WILLIAM F. PERALTA vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

November 12, 1945 | Feria, J | De Facto Government & Writ of Habeas Corpus The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent
occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction.
FACTS:
● Peralta was a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila. He was in charge of the A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary
supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts,
necessaries defined in Sec. 1 of Act No. 9 of the National Assembly of the Philippines he may nevertheless, so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of
● Peralta was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment for the crime of robbery public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of
penalized by Sec 2(a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly which he commenced to serve on which justice is administered as well as the laws regarding procedure."
August 21, 1944 by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction (CSECJ)
● The CSECJ was created in Sec 1 of Ordinance No. 7, promulgated by the President The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the
● The petition for habeas corpus was filed based on the ground that (1) Ordinance No. 7 should laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding
be null and void because CSECJ is a political a political instrumentality of the military procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of the territory
forces of the Japanese Imperial Army that is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the
of the Philippines ; (2) that Ordinance No. 7 violates the fundamental laws of the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
Commonwealth of the Philippines and (3) "the petitioner has been deprived of his conscience.
constitutional rights"; (4) that the petitioner is being punished by a law created to serve
the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and (5) "that the
penalties provided for are more severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised
Penal Code."
● The City of Fiscal of Manila submitted a memorandum that the petition for habeas corpus be
denied because (1) the CSECJ and the laws creating it are not of political complexion because
it was created in response to an urgent necessity; (2) that the right to appeal in a criminal case
it not a constitutional right; (3) and that the summary procedure established in Ordinance No.
7 does not violate Art. III, Sec 1(18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.

ISSUE:
1. WON the creation of CSECJ under Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional? YES.
2. WON the sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of life imprisonment
during the Japanese military occupation is valid? – YES

HELD:
● In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is
ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

RATIONALE:
As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of
paramount force) the questions involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of
the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government. The Constitution of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent
occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal
jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.

It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the
invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or
conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as denned in the usages of nations. The
authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and
procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the
ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district."
 ANICETO ALCANTARA vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
November 29, 1945 | Feria, J | De Facto Government & Writ of Habeas Corpus

FACTS:
● This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the
Alcantara on the ground that he was unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by
Respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
● Alcantara was convicted by the CFI of Ilocos for illegal discharge of firearms with less
serious physical injuries.
● September 12, 1944: COA modified said sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 4
months and 21 days of arresto mayor to 3 years, 9 months and 3 days of prison correccional.
● June 23, 1945: Commenced serving his sentence.
● Alcantara questioned the validity of the COA because court was only a creation of the so-
called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that
the COA was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and
that only the two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in
question.

ISSUE: WON the sentence of the COA is valid and enforceable – YES

HELD: In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.

RATIO:
● The sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged
with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth,
the Revised Penal Code.
● A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either a
new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime
against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new
offenses committed against belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary
for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier.
● They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or
indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security,
of the belligerent occupant.
 BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA vs. HON. ELIAS B. ASUNCION
May 31, 1982 | Makasiar, J | Change of Sovereignty
FACTS:
● A complaint for partition was filed by the Reyes siblings in Civil Case No. 3010 of the CFI
of Leyte was filed against Macariola, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco
Reyes, the common father of the Reyes siblings and of Macariola.
● Macariola alleged: a) that Bales (one of the Reyes Siblings) was not a daughter of the
deceased; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the
only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining
Reyes siblings who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene
Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and
his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the deceased during his
second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties should
first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being
the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share
of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his two
marriages.
● Judge Asuncion was the judge of the case rendered a decision which became final for lack of
appeal. He rendered that the Project of partition in the case, Lot 1184, is to be adjudicated to
the Reyes siblings in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184-
A to 1184-E.
● Lot 1184-D was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court
● Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of it to Judge Asuncion
and his wife. After a year, Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot
to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries wherein Judge Asuncion was the President
and his wife as secretary.
● Macariola then filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge”
alleging that the Judge in acquiring by purchase a potion of Lot 1184-E violating the
following:
- Art. 1491(5) of the New Civil Code
- Art. 14(1) and (5) of the Code of Commerce
- Sec. 3(H) of RA 3019
- Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
- Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
ISSUE:
1. WON Judge Asuncion violated the law provided above which he previously decided in Civil
Case No. 3010 and his engagement in the business - NO
HELD: In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation
in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency
as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his
private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only
be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES.
RATIO:
Article 1491 (5) of the New CC
● The prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale
or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No.
3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein
filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer
subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly
from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier
purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010.
Article 14(1) and (5) of the Code of Commerce
● Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices of the SC, judges and officials
of the department of public prosecution in active service from engaging in commerce, either
in person or proxy or from holding any office or have an direct, administrative or financial
intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the territory in which
they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885,
which was extended to the Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to
have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no affirmative act that continued
the effectivity of said provision. consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal
and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.
Sec 3(H) of RA 3019
● Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under said provision because there is no showing that
he participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of Traders
Manufacturing. In this case, the business of the corporation in which he participated has
obviously no relation to his judicial office.
Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
● This does NOT apply to members of the Judiciary, who are covered under RA 296
(Judiciary Act of 1948) and Art X (7) of the 1973 Constitution. Under Sec 67 of RA 296, the
power to remove or dismiss judges is vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the
CSC, and only on 2 grounds—serious misconduct and inefficiency. Under the 1973
Constitution, only the SC can discipline judges of the inferior courts as well as other
personnel of the Judiciary. Judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers
or employees because the Commissioner of the CSC is not the head of the Judiciary
department. Moreover, only permanent officers in the classified service are subject to the
jurisdiction of the CSC. Judges, however, are not within this classification, as they are
considered to be non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential
appointee.
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
● This reminds judges to abstain from making personal investments in enterprises, which are
apt to be involved in litigation in his court. Judge Asuncion and his wife, however, had
withdrawn from the corporation and sold their shares to third parties only 22 days after its
incorporation, which indicates that Judge Asuncion realized that their interest in the
corporation contravenes said Canon. The Court even commended the spouses for such act.
 PEDRO SYQUIA vs. NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ
August 17, 1949 | Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity

FACTS:
● Plaintiffs are the undivided joint owners of 3 apartment buildings in Manila known as the
North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments.
● Plaintiffs executed 3 lease contracts for each apartment, in favor of the US who seeks rent it
for the duration of the war and 6 months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the US. The
apartments were used for billeting and quartering officers of the US armed forces stationed
in the Manila Area.
● George F. Moore, Commanding General of the US Army in Manila, was in direct charge and
control of the lease and occupancy of the 3 apartment buildings.
● When Japan surrendered, after 6 months as agreed, plaintiffs approached the predecessors in
office of Moore and requested the return of the apartment buildings to them but the US Army
advised on continuing to occupy the premises.
● US army denied Plaintiff’s request to renegotiate said leases, execute it for a period of 3 years
and to have it paid a reasonable rental higher that what was originally agreed. US Army said
that they will vacate the subject properties before Feb 1, 1947.
● Petitioners sued with the demand to get the properties as their agreement supposedly expired
and asked for an increased rental until premises have been vacated.

ISSUE: WON the PH Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity - NO

HELD: In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of Manila committed no error in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and that the Court of First Instance acted correctly in
affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal. Case dismissed, without pronouncements as
to costs.

RATIO:
● This is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of
his country.
● A private citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain property may, to recover
possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government who
are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and
agents claim that they are acting for the Government, and the courts may entertain such a suit
although the Government itself is not included as a party-defendant.
 PEOPLE vs GREGERIO PERFECTO citizens must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitutions and laws,
October 4, 1922 | Effect of Change in Sovereignty every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man."

FACTS:
● About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero,
discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by
witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly
thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-
General, the Secretary of the Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of
the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening of the
Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La, Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto,
published an article against the Philippine Senate.
● The Philippine Senate, in its session of September, adopted a resolution authorizing its
committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with
reference to the article published in La Nacion.
● On September 15, 1920, the Seriate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the
Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action, all the
papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto.
● As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of Manila by an
assistant 'city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged
that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio
Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

ISSUE: WON Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing “Any person, who, by …
writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority...”
is still in force - NO

HELD: To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although
for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant
acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

RATIO:
● Article 256 of the Penal Code punishes "Any person who, by * * * writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority." The Philippine Libel
Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much. of article 256 of the Penal Code
as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult.
● Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change
from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with
democratic principles of government.
● It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "It cannot be admitted that the King of
Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives;
and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them.
Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the constitution
and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it."
● Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty,
a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer
is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the