Proceedings of the 8th International Pipeline Conference
IPC2010
September 27-October 1, 2010, Calgary, Alberta, Canada
A MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE FAILURE RATES OF OFFSHORE PIPELINES
*
Vania de Stefani
BP International
Sunbury on Thames, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT
Pipelines are subjected to several threats which can cause
failure of the line, such as external impact, mechanical
defects, corrosion and natural hazards. In particular, offshore
operations present a unique set of environmental conditions
and adverse exposure not observed in a land environment.
For example, offshore pipelines located near harbor areas and
in major shipping lanes are likely to be exposed to the risk of
damage from anchor and dropped object impact. Such
damage may result in potential risk to people and the
environment, and significant repair costs.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is a method which
is often used in the oil and gas industry to predict the level of
risk. In QRA calculations the frequency of an incident is often
assessed by a generic failure frequency approach. Generic
failure frequencies derived from local incident databases are
largely used in pipeline risk assessments. As a result, risk
assessments for offshore pipelines may not reflect accurately
operational experience for a specific pipeline or region of
operation. In addition, a better understanding of the causes
and characteristics of pipeline failure should provide
important information to improve inspection and maintenance
activity for existing pipelines and to aid in selection of design
criteria for new pipelines.
This paper presents an analysis of the failure data from
various pipelines databases to see if there is a common trend
regarding failure rates, and failure-rate dependence on
pipeline parameters.
A breakdown of the causes of failure has been carried
out. The effect on failure frequency of factors such as
pipeline age, location, diameter, wall thickness, steel grade,
burial depth, and fluid transported have been investigated and
are discussed.
*
Corresponding Author: email : vania.destefani@bp.com
1 Copyright © 2010 by ASME
IPC2010-
Peter Carr
E-P-Consult LLC,
Houston, Texas, USA
The objective of this paper is to provide a guideline for the
determination of failure frequency for offshore pipelines
and to describe a new model developed for use within BP for
this purpose. This model uses historical databases and
predictive methods to develop failure frequencies as a function
of a range of influencing parameters.
1 INTRODUCTION
In order to assess the risk associated with the operation of
any pipeline, it is necessary to be able to accurately predict the
frequency with which hazardous events may be realized.
One of the simplest ways to estimate the failure frequency
is to look at historical incident records and extrapolate current
incident rates and trends into the future. This actuarial approach
to risk assessment breaks down for many major hazards. Data
are sparse as the number of major incidents is small in relation
to the operating experience. There are also differences in design
and operating conditions between pipelines, which make large
differences to risk. Furthermore, in areas where technology is
evolving rapidly, there is an inevitable difficulty in applying
yesterday’s data to today’s technology.
The alternative of synthesizing the frequency is to use
techniques such as fault tree analysis. This is a time consuming
process as it requires the detailed knowledge of the probability
of intermediate events that build the fault tree itself. These
probabilities need to be quantified using historical failure data.
However, for some of the influencing parameters there are very
little data available.
BP has developed a model for the prediction of offshore
pipeline failure frequencies. The model is based on generic
failure statistics with adjustments for geographical location,
pipeline attributes, and operating conditions.
The model has been developed for use within BP, and the
views informing its development are for BP’s purposes.
 The model is intended for use in a high level quantified
risk assessment with a consistent approach for all BP
operations with the potential to give rise to a major incident.
Offshore pipelines are considered, including mid line
pipelines, and shore approaches. Flexible as well as rigid
steel pipelines are considered; however, due to lack of
available data, flexible lines are treated simplistically.
The study excludes failures of risers, pipeline fittings
(valves, mechanical connectors, injection points, bypass lines,
etc.) and non-pipe equipment such as meters and
compressors.
2 REVIEW OF HISTORICAL DATABASES
A preliminary review of sources of failure data for
offshore pipelines was made. The information stored within
these databases varies widely depending on the reporting
criteria. Only accidents that lead to loss of containment are
included in this study. Four sources were identified that were
suitable for further analysis. These were:
• PARLOC (Pipeline And Riser Loss Of Containment) [1] is
a database of information on damage incidents and loss of
containment incidents involving North Sea pipelines and
risers. The database was compiled from information
supplied by the UK, Norwegian, Dutch, German, and
Danish regulatory authorities, by individual operators in
the UK, Dutch and Danish sectors, and by various other
organizations. The latest PARLOC covers the period from
the early years of North Sea operation through to the end
of 2000. The operating experience encompassed by
PARLOC amounts to 307,246 km-yr for steel pipelines
and 8,155 km-yr for flexible pipelines.
• Health and Safety Executive Hydrocarbon Release
Database (OIR12). The latest report from the HSE’s
Hydrocarbon Release Database [2] includes release
frequencies for steel and flexible pipelines based on data
from 1 October 1992 to 31 March 2001. These incidents
are likely to be included in the much larger and more
detailed PARLOC database, and therefore the OIR12 data
are not considered further.
• Data on pipeline failures in the Gulf of Mexico collected
by the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and
published by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), [3] and [4]. The reporting
threshold for hazardous liquid pipeline incidents,
currently 5 gallons, was 50 barrels prior to 2001. The
PHMSA publishes statistics on pipeline incidents and
populations within the jurisdiction of DOT. The DOT-
regulated offshore pipeline infrastructure currently
comprises roughly 11,000 km of gas gathering pipelines,
10,000 km of gas transmission pipelines, and 8,000 km of
hazardous liquid (mainly crude oil) pipelines. Incident
statistics for DOT-regulated pipelines go back to around
1968, though only the data from the mid 1980's has been
2 Copyright © 2010 by ASME
considered in this paper because earlier data are thought
likely to be too old to be relevant. The incident datasets used
cover the period 1984 to 2008 for gas gathering and
transmission pipelines (estimated operating experience
477,890 km-years) and 1986 to 2008 for liquid pipelines
(estimated operating experience 170,489 km-years). The
total operating experience for DOT-regulated pipelines since
the mid 1980's is estimated as 648,379 km-yr. This makes
the total DOT operating experience more than twice as
much as PARLOC.
• The Minerals Management Service (MMS) [5] and [6]
database covers the period from approximately 1959 to the
end of 2007. The MMS pipeline database lists the pipelines
in segments. There are 17,580 segments in the database. The
total length of all the segments is 72,147 km, including
abandoned segments. Currently active segments total 40,740
km. The MMS data are structured in a way that makes it
difficult to extract loss-of-containment data and are not
considered further.
Thus, of the four sources above, only the PARLOC and
DOT databases were taken forwards for detailed analysis.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the results for these two data
sources.
Failure frequency (per km .yr)
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
PARLOC PARLOC DOT (Gas) DOT DOT (Total)
(steel) (flexible) (Liquid)
Figure 1: Failure frequencies (mean value) for offshore pipelines
Table 1 presents the total failure frequency for offshore
pipelines. Exposure data for onshore pipeline databases are also
presented for comparison purpose: the operating experience for
offshore pipelines is more than ten times lower than that for
onshore pipelines. Where failure mechanisms are essentially the
same for onshore and offshore pipelines, the onshore databases
have therefore been used to derive failure frequencies.
Both gas and liquid pipelines in the US have higher failure
frequencies than for oil and gas steel pipelines in the North Sea.
However, the DOT data include failures to flexible pipelines
and safety zone areas, which are excluded from the PARLOC
data used in this analysis.
 Table 1 Pipeline accident databases

Database Name Region Contents Type From To Exposure (km.yr) Failure Frequency (per km.yr)

Offshore Pipelines
PARLOC (steel) North Sea Oil and Gas N/A 2000 307,246 8.79.E-05
PARLOC (flexible) North Sea Oil and Gas N/A 2000 8,155 1.01.E-03
Gas 1984 2008 482,142 3.65.E-04
DOT (PHMSA), [3], [4] US Oil 1986 2008 179,254 3.12.E-04
Oil and Gas 1984 2008 661,396 3.51.E-04
Onshore Pipelines, [7]
EGIG, [8] EUROPE Gas 1970 2007 3,150,000 3.70E-04
CONCAWE , [9] EUROPE Oil 1971 2005 858,705 5.59E-04 (1)
Gas 1986 2006 9,300,060 1.12E-04 (2)
DOT (PHMSA), [3], [4] US
Oil 1986 2006 5,056,591 5.69E-05
APIA, [10] Australia Gas 1971 1995 348,000 7.76E-05
Gas 1984 2003 556,000 4.86E-05 (3)
NEB, [11] Canada
Oil 1984 2003 304,000 6.25E-05 (3)
World Bank, [12] Russia & FSU Oil 1990 1996 588,379 4.86E-05 (3)
OSSA-1, [13] Bolivia Oil 1983 2003 8,300 6.25E-05 (3)
UKOPA, [14] UK Gas 1952 2006 700,463 4.86E-05
Oil 1990 2005 231,250 6.25E-05
ERCB, [15] Alberta, Canada Gas 1990 2005 2,313,942 4.86E-05
Sour 1990 2005 171,233 6.25E-05
(1) CONCAWE records 436 incidents, 176 of which can be categorised by hole size.
(2) DOT website records 764 incidents; however, the raw data used in the analysis for the rupture frequency only records 761.
(3) Only data for rupture is available

Several types of incidents have been identified by the gas A breakdown for failure causes as derived from the
and oil pipeline industry in the past according to their initial databases listed above is summarized in Figure 2.
causes. Some of the causes of offshore pipeline failures are
listed below:
• Mechanical damage: The following causes of external 1.0E-02
PARLOC - Steel
damage are considered: anchors, trawling, ship sinking, PARLOC - Flexible
DOT - Total
1.0E-03
and objects dropped from ships. Location-specific threats, DOT - Liquid
DOT - Gas
Failure frequency (per km.yr)

e.g. presence of shipping channels, cannot be identified 1.0E-04

using generic failure frequencies.
• External or internal corrosion: Corrosion, in all forms, is 1.0E-05

another major cause of incidents and is increasingly

1.0E-06
prevalent in ageing pipelines that need to withstand the
aggressive nature of the produced fluids and the marine 1.0E-07
environment.
• Construction defect and mechanical or material failure: 1.0E-08
Total Internal External External Construction Natural Other failure
Construction and material defects (caused during Corrosion Corrosion Interferance and Material Hazards modes
defects
processing or fabrication) are often connected with welds
and equipment associated with the pipeline.
• Natural hazards: For the majority of pipelines, there is Figure 2: Failure frequencies for offshore pipelines – failure causes
little or no risk of failure due to the occurrence of natural
hazards. However, under certain circumstances, pipelines The proposed failure frequency model is discussed in the
may need to be routed through areas affected by following paragraphs for each of the failure modes. It should be
hurricanes, earthquakes, mudslides, debris flows or noted that failure frequencies have been derived for leaks and
turbidity currents. ruptures.
• Other or unknown causes.

3 Copyright © 2010 by ASME

3 FAILURE FREQUENCY MODEL
The proposed failure frequency model is given by:
F = FEI + FMF + FICO + FECO + FNH (1)
Where:
FEI: Calculated External Interference failure frequency -
from predictive model
FMF: Modified Mechanical Failure frequency
FICO: Modified Internal Corrosion failure frequency
FECO: Modified External Corrosion failure frequency
FNH: Modified Natural Hazards failure frequency
These elements are defined in the following sections. It
should be noted that, as described in the paper, many of the
parameters used in this model are dependent on hole size and
so separate modified failure frequencies can be generated for
punctures and ruptures.
4 CONSTRUCTION AND MATERIAL DEFECTS
Construction and material defects (caused during
processing or fabrication) are often connected with fittings
associated with the pipeline. Material and construction
defects contribute to 11% of all failures in the PARLOC
database and 9% in the DOT database. These values are
lower than those reported by the databases for onshore
pipelines: 16% for EGIG and 22% in the CONCAWE
database. This may be explained by the fact that in Europe
there are much older onshore pipelines than offshore.
The key parameters that influence the failure frequency
associated with construction and material defects are the
quality of pipeline construction and age at the time of failure.
Other factors (e.g. pipeline material) have not been taken into
account as historical databases don’t record the type of
material in place therefore this parameter is not included in
the final model.
Therefore, the failure frequency for material and
construction defects (FMF) is given by the following formula:
FMF = F yr × Page (2)
Where:
Fyr: Baseline mechanical failure frequency (per km.year),
Page: Modification factor for pipeline age
The quality of construction has improved through
modern construction and inspection methods and quality
control of steel manufacturing. Year of construction may be
an indicator of quality, although construction practices in a
given period may vary between countries. The DOT database
for offshore pipeline reports failures broken down by year of
construction. However, for the period under consideration,
very few data are available to derive a valuable statistical
4 Copyright © 2010 by ASME
analysis. Therefore, the data available for onshore pipelines
from the EGIG databases have been used instead. This is
considered to be appropriate since offshore and onshore
pipelines are constructed to similar standards, in terms of the
quality of steel and the welding and inspection techniques
employed.
Historical databases also demonstrate that incident
frequencies are higher in the early years and towards the end of
a pipeline’s life. This has been attributed to early appearance of
defects in materials. For offshore databases, there have been
insufficient incidents to determine clear trends in the
frequencies calculated from the reported number of incidents
and the confidence intervals show considerable overlap.
Therefore, to take into account the impact of pipeline age, a
series of modification factors were developed from data within
CONCAWE, [9]. The values are presented in [7].
5 CORROSION
5.1 Internal corrosion
Corrosion, in all forms, is another major contributor to
pipeline failures and mostly attacks pipes as they are ageing.
Corrosion has been extensively studied and much literature
exists on the topic. Approaches adopted in pipeline risk
assessments range from generic historical data to complex
reliability models, requiring detailed information on pipeline
properties and corrosion mechanisms. The failure frequency for
internal corrosion is given by the following formula:
FICO = FIBC × Pwt × Ppig (3)
Where:
F ICO: Modified failure frequency - Internal corrosion
FIBC: Baseline failure frequency for internal corrosion-
dependant on fluid type
Pwt: Wall thickness modification factor
Ppig: In-line inspection modification
The baseline corrosion failure frequencies for the BP model
depend upon the fluid type.
Some fluids (e.g. multiphase streams) generate higher rates
of internal corrosion than others (e.g. dry natural gas) as the
water within the fluid will influence the potential for corrosion.
To address this aspect, a review of data available in literature
has been undertaken to establish the failure frequency due to
internal corrosion associated with different fluid types.
Limited amount of data are available for comparing
pipeline failure frequencies as a function of product type.
However, the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB)
report summarizes the inventory of all energy-related pipelines
in Alberta including values for various fluid types. Table 2
presents a summary of the results in each of the data sources
described above.
 Table 2: Baseline Internal Corrosion failure frequency (per km.yr), FIBC
Failure
Fluid Type Frequency Ref Note
(per km.yr)
Water 8.07E-03 [15]
Multiphase 4.22E-03 [15]
Sour Gas 1.16E-03 [15] Sour gas pipelines are those where the H2S content exceeds 1% Vol of H2S in natural gas.
Wet Natural Gas 9.50E-04 [15]
CONCAWE make a distinction between cold pipelines (oil transported at ambient temperature) and hot
Crude oil 5.05E-05 [9]
pipelines (such as hot crude oil, lubricating oils and heavy fuel oils transported at elevated temperatures), [7].
Dry Natural Gas 4.74E-05 [8]
HVP and LVP products. Additional pipelines contained in the “other” classification include hydrogen, carbon
Other 2.27E-05 [15]
dioxide, nitrogen, ammonia, polymer, sulphur.

The remaining parameters that have been considered Table 3: Subsea pipeline failure frequencies due to external
which may have an important impact on the failure frequency corrosion derived from PARLOC1*
due to corrosion are:
Diameter No. of Failure frequency (per km.yr)
• Pipeline-specific parameters such as wall thickness, range failures Mean value Low conf. High conf.
diameter, pressure, and material properties. However, (in)
limit limit
other than for wall thickness, there is insufficient evidence [0,6] [2,8] [5.8E-5,2.3E-4] 1.04E-5 4.21E-4
within the public historical data to establish a link (6,40] 0† 2.54E-6 0 1.10E-5
between failure frequency and these properties. All [2,8] [6.5E-6,2.6E-5] 1.16E-6 4.70E-5
• In-line inspection (ILI) programs (pigging) which play a *Excluding pipelines in safety zone
major role in controlling the corrosion threat.
The modification factors discussed above, wall thickness
and pigging, should apply equally to both onshore and Table 4: External corrosion failure frequencies for subsea pipelines
offshore pipelines. Therefore, the values previously with CP from DOT data
developed for onshore pipelines [7] are used in this paper.
Data source Failure frequency (per km.yr)
Mean Low High
5.2 External corrosion value confidence confidence
External corrosion failure frequencies derived from limit limit
PARLOC are presented in Table 3. DOT, gas, 2002–2008 3.38E-05 1.33E-05 7.10E-05
A range of values is given, the lower value relating to DOT, gas, 1984–2001 2.15E-05 1.01E-05 4.03E-05
failures that were reported as external corrosion and the DOT, liquid, 2002-2008 1.23E-05 0.00E+00 5.28E-05
higher value taking into account additional failures not clearly DOT, liquid, 1986-2001 6.16E-05 2.89E-05 1.16E-04
described that may have been caused by external corrosion. DOT gas, all 2.53E-05 1.46E-05 4.10E-05
The failure rate appears to be higher for smaller diameter DOT liquid, all 4.11E-05 1.93E-05 7.71E-05
pipelines. This could be because smaller diameter pipelines DOT, all data 2.95E-05 1.93E-05 4.32E-05
tend to have thinner walls. It is also possible that smaller
diameter pipelines receive less attention in design and
operation.
External corrosion failure frequencies derived from DOT
1
data are presented in Table 4 for pipelines with cathodic Notation [a,b] indicates an interval. (a,b] indicates an interval open at the
protection (CP) and in Table 5 for pipelines without CP. The lower end, i.e. value a is not included in the interval.
fraction of leaks (as opposed to ruptures) derived from DOT
When the failure frequency is expressed as an interval, the first number
data was 94%. corresponds incidents reported for that cause while the second number
additionally takes into account the incidents whose causes are unknown or
unclear. Lower confidence limit is based on the smaller number of failures and
higher confidence limit on the larger number of failures.

†Where zero failures, mean calculated as 0.7/operating experience and high

confidence limit as 3.0/operating experience. These values have been derived
using the Poisson distribution.

5 Copyright © 2010 by ASME

 Table 5: External corrosion failure frequencies for subsea PCP: Modification factor for CP/no CP
pipelines without CP from DOT data Ppig: Modification factor for in-line inspection
Data source Failure frequency (per km per.yr)
It is considered that nearly all North Sea pipelines would
Mean Low High
value confidence confidence have been cathodically protected; therefore the baseline
limit limit frequency derived from the PARLOC data is taken as applicable
DOT, gas, 2002–2008 7.38E-03 0.00E+00 3.16E-02 to all cathodically protected pipelines. In the above equation,
DOT, gas, 1984–2001 5.62E-04 9.98E-05 1.77E-03 the baseline corrosion frequency has been based on cathodically
DOT, liquid, 2002–2008 1.17E-01 2.09E-02 3.70E-01 protected pipelines. From PARLOC this frequency is 5.83E-05
DOT, liquid, 1986–2001 2.93E-02 1.50E-03 1.39E-01 per km.yr for pipelines up to 6" nominal diameter and 2.54E-06
DOT gas, all 5.47E-04 9.72E-05 1.72E-03 per km.yr for larger pipelines. From US DOT data, the increase
DOT liquid, all 1.73E-01 4.72E-02 4.47E-01 in failure frequency for absence of cathodic protection has been
DOT, all data 1.35E-03 5.31E-04 2.84E-03 estimated as a factor of 46 on baseline frequency. There are no
reliable data on what proportion of subsea pipelines were
Figure 3 compares failure frequencies due to external subject to in-line inspection, therefore, the factor for inline
corrosion derived from PARLOC and DOT data. For this inspection is assumed to be the same as derived for onshore
comparison, the DOT pipelines without CP are excluded on pipelines. The loss-of-containment frequency is split between
the assumption that nearly all PARLOC pipelines would have punctures and ruptures based on a relative frequency of
had CP. In addition, when making the comparison, only punctures of 0.94, which was derived from US DOT data.
failures definitely reported as due to external corrosion are
considered – failures whose causes are not clearly described 6. EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE
are excluded. Failure frequencies due to external corrosion Table 6 and Table 7 present subsea pipeline failure
appear higher in the USA – this might be a water temperature frequencies due to external interference derived from DOT and
effect (most of the DOT-regulated pipelines are in the Gulf of PARLOC data, respectively.
Mexico where the water is warmer than in the North Sea) or it
might be a statistical uncertainty (the confidence intervals
Table 6: Failure frequencies for subsea pipelines due to external
overlap). interference derived from DOT data
1.0E-04 Data source Failure frequency (per km per.yr)
Failure frequency per km per yr .

Mean value Low High

8.0E-05 confidence confidence
limit limit
DOT, gas, 2002–2008 2.03E-05 5.52E-06 5.24E-05
6.0E-05
DOT, gas, 1984–2001 9.70E-05 7.06E-05 1.30E-04
4.0E-05
DOT, liquid, 2002–2008 3.52E-05 6.26E-06 1.11E-04
DOT, liquid, 1986–2001 1.67E-04 1.09E-04 2.45E-04
2.0E-05 DOT gas, all 7.32E-05 5.41E-05 9.71E-05
DOT liquid, all 1.23E-04 8.25E-05 1.77E-04
0.0E+00 DOT, all data 8.64E-05 6.83E-05 1.08E-04
PARLOC DOT Gas Dot Liquid DOT Gas + Liquid

Pipeline system Figure 4 compares failure frequencies due to external force

Figure 3: Failure Frequency - external corrosion
(horizontal bar indicates mean value; vertical bar indicates 90% confidence
limits)
Although external corrosion failures would be expected
to be related to age, there is no clear evidence of this in either
the PARLOC or DOT data. Therefore, the failure model
adopted for external corrosion is:
FEECO = FEBC × PCP × Ppig
Where:
FECO: Modified failure frequency for external corrosion
FEBC: Baseline failure frequency for external corrosion-
dependant on fluid type
derived from PARLOC and DOT data. The US failure
frequencies appear to be higher. It is expected that failure
frequencies due to external interference are highly pipeline-
specific and are dependent on shipping, trawling, and
construction activities.
The model addresses the following types of external
interference: anchoring, objects dropped from ships, ship
sinking, and trawling. The risks associated with construction
activity and dropped objects are not included in the model but
(4)
are assessed on a project-by-project basis, using specific
methodologies like DNV-RP-F107, [21].
The models for external interference are too lengthy for the
equations to be given in this brief paper but the basis for each
model is described.

6 Copyright © 2010 by ASME

 Table 7: Failure frequencies for subsea pipelines* due to the probability of puncture for a given impact as a function of
external interference derived from PARLOC data1 the pipeline design parameters.
Cause Dia. No. of
Failure frequency (per km.yr) The impact frequency will vary between locations. For
Mean range failures
Low High
marine hazards (anchoring, objects dropped from ships, and
value(in) ship sinking), the model requires the user to estimate the
conf. conf.
limit limit shipping density as low, medium, high, or very high.
Anchoring [0,6] [2,6] [5.83E-5, 1.04E-5 3.45E-4 Alternatively, the user can input a ship crossing frequency if the
1.75E-4] information is available. The model bases the ship size
(6,40] [0,1] [2.54E-6, 0 1.74E-5 distribution, and other needed characteristics of the ships, on
3.66E-6]
All [2,7] [6.51E-6, 1.16E-6 4.28E-5
the world fleet – the same ship data (other than crossing
2.28E-5] frequency) are assumed for all pipelines. Adjustments are made,
Trawling [0,12] [6,10] [8.99E-5, 3.92E-5 2.54E-4 however, to remove larger ships from the distribution when the
1.50E-4] water depth is shallow.
(12,40] [0,1] [2.88E-6, 0 1.97E-5
For the trawling hazard, the model requires the user to
4.16E-6]
All [6,11] [1.95E-5, 8.51E-6 5.93E-5 estimate the trawling density as low, medium, or high, and to
3.58E-5] estimate the relative likelihood of otter trawling, beam trawling,
Ship All [1,2] [3.25E-6, 1.67E-7 2.05E-5 and twin trawling with clump weight.
Sinking 6.51E-6
All Causes All [9,20] [2.93E-5, 1.53E-5 9.46E-5
The model also takes into account the mitigating effect of
6.51E-5] the type and depth of cover on the likelihood of occurrence of
*Excluding risers and safety zone pipelines impact frequency.
The anchoring model is subdivided into sub-models that
address anchoring under emergency conditions (ship
2.0E-04
breakdown), random anchoring under non-emergency
conditions (anchorings of convenience), and anchorings when
Failure frequency per km per yr

1.5E-04
ships lay up outside a port to wait for a berth. The hazard of
ships dragging out of anchorages in severe storms requires
much site-specific information so is excluded from the general
1.0E-04 model and dealt with on a case by case basis.
Where possible, each model was benchmarked against
historical failure statistics derived from the PARLOC and DOT
5.0E-05
data sources.
The models for external interference are described in more
0.0E+00
detail in the subsections below.
PARLOC DOT Gas Dot Liquid DOT Gas + Liquid

Pipeline system
6.1 Anchoring
Pipelines respond both locally and globally to anchor
Figure 4: Comparison between DOT and PARLOC for failures loading. The local response may be by denting, gouging, and
caused by external force ovalization. The global response involves an interaction
(horizontal bar indicates mean value; vertical bar indicates 90% confidence between bending stress, tensile stress, and hoop stress. Based on
limits) theoretical analyses and field experience, it was decided that
global response is usually the more critical issue and the
It was desired to relate failure frequencies associated anchoring model was limited to global response. Normally, a
with external interference to pipeline-specific parameters global response analysis is conducted using finite element
including diameter, wall thickness, steel grade, coatings, software but this was not possible within the project timescale.
burial status, etc. The only parameter that could be addressed Therefore, a simplified global response analysis was performed
directly from failure statistics was pipe diameter. Therefore, that treats the pipe material as linear elastic but accounts for
predictive models were developed and failure statistics were geometrical nonlinearities (the "P-delta" effect). A closed-form
used mainly to validate the models. In some limited respects, solution to the governing differential equations was developed
information derived from the failure statistics was by making the assumption that the deflected shape of the
incorporated directly into the models. pipeline is a sine curve. The closed-form solution was validated
The failure frequency due to external interference with a single finite element analysis.
consists of two components: a) an impact frequency The concept of the model is shown in Figure 5.
assessment that determines the frequency of mechanical
interference; and b) a puncture failure model that calculates

7 Copyright © 2010 by ASME


Figure 5: Model for global response of pipeline hooked by
anchor
The resistance to deflection is taken to be due to pipe
section modulus, lateral soil friction, and axial soil friction.
The axial soil friction restricts the straight sections of pipe
from feeding in to the deflected length. At points A and B, the
pipeline is effectively anchored by the axial friction.
The lateral load per unit length is expressed by:
wL = µ L q (5)
Where:
µL: the lateral coefficient of friction and
q: the submerged weight of the pipeline per unit length.
The axial load per unit length is:
wA = µ Aq (6)
Where:
µA: the axial coefficient of friction
For an unburied pipeline, µA is taken as 0.5 and µL is
taken as 0.55
[16]. For a buried pipeline, effective friction coefficients
are adopted. In calculating the effective friction coefficients,
it is assumed that the surrounding soil is an elastic-plastic
material. It is also assumed that the pipeline deflects
sufficiently to mobilize the full plastic strength of the soil and
that this strength is mobilized throughout the entire deflection
process. This is generally a reasonable assumption as the
movement to mobilize the full plastic strength is of the order
of centimeters while the predicted pipeline deflection is
usually of the order of meters. The plastic resistance of the
soil per unit length of pipeline is calculated in the axial and
lateral directions following the procedures described by PRCI
[17]. The soil resistance (axial or lateral) per unit length is
then converted to an effective friction factor by dividing by
the submerged weight of the pipeline per unit length.
The ultimate load of the pipeline was assumed to
correspond to an interaction ratio of 1.0, with the interaction
ratio calculated as per the combined loading criterion of
DNV-OS-F101 [18].
The simplified analysis is somewhat conservative in
neglecting the plastic reserves of strength of the pipeline. On
8 Copyright © 2010 by ASME
the other hand, it is somewhat non-conservative in neglecting
local deformation of the cross-section.
The simplified anchoring model was used for sensitivity
studies and regression equations were fitted to the results to
obtain formulae for the pipeline ultimate load as a function of
the important parameters. The following parameters were
considered: diameter, wall thickness, steel grade, depth of
burial, and type of backfill. The following types of backfill were
considered: none, natural sediment, and gravel, with typical
geotechnical properties assumed for the last two types. The
resulting regression equations provide the resistance model for
the anchoring hazard.
The loading applied to a pipeline by a dragging anchor is
highly uncertain but is crucial data for the analysis. Marine
specialists recommended that the applied loading in emergency
anchoring scenarios be taken equal to 70% of the anchor chain
breaking strength and that the loading in normal anchoring be
taken equal to three times the anchor weight in air. Anchor
weights and chain breaking strengths were derived from
correlations against ship deadweight tonnage.
No credit was given for open trenches in protecting against
anchors. Modification factors for backfill depth were derived by
Monte Carlo simulation considering ship size distribution
(which as mentioned was assumed the same for all pipelines)
and the assumptions that penetration would be one fluke length
for gravel backfill and three fluke lengths for natural sediment
backfill. This resulted in modification factors as shown for
natural sediment and gravel backfill and in Figure 6 for natural
sediment backfill.
1
0.9
0.8
Natural Backfill
0.7
Modification Factor
Gravel
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Backfill depth to top of pipe (m)
Figure 6: Modification factor for natural sediment and gravel
backfill on anchor interaction probability
These modification factors are applied to the frequency
with which anchors are estimated to be dragged across the
pipeline route to arrive at the frequency with which an anchor
interacts with the pipeline. The frequency of interaction is
predicted to reduce to zero for about 3.3 m of gravel backfill or
10 m of natural sediment backfill.
 The anchoring analyses are conducted for each of 6 size
classes of ship and 13 ship type classes. For each size/type
combination, the average anchor chain length was calculated.
If the anchor chain length is less than 1.5 times the water
depth for emergency anchoring, or less than 3 times the water
depth for normal anchoring, it is assumed that ships will not
anchor.
Three types of anchoring analysis are conducted:
emergency anchoring when a ship loses propulsion or
steering, normal anchoring made at random locations under
non-emergency conditions, and normal anchoring when ships
lay up outside a port when waiting on a berth.
Emergency anchoring
Estimates were made for the frequency of emergency
anchoring per unit distance traveled by each ship based on
propulsion and steering failure data. Ships were considered in
6 tonnage classes and 13 ship types. For each tonnage/type
class, anchor dragging distance was estimated based on ship
displacement, assumptions for ship speed at time of anchor
deployment (as function of ship size), and the assumption that
the anchor holding power under emergency conditions would
be typically twice the anchor weight in air. The frequency of
dragging across the pipeline route is estimated by combining
the frequency of emergency anchoring per unit distance
traveled, the numbers of ships of each size and type per year
crossing the pipeline route, and the mean anchor dragging
distance for each size and type of ship. If the anchor chain
length is less than 1.5 times the water depth, it is assumed that
ships will not attempt an emergency anchoring due to the risk
of breaking the anchor chain. If the pipeline is shown on
charts, a risk reduction factor of 0.1 is applied (based on
engineering judgment) since navigation charts should be
checked before anchoring.
Normal anchoring at random locations
In this scenario, 'normal anchoring' means an anchorage
made at a random location under non-emergency conditions.
This scenario is analyzed using the same model as for
emergency anchoring but the speed of the ship when
deploying the anchor is taken as 0.5 knots and it is assumed
that anchoring will not take place if the available chain is less
than 3 times the water depth. The frequency with which this
scenario arises is highly uncertain. By benchmarking the
model against data from PARLOC, it was estimated that the
frequency of random anchorings in water depths where
anchoring is possible is 1.0E-4 per km traveled.
Anchor hazards for pipelines near major ports
At many ports around the world, vessels need to wait to gain
admittance. While there may be certain designated anchorage
areas, these are often insufficient and vessels may anchor at
any location they find convenient provided it is not in an
anchoring exclusion zone. Without detailed knowledge of a
9 Copyright © 2010 by ASME
particular port and its surrounding areas, it is impossible to
know which areas vessels may favor for anchoring.
The analysis program incorporates a database of ship calls
to all the major ports of the world from which the annual
number of ship calls and the average deadweight tonnage may
be determined. The program uses that information to estimate
the average anchor mass and hence the average anchor dragging
distance during setting. It is assumed that all ships calling at a
port will anchor to wait on a berth. The pipeline is at risk if the
anchor is placed within a strip of width 2B around the pipeline,
where B is the distance the anchor is dragged during setting.
The probability the anchor is placed in that strip is assumed to
be related to the closest distance of the pipeline from the port.
The distance away from the port that ships anchor is assumed to
follow a Gaussian distribution with mean of zero and standard
deviation, . Unfortunately, the standard deviation σ is
unknown and there is no basis for estimating it without detailed
knowledge of the local port conditions – σ is therefore taken
equal to the pipeline distance from the port, which gives a worst
case result. If the pipeline is shown on charts, a risk reduction
factor of 0.1 is applied.
6.2 Objects Dropped from Ships
Objects can be dropped into the sea by merchant ships.
These may be unwanted items thrown overboard or items of
deck cargo lost overboard. The majority of non-bulk cargoes
are carried nowadays in containers on specialized container
ships. Container ships carry between 40% and 60% of their
cargo on or above the main deck and it is known that containers
are sometimes washed overboard in heavy weather. Based on
very limited data, it is estimated that the frequency of dropping
a container is 3.3E-06 per container ship per nautical mile
traveled.
Cargoes other than containers may be lost from ships.
Standard steel drums, up to 55 gallons capacity, are often
carried on deck of vessels, especially ferries, and may be
washed overboard in heavy weather. Drums usually carry
liquids so their specific gravity is often not much more than
seawater and they tend to sink relatively slowly if they sink at
all. Calculations performed during this study indicated that a
drum hitting a pipeline is unlikely to cause loss of containment.
Drums were therefore considered unlikely to make a significant
contribution to the total dropped object risk.
Large heavy objects may sometimes be carried on the decks
of general cargo ships. Such objects might comprise wire reels,
locomotives, cranes, yachts, etc. The numbers of such large
heavy objects transported on deck is assumed to be small
relative to the numbers of containers transported on or above
the main deck of container ships and therefore unlikely to make
a significant contribution to the total dropped object risk.
Ships may sometimes inadvertently release their anchors
when underway. When a ship is at sea, each anchor is secured
by a variety of devices, which may include the windlass
(wildcat) brake, one or two chain stoppers and a pawl. Chain
stoppers and pawls can be improperly set or can vibrate open in
rough weather and brakes can fail allowing the anchor to be
released. Ships make their anchors ready for use when
approaching anchorage areas or restricted waters by testing
equipment and by removing some of the securing devices. All
securing devices are released shortly before anchoring to
walk the anchor out slightly and check that everything is free.
No statistical data could be found on the frequency of
inadvertently releasing anchors either in the secured or the
ready-for-use condition. Since the risk would be mainly to
pipelines in restricted waters where anchors are required to be
kept ready for use, it was considered that this hazard could be
excluded for the purposes of this study.
Thus, the analysis of objects dropped from ships only
considers containers dropped from container ships. Other
types of object dropped from ships are assumed to make
negligible contribution to loss-of-containment frequency.
Containers are assumed to initially float, then to flood
and sink. Containers are assumed to be standard 12 m
containers. Three container loading scenarios are considered:
empty of goods, laden to 50% of allowable net load, and fully
loaded. Seven impact scenarios are considered, representing
different orientations with which a container may land on the
seabed (corner, different edges, different faces). Each loading
and impact scenario is weighted by its estimated relative
probability. For each scenario, the model calculates the
impact energy of the dropped container at the seabed as a
function of water depth. The impact energy at the seabed is
calculated. If the pipeline is buried, the energy absorbed by
the backfill is calculated. If the residual energy at the depth of
the pipeline is not zero, the pipeline dent depth is calculated.
Conditional puncture and rupture probabilities are calculated
as a function of dent depth using a lookup table from DNV-
RP-F107. Finally, annual puncture and rupture frequencies
are calculated based on the annual numbers of container ships
crossing the pipeline.
6.3 Ship Sinking
Ships sinking are analyzed using the dropped object
model, treating the ship as a dropped object. Ships are
considered in 6 size classes and 13 type classes as mentioned
earlier. Frequencies of foundering are taken from the COST
301 report [19] as a function of ship gross registered tonnage.
Founderings in ports are excluded.
6.4 Trawling
Trawling poses three hazards to pipelines: impact
loading, pullover loading as the trawl gear rides over the
pipeline, and potentially hooking loads if the trawl gear snags
on the pipeline. Assessment of the last two loading types
requires dynamic nonlinear finite element analysis and is not
amenable to a simplified model. The model therefore only
considers impact loading.
The program requires the user to estimate only the
trawling density as low, medium, or high, and to estimate the
10
relative likelihood of otter trawling, beam trawling, and twin
trawling with clump weight.
The methodology involves use of predetermined gross
impact energy distributions for the three different types of
bottom trawling (otter trawling, beam trawling, and twin
trawling). These distributions are scaled according to the
attributes of a specific pipeline using adjustment factors given
in DNV-RP-F111 [20] to arrive at distributions for the impact
energy to be absorbed by the steel pipe. These distributions are
then divided into a large number of intervals, the dent depth for
each interval is calculated using the DNV-RP-F111 formula, the
leak and rupture probabilities are determined as a function of
the ratio of dent depth to pipe diameter using the lookup table
from DNV-RP-F107, [21], and finally these probabilities are
combined with frequency information for the three different
trawling types to arrive at pipeline puncture and rupture failure
frequencies.
7 NATURAL HAZARDS
Environmental hazards (i.e. tsunamis, fault movement,
seismic activities, hurricanes) may lead to a variety of
geotechnical consequences, including soil liquefaction, slope
failure and mass gravity flow. It is beyond the scope of this
assessment to investigate in detail the effects of each of these
hazards. However, simple baseline failure frequencies have
been derived from historical databases.
PARLOC, does not include incidents associated with
natural hazards. Therefore it has been assumed that a failure
frequency of 1E-7 per km.yr could be applied, in agreement
with failure frequency derived for onshore pipelines, [7]. This
value represents a conservative estimate for pipelines routed
through benign terrain.
The DOT database for offshore pipelines reports 23
accidents occurred as a result of earth movement and
hurricanes.
The baseline corrosion frequency for regions affected by
environmental hazards has been based on DOT and has been
taken as 6.28E-06 per km.yr for leaks and 4.19E-05 per km.yr
for ruptures.
8 CONCLUSIONS
A study was carried out to derive a range of modification
factors that could be applied to generic failure frequencies to
take pipeline-specific factors into account. The study included a
review of available databases, a proposed methodology for the
application of risk modification factors, and the identification of
historical data sources or predictive models that could be used
to derive risk modification factors depending on the robustness
of available information.
Baseline failure frequencies and modification parameters
have been derived for each of the major failure causes
identified, in particular: External Interference; Mechanical
Failure; Corrosion and Natural Hazards. The model has been
coded into a software tool for use within BP.
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
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Data Group (EGIG). EGIG 08.TV.0502. December 2008

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2006), Advantica report 6957, August 2007, available from
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11 Copyright © 2010 by ASME