1.
Ampatuan v De Lima February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits
GR No. 197291 | April 3, 2013
Bersamin, J. | Institution of actions arising from crime; Criminal
Aspect; Generally — Executive power to prosecute evidence
By: Ramos
Petitioner: Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr.
Respondent: Sec.Leila De Lima, et al.
Summary: Petitioner Ampatuan filed a petition for mandamus to
compel De Lima to include Kenny Dalandag (who was one of the
participants in the massacre) in the information for murder.
Dalandag was declared a state witness and was admitted into a
witness protection program. The court ruled that the Executive
Department has a wide range of discretion in prosecuting violators.
The court will only step in when the public prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion.
Doctrine: The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive
Department whose principal power and responsibility are to see to
it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of
the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a
wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to
charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.
ISSUE:
W/N the public respondents may be compelled by mandamus to
investigate and prosecute Kenny Dalandag as an accused in light of his
admitted participation in his affidavit?
FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio
Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the
principal suspects was herein petitioner, Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr, then the
Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Four days
later, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding
informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several
persons. In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of
Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the
Maguindanao massacre. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of
of one Kenny Dalandag, who was one of the participants in the massacre.
Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. On
September 7, 2010, the QC RTC (The trial was transferred to QC upon the
request of the Secretary of Justice) issued its amended pre-trial order,wherein
Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses. petitioner, through
counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag
in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already
confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations.
Petitioner reiterated the request twice more, but Secretary De Lima denied
petitioner’s request. on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for
mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No. 10-124777), seeking to
compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various
murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. This was dismissed, hence the
appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
HELD:
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department and a
necessary component of their power is the right to prosecute their violators.
The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of
discretion. The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination
of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the
filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be
filed in court.
The Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, exclusively
to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause
for the prosecution of supposed offenders. However, judicial review may be
allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion.
The exclusion of Dalandag as an accused from the information did not at all
amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors
whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all
persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a
mandatory provision, may be subject to some exceptions, one of which is when
a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
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A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the
Respondent: Libertad Lagon and Hon. Judge Isidro O. Barrios (as
criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged
presiding judge of the City Court of Roxas City)
accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense,
unless of course, he fails or refuses to testify.On the other hand, there is no
Summary:
requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a
Information was filed before the City Court of Roxas charging Lagon
person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission
with the crime of Estafa. Lagon issued a check worth P4,232.80 but
into the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under
it was bounced for insufficient funds. However, the City Court
Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot
dismissed the information on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or
stated that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law in
refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ,
force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time when
not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as
the crime was committed. The SC held that City Court correctly
an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification
dismissed the information, and ruled that RTC has proper
of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court
jurisdiction over the case and will retain the same by applying this
for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and
doctrine which states, that the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court
exclusion of said accused from the information.
in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at
the time of the commencement of criminal action rather than by the
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the
law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged.
Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the
absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the
Doctrine:
criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No.
6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the Subject matter jurisdiction of Court in criminal law matters is
properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the
commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission
commencement of criminal action rather than by the law in effect at
into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was
the time of the commission of the offense charged.
necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not
anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to
which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or Once court attains proper jurisdiction over the case to the extent of
the penalty imposed, it will retain the same regardless, whether the
fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis
evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the
for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
information. (People v. Purisma, People v. Mision)
Petition DENIED; Order of RTC Affrimed. Petitioner to pay the costs.
ISSUE: w/n the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over the criminal
case – NO.
2. People v. Lagon
G.R. No. 45815 | May 18, 1990 FACTS:
Feliciano, J. | Institution of actions arising from crime; Venue and 1. Criminal Information was filed before the City Court of Roxas City charging
Jurisdiction; RTC private respondent Lagon with the crime of estafa under par. 2(d) of Article
By: Kang 315 of the RPC. It stated that the accused had allegedly issued a check with
the amount of P4,232.80 as payment of the goods purchased knowing that
she did had insufficient funds. Hence, the check bounced.

2. City Court dismissed the information on the ground that the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond their authority to impose.
The judge held that the jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal action is
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determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and
not at the commission of the crime. The crime was committed before the
amendment of the law on crime of estafa, but when it was filed, it was already
amended which increased the penalty to be imposed.
3. Hence, this petition for review was brought by the People arguing that the
City Court had jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
The petitioner had failed to show that the City Court had committed reversible
error in dismissing the criminal information (without prejudice to its refiling in
the proper court).
Under section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, it provides:
"[m]unicipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces
and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First
Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective
jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine
not exceeding P6,000.00 or both…”
At the time of the commission of the offense charged on April 5, 1975, the
penalty imposable was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period. Which gave City Court jurisdiction to try
the case. But at the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on July 7,
1976 the penalty imposable for the offense charged had been increased by
P.D. No. 818: to prision mayor in its medium period.
The imposable penalty for the offense charged in this case is in excess of the
maximum penalty which a city court could impose.
Subject matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority if
the court to impose penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the
allegations of a criminal information.
In People v. Purisima: “… In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the
jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the
offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be
presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law
imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the
complaint.”
In People v. Mision, (subject-matter jurisdiction) It is retained regardless
whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the
information.
RTC will retain jurisdiction over the criminal case of the private respondent.
Regardless, in the presentation of evidence, if it shows that the crime was
committed before the amendment of Art. 315 under par 2(d) of the RPC (which
increased the penalty imposable), and imposes lower penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack
of merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding
Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
3. People v. Villanueva
G.R. No. 138364 | October 15, 2003
Bellosillo, J. | The Information as one whole
By: Agustin
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
Respondent: ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, appellant
Summary: Appellant Rogelio Villanueva was found guilty by the
trial court of raping his fifteen (15)-year old daughter and was
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. On automatic
review, appellant imputed grave error to the trial court in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape defined and penalized under
Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, and
in imposing upon him the extreme penalty of death.
The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction, but modified the
death penalty imposed by the trial court by imposing the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court found no independent
evidence on record that could accurately show the age of the victim.
The Court emphasized that failure to sufficiently establish the
victim's age will bar any finding of rape in its qualified form.
Doctrine: There is no law or rule prescribing a specific location in
the Information where the qualifying circumstances must
"exclusively" be alleged before they could be appreciated against
the accused. Nothing in Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule 110 mandates the
material allegations should be stated in the body and not in the
preamble or caption of the Information. Instead, both sections state
that as long as the pertinent and significant allegations are
enumerated in the Information it would be deemed sufficient in form
and substance.
3

ISSUE: W/N the Information failed to allege the qualifying circumstance of
relationship between the accused and the offended party
FACTS: The accused raped his 15-year old daughter. His daughter thereafter
fled to her maternal uncle’s home. Accused then tried sexually abusing
another of his daughters. She then fled to her aunt, who then brought her to
her mother in Davao City. Together, the sisters reported the sexual assaults
committed against them by their father. The trial court later on convicted the
accused of rape qualified by the minority of the victim and her relationship with
appellant as father and daughter, and sentenced him to death under Sec. 11,
RA 7659, amending Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code. The case was then
raised to the Supreme Court for automatic review. Before the Court, the
accused argues that the Information against him failed to allege the qualifying
circumstance of relationship between him and his daughter, hence he should
only have been found guilty of simple rape and not of qualified rape.
HELD: No, the qualifying circumstance of relationship of the accused to the
victim being father and daughter is so alleged in the Information.
There is no law or rule prescribing a specific location in the Information where
the qualifying circumstances must "exclusively" be alleged before they could
be appreciated against the accused. Section 6, Rule 110, of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires, without more —
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information.
While Sec. 8, Rule 110, of the same Rules states —
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the facts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it (emphasis
supplied).
Nothing in Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule 110 mandates that material allegations should
be stated in the body and not in the preamble or caption of the Information.
Instead, both sections state that as long as the pertinent and significant
allegations are enumerated in the Information it would be deemed sufficient in
form and substance. We hold that it is irrelevant and immaterial whether the
qualifying circumstance of relationship is mentioned in the opening paragraph
of the Information or in the second paragraph which alleges the acts
constituting the crime charged since either paragraph is an integral part of the
Information.
The information sheet must be considered, not by sections or parts, but as one
whole document serving one purpose, i.e., to inform the accused why the full
panoply of state authority is being marshalled against him. Our task is not to
determine whether allegations in an indictment could have been more artfully
and exactly written, but solely to ensure that the constitutional requirement of
notice has been fulfilled. Accordingly, the sufficiency of the allegations of
qualifying circumstances therein must be judged objectively, and measured by
practical considerations. Allegations of qualifying circumstances should not be
declared insufficient merely by virtue of a perceived formal defect in their
locations, which do not otherwise prejudice the substantial rights of the
accused. As long as they are adequately pleaded within the four corners of the
charge sheet, as in the instant case, they could not be invalidated by the fact
that they are found only in the introductory paragraph.
We fail to see how the relative positioning of the qualifying circumstances in
an Information could possibly transgress the constitutional right of an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. All that this
fundamental right signifies is that the accused should be given the necessary
data as to why he is being prosecuted against. This is to enable him to
intelligently prepare for his defense, and prevent surprises during the trial.
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 4. Enrile v. People
GR No 213455 | August 11, 2015
Brion, J. | Institution of actions arising from crime — Criminal aspect
— The complaint/information; test of sufficiency - Ultimate facts as
distinguished from evidentiary facts, only need be alleged
By: Jaro
Petitioner: Juan Ponce Enrile
Respondent: People Of The Philippines, Hon. Amparo M.
Cabotaje- Tang, Hon. Samuel R. Martires, And Hon. Alex L.
Quiroz of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan
Summary: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for
plunder against Enrile, et al, alleging ill-gotten wealth amounting to
P172,834,500.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal
acts.
After receiving notice of his arraignment, Enrile filed a motion for
bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, stating
that the details he sought were “substantial reiterations” of the
arguments raised in his supplemental opposition, and that they
were evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
The Court partially granted Enrile’s petition (for certiorari), holding
that, while several details he requested (i.e. who received the ill-
gotten wealth; about his PDAF; the approximate dates of the
kickbacks; and details under paragraph (b) of the Information
(“taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official
position”) were evidentiary in nature, he was entitled to a bill of
particulars for the overt acts constituting the “combination” or
“series” under the Plunder Law.
Doctrine: While it is fundamental that every element of the offense
must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence — as
distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense
— do not need to be alleged. Whatever facts and circumstances
must necessarily be alleged are to be determined based on the
definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.
ISSUE: W/N all the details Enrile sought were evidentiary in nature — NO.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Juan
Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and
John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan, alleging that they
acquired ill-gotten wealth amounting to P172,834,500.00 through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts.
Enrile filed before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion to
dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad
cautelam motion for bail; and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of
warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information. The Sandiganbayan denied
both motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder
case against the accused.
After receiving a notice of hearing of his arraignment before the
Sandiganbayan’s Third Division, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion, stating that
1. the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the
arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of
warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and
2. the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best
ventilated during trial.
A further motion for reconsideration, filed by Enrile’s counsel (Atty. Estelito
Mendoza) was denied. The instant petition is a petition for certiorari filed by
Enrile.
[PETITIONER]
Enrile claims in the petition that
1. the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of
particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information
filed against him;
2. that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; and
3. that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the
crime of plunder had been,
a. positing that the Information should have stated the details of
the particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed
series or combination of overt acts that led to the charge of
plunder
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 b. positing that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in
nature; and that they are material facts that should be
clearly alleged in the information so that he may be fully
informed of the charges against him and be prepared to
fully meet the issues at the trial.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET ASIDE the
Sandiganbayan’s resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied Enrile’s motion for bill
of particulars and his motion for reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period
of fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of
particulars containing the facts sought that we herein rule to be material and necessary.
The bill of particulars shall specifically contain the following:
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of
overt criminal acts” charged in the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly
received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or
commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the
alleged kickbacks and commissions from the identified projects. At the very
least, the prosecution should state the year when the kickbacks and
transactions from the identified projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ nongovernment organizations (NGOs) which were
the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’
NGOs. The particular person/s in each government agency who
HELD:
Ultimate facts are
● the facts that the evidence will prove at the trial,
● the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on whose existence
the cause of action rests, and
● the essential and determining facts on which the court’s conclusion
rests and without which the judgment would lack support in essential
particulars.
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are facts supporting the existence of
some other alleged and unproven fact, and are necessary, as premises, to
lead and establish the ultimate facts.
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in
the Information, matters of evidence — as distinguished from the facts
essential to the nature of the offense — do not need to be alleged.
Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be
determined based on the definition and the essential elements of the specific
crimes.
The Court found that Enrile’s requested details on
1. “Who among the accused acquired the alleged ‘ill-gotten wealth’”; and
2. His PDAF, asking
a. under what law or official document is a portion of the “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” identified as that of a member
of Congress, in this instance, as ENRILE’s, to be found;
b. what amount for each year is Enrile’s Priority Development
Assistance Fund;
i. stating that Enrile may be in a better position to know
these details than the prosecution and thus cannot
claim that he would be taken by surprise during trial
by the omission in the Information of his annual PDAF
allocations
c. and what COA audits or field investigations were conducted
which validated the findings that each of Enrile’s PDAF
projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious
projects
3. approximate dates of commissions or kickbacks; and
4. details of the allegation under paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x
x x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official
position, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines)
since they were evidentiary in nature. However, it found Enrile entitled to a bill
of particulars for specifics for
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 1. The overt acts constituting the “Combination” or Series” under the
Plunder Law (what acts constitute the “combination” and “series”; who
committed the acts)
a. since even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at
least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act;
b. the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name
of Napoles’ NGO (e.g. Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to
sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular transactions referred
to;
c. the alleged conduits (government agencies) between Enrile
and Napoles’ NGOs
and that the prosecution rendered a “shotgun approach” in alleging the
criminal overt acts allegedly committed by Enrile, making little or no effort to
particularize the transactions that would constitute the required series or
combination of overt acts, even clustering under paragraph (a) of the
Information its recital of the manner Enrile and his co-accused allegedly
operated, thus describing its general view of the series or combination of overt
criminal acts that constituted the crime of plunder.
5. Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 180122. March 13, 2009.
The complaint/information; test of sufficiency;Rule 110, Sec. 6; Ultimate facts
as distinguished from evidentiary facts, only need be alleged
By: Mascareñas
PETITIONER: Felicisimo F. Lazarte Jr.
RESPONDENT: Sandiganbayan (First Division) and PEOPLE
NATURE: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Resolution dated 2 March 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
26583 entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Robert P. Balao, et al.,” which denied petitioner
Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr.’s Motion to Quash. The Resolution dated 18 October 2007 of said court
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is likewise challenged in this petition.
CRIME: VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e) of REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019, AS
AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)
SUMMARY: NHA awarded a contract for infrastructure works in Bacolod City
to A.C. Cruz Construction for 7.6M. It was later discovered that the private
contractor failed to comply with the work instruction and only accomplished 40%
of the job. The remaining work was then awarded to Triad Construction who
later on discovered that the accomplished and acceptable work done by the
previous contractor were in fact non-existent. Consequently, petitioner, as
manager of the Regional Projects Department and Chairman of the Inventory
and Acceptance Committee, and other NHA officials were charged in an
Information.
DOCTRINE: The test as to sufficiency of complaint or information is whether
the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise
the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison
d’etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense, the
use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the
offense charged is sufficient.
The allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be confused with
the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is
proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement,
a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments
to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A statement of the evidence on the
conspiracy is not necessary in the Information.
ISSUE: W/N the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently
averred the essential elements of the crime charged as it failed to specify the
individual participation of all the accused? (NO)
FACTS: In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the
original contract for the infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and
Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz Construction. The
project, with a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was funded by the World Bank
under the Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983 between the
Philippine Government and the IBRD-World Bank. A.C. Cruz Construction
commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990. In April 1991, the
complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr. (Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project
Engineer of the project.
A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of
unsuitable materials and road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of
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A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report of Physical
Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered certain
deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some
supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of approved concrete pouring; (2)
survey results of original ground and finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of
earth fill actually rendered on site; (4) test results as to the quality of materials
and compaction; and (5) copy of work instructions attesting to the demolished
concrete structures.
The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.'s
further verification, it was established that there was no actual excavation and
road filling works undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction. (No topographic map
was appended, No laboratory tests were conducted to ascertain unsuitability
of materials, no records of the excavation and disposal of unsuitable materials
and of road filling works having been made by the previous engineers at the
time said activities were allegedly executed, The excavation of unsuitable
materials and road filling works were overestimated to the prejudice of the
government, No laboratory test was made to ascertain the quality of imported
road fill materials.)
In its Report dated 12 August 1991, the Inventory and Acceptance Committee
determined the total accomplishment of the contractor at 40.89%, representing
P3,433,713.10 out of the total revised contract amount of P8,397,225.09
inclusive of Variation Order No. 1 in the amount of P710,717.54. Thereafter,
said Committee recommended that the temporary project suspension imposed
by the contractor, which incurred delays in the project completion, be referred
to the Legal Department for appropriate action.
In March 1992, the NHA Board of Directors, per Resolution No. 2453,
approved the mutual termination of the A.C. Cruz Construction contract and
awarded the remaining work to Triad Construction and Development
Corporation (Triad). The contract amount for the remaining work was
P9,554,837.32. Thereafter, representatives from A.C. Cruz Construction, Triad
and NHA-Bacolod conducted a joint measurement at the site to determine the
total accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction inclusive of accomplishments
after NHA inventory.
Triad discovered that certain work items that had been in under the inventory
report as accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Fajutag, Jr.
brought these irregularities to the attention of the Commission on Audit (COA).
The COA uncovered some anomalies, among which, are ghost activities,
specifically the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works and
substandard, defective workmanship. Laboratory tests confirmed the
irregularities.
INFORMATION
“The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses
ROBERT P. BALAO, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, JOSEPHINE O.
ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, NOEL H. LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e) of REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows: That in or about the month of March,
1992 at Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO,
VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, and NOEL
H. LOBRIDO, Public Officers, being the General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt. Office,
Division Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD, Project Mgt. Officer A and Supervising Engineer,
Diliman, Quezon City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office and while
in the performance of their official functions, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with
each other and with accused ARCEO C. CRUZ, a private individual and General Manager of A.C.
Cruz Construction with address at 7486 Bagtikan Street, Makati City with deliberate intent, with
manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause to be paid to A.C. Construction public funds in the amount of (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE
CURRENCY, supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and
Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact no such works were undertaken by A.C.
Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit, thus
accused public officials in the performance of their official functions had given unwarranted
benefits, advantage and preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and
themselves to the damage and prejudice of the government. CONTRARY TO LAW.”
On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising
the following grounds: (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense; (2) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusations against them have been violated by the
inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the
individual participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience
with the Resolution dated 27 March 2005.
On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution
denying petitioner's motion to quash. We quote the said resolution in part:
Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the
alleged offense is specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is
accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the Inventory and
Acceptance Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory and final
8
quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction. The whether the government or private party; 4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. The public officer has acted with manifest
allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain constraints, allegedly had to
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.”
rely on the reports of the field engineers and/or the Project Office as to which
materials were actually installed; and that he supposedly affixed his signature
The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements
to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991
of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically
despite his not being able to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly
alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being then the
saw that all the members of the Committee had already signed are matters of
Department Manager, Project Management Officer A and Supervising
defense which he can address in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of
Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense
the information with respect to accused Lazarte is denied for lack of merit.
in relation to the office and while in the performance of their official functions,
connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and with accused
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution
Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and
to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The felonious
HELD: The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash
act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether
the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works
or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact
essential elements of the crime defined in law. Matters aliunde will not be
that no such works were undertaken by said construction company as revealed
considered.
by the Special Audit conducted by COA.

The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is

On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual participation
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
of the accused in the allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court
is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment.
underscores the fact that under Philippine law, conspiracy should be
The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime
understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a crime or
charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
it may be constitutive of the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime
must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific
in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty
crimes.
for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and
sedition.
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such
particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the
The allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be confused with
offense charged. The raison d’etre of the rule is to enable the accused to
the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is
suitably prepare his defense. Another purpose is to enable accused, if found
proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement,
guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments
The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting
to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A statement of the evidence on the
the offense charged is sufficient.
conspiracy is not necessary in the Information.
The essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 are as follows: “1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged in The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence of any damage or
conspiracy with him; 2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of injury caused to any party or the government, likewise are matters of evidence
his official duties or in relation to his public position; 3. He causes undue injury to any party, best raised during trial. As to the contention that the residual averments in the
9
Information have been rendered unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges
against some of his co-accused, the Court finds that the Information sufficiently
makes out a case against petitioner and the remaining accused.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated
2 March 2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
6. Rodriguez v Ponferrada
GR No 155531-34 | July 29 2005
Panganiban, J | Person Prosecution Criminal Action; intervention of
offended party through private prosecutor
By: Nepomuceno
Petitioner: Mary Ann Rodriguez
Respondent: Thelma Ponferrada, in her Official Capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Quezon City Branch
104; People of the Philippines; and Gladys Nocom
Summary:
2 cases were filed against the petitioner: a case for violation for
BP22 was filed in the MTC while a case for Estafa was filed with the
RTC. In the RTC, There was a Formal Entry of Appearance of a
Private Prosecutor to pursue Civil Liability against Rodriguez.
Rodriguez contends that the private prosecutor is barred from
appearing before this court as his appearance is limited to the civil
aspect which must be presented and asserted in the BP22 cases
pending before the MTC and not in the RTC where the Estafa case
is being tried. The RTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear
and intervene in the proceedings. Hence, the petition filed a petition
for certiorari. The Supreme Court held that the private prosecutor is
not barred from intervening in the estafa suit.
Doctrine:
1. While the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give
rise to two distinct criminal offenses—estafa and violation
of BP22—the same involves only once civil liability for the
offended party since he sustained only a single injury.
2. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion
of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law precludes the institution in an estafa
case of the corresponding civil action, even if both offenses
relate to the issuance of the same check
3. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual
damages in criminal action, the rule on the necessary
inclusion of a civil action with the payment of filing fees
based on the face value of the check involved was laid
down to prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat
of a criminal prosecution to collect on their credit free of
charge
4. An offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a
crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the
nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no
civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and
(2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended
parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the
right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right
to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any
of these instances, the private complainant’s interest in the
case disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the
sole function of the public prosecutor. None of these
exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private
prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa
suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Private Prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and
participate in the proceedings of the above-entitled Estafa cases for the
purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of
the checks involved which is also subject matter of the pending B.P. 22 cases
FACTS:
● Rodriguez was charged with Estafa and violation of BP 22 (bouncing
checks law)
● City Prosecutor Morales-Montojo of Quezon City Prosecutors Office
found PROBABLE CAUSE to charge Rodriguez with ESTAFA and for
Violation of BP22
● Violation of BP22 was filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City and the docket fees were accordingly paid by private
complainant
● Estafa case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
● During the hearing, Judge Ponferrada noted the Formal Entry of
Appearance of Atty.Felix R. Solomon as Private Prosecutor (in order
to pursue Civil Liability against Rodriguez), but this was opposed by
Rodriguez so he filed an Opposition to the Formal Entry of
Appearance of the Private Prosecutor, which was denied
10
 ● Judge Ponferrada issues an Order which allowed the appearance of
the private prosecutor in the criminal cases
● Rodriguez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied
by Judge Ponferrada
● RTC Ruling: Civil action for recovery arising from the offense charged
is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1) Waives civil action,
(2) Reserves the right to institute it separately, or (3) Institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. Considering that the offended party
had paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior to the
filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the
RTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear and intervene in
the proceedings.
● Hence, this Petition for Certiorari
HELD:
● Rodriguez contends that the private prosecutor is barred from
appearing before this court as his appearance is limited to the civil
aspect which must be presented and asserted in the BP 22 cases
pending before the MTC and not in the RTC where the Estafa case is
being tried.
● The Supreme Court held that the Petition has no merit. Civil Action in
BP22 Case not a Bar to Civil Action in Estafa Case
● An offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except
in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and
the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a
private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense,
the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive
the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do
so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these instances,
the private complainant’s interest in the case disappears and criminal
prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. None
of these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private
prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit.
● The traditional theory is that when a person commits a crime he
offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the
individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity
or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same
punishable act or omission…While an act or omission is felonious
because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise
to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by
reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words,
criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious
act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct
and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently
the foundation of the civil action
● Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of
issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions
deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation
prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even
automatically in the present case, the institution of a civil action
without need of election by the offended party. As both remedies
are simultaneously available to this party, there can be no forum
shopping.
● Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner ultimately
espouses. At the present stage, no judgment on the civil liability has
been rendered in either criminal case. There is as yet no call for the
offended party to elect remedies and, after choosing one of them, be
considered barred from others available to her. The petitioner is
actually raising the Doctrine of Election of Remedies.
● Doctrine of Election of Remedies: the purpose of the doctrine of
election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to
prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is regarded as an
application of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot,
in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions which form
the basis of his respective remedies. However, when a certain state
of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative remedies, both
founded upon the identical state of facts, these remedies are not
considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the invocation of one
remedy is not an election which will bar the other, unless the suit upon
the remedy first invoked shall reach the stage of final adjudication or
unless by the invocation of the remedy first sought to be enforced, the
plaintiff shall have gained an advantage thereby or caused detriment
or change of situation to the other. It must be pointed out that ordinarily,
election of remedies is not made until the judicial proceedings has
gone to judgment on the merits.
● In the present case, the institution of the civil actions with the
estafa cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with
the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with
each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion
of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding
11
 civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same
check.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Assailed Order AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner
7. People v. Beriales
G.R. No. L-39962 | April 7, 1976
Concepcion, Jr., J. | Physical presence of fiscal or proceedings are void
By: Abary
Petitioner: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
Respondent: RICARDO BERIALES, BENEDICTO CUSTODIO
and PABLITO CUSTODIO, accused-appellants
Summary: The accused were charged with murder before the CFI.
They however filed a motion of reinvestigation. The same was
granted by the court. However, before the reinvestigation was
completed and despite the fiscal’s absence, the trial court
proceeded with the arraignment and trial of the accused. The fiscal
was absent during the trial and only the private prosecutor
presented evidence on behalf of the State. The accused were
thereafter convicted of murder. They appealed to the Supreme
Court, arguing that their right to due process was violated because
of the trial court proceeded with the case despite the pending
reinvestigation and the absence of the fiscal during the trial. The
Supreme Court held that the trial court gravely erred when it
proceeded with the criminal case despite the fiscal’s absence.
Doctrine: While there is nothing in the rule of practice and
procedure in criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal, in
the exercise of a sound discretion, to turn over the active conduct of
the trial to a private prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty to direct and
control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be
present during the proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred when it proceeded with the arraignment and
trial of the accused despite the fiscal’s absence and pending reinvestigation of
the case
FACTS: Before trial, the accused moved for reinvestigation which was granted.
Before its completion, however, the trial court relying on the constitutional right
of the accused for speedy trial, finally set the case for hearing, notwithstanding
vigorous objections thereto on the part of the accused, on the ground that the
City Fiscal had not yet completed the reinvestigation. The City Fiscal through
Special Counsel, then manifested that the private prosecutor be authorized to
conduct the trial in behalf of the prosecution. When the case was called,
counsel for the accused reiterated his objection to the trial and requested the
court to wait for the Fiscal who might be able to submit his report on the
reinvestigation but the same was turned down. Subsequently, the court
ordered for the arraignment of the accused. The latter refused to plead,
whereupon, the court entered a plea of not guilty for them and ordered the
private prosecutor to commence the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution. However, counsel for accused refused to cross-examine the
witnesses which refusal was considered as waiver. Thereafter, the private
prosecutor rested the case, which was then, declared submitted for decision.
On the date set for the promulgation of the judgment, the accused manifested
their disagreement to the promulgation of the sentence on the ground that the
trial was irregular. The court nevertheless proceeded with said promulgation
and convicted the accused of the crime of murder. Appellants appealed
invoking due process.
HELD: Yes. Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal." In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the government.
As stated by this Court, "once a public prosecutor has been entrusted with the
investigation of a case and has acted thereon by filing the necessary
information in court he is by law in duty bound to take charge thereof until its
final termination, for under the law he assumes full responsibility for his failure
or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its
termination." While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in
criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor,
nevertheless, his duty to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases
requires that he must be present during the proceedings.
In the present case, although the private prosecutor had previously been
authorized by the special counsel Rosario R. Polines to present the evidence
for the prosecution, nevertheless, in view of the absence of the City Fiscal at
the hearing on December 13, 1974, it cannot be said that the prosecution of
the case was under the control of the City Fiscal. It follows that the evidence
presented by the private prosecutor at said hearing could not be considered
as evidence for the plaintiff, the People of the Philippines. There was, therefore,
12
no evidence at all to speak of which could have been the basis of the decision
of the trial court.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, "to permit such
prosecution of a criminal case by the private prosecutor with the fiscal in
absentia can set an obnoxious precedent that can be taken advantage of by
some indolent members of the prosecuting arm of the government as well as
those who are oblivious of their bounden duty to see to it not only that the guilty
should be convicted, but that the innocent should be acquitted — a duty that
can only be effectively and sincerely performed if they actively participate in
the conduct of the case, especially in the examination of the witnesses and the
presentation of documentary evidence for both parties."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the trial court for another arraignment and trial. Costs de oficio.
8. MERCIALES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124171 | March 18, 2002
Ynares-Santiago, J. | Private complainant’s standing to appeal acquittal
By: Panisales
Petitioner: Leticia R. Merciales – mother of the victim
Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals, The People of the
Philippines, Joselito Nuada, Pat. Edwin Moral, Adonis Nieves,
Ernesto Lobete, Domil Grageda, and Ramon “Pol” Flores
Summary:
Several criminal cases for rape with homicide were filed against the
private respondents in the RTC Legazpi. The public prosecutor
moved to discharge accused Joselito Nuada to present him as a
state witness, but contended that no evidence was required to
warrant his discharge. The RTC denied the motion to discharge for
failure to present evidence. The hearing was set on a later date by
motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution, but on the day,
the prosecution filed another MR pending a petition for certiorari
filed with the SC questioning the denial for motion to discharge. The
public prosecutor declined to present NBI agent who took Nuada’s
extrajudicial confession the RTC directed him to present, and rested
the prosecution’s case. Accused filed a demurrer to evidence, which
the RTC granted, dismissing the case and acquitting the accused.
Leticia Merciales, the victim’s mother, filed a petition for certiorari to
annul the RTC’s order before the CA, and later an MR, both denied.
The Court held that petitioner has legal standing since the right of
the offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which
deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only
limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do
so would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Doctrine:
Ordinarily, a private complainant cannot bring an action questioning
a judgment of acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect of the
criminal case is concerned. Under Section 5 of Rule 110, the
Solicitor General, in representation of the People, may question a
judgment of acquittal. However, the right of the offended parties
to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due
process has always been recognized, the only limitation being
that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would
place the accused in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: W/N private complainant Merciales has legal standing to appeal the
acquittal of the respondents? -YES.
FACTS:
● Several criminal complaints for rape with homicide were filed against
private respondents Joselito Nuada, Pat. Edwin Moral, Adonis Nieves,
Ernesto Lobete, Domil Grageda and Ramon “Pol” Flores.
● During trial, the public prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of
accused Joselito Nuada so he may be used as a state witness.
However, this was denied the RTC judge for failure of the prosecution
to present evidence as provided for by Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
● The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC,
questioning the RTC judge’s denial of the motion to discharge Nuada.
Thereafter, the RTC judge did not set the case for further hearing to
give the prosecution time to secure the TRO from the SC.
13
 ● Private respondents then filed a motion to set the case for hearing,
invoking their constitutional right to a speedy trial which was granted
by the respondent judge.
● The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration, instead of
presenting further evidence, so respondent judge reset the hearing.
● The prosecution again filed a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking its
petition for certiorari with the SC. The private respondents objected to
any further resetting as this would constitute a violation of their right to
a speedy trial.
● The respondent judge called for a recess so as to let the prosecution
decide whether or not to present an NBI agent, who was then present,
to prove the due execution of the accused Nuada's extrajudicial
confession. After recess, the public prosecutor declined to present the
NBI agent, and instead manifested that he was not presenting any
further evidence. Because of this, the defense asked leave of court to
file a demurrer to evidence.
RTC Ruling: For lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the accused were ACQUITTED and the cases filed
against them were DISMISSED.
● Thereafter, petitioner Leticia Merciales, mother of the victim, filed
before respondent Court of Appeals a petition to annul the RTC’s order.
However, the CA dismissed the said petition.
HELD:
● It is true that a private complainant cannot bring an action questioning
a judgment of acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect of the
criminal case is concerned.
● In any event, petitioner has an interest in the maintenance of the
criminal prosecution, being the mother of the deceased rape
victim. The right of the offended parties to appeal an order of the
trial court which deprives them of due process has always been
recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any
adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double
jeopardy.
DP: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37341 is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 6307-6312 is
ANNULLED, and this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 8, for further proceedings. The public prosecutor is
ORDERED to complete the presentation of all available witnesses for the
prosecution.
9. PEOPLE v MADALI
GR No. 126050 | January 16, 2001
Mendoza, J. | Role of private complainant
By: Manlongat
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: SP02 Eleazar M. Madali, SP02 Eustaquio V.
Rogero, and SP01 Randy M. Rubio
Summary:
Helen Abrenica saw her husband, Reynald Abrenica dead on the
stairs of their house. After Three year, an alleged eyewitness, Mercy
Villamor, surfaced and implicated accused-appellants in the death
of Reynaldo claiming that she saw accused-appellants kill the
victim. Hence, this appeal.
In acquitting accused-appellants of the crime charged, the Supreme
Court held that the trial court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of the supposed eyewitness, Mercy Villamor, despite its
many improbabilities and inconsistencies which rendered it
doubtful. The inconsistencies, improbabilities, and uncertainties in
Mercy's testimony were many, and they related to material points.
The suspicion cannot be helped that she was a rehearsed witness.
It cannot be too often repeated that for evidence to be believed it
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must
itself be credible. The Court cannot help noticing that, in order to go
through her direct examination, Mercy had to be asked leading
questions by the private prosecutor. Moreover, there were several
instances when she did not make sense when confronted with her
conflicting statements. In her dire attempt to explain away the
irreconcilable statements in her affidavits and in her testimony in
court, she used lame and shallow excuses.
14

Doctrine:
Rule 122, §1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that "(a)ny party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless
the accused will be placed in double jeopardy." It has been held that
the word "party" in the provision in question includes not only the
government and the accused but other persons as well, such as the
complainant who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the
criminal proceedings. The complainant has an interest in the civil
liability arising from the crime, unless of course he has reserved to
bring a separate civil action to recover the civil liability. Hence, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is that of a witness
for the prosecution. Ordinarily, the appeal of criminal cases involves
as parties only the accused, as appellants, and the State,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, as the appellee.
The participation of the private offended party would be a mere
surplusage, if the State were simply to seek the affirmation of a
judgment of conviction. However, where the Office of the Solicitor
General takes a contrary position and recommends, as in this case,
the acquittal of the accused, the complainant's right to be heard on
the question of award of indemnity and damages arises. In the
interest of justice and equity and to provide perspective for this
appeal, therefore, the Court hereby allows in this case the
memorandum filed by complainant, which is hereby admitted as part
of the records of this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N The trial court erred in failing to resolve doubts and discrepancies in its
findings of fact in favor of the accused? YES
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992, at around 11 p.m., Reynaldo Abrenica and his wife Helen
came home at the house of Harry Mindo in Romblon, Romblon where
Reynaldo had some drinks. Helen went to bed ahead of her husband in their
bedroom on the second floor of their house. When Helen woke up at around 1
a.m., she found that her husband was not beside her. She looked for him and
on the landing of the stairs, Helen found her husband lying with his head
towards the wall, his left hand placed on his back and his right arm pinned
under his body. He was wearing a white sleeveless undershirt with a towel
over his bare buttocks. There were feces hanging from his anus. Helen did not
find any trace of blood on the body of her husband nor in the place where it
lay. When she touched her husband she found he was dead. She went out for
help crying that her husband had accidentally fallen from the stairs.
Three years after the death of Reynaldo Abrenica, an Information for murder
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, charging
accused-appellants, all members of the Philippine National Police, of killing
Reynaldo. An alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor, surfaced and implicated
accused-appellants in the death of Reynaldo claiming that she saw accused-
appellants kill the victim. After due trial, the court imposed upon the accused-
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of murder on the
basis of the testimony of an alleged eyewitness to the crime, Mercy Villamor.
HELD:
Atty. Reynaldo Z. Calabio filed a Notice of Appearance as counsel for
complainant Helen M. Abrenica, widow of the deceased Reynaldo M. Abrenica.
His request to be allowed to appear on behalf of the complainant was denied
for lack of merit.
Complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief, separate from that which the
Office of the Solicitor General would file, by way of answer to the brief of
accused-appellants. This was likewise denied for lack of merit.
The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Appellee's Brief
recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. In view of the position
taken by the OSG, complainant filed on a Manifestation and Motion to be
Allowed to File Brief. She subsequently filed a Memorandum for the Private
Complainant, which was noted in the Court's resolution.
When required to comment on complainant's motion for leave to file a separate
brief, the Solicitor General stated that since complainant had already filed a
memorandum, there was no further need for a brief sustaining the decision on
appeal. On the other hand, complainant stated that her memorandum had
already been noted by the Court and, in the interest of a balanced presentation
of facts and the issues, the same should be considered in the resolution of this
appeal.
Rule 122, §1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "(a)ny
party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy." It has been held that the word "party" in the
provision in question includes not only the government and the accused but
other persons as well, such as the complainant who may be affected by the
judgment rendered in the criminal proceedings. The complainant has an
interest in the civil liability arising from the crime, unless of course he has
reserved to bring a separate civil action to recover the civil liability. Hence, in
the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is that of a witness for
the prosecution. Ordinarily, the appeal of criminal cases involves as parties
15
only the accused, as appellants, and the State, represented by the Office of
Petitioner: RAMONCITA O. SENADOR
the Solicitor General, as the appellee. The participation of the private offended
Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA
party would be a mere surplusage, if the State were simply to seek the
JAIME
affirmation of a judgment of conviction. However, where the Office of the
Summary: Petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was
Solicitor General takes a contrary position and recommends, as in this case,
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) with the crime of
the acquittal of the accused, the complainant's right to be heard on the
Estafa. Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the
question of award of indemnity and damages arises. In the interest of justice
foregoing evidence of the prosecution. She relied on the defense
and equity and to provide perspective for this appeal, therefore, the Court
that the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven
hereby allows in this case the memorandum filed by complainant, which is
and established during the trial differ. In particular, Senador
hereby admitted as part of the records of this appeal.
asserted that the person named as the offended party in the
Information is not the same person who made the demand and
After considering the records of this case, we agree with the Solicitor
filed the complaint. According to Senador, the private complainant
General that the evidence is insufficient to sustain accused-appellants'
in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas,
conviction and, therefore, the decision of the trial court should be reversed and
during trial, the private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime."
accused-appellants should be acquitted.
Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as a witness. RTC
The prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that the death of Reynaldo M.
and CA found her guilty of Estafa. Thus the issue whether or not
Abrenica was not accidental but intentional and that accused-appellants were
an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party
guilty of killing him.
violates, as petitioner argues, the accused's constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her,
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81,
thus, entitling her to an acquittal - NO. The Supreme Court held
Municipality of Romblon, Romblon is REVERSED and accused-appellants
that in the case of an error in the designation of the offended party
Eleazar M. Madali, Eustaquio V. Rogero, and Randy M. Rubio are
in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, they are
mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal.
ordered forthwith released from custody unless they are being lawfully held for
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against
another cause.
property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the
offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this
of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.
Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5)days
from receipt hereof.
Doctrine: Rule 110, Sec 12
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or
information must state the name and surname of the
10. Senador v. People
person against whom or against whose property the
G.R. NO. 201620 |March 6, 2013
offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by
VELASCO, JR., J. | Form & Substance - Procedural - Effect of wrong
which such person has been or is known. If there is no
designation of offended party in an infromation
better way of identifying him, he must be described under
By: PATALUD
a fictitious name.

(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the

offended party is unknown, the property must be
described with such particularity as to properly identify the
offense charged.

16

(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against
whose property the offense was committed is thereafter
disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true
name to be inserted in the complaint or information and
the record. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
We conclude that in offenses against property, if the subject matter
of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money
unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of
the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the
accused.
However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and
identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as
in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the offended
party is immaterial.
ISSUE: Whether or not an error in the designation in the Information of the
offended party violates, as petitioner argues, the accused's constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her,
thus, entitling her to an acquittal - NO
FACTS:
● Petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) with the crime of Estafa for failure to
return the unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen (15) days from the
delivery. Rita demanded from Senador the return of the unsold
jewelry or the remittance of the proceeds from the sale of jewelry
entrusted to her. Thus Rita filed instant criminal complaint against
Senador.
● During the preliminary investigation, Senador tendered to Rita
Keppel Bank Check No. 0003603 for the amount of PhP 705,685,9
as settlement of her obligations. Nonetheless, the check was later
dishonored as it was drawn against a closed account.
PETITIONER
● Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing
evidence of the prosecution,
● She relied on the defense that the facts alleged in the Information
and the facts proven and established during the trial differ. In
particular, Senador asserted that the person named as the offended
party in the Information is not the same person who made the
demand and filed the complaint.
● According to Senador, the private complainant in the Information
went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private
complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime
was never presented as a witness.
● Hence, citing People v. Uba, et al. (Uba) and United States v.
Lahoylahoy and Madanlog (Lahoylahoy), Senador would insist on
her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been
violated.
RTC - Senador guilty of estafa
CA - Upheld RTC’s ruling
● Senador filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,
the present petition of Senador.
HELD:
Senador's reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba, the appellant was charged
with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of the
person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material
element.
Thus, an erroneous designation of the person injured is material. On the
contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a crime
against property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper
designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely
necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the
information. Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party
in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates
the correction of the information, not its dismissal:
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information
must state the name and surname of the person against whom or
against whose property the offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known.
If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described
under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is
unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as
to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or
17
 ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an
the complaint or information and the record. x x x (Emphasis error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result
supplied.) in the acquittal of the accused.

It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable,
materiality of the erroneous designation of the offended party would depend such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and
on whether or not the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described Ricarze, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial.
and identified.
WHEREFORE, Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
US v. Lahoylahoy
Supports the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is generic or 11. People v. Fernandez
one which is not described with such particularity as to properly identify the G.R. No. L-62116 |March 22, 1990
offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended party is PADILLA. | Substantive - Single offense - Rule 110, sec. 13;
material and would result in the violation of the accused's constitutional right By: Mica Sarenas
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
error, Lahoylahoy teaches, would result in the acquittal of the accused.
Respondent: MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ alias "Moding", and
FEDERICO CONRADO
In Lahoylahoy, the subject matter of the offense was money in the total sum
of PhP 100. Since money is generic and has no earmarks that could properly
Summary:
identify it, the only way that it (money) could be described and identified in a
Before the Court is Federico Conrado's appeal from the decision
complaint is by connecting it to the offended party or the individual who was
of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus, the identity of the offended party is
Pangasinan, Branch I, in Criminal Case No. L-2593 entitled, "The
material and necessary for the proper identification of the offense charged.
People of the Philippines vs. Melquiades Fernandez, alias 'Moding'
Corollary, the erroneous designation of the offended party would also be
and Federico Conrado" convicting him and the other accused of
material, as the subject matter of the offense could no longer be described
the crime of rape and sentencing them each to suffer inter alia two
with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
(2) death penalties. In the trial court's decision holding that the guilt
of both accused had been established beyond shadow of any
United States v. Kepner, Sayson v. People, and Ricarze v. Court of
doubt. Hence, the judgment of conviction, now the object of this
Appeals
appeal. The rule invoked in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Support the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is specific or one
Court which states that there should be only one (1) offense
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged,
charged in a criminal complaint or information, the purpose of
then an erroneous designation of the offended party is not material and
which is to afford the defendant a necessary knowledge of the
would not result in the violation of the accused's constitutional right to be
charge so that he may not be confused in his defense. But it is
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such error
likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is committed, the
would not result in the acquittal of the accused.
same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the complaint;
and failure of the accused to interpose the objection constitutes
Sayson
waiver. Conrado, after he had been convicted by the court a quo,
In Sayson, this Court upheld the conviction of Sayson for attempted estafa,
can no longer assail its judgment by raising this issue. Neither can
even if there was an erroneous allegation as to the person injured because
he claim, as he now does, that he was denied the information that
the subject matter of the offense, a check, is specific and sufficiently
he was to be tried for two (2) separate crimes of rape. The acts
identified.
complained of, as constituting the offenses, were stated in the 2
June 1982 complaint in ordinary and concise language that any
Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses
against property, if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not
18

person of common intelligence would be able to understand and
thereby
Doctrine: The rule invoked in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court which states that there should be only one (1) offense
charged in a criminal complaint or information, the purpose of
which is to afford the defendant a necessary knowledge of the
charge so that he may not be confused in his defense. But it is
likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is committed, the
same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the complaint;
and failure of the accused to interpose the objection constitutes
waiver.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in convicting accussed-appellant for
two crimes of rape - NO
FACTS:
● Before the Court is Federico Conrado's appeal from the
decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Pangasinan, Branch I, in Criminal Case No. L-2593
entitled, "The People of the Philippines vs. Melquiades
Fernandez, alias 'Moding' and Federico Conrado" convicting
him and the other accused of the crime of rape and sentencing
them each to suffer inter alia two (2) death penalties.
The criminal complaint filed before the trial court, reads as follows:
● That on or about the 13th day of January, 1982, at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, at barangay Taloy, municipality of Malasiqui, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the trial Court,
the accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with the undersigned offended party Rebecca M. Soriano, a virgin and
15 years old, by means of force and intimidation and against the will
of the latter.
● Assisted by counsel, the accused Fernandez and Conrado, uncle
and nephew respectively, pleaded not guilty on arraignment and
underwent trial.
● During the trial, Amelita Malong declared that in that afternoon of 13
January 1982, she was combing her hair in her room when she saw
the approaching Rebecca, naked with smeared mud on her lower
private part and a piece of cloth around her neck. She testified that
after she was told by Rebecca about the incident, they reported the
same to her father, Teofilo, who was in his store. She also declared
that she knew both the accused because Fernandez used to spray
their mango trees while Conrado sold to them a dog sometime in
November 1981.
● The "Medico-Legal Certificate" issued by Dr. Claudio Submitted was
submitted as evidence for the prosecution, indicating his findings of
"hymenal lacerations at 6, 10, 3 o'clock positions and one dead sperm
cell seen on a slide examined."
● In defense, the two (2) accused denied any involvement in the offense,
both claiming they were nowhere at the scene of the crime when it
was committed.
○ Fernandez claimed he was in his house at Taloy, Malasiqui
weaving baskets when the incident happened. He admitted
having been formerly employed by Teofilo for about two (2)
years to spray his mango trees and stated that during the
period he was hired as such, he lived alone in a small hut
constructed under a mango tree.
○ Conrado, on the other hand, alleged that when the crime was
committed, he was at Malimpuec, Malasiqui as he was hired
to spray the mango trees of a certain Mr. Overo Bo.
Malimpuec is his hometown but he admitted that he used to
go to Bo. Taloy, prior to the incident, as his parents-in-law
lived there.
● In the trial court's decision holding that the guilt of both accused
had been established beyond shadow of any doubt, the following
observations and conclusions are made:
○ As already stated, the defense of both accused is alibi, which is not even
corroborated by a single defense witness. It is well-settled rule that alibi is the
weakest defense that can be resorted to by an accused, as it is easy to
concoct or fabricate. . . the alibi of both accused can not prevail over their
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses (especially by
complainant victim of rape, Rebecca Soriano) as the perpetrators of the crime
charged, they having testified in a clear, straightforward, positive, truthful, and
convincing manner, with no motive to fabricate this serious charge of rape or
falsify the truth. The alibi of both accused can not also be given credence or
weight, considering that at the time of the rape, accused Melquiades
Fernandez was in his house at Bo. Taloy, which is just 150 meters away from
the house of the Malongs, where Rebecca Soriano was raped; and accused
Federico Conrado was at Bo. Malimpuec, which is only 9 kms. away from Bo.
Taloy, where Rebecca was raped that afternoon of January 13, 1982. The
evidence disclose that said distance of 9 kms. can be negotiated in only about
30 minutes by motorized vehicle, on good road connecting the 2 barrios.
● The clear, positive, straightforward, and convincing testimony of rape
victim Rebecca Soriano, and her immediate reporting of the incident
to the police authorities, just 30 minutes or so after she was raped that
afternoon of January 13, 1982 and her giving of a sworn statement on
January 14, 1982 just the day after she was raped) which was
19
 corroborated by the statements on the same date (January 14, 1982)
by prosecution witnesses Amelita Malong and Teofilo Malong, more
than convinces and satisfies this Court that the came charged was, in
truth and fact, perpetrated by both accused.
● Hence, the judgment of conviction, now the object of this appeal,
the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
○ WHEREFORE, the Court finds each of the accused
MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ, alias "Moding" and FEDERICO
CONRADO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of
rape, aggravated by cruelty or ignominy, and, pursuant to law,
hereby sentences each of them to suffer two (2) penalties of
death, to indemnify the aggrieved party, Rebecca M. Soriano,
in the amount of P12,000.00 as moral damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
○ In an effort to reduce the imposed penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment), without disproving the charges
against them, the two (2) accused assigned the following
errors: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR TWO (2) CRIMES OF RAPE.
HELD:
● The trial court is accused of violating the rule against duplicity of
offenses in that, the accused were convicted for two (2) crimes of rape
even when under the criminal complaint against them, there is only
one (1) crime of rape alleged.
● The rule invoked in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which
states that there should be only one (1) offense charged in a criminal
complaint or information, the purpose of which is to afford the
defendant a necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may not
be confused in his defense.
● But it is likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is
committed, the same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash
the complaint; and failure of the accused to interpose the
objection constitutes waiver.
● Conrado, after he had been convicted by the court a quo, can no
longer assail its judgment by raising this issue. Neither can he claim,
as he now does, that he was denied the information that he was to be
tried for two (2) separate crimes of rape. The acts complained of, as
constituting the offenses, were stated in the 2 June 1982 complaint in
ordinary and concise language that any person of common
intelligence would be able to understand and thereby know what acts
he was to defend himself against.
● The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty
corresponding to two (2) crimes of rape is proper, because of the
existence of conspiracy. As clearly found by the trial court:
○ Both accused have, obviously, conspired and confederated to
commit the crime, considering that they entered the bathroom
where Rebecca was, together and at the same time. Accused
Fernandez then tied her with a piece of cloth tightly around
her neck, while accused Conrado held her hands placing
them behind her body, to prevent her from struggling or
resisting. Then after accused Fernandez had raped Rebecca,
accused Conrado raped her. Both accused, thereafter, fled
from the scene of the crime together and at the same time. All
these circumstances show beyond shadow of any doubt
conspiracyon the part of both accused, which renders each of
them liable for two (2) crimes of rape, . . .
● In a long line of decided cases, it has been held by this Court that in
multiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape
personally committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the
others, because each of them (accused) cooperated in the
commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by acts without
which it would not have been accomplished.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, as above modified, is
AFFIRMED. With costs against the accused-appellant Federico Conrado.
SO ORDERED.
12. People v Resayaga
GR No. L-49536 |March 30,1988
Padilla J. | Form & Substance: Requirements of Complaint or
Information - Substantive - Not title; Allegations in the Information
determine offense
By: Ramos
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Felix Resayaga, et al.
Summary: Resayaga and his co-accused were charged with the
crime of homicide. The court found that the information although
designated as one for Homicide, is in reality one for Murder, in view
of the allegation therein that the accused had taken advantage of
superior strength in the killing of the deceased. Resayaga’s co-
20

accused were found guilty of the crime of murder. Appellants allege
that the RTC erred in disregarding the information filed which
specifically charged the accused of homicide. The court ruled that
the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. (text > title)
Doctrine: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined,
not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the law alleged to have been violated these being
conclusions of law but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint
or information.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in:
(a) in disregarding, motu proprio, the information filed by the
Provincial Fiscal which specifically charged the accused of the
crime of homicide
(b) in asserting that the allegations of the information constitute
the crime of murder
(c) in convicting the accused therefore
FACTS:
Felix Resayaga, Hipolito Resayaga, Julio Babol, Marcelo Doroin Avelino
Britanico, and Macario Resayaga were charged with Homicide, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of April, 1960 in the Municipality of Baao,
Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with their icepicks one Paulo Balane, thereby inflicting
upon him several mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death.
therein that the accused had taken advantage of superior strength in the killing
of the deceased — a circumstance which qualifies a killing to murder — found
them guilty of Murder and sentenced each of the accused to suffer the penalty
of from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of the late Paulo Balane moral and exemplary damages, and to pay
proportionate costs of suit, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, However, of the five (5)
appellants, only the appeal of Marcelo Doroin remains to be resolved. The
Court of Appeals rendered a decision on the appeal of Marcelo Doroin finding
him guilty of Murder. The appellate court, however, believed that the proper
penalty to be imposed upon the appellant is at least reclusion perpetua, and
certified the case to SC for review.
HELD: NO to all.
The contention is without merit. Reliance is placed mainly upon the
designation of the offense given to it by the fiscal. It is well-settled that the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined, not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged
to have been violated these being conclusions of law but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. In the instant case, the
information specifically alleges that "the said accused conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with ice picks one Paulo Balane,
thereby inflicting upon him several mortal wounds which caused his
instantaneous death." Since the killing is characterized as having been
committed by "taking advantage of superior strength, "a circumstance which
qualifies a killing to murder, the information sufficiently charged the
commission of murder.

When arraigned, the accused Felix Resayaga entered a plea of "Guilty" and
the court sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion, temporal, as maximum to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The other accused, upon the other hand, entered pleas of "Not Guilty" and,
after trial, the court, finding that the information, although designated as
one for Homicide, is in reality one for Murder, in view of the allegation
21
 determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the
13. Balitaan v. CFI Batangas
specific crimes.
G.R. No. L-38544 | July 30, 1982
- The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a
Guerrero J. | Cause of accusation; must contain all the elements of the
crime to be set out in an information is to enable the
crime charged
accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is
By: Kangs
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
Petitioner: Luz E. Balitaan that constitute the offense.
Respondent: Court of First Instance of Batangas, Brach II and
Rita De Los Reyes It is a general rule that the matters of evidence, as distinguished
from facts essential to the description of the offense need not
Summary: to be averred. All that is required is that the charge be set forth
Information was filed before the Municipal Court charging de los with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact
Reyes with the crime of estafa through misappropriation or grave offense which the accused is alleged to have committed and will
abuse of confidence. The respondent willfully, and feloniously enable him intelligently to prepare his defense, and if found
misappropriate the payment received for the baby clothes guilty to plead her conviction, in a subsequent prosecution for the
delivered. The information stated that the amount misappropriated same offense.
was P127.58. However, during the trial the testimony by the
complainant, Balitaan, alleged that 3 checks were
ISSUE: w/n the facts essential in the description of the crime be
misappropriated by de los Reyes in the total of P1,632.97. Then
included in the information if the information already clearly stated all
the counsel for the defense objected by filing 2 motions (1) to
the elements of the crime – NO.
strike out the testimony on ground of immateriality and variance
with the information which did not allege the existence of said
FACTS:
three checks; and (2) to object to any and all other questions
1. An information was filed before the Municipal Court of Bauan, Batangas
concerning the check in the total amount of P1,632.97 on the
charging respondent de los Reyes of the crime of estafa through
ground of variance inasmuch as the information. MTC denied the
misappropriation or with grave abuse of confidence. The information
motions, and subsequently denied another motion to strike out the
stated that de los Reyes in grave abuse of confidence, despite demand to be
testimony of Balitaan at the close of direct examination. CFI
returned, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misappropriate, misapply, and
nullified the orders of the MTC on the ground that in the
covert the sum of P127.58 (in exchange of baby clothes) to her own benefit
information, it only indicated P127.58 that was misappropriated.
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant, Balitaan in the said amount.
The SC reversed the decision of the CFI stating that the existence "That in, about and during the period comprised between April 27, 1982 to June,
of the three (3) checks need not be alleged in the information. 1972, inclusive, in the Municipality of Bauan, Batangas, Philippines, and within the
This is an evidentiary matter which is not required to be alleged jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then an
therein. These checks amounted to P1,632.97 which did not vary employee of one Luz E. Balitaan, owner of a baby dresses mending shop in Barrio
Aplaya of the said municipality and having collected and received from Uniware, Inc.,
the information. Proof of the checks and their total amount was a business establishment in Makati, Rizal, to which finished baby dresses are turned
material evidence of the fact that respondent misappropriated the over after they have been mended and made, the sum of P127.58 in payment of
amount of P127.58 which was but a part of the total sum of work done on baby dresses by said Luz E. Balitaan, and under the express obligation
the checks. on the part of the accused to immediately account for and deliver the said amount of
P127.58 to said Luz E. Balitaan, with unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence
and in spite of repeated demands made to the said accused to turn over the said
Doctrines: amount of P127.58, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is misappropriate, misapply and convert the sum of P127.58 to her (accused) own use
composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. What and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Luz E. Balitaan in the
aforementioned amount of P127.58.
facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be

22
2. Complainant Balitaan was testifying that there exists 3 checks that were
made as payment in exchange of the baby clothes they delivered and that
this was received by de los Reyes in total amount of P1,632.97.
3. During the trial, when Balitaan was testifying, Counsel of de los Reyes
filed 2 motions namely:
(1) to strike out complaining witness’ (Balitaan) testimony concerning the
cash voucher on the ground of immateriality and variance with the
information which did not allege the existence of said voucher and three
checks; and
(2) to object to any and all other questions concerning the check in the
total amount of P1,632.97 on the ground of variance inasmuch as the
information recited that the accused received and misappropriated the
amount of P127.58 only.
MTC: denied the motions and allowed the direct testimony to continue. Also
denied the motion to strike out the foregoing testimonies of the respondent at
the close of the direct examination of Balitaan.
CFI: nullified the assailed orders of the MTC and ordered the questioned
testimonies stricken out from the records.
Hence, this petition for review.
is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense. However, it is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence,
as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order to render the
information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. Moreover, reasonable
certainty in the statement of the crime suffices.
- All that is required is that the charge be set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which
the accused is alleged to have committed and will enable him
intelligently to prepare his defense, and if found guilty to plead her
conviction, in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
The Court ruled that the existence of the three (3) checks need not be
alleged in the information. This is an evidentiary matter which is not
required to be alleged therein. These checks amounted to P1,632.97 which
did not vary the information that respondent de los Reyes misappropriated
the amount of P127.58. Proof of the checks and their total amount was
material evidence of the fact that respondent misappropriated the amount of
P127.58 which was but a part of the total sum of the checks.
MTC correctly denied the motions filed by the defense, respondent in this
case, de los Reyes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch II in Civil Case No. 81, ordering the questioned testimonies to be
stricken from the record is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

HELD:
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must
be alleged in the complaint or information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the definitions
and the essentials of the specific crimes

The information must contain these elements:

(a) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond;
(b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person
who has so received it;
(c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(d) that there be demand for the return of the property.

The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out
in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He
23
 14. Enrile v. People
GR No. 213455 | August 11, 2015
Brion, J. | Evidentiary Facts & Ultimate Facts
By: Raffy (FOR PRINTING ONLY; FACTS FROM RAMOS)
Petitioner: Juan Ponce Enrile
Respondent: People of the Philippines, et al.
Crime: Plunder
Summary: Enrile was charged with the crime of plunder. Enrile filed
a motion for bill of particulars but was denied because according to
Sandiganbayan, Enrile’s desired details are evidentiary in nature.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Enrile stating that although
some of the details were not proper subjects of a bill of particulars,
others were in fact, material. The court ruled that Enrile is entitled to
those details.
Doctrine: Evidentiary facts are the facts necessary to establish the
ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts
as conclusion.
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the
offense; the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting
the ultimate facts) can be provided during the trial
ISSUE: W/N Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a bill
of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or
specified are all evidentiary, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.?
(YES)
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile,
among others, before the Sandiganbayan. Enrile responded by filing before the
Sandiganbayan an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on
record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail), and a
supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
Information. Sandiganbayan denied both motions.
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. Enrile was brought
to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayan’s order and his motion for bill of
particulars was called for hearing. When the court session resumed, it announced the
Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars essentially on the following
grounds: (1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the
arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest
and for dismissal of information; and (2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and
are best ventilated during trial. The counsel of Enrile orally presented his arguments
for the reconsideration of the denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars, but it was
denied.
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill
of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against
him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature; they are material
facts that should be clearly alleged in the Information so that he may be fully informed
of the charges against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
HELD: An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense;
the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be
provided during the trial. Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected
evidence will support. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or
particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established.” It
refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the trial. Ultimate facts has also been
defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on whose existence the
cause of action rests; they are also the essential and determining facts on which the
court’s conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support in essential
particulars.
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate
facts; they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. They are facts
supporting the existence of some other alleged and unproven fact. According to the
ponencia, “conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment, for
this reason, more process is due, not less.” The ponencia seeks to impress that those
accused of the crime of plunder must be extended special treatment, requiring
evidentiary matters to be alleged in the Information, in view of the penalty involved,
which is reclusion perpetua. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is not imposable
exclusively to those accused and found guilty of plunder. This punishment likewise
attaches to the crimes of murder, serious illegal detention, and rape, among others.
Meanwhile, syndicated estafa, qualified trafficking in persons, possession of prohibited
drugs and illegal recruitment in large scale carry with it the penalty of life imprisonment,
which is a penalty harsher than reclusion perpetua.
The remedy against an insufficient Information in that it fails to allege the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense is a motion to quash on the ground
that the allegations of the Information do not constitute the offense charged, or any
offense for that matter, under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Its civil case counterpart is a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action. Note that when the rules speak of “the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense,” they actually pertain to the
ultimate facts that comprise the alleged crime’s component elements. In civil procedure,
the term “ultimate facts” means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of
action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of
the cause of action insufficient. Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which
either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up
24
the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. Ultimate facts should be distinguished 6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The particular
from evidentiary facts. person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a
particular. All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged
to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan
should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made the
necessary determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, 15. People v. Buca
particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be found
in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate
GR No 209587 | September 23, 2015
that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these desired details; neither can we Villarama, Jr., J. | Form & Substance: Requirements of Complaint or
put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the Information - Substantive - Date, place and time of commission -
desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by Precise date only when element of offense
the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
By: Jaro
Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsman’s resolution
(which found probable cause to indict the petitioner and his co -accused not only of the Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
crime of plunder, but also for violations of several counts of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Accused-appellant: Joel “Anjoy” Buca
Practice Act) to justify his argument that Enrile was already aware of the details he
seeks in his motion for a bill of particulars, all the more Summary: Three Informations for rape were filed against Joel
strengthens our conclusive position that the Information for plunder filed against Enrile “Anjoy” Buca for the rape of AAA, a 7-year-old minor, and Buca
was ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper plea and to was subsequently found guilty under CC No 52,261-2003. Buca
prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of being repetitive, that the purpose of the bill
argued that CC No 52,261-2003, specifically the statement in the
of particulars in criminal cases is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint
or information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. Moreover, Information that the rape occurred sometime before December 24,
a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount to nor does it 2002 despite the fact that the prosecution established that the
serve the purpose of a bill of particulars. crime was committed on December 24, 2002 violates Section 11,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting amended, on the requirement of stating the date of the
the scope of the proof; it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters commission of the offense and the right of the accused to be
alleged in the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
of an accused to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to
evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more
Doctrine: Under Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
or less general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.
Criminal Procedure, as amended, it is not necessary to state in the
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing: a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for complaint or information the precise date the offense was
certiorari, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense.
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his motion for reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of fifteen
(15) days from finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing ISSUE: W/N accused-appellant Joel “Anjoy” Buca may be convicted of rape
the facts sought that we herein rule to be material and necessary. despite the failure to allege the exact date of the commission of the crime in
The bill of particulars shall specifically contain the following:
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt criminal
the Information — YES.
acts”charged in the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly received, stating how FACTS:
the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at. Three Informations for the Rape of AAA, a 7-year-old minor, were filed against
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and Joel “Anjoy” Buca, a neighbour of her family, as follows:
commissions from the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year
when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects were received.
I. Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003;
5. The name of Napoles’ nongovernment organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients
and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
25
 ○ “That sometime in the months prior to December 2002, in the City of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above mentioned [accused], by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge
of the child AAA, seven (7) years old, by forcibly inserting his penis into
her vagina.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
II. Criminal Case No. 52,261-2003;
○ “The undersigned accuses the above named accused of the crime of
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as Amended by
R.A. 8353, committed as follows:
○ That sometime before December 24, 2002, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did there and
then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge of the
child AAA, seven (7) years old, by forcibly inserting his penis into her
vagina.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
III. Criminal Case No. 52,262-2003)
○ “That sometime in the months after December 25, 2002, in the City of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did
there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge
of the child AAA, seven (7) years old, by forcibly inserting his penis into
her vagina.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Trial ensued after Buca entered his pleas of not guilty.
The trial court dismissed Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003 on May 28, 2007
after Prosecutor Dayanghirang manifested that the prosecution will not present
evidence because “during his interview with the witness, she could not recall
the dates x x x it was between 2001 and 2002 but she could not recall, so [the
prosecution] will not anymore present.”
The RTC found Buca guilty of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 52,261-
2003.
Buca appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC ruling, agreeing that the
testimony of AAA was sufficient to establish the crime, hence the instant
appeal.
Buca argued that the statement in the Information that the rape occurred
sometime before December 24, 2002 despite the fact that the prosecution
established that the crime was committed on December 24, 2002 violates
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, on the requirement of stating the date of the commission of the
offense and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
HELD:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary
to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a)
Under Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended,
● it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient
of the offense. Such requirement is not applicable to the crime of rape
where the date of the commission of the offense is not an essential
element; and
● expressly permits that a crime may be alleged to have been committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
The information charging accused-appellant of rape sometime before
December 24, 2002 when the crime was committed exactly on December 24,
2002 is sufficiently compliant with said Section 11, as well as, as the Court
agrees was correctly pointed out as valid by the CA, Section 6, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that
● an information is deemed sufficient if it states
○ the name of the accused;
○ the designation of the offense given by the statute;
○ the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense;
○ the name of the offended party;
○ the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
26
 ○ and the place where the offense was committed.
The Court also cited People v. Lizada which, in turn, cited People v. Salalima:
● Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes
occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on
its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the
victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of
the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the
circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at
any time as near to the actual date when the offense was
committed an information is sufficient.
The Court found that the allegation was sufficient to inform him of the date the
crime charged occurred which enabled him to prepare his defense.
16. Rocaberte v. People
G.R. No. 72994. January 23, 1991.
Date, place and time of commission; Rule 110, secs. 10, 11; Remedy when
time of commission not definite - “from 1977 to December 1983":
By: Mascareñas
PETITIONER: Felicisimo Rocaberte
RESPONDENT: People and HON. ANDRES S. SANTOS, Judge, RTC,
Tagbilaran, Bohol
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION of certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Tagbilaran City, Br. 2.
CRIME: Theft (Art.308, 309 RPC)
SUMMARY: Rocaberte and 2 others were charged for theft wherein the date
in the information was vague (1977 – Dec. 28, 1983). He moved to quash the
information but was denied by the RTC.
DOCTRINE: The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of
the commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of
particulars.
If an information is ambiguous, the proper recourse is not a motion to
dismiss, but a motion for bill of particulars.
ISSUE: W/N a defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the
crime charged is a ground for a motion to quash? (NO)
FACTS: Rocaberte and two others were charged with the crime of theft in RTC
Bohol.
“The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal hereby accused Felicisimo
Rocaberte, Florencio Ranario and Flaviana Ranario of the crime of Theft,
committed as follows: That on or about the period from 1977 to December 28,
1983 at the offshore of West Canayaon, municipality of Garcia-Hernandez,
province of Bohol, Philippines x x, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping each other, with intent to gain and without the
consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away the following properties, to wit:
One (1) pc. sledge hammer, valued at P 136.00
One (1) pc. H beam, valued at 400.00
Two (2) cut abrasive steel plates for cargo berth cover protector 158.00
Ninety-nine (99) blocks of aluminum, alloy anodes at P3,750.00 each block
P371,250.00
in the total amount of (P371,944.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to and
owned by the Philippine Sinter Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter in the aforestated amount. Acts committed contrary to the provisions
of Articles 308, 309 of the Revised Penal Code.”
Rocaberte moved to quash the information, alleging that the statement of the
time of commission of the felony charged, "from 1977 to December 1983, a
period of 7 years," or "about 2,551 days," was fatally defective; there was "so
great a gap as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same
offense"; "the variance is certainly unfair to the accused for it violates their
constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against
them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. The trial
court denied the motion.
27
Rocaberte then instituted in this Court, the special civil action of certiorari at
bar, impugning the denial by respondent Judge Santos of his motion to quash,
or his refusal, at the very least, to direct the amendment of the information
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Court.
HELD: In line with this last mentioned rule (Section 4, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Court), a
variance of a few months between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the
evidence during the trial has been held not to constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal
of a conviction solely on that score. Hence, where the information sets the date of commission of
a robbery at March 25, 1900, evidence was allowed to show that the offense was actually
perpetrated on the 5th or 6th of March; and an amendment of an information so as to change the
year therein stated to that following it, was allowed it appearing that the alteration impaired none
of the defendant’s rights.
Where, however, there was a variance of several years between the time stated in the information,
1947, and the proof of its actual commission adduced at the trial, 1952, the dismissal of the case
by the Trial Court was sustained by this Court, since to allow amendment of the indictment to
conform to the evidence would be violative of defendant’s constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The statement of the time of the commission of the offense which is so general as to span a
number of years, i.e., “between October, 1910 to August, 1912,” has been held to be fatally
defective because it deprives the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense.
The information against petitioner Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It
places on him and his co-accused the unfair and unreasonable burden of
having to recall their activities over a span of more than 2,500 days. It is a
burden nobody should be made to bear. The public prosecutor must make
more definite and particular the time of the commission of the crime of theft
attributed to Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution
cannot be maintained, the case must be dismissed.
A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged
is not, however, a ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court. Even if it were, a motion for quashal on that account will be denied
since the defect is one that can be cured by amendment; instead, the court
shall order the amendment to be made by stating the time with particularity.
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the
commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of
particulars, provided for in Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court of 1964.
Bill of particulars.—Defendant may, at the time of or before arraignment, move
for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him
properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects
complained of and the details desired.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the writ of certiorari prayed for
is ISSUED, ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the challenged Orders of
respondent Judge dated August 12, 1985 and September 10, 1985 in Criminal
Case No. 3851, and DIRECTING the amendment of the information in said
case by the prosecution within such time as the respondent Judge may deem
proper, failing which the criminal prosecution against the petitioner and his co-
defendants shall be dismissed.
17. People v Arambulo
GR No 186597 | June 17 2015
Perez, J | Suspension of criminal action by reason of Prejudicial
Question - SEC nullification case prejudicial to Estafa
By: Nepomuceno
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Victoria R. Arambulo and Miguel Arambulo, Jr.
Summary:
A complaint for estafa was filed against the petitioners for failure to
remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of
commercial apartments were transferred to Anaped and despite
demand from Anaped. The respondents contend that 2 pending
SEC cases serve as a prejudicial action to the institution of the
criminal action. The Supreme Court held that only 1 SEC case
(questioning authority of Anaped) serves as a prejudicial question
to the estafa case.
Doctrine:
Requisites for a Civil Action to be considered a Prejudicial
Question to a Criminal Case
1) The civil case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
2) In the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined and
28
 3) Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal
ISSUE: Whether or not pending SEC cases raises a prejudicial question to the Estafa
Case - YES (Only the SEC Case questioning the authority of Anaped serves as a
prejudicial question to the estafa case)
FACTS:
● Respondent Victoria Arambulo (Victoria), Gungab, Reynaldo, Domingo Reyes,
Rodrigo Reyes, and Oscar Reyes are heirs of Spouses Pedro Reyes and
Anastacia Reyes. Anaped Estate, Inc. (Anaped) was incorporated as part of
the estate planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the estate of Pedro
Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs
● Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice President and General Manager of Anaped, filed
a complaint for estafa against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo Jr
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that
Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of the
commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped
● The respondents (Victoria and Miguel Arambulo) filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of the pendency
of two intra-corporate cases pending before the RTC of QC and Makati
○ SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 (SEC CASE 1) - filed by Victoria’s brother
Oscar - for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped,
annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages
○ SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 (SEC CASE 2)- filed by Victoria and her
brothers Reynaldo and Domingo - questioning the authority of their
elder sibling Reyes and Gungab, as well as the Anaped Board of
Directors and officers, including Buban to act for and in behalf of
the corporation
● In this Motion to Suspend Proceedings, respondent asserted the resolution of
the SEC cases in their favor: particularly the issues of whether of the group of
Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation and
whether they are duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would
necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case
● RTC
○ Granted the motion for suspension of proceedings
○ The petitioner then filed a Motion for reconsideration and the Trial
Court issued an Order which set aside the granting of the motion for
suspension of proceedings and setting the case for pre-trial
○ Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed
to file their Opposition to the MR and that the pre-trial be held in
abeyance → denied by RTC
● CA
○ Respondents filed a petition for certiorari → granted
○ Petitioner filed an MR → denied
● Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
HELD:
● A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,
it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined.
● Rule 11 Section 7 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
● The following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
● SEC Case 1 DOES NOT present a prejudicial question to the criminal
case for estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets
of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages. Even if
said case will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged free
from criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow than an accounting
of corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate
assets would result in the conviction of the respondents in the estafa case
● SEC Case 2 is indeed a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION. The complaint prays for
the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the
issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the
corporation.
● The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust
29
 or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender,
or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is
demand by the offended party to the offender.
● The elements of DEMAND and MISAPPROPRIATION bear relevance to the
validity of invalidity of Anaped directors and officers. However, demand is not
necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation
● In this case, the resolution of misappropriation by the respondents depends
on the result of SEC Case 2. If it is ruled in the SEC case that the present
Anaped directors and officers were not validly elected, then respondent
Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban. Hence,
the essential element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent in this case.
● From the foregoing, it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC
Case 2, then Buban, who does not own either by himself or in behalf of
Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore managed by Victoria,
cannot demand remittance of the rentals on the property and Victoria does not
have the obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban.
● Verily, the result of SEC Case 2 will determine the innocence or guilt of
respondents in the criminal case for estafa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
18. Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag
G.R. No. 103102 | March 6, 1992
Realado, J. | Amendment/Downgrading & Substitution of Information
By: Abary
Petitioner: CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner
Respondent: HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents
Summary: Petitioner shot the offended party on the head. He was
thereafter charged with frustrated murder because the victim
survived due to timely medical intervention.Trial ensued, and
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence. However, the victim died.
Her death prompted the prosecution to file an amended information
for murder. The petitioner thereafter refused to be rearriagned for
lack of preliminary reinvestigation. He thereafter went to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court erred when it admitted
the amended information. The Supreme Court ruled against the
petitioner, stating that the amended information did not prejudice the
rights of the accused.
Doctrine: Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during
the trial but only as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice
is caused to the rights of the accused.
ISSUE: W/N an amended information involving a substantial amendment,
without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the
original information, may legally and validly be admitted
FACTS: Petitioner, Teehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated
murder for the act of shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, which
would have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed
to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the
said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an
amended information. The amended information was filed, however, the
petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended information for lack of
preliminary investigation.
HELD: Yes, the amendment is legal and valid.
Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to
matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the
accused. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed
against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense
originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation,
that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to
aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Under the
circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information
for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during
the trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a formal
amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a
preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the
accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite
preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to be protected from
30
an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
19. MATALAM v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No 165751 | April 12, 2005
Chico-Nazario, J. | Amendment/Downgrading & Substitution of
Information – Meritorious Motions
By: Panisales
Petitioner: Datu Guimid P. Matalam
Respondent: The Second Division of the Sandiganbayan and The
People of the Philippines
Summary:
An Information was filed against petitioner Matalam charging him
and several others with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for
their alleged illegal and unjustified refusal to pay monetary claims.
After a reinvestigation of the case, the public prosecutor filed a
“Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information Deleting
the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid Matalam", to
which petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the
Motion to Admit the Alleged Amended Information Against the
Accused Guimid P. Matalam. In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
alleged that the amended information charges an entirely new
cause of action. In the original information, he was charged for his
alleged refusal to pay backwages. In the amended information, he
was charged for illegal dismissal of his employees. Since the
charges in both informations differed from each other, he claims that
he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not
informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the
complaining witnesses and that he was not given the opportunity to
explain. In its Decision, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s
motion stating that the amended information charges essentially the
same offense to the original Information. Thus, the amendment is a
matter of form only. Upon review of the SC, it found that the
amendment was indeed substantial and warrants a new preliminary
investigation for the petitioner.
Doctrine: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an
information entitles an accused to another preliminary
investigation. However, if the amended information contains a
charge related to or is included in the original information, a
new preliminary investigation is not required.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was deprived of due process of law when the
Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information without conducting
another or new preliminary investigation? -YES.
FACTS:
● An Information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam and several
others with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for their alleged
illegal and unjustified refusal to pay monetary claims. The accusatory
portion reads:
That from the period January 1998 to June 1999, in Cotobato City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused ARMM Vice-Governor
and Regional Secretary, DAR, DATU GUIMID MATALAM, a high ranking
public official, HABIB A. BAJUNAID, ANSARI M. LAWI, MUSLIMIN UNGA
and NAIMAH UNTE, all low-ranking public officials, committing the offense
while in the performance of their official duties and taking advantage of their
public position, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another,
did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury to
several employees of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Cotobato City, thru
evident bad faith in the performance of their official duties to wit: by illegally
and unjustifiably refusing to pay the monetary claims of the complaining DAR
employees namely: KASAN I. AYUNAN, ABDUL E. ZAILON, ESMAEL A.
EBRAHIM, ANNABELLE ZAILON, PENDATUN MAMBATAWAN, HYRIA
MASTURA and FAIZAL I. HADIL, for the period of January 1998 to June 1999
amounting to P1,606,788.50 as contained in Civil Service Resolutions Nos.
982027 and 990415 in the nature of unpaid salaries during the period when
they have been illegally terminated, including salary differentials and other
benefits.
● Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. After the said
reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a “Manifestation and Motion
to Admit Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused
Except Datu Guimid Matalam", to which petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss and Opposition to the Motion to Admit the Alleged Amended
Information Against the Accused Guimid P. Matalam. The Amended
Information reads:
31
 That on December 16, 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Cotobato City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused a public officer being then the ARMM Vice-Governor and
Regional Secretary DAR, committing the offense while in the performance of
his official duties and thru evident bad faith and manifest partiality did there
and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury by illegally
dismissing from the service complaining DAR-Maguindanao employees,
Cotobato City, namely: Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Annabelle Zailon,
Pendatum Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil, to their damage
and prejudice amounting to P1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid salaries during
the period when they have been illegally terminated including salary
differentials and other benefits.
● In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended
information charges an entirely new cause of action. The corpus delicti
of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal to pay
backwages, but the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from
the service of the complaining witnesses. He insists that the amended
information charging a separate and entirely different offense cannot
be admitted because there would be a serious violation of due process
of law. He claims he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he
was not informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of
the complaining witnesses and that he was not given the opportunity
to explain.
● The Sandiganbayan granted the Manifestation and Motion to Admit
Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except
Datu Guimid P. Matalam. In its Decision, it pointed out that the
Amended Information charges essentially the same offense to the
original Information. Thus, the amendment is a matter of form only. It
further pointed out that Matalam is not in any way prejudiced since he
already elaborated his version on the surrounding circumstances that
brought about the alleged illegal dismissal of the complaining
witnesses. It also stated that remanding it again to the Public
Prosecutor would be a waste of time since Matalam, in his counter-
affidavit had already explained his defense on the new allegations.
● Petitioner Matalam then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
later denied by the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
● Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of
the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state
its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party.
● A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
All other matters are merely of form.
● The following have been held to be merely formal amendments:
○ New allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty
that the court might impose in the event of conviction
○ An amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one
○ Additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume
○ An amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused
○ An amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate
vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and
material facts, and merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential for conviction
for the crime charged
● The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment
has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is made,
and whether any evidence defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other. An amendment to an information which does not change the
nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the
offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not
of substance.
● In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. The
recital of facts constituting the offense charged was definitely
altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly
32
 committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay
the monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the amended
information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private
complainants. However, it cannot be denied that the alleged illegal
and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related to, and
arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private
complainants.
● The rule in amending an Information is: Before or after a plea, a
substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to
another preliminary investigation. However, if the amended
information contains a charge related to or is included in the
original information, a new preliminary investigation is not
required.
● While it is true that the charges in the original and amended
informations are related, i.e., an inquiry into one would have elicited
substantially, if not precisely, the same facts that an inquiry into the
other would have brought into light, this fact should not necessarily
deprive an accused to his right to a new preliminary investigation.
As above- stated, the rule is that a new preliminary investigation is
needed if there is a substantial amendment. The exception, i.e.,
charge is related or included in the original information, should
not be applied automatically. The circumstances in every case
must be taken into consideration before the accused is deprived
of another preliminary investigation.
● Admittedly, the alleged illegal dismissal contained in the amended
charge gave rise to the original charge of failure to pay the monetary
claims of private complainants. It cannot be disputed that petitioner
already discussed circumstances surrounding the termination of
services of the private complainants in his counter-affidavit. However,
we find nothing therein that would show that he had already touched
the issue of evident bad faith or manifest partiality. As can be gathered
from the counter-affidavit, there were arguments tending to counter
the presence of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross
inexcusable negligence, but the same refer to the allegation of failure
to pay the monetary claims and not to the alleged illegal dismissal.
Although one allegation stemmed from the other, the court a quo and
the public prosecutor cannot say the element of evident bad faith,
manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence is the same in both.
This being an element of the offense charged, petitioner should be
given the opportunity to thoroughly adduce evidence on the matter.
● If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for
the amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced
because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show
or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and
manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due
process.
● A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary
investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the
accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due
process.
● In the case of petitioner herein, although the charge remained the
same (Violation of Section 3(e), Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended), the
prohibited act allegedly committed changed, that is, failure to pay
monetary claims to illegal dismissal, and he was not given the
opportunity to submit his evidence on the absence or presence of
evident bad faith and manifest partiality as to the illegal dismissal.
Petitioner has not waived his right to a new preliminary investigation
and, instead, is asking for one.
● It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the
determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is
the function of the prosecution.
● Our ruling in this case does not in any way divest the public prosecutor
of its duty under the Rules. This Court is not determining if petitioner
should or should not be brought to trial. What we are looking into is
whether or not petitioner was given all the opportunity to present
countervailing evidence on the amended charge. Accordingly, finding
that petitioner was not given the chance to fully present his evidence
on the amended information which contained a substantial
amendment, a new preliminary investigation is in order.
DP: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent court's resolutions dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November
2004 in Criminal Case No. 26381 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Respondent court is directed to order the Office of the Ombudsman to forthwith
conduct a preliminary investigation of the charge embodied in the Amended
Information filed against petitioner. It is further directed to suspend the
proceedings in the said case pending termination of the preliminary
33
investigation, and thereafter to take such action on petitioner's case as may
be warranted by the results of said preliminary investigation.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the 􀀽ling of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule
119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy.
The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
20. Soberano v. People
appearance at the trial."
GR No. 154629 | October 5,2005
Chico-Nazario, J. | Excluding an accused by amendment
By: Manlongat

ISSUE:
Petitioner: SP04 Marino Soberano, SP03 Mauro Torres and SP03
W/N the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 14 of Rule 110 of the
Jose Escalante
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on amendment of complaints?
Respondent: The People of The Philippines
FACTS:
Summary:
The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 41, Manila, presided by Judge Rodolfo
The prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador "Bubby"
A. Ponferrada.
Dacer, together with his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted
along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila. Their charred remains,
The prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information, which was
consisting of burnt bones, metal dental plates and a ring, were later
granted and the Amended Information was admitted by the trial court:
found in Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were positively
identified by their dentists and by forensic pathologists from U.P.
“That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the
Both victims were killed by strangulation.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, some of whom
are public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Doctrine:
Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp
Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised
Crame, Quezon City, (SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante,
Rules of Criminal Procedure , as amended, reads —
P/Supt. Dumlao, P/ C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon, SPO4 Taladua,
SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1 Sarmiento, SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1
"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or
Sarmiento and SPO1 Nemeno), abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave
EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of Osmeña Highway (formerly South
of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the
Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them
plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made
to Indang, Cavite, and with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of
with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
superior strength, nighttime and remoteness of the place and with deliberate
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
intent to kill, conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, the
accused police officers using their offices in committing the offense, did then
"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill said SALVADOR (Bubby)
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO by strangulation, which was the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
immediate cause of their death, and thereafter dispose of their body by
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
incineration, to the damage and prejudice of the latter's respective heirs.”
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies
of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.

34
Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato Malabanan, Jovencio
Malabanan and Rollan moved to quash the Information. (Denied by the trial
court)
Accused P/Supt. Glen Dumlao was subsequently arrested. He later executed
a sworn statement implicating other police officers to the Dacer-Corbito double
murder, specifically P/Supt. Michael Ray B. Aquino, P/Supt. Cesar Mancao,
PO3 Larry Ambre and a certain Rigor, all former members of the defunct
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
One of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation asserting that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in
the double murder. (Granted by the trial court)
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information was filed by the
prosecution. The Amended Information —
(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and
Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar
Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Viña.
Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio
Malabanan opposed the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information in an Opposition. They prayed that the Motion to Admit Amended
Information and the discharge of accused Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers
Lopez be denied
The trial court denied the Motion to Admit Amended Information. The
prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
The prosecution filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court praying that the
Orders of then Judge Ponferrada be annulled and set aside and that Judge
Perfecto A.S. Laguio of Branch 18 be restrained, in the meantime, from
proceeding with the case in accordance with said orders.
CA: All the foregoing premises considered, the present petition is hereby
GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. The
assailed Orders dated October 01, 2001 and October 24, 2001 which were
issued by JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in Criminal Case No. 01-
191969, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Lopez, et al ." are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent JUDGE PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO,
JR. or any person or persons acting in his stead, is/are hereby ORDERED to
ADMIT the Amended Information dated September 17, 2001 substituting
SPO3 ALLAN CADENILLA VILLANUEVA for P/Insp. DANILO VILLANUEVA
as accused, and charging P/Senior Supt. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, P/Senior
Supt. CEZAR MANCAO II and P/Senior Supt. TEOFILO VIÑA as additional
accused, and discharging or excluding only the accused JIMMY L. LOPEZ,
WILLIAM L. LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY and to CONTINUE with the
proceedings therefrom with utmost deliberate dispatch. Needless to state, the
original information filed on May 11, 2001 stands insofar as P/Senior Supt.
GLEN(N) G. DUMLAO is concerned.
HELD:
The key lies in the correct interpretation of two pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., Section 14 of Rule 110 on
amendment of information and Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an
accused as state witness.
Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure , as amended, reads —
"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information,
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended
party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial."
The prosecution likewise professes that Section 14, Rule 110 should be
applied, and not Section 17, Rule 119 for the following reasons: first, while the
case was already filed in court, the accused therein have not yet been
arraigned; second, the trial court ordered the reinvestigation of the case; and
35
third, new evidence dictate the necessity to amend the Information to include
have done was to direct the State Prosecutor to file a new
new accused and to exclude other accused who will be utilized as state
Information charging the proper offense, and after compliance
witnesses.
therewith, to dismiss the original Information pursuant to Section
14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an
Court. Thus the issue of whether or not the case may be remanded
amendment of an information to exclude some accused and that the same is
to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule
made before plea. Thus, at the very least Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable
110 and Sec. 19, Rule 119
which means that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. What
The Supreme Court held NO. The CA erred in remanding the case
seems to complicate the situation is that the exclusion of the accused is
to the trial court for the purpose of filing the proper Information on
specifically sought for the purpose of discharging them as witnesses for the
the basis of the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 and Section
State.
19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. It is clear that the rules are
applicable only before judgment has been rendered. In this case,
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes
the trial has been concluded. The RTC already returned a guilty
some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the
verdict, which has been reviewed by the CA whose decision, in turn,
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in
has been elevated to this Court. Said directive clearly shows that
compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify
the CA still had cause to detain Caoili and did not discharge him; in
the grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in
fact, the CA would have Caoili answer for the proper Information
equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of
which it directed the prosecution to file.
probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as
in this case, or on some other ground.
These are not consistent with the concept of acquittal which denotes
a discharge, a formal certification of innocence, a release or an
absolution. While the procedure adopted by the CA is certainly
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the
incorrect, its decision cannot be deemed to have the effect of an
Court of Appeals dated 04 April 2002 and 12 August 2002, respectively, are
acquittal.
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION to include P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G.
DUMLAO as one of the accused excluded from the Amended Information
Supreme Court DENIED both petitions. The decision of the Court of
dated 17 September 2001. No costs.
Appeals is SET ASIDE. Accused Noel Go Caoili alias Boy Tagalog
is guilty of Lascivious Conduct.
21. People v. Caoili
Doctrine:
G.R. No. 196342 |August 8, 2017
Rule 110 Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. — x x x
TIJAM, J. | Remedies Available - Substitiution of a private complainant
By: PATALUD
xxxx
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: NOEL GO CAOILI ALIAS "BOY TAGALOG" If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
Summary: made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
On June 22, 2006, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Raul O. original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
Nasayao filed an Information against Caoili, charging him with the charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule
crime of rape through sexual intercourse with [AAA], a 15 year old 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy.
and daughter of the accused (aggravating circumstance). RTC ruled The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
declaring Caoili guilty of rape. The CA held that although Caoili is appearance at the trial.
clearly guilty of rape by sexual assault, what the trial court should

36

Suffice it to stress that the provisions on substitution of information
applies only when:
(1) there is a mistake in charging the proper offense, and
(2) the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any
other offense necessarily included in the offense charged. The
second requisite is absent in this case.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE CASE MAY BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION 14, RULE 110 AND
SEC. 19, RULE 119 OF THE RULES OF COURT - NO
FACTS:
● On June 22, 2006, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Raul O.
Nasayao filed an Information against Caoili, charging him with the
crime of rape through sexual intercourse with [AAA], a 15 year old
and daughter of the accused (aggravating circumstance)
● RTC issued an order confirming Caoili 's detention at the Municipal
Station of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology after his
arrest.
● Upon arraignment, Caoili pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After
the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
● The victim, AAA, testified and underwent a medical examination
conducted by Dr. Ramie Hipe (Dr. Hipe) at the [KKK] Medicare
Community Hospital. Dr. Hipe issued a medical certificate showing the
results that she did suffer rape.
● For his defense, Caoili denied molesting AAA. He alleged that AAA
with her boyfriend at the cassava plantation. He confronted her and
the latter admitted that she was with her boyfriend "Dodong" earlier
that evening. He was so angry so he struck AAA's right thigh with a
piece of wood and pushed the same piece of wood on her forehead.
And he and his son slept in one room; while AAA and her siblings slept
in another room.
RTC's Ruling - Declaring Caoili GUILTY of rape.
● Proven beyond reasonable doubt, as a principal, of the crime of rape,
and after considering the aggravating circumstance of being the
parent of the complainant there being no mitigating circumstance to
off-set the same.
CA’s Ruling - IMMEDIATELY REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
● The CA held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by sexual
assault, what the trial court should have done was to direct the State
Prosecutor to file a new Information charging the proper offense, and
after compliance therewith, to dismiss the original Information
.
● The appellate court found it "imperative and morally upright" to set
the judgment aside and to remand the case for further proceedings
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court.
● Thereafter, Caoili and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
their respective petitions for review before this Court: G.R. No. 196342
was instituted by the OSG and G.R. No. 196848 was filed by Caoili.
HELD:
The prosecution has established rape by sexual assault.
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
[and]
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present[.]
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, rape under the RPC, as amended, can be committed in two
ways:
37
 (1) Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to rape through sexual
intercourse, also known as "organ rape" or "penile rape." The central
element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also
called "instrument or object rape," or "gender-free rape." It must be
attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d) of paragraph 1.[33] (Emphasis ours)
Through AAA's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that Caoili
molested his own daughter when he inserted his finger into her vagina and
thereafter made a push and pull movement with such finger for 30 minutes,
thus, clearly establishing rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC.
Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape through sexual
intercourse.
● We cannot accept the OSG's argument that based on the variance
doctrine, Caoili can be convicted of rape by sexual assault because
this offense is necessarily included in the crime of rape through sexual
intercourse.
The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime
proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged
● Nonetheless, under the variance doctrine embodied under Sections 4
and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, sufficient evidence exists to
convict Caoili of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC
● The Court, thus, takes this occasion to once again remind public
prosecutors of their crucial role in drafting criminal complaints
or Information. They have to be more judicious and circumspect in
preparing the Information since a mistake or defect therein may not
render full justice to the State, the offended party and even the
offender.
The CA's order to remand the case to the trial court is procedurally infirm
(TOPIC)
The CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for the purpose of filing
the proper Information on the basis of the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110 and Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. — x x x
xxxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging
the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided
the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense.
— When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case,
the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
(Emphasis ours)
It is clear that the rules are applicable only before judgment has been rendered.
In this case, the trial has been concluded. The RTC already returned a
guilty verdict, which has been reviewed by the CA whose decision, in turn, has
been elevated to this Court.
The CA's judgment did not amount to an acquittal.
Contrary to Caoili's stance, the CA's decision did not amount to a judgment of
acquittal. It is true the CA declared that given the substantial distinctions
between rape through sexual intercourse, as charged, and rape by sexual
assault, which was proved, "no valid conviction can be had without running
afoul of the accused's Constitutional right to be informed of the charge."
This statement, however, must be read alongside the immediately succeeding
directive of the appellate court, remanding the case to the RTC for further
proceedings pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court. Said directive clearly shows that the CA still had cause to
detain Caoili and did not discharge him; in fact, the CA would have Caoili
answer for the proper Information which it directed the prosecution to file.
These are not consistent with the concept of acquittal which denotes a
discharge, a formal certification of innocence, a release or an absolution.
38
While the procedure adopted by the CA is certainly incorrect, its decision
Petitioner: ARTEMIO T. TORRES, JR.
cannot be deemed to have the effect of an acquittal.
Respondent: SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO & NELIA T.
TORRES-AGUINALDO,
DP: WHEREFORE, both petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals' July 22,
Summary: Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo
2010 Decision and March 29, 2011 Resolution are SET ASIDE. Accused Noel
filed before the OCP of Manila, a complaint against petitioner Torres
Go Caoili alias Boy Tagalog is guilty of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b)
for falsification of public document.They alleged that titles to their
of Republic Act No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
properties covered by Transfer Certificates were transferred without
perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay a fine of Php 15,000.00.
their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres through a forged
Deed of Sale dated July 21, 1979.Torres denied the allegations of
forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
him as evidenced by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale.
Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an
PERALTA, J.:
information for falsification of public document against Torres, which
Applying the variance doctrine in this case where the crime charged is rape
was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC),
by sexual intercourse, Caoili can still be convicted of sexual abuse under
Branch 8, on October 3, 2001. Torres moved for reconsideration but
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A No. 7610.
was denied.On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the
findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal
This is because the same crime was proved during trial and is necessarily
of the information. The motion for reconsideration filed by Aguinaldo
included in the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC
was denied.A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed which the
which, under settled jurisprudence, is necessarily included in a complaint for
MTC granted on June 11, 2003. It should be noted that petitioner
rape.
has not been arraigned. Torres motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Torres
For the same reason, the CA erred in applying Section 14, Rule 110, in
contends that the order granting the withdrawal of the information
relation to Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, and ordering the
rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of
remand of the case for further proceedings.
Appeals. Citing Bañares II v. Balising, Torres insists that an order
dismissing a case without prejudice is final if no motion for
Suffice it to stress that the provisions on substitution of information applies
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. The contention
only when:
is untenable. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion
(1) there is a mistake in charging the proper offense, and
to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their
(2) the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other
legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the
offense necessarily included in the offense charged. The second requisite is
information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt
absent in this case.
thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon
reinvestigation.On the other hand, the order granting a motion to
22. Torres v. Aguinaldo
dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with
G.R. No. 164268 | June 28, 2005
prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves
YNARES-SANTIAGO. | Motion to Withdraw & Motion to Dismiss-
finality. In Bañares II v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus
Distinguished
putting into place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal. In the
By: Mica Sarenas
case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a
motion to dismiss. Hence, Bañares II v. Balising would not apply.

Doctrine: Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw

information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

39

which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes
operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case
involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal
shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving a
penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
ISSUE: Whether the order of the MTC-Manila granting the motion to
withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by
Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the
OCP of Manila; - No
FACTS:
● This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 22, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 77818, and its
resolution dated June 28, 2004 denying reconsideration thereof.
● Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a complaint against
petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (Torres) for falsification of public
document.
● They alleged that titles to their properties covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-93596, T-87764, and T-87765, were
transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres
through a forged Deed of Sale dated July 21, 1979.
● Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo
sold the subject properties to him as evidenced by the March 10, 1991
Deed of Absolute Sale.
● Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an
information for falsification of public document against Torres, which
was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC), Branch
8, on October 3, 2001.
● Torres moved for reconsideration but was denied.
● On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the
investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information.
The motion for reconsideration filed by Aguinaldo was denied.
● A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed which the MTC
granted on June 11, 2003. It should be noted that petitioner has
not been arraigned.
● Meanwhile, Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari which was granted in the assailed decision dated March 22,
2004.
● Torres motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari
HELD:
Torres contends that the order granting the withdrawal of the information
rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. Citing
Bañares II v. Balising, Torres insists that an order dismissing a case without
prejudice is final if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely
filed.
● The contention is untenable. A motion to withdraw information differs
from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in
court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of
the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon
reinvestigation.
● On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes
final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-
filing of the same case once such order achieves finality. In
Bañares II v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus putting into
place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal.
● In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and
not a motion to dismiss. Hence, Bañares II v. Balising would not
apply.
○ Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw
information is not time-barred and does not fall within the
ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on
provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge
dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and
with notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a
penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a
fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional
dismissal shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been
revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, where such provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been
revived.
40
 ● There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed expressly for
that purpose complies with the following requisites, viz.: (1) It
must be with the express consent of the accused; and (2) There
must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117
contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion
to withdraw information. Thus, the law on provisional dismissal
does not apply in the present case.
● Even assuming that the Motion to Withdraw Information is the same
as a Motion to Dismiss, the Court does not find that it complied with
the above requisites. The Motion to Withdraw Information was filed by
the Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the City Prosecutor
without the conformity of the accused, herein petitioner Torres. Thus,
it cannot be said that the motion was filed with his express consent as
required under Section 8, Rule 117.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 22, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution
of the Secretary of Justice dated November 12, 2002 is REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
23. Enrile v. People
GR No. 213455 | August 11, 2015
Brion, J. | Remedies available - Bill of Particulars
By: Ramos
Petitioner: Juan Ponce Enrile
Respondent: People of the Philippines, et al.
Summary: Enrile was charged with the crime of plunder. Enrile filed
a motion for bill of particulars but was denied because according to
Sandiganbayan, Enrile’s desired details are evidentiary in nature.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Enrile stating that although
some of the details were not proper subjects of a bill of particulars,
others were in fact, material. The court ruled that Enrile is entitled to
those details.
Doctrine: The court reiterated that the purpose of a bill of particular
is to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague,
or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead
and prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which
he stands accused.
ISSUE: W/N Sandiganbayan erred in denying the motion for bill of
particulars?
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against
Enrile, among others, before the Sandiganbayan. Enrile responded by filing
before the Sandiganbayan an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for
lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam
motion for bail), and a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest
and for dismissal of Information. Sandiganbayan denied both motions.
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. Enrile was
brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayan’s order and his
motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing. When the court session
resumed, it announced the Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars essentially on the following grounds: (1) the details that Enrile
desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal
of information; and (2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best
ventilated during trial. The counsel of Enrile orally presented his arguments for
the reconsideration of the denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars, but it
was denied.
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion
for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information
filed against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature; they are
material facts that should be clearly alleged in the Information so that he may
be fully informed of the charges against him and be prepared to meet the
issues at the trial.
41
HELD: YES.
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully
appraise the accused of the nature of the charge against him and to avoid
possible surprises that may lead to injustice.
A bill of particulars in general, is the further specification of the charges or
claims in an action, which an accused may avail of by motion before
arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. In criminal
cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the
Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its
purpose is to enable an accused: to know the theory of the government’s case;
to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal
or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense; and to compel
the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering evidence.
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides: Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment,
move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for
trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or
information and the details desired. The rule requires the information to
describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the
crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The
particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what the Information means.
granting and order the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the
charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full
meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by
restricting the scope of the proof; it limits the evidence to be presented by the
parties to the matters alleged in the Information as supplemented by the bill. It
is for this reason that the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars
deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully
introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms
which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.
The court ruled that some of Enrile’s desired details are not proper subjects
for a bill of particulars. The court did however note that Enrile is entitled to a
bill of particulars to his other questions.The court reiterated that the purpose
of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite,
vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and
prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he stands
accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if
the allegations are incomplete or are unclear to him.
In the light of all these considerations, the SC hold that the Sandiganbayan’s
denial of the petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the
details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary – without any
explanation supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the

accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The
purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the
complaint or information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare
for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the elements
of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that
a bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the complaint
or Information.

In Virata v. Sandiganbayan, the court also stated that the function or purpose
of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe
the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general
function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in
the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill. Thus,
if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its
42
 25. Revilla Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 218232, 218235, 218266, 218903 & 219162
| July 24, 2018
Carpio, J. | Provisional remedies in criminal cases
By: Kang
Petitioner: Ramon “Bong” Revilla Jr.
Respondent: Sandiganbayan (First Division) and People of the
Philippines
Summary:
An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioners Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, among others, with the
crime of plunder. Sandiganbayn issued a warrant of arrest against
the petitioners. Same day, Revilla voluntarily surrendered. The
prosecution filed an ex-parte motion for issuance of Writ of
preliminary Attachment/Garnishment against the properties of
Revilla, alleging that it was ill-gotten wealth. Revilla then filed an
Opposition alleging that Sandiganbayn committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the ex-parte motion since the writ was
erroneous and premature. And that the plunder law does not allow
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, hence it is
violative of his constitutional rights on due process and
presumption of innocence. SC held that the Sandiganbayan did
not committed grave abuse of discretion in it decision stating Rule
127 which states that the provisional remedy of attachment on the
property of the accused may be availed of to serve as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the
accused when the criminal action is based on a claim for money
or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or
converted to the use of the accused who is a public officer, in
the course of his employment as such, or when the accused
has concealed, removed or disposed of his property or is
about to do so.
Doctrine:
The Rules of Court states that the provisional remedies in civil
actions, insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in
connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal
action.
ISSUE: w/n Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the State's Ex-
Parte Motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment – No.
FACTS:
1. In G.R. No. 219162, Revilla assails the Resolution dated February 5, 2015
of the Sandiganbayan granting the prosecution’s motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment and the Resolution dated May 28 2015
denying his MR.
2. June 5, 2014; an information was filed by the Office of the Ombudsman in
the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles,
among others, with the crime of Plunder, under Section 2 of RA 7080.
Information reads:
In 2006 to 2010, or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court's
jurisdiction, above-named accused RAMON "BONG" BAUTISTA REVILLA, JR., then a
Philippine Senator and RICHARD ABDON CAMBE, then DIRECTOR III at the Office of
Senator Revilla, Jr., both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD
JOHN B. LIM, and JOAN RAYMUND S. DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (Php224,512,500.00), through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts, as follows:
a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE
ASIS, and others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances:
before, during and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and
REVILLA, JR. and/or CAMBE received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be
funded from REVILLA, JR.'s Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of REVILLA, JR.'s endorsement, directly or through CAMBE, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES' non- government organizations
which became the recipients and/or target implementors of REVILLA, JR.'s PDAF
projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus
enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions,
authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves
at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2. Upon arraignment, Napoles and Cambe pleaded no guilty to the charge
against them, while petitioner Revilla refused to enter any plea; thus, the
Sandiganbayan entered a plea of not guilty in his behalf pursuant to Section
1(c), Rule 116 of the ROC.
3. Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against Revilla, Cambe, and
Napoles. Same day, revilla voluntarily surrendered to the PNP and filed a
Motion to Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam praying for his detention at
the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame. Cambe also voluntarily
43
surrendered to Sandiganbayan, and filed an Urgent Motion to Commit
Accused to CIDG pending trial of the case.
4. In two separate Resolutions both dated 20 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the turnover of Revilla and Cambe to the PNP-CIDG, Camp Crame,
Quezon City for detention at its PNP Custodial Center Barracks.
(Facts in relation to G.R. No. 219162 only)
5. October 27, 2014; the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Attachment/Garnishment against the monies ad properties of
Revilla to serve as security for the satisfaction of the amount of
P224,512,500 as alleged as ill-gotten wealth in the event that a judgment is
rendered against him for plunder.
- This is to prevent the disappearance of Revilla’s monies and properties
found to be prima facie unlawfully acquire, considering that the AMLC
reported that many investment and bank accounts of Revilla were
terminated immediately before and after the PDAF scandal circulated in
the media. And Revilla himself publicly confirmed that he closed several
bank accounts when the PDAF scam was exposed.
6. Revilla filed an Opposition to the motion arguing that the factual basis for
the issuance of the writ is yet to be proven, and that the issuance of the writ
would unduly preempt the proceedings in his bail application.
Sandiganbayan:
1. Granted the motion of the prosecution. It held that the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment is properly anchored on Secs. 1 and 2 of
Rule 57, and Secs. 1, 2(b), and (c) of Rule 127 of the ROC.
2. Granted the prosecution’s amendatory motion and issued an Alias Writ
of Preliminary Attachment, which included the properties under the known
aliases or other names of Revilla and his spouse, Lani Mercado.
3. Denied the MR filed by Revilla. held that the writ of preliminary
attachment is not the penalty of forfeiture envisioned under Section 2 of
RA 7080, contrary to Revilla's argument.
4. Issuance of the writ is an ancillary remedy which can be availed of
during the pendency of the criminal case of plunder, and it is not necessary
to await the final resolution of the bail petition before it can be issued.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
HELD:
PD No. 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction to jointly determine in the same proceeding the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability,
considering that he filing of the criminal action before the Sandiganbayan is
deemed necessarily carry with it the filing of civil action. It also provides that
the ROC promulgated by the SC shall apply to all cases and proceedings
filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The Rules of Court state that the provisional remedies in civil actions, insofar
as they are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the civil action
deemed instituted with the criminal action
Rule 127 states that the provisional remedy of attachment on the property of
the accused may be availed of to serve as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered from the accused when the criminal action
is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public
officer, in the course of his employment as such, or when the accused
has concealed, removed or disposed of his property or is about to do
so.
Similarly, Rule 57 provides that attachment may issue: "x x x (b) in an action
for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to
his own use by a public officer x x x; (c) in an action to recover the
possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or converted,
when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or
disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an
authorized person; x x x."
For an ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment to be valid, an
affidavit of merit and an applicant’s bond must be filed with the court in which
the action is pending.
For Affidavit of merit, Sec. 3 of Rule 57.
- The mere filing of an affidavit reciting the facts required by
Section 3, however, is not enough to compel the judge to
grant the writ of preliminary attachment.
- It is determined by the court in the exercise of its discretion.
Revilla, while still a public officer, is charged with plunder, committed by
amassing, accumulating, and acquiring ill-gotten wealth, through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts, as follows:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
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person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including promise of
future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
The filing of the criminal action for plunder, which is within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, is deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the
civil action. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary attachment is an available
provisional remedy in the criminal action for plunder.
Court agreed to the finding of probable cause against Revilla and held that
for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute
certainty." Thus, we held that the prosecution's evidence established a prima
facie case for plunder against Revilla.
Furthermore, in its Resolution dated 1 December 2014 denying bail to
Revilla, the Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution duly established with
strong evidence that Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, in conspiracy with one
another, committed the crime of plunder. The finding of strong evidence for
purposes of bail is a greater quantum of proof required than prima facie
factual foundation for the attachment of properties. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
properly exercised its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment
upon appreciating and evaluating the evidence against Revilla.
a preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own
sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and
expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure
auxiliary or incidental to the main action.
When is it available: it is available during the pendency of the action which
may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in
the case.
The remedy of attachment is provisional and temporary, designed for
particular exigencies, attended by no character of permanency or finality, and
always subject to the control of the issuing court.
Who may avail: The State may avail of the provisional remedy of
attachment to secure the preservation of these unexplained wealth and
income, in the event that a judgment of conviction and forfeiture is rendered.
It is needed to protect the interest of the government and to prevent the
removal, concealment, and disposition of properties in the hands of
unscrupulous public officers. Otherwise, even if the government
subsequently wins the case, it will be left holding an empty bag.
This Decision does not touch upon the guilt or innocence of any of the
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit and AFFIRM the
assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

The sufficiency of the affidavit depends upon the amount of credit given by
the Sandiganbayan, and its acceptance, upon its sound discretion. We
refuse to interfere in its exercise of discretion, absent any showing that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.

A writ of preliminary attachment may issue even without a hearing in

accordance with Section 2, Rule 57

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