son
1. Hermosa, Tuñacaowere accused by Bogo-
Medellin of qualified theft. Information was then
filed in court. However, Bogo-Medellin filed on 14
April 1986 a manifestation informing the trial court
of petitioner Hermosa's desire and willingness to
act as state witness and to testify against his co-
accused, private respondent Tuñacao who,
Hermosa claimed, was the most guilty.
2. Initially, Judge Tomol denied the application of
Bogo-Medellin for discharge of Hermosa. On
Bogo-Medellin's motion for reconsideration,
however, Judge Tomol issued an order reversing
himself and discharging Hermosa from the
information for qualified theft.
3. On the initial scheduled date of hearing, Hermosa
failed to appear before the trial court. The hearing
was then rescheduled, first to 20 January and
later to 3 March. By the latter date, respondent
Judge Son had become Presiding Judge of
Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
4. On the 3 March hearing, counsel for Tuñacao
manifested to the court that he would be moving
for reconsideration of the order of Judge Tomol
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
discharging petitioner Hermosa from the qualified
theft information.
5. Bogo-Medellin opposed the motion for
reconsideration upon the ground that
reinstatement of Hermosa as co-accused in
would place him in double jeopardy, considering
that the order of Judge Tomol discharging
Hermosa had resulted in his acquittal of the crime
of qualified theft.
Issue: W/N there would be double jeopardy if Hermosa
would be reinstated YES
1. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, the following are the requisites for the
defense of double jeopardy:
a. There must be a complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction;
b. Filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction;
c. After the accused had been arraigned and
pleaded to the charge;
d. Than the accused was convicted or
acquitted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent;
e. The second offense charged is the same
as the first offense charged, or for an
attempt to commit the same or a frustration
thereof; or
f. The second offense necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the first offense
charged.
2. the discharge of Hermosa must be considered as
737
valid for present purposes, that is, for
determination of whether a second and prohibited
jeopardy would attach upon reinstatement of
Hermosa as a co-accused in the qualified theft
information.
3. The general rule is that the discharge of an
accused in order that he may turn state witness,
is expressly left to the discretion of the trial court.
4. The effect of the discharge of a defendant is
specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 in the
following manner: The order indicated in the
preceding section, shall amount to an acquittal of
the accused discharged and shall be a bar to
future prosecution for the same offense, unless
the accused fails or refuses to testify against his
co-accused in accordance with his sworn
statement constituting the basis for his discharge.
5. Once the discharge of an accused from the
information is effected, the legal consequence of
acquittal follows and persists unless the accused
so discharged fails or refuses to testify against his
co-defendant, in which case the defense of
double jeopardy is withdrawn from him and
becomes unavailable to him. Until it is shown that
the discharged accused has in fact failed or
refused to testify against his co-defendant,
subsequent proof showing that any or all of the
conditions listed in section 9 of Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court had not been actually fulfilled,
would not affect the legal consequence of the
discharge, i.e., would not wipe away the resulting
acquittal.
6. In the case at bar, there is no evidence of record
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
to show that petitioner Hermosa failed or refused
to testify against his co-accused, i.e., that he
reneged on his covenant with the prosecution.
7. All the record shows is that petitioner Hermosa
failed to attend two scheduled hearings, which
does not necessarily show that he had violated
his undertaking to testify against his co-accused
"in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for his discharge." He has
still YET to testify.
Argel v Judge Pascua August 20, 2006
1. Argel complained against Judge Pascua that he
was already acquitted in an earlier decision but
then she amended her decision and instead
convicted him
2. Judge said that she erroneously thought that
there was no witness who positively identified him
because of the fact that the testimony of the
eyewitness was not attached to the records at the
time she wrote her decision
Issue: W/N the amended decision is null and void YES
1. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once
final is no longer susceptible to amendment or
alteration except to correct errors which are
clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused
by an omission or mistake in the dispositive
portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought
about by a moro-moro or mock trial. A final
decision is the law of the case and is immutable
738
and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or
incorrectness.
2. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot
be recalled for correction or amendment except in
the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by
another order reconsidering the dismissal of the
case since the inherent power of a court to modify
its order or decision does not extend to a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
3. she could no longer "revise" her decision of
acquittal without violating not only an elementary
rule of procedure but also the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy
4. The fact that respondent never had any intention
of having complainant incarcerated on the basis
of the second decision but only to make him
answer for the civil liabilities arising from the
crime, as respondent explained, cannot exculpate
her from administrative liability.
2. Crimes Covered
P/CPL. GUILLERMO SARABIA, PNP, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 142024
July 20, 2001
MENDOZA, J.:
Nature: petition for review of the decision of Court of
Appeals
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
1. June 23, 1991 - Petitioner Sarabia, then a member of
the city police force with intimidation, pointed his gun at
complainant Josephine Picos-Mapalad and her then
boyfriend, complainant Anastacio Mapalad and forced
them to perform sexual acts against their will.
2. Three criminal informations against petitioner for
grave coercion were filed in the Municipal Trial Court of
Tagbilaran City, which resulted in the filing of Criminal
Case Nos. 4399, 4400, and 4401 in that court. Court
found him guilty in all three cases.
3. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, the
three criminal cases were raffled to two salas of the
court. Branch 1 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case
Nos. 4399 and 4400. Branch 47 of the RTC of Bohol
ordered the transfer of the records of Criminal Case No.
9730 to Branch I of the same court to be consolidated
with Criminal Case No. 9729 and 9731. The three cases
were finally raffled off to Branch 48 of the RTC.
4. Branch 48 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed in toto the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court. The Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed in
toto the decision of the lower court.
5. Petitioner raises the plea of double jeopardy. He
contends the incident which gave rise to this case is
also the subject of a criminal case for robbery with
739
violence against or intimidation of person wherein he
was convicted, and which is now on appeal with the
Court of Appeals.
W there is double jeopardy - NO.
To raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, the
following elements must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the
first.
With respect to the third element, under Rule 117, ß7 of
the Rules of Court, the test is whether one offense is
identical with the other or whether it is an attempt or
frustration of the other or whether one offense
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
other. On the other hand, Rule 120, ß5 provides:
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. ñ An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved, when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
The third requisite, identity of offenses, is absent in this
case. The crime for which petitioner now stands
charged is not the same as the crime of robbery with
violence against or intimidation of person for which he
was convicted. Neither is the former an attempt to
commit the latter or a frustration thereof. And the former
crime does not necessarily include, and is not
necessarily included in, the first crime charged.
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
1. 14 March 1985 - an owner-type jeep, then driven by
petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then
driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the
tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino
Gonzal.
2. (2) informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an
Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property with multiple physical injuries under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) an Information
for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim.
3. 29 June 1987 - the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
rendered its decision in Criminal Case No. 2793 finding
740
the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of
one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph
2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig.
4. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was
arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. He entered a plea
of not guilty.
5. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was
arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
W there could be a valid charge for alleged
abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides as basis for prosecution. "2.
Anyone who shall fail to help another whom he has
accidentally wounded or injured" when, he was
previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property with multiple physical injuries"
under Article 265 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code -
YES.
1. The petitioner is actually invoking his right against
double jeopardy. He, however, failed to directly and
categorically state it in his petition or deliberately
obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant
absurdity of the two informations. The reason seems
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the
three courts below. In any case, to do so would have
been a futile exercise.
2. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No.
2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No.
64294 before the Regional Trial Court. As stated above,
the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered
on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took
place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for
double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have
been arraigned in the previous case.
Legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered, and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
3. Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses
under the Revised Penal Code. It is a cardinal rule that
the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple
act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
741
other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal
of the information under one does not bar prosecution
under the other.
4. Since the informations were for separate offenses ó
the first against a person and the second against public
peace and order ó one cannot be pleaded as a bar to
the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly
for separate offenses. Quasi offenses under Article 365
are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against
Security are committed by means of dolo. Moreover, in
Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither
an offense by itself nor an element of the offense
therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the
penalty by one degree. Upon the other hand, failure to
help or render assistance to another whom one has
accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE
HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL
OPULENCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45129
March 6, 1987
FELICIANO, J.:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Nature: petition for certiorari and mandamus, the
People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of
the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266
1. 1 February 1975 - members of the Batangas City
Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric
Light System, equipped with a search warrant searched
and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena
Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the
private respondent Manuel Opulencia.
2. They discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government, and "architecturally
concealed inside the walls of the building"
3. 24 November 1975 - Assistant City Fiscal of
Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas
City an information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance No. 1.
4. 2 February 1976 - Manuel Opulencia filed motion to
dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime
there charged had already prescribed and that the civil
indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award.
5. Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on
the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense
charged was a light felony which prescribes two months
from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing
further that the information was filed by the fiscal more
than nine months after discovery of the offense.
6. 14 days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal
of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance
742
of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against
Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power
under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph
(1), of the Revised Penal Code.
7. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel
Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976,
alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the
offense charged in the second information and that the
filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right
against double jeopardy. Judge granted the accused's
motion to quash.
8. Petitioner argues that the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is protection against a second
or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The
petitioner stresses that the first information filed before
the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices,
acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City
Government of Batangas.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code filed
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential
elements.
Whether there is double jeopardy - Yes. :|
1. The first sentence of Article IV (22) 1973 Constitution
sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different
from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the
general proposition: the constitutional protection,
against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from
the offense charged subsequently under a national
statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that
both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
2. Where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of
offenses charge: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is
shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is
charged under a municipal ordinance while the
other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is
to the identity of the actswhich the accused is said to
have committed and which are alleged to have given
rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts
which constitute or have given rise to the first offense
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged
under a statute.
3. The question may be raised why one rule should
exist where two offenses under two different sections of
the same statute or under different statutes are
charged, and another rule for the situation where one
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and
another offense under a national statute. If the second
sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been
743
written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal
under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act under a
national statute. An offense penalized by municipal
ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense
under a statute. The two offenses would never
constitute the same offense having been promulgated
by different rule-making authorities — though one be
subordinate to the other — and the plea of double
jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the
1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the
second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose
of extending the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be
covered by the first sentence. 13
4. The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses
is addressed by examining the essential elements of
each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are
set out in the respective legislative definitions of the
offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts
which are claimed to have generated liability both under
a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be
addressed, in the first instance, by examining the
location of such acts in time and space. When the acts
of the accused as set out in the two informations are so
related to each other in time and space as to be
reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same
occasion and where those acts have been moved by
one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary
design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately
characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise
to penal liability simultaneously under different legal
enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
statute).
5. In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within
the same time frame: from November 1974 to February
1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia
installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring
and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the
necessary permit or authorization from the municipal
authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or
permitted such unauthorized installation for the very
purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt
intent was thus present from the very moment that such
unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical
effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward
flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without
the corresponding recording thereof in his electric
meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current
was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric
wiring and devices.
6. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not
be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may
be regarded as the "same offense" where the second
offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of
double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical
elements constituting the first offense need be present
in the technical definition of the second offense. The law
here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused
person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
744
technical elements.
7. By the same token, acts of a person which physically
occur on the same occasion and are infused by a
common intent or design or negligence and therefore
form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced,
as it were, to produce as many different acts as there
are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that
an enterprising prosecutor can find.
8. It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's
petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. It is
difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who
would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the
community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape
criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by
inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information
for an offense which he should have known had already
prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the
fundamental law to hold the protection of the right
against double jeopardy available even to the private
respondent in this case.
3. Act punished by a law or ordinance, conviction or
acquittal shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.
4. Doctrine of Supervening Event
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME
MANUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 99287
June 23, 1992
MEDIALDEA, J.:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Nature: petition for certiorari seeking to reverse RTC
decision
1. Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of
Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425 for possession of
0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu)
2. During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea
of not guilty. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private
respondent verbally manifested in open court that
private respondent was willing to change his former plea
of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425. Judge found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 17, Article III, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended.
W Respondent Judge erred in granting accused's
request to plead guilty to a lesser offense - YES.
1. Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979,
p. 1037). It usually involves the defendant's pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge (ibid).
Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial
stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still
permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his
plea thereafter.
2. However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to
a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a
745
matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion
of the trial court.
3. In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused)
moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the
prosecution had already rested its case. In such
situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and
the Office of the Prosecutor with yardstick within which
their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in
People v. Kayanan, We held that the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged.
4. As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not
wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor
before it could act on the accused's motion to change
plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment
whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the
trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which
the accused made his change of plea to the end that the
interests of justice and of the public will be served.
5. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in
hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private
respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.
6. The counsel for the private respondent argues that
only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes
involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because
there is no offended party to speak Of and that even the
latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before
the trial court could allow the accused to change his
plea. We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule
116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the
offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
guilty to a lesser offense. It would not also be correct to
state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA
6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the
crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so
by law because they infringe upon the rights of others.
relevant:
7. Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent
maintains that the private respondent's change of plea
and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of
Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open
to review otherwise his constitutional right against
double jeopardy will be violated. uch supposition has no
basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the
accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended
party consent to the private respondent's change of
plea.
Under Rule 117, Sec. 7: the private respondent could
still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation
of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the
lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the
offended party, i.e., the state.
X. Ex post facto law and Bill of Attainder
Art. III, Sec. 22
1. Ex post facto law
a. Kinds
b. Characteristics
c. Some cases
REYNALDO R. BAYOT, PETITIONER, VS.
746
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. L-61776
March 23, 1984
1. Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several
persons accused in more than one hundred (100)
counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents
before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed
from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor
of the Commission on Audit assigned to the Ministry of
Education and Culture, together with some
officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of
Treasury and the Teachers’ Camp in Baguio City, in the
preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks
for non-existent obligations of the Teachers’ Camp
resulting in damage to the government of several million
pesos.
2. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25,
1976.
3. In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of
municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local
elections held in January 1980. He was elected.
4. On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
decision convicting herein petitioner and some of his co-
accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases filed
against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this
Court and the cases are now pending review in G. R.
Nos. L-54645-76.
5. However; on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg.
195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of Republic Act No. 3019.
6. Thereafter, in other cases pending before the
respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the
accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all
the accused-public officers pendente lite from their
respective offices or any other public office which they
may be occupying pending trial of their cases.
7. On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order
directing the suspension of all the accused including
herein petitioner “from their public positions or from any
other public office that they may be holding x x x ”
8. Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging that “to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of the
constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post
facto law”. The motion was denied by respondent court
in a resolution dated September 6, 1982. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
9. Petitioner submits that respondent court acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction amounting
to lack of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending petitioner from office as Mayor of Amadeo,
Cavite, pendente lite because in the supposition that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is to be applied retroactively,
its application would violate the Constitutional provision
against enactment of ex post facto law;
W BP 195 is an ex post facto law - NO.
1. We find no merit in petitioner’s contention that
Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa
thru Falsification of Public Document as among the
747
crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith
with suspension from office pending action in court, is a
penal provision which violates the constitutional
prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.
2. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code
clearly states that suspension from the employment or
public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not
a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.
3. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of
said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before
final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore,
the suspension from office, pending trial of the public
officer charged with crimes mentioned in the
amendatory provision committed before its effectivity
does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post
facto law.
4. Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be
suspended because he is presently occupying a
position different from that under which he is charged is
untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that
any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under Republic
Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the
government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage
of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
of the word “office” the same applies to any office which
the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he was charged.
FAJARDO v COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 128508 (February 1, 1999)
Petitioner: Daniel G. Fajardo
Respondent (s): Court of Appeals, Hon. Florentino P.
Pedronio (in his capacity as presiding Judge, RTC Br
31, Iloilo City, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
Station Commander of Iloilo City
FACTS:
On May 26, 1988, the RTC Br 31 of Iloilo City convicted
petitioner of violation of BP Blg 22 and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of 8 months imprisonment and pay
the costs. The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. By decision promulgated on February 27,
1990, the CA affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari of the conviction before
the SC but latter also denied said petition.
On June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for probation
before the trial court contending that he was eligible for
probation because at the time he committed the offense
in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction
was still qualified to apply for probation and that the law
that barred an application for probation of an accused
who had interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its
application and hence, not applicable to him. Trial court
denied petitioner’s motion for probation and so did CA.
ISSUES:
748
1. Whether or not petitioner could qualify to apply for
probation under PD No. 986 since he had
appealed from his conviction in 1988, after PD
1990 amending PD 986 become effective in
1986.
2. Whether or not PD 1990 is an ex post facto law
hence, invalid.
HELD:
1. NO. PD 1990 provides, “no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction”. At the time of the
commission of the offense in 1981, petitioner
could have appealed if convicted and still availed
himself of probation but he was convicted on May
26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, PD 1990
was then in full effect. He could no longer apply
for probation since he had appealed.
2. NO. PD 1990 is valid. It is not an ex post facto
law in its application and neither is it considered
as such. The law applies only to accused
convicted after its effectivity. An ex post facto law
is one that punishes an act as a crime which was
innocent at the time of its commission. PD 1990 is
not penal in character just like the Probation Law
that it amends.
2. Bill of Attainder
a. Definition.
b. Characteristics
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
IV. CITIZENSHIP
A. General Principles
1. Definition
a. Distinguished from nationality
2. Usual modes of acquiring citizenship
3. Modes (by birth) applied in the Philippines:
a. Before adoption of the 1935 Constitution
i. Jus Sanguinis
ii. Jus Soli
ROA v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
GR No. L-7011 (October 30, 1912)
FACTS:
On July 6, 1889, appellant Tranquilino Roa was born in
lawful wedlock in the Philippines to a Chinese father
and a Filipina mother. His father went to China in 1985
and died there about 1900. On 1901, while still a minor,
appellant was sent to China by his mother to study.
When he returned to the Philippine Islands on 1910, he
was denied admission by the Board of Special Inquiry
for the reason that he takes the nationality of his father
and thus becomes a subject of the Emperor of China
and not a citizen of the Philippines, to which the Insular
Collector of Customs affirmed. Appellant filed the
749
appeal from a judgment of CFI of Cebu, who likewise
remanded the appellant to the Collector of Customs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is a citizen of the Philippine
Islands?
HELD:
YES. The mother before she married was a Spanish
subject and entitled to all the rights, privileges and
immunities pertaining thereto. Upon the death of her
husband, which occurred after the Philippine Islands
were ceded to the United States, she, under the rule
prevailing in the United States, ipso facto reacquired the
nationality of the Philippine Islands, being that of her
native country. If it may be said that during the lifetime
of the father minor children follow his nationality, it
logically follows, by the widow placing herself and her
children within the jurisdiction of the United States on
his death, whereby she herself reacquires her former
nationality, and she being the natural guardian of such
children, that they should follow her nationality, with the
proviso that on becoming of age they may elect for
themselves. The nationality of the appellant having
followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of
the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having
expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this
country.
b. After adoption of the 1935 Constitution
4. Natural-born citizens
5. Marriage by Filipino to an alien
6. Policy against dual-allegiances
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
MERCADO v MANZANO
GR No. 135083 (May 26, 1999)
NATURE: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set
aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to
declare Manzano disqualified to hold the office of vice-
mayor of Makati City. Important details on Edu
Manzano: born September 4, 1955 in San Francisco,
California, USA to Filipino parents.
FACTS: On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-
mayoralty of Makati City, 3 candidates competed for the
post: Eduardo B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and
Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his
proclamation was suspended due to a pending petition
for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
alleging that Manzano was an American citizen. On May
7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC
cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the
grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him
according to Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado
sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.
Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion
was unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining)
reversed the Second Division’s ruling on the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing
the proclamation of Manzano as winner, saying:
Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US
citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws
under principle of jus soli (basis is place of birth).
750
Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural
born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the
right of blood).
Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration and holds and American
passport, he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he
has not renounced it and has not taken an oath of
allegiance to the USA.
Manzano, after the age of majority, registered himself
as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998
Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US
citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law,
he no longer had US citizenship.
Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as
vice-mayor of Makati City.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring
this suit considering that he was not an original
party in the case for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mamaril nor was his motion for leave to
intervene granted. YES.
2. WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if
so, WON he is disqualified from being a
candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City. NO.
REASONS: Manzano argues that Mercado has neither
legal interest in the matter of litigation nor an interest to
protect because he is “a defeated candidate for the
vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the
private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and
executory judgment.”
This assumes that at the time intervention was sought,
there had already been a proclamation of the election
results for the vice-mayoralty elections when in fact,
there has not been such a proclamation. Certainly, the
petitioner had, and still has an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race when he sought to intervene.
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC only applies when the
election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is WON the second placer may be declared
winner. If Mamaril was competent to bring action, so
was Mercado, being a rival candidate.
Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the
motion on May 20, 1998, when it was shown that the
private respondent had the most votes. Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 provides that intervention may
be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has been no final judgment
rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve
petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount
to denial of the motion, justifying this petition for
certiorari.
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner
contends that through Sec.40(d) of the Local
Government Code (which declares as “disqualified from
running for elective local position… Those with dual-
citizenship”), Congress has “command[ed] in explicit
751
terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual
allegiance to hold elective office.”
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances
of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be
a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a
result of a person’s volition; it is a situation wherein a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an
issue because a person who has this raises a question
of which state’s law must apply to him/her, therefore
posting a threat to a country’s sovereignty. In Sec.5
Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern
was not with dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized
citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of
origin even after naturalization. Hence, “dual citizenship”
in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean
“dual allegiance”. Therefore, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for
candidacy, such persons with dual citizenships have
elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their
dual citizenship. In private respondent’s certificate of
candidacy, he made these statements under oath on
March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Natural-
born”. “I am not a permanent resident of , or
immigrant to , a foreign country.” “I am eligible for
the office I seek to be elected. I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…”The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual-citizen. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was held that
“By laws of the United States… Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government.” Therefore,
petitioner Mercado’s contention that the oath of
allegiance contained in private respondent’s certificate
of candidacy is insufficient to constitute his renunciation
of his American citizenship. Also, equally without merit
is his contention that, to be effective, such renunciation
should have been made upon reaching the age of
majority since no law requires the election of Philippine
citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Plus, the fact that Manzano admitted that he was
registered as an American citizen with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he
holds an American passport which he used for his last
travel to the US dated April 22, 1997should not be such
a big deal. At the time of said travel, the use of an
American passport was simply an assertion of his
American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship. Admitting that he was a registered
alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipino (Aznar
v. COMELEC).
Manzano’s oath of allegiance, together with the fact he
has spent his life here, received his education here, and
practiced his profession here, and has taken part in past
752
Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari,
DISMISSED. *Ineligibility refers to lack of qualifications
prescribed.
VALLES v COMELEC
GR No. 137000 (August 9, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner questions the qualification of private
respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez to run for governor
of Davao Oriental on citizenship grounds. Respondent
was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1998, she applied for an Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an
Australian passport.
ISSUE: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is,
WON she renounced her citizenship by applying for
ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
RULING: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the
controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine
Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts,
all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including
their children, are considered Philippine citizens.
Respondent’s father was therefore a Filipino, and
consequently, her.
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation
of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR,
and Australian passport are not enough to renounce
citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced
the same.
Dual citizenship in the LGC, Sec 40, meansdual
allegiance
JACOT v DAL AND COMELEC
GR No. 179848 (November 27, 2008)
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of
COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14
May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground
that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US
citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US
on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US
citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?
HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of
allegiance is a general requirement for all those who
wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while
the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and
who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
753
AASJS - CALILUNG v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
DATUMANONG
GR No. 160869 (May 11, 2007)
Facts:
Petitioner filed this petition to prevent Justice Secretary
Datumanong from implementing R. A. 9225 arguing that
R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article
VI of the Constitution which states that dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be
dealt with by law.
Issue:
Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the
court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual
allegiance.
Held:
R.A. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no
jurisdiction yet to pass upon the issue of dual
allegiance. The court held that that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away
with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section
3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the
issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No.
9225.
Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10
Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.
7. Attack on one's citizenship may be made only
through a direct, not a collateral proceeding.
Co v HRET
July 30, 1991
J. Gutierrez Jr.
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, congressional election for the second
district of Northern Samar transpired. Among the
candidates were petitioner Balinquit and private
respondent Ong. Ong was proclaimed the winner.
However, an election protests was filed against him on
754
the ground that he is not a natural born citizen, nor was
he a resident of the second district. One of petitioner’s
argument was that respondent's father was not, validly,
a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of
the oath of citizenship.
The HRE ruled for private respondent Ong. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Thus the
petition on certiorari with the SC.
Issue:
WON the issue on the citizenship of respondent Ong
can extend to a collateral attack on the citizenship of his
father.
Held/Ratio:
No. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his
death just so we can go after the respondent. The
petitioners questioning of the citizenship of the father
through a collateral approach cannot done. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the
Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to
Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the
principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already
been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity
to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak
8. Res judicata in cases involving citizenship
B. Citizens of the Philippines
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution
a. Re: 1935 Constitution
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Valles v COMELEC
August 9, 2000
J. Purisima
Facts:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, with a
Filipino father and Australian father. In 1949, at the age
of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.
In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since
then, she has continuously participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well.
In 1992, she ran for was elected as governor of Davao
Oriental. This was contested by her opponent Gil Taojo
in a petition of quo warranto on the ground of her
Australian Citizenship.COMELEC dismissed the
petition.
When she ran in 1995, she again won against Rabat
which was also contested. Said petition was also
dismissed. Thus this petition for certiorari.
In her reelection in 1998, her citizenship was again
contested by now petitioner Valles. COMELEC again
dismissed the case. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, thus this petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
WON Lopez was a Filipino citizen.
755
Yes. Lopez was born a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what
served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country which were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law. Under both organic
acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including
their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Lopez’s father, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte, thus under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law he is deemed a Filipino citizen. By
virtue of the same laws, herein private respondent
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
Tecson v COMELEC
March 3, 2004
J. Vitug
Facts:
On December 31, 2003, Roland Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ)
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner
Victorino Fornier filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents were
foreigners. Even on the assumption that his father
Lorenzo Pou was a Filipino citizen, such could not have
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
been transmitted to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother.
COMELEC dismissed the case. The motiton for
rconsideration filed by petitioner was also dismissed.
Thus this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON FPJ was a Filipino citizen
Held/Ratio:
Yes. The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands"
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902,
also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act
of 1902 which provided that:
“...that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing
to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands …”
The only conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou that could be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou),
if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
756
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
Chiongbian v De Leon
January 31, 1949
CJ Moran
Facts:
This a petition filed by William CHiongbian seeking to
permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from
cancelling the registration certificates of his vessels, and
respondent Philippine Shipping Administration from
rescinding the sale of three vessels to him.
The entire case hinges on whether or not petitioner
William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen
Issue:
WON petitioner is a Filipino citizen
Held/Ratio:
Yes. The Article IV of the 1935 Constitution provides
that:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
…
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines
…
In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and
father of the herein petitioner, was elected to and held
the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel,
Occidental Misamis. Thus his father became a Filipino
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of
the Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein
petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino
citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the
Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen
upon the adoption of said Constitution.
The argument that subsection 2 is is strictly personal
and does not extend to the children of the grantee . The
framers adopted said provision fully cognizant of the
transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in
subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the
transmission of citizenship in such a particular case,
they would have so clearly stated.
b. Re: 1973 Constitution
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
a. Procedure for election
b. When to elect
Cuenco v Secretary of Justice
May 26, 1962
J. Concepcion
Facts:
Counsel for petitioner Alfonso DyCuenco wrote to the
Commissioner of Immigration a letter requesting the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration, upon
the ground that he had exercised the right to elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Article IV, section I(4)
of the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625. He
757
stated that he was born of a Chinese father and a
Filipina mother. He is married to a Filipina with who he
has four children. He also stated that he had already
renounce all allegiance to the Republic of China; that he
recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; and that he will obey, support
and defend the Constitution and laws of the Philippines
The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to
the DOJ Sec who opined that hat the alleged Philippine
citizenship of petitioner's mother had not been
sufficiently established, that said election of Philippine
citizenship by petitioner herein was legally ineffectual
and that he did not thereby become a Filipino citizen
Petitioner sough rehearing and reconsideration and
argued that the delay in electing citizenship was due to
the belief that he was a citizen of the Philippines. When
it was referred back to DOJ sec, petition was denied.
Petitioner then instituted in the CFI of Manila this action
for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice and the
Commissioner of Immigration, to compel them to
recognize as valid said election of Philippine citizenship
by petitioner and to cancel his alien's certificate of
registration.
Issue:
WON delay to elect citizenship was justified in
petitioner’s circumstance
Held/Ratio:
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
NO. Petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was
over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7)
years after he had reached the age of majority. It is
clear that said election has not been made "upon
reaching the age of majority."
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, and
that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to
above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino. For this reason,
petitioner introduced evidence to the effect that he is
referred to as a Filipino in his birth certificate, in his
marriage contract and in the birth certificates of his
children; that he married a Filipina; and that he enlisted
in the Philippine guerrilla forces in December,
1942.1äwphï1.ñët
However, he stated that he joined a unit
of Chinese volunteers and that he registered himself in
the Bureau of Immigration as a Chinese. Moreover, it
appears that, as early, at least, as 1947, petitioner knew
that he had to make a formal election, if he wanted to be
a citizen of the Philippines, and yet he did not do so until
four (4) years later, or in May 1951. The reasons given
by him for such delay were his alleged financial
difficulties and the illness of members of his family.
These reasons are patently insufficient to excuse
758
said delay or to warrant extension of the period to
elect Philippine citizenship.
In re: Ching.
Bar Matter No. 914, 01 October 1999
(citizenship; perfection of Filipino citizenship; age of
majority; reasonable time)
Petitioner Ching, an applicant for admission to the
Philippine Bar, was born to a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution. As such,
his citizenship followed that of his father’s. The 1973
and 1987 Constitutions allowed individuals to elect to
perfect their Filipino citizenship for which CA 625
provided the procedure. In all cases, perfection of one’s
citizenship had to be done “upon reaching the age of
majority” which has been taken to mean that it must be
done “within reasonable time” from reaching such age.
In turn, “within reasonable time” has been taken to
mean three (3) years although the Court in Cuenco v
Justice Secretary said that the three year rule was
not inflexible but warned against over-extending the
time period.
In this case, Ching only elected to become a
Filipino citizen at the age of thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after
he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase “upon reaching the age of
majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by
any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
within which to exercise the privilege. It should be
stated, in this connection, that the special
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down
the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by election.
Villahermosa v Commissioner of Immigration
80 Phil 541, 31 March 1948
(citizenship; jus sanguinis; subsequent acquisition of
citizenship by parent)
This is a petition for a Writ of Habea Corpus; the
petitioner is the mother of Delfin Co, an 18-year-old
Chinese national who was apprehended with a party of
his compatriots who entered the Philippines illegally.
Delfin and company was adjudged as illegal aliens and
ordered deported back to China. Petitioner, who had
lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to Delfin’s
father, filed an Oath of Allegiance with the Civil Registry
of Tarlac for which reason, under CA No. 63, she thus
resumed her Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner thus came to court arguing that since
she is once again a Philippine citizen and since the
citizenship of a minor follows that of his mother, Delfin
Co is, for all intents and purposes, a Filipino citizen and
cannot be deported to China.
HELD: Petition denied. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does
not provide that upon repatriation of a Filipina her
children acquire Philippine citizenship. It would be
illogical to consider Delfin as repatriated like his mother,
759
because he never was a Filipino citizen and could not
have reacquired such citizenship. While his Chinese
father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was
not a Filipina; she was Chinese. After the death of such
father, Villahermosa continued to be a Chinese, until
she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in April, 1947.
After that reacquisition Delfin could claim that his
mother was a Filipina within the meaning of paragraph
4, section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution; but,
according to that same Organic Act, he had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon attaining his majority. Until
he becomes of age and makes the election, he is the
Chinese citizen that he was at the time of his father's
demise. This petition is moreover to be denied on the
strength of precedents heretofore established, because
Delfin was a Chinese when he arrived here; and any
posterior change of status can not affect the legality of
his detention for purposes of deportation.
Republic v Chule Lim
G.R. No. 153883, 13 January 2004
Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an illegitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She filed a petition
to the court for correction of four erroneous entries in
her birth certificate, among which was her citizenship
which was listed as Chinese when she claims to be a
Filipino. The petition was granted. However, petitioner
herein filed an appeal specifically on the correction of
her citizenship (from Chinese to Filipino) not having
complied with the legal requirements for election of
citizenship in that the respondent never elected her
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority as
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
provided for in Article IV, Sec 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution and Sec 1, CA No. 625.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent needs to elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the ageof majority?
HELD: Petition denied; judgment upheld. The
constitutional and statutory requirements of electing
Filipino citizenship applyonly to legitimate children; the
case at bar clearly states that respondent is an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father. By
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
C. Naturalization
1. Modes of Naturalization
a. Direct
b. Derivative
2. Doctrine of indelible allegiance.
3. Direct naturalization under Philippine laws.
4. Naturalization under C.A. 473
a. Qualifications
b. Disqualifications
c. Procedure
Republic v Hamilton Tan Keh
G.R. No. 144742, 11 November 2004
(petition for naturalization; publication requirements)
Respondent filed a petition for naturalization pursuant to
RA 530 and caused the publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing in the manner prescribed by law. On the
760
date of initial hearing, 27 April 1995, the OSG entered
its appearance and manifested its objection on the
ground that as per Section 10 of CA 473, the initial
hearings of petition for naturalization are proscribed
within 30 days preceding the next election (which, in this
case was 08 May 1995). The hearing of the case was
reset to 09 June 1995 at which time the OSG again filed
a Motion to Dismiss as no publication of this subsequent
hearing was made. As such, the court did not obtain
jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: The Court disagreed with the Republic. A plain
reading of Section 9 of CA 473 shows that for there to
be a valid publication, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the petition and notice of hearing must be
published; (2) the publication must be once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks; and, (3) the publication
must be in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province where the applicant
resides. The said provision also requires that copies of
the petition and notice of hearing must be posted in the
office of the clerk of court or in the building where the
office is located. Further, the petition shall not be heard
within six (6) months from the date of last publication of
the notice. The fact that, in this case, the initial hearing
was originally set during the prohibited period in Section
10, but well beyond the six (6) months prohibited period
in Section 9, did not render the publication of the notice
and the petition invalid. Respondent Tan Keh had
strictly complied with all the requirements under Section
9. His petition and the notice of hearing were duly
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
the Official Gazette during the month of September
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
1994 and in a newspaper of general circulation in July
1994. Moreover, the original date of hearing, April 27,
1995, was not within six (6) months from the last
publication of the notice thereof. There are two
prohibited periods that must be reckoned with under
Sections 9 and 10 of CA 473. Section 9 provides that
the notice must set forth, inter alia, "the date of the
hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held
within six months from the date of last publication of the
notice." Section 10, on the other hand, provides that "no
petition shall be heard within thirty days preceding any
election." The hearing on June 9, 1995 on respondent
Tan Keh’s petition was not within any of these two
prohibited periods.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF GAN
TSITUNG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES. GAN TSITUNG, , -versus-REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. L-20819 November 29, 1965
CONCEPCION
FACTS:
On December 24, 1954, CFI- Manila rendered a
decision granting the petition for naturalization as citizen
of the Philippines, filed on November 14, 1953, by
appellant Gan Tsitung. On the latter's motion, he was,
on December 26, 1956, allowed to and did take his oath
of allegiance as citizen of the Philippines and the
corresponding certificate of naturalization was issued to
761
him.
Subsequently, or on May 10, 1962, the Solicitor General
filed a petition praying that said decision and certificate
of naturalization be respectively annulled and cancelled,
upon the ground that the notice of the filing of said
petition and of the hearing thereof had been
published in the Official Gazette only once, instead
of once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in
violation of Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. After due hearing said court issued on October 15,
1962, the order complained of granting relief sought by
the Solicitor General. Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE: WON publication is necessary to make his
naturalization valid? YES
RATIO:
The SC decided the case based on the ruling on Ong
Son Cui Republic which explicitly held that "there being
only one publication of said notice hearing in this
case in the Official Gazette, the same is clearly
incomplete and, therefore, insufficient to confer
jurisdiction to the court a quo to try the case and
grant the petition."
This doctrine was reiterated in Celestino Co y Quing
Reyes vs. Republicupon the ground that non-
compliance with the provisions of Section 9 of the
Revised Naturalization Act, relative to the
publication of the aforesaid notice once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks — affects the
jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect,
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
for it impairs the very root or foundation of the
authority to decide the case, regardless of whether
the one to blame is the clerk of court or the
petitioner or his counsel
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
Sy v Republic
MAKASIAR, J.
Facts:
Juanita Sy filed a petition for naturalization in CFI-
Manila, however, the notice of the petition as Published
in the Daily Mirror, a newspaper of general circulation,
and as posted on the Court bulletin board, did not
restate verbatim the petition, but merely summarized
some of the averments therein. Thus the Solicitor
General argues that since she was unable to comply
with the requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
she should not be afforded citizenship.
ISSUE: WON publication of naturalization is necessary?
YES
RATIO:
WE have ruled with undeviating uniformity "that a
naturalization proceeding is not simply a private contest
between the applicant and the Solicitor General but a
762
matter impressed with the highest public interest,
involving as it does an inquiry as to when an alien
should be allowed to enjoy the coveted boon of Filipino
citizenship. It is for this reason that the burden of proof
is upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with requirements of the law. The
government can at all stages of the proceeding raise the
issue of such non-compliance even without filing a
formal opposition to the petition.
The requirement by Section 9 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended, that the copy of the petition to be
posted and published should be a textual or verbatim
restatement of the petition as filed, is jurisdictional. Non-
compliance therewith, as in the instant case, nullifies the
proceedings including the decision rendered therein in
favor of the applicant (
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION DATED DECEMBER
11, 1961 AND THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 23,
1965, ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE,
WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLEE.
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China.
In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of
Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
has stayed in the Philippines where he found
employment and eventually started his own business,
married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On
July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition
to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
The TC granted his petition for naturalization. However
this was reversed by the CA after the OSG noted
several infirmities in his petition:
(1) failed to state all his former placer of residence
in violation of C.A. No. 473 (pertinent defect)
(2) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of §2;
(3) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his
previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared,
also in contravention of §2; and
(4) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.4
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address
in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes,
such publication constitutes substantial compliance
ISSUE: Won substantial compliance with the law is
sufficient to grant him citizenship? NO
763
It is settled, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by
the State, C.A. No. 473, clearly provides that the
applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition
his present and former places of residence. 23This
provision and the rule of strict application of the law
in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument
of "substantial compliance" with the requirement
under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this
ground alone, the instant petition ought to be
denied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs. Dela Rosa
(sorry couldn’t find case online; only found a digest)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and
Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of
the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted
private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the
Revised Naturalization Law and
(2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private
respondent on February 27, 1992.
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for
naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of
the Philippines. The respondent Judge set the petition
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the
publication of the said order and petition in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for
three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which
should be at least six months before the said date of
hearing.
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion
to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done
on January instead of having it on March, " where he
manifested his intention to run for public office in the
May 1992 elections. The motion was granted and the
hearing was moved on February. Six days later, on
February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed
Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO,
is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him,
all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino
citizen
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18,
1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal
directly with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his
citizenship as Filipino.
Held:No.
The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon.
He is ordered to VACATE his office and to
SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final
and executory.
764
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the
following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the
order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition
itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the
last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without
observing the two-year waiting period
d. Effects of naturalization
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
GR L-21289, 4 October 1971
Facts:
On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a
passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines. She was permitted to come into the
Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her
arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau
Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines
on or before the expiration of her authorized period of
stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration.
After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in
the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after
the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an
action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer
for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen
Yeung appealed.
Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a
Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel
provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during
the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as
a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of
a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
Every time the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
765
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962
e. Denaturalization
5. Naturalization by direct legislative action
6. Administrative Naturalization [R.A. No. 9139]
a. Special Committee on Naturalization
b. Qualifications
c. Disqualifications
d. Procedure
e. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children
f. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization
D. Loss and Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
(C.A. 63)
1. Loss of Citizenship
a. By naturalization in a foreign country
b. By express renunciation of citizenship
Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC
(Aug. 1, 1989)
Ponente: Cruz, J.
FACTS:
 Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the
Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in
1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for
being bigamous.
 Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Australian passport, and obtained an Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for
a change in status from immigrant to returning
Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation denied his application
for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not
applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship.
 According to the records of the Australian Embassy
(as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still
an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although
no direct evidence was presented to prove that he
took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian
citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any
person over the age of 16 years who is granted
Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance.
The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation
of all other allegiance.
 Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the
local elections held on January 18, 1988. The
second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for
quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from
holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and
asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be
annulled.
ISSUES:
*The original issue raised before the Supreme Court
concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition
for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the
COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry
regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to
rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is
766
also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen
holding public office in the Philippines), and in the
interest of the speedy administration of justice.
1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire
into Labo's citizenship?
2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?
3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?
4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can
Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace
him?
HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not
immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC
had at first considered the petition as a pre-
proclamation proceeding, which does not require the
payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC
reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the
filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-
day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such
technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on
significant issues, such as the one being decided in this
case.
2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his
Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the
Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2)
express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of
Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.
- Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia
did not confer him with dual citizenship. The
Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is
inimical to national interest.
- The contention that his marriage to an Australian
national did not automatically divest him of Filipino
citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo
had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of
that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been
automatically restored upon the annulment of his
Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared
void on the grounds of bigamy.
- The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held
in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The
earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is
totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been
politically motivated. The latter can be reversed
because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship.
3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the
Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he
was elected.
4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes,
Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor
because he has not been duly elected by the people of
Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not
entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice
Mayor shall replace Labo.
767
*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.):
Although no decision has been rendered by the
COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is
undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold
public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however,
that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his
citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while
serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case.
YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989
THE CASE Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus
(right to due process) with a prayer to be released from
arbitrary detention as he claims that his continued
Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
FACTS
 Petitioner- a Portuguese National acquired a
Philippine citizenship by naturalization on Feb.
10, 1978.
 Despite naturalization, on 21 July 1981, petitioner
applied for and was issued a renewed
Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410
by the Consular Section of the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies
that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July
1986.
 Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed
commercial documents stating his citizenship as
Portuguese without the authentication of an
appropriate Philippine Consul
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
 Petitioner was detained by the CID for obtaining a
Foreign passport while (at the same time) holding
a Filipino citizenship as well
 Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full
knowledge and legal capacity when he applied for
A Philippine citizenship through naturalization he
consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to
the oath taken which states to renounce
‘absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty” and pledged to “maintain true faith
and allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines,". Hence, petitioner then knows the
limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said
oath and it succeeding consequences should they
be violated.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yu’s acts constitute
a renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship? YES
HELD
Petitioner’s motion for release from detention is
DENIED (along with other motions filed).
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status
as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport and represented himself as such
768
in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship
While still a citizen of the Philippines who had
renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese
in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd. filed in
Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
How Philippine Citizenship obtained/reacquired:
1.) By direct act of Congress
2.) By naturalization- take the oath of allegiance to
the Republic Act 9225
3.) By administrative repatriation—take the oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and register the same
in the local civil registry or in the place where the
person resides/last resided; original citizenship is
acquired
c. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance
d. By rendering service to or accepting commission in
the armed forces of a foreign country
e. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization
f. By having been declared by competent authority a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
2. Reacquisition of Citizenship
a. Taking an oath of allegiance
b. Naturalization
c. Repatriation
ANGAT V. REPUBLIC
14 SEPT.1999
Facts: Angat was a natural born citizen who lost his
citizenship by naturalization in the US. On March 11,
1996, he filed a petition with the RTC to regain his
status as a citizen of the Philippines. The court
thereafter repatriated him.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction
repatriation cases
Held: No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with
the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with
the RTC which has no jurisdiction thereover. The court’s
order was thereby null and void. The Special Committee
on Naturalization was reactivated on June 8, 1995,
hence, when Angat filed his petition on March 11, 1996,
the Committee constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270
under PD No. 725 (a Decree providing for repatriation of
Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens and of natural born Filipinos) was
in place.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC
[174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989]
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed
769
governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October
27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was
also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo;
election and proclamation on the ground that he was not
a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May
22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in
the United States as alleged but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced
over upon himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the
Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the
restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the
private respondents reiterated their assertion that
Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not
reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also
argued that their petition in the Commission on
Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate
purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as
governor, his candidacy and election being null and void
ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the
public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the
contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he
was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His
election did not cure this defect because the electorate
of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local
Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He
also joined in the privaterespondent's argument that
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not
applicable because what the League and Estuye were
seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation
and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also
asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employeesowe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government
Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter
of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of
the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of
the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement
for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
770
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19,
1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born"
citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows,
however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1983 per the following certification from
the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado
P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the
petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
consequence thereof he was coerced
into embracing American citizenship. His feeble
suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of
his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting
as provincial governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he
was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse
this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to
serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and
our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be
treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is
surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot
be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its
difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and
possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to
welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an
express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty
and love.
Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is
hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines
and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to
vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly
elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this
decision becomes final and executory.
BENGZON VS. HRET
[357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001]
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the
1935Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however,
771
respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, section
1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, "rendering service to or
acceptingcommission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March
17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative
of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson
III, who was then running for reelection.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of
the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen.”
Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines. Asdistinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriationsimply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA V. COURT OF
APPEALS
POSTED IN UNCATEGORIZED BY ADMIN ON 27 FEB
2010
G.R. No. 125793 (August 29, 2006)
Facts: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was
seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a
naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative
naturalization,20petitioner also acquired American
citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on 3 August 1995
and was admitted as abalikbayan for one year.
Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained in
Baybay, Malay, Aklan by agent Wilson Soluren of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on 23 May 1996
(pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72).
Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention
Center in Manila. Petitioner was, eventually, ordered
deported to his country of origin.
Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order on 29 May 1996. Tabasa
alleged, among others, that he is entitled to admission
or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota
immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as
provided in §13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
772
Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative
naturalization when he was seven years old due to the
naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968. 21
Held: RA 8171, “An Act Providing for the Repatriation of
Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born
Filipinos,” was enacted on 23 October 1995. It provides
for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons,
viz.:
1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-
born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship, including their minor children, on
account of political or economic necessity, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
Provided, That the applicant is not one of those
disqualified, as enumerated in the law:
1.1 Person opposed to organized
government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing
organized government;
2. Person defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;
3. Person convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude; or
4. Person suffering from mental alienation or
 Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 773

incurable contagious diseases.

ii
iii
Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino iv
who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of v
political or economic necessity under RA 8171? He vi
does not. vii
viii
ix
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of x
repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural- xi
born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of xii
political or economic necessity, and to the minor xiii
xiv
children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that,
if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship
due to political or economic reasons later decides to
repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also
benefit his minor children according to the law. This
includes a situation where a former Filipino,
subsequently, had children while he was a naturalized
citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the
former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship
on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship. To
claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children
must be of minor age at the time the petition for
repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a
child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil
life much less the capacity to undertake a political act
like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor
children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization
separately from their parents.
d. Direct act of Congress