No. 1 : Zaldivia vs. Reyes SECTION 1. Scope.

— This
rule shall govern the procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Topic: Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law
following cases:
specifying the prescriptive period for violations of
municipal ordinances. xxx xxx
xxx
Parties:
B. Criminal Cases:
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA – petitioner
1. Violations of traffic
FACTS:
laws, rules and
regulations;
 The petitioner is charged with quarrying for
2. Violations of rental
commercial purposes without a mayor's
law;
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series
3. Violations of municipal
of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in
or city ordinances;prLL
the Province of Rizal.
4. All other criminal
May 11, 1990 - The offense was committed. cases where the
May 30, 1990 - The referral-complaint of the penalty prescribed by
police was received by the Office of the law for the offense
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. charged does not
October 2, 1990 - The corresponding exceed six months
information was filed with the Municipal Trial imprisonment, or a
Court of Rodriguez. fine of one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00), or
 The petitioner moved to quash the both, irrespective of
information on the ground that the crime other impossible
had prescribed, but the motion was denied. penalties, accessory or
 On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of otherwise, or of the
Rizal, the denial was sustained by the civil liability arising
responded judge. therefrom. . . ."
 In the present petition for review on (Emphasis supplied.)
certiorari:
x
Petitioner’s arguments: xx xxx
xxx
Summary: Petitioner concluding that the case
should have been dismissed since the case SECTION 9. How
against her was being filed way beyond the 2 commenced. — The prosecution of
months statutory period. criminal cases falling within the scope
of this Rule shall be either by
1. The charge against her is governed by complaint or by information filed
the following provisions of the Rule on directly in court without need of a
Summary Procedure: (Section 1 (B), prior preliminary examination or
Section 9) preliminary investigation: Provided,
however, That in Metropolitan Manila

1
 and chartered cities, such cases shall alleged commission of the offense, the
be commenced only by information; charge against her should have been
Provided, further, That when the dismissed on the ground of prescription.
offense cannot be prosecuted de (main argument)
officio, the corresponding complaint
shall be signed and sworn to before Prosecution arguments:
the fiscal by the offended party.
Summary: Petitioner contends that when the
2. She then invokes Act No. 3326, as case was filed on the Prosecutor’s office it
amended, entitled "An Act to Establish suspends the prescriptive period.
Periods of Prescription for Violations
1. The prescriptive period was suspended upon
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
the filing of the complaint against her with
Ordinances and to Provide When
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading
2. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the
as follows: (Section 1,2,3)
Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule
SECTION 1. Violations 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
penalized by special acts shall, unless providing as follows:
otherwise provided in such acts,
SECTION 1. How Instituted. —
prescribe in accordance with the
For offenses not subject to the rule
following rules: . . . Violations
on summary procedure in special
penalized by municipal ordinances
cases, the institution of criminal action
shall prescribe after two months.
shall be as follows:
SECTION 2. Prescription shall
a) For offenses falling
begin to run from the day of the
under the jurisdiction of the
commission of the violation of the
Regional Trial Court, by filing
law, and if the same be not known at
the complaint with the
the time, from the discovery thereof
appropriate officer for the
and the institution of judicial
purpose of conducting the
proceedings for its investigation and
requisite preliminary
punishment.
investigation therein;
The prescription shall be
b) For offenses falling
interrupted when proceedings are
under the jurisdiction of the
instituted against the guilty person,
Municipal Trial Courts and
and shall begin to run again if the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
proceedings are dismissed for
by filing the complaint directly
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
with the said courts, or a
SECTION 3. For the purposes complaint with the fiscal's
of this Act, special acts shall be acts office. However, in
defining and penalizing violations of Metropolitan Manila and
law not included in the Penal Code." other chartered cities, the
(Emphasis supplied) complaint may be filed only
with the office of the fiscal.
3. Her conclusion is that as the information
was filed way beyond the two-month In all cases, such
statutory period from the date of the institution interrupts the
period of prescription of the
2
 offense charged. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The
respondent maintains that the filing of the
complaint with the Officer of the Provincial
Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such
institution" and that the phrase "in all cases"
applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
3. The said paragraph, according to the
respondent, was an adoption of the following
dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals:
In view of this diversity of precedents,
and in order to provide guidance for
Bench and Bar, this Court has re-
examined the question and, after
mature consideration, has arrived at
the conclusion that the true doctrine
is, and should be, the one established
by the decisions holding that the
filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court, even if it be merely
for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should,
and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed
can not try the case on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this
conclusion:
first, the text of Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code,
in declaring that the period of
prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information"
without distinguishing
whether the complaint is filed
in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the
merits.
3
Second, even if the
court where the complaint or
information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the
case, its actuations already
represent the initial step of
the proceedings against the
offender.
Third, it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of
the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays that are
not under his control. All that
the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint.
ISSUE:
1. WON the prescription of period ceased to
run or was interrupted when the case was
filed on the prosecutor’s office.
NO.
Summary: As a general rule, the filing of the case in
the prosecutor's office is sufficient to interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period except when the
case is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
If it is any crime, you file it in the fiscal's office; the
running of the
prescriptive period is interrupted. But in the case at
bar having only a penalty of arresto menor
it therefore falls under the provisions of the Rules on
Summary Procedure. If it is covered by the
Summary Rules, the period continues. It must be the
filing of the case in court which will interrupt the
period from running.
Prosecution’s Arguments and SC Ruling:
Prosecution’s Arguments: Section 1, Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure applies. And The
prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of
the complaint against her with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
SC Ruling: It is important to note that this decision
was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months
before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand,
Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been
incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the
last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase,
"for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies
that the section does not apply to offenses which are
subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all
cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously
refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is,
those offenses not governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to
the canon that words in a statute should be read in
relation to and not isolation from the rest of the
measure, to discover the true legislative intent. cdphil
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary
Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is
for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez,
is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does
speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32 (2) of
B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos.
4
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
"the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both
parties agree that this provision does not prevent the
prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall
be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court,
whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary investigation. This means that the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on
the date the case is actual filed in court and not on
any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-
quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of
the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a
matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special
law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326
and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
Prosecution’s Arguments: adoption of Francisco v.
Court of Appeals.
SC Ruling: Going back to the Francisco case, we find
it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would
have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the
offense involved was grave oral defamation
punishable under the Revised Penal Code with
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the
prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a
municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot
exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above
interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's
office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution
of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too
late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their
obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their
plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
SC DECISION:
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the
crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its
alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two
months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance
with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted
by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was
not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding
that could have interrupted the period was the filing
of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2,
1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the
challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED
on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
# 2 LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON
and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008
5
Topic: Interruption of Prescriptive Period by Filing
Complaint with City Prosecutor for Preliminary
Investigation
Parties:
Luis Panaguiton - petitioner, lent money to Cawili
Rodrigo Cawili - respondent, borrowed money from
Panaguiton
Ramon Tongson - alleged business associate of
Cawili, signed check in favor of petitioner
Facts:
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various
sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from
petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business
associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly
issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3)
checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and
Tongson.
Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993,
the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency
of funds or by the closure of the account.
Panaguiton made formal demands to pay the
amounts of the checks upon Cawili on and upon
Tongson, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint
against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP 22
before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During
the preliminary investigation, only Tongson
appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.
Tongson's Arguments:
Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included
as party-respondent in the case since Cawili in
borrowed money in his personal capacity. That he
also lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation
of his services, he was offered to be an officer of
Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not
Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had
filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued
the bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

Panaguiton's Arguments:
Panaguiton presented several documents showing
Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the
same as the those appearing on the checks. He also
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim
wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's
business associate.
City Prosecutor:
6 December 1995 - City Prosecutor Lara found
probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the
charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial
appeal before the DOJ and the case against Cawili
was filed before the proper court.
11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for
Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he
had deliberately altered his signature in the
pleadings submitted during the preliminary
investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Zuño directed
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to
refer the questioned signatures to the NBI.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor
Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint
against Tongson without referring the matter to the
NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her
resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides that violations penalized
by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In
this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date
the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993
and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint
before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August
1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that
from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had
already elapsed and no information had as yet been
filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.
DOJ:
Panaguiton appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ,
through Undersecretary Teehankee, dismissed the
6
same, stating that the offense had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326.
Panaguiton filed a MR of the DOJ resolution. On 3
April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then
Undersecretary Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and
declared that the offense had not prescribed and
that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's
office interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period. Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate
informations against Tongson for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Prosecutor filed the said cases against
Tongson.
In resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ,
presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration
filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had
already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of
the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22"
against Tongson. The DOJ cited the case of Zaldivia
v. Reyes, Jr., wherein the SC ruled that the
proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as
amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one
before the prosecutor's office.
CA:
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the
DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the CA because
of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification
and certification of non-forum shopping.
DOJ:
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also
reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does
not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P.
Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its
own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4)
years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
According to petitioner, what is applicable in this
case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, wherein this Court
ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office for preliminary investigation suspends the
running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also
notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the
violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, petitioner notes. He argues that
sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals'
pronouncements would result in grave injustice to
him since the delays in the present case were clearly
beyond his control.
Issue:
WON the filing of a complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City interrupts the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22.
Ruling: YES!
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses
under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22
merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a
fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof.
Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that
only the filing of a case in court can toll the running
of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was
passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment," and the prevailing
rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed
with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is
halted.
Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at
a time when the function of conducting the
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was
vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the
prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of
U.S. v. Lazada and People v. Joson, is that the
7
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint
is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint
signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings
against the accused. These cases were followed by
our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao that the
first step taken in the investigation or examination of
offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding
which suspends the prescription of the offense.
Subsequently, in People v. Olarte, we held that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if
it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information
is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition,
even if the court where the complaint or information
is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender, and hence, the
prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company
Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and
the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which
are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature
and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of
the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted
by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources
case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial
proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears
before "investigation and punishment" in the old law,
with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term "proceedings" should
now be understood either executive or judicial in
character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the
trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any
kind of investigative proceeding instituted against
the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured
party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control. A clear
example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed
his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within
the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise
timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges
against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels,
within the prescribed periods.
However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ
issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period
of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was
beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already
initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as
24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of
the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties,
especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed
to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet
prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on
24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and
thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for
the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg.
22.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
8
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of
Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED
to REFILE the information against the accused.
Laws Applicable:
Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to
offenses under special laws which do not provide
their own prescriptive periods.
The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall,
unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after
four years for those punished by imprisonment for
more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x
x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
#3 People v. Pangilinan
GR 152662, June 13 2012
Topic: Preliminary Investigation?
Parties:
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan – herein respondent,
accused in BP 22 case (Bouncing Checks)
Virginia C. Malolos – private complainant in BP 22
case
Facts:
OSG (representing the People) filed this petition for
review on certiorari (Rule 45) praying to set aside the
decision of the CA in the case entitled “Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan v. People and Virginia Malolos”
March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben
Catubay recommended the suspension of the
criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the
civil action respondent (Pangilinan) filed against
private complainant (Malolos) with the RTC of
Valenzuela. The recommendation was approved by
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Private
complainant then raised the matter before the DOJ.
January 5 1999, Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuervas
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon and ordered the filing of informations for
violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan in connection
with her issuance of City Trust Check 127219 in the
amount of PHP 4,129,000 and RCBC check 423773 in
the amount of PHP 4,475,000, both checks totaling
PHP 8,604,000. However, the estafa and violation of
BP 22 involving seven other checks included in the
affidavit-complaint filed on September 16 1997 were
dismissed.
2 counts for violation of BP 22, both dated
November 18, 1999, were filed against Pangilinan on
February 3, 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of
Court, MeTC, Quezon City. These cases were raffled
to MeTC Branch 31 on June 7, 2000.
June 17, 2000, respondent filed an ”omnibus motion
to quash the information and to defer the issuance
of warrant of arrest”. She alleged that her criminal
liability has been extinguished by prescription. This
was granted by the Presiding judge of MeTC Branch
31 in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
On October 26 2000, Malolos filed a notice of
appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC
Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated July 27,2001, the presiding judge
of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the
October 5, 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent
portion of the decision reads:
. . . Inasmuch as the informations in this case
were filled on February 3, 2000 with the Clerk
of Court although received by the Court itself
only on June 7, 2000, they are covered by the
Rule as it was worded before the latest
amendment. The criminal action on two
counts for violation of BP 22, had, therefore,
not yet prescribed when the same was filed
with the court a quo considering the
appropriate complaint that started the
proceedings having been filed with the Office
of the Prosecutor on September 16 1997 yet.
9
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05
October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to
proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case
Nos. 89152 and 89153.
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, Pangilinan filed
with the SC a petition for certiorari, the SC referred
the petition to the CA for appropriate action.
In a Decision dated March 12, 2002, the CA reversed
the Decision of RTC, thereby dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the
cases for violation of BP 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court
ratiocinated that:
. . . this Court reckons the commencement of
the period of prescription for violations of BP
22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the
latter part of 1995, as it was within this period
that the [respondent] was notified by the
private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor
of the subject checks and, the five (5) days
grace period granted by law had elapsed.
The private respondent then had, pursuant to
Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, 4 years
therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to
file her complaint or information against the
petitioner before the proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 89152 and 89152 against the petitioner
having been filed with the MeTC of Quezon
City only on February 3, 2000, the said cases
had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended, prescription shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia v s. Reyes the SC held
that the proceedings referred to in Section 2
of Act No. 3326, as amended, are 'judicial
proceedings', which means the filing of the
complaint or information with the proper
court. Otherwise stated, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be stayed on the
date the case is actually filed in court and not
on any date before that, which is in
consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended.
 While the aforesaid case involved a violation
of a municipal ordinance, this Court,
considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended, governs the computation of the
prescriptive period of both ordinances and
special laws, finds that the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes likewise
applies to special laws, such as BP 22.
Petitioner’s arguments (OSG):
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant
petition for review. According to the OSG, while it
admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated
November 23, 1930, governs the period
prescription for violations of special laws, it is the
institution of criminal actions, whether led with the
court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that
interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
charged. It submits that the filing of the complaint-
affidavit by private complainant on September 16,
1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period of the subject BP 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its
decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by
this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. that the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor is not the "judicial proceeding" that could
have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying
on Zaldivia, the CA allegedly failed to consider the
subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid
ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, the SC
ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal's
Office for preliminary investigation suspends the
running of the prescriptive period. It therefore
concluded that the filing of the informations with the
MeTC of Quezon City on February 3 2000 was still
within the allowable period of 4 years within which to
file the criminal cases for violation of BP 22 in
accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
Respondent’s arguments (Pangilinan):
In her comment-opposition dated July 26, 2002,
respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should
be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with
the mandatory requirements on the submission of a
certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the
required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are
allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the
filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor's
Office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period considering that the offense
charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced
by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises.
She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner
involved felonies punishable under the RPC and are
therefore covered by Article 91 of the RPC and
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Respondent pointed out that the crime
of imputed against her is for violation of BP 22, which is
indisputably a special law and as such, is governed
by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a
distinction should thus be made between offenses
covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as
in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
Issues: WON the filing of the affidavit-complaint for
estafa and violation of BP 22 with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City on September 16
1997 interrupted the period of prescription
Ruling: We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent's claim that the
OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate
original or certified true copy of the March 2002
decision of the CA and the required proof of service
is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record
reveals that attached to the original copy of the
petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It
was also observed that annexed to the petition was
the proof of service undertaken by the Docket
Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find
that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the
offense committed by respondent had already
prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law
applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law
reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special
acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
10
 acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: (a) . . .; (b) after 4 years for
those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) .
...
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 30 days but
not more than 1 year or by a fine for its violation, it
therefor prescribes in 4 years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive
period, however, should be tolled upon the
institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, this
Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed cannot try the case
on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the
Court in the case of Francisco, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. when it held that the filing of the
complaint with the Fiscal's Office also suspends the
running of the prescriptive period of a criminal
offense.
Respondent's contention that a different rule should
be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of
merit. There is no more distinction between cases
under the RPC and those covered by special laws
with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. is not
controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican ,
Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, Brillante v. CA , and
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, cases involving
special laws, this Court held that the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
11
accused interrupts the period of prescription. In SEC
v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., the Court
even ruled that investigations conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of
the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code effectively interrupts the
prescription period because it is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, which is
in all fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically ruled that commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses
they had been charged under BP 22. Aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply
because of circumstances beyond their control, like
the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that
"sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning
date of the commencement of presumption for
violations of BP 22, such being the period within
which herein respondent was notified by private
complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks
and the five-day grace period granted by law
elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were led
against respondent on September 16, 1997. The
cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on
February 13 2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent led a civil case for accounting followed
by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of
"prejudicial question". The matter was raised before
the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor
approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It
was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered
that the informations for the violation of BP 22 were
filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent's own motion for the
suspension of the criminal proceedings, which
motion she predicated on her civil case for
accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997
initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte, it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. The
only thing the offended must do to initiate the
prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite
complaint.
FAllO:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING IN LIGHT OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department
of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent. SO
ORDERED.
Laws mentioned:
BP 22 – Bouncing Checks law
Sec. 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure
Sec. 1 of Act 3326
# 4 Herminio T. Disini vs. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 169823-24
Case:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the criminal action involving petitioner
notwithstanding that he is a private individual
considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately
related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and
close associates.
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for
certiorari there solutions promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and
Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v.
Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his
1
motion to quash the informations) and August 10,
2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the
2
denial of his motion to quash), alleging that the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations
12
dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials,
penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001),
and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act
3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986,
in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI,
conspiring together and confederating with the then
President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s
ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion)
shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining
Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock
in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock
having then a book value of ₱100.00 per share of
stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia, owned and
controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the
mechanical and electrical construction work on the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project("Project") of
the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan,
all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking
and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts
to do the engineering and architectural design and
to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to his
office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and
presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to
do the engineering and architectural design and to
construct the Project, respectively, which acts
constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 28002
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI,
conspiring together and confederating with the then
President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos,
being then the close personal friend and golfing
partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being
further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who
was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the
Marcos family, taking advantage of such close
personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in
connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
(PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and
receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the
total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars
($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from
Westinghouse Electric
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of
Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more
or less, both of which entities were then having
business, transaction, and application with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for
and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and
obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain,
the contract for the said Burns and Roe and
Westinghouse to do the engineering and
architectural design, and construct, respectively, the
said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and
receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc.
owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned
and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which
stated amounts and subcontracts constituted
kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or
pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as
accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the
direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for
Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural
contract, and for Westinghouse the construction
contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
13
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to
quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been
extinguished by prescription, and that the
informations did not conform to the prescribed form.
The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted
himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for
permission to travel abroad.7 He then entered a plea
of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) promulgated its first assailed
resolution denying the motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 but the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on
August 10, 2005 through the second assailed
resolution.
Issue(s):
- WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
- WON the filing of the criminal action had
prescribed
- WON the SB correctly upheld the sufficiency of the
information filed, and the same were in the correct
form
Ruling:
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to
the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled
Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved
the civil action for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil Case No.
0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed
by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG) against Disini and others.13 The
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged
that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-
defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through them is appropriation of public
funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion,
14
embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, as
follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate
of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband
of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By
reason of this relationship xxx defendant Herminio
Disini obtained staggering commissions from the
Westinghouse in exchange for securing the nuclear
power plant contract from the Philippine
government.
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob,
by themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active
collaboration and willing participation of defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and
taking undue advantage of their association and
influence with the latter defendant spouses in order
to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten
assets, engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems
such as:
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of
Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits
through which defendants received, kept, and/or
invested improper payments such as unconscionably
large commissions from foreign corporations like the
Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special
concessions, privileges and/or benefits from
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, such as a contract awarded to
Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable
nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously
exorbitant amount that included defendant’s
staggering commissions – defendant Rodolfo Jacob
executed for HGI the contract for the aforesaid
nuclear plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG
transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG
(G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, we
are hereby transmitting to your Office for
appropriate action the records of the attached
14
criminal case which we believe is similar to the said
Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some
parts or elements are also parts of the causes of
action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the
Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the
respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the
respondents are also party defendants in the civil
cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld
by the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to
you for proper action the herein-attached case in
view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct
an impartial investigation in cases similar to that of
the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was
adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government
(Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a
prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against
petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the
same illegal or criminal acts subject of the
subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General
filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x
x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration
and freeze orders against petitioner’s properties, it
was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the
same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in
relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy
funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot
possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said
criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an
impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x x
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the
case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be
impartial in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation of the aforesaid complaints against
petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside
in the said preliminary investigation with an even
hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of
justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be
prohibited from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the complaints subject of this petition
and the petition for intervention and that the records
of the same should be forwarded to the
Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional
officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this
nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and
take appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the
Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary
investigation on the criminal complaints thus
transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set
aside by the Court in Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the
Ombudsman to file the informations that became
the subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal
Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
2. Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not
allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to
and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1,
2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of
the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A because the allegations in the informations
neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth,
nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by
the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not
charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory
of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the
regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the
purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that
both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints
initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate
under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and
15
file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover
ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their
immediately family but also of their relatives,
subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that
established the Sandiganbayan and defined its
jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975
and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple
or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to
and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended.
In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had
initially filed the criminal complaints in the
Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman
taking over the investigation of Disini only after the
Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the
PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the
Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would
not be an impartial office following its finding of a
prima facie case being established against Disini to
sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case
No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the
same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded
through the intervention of Disini and President
Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the
engineering and architectural design, and
Westinghouse to do the construction of the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP).
Given their sameness in subject matter, to still
expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer
necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil
Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to
institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini
pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove
the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked
the PCGG with assisting the President in "the
recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled
by them, during his administration, directly or
16
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship,"
expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to
recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, without distinction as to their private or
public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying
clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand
Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which
follows:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’
and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989(Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors
engineers and other city department
heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and
higher;
 (d) Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National
Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintendent or
higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions
or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade ‘27’and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office. (bold
emphasis supplied)
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions
classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only
in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the
plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause
to such public officials. To include within the ambit of
the qualifying clause the persons covered by
17
Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive
mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal
cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan
properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a
private individual, and despite the lack of any
allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public official in the commission of
the offenses charged.
3. The offenses charged in the informations have not
yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following
must be considered, namely: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged;(2) the time
when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3)
the time when the prescriptive period is
interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged
that Disini had offered, promised and given gifts and
presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were
in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation
(Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the
engineering and architectural design of and to
construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did
award or cause to be awarded the respective
contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which
acts constituted the crime of corruption of public
officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in
Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of
the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties
imposed upon the officer corrupted."25 Under the
second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by
the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
that does not constitute a crime, and the officer
executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a
fine of not less than three times the value of the gift.
Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code,27 the period of prescription for this specie of
corruption of public officials charged against Disini is
15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged
with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By
express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses
committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15
years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive
period was only 10 years. It became settled in People
28
v. Pacificador, however, that the longer prescriptive
period of 15years would not apply to crimes
committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982,
because the longer period could not be given
retroactive effect for not being favorable to the
accused. With the information alleging the period
from 1974 to February1986 as the time of the
commission of the crime charged, the applicable
prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with
People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code,
Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019,
29
Section 2 of R.A. No. 3326 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double
jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to
run on the day the crime is committed. That an
aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of
which his right arises," does not prevent the running
of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is
the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in
18
Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the
statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the
fact of the invasion of a right which will support a
cause of action. In other words, the courts would
decline to apply the statute of limitations where the
plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means
of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was
in this accord that the Court confronted the question
on the running of the prescriptive period in People v.
Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999
Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No.
130149), and the subsequent cases which
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on
the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a
catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law
was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive
period for the crime which is the subject herein,
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992
after the Committee made an exhaustive
investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997,
only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription
has not yet set in. The rationale for this was
succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it
was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known these crimes committed prior
to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged
connivance and conspiracy among involved public
officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet
another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during
the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
question the legality of these transactions. (Citations
omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that
the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the
time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were
awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse.
Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the
sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth
instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,
the connivance and conspiracy among the public
officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors
illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh
impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to
have known of the commission of the crimes
charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986.
Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-
known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or
transactions in relation to it were discovered only
through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation,
resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case
sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No.
0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP
contracts, which partook of a public character,
enjoyed the presumption of their execution having
been regularly done in the course of official
functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime,
no person would have dared to assail the legality of
the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect
that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was
possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed
and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the
Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the
conduct the preliminary investigation.33 In
accordance with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton,
Jr. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal
complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman
effectively interrupted the running of the period of
prescription. According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company
Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and
the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which
are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of
19
the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted
by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources
case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial
proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears
before" investigation and punishment" in the old law,
with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term "proceedings" should
now be understood either executive or judicial in
character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the
trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any
kind of investigative proceeding instituted against
the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured
party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of
whether the offense charged is punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing
of the complaint or information in the office of the
public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary
investigation that interrupts the period of
prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet
set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the
time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to
April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal
complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and
substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must
state every single fact necessary to constitute the
offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to
quash on the ground that the complaint or
information charges no offense may be properly
sustained. The fundamental test in determining
whether a motion to quash may be sustained based
on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential
elements of the offense as defined in the
law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not
considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the
presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise,
there would no longer be any need for the
Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001
(corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No.
28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have
sufficiently complied with the requirements of
Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. —
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging
corruption of public officers specifically put forth that
Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in
Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating
with then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and
presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue
advantage of his position as President, committed
the offense in relation to his office, and in
consideration of the gifts and presents offered,
promised and given by Disini, President Marcos
caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design of and to
construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of
causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded
to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the
gifts and promises offered by Disini to President
Marcos.
20
The elements of corruption of public officials under
Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or
promises, or gives gifts or presents to a
public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or
the gifts or presents are given to a public
officer under circumstances that will make
the public officer liable for direct bribery or
indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of
public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime. The
information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and
promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public
officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers,
promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the
award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position
and in committing said act in relation to his office,
was placed under circumstances that would make
him liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers
simply required the public officer to be placed under
circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would
make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus,
even without alleging that President Marcos received
or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an
essential element in direct bribery – the allegation
that President Marcos caused the award of the
contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed
to place him under circumstances of being liable for
direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information
charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense
under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close
personal relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes
advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift, material or
 pecuniary advantage from any person having the offense of libel allegedly occurred on December
some business, transaction, application, 21, 1993, but the information was filed on may
request or contract with the government; 18,1994 at the MTC. Later it was found out RTC
should have jurisdiction so it was forwarded to RTC
3. That the public official with whom the (without dismissing ). Petitioner said that prescription
offender has family or close personal relation should run again when the prosecutor
has to intervene in the business transaction, recommended filing to RTC ( since MTC not proper
application, request, or contract with the court ) and that it should interrupt again upon filing
government. in RTC(proper court). SC said prescription period of
prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of the
The allegations in the information charging the
complaint or information' without distinguishing
violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if
whether the complaint is filed in the court for
hypothetically admitted, would establish the
preliminary examination or investigation merely, or
elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini,
for action on the merits. Second, even if the court
being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the
where the complaint or information is filed may only
first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos,
proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
and at the same time the family physician of the
already represent the initial step of the proceedings
Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the
with and free access to President Marcos, a public
injured party the right to obtain vindication on
official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family
account of delays that are not under his control. All
and close personal relations, requested and received
that the victim of the offense may do on his part to
$1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00
initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
from Westinghouse, the entities then having
complaint.||| (Arambulo v. Laqui, G.R. No. 138596,
business, transaction, and application with the
[October 12, 2000], 396 PHIL 914-928)
Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3)
Here. Libel filed in 1994. Ulttimately filed
President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini
had family or close personal relations, intervened to
PARTIES:
secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering
Petitioner: SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO
and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the
Respondents: HON. HILARION LAQUI, SR. HELEN
construction of the PNPPP.
OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ
-On February 2, 1994. private respondents(LAQUI)
# 5 Arambulo v laqui
filed a joint complaint-affidavit for libel against
petitioners before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
TOPICS: Prescription and jurisdiction ( two are
Quezon City(ARAMBULO alleging that the latter
connected in the case )
circulated on December 21, 1993 a letter containing
malicious imputations against them.
LAWS RELATED:
-May 18, 1994, Information for libel filed in MTC
ART. 90 The crime of libel or other similar offenses
-After the prosecution presented its evidence,
shall prescribe in one year.
petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence. Without
"Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. —
resolving the incident, the Metropolitan Trial Court in
The period of prescription shall commence to run
its Order dated November 9, 1996 ruled that it had
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
no jurisdiction over the case as the same falls under
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
Trial Court, and ordered that the case be forwarded
information, and shall proceed to run again when
to the RTC for further proceedings.|||
such proceedings terminate without the accused
-On November 29, 1996, the case was forwarded to
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
Branch 215 Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-6870|||
SUMMARY:

21
-On January 3, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
prescription of the offense of Libel. The RTC
dismissed the case in an Order dated April 2, 1997
but, stating that the offense had not yet prescribed,
ordered the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to re-file
the Information for Libel with the RTC.||| (Arambulo v.
Laqui, G.R. No. 138596, [October 12, 2000], 396 PHIL
914-928)
--On April 27, 1997, the Information for Libel
was re-filed with respondent court docketed
as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70948.
-On June 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash on the ground of prescription. The
motion was denied in the assailed Resolution
dated October 3,1997.
-Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
also denied in the other Assailed Order dated
December 4, 1997."
-Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of the
trial court, herein petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals raising the issue of "whether or not public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion or
grossly erred in holding that the offense of libel in
the instant case has not yet prescribed."
- The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated March
01, 1999, upheld the contention of the trial court that
the offense of libel had not yet prescribed and
consequently, dismissed the said petition. The
appellate court likewise denied herein petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR LIBEL
HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED
RULING:
NO
-In the case at bench, the offense of libel allegedly
occurred on December 21, 1993 when petitioner
circulated a letter containing allegedly malicious
imputations against private respondents. At this
point, the period of prescription for the alleged
crime had already started to run.
-The one-year period of prescription for the crime
was interrupted on February 2, 1994 when
respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit for libel
against petitioner before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Quezon City. At this point, the
22
prescription period had already run for forty-two (42)
days.
-A preliminary investigation by the Office of the City
Prosecutor was thus conducted. On April 27, 1994,
Asst. City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos
issued a Resolution stating that probable cause exists
against petitioner and recommended the filing of an
information for libel against her. Consequently, an
information for libel was filed against petitioner on
May 18, 1994 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 32.
-Despite the fact that the Metropolitan Trial Court
had no jurisdiction over the crime of libel, the said
court proceeded to conduct trial on the merits. After
the prosecution had rested, petitioner filed a
Demurrer to Evidence dated September 18, 1996.
However, instead of acting on the said demurrer, the
Metropolitan Trial Court, on November 08, 1996,
issued an Order ruling that it had no jurisdiction
over the crime of libel as the same falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Instead of dismissing the case outright, the MTC
ordered the forwarding of the records of the case to
the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings. The
case was eventually raffled off to Branch 215 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
- Petitioner based their argument on People v
Olarte.
The Court restated the correct and prevailing
doctrine, as follows:
"In view of this diversity of
precedents, and in order to provide
guidance for the Bench and Bar,
this Court has reexamined the
question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is,
and should be, the one established
by the decisions holding that the
filing of the complaint with the
Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or -P
information is filed can not try the
It is thus evident that petitioner's first premise
case on the merits. Several reasons
that the period of prescription commenced to run
buttress this conclusion: first, the
again when the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office
text of Article 91 of the Revised
recommended the filing of a criminal complaint
Penal Code, in declaring that the
against her is incorrect. When the City Prosecutor
period of prescription 'shall be
recommended the filing of libel charges against
interrupted by the filing of the
petitioner, the proceedings against her were not
complaint or information' without
terminated, precisely because a prima facie case for
distinguishing whether the
libel was found against her. Instead of terminating
complaint is filed in the court for
the proceedings against petitioner, the resolution of
preliminary examination or
the city prosecutor actually directed the continuation
investigation merely, or for action
of the proceedings against the petitioner by the filing
on the merits. Second, even if the
of the appropriate information against her and by
court where the complaint or
the holding of trial on the merits. As such, when the
information is filed may only
information for libel was filed with the Metropolitan
proceed to investigate the case, its
Trial Court, the period of prescription for the crime
actuations already represent the
was still suspended.
initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is Another important teaching in Olarte is that
unjust to deprive the injured party "it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to
the right to obtain vindication on obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
account of delays that are not under his control." This is because in criminal
under his control. All that the victim prosecutions, the only thing that the victim of the
of the offense may do on his part to offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution
initiate the prosecution is to file the is to file the requisite complaint.
requisite complaint. In the case at bench, private respondents
And it is no argument that were not remiss in their right to seek grievance
Article 91 also expresses that the against respondent as they filed their complaint
interrupted prescription 'shall before the city prosecutor forty-two days after the
commence to run again when such alleged crime of libel occurred. It was the Office of
proceedings terminate without the the City Prosecutor that committed an error when it
accused being convicted or filed the complaint with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
acquitted,' thereby indicating that -Petitioner's other argument that she has been
the court in which the complaint or denied her right to a speedy trial deserves scant
information is filed must have the consideration. Well-established is the doctrine that
power to convict or acquit the the right to a speedy trial is violated only where there
accused. Precisely, the trial on the is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay
merits usually terminates in without participation or fault of the accused, or when
conviction or acquittal, not unjustified postponements are sought which prolong
otherwise. But it is in the court the trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the
conducting a preliminary case at bench, besides the filing of the petitions
investigation where the before the Court of Appeals and this Court,
proceedings may terminate without petitioner had likewise filed a Motion to Quash and a
conviction or acquittal, if the court Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional Trial
should discharge the accused Court of Quezon City, Branch 218. As such, it is clear
because no prima facie case had that petitioner is not without fault in the delay in the
been shown prosecution of the case against her.|||
23
24