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TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................................................... 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... 6
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Project Description ................................................................................................. 7
1.2 Purpose .................................................................................................................. 8
1.3 Meeting Details ....................................................................................................... 8
1.4 HAZOP Team ......................................................................................................... 8
2 SCOPE & APPROACH ........................................................................................ 10
2.1 Study Scope ......................................................................................................... 10
2.1.1 Inclusions ............................................................................................................. 10
2.1.2 Exclusions ............................................................................................................ 10
2.2 Study Approach .................................................................................................... 10
2.3 Study Recording & Actions ................................................................................... 11
3 STUDY BASIS ..................................................................................................... 12
3.1 Master Documents ............................................................................................... 12
3.2 HAZOP (Utility) Nodes .......................................................................................... 16
3.3 Risk Assessment .................................................................................................. 17
3.4 Node Descriptions ................................................................................................ 18
3.5 Assumptions & Assurances .................................................................................. 25
4 MAIN FINDINGS .................................................................................................. 27
4.1 Summary .............................................................................................................. 27
4.2 Full List of Recommendations............................................................................... 27
5 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 37
APPENDIX A: HAZOP GUIDEWORDS ......................................................................... 38
APPENDIX B: HAZOP (UTILITY) MASTER P&IDS ....................................................... 39
APPENDIX C: HAZOP (UTILITY) STUDY WORKSHEETS ........................................... 40
Table of Figures
Figure 1-1: Location of Reggane Nord Perimeter............................................................. 7
Figure 3-1: HAZOP Worksheet Template....................................................................... 18
Table of Tables
Table 1-1: HAZOP Team Members .................................................................................. 9
Table 3-1: Primary / Master Documents ......................................................................... 12
Table 3-2: Secondary / Supporting Documents.............................................................. 14
Table 3-3: HAZOP (Utility) Nodes .................................................................................. 16
Table 3-4: List of Assumptions & Assurances ................................................................ 25
Table 4-1: Recommendations ........................................................................................ 27
HOLDS LIST
REVISION HISTORY
GLOSSARY
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
KH Kahlouche
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Genesis has carried out FEED studies for the Reggane Nord facilities, including HAZOP
studies for the Process and Utility Systems, to identify hazards with a potential for safety,
environmental impact or operability consequences. The aim of this Report is to
document the HAZOP study of the Utility Systems.
The HAZOP scope covers the Reggane Nord facilities up to the tie-in to the existing
Sonatrach GR5 pipeline. The P&IDs identified in Table 3-1 were reviewed by the
HAZOP team, in accordance with the agreed Terms of Reference (Ref. 1).
No major issues were identified during the HAZOP, but some of the more significant
issues / those with a wider impact, are summarised below:
1. Vendor packages should be subject to formal HAZOP once the detailed design has
been defined by the vendor;
2. The presence of SDVs at the liquid outlet of vessels should be reviewed so that their
benefits (preventing gas blowby) are assessed against their drawbacks (potential
generation of high liquid level and overspill).
Issues requiring verification and close-out will be addressed via the HSSE Action
Tracking Register (Ref. 3).
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Project Description
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this Report is to document the findings of the HAZOP (Utilities) study,
which has been carried out as per the principles outlined in the Terms of Reference (Ref
1).
The aim of this HAZOP study was to identify hazards with a potential for safety,
environmental impact or operability consequences. This was achieved by reviewing the
Utility P&IDs.
Vendor packages have not been reviewed as part of this HAZOP. P&IDs produced as
part of FEED are indicative only. Prospective vendors will design their own package
given inlet conditions and discharge product specifications. Most vendor packages are
currently shown only as an empty box on current P&IDs, and a full HAZOP of the
package P&IDs is therefore neither possible nor appropriate at this FEED design stage.
Relevant P&IDs (or parts thereof) are subject to engineering review / coarse HAZOP in
order to identify key hazards. Actions arising can then be highlighted in enquiry /
purchase specifications for the package or, for those hazards extending beyond the
package boundary, considered in FEED design or in future design phases as
appropriate.
The HAZOP was performed on 25th February – 1st March, and 4th – 6th March, 2013 in
the 2nd Floor Conference Room of Genesis’s offices at 262 High Holborn, London.
The HAZOP was performed by the team listed in Table 1-1. The make-up of the team
varied on a day-by-day basis.
Name Role
GRN Personnel
Genesis Personnel
The Terms of Reference (TOR) for this study have been defined separately (Ref. 1).
2.1.1 Inclusions
All new equipment and lines shown on project P&IDs, except as listed in
Section 2.1.2.
2.1.2 Exclusions
Systems beyond the tie-in point of the Reggane facilities to the existing
Sonatrach GR5 pipeline;
Future facilities;
Vendor packaged items;
Base de Vie Water Supply Systems.
The Genesis process engineer provided an overview of the FEED design (Ref. 2) and an
overall description of the process.
Each utility system was subdivided as necessary into sections, or nodes. For each
node:
The extent of the node was proposed by the Chairman, and agreed by the
team;
The Chairman marked up the node on the relevant P&IDs (see Appendix B);
The process engineer defined the design intent of the node, which was
recorded on the worksheets;
The pressure and temperature limits of system design envelope were
recorded, together with the parameters for normal operation;
The mode of operation to be reviewed (normal, SIMOPS, other, etc) was
recorded;
Credible deviations from normal operating conditions were then identified
using a checklist of key parameters and guidewords included in Appendix A to
provide structure to the review;
The causes and consequences of each deviation were recorded on the
worksheets, together with the safeguards incorporated into the design to
contain or control potential hazards, to identify that a deviation had occurred,
and where necessary to initiate executive action;
Genesis Page 10 of 40 Date: June 13
File name: PS-0000-1130-322-E Rev 01 HAZOP Report (Utility Systems)
Groupement Reggane
HAZOP Report (Utility Systems)
When the HAZOP had been completed, the deviations for which actions were
recommended were subjected to a risk assessment to confirm that the risk had been
reduced to a tolerable level by the action.
Where no action had been recommended the team considered that the risk was already
tolerably low, as judged by experience and good practice. This assumption was agreed
to be reasonable since all the utility units incorporated established and conventional
technology - there were no new or unusual aspects in the design.
The HAZOP study findings are recorded in full on the worksheets, which are included in
Appendix C, and summarised in Section 4.
The discussions were recorded in full on the worksheets, and not by exception.
3 STUDY BASIS
The HAZOP review was conducted in accordance with the Terms of Reference (Ref. 1),
and applying the Repsol and Sonatrach HAZOP procedures (Refs. 4 and 6). The review
started by establishing the intent of the design and operations by discussion of the
supplied documents, prior to formal review.
Documents used for the study are listed below in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2. The Master
documents used for the HAZOP (Utility) have been included in Appendix B (with nodes
identified) for ease of reference. The Process P&IDs are also included in Appendix B
(with nodes identified to highlight Process / Utility interfaces).
Note:
P&IDs that include vendor packages are subject to engineering review / coarse HAZOP, as discussed in
Section 1.2.
The utility systems were divided into 27 nodes (36-62) for review. These nodes are listed
in Table 3-3.
Node Description
40 LP Flare Header System
41 LP Flare Header Condensate Recovery
42 Acid Gas Vent System
43 Acid Gas Condensate Recovery
44 GTP Burn Pit
45 Heating Medium Storage, Pumping and Filtration
46 Heating Medium Heating and Use Circuit
47 HP Fuel Gas Heating and Supply to Users
48 LP Fuel Gas Heating and Supply to Users
49 HP and LP Fuel Gas Separator Liquid Outlets
50 Start Up Fuel Gas System (Pipeline Gas)
51 Closed Drain System
52 Oily Water Supply and Water Recovery
53 Open Drains Water Recovery, Oil Recovery and Discharge
54 Diesel Fuel System
55 Aquifer Water Supply from Source
56 Raw Water Supply to Service Water Storage Tank
57 Service Water Supply to Users
58 Demin Supply to Users
59 Firewater Supply System
60 Foam Supply System
61 Plant and Instrument Air System
62 Nitrogen System
On completion of the HAZOP, deviations for which actions were recommended were
subjected to a risk assessment to confirm that the risk had been reduced to a tolerable
level by the action. Where no action had been recommended the team considered that
the risk was already tolerably low, as judged by experience and good practice.
The risk assessment was performed by a small team (GRN and Genesis) at the end of
the HAZOP workshop. This exercise was recorded on the HAZOP template, see Figure
3-1 below.
The Repsol HAZOP guide (Ref. 4) provides the following description of the risk
assessment steps:
‘C, P, S, R: Identification of the risk following the CEL method where the consequences (C) are
evaluated, simultaneously considering the probability (P) of occurrence of the scenario or
consequence and the exposure (E) to the risk of the vulnerable element. The composition of the
three magnitudes will determine the assigned risk ®, which is obtained using a numerical value.’
The CEL (Consequence, Exposure and Likelihood) risk assessment method is described
further in the Repsol PHA guide document (Ref. 5, Annex IX). This indicates the use of
three independent matrices (Ref. 7) which are calibrated to the Repsol risk acceptability
criteria.
The HAZOP (Utilities) study has recorded, as part of the risk evaluation, the
consequences for applicable scenarios, including the potential for equipment damage,
but excluding the potential for injury to personnel. The SIL (Utilities) study is based on
the identified HAZOP hazard scenarios, including current or recommended safeguards.
Where necessary, the SIL study has developed the HAZOP risk evaluation, taking into
account the risk of injuries or fatalities to personnel, to facilitate the assignment of a
target SIL to the relevant SIF.
The following node descriptions have been included for further clarity.
General Node
A number of general points affecting some or all of the nodes were discussed, and are
recorded here in order to avoid the need to repeat them in the worksheet for every node.
• Loss of Containment:
Where Loss of Containment was considered credible, its consequences were
considered by the team.
• Fire protection:
Any significant release of flammable material that ignites will be detected by the
fire detection system, and confirmed fire will initiate an ESD level 1 shutdown
which shuts in and blows down every isolatable section.
Fire has not therefore been addressed as a general issue in the HAZOP
worksheets. Credit is given where equipment that can be isolated with trapped
inventory is protected by a PSV. At the time of the HAZOP, the PSV sizing cases
were on hold and it was assumed that they would be adequately sized for fire.
Fixed fire fighting measures located in the process area include: deluge and
monitors (fire water / foam). These systems are further defined in the Specification
for Active Fire Protection (Ref. 8).
• Vendor Packages:
• Electrical Heaters:
It was noted that some electric heaters had instrumentation notation which was
incorrectly displayed. Accordingly, all plant electrical heaters should be reviewed
to ensure internal trips are correctly displayed (ie no reference to ESD for internal
trips)
• Economic Consequence:
An additional Economic Consequence was agreed for use, which refers to loss of
production or cost impact.
• Winterisation Study:
It was noted at several points that freezing of stagnant water in low ambient
temperature conditions was credible. Accordingly, a Winterisation Study is to be
performed where ever such a risk is perceived.
• SDV/ESDV Labelling:
Rationalise labelling of SDVs (used in non process areas) and ESDVs (isolating
process areas in case of fire or other emergency) to ensure consistency across
facility.
• Bird Screens:
Given the use of bird screens can cause problems as well as alleviating them,
their use on the facility is to be reviewed.
• Definition of Likelihood:
As it was not clearly stated in the Guidance Notes, it was agreed in the Review
that, when carrying out the Risk Ranking exercise, the likelihood (L) parameter is
taken to be the probability of propagation taking existing safeguards and
recommended actions into account
If decision is made for 141A-V-601/2 to not be buried, a full safety review must be
carried out on the new design.
Node 53: Open Drains Water Recovery, Oil Recovery and Discharge
The purpose of this system is to purify waste water such that it can be discharged without
infringing environmental thresholds. Coursely treated water from the Oily Water
Separator and discharges from the Open Drains are fed to the CPI Separator. It first
passes through a Sand Trap to remove any entrained solids. It is then fed to a
Corrugated Plate Separator, which acts to disentrain residual hydrocarbons from water.
Separated hydrocarbons pass over a baffle into a collection pot, which feeds an Oil
Sump. From here, the Waste Oil Pump transfers the oil to the Closed Drain System.
Meanwhile, the separated water passes under the baffle into the Clear Water Sump, and
is then pumped to the Evaporation Pond.
The design intent defined in the supplied information was modified and clarified during
the HAZOP study. These clarifications form part of the study basis as agreed by the
HAZOP team and are summarised in Table 3-4. It will be necessary to verify the validity
of these assumptions and assurances to ensure the study findings remain valid.
Ref Assumption By
A7 Actions to confirm that logic controllers perform as they are EPC
supposed to are assumed to be ALARP on the basis that the Contractor
logic will be reviewed in detail once it has been defined.
A8 All recommendations related to operational improvement (e.g. EPC
removing redundant trips) are classified as ‘ALARP’ because Contractor
they do not affect risk.
A9 Where actions are placed on vendors it is assumed that they will EPC
be satisfactorily addressed so, at this stage of the design Contractor
process, they will be classified as ALARP.
A10 Failure of ESDVs on pump suctions will cause those pumps to EPC
trip. Contractor
A11 Node 38: EPC
Amine discharge to HP flare system not considered credible Contractor
therefore no need to have dedicated system to collect and
dispose expensive amine.
A12 Node 49: EPC
HAZOP Assumption 16: Fuel Gas KO Drums (141A-V-202 and Contractor
141A-V-201) are run with no liquid inventory
The close-out of these actions will be performed via the HSSE Action Tracker (Ref. 3).
Assumptions A1-9 also apply to the HAZOP of Process Systems.
Any changes to the assumptions will need to be reviewed by GRN to assess their
significance and the requirement for any follow-up reviews.
4 MAIN FINDINGS
4.1 Summary
The P&IDs listed in Table 3-1 were reviewed in accordance with the HAZOP process
described in the ToR (Ref. 1).
No major issues were identified during the HAZOP, but some of the more significant
issues / those with a wider impact, are summarised below:
1. Vendor packages should be subject to formal HAZOP once the detailed design has
been defined by the vendor;
2. The presence of SDVs at the liquid outlet of vessels should be reviewed so that their
benefits (preventing gas blowby) are assessed against their drawbacks (potential
generation of high liquid level and overspill).
Issues requiring verification and close-out will be addressed via the HSSE Action
Tracking Register (Ref. 3).
General Node.
G1 Electrical Heaters: Genesis Process
It was noted that some electric heaters had instrumentation notation which was
incorrectly displayed. Accordingly, all plant electrical heaters should be reviewed to
ensure internal trips are correctly displayed (ie no reference to ESD for internal
trips).
G2 Closed Drain System: Genesis Process
Ensure that all process lines feeding the Closed Drain system are reviewed for 2
phase flow and designed appropriately.
G3 Winterisation Study: EPC Contractor
It was noted at several points that freezing of stagnant water in low ambient
temperature conditions was credible. Accordingly, a Winterisation Study is to be
performed where ever such a risk is perceived.
Node Action By
36 36.3. Remove high pressure alarm 1417-PI-1011 H, which does not provide any Genesis Process
additional useful information.
37 37.1. Add HH trip to 1417-LI-1007 in accordance with note 6 (PD-1417-1153-103- Genesis Process
D), determine appropriate voting rules and update Cause and effects accordingly.
37 37.2. Review purpose of SDV-1001 and remove if perceived benefits are Genesis Process
outweighed by disadvantages.
37 37.3. Determine the voting system and add designation to 1417-LI-1007 (PD-1417- Genesis Process
1153-103-D) and update Cause and effects accordingly.
38 38.1. Ensure that flare packages have O2 analysers on flare stacks (1417-PU-110) EPC Contractor
39 39.1. Add HH trip to 1417-LI-1009 in accordance with note 8 (PD-1417-1153-106-D) Genesis Process
and determine appropriate voting rules and update Cause and Effects accordingly
39 39.2. Review cause and effect matrix to confirm correct shutdown scenarios. Genesis Process
Node Action By
39 39.3. Review purpose of SDV-1003 and remove if perceived benefits are Genesis Process
outweighed by disadvantages.
39 39.4. Determine the voting system and add designation to 1417-LI-1009 (PD-1417- Genesis Process
1153-106-D). Update Cause and Effects accordingly
39 39.5. Remove 1417-V-103 minimum recycle line (PD-1417-1153-106-D). Genesis Process
39 39.6. Confirm existence of internal high temperature trip to 1417-HE-101. EPC Contractor
40 40.1. Ensure that flare packages have O2 analysers on flare stacks (1417-PU-109) EPC Contractor
40 40.3. Remove high pressure alarm 1417-PI-1022 H, which does not provide any Genesis Process
additional useful information.
40 40.4. Verify means of safely maintaining rotameter 1417-FI-1012/1013. EPC Contractor
41 41.1. Add HH trip to 1417-LI-1008 in accordance with note 7 (PD-1417-1153-109-D) Genesis Process
and determine appropriate voting rules. Update Cause and Effects accordingly
41 41.2. Review cause and effect matrix to confirm correct shutdown scenarios. Genesis Process
41 41.3. Review purpose of SDV-1002 and remove if perceived benefits are Genesis Process
outweighed by disadvantages.
41 41.4. Determine the voting system and add designation to 1417-LI-1008 (PD-1417- Genesis Process
1153-109-D). Update Cause and Effects accordingly
41 41.5. Remove 1417-V-102 minimum recycle line (PD-1417-1153-109-D). Genesis Process
43 43.1. Determine the voting system and add designation to 1417-LI-3003 (PD-1417- Genesis Process
1153-301-D). Update Cause and Effects accordingly
43 43.2. Review purpose of SDV-3001 and remove if perceived benefits are Genesis Process
outweighed by disadvantages.
43 43.3. Delete note 3 on PD-1417-1153-301-D, as not required. Genesis Process
43 43.5. Delete minimum recycle line associated with 1417-P-301A/B, as not required. Genesis Process
Node Action By
44 44.2. Add slope indication to burn pit feed pipes (PD-1417-1153-201-D) Genesis Process
44 44.3. Review P&ID and confirm design of burn pit with respect to ignition philosophy. EPC Contractor
44 44.4. Prepare operating and start up procedures and philosophy for GTP burn pit EPC Contractor
system
44 44.5. Review design of pit lining to prevent crack development EPC Contractor
45 45.0. Design pressure of 141A-V-101 to be revised following reduction in operating Genesis Process
conditions.
45 45.1. Review "safe location" of vent, based on anticipated conditions of 141A-PSV- EPC Contractor
1019A/B discharge.
45 45.2. Consider swapping failure modes of 141A-PV-1016 and 141A-PV-1017. Genesis Process
45 45.3. Review use of a single line for dosing more than one chemical in terms of EPC Contractor
operability and hold up in the dosing line.
45 45.4. Review method for inerting heating medium system for start up, specifically EPC Contractor
where nitrogen will be charged and vented
46 46.1. Modify executive action of 141A-FI-1011 LL to only trip 141A-H-101. Update Genesis Process
Cause and Effects accordingly
46 46.2. Review requirement for 141A-PI-1024 HH trip and delete if not required. Genesis Process
(141A-FV-1008/1009/1010 will act to protect 141A-P-101A/B/C)
46 46.3. Align P&ID with Cause and Effects, with respect to 141A-TI-1019 such that H Genesis Process
temperature pre-alarm and HH temperature trip are both shown.
46 46.4. Review line sizing basis of 12"-HMS-141A-10714-3A3-H. Line is not required Genesis Process
to be full flow.
46 46.5. Additional ´´package tripped´´ tag required from package to ESD system to be Genesis Process
added to cause and effects and P&IDs. (141A-XS-1012 duplicated)
46 46.6. Review requirement for 141A-PSV-3001/3002/3003 Genesis Process
46 46.7. If 141A-PSV-3001/3002/3003 are retained, review "safe location" of vent, EPC Contractor
based on anticipated conditions of 141A-PSV-3001/3002/3003 discharge.
46 46.8. Add positive isolation around 141A-H-301A/B/C and ensure consistency EPC Contractor
between P&IDs (vendor packages).
47 47.1. Revise tag numbering of 141A-PV-2014, to give unique number (PD-141A- Genesis Process
1153-203-D).
47 47.2. Review sizing criteria for 141A-PSV-2012A/B to ensure appropriate sizing for EPC Contractor
failure of 141A-PV-2014. Also consider relocating 141A-PSV-2029A/B to cover
valve failure case from either start-up or main route.
47 47.3. Review sizing criteria for 141A-PSV-2012A/B to ensure appropriate sizing for EPC Contractor
failure of 141A-PV-2014C/D.
Node Action By
47 47.4. Review location of 141A-HE-203A/B with respect to optimum fuel gas EPC Contractor
processing
47 47.5. Add high and low alarm to 141A-PIC-2014. Genesis Process
47 47.6. Review Cause and effects with respect to executive action of 141A-PI-2011 Genesis Process
LL.
47 47.7. Review duplication of tag 141A-ESDV-2018, and consider deleting if not Genesis Process
required.
48 48.0. Verify pressure control valve tag numbers at inlet to LP fuel gas separator. Genesis Process
48 48.3. Ensure that downstream equipment are designed to deal with small quantities EPC Contractor
of liquid drop-out.
48 48.4. Add high and low pressure alarm to 141A-PIC-2008. Genesis Process
49 49.1. Review requirement to close ESDVs to heating medium fired heater on 141A- Genesis Process
LI-2003 HH trip. Update Cause and Effects accordingly
50 50.1. Review requirement to use raw gas during start up under LP well operation GRN Project
51 51.2. Add an independent level indication with trip function to stop 141A-P-601 in Genesis Process
case of low low level on 141A-V-601 (PD-141A-1153-609-D). Update Cause and
Effects accordingly
51 51.3. Add appropriate instrumentation, including high HC alarm to leak detection Genesis Process
equipment on 141A-V-601.
51 51.4. Ensure that 141A-PSV-6001 A/B is appropriately sized for reverse flow from EPC Contractor
1413-V-101, in conjunction with check valve mitigation.
51 51.5. Consider rationalisation of check valves in liquid discharge line from 141A-V- Genesis Process
601
51 51.6. Verify sizing of 141A-PSV-6001A/B for uncontrolled heating. EPC Contractor
51 51.7. Review requirement for vessel heater in 141A-V-601, and remove if not Genesis Process
required.
51 51.8. Review failure modes of 141A-PCV-6004/6005 Genesis Process
51 51.9. Verify that 141A-V-601 is designed for full vacuum. EPC Contractor
51 51.10. Add low pressure alarm and pump inhibition to 141A-PI-6020. Update Cause Genesis Process
and Effects accordingly
Node Action By
52 52.1. Consider conversion of 141A-LI-6008 HH trip to H alarm on vessel 141A-V- Genesis Process
602. Update Cause and Effects accordingly
52 52.2. Remove 141A-LI-6008 HH trips on 141A-V-602 from cause and effects, as not Genesis Process
required
52 52.3. Remove 141A-FI-6003 L alarm. Genesis Process
52 52.4. Consider conversion of 141A-LI-6009 HH trip to H alarm on vessel 141A-V- Genesis Process
602. Update Cause and Effects accordingly
52 52.5. Remove 141A-LI-6009 HH trips on 141A-V-602 from cause and effects, as not Genesis Process
required
52 52.6. Remove 141A-FI-6005 L alarm Genesis Process
52 52.7. Ensure that vent line is adequately sized to prevent vacuum formation in EPC Contractor
vessel 141A-V-602
52 52.8. Consider designing 141A-V-602 for full vacuum EPC Contractor
52 52.9. Review requirement for flame arrestor at vent discharge of 141A-V-602. EPC Contractor
52 52.11. Review note 6 on PD-141A-1153-602-D with respect to whether vessel is EPC Contractor
buried or not
52 52.12. Add appropriate instrumentation, including high HC alarm to leak detection EPC Contractor
equipment on 141A-V-602
Node 53: Open Drains Water Recovery, Oil Recovery and Discharge
53 53.1. Consider replacing 141A-LI-6006 HH trip with H level alarm, and update Genesis Process
Cause and effects accordingly.
53 53.2. Consider replacing 141A-LI-6004 HH trip with H level alarm, and update Genesis Process
Cause and effects accordingly.
53 53.3. Verify that design pressure of 141A-P-605A and associated piping is 3.5 barg. Genesis Process
53 53.4. Include regular sampling of water quality in operating procedures EPC Contractor
53 53.5. Provide appropriate positive isolation on discharge of pump 141A-P-605A EPC Contractor
54 54.2. Consider replacing 141A-FV-5001 with restriction orifice on 141A-P-501A/B EPC Contractor
min. flow recycle line
54 54.3. Consider deletion of 141A-PI-5015 HH trip Genesis Process
54 54.4. Update PD-141A-1153-501-D to reflect single diesel transfer pump specified Genesis Process
55 55.1. Update Cause and effects for 141A-LI-8001 HH executive action to trip 141A- Genesis Process
P-807
Node Action By
55 55.3. Update tag number reference table to include relevant instrumentation for EPC Contractor
service water lift pumps 141A-P-802/807 on PD-141A-1153-801-D.
55 55.4. Ensure design pressure of sodium hypochlorite injection system does not EPC Contractor
exceed design pressure of service water supply system.
55 55.5. Ensure adequate overpressure protection is provided in sodium hypochlorite EPC Contractor
injection system
55 55.6. Ensure design pressure of biocide injection system does not exceed design EPC Contractor
pressure of service water supply system.
55 55.7. Ensure adequate overpressure protection is provided in biocide system EPC Contractor
55 55.9. Revise tag number of 1430-SDV-8001 for unit number 141A Genesis Process
55 55.10. Rationalise 141A-PSV-8014 set point with respect to system design pressure EPC Contractor
55 55.11. Relocate biocide injection point onto service water collection header. EPC Contractor
55 55.12. Relocate sodium hypochlorite injection point and 141A-AI-8001 to service EPC Contractor
water collection header.
56 56.1. Update executive action on 141A-SDV-8002 failure to trip sodium hypochlorite Genesis Process
injection system in cause and effects
56 56.2. Consider trip of 141A-PU-802 on 141A-PI-8010 HH trip. Engineering Genesis Process
56 56.3. Review executive action, name and tag of 141A-P-805A/B trip in Cause and Genesis Process
Effects. (Currently trips itself) Engineering
56 56.4. Update executive action for 141A-P-805A/B trip to stop 141A-PU-802 Genesis Process
56 56.5. Review relative location of chloride analyser 141A-AI-8003 with respect to EPC Contractor
sodium hypochlorite injection points.
56 56.6. Rationalise tag number 141A-AI-8004 on P&IDs PD-141A-1153-803-D and Genesis Process
PD-141A-1153-804-D.
57 57.1. Update cause and effects such that 141A-LI-8003 HH trips 141A-P-803A/B Genesis Process
and 141A-PU-805.
57 57.2. Define safe location for discharge of 141A-PSV-8042/8044. Design of these EPC Contractor
PSVs shall consider release of fuel gas and possible overfilling of vessel. Tank may
require separate overfilling protection.
57 57.3. Update executive action in Cause and effects, such that 141A-LI-8005 LL trips Genesis Process
141A-PU-805.
57 57.4. Update executive action on 141A-ESDV-8002 failure to trip oxygen scavenger Genesis Process
injection system in cause and effects
57 57.5. Consider requirement for HH pressure trip at discharge of 141A-P-803A/B GRN Project
57 57.6. Consider adding additional executive action to 141A-LI-8005 HH to trip 141A- Genesis Process
PU-805.
Node Action By
57 57.8. Review system design of piping to domestic consumers to ensure that EPC Contractor
temperature is within safe limits for human exposure (due to solar radiation)
57 57.9. Verify that 141A-PSV-8042/8044 are sized for blocked outlet or inlet valve EPC Contractor
failure open
57 57.10. Review design pressure of 141A-TK-803, in light of gas blanketed vessel Genesis Process
design
57 57.11. Consider additional layer of protection on 141A-TK-803, with respect to Genesis Process
141A-PV-804A failing open
57 57.12. Ensure that 141A-TK-803 is designed for -25 mmWC. EPC Contractor
57 57.14. Consider adding conductivity analyser with H alarm downstream of 141A-TK- Genesis Process
803
57 57.15. Review use of a storage tank for the storage of deoxygenated demin. water EPC Contractor
(consider if a vessel design will be better, or a liquid seal overflow).
57 57.16. Review requirement for dedicated oxygen scavenger injection in heating EPC Contractor
medium system
58 58.2. Review use of 141A-PCV-8043 as min. flow control valve EPC Contractor
58 58.4. Review requirement for thermal protection on demin water header and piping EPC Contractor
58 58.5. Start up procedure to include method for avoiding oxygen contamination EPC Contractor
during start up
59 59.1. Review the control of level in the firewater tanks141A-TK-901A/B. Consider EPC Contractor
acting only on 1430-SDV-8001 and start/stop of additional lift pumps to be controlled
manually.
59 59.2. Revise 141A-LIC-9001/9003 L alarm set point to reflect minimum inventory EPC Contractor
requirement for firewater storage. Also, review level settings for high alarms.
59 59.3. Add low pressure alarms on 141A-PIC-9011/9004/9009 Genesis Process
59 59.4. Consider independent low pressure safety function at most distant point in ring EPC Contractor
main to start firewater pump through ESD system.
59 59.5. Firewater P&IDs PD-141A-1130-901-D and PD-141A-1130-903-D to be Genesis Process
updated with revised control schematic, including reference to identified safeguards
59 59.6. Review how ring main header pressure is maintained in firewater system, e.g. EPC Contractor
use of an expansion vessel vs. continuously running jockey pump
59 59.7. Add line 2"-SW-141A-80414-1P1-B to PD-141A-1153-902-D to both tanks, Genesis Process
141A-TK-901A/B
59 59.8. Consider adding non-return valve into line 2"-SW-141A-80414-1P1-B Genesis Process
Node Action By
59 59.9. Ensure that electric driven firewater pump is protected against electrical EPC Contractor
overload during start up
59 59.10. As this is part of a safety critical system, it should be part of an assurance EPC Contractor
and verification program during the design and operation phases.
60 60.1. Ensure that level indicator 141A-LI-9005B is in view of filling point EPC Contractor
60 60.3. Correct dimensions and capacity unit dimensions of 141A-TK-902. Genesis Process
60 60.5. Review pump operation and provide activation methodology EPC Contractor
60 60.6. Confirm foam pumps 141A-P-902A/B are on emergency board. Genesis Process
60 60.7. Review requirement for one pump of 141A-P-902A/B to be diesel driven. Genesis Process
60 60.8. As this is part of a safety critical system, it should be part of an assurance and EPC Contractor
verification program during the design and operation phases.
60 60.9. Provide sun shelter for 141A-TK-902 EPC Contractor
60 60.10. Review characteristics of foam concentrate at low temperature i.e. flow and EPC Contractor
degradation
60 60.11. Provide procedure for filling of 141A-TK-902 and charging of foam distribution EPC Contractor
system prior to start up.
60 60.12. Revise drawing to reflect use of positive displacement pumps for foam Genesis Process
concentrate distribution. Add dip pipe to liquid recycle line and remove 141A-RO-
9001/9002 recycle lines. Change 141A-PV-9018 to PCV and change sensing from
downstream to upstream. Show vessel level instruments to top of vessel. Also
provide note on P&ID that vessel should be kept completely filled.
61 61.1. Consider auto-start of standby air compressor in case of duty compressor EPC Contractor
failure
61 61.2. Consider removing non return valve immediately upstream of 141A-V-702 Genesis Process
Node Action By
62 62.1. Review function of 141A-PI-A004 LL to close air supply to nitrogen package. EPC Contractor
Consider supplying nitrogen to critical users (e.g. compressors) should be preserved
as much as possible.
62 62.2. Review whether adequate overpressure protection of nitrogen system is EPC Contractor
provided. Consider relocation of nitrogen purge connection to flare stack only on HP
flare system.
62 62.3. Nitrogen is required prior to fuel gas and main power supply start up. EPC Contractor
Therefore, confirm that nitrogen generation system is provided with emergency
power supply.
62 62.4. As this is part of a safety critical system, it should be part of an assurance and EPC Contractor
verification program during the design and operation phases.
5 REFERENCES
1. Terms of Reference – HAZOP, PS-0000-1130-308-E, Genesis.
4. Guide for the Performance of HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability analysis) Studies,
SCOR G-02, Rev 0, February 2007, Repsol.
5. Guide for the Performance of PHA Studies, SCOR G-01, Rev. 0, September,
2007, Repsol.
Master_HAZOP
Utillity.pdf
REGGANE utility
HAZOP WORKSHEETS