Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.

JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

GR No. 115634, 2000-04-27

FELIPE CALUB v. CA

FACTS:
The two motor vehicle of Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon together with
the drivers of the vehicles was apprehended by the Forest Protection and Law
Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR because they failed to present proper documents and/or
licenses. Apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of
lumber at the DENR-PENR Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio
Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2)
impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before
the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and
issued the corresponding writ

ISSUES:
Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143,
is in custodia legis.
Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded
vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.

RULING:
There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in
“custodia legis”. It could not be subject to an action for replevin since there was a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with
law, the subject vehicles were validly deemed in “custodia legis”. It could not
be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue
of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

G.R. No. 155634, April 27, 2000

LALICAN v. HON. VERGARA, et al.

FACTS:
Lalican was charged with the violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for possessing
without lawful authority of permit, 1,800 board feet of assorted species and
dimensions of LUMBER on 2 passenger jeeps with a value of P14,000. Lalican
claimed that the law is “vague and standard less” as it does not specify the authority
or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, the
information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether a charge of illegal possession of “lumber” is excluded from the crime
of illegal possession of “timber” as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705 to warrant the quash of an information charging the former offense or a
“nonexistent crime.”

RULING:
No, to exclude possession of “lumber” from the acts penalized in Sec. 68
would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to
allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford
an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or
contravene the plain words of the law. The phrase “forest products” is broad enough
to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

G.R. No. 131270, March 17,

PALLADA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 2000

FACTS:
The Department of Natural Resources (DENR) in Bukidnon received
reports of some illegally cut lumber that is being delivered to the warehouse of
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is
engaged in rice milling and trading. DENR and Police officers raided the
company’s warehouse and found a large stockpile of lumber, the petitioner
produced two receipts to prove that they had acquired the lumber by purchase. As
stated in the receipt they had purchased the lumber at R.L. Rivero Lumber Yard.
The DENR officers, however, did not give credit to the receipt since the
permit of R.L.’s permit to operate has long been suspended. The team made an
inventory and seized the first batch of the lumber, afterwards the raiding team
went back to the warehouse of VGHC to seize the second batch of lumber, and
however, they were confronted by the company president of VGHC and a certain
lawyer. They were asking for the suspension of the operation to enable them to
seek a lifting of the warrant.
The motion was filed to the court which issued the warrant however it was
denied, accordingly the remaining lumber was seized, but, Pallada the General
Manager refused to sign the seizure orders. His Assistant General Manager Noel Sy,
Company President Isaias Valdehueza, were all charged for possession of illegal
possession of lumber in violation of the Revised Forestry Code. The General
Manager and Company president were found guilty by the RTC, however, Isaias
and the assistant general manager were acquitted for lack of evidences against
them. The petitioners appealed to the C.A., the C.A. Affirmed the decision of the
RTC however it acquitted the president of VGHC for lack of proof of his
participation in the said purchase. Hence the petition with the S.C

ISSUE:
Whether or not a certificate of origin should be issues timber and lumber.
Whether the term “timber” includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of
Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in establishing the
legality of the company’s possession of the lumber.

RULING:
The S.C. ruled that different certificate of origin should be issued for timber
and lumber and none-timber forest products, the rationale behind this is for the
determination of accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber and to
have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof.
The statement in the Mustang Lumber case that lumber is merely processed
timber and, therefore, the word “timber” embraces lumber, was made in answer to
the lower court’s ruling in that case that the phrase “possess timber or other forest
products” in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber
and forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable,
while those who possess lumber are not liable.
On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of
origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin
are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

G.R.No.136142; October 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFONSO DATOR and, BENITO
GENOL, PASTOR TELEN,

FACTS:
Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, were
charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code on the ground that on or about the
29th day of October, 1993 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, in barangay
Laboon, municipality of Maasin, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, accused
was found in possession of 41 pcs Dita lumber and 10 pcs Antipolo lumberwith a
size of 1,560.16 board feet, valued at P23,500.00 without any legal document as
required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government
authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government
Pastor Telen, the owner of the lumber, argued that the lumber will be used in
renovating his residence. He further argued that he was given a verbal permission
by Boy Boy Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENR-CENRO in Maasin, Southern
Leyte before cutting the lumber, and that the latter purportedly assured him that
written permit was not anymore necessary before cutting soft lumber, such as the
Antipolo and Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, provided that he
would plant trees as replacements thereof, which he already did

ISSUE:
Whether or not permit was still needed for cutting or transporting of soft
lumber cut from a private parcel of land.

RULING:
Yes, the appellant cannot validly take refuge under the pertinent provision of
DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 199025 which prescribes rules on the
deregulation of the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or
timber planted in private lands. Appellant submits that under the said DENR
Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees
within titled lands except Benguet pine and premium species listed under DENR
Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, namely: narra, molave, dao,
kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle, apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis, bolong-eta, kalantas,
lanete, lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo and manggis.
Under the same DENR administrative order, a certification from the CENRO
concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared
alienable and disposable land must still be secured to accompany the shipment. This
the appellant failed to do, thus, he is criminally liable under Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of permit and "legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations." The pertinent
portion of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990, is quoted here under,
to wit:
“provided, that a certification of the CENRO concerned to the effect
that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and
disposable land is issued accompanying the shipment”.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

G.R. No. 161798; October 20, 2004

PICOP vs CALO

FACTS:
Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion
peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds
government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the
exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of
forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its
officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997,1 February 16,
2001,2 and April 6, 2001,3 by virtue of which petitioner was designated a DENR
depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances within
its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) containing "Procedural
Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation."4 The MOA
provided, among others, that field validation/verification of applications for
Certificates of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the
DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to these
Memoranda, petitioner's security personnel were deputized as DENR officers to
apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission
of illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner
PICOP, through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended
within its concession and tree plantation area, violators who loaded the illegally cut
trees in trucks and other forms of conveyance, such as carabaos, for transport out of
the plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept in
PICOP's impounding area.
Casia et al. filed a complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for
issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 5, Agusan del Norte and Butuan City alleging in their complaint that
the Memoranda dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 and the
MOA dated May 25, 2001 were illegal for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. They sought to have the Memoranda declared null and void for this
reason and also sought to restrain the DENR and all those acting for and in their
behalf, including herein petitioner, from enforcing or implementing said
Memoranda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a depository can retain possession of conveyances

RULING:
No, petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest
products and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by
its licensing agreementPetitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the
apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of
the DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner
merely holds the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the DENR
while the administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said products is pending.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

The trial court noted that the confiscated vehicles were already subject of
administrative proceedings before the CENRO-Bislig and criminal complaints
before the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. There were also
letters or notices to petitioner from officers of the CENRO and the Office of the
Government Prosecution requesting the release of some of the conveyances to their
owners.14There is no reason for petitioner to refuse to hand over possession of the
vehicles and forest products since, being confiscated items, they will have to be
handed over to the proper government agencies for appropriate disposition
proceedings.
Furthermore, the transfer of custody of the confiscated products and
conveyances will not in any way place petitioner at a disadvantage. Petitioner is
merely a depository and the release of the conveyances and products to the
government agencies concerned has to be done but only in compliance with lawful
court orders.
It should also be remembered that the Memorandum dated February 16, 2001,
which designated petitioner as a DENR depository, had been revoked by the
Memorandum of January 21, 2002. As of the filing of the Petition for Review before
this Court on March 11, 2004, petitioner no longer had any right, as a depository, to
retain possession of the conveyances.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

YSMAEL, JR. vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

FACTS:
On October 12, 1965, Ysmael Jr. entered into a timber license agreement
designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an
exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within
a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in
the municipality of Maddela, Province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965
until June 30, 1990
On August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development issued
a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest
concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of
the Minister of Natural Resources.
After the cancellation of its timber license agreement, petitioner immediately
sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought
reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions
to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard
prior to the cancellation of its logging operations.
Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda
issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled
that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the
Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public
interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in
view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked
in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2,
1986.

ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative
orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime.

RULING:
No. A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent
Minister Maceda of the MNR which were ordered by the Office of the President,
will disclose public policy consideration which effectively forestall judicial
interference in the case at bar.
Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional
command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

stand clear. A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present
case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public
at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation.
For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the
government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and
manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of
utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process
of law clause.
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than
suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber
licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption
of appropriate corrective measures by the department.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

GR No. 152160; January 31, 2004

Bon v People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Virgilio Bon together with Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., and Rosalio Bon were
convicted by the trial court for violating Section 68 of PD 705. They were alleged in
conspiring with each other in the cutting, gathering and manufacturing of narra,
cuyao-yao and amugis trees without the knowledge and the consent of the owner and
without obtaining first from the proper authorities the necessary permit or license
and/or legal supporting documents. They pleaded not guilty to the allegations. The
prosecution supplied their evidence with the testimonies of witnesses saying that the
investigation they conducted together with the Barangay Tanods in response to the
complaint from the owner of the property revealed that indeed stealing of trees
happened. They also took photographs of the stump of sawed trees. Moreover,
Virgilio Bon admitted the ordering of cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber.
They petitioned before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the trial
court with a modification acquitting Jeniebre for lack of evidence to prove his
participation to the crime.
The petitioner now questions the credibility and the sufficiency of the
testimonies of the witnesses and the admissibility of his purported extrajudicial
admission of the allegation.

ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence
proving their guilt

HELD:
Yes. Section 68 of the Forestry Code, enumerated the following punishable
acts (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, alienable or disposable public land or from private land
without authority; and (2) possessing timber or other forest products without legal
documents.
The petitioners were charged with the first offense. Although there were no
direct evidence presented by the prosecution, the Supreme Court explained that
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and provided that the following
elements are present: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, records show that the circumstances satisfy the above-
mentioned requirements. First, the petitioner being the tenant and who is in actual
possession and control over the land and trees has admitted before the Barangay
Tanod and other witnesses that he had ordered the cutting of the trees. Such
confession is admissible as it was delivered voluntarily and not under custodial
investigation; Second, the petitioner went to the private complainant demanding the
latter to pay the value of the questioned trees which they cut and that the petitioner
asked for forgiveness for cutting the trees; lastly, the alleged cutting, gathering and
manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the
photographs of tree stumps, the investigation report of an officer from the
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

Community Environment and Natural Resources indicating that no permit was

secured for the cutting of the trees with the records on the computation of the
CENRO of the value of the timber generated from the felled trees.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

A.M. RTJ-03-1786, August 28, 2003

Chu v. Tamin

FACTS:
The respondent-judge was charged with a complaint for gross ignorance of
the law, serious misconduct and grave abuse of discretion before the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga Del Sur. Allegedly, the respondent judge for several times had
issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation of
PD 705. The latest warrant issued to him alleges that the complainant was in
possession of forest products of dubious origin and ordered the seizure of several
pieces of mangrove lumber from the complainant by the CENRO officers together
with the law enforcement agents.
The petitioner alleges that the certified copies of the fifth case filed against
him did not contain any transcript of respondent judges’ examination of CENRO
officer or his witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Procedure. It was also recalled by the petitioner that the first four warrants issued
to him by the respondent judge also did not contain any transcript of the required
examination of witnesses in which he filed for motion to quash. Such motion was
then denied by the respondent judge on the ground that an examination was in fact
conducted but the record of the deposition was misfiled in another case folder
through inadvertence.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law
HELD:
Yes. Section 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure provides
that a judge must, before issuing a warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. Furthermore, it was
reiterated in the case of Pendon v. CA the requirements on the issuance of search
warrants under Art. III Sec.2 of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the issuance of
a search warrant is justified only upon finding of a probable cause. In determining
the existence of a probable cause it is required that (1) the judge must examine the
witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; (3) the examination
must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
In the present case, the respondent judge claimed to have conducted the
examination but failed to include the transcript of copies of the same because the
clerical staff who prepared for its certified copy inadvertently failed do so. However,
records have shown that there were discrepancies and inconsistencies on the facts
given by the respondent judge, such that the transcript of the records were only
produced after the filing of the instant complaint. Also, he was not able to secure
any affidavit of his claimed witnesses during the examination and the affidavit of
the unnamed legal researcher who allegedly prepared the certified copies of the
records obtained by complainant. Lastly, he also failed to present as evidence during
the investigation the magnetic copy of the transcript allegedly stored in his office
computer.
The Supreme Court concluded that the respondent judge failed either to
examine the witness or witnesses before issuing the search warrant or to reduce the
examination in writing. Such omissions render him liable for gross ignorance of the
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

law. He likewise failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of

judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that judges should be
the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence; and that judges shall
maintain professional competence.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

G.R. No. 101083; July 30, 1993

OPOSA V. FACTORAN

FACTS:
An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing timber license
agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the
resultant deforestation and damage to the environment violated their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15, Article
II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they represented others of their
generation as well as generations yet unborn.
The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection
by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR
Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the
highest law of humankind-- the natural law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-
preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking
the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the children have the legal standing to file the case.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had
the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational
responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to
preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said,
the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police
power of the state in the interest of public welfare.
Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that
it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter: “[it] concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions”. The right is linked
to the constitutional right to health, is “fundamental”, “constitutionalized”, “self-
executing” and “judicially enforceable”. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.. In this instance the Court made a statement that
economic, social and cultural rights are not real rights
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

G.R. No. L-46772; February 13, 1992.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
QUEZON (BRANCH VII)

FACTS:
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs,
defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which
read:
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the
information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form. The Trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked
and the reconsideration sought was denied.
This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the CFI of Quezon
dismissing the information filed therein. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the information charged an offense.

HELD:
YES. The Court agree with the petitioner that the information substantially
alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section
68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege
that the taking of the logs in question was "without the consent of the state,"
nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather,
take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without
any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of
different species. . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license
agreement or permit for utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the
allegation in the information that the importation of the logs was "without any
authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to
alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the
sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the
law.
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the
state is not fatal. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license
or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products
produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. While
it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or
remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state.
In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is
retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes
everything found on its surface.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60
of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

Forest products is not material, it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was
without any authority or license from the government.
The petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing
the information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1591 is reinstated.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

PEOPLE VS QUE
G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996

FACTS:
Accused Que was discovered to be in possession of 258 pieces of various sizes
of Forest Products -chainsawn Tanguile lumber - in his truck, without necessary
permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities. Hence, accused was
convicted by the trial court for violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree P.D.705.
However, accused contended that he is not guilty since he acquired the
tanguile lumber from a legal source as evidenced by private land timber permits
(PLTP) issued by the (DENR) to Cayosa and Sabal which the latter gave to him by
Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of P.D. 705 of Section 68.

HELD:
Yes, there is a violation of P.D. 705 of Section 68.
There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of
P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authority; And
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal
or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is
immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents as “malum prohibitum”.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

G.R. No. 152989; September 4, 2002

ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al.

FACTS:
The petitioner is an owner of parcel of land. In 2009, he applied for a Private
Land Transfer Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm in his
property. He was informed that he can proceed with the cutting of trees even though
his application of permit was still pending. His property was then raided by the
representatives of CENRO (Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office) without a search warrant and the woods were turned over to a barangay
kagawad. Thereafter, CENRO returned with a search warrant and confiscated the
logs. The petitioner then filed a case against CENRO, however, he was prosecuted
for finding a probable cause for violating Section 68 of P.D. 705.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the owner of a private land, the petitioner in this case, is criminally
liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property;
2. Whether the owner of the private property is administratively liable under
Sec. 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not
transport the logs out of his property and just used them for his own agricultural
purposes therein; and
3. Whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to the
petitioner considering that the same were not transported out and merely used for his
own agricultural purposes.

RULING:
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277 provides that: “Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code”
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well
as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found.
As to the second issue, Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the
"Revised Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private
Land Timber Permit," provides that: “Any log/timber or finished-wood products
covered by these regulations which are transported without the prescribed
documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to confiscation in favor
of the government and shall be disposed in accordance with laws, rules and
regulations governing the matter.
The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order considers the mere
act of transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as
an offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law.
On the issue of whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to
petitioner, any pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature as the guilt
of the petitioner has not been legally established. The records of the case indicate
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

that trial on the merits is still in progress. Hence, this Court is not in a position to
speculate on or prescribe the courses of action or remedies the petitioner may avail
of under the aforementioned law. Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is not
duty bound to render advisory opinions.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.
JD-2C

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

Secretary of DENR et al. vs. Yap et al. (Consolidated with G.R. No. 173775)

FACTS:
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo Aklan granting the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for
titling purposes. This is now a petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision
the Court of Appeals.
On Nov. 10, 1978, Proclamation No. 1801 was issued by President Marcos
which declares Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. The petitioner
claimed that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the
petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was
not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code.

ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:
No, unclassified lands of the public domain are not automatically deemed
agricultural land, thus making these lands alienable.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. The applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports
of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
In keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.