RULE 87

MARIA G. AGUAS, FELIX GUARDINO and FRANCISCO SALINAS, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs. HERMOGENES LLEMOS, deceased defendant substituted by his representatives,
PERPETUA YERRO-LLEMOS, HERMENEGILDO LLEMOS, FELINO LLEMOS and AMADO LLEMOS, defendants-appellees.

Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar to recover
damages from Hermogenes Llemos, averring that the latter had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with
notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from
their residence in Manila accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously
failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment.

Before he could answer the complaint, the defendant died. Upon leave of court, plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs of the deceased.
The heirs filed a motion to dismiss, and by order of the court below dismissed it, on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs, should
have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and
the claim filed therein.

Motion for reconsideration having been denied, the case was appealed to us on points of law.

Plaintiffs argue with considerable cogency that contrasting the correlated provisions of the Rules of Court, those concerning claims that are barred if not
filed in the estate settlement proceedings (Rule 87, sec. 5) and those defining actions that survive and may be prosecuted against the executor or
administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), it is apparent that actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant survive the death of the latter.

Whether or not actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant survive the death of the latter.

Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2)
judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the
plaintiffs-appellants; for it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied", and
these words (also used by the Rules in connection with attachments and derived from the common law) were construed in Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38
Phil., 182, 189-194.

to include all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Upon the other hand, Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to
recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific
property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished (Baker vs. Crandall, 47 Am. Rep. 126; also 171 A.L.R., 1395). To
maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property (Javier vs. Araneta, L-4369,
Aug. 31, 1953).

Be that as it may, it now appears from a communication from the Court of First Instance of Samar that the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement
of their differences, and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. The settlement has been approved and embodied in an order of the Court of First
Instance.

The case having thus become moot, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the questions raised therein. This appeal is, therefore, ordered dismissed, without
special pronouncement as to costs.

RULE 89

Page 1 of 14
 1. MANOTOK REALTY, INC. petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and APOLONIO SIOJO, respondents.

Vicente Legarda as co-administrator allegedly sold an area of about 280 square meters of the subdivision denominated as Lot 6, Block 4 situated at
Dinalupihan, Tondo, Manila at P30.00 per square meter to Abelardo Lucero. The sale was on an installment basis and Lucero paid an initial amount of
P200.00 by virtue of which a receipt was issued by Legarda. On the same day, Lucero took possession of the lot.

Lucero leased the lot to six persons, one of whom is Apolonio Siojo. Like the other tenants, Apolonio Siojo constructed a house on an area of 73 square
meters of the lot now denominated as Lot III, Block 2, and paid P15.00 as monthly rentals.

The probate court issued another order authorizing the Philippine Trust Company as administrator, to sell the subdivision at the earliest possible time at
the best obtainable price.

The lessees of Lucero, including Apolonio Siojo, defaulted in their payment of rentals. Separate actions for ejectment were filed against them. However,
a compromise agreement was concluded and the tenants resumed the payment of rentals.

In the meantime, Lucero accordingly awaited the sending by Legarda of the formal contract but as none came, he could not make further payments. He,
therefore, went to the Philippine Trust Company to make further payments, showing it the receipt evidencing the down payment but the latter refused
either to receive payment or to issue a formal contract because the Legarda-Tambunting Subdivision was involved in litigation.

Manotok Realty, Inc. was subsequently awarded the sale of the entire subdivision. The deed of sale was executed by and between Manotok Realty, Inc.
and Philippine Trust Company and the same was approved by the probate court. Manotok Realty, Inc. obtained Transfer Certificate of Title which
covered the whole Legarda-Tambunting estate including the lot sold to Lucero.

Manotok Realty, Inc. caused to be published in the Manila Times and Taliba notices addressed to "all squatter-occupants" of the subdivision advising
them to surrender the material and actual possession of the portions occupied by them otherwise judicial action would be taken. Manotok Realty, Inc.
filed the complaint below for ejectment against Apolonio Siojo. Summons was served on Apolonio Siojo. These circumstances, notwithstanding, Lucero
executed a deed of assignment of the lot in question in favor of his lessees, including the Apolonio Siojo.

Manotok Realty contends the appellate court committed an error of law when: a) it upheld the validity of the contract of sale between Legarda and
Lucero; and b) it ruled that the approval of the probate court was not necessary for the validity of the said sale.

The Manotok Realty argues that the receipt evidencing the alleged sale by Legarda to Lucero does not conform to the legal requirements of contracts of
sale and that when the law requires that a contract be in a public document in order that it may be valid or enforceable, such as contracts which have for
their object the creation or transmission of real rights over immovable property, that requirement is absolute and indispensable. Therefore, the
questioned sale cannot be enforced against third persons such as Manotok Realty by the Apolonio Siojo who only derived his right to the property from
Lucero. Furthermore, the alleged sale was on an installment basis and thus, necessitated court approval because the same was patently not in
accordance with the express terms and conditions specified in the authorization to sell by the probate court.

Whether or not

The alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero should have been embodied in a public instrument in accordance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code and
should have been duly registered with the Register of Deeds to make it binding against third persons. The authority given by the probate court to
Legarda specifically required the execution of necessary documents. Lucero not only failed to obtain a deed of sale from Legarda but also failed to
secure any kind of writing evidencing the contract of sale other than the receipt issued by Legarda acknowledging the amount of P200.00. No
explanation was offered by the private respondent as to why there was no effort on the part of Lucero to pay the balance of the purchase price during
the time that Legarda was the special co-administrator. The Apolonioo Siojo merely alleged that Lucero awaited the sending of the formal contract by
Legarda but as none came, he could not make further payments. It was only after about five years that Lucero allegedly went to the administrator and
offered to pay the balance. By this time, Philippine Trust Company was already the administrator of the LegardaTambunting estate and it refused to
accept further payments from Lucero who had only the receipt in the amount of P200.00 and nothing more as proof that more than five years earlier a
piece of real property was sold to him by a special administrator acting under court orders.

That the alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero did not bind the Legarda-Tambunting estate, much less, Manotok Realty who acquired the property in
dispute with the approval of the probate court and in a sole reliance on the clean title of the said property. As correctly ruled by the trial court:

"The plaintiff (petitioner), as the registered owner of the property, is entitled to the possession thereof, unless the defendant (private respondent) could
show that he is entitled to its possession or to purchase the same. The property was advertised for sale, but neither Abelardo Lucero nor the defendant
herein appeared in the testate proceedings of Clara Tambunting de Legarda to claim their right to the particular lot in question. The records of the
testate proceedings of Clara Tambunting de Legarda did not show that any claim was made by Dr. Abelardo Lucero or by the defendant herein. The
alleged sale made by Vicente Legarda in favor of Dr. Lucero did not bind the estate, for aside from the fact that no formal deed of sale was executed by
Vicente Legarda specifying the terms thereof, it was never approved by the Court. Sales of immovable properties by the administrators did not bind the
estate and have no validity unless they are approved by the Court Moreover, the alleged receipt issued by Vicente Legarda does not constitute even a
memorandum of sale, because it did not specify the price of the land and the manner of payment x x x."

We also find that the appellate court committed an error of law when it held that the sale of the lot in question did not need the approval of the probate
court

Page 2 of 14
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special
proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.

An administrator under the circumstances of this case cannot enjoy blanket authority to dispose of real estate as he pleases, especially where he ignores
specific directives to execute proper documents and get court approval for the sale's validity.

Moreover, the authority granted by the probate court in the case at bar specifically ordered Legarda to submit the document of sale for its approval.

Thus, as stated earlier, the sale made by Legarda to Lucero, having been done without the approval of the probate court and without the execution of
the necessary documents did not bind the Legarda-Tambunting estate and could not have affected the rights of the petitioner over the disputed lot.
Furthermore, the private respondent is only a transferee of Lucero, At the time of the transfer of rights, Apolonio Siojo already had notice of the
Manotok Realty's ownership because he was served with a summons in the ejectment case filed against him by Manotok Realty. More importantly,
Apolonio Siojo is deemed to have constructive notice of such ownership from the time Manotok Realty was able to secure a title over the said property
in 1959. The controversies and litigations over the estate, the problems with numerous squatters, and other aspects of the acquisition of the property
attracted wide public attention and anybody in the subsidivision could not have avoided being involved or aware. Therefore, the Apolonio Siojo cannot
even be considered a possessor and builder in good faith,

Again, as correctly held by the trial court:

"After this case had been filed, Dr. Abelardo Lucero, executed a deed of sale of the lot in question in favor of his lessees, including Apolonio Siojo. This
deed of sale did not confer upon Apolonio Siojo the character of a builder in good faith. He built his house at the time when he was a mere lessee of Dr.
Abelardo Lucero. The fact that he subsequently bought the rights of Dr. Lucero did not change the character of his possession to a possessor in good
faith. Moreover, it is apparent that the deed of sale was executed in bad faith with the intention of giving Apolonio Siojo the character of a possessor in
good faith. The records show that Apolonio Siojo was served with summons. At the time of the execution of the deed of sale, Apolonio Siojo t already
knew, or had been informed, that the plaintiff claims to be the owner of the land in question, and that plaintiff s ownership is evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title. The alleged sale made by Vicente Legarda to Abelardo Lucero was not annotated in the certificate of title of the plaintiff, and
therefore, was not binding upon it. When Dr. Abelardo Lucero executed the deed of sale in favor of the defendant Siojo, he already knew of the plaintiff
s claim of ownership."

RULE 89

2. ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Margarita Suri Santos, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL., defendants. CITY OF DAGUPAN, defendant-appellant.

Page 3 of 14
Margarita Suri Santos died intestate. She was survived by her husband Severo Maneclang and nine (9) children. A petition for the settlement of her
estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate children, with the Court of First Instance at Dagupan City, Pangasinan; At the time of the
filing of the petition, the ages of her children were as follows:

No guardian ad litem was appointed by the court for the minor children.

Margarita left several parcels of land, among which is Lot No. 203 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan City containing an area of 7,401 square meters,
more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1393.

Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate estate of Margarita, filed a petition in SP Proc. No. 3028 asking the court to give him “the authority
to dispose of so much of the estate that is necessary to meet the debts enumerated” in the petition. While notice thereof was given to the surviving
spouse, Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.

Despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court issued an Order “authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the
properties of the estate for the purposes (sic) of paying off the obligations” referred to in the petition.

Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator of the intestate estate, executed a deed of sale in favor of the City of Dagupan,
represented by its mayor, Angel B. Fernandez, of a portion consisting of 4,515 square meters of the aforementioned Lot No. 203 for. This sale was
approved by the intestate court.

The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and constructed thereon a public market. It has been in continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the property since the construction of the market.

Some other parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate were sold by the administrator pursuant to the same authority granted by the 9 September
1949 Order. The new judicial administratrix of the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter of the late Margarita Suri Santos, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the sales made by the previous administrator pursuant to the Order of 9 September
1949, cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun, Marcelo Operaña and Aurora
Pagurayan, Crispino Tan-doc and Brigida Tandoc, Jose Infante and Mercedes Uy Santos, Roberto Cabugao, Basilisa Callanta and Fe Callanta, Ricardo
Bravo and Francisca Estrada, the City of Dagupan, and Constantino Daroya and Marciana Caramat.. The cause of action against the City of Dagupan
centers around the deed of sale executed in its favor by former judicial administrator Oscar S. Maneclang. In its Answer filed the City of Dagupan
interposed the following affirmative defenses: (a) the sale in its favor is valid, legal and above board; (b) plaintiff has no cause of action against it, or that
the same, if any, had prescribed since the complaint was filed thirteen (13) years after the execution of the sale; (c) plaintiff is barred by estoppel and by
laches; (d) it is a buyer in good faith, and (e) it has introduced necessary and useful improvements and constructed a supermarket worth P200,000.00;
hence, assuming arguendo that the sale was illegal, it has the right to retain the land and the improvements until it is reimbursed for the said
improvements.

Plaintiff and the City of Dagupan entered into a Stipulation of Facts wherein they agreed on the facts earlier adverted to. They, however, agreed: (a) to
adduce evidence concerning the reasonable rental of the property in question and other facts not embodied therein but which are material and vital to
the final determination of the case, and (b) to request the court to take judicial notice of SP Proc. No. 3028.

The evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang was induced by its then incumbent Mayor, Atty. Angel B. Fernandez, to sell the
property to the City of Dagupan and that the said City has been leasing the premises out to numerous tenants.

The issue presented in this case is the validity of a sale of a parcel of land by the administrator of an intestate estate made pursuant to a petition for
authority to sell and an order granting it which were filed and entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the decedent.

The trial court held that: Under Rule 90 of the Rules of Court,8 which is similar to the provisions of Section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is essential and
mandatory that the interested parties be given notices of the application for authority to sell the estate or any portion thereof which is pending settlement in a probate
court. As held in the early case of Estate of Gamboa vs. Floranza ,9 an order issued by a probate court for the sale of real property belonging to the estate of a deceased
person would be void if no notice for the hearing of the petition for such sale is given as required by said Section 722. Under this section, when such a petition is made,
the court shall designate a time and place for the hearing and shall require notice of the petition and of the time and place of such hearing to be given in a newspaper of
general circulation; moreover, the court may require the giving of such further notice as it deems proper.

In the instant case, no notice of the application was given to the heirs; hence, both the order granting authority to sell and the deed of sale executed in favor of the City
of Dagupan pursuant thereto, are null and void.

Court of Appeals

Article 320 of the present Civil Code, taken from the aforesaid Article 159, incorporates the amendment that if the property under administration is worth more than
two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), the father or the mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. This provision then restores the old
rule18 which made the father or mother, as such, the administrator of the child’s property. Be that as it may, it does not follow that for purposes of complying with the
requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, notice to the father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said Rule state explicitly that the notice,
which must be in writing, must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be
given to the interested parties.

There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or by a guardian ad litem in the case of the minors, the notice may be given to such counsel or
guardian adlitem. In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector Maneclang and
Page 4 of 14
Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still minors with no guardian ad litem having
been appointed to represent them. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisites set forth in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory
and essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.19 The reason behind this requirement is
that the heirs, as the presumptive owners20 since they succeed to all the rights and obligations of the deceased from the moment of the latter’s death,21 are the persons
directly affected by the sale or mortgage and therefore cannot be deprived of the property except in the manner provided by law.

While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was actually issued on 9 September 1949, the same was secured during the incumbency of the
then judicial administrator Pedro Feliciano. Even if it is to be assumed that Mayor Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz induced Oscar Maneclang to sell the
property, the fact remains that there was already the order authorizing the sale. Having been issued by a judge who was lawfully appointed to his
position, he was disputably presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and that his official duty was regularly performed. It was not
incumbent upon them to go beyond the order to find out if indeed there was a valid motion for authority to sell. Otherwise, no order of any court can be
relied upon by the parties. Under Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it; furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. It implies
freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. We find no circumstance in this case to have alerted the vendee,
the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or defect in the authority of the judicial administrator to sell the property. Since good faith is always presumed,
and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof, it was incumbent upon the administrator to establish such
proof, which We find to be wanting. However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that: “Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this
character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully.” The filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith.

The date of service of summons to the City of Dagupan in Civil Case No. D-1785 is not clear from the record. Its Answer, however, was filed on 5
November 1965. Accordingly, its possession in good faith must be considered to have lasted up to that date. As a possessor in good faith, it was entitled
to all the fruits of the property and was under no obligation to pay any rental to the intestate estate of Margarita for the use thereof. Under Article 544 of
the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted. Thus, the trial court committed an
error when it ordered the City of Dagupan to pay accumulated rentals in the amount of P584,602.20 from 4 October 1952 up to the filing of the
complaint.

6. However, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan already became a possessor in bad faith. This brings Us to the issue of reasonable
rentals, which the trial court fixed at P3,747.45 a month. The basis therefor is the monthly earnings of the city from the lessees of the market stalls inside
the Perez Boulevard Supermarket. The lessees were paying rental at the rate of P0.83 per square meter. Appellant maintains that this is both unfair and
unjust. The property in question is located near the Chinese cemetery and at the time of the questioned sale, it had no access to the national road, was
located “in the hinterland” and, as admitted by the former judicial administrator, Oscar Maneclang, the persons who built houses thereon prior to the
sale paid only P6.00 to P8.00 as monthly rentals and the total income from them amounted only to P40.00 a month. Appellant contends that it is this
income which should be made the basis for determining the reasonable rental for the use of the property.

There is merit in this contention since indeed, if the rental value of the property had increased, it would be because of the construction by the City of
Dagupan of the public market and not as a consequence of any act imputable to the intestate estate. It cannot, however, be denied that considering that
the property is located within the city, its value would never decrease; neither can it be asserted that its price remained constant. On the contrary, the
land appreciated in value at least annually, if not monthly. It is the opinion of this Court that the reasonable compensation for the use of the property
should be fixed at P1,000.00 a month. Taking into account the fact that Severo Maneclang, insofar as his usufructuary right is concerned, but only until
his death, is precluded from assailing the sale, having been properly notified of the motion for authority to sell and considering further that the heirs,
Hector, Cesar, Oscar and Amanda, all surnamed Maneclang, are, as discussed above, barred by laches, only those portions of the monthly rentals which
correspond to the presumptive shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang, to the extent untouched by the
usufructuary right of Severo Maneclang, should be paid by the City of Dagupan. There is no showing as to when Severo Maneclang died; this date of
death is necessary to be able to determine the cessation of his usufructuary right and the commencement of the full enjoyment of the fruits of the
property by the unaffected heirs. Under the circumstances, and for facility of computation, We hereby fix the presumptive shares in the rentals of the
aforenamed unaffected heirs at P500.00 a month, or at P100.00 each, effective 5 November 1965 until the City of Dagupan shall have effectively delivered
to the intestate estate 5/9 of the property in question. The latter, however, shall reimburse the City of Dagupan of that portion of the real estate taxes it
had paid on the land corresponding to 5/9 of the lot commencing from taxable year 1965 until said 5/9 part is effectively delivered to the intestate
estate.

Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the City of Dagupan may retain possession of the property until it shall have been fully reimbursed the value
of the building in the amount of P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price amounting to P6,493.05.

RULE 90

1. JULIAN BOÑAGA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ROBERTO SOLER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Following the death of the spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac, intestate proceedings for the settlement of their estate were commenced in the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur. In time Juan Garza was appointed administrator of the estate Upon application, Juan Garza was authorized by the
probate court to sell certain parcels of land pertaining to the estate. Pursuant hereto, Garza sold said parcels of land in favor of appellee Roberto Soler,
which sale was subsequently approved, the heirs of the deceased wife, Maria Isaac, after having been declared as such, sold all their shares and interests
over certain parcels of land in favor of appellee Soler.

Page 5 of 14
Sometime during the war, the records of Special Proceeding No. 7194 were destroyed. Upon reconstitution of these records by court order, Julian
Boñaga was issued letters of administration, the instant action was filed by Boñaga in his capacity as administrator, seeking to annul the sales of August
30, 1944 and October 14, 1944 in favor of Roberto Soler on the ground that said transactions were fraudulent made without notice to the heirs of
Alejandro Ros of the hearing of the application to sell, and that the sales were not beneficial to the heirs for various reasons, and praying for
reconveyance of the lands sold, since they were fraudulently registered under Act 496 in the name of Roberto Soler.

Soler filed his third motion to dismiss, for the first time raising estoppel, prescription of the action, and non-inclusion of necessary parties, as grounds.
Upon an order for Boñaga to include the vendors in the sales as parties to the case, the court, ]denied the motion to dismiss, but apparently without
resolving the issues of estoppel and prescription. ] Soler sought a resolution of his third motion to dismiss. Over plaintiff's objections, the court ordered
the dismissal of the action, sustaining the contention that as administrator of the estate succeeding Juan Garza, plaintiff was estopped to file an action to
annul the sales, and, moreover, that the action had prescribed. Hence, this appeal.

The sale appears to be of 21 parcels of abaca, coconut, forest and pasture lands. Boñaga alleges that these lands comprised almost the entire estate.
Nothing in the record would show whether, as required by Rule 90, sections 4 and 7, the application for authority to sell was set for hearing, or that the
court ever caused notice thereof to be issued to the heirs of Alejandro Ros Incidentally, these heirs seem not to have gotten any part of the purchase price
since they were then allegedly in Spain. Yet, in the order of declaration of heirs of the wife and approving the sale to Soler, the declaration of the heirs of
the husband Alejandro Ros was expressly held in abeyance, indicating a recognition of their existence. Appellees Roberto Soler, et. al. maintain that the
sale was made for the purpose of paying debts, but this, at lease, is controversial.

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action without trial on the merits considering that there is allegation that the sale of the parcels of
land to Soler did not comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court

We think the lower court erred in dismissing the action without a hearing on the merits. A sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested
parties, under Sections 4 and 7, Rule 90, must comply with the requisites therein provided, which are mandatory. Among these requisites, the fixing of
the time and place of hearing for an application to sell, and the notice thereof to the heirs, are essential; and without them, the authority to sell, the sale
itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio. Rule 90, Section 4, does not distinguish between heirs residing in and those residing
outside the Philippines. Therefore, its requirements should apply regardless of the place of residence of those required to be notified under said rule.

The contention that the sale was made under Section 2, Rule 90 (wherein notice is required only to those heirs, etc., residing in the Philippines), is not
substantiated by the record. Neither the deed of sale, nor the orders issued by the probate court in connection there with, show whether, as required by
said Section 2, the personal properties were insufficient to pay the debts and expenses of administration. There is not even a showing, to start with, that
the sale was made for the purpose of paying debts or expenses of administration (or legacies), a condition which circumscribes the applicability of that
section. On the face of the reamended complaint at any rate, it does not appear that the contested sale was one under section 2 of Rule 90; and the same
can not be invoked to sustain the motion to dismiss. Without reception of further evidence to determine whether the requisites of the applicable
provisions of the Rules had been followed, the dismissal of the action was erroneous and improvident. Boñaga should at least have been given a chance
to prove his case.

As to the plea of estoppel, the rule is that a decedent's representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void deed purporting to convey
land; and if this be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor cannot be estopped to question the acts of his predecessor are not
conformable to law.

We also find untenable the claim of prescription of the action. Actions to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe, a principle applied even
before the effectivity of the new Civil Code. The sale on October 14, 1944 by the heirs of Maria Isaac of whatever interests or participation they might
have in the four parcels of land covered by the deed may be valid, yet it could not have effected an immediate absolute transfer of title to appellee Soler
over any part of the parcels of land themselves, much less over their entirety. Necessarily, the sale was subject to the result of the administration
proceedings, a contingency upon which the deed of sale itself expressly founded the transaction. By its terms, not only was the existence of possible
heirs of Alejandro Ros recognized, but it also provided for the contingency that said heirs could yet be declared or adjudicated in the administration
proceedings as the sole owners of the four parcels being sold.

The subsequent registration of those lands covered by the sale of October 14, 1944 and that of August 30, 1944, allegedly in the exclusive name of
appellee Roberto Soler, gave rise to an action for reconveyance based on trust. Assuming that this case is one of constructive trust, and under the theory
that actions to recover property held in constructive trust would prescribe, there is here no showing as to when the alleged fraud was discovered.
Hence, it cannot be said that prescription has tolled the action.

Finally, neither in the first motion to dismiss on August 29, 1952; nor in the Answer on September 26, 1952; nor in the second motion to dismiss on June
11, 1953, was the defense of prescription raised. From the time the Complaint was filed on May 9, 1952 to the third motion to dismiss on July 18, 1955,
was a period of more than three (3) years in which it took Soler just to raise prescription as an issue. Not having been set up in the two (2) motions to
dismiss or in the answer as affirmative defense, it is deemed to have been waived. Obviously, prescription in this case does not appear on the face of the
pleadings, where failure to plead it would not have constituted a waiver

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RULE 90

2. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MERCEDES CANO. FLORANTE C. TIMBOL, administrator-
appellee, vs. JOSE CANO, oppositor-appellant.

The intestate Mercedes Cano died, leaving as her only heir her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was
appointed administrator. Jose Cano, filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also an uncle of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing
that the agricultural lands of the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to be used for the
maintenance of the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues to the government. Judge Edilberto Barot, then presiding the court, approved the
motion

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The court, upon motion of the administrator and the conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the annual rental of the
agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into a
subdivision.

Upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of
the intestate.

Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano and on January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modified in a subsequent
one of January 8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233
hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give
opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his objections to the motions. Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of
the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express
authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.

The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objections of Jose Cano, in the order now subject of appeal, which reads:

The said contract of lease is on all forms illegal. Under article 1646 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, — a new provision, — "the persons disqualified to buy referred
to in articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned therein," and under article 1491 (3) o the same Code, executors and
administrators cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate under administration.

If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only pointed administrator on June 6, 1957 and the said contract of lease having been executed on July 9, 1956, the same
fall within the prohibition provided by law. However, Jose C. Cano avers that this Court, in the instant proceedings, cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease
contract, but in its general jurisdiction. There is no need for the court to declare such contract illegal and, therefore, null and void as the law so expressly provides.

In the first assignment of error appellant claims that the consideration of the motions of the administrator July 6 and 8, 1958, without due notice to him,
who is lessee is a violation of the Rules of Court. This objection lost its force when the court, motu proprio set aside it first order of approval and
furnished copy of the motion to appellant and gave him all the opportunity to present his objections thereto.

In the second and third assignments of error appellant argues that the court below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his
rights under the lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified only by a court of general jurisdiction. The above arguments are without merit.
In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled
thereto or to any qualified; supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87, See.
13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs the delivery
of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the
estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated.

Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with
the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The
matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to the approval of the court. Of course, if the court abuses its discretion
in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its orders may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not because the court
may make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of administration of the administrator.

In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the effect of the reduction of the area under lease would be to deprive the tenants of appellant of
their landholdings. In the first place, the tenants know ought to know that the lands leased are lands under administration, subject to be sold, divided or
finally delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the administration of the lands of the intestate. The order appealed from does not have the
effect of immediately depriving them of their landholdings; the order does not state so, it only states that the lands leased shall be reduced and
subdivided. If they refuse to leave their landholdings, the administrator will certainly proceed as the law provides. But in the meanwhile, the lessee
cannot allege the rights of his tenants as an excuse for refusing the reduction ordered by the court.

In the fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that his rights as lessee would be prejudiced because the land leased would be reduced without a
corresponding reduction in the rentals. This would be a matter to be litigate between the administrator and himself before the probate court. But the fact
of the prejudice alone cannot bar reduction of the land leased, because such reduction is necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the
debts of the estate under administration.

The sixth assignment of error merits no attention on our part; it is appellant himself who, as administrator since 1945, has delayed the settlement of the
estate.

In the seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project of partition had already been approved and had become final, the lower court
has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision. This assignment of
error needs but a passing mention. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been
delivered to the heirs as such heir.

We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the
declaration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was
granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.(See Arts. 1646
and 1491, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the court below that the lease is null and void, which declaration we hereby
affirm, it would seem proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to take steps to get back the lands leased from the appellant herein,
or so much thereof as is needed in the course of administration.

Page 8 of 14
RULE 90

3. CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,

vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition,
reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages.

a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for
defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share
of defendants shall be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the 'SalustiaSolivioVda. deJavellana Memorial
Foundation;'

b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned
in this decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2)
of this produce shall belong to plaintiff;

Page 9 of 14
 c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was
born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High
School, brought up Esteban, Jr.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited
from her mother, GregoriaCelo, EngracioSolivio's first wife but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her
sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a
foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack
without having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about
Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to
Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order which she filed in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:

4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of
the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein],
because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each
other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith
and upon the advice of her counsel, filed Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana,
Jr. Later, she filed an amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and
that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is
the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the
foundation would be facilitated.

The court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes
and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused
to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission

Four months later, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of
Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. Her motion was denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial,
Concordia filed Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. CeledoniaSolivio" for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

The said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.

On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been
transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'SalustiaSolivioVda. deJavellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for
reconsideration.

1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia
Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch
23 of the same court;

4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia SolivioVda. deJavellana
Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.

Page 10 of 14
 I. The question of jurisdiction—

After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to
entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings
(Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission
and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end
of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The
pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:

2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss CeledoniaSolivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record
that despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to
the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on
February 26, 1977.

During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without
any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who
reared him and with whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.

2. Miss CeledoniaSolivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died
intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.

The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated.

In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set
aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the
properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the
denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate
action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.

In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with
probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.

The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11)
on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition
of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say
the least, for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.

However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, SalustiaSolivioVda. de
Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated
April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:

4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner CeledoniaSolivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which
are not far away for (sic) each other.

Sshe is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all
of Esteban's estate in the "SalustiaSolivioVda. deJavellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and
to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.

Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to
prove the agreement

The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have done
so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, JuanitoDomin, actively
participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his
wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has
honored hers.

Page 11 of 14
 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement
between her and her co-heir, CeledoniaSolivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "SalustiaSolivioVda. de Javallana
Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of
trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The
petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to
terminating the proceedings therein.

RULE 91

1. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion
of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an
agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312)
by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with
another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen.
Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands
by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an
Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

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w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate
Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.

:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands
of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

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