Elena Dycaico VS Social Security System

Facts:
Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of SSS and designated Elena Dycaico and their eight children
as beneficiaries therein. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. Nine years after, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly
pension from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away. A few months
prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner.
Shortly after Bonifacio’s death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor’s
pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that they were not living under the benefit
of marriage when Bonifacio became a member of SSS. The basis was Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep.
Act) No. 8282 which reads: Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.
…
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. …

Issue:
Whether The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs
afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages
to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits.
HELD:
Yes. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an
opportunity to be heard. This has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement
date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282.
This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any
opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive
presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true.
In the United States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an irrebuttable presumption and statutes
creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process
clause.

REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS
707 SCRA 584 (2013)

Facts:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC).
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity[4] of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had anyintention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00... she did not pay him the $2,000.00
because he never processed her petition for.citizenship therefore, null and void ab initio.

Issues:
 Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

Ruling:
No. their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with
the requirements of an application for citizenship. The court also explained that “There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares,
such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.

ROMUALDEZ, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA 8189
or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to their residence in their applications
as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary
investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the
same.
Sps. Romualdez contends that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000,
they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron.The Complaint-
Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the
evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

Issue: Whether due process was violated.

Held: No.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses
charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be
accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no
incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Information filed before
the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered
by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 8189. Evidently, the Information directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which
were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et al.

FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act. In one of the issues they assailed definition of
terrorism contending that it is vague. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary
Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and
Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the
petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE:
Was there a violation of due process of law due to void for vagueness?
HELD:
No.A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. In
this case, since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent charge against them. In fine, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372.  Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition
of “terrorism” is thus legally impermissible.
Hence it was DISMISSED

Imbong vs Ochoa et.al. G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

FACTS:

1. Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the constitutionality of the
Reproductive Health Bill. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the
said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on so many grounds and one of
them is that The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
HELD:
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several
terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law)
as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

Agabon vs. NLRC / Riviera Home - GR No. 158693 Case Digest

FACTS:
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers from January
1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and was decided in their favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the
NLRC contending just cause for the dismissal because of petitioner’s abandonment of work. NLRC ruled
there was just cause and petitioners were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The CA in turn
ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because they have abandoned their work but ordered the payment
of money claims.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

RULING:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also
enjoins the employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to defend himself. Abandonment is
the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. For a valid finding or
abandonment, two factors are considered: failure to report for work without a valid reason; and, a clear
intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the second as the more determinative factor
which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention
to work.
Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process
requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the
employee. This became known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated Due process Rule.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property to El
Banco Espanol-Filipino. Engracio returned to China where he died without returning again to the
Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident,
it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the
summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the
Clerk complied with this requirement.after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause
proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards
sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder.this sale was confirmed by the court.
However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca,
as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set
aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The
basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void
because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:
Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute denial of due
process?
RULING:
No.The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an
opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would
seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the
requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which
is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these
proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress
declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been
infringed.

G.R. Nos. L-39516-17 January 28, 1975

ROSARIO CASTILLO and SONIA VILLASANTA, vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE CELESTINO JUAN,
FACTS:
petitioners, two young maidens who are the offended parties in two rape cases, assail the
actuation of respondent Judge and seek his disqualification on the ground of bias and prejudice. What
was done by him, according to their strongly-worded petition, was in disregard of the highly-prized ideal
in adjudication, likewise a due process requirement, that a litigant "is entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge."
On two separate occasions on August 15 and 27, 1974, in the secrecy of his chambers he informed
petitioners of the weakness of their cases, the likelihood of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused,
and impressed upon them that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their
behalf was to have such accused indemnify them. This move, according to him, would assure their being
spared from the embarrassment occasioned by suits of this character, clearly prejudicial to their future.
These conversations took place even before the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, one of
the petitioners not having testified as yet.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge violated due process.

HELD:
In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial
judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to
indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at times human failing of yielding to first
impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It is now beyond
dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a
judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a
judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing.
Espleta v Avelino (1975) 62 SCRA 395
J. Fernando

Facts:
Shell’s counsel Bellaflor forwarded an oral motion for the revocation of appearance of Espleta’s
witness Montano for cross-examination and the conlusion of her testimony. She was unable to appear in
one of the trials due to her an audit for a job in the Department of Local Government at the day she was
supposed to finish her testimony and cross-examination. Judge Avelino accepted this proposal and even
allowed Shell to present its rebuttal witness for Espeleta’s testimony. The judge granted this request to
the prejudice of Espeleta. The magistrate also did not consider Espeleta’s counsel’s letter for
postponement. The judge told parties to submit documentary evidence afterwards but rejected the ones
from Montano’s testimony due to her being stricken from the records. In essence, there was partiality on
the part of the judge.

Issue:
Whether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if the
right to be heard of petitioner was revoked by the respondent Judge?

Held:
No. Petition for certiorari granted.
Espeleta presented Montano as an accountant to testify for the reduced balance to Shell in the
form of 14,000 from Shell’s proposed amount of 22,000. The deductions included payment for damage
due to gasoline leakages.
Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is understandable
for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than just a
probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully heard. The trial didn’t
satisfy the standard for a judicious inquiry, because there was a mockery of the requirement that the
litigants should be given full opportunity to sustain their claims and have their evidence considered and
weighted. The petitioner can assert due process.