WRIT OF AMPARO / HABEAS DATA

37. Sec of DND et al, v. Raymund Manalo, et al., October 7, 2008

FACTS:
On February 14, 2006 past afternoon, Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted
by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and
supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on
August 13, 2007. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them
of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a
manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On
December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA
ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’
custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and
produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody.
The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking
to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person
may be invoked.
HELD:
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the
Manalos right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or
entities. Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. The right to security of person is
a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded
without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical
injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or
security of a person.
38. Robert Reyes v Sec. Raul Gonzales, December 3, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales
issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering to include in the Hold Departure List of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others in the interest
of national security and public safety. RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion
against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitioner argues that the DOJ
Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order and has no legal basis since Rebellion
case has already been dismissed but the HDO has not been lifted.
Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that every time petitioner would leave
and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for
several minutes because of the existing HDO. The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on
the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. The CA dismissed
the petition and denied the privilege of the writ of amparo. The motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
HELD:
Petition is denied. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under
Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right
to security. In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the court made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of
“extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” or to threats thereof.
The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal
case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to
travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of
his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or
remedy. The direct recourse to this Court is inappropriate, considering the provision of Section
22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which provides, that when a criminal action has commenced
no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by
motion in the criminal case.
39. In the Matter of Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data in favor of
Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. November 15, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan),
a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that
the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to
confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders,
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was
filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo
as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases.
HELD:
The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the
courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court
from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever
processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute
criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position
to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and
accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of
course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.

40. Dr. Joy Lee v Neri Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, October 4, 2014
FACTS: Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy,
her former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s
condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera
missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered
from the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded
the return of the camera, but she refused. The had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed
Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic Act
9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilizing the said video.
The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other woman,
thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data.
After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ and directed
Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well as the original and copies
of the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted
keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as
evidence in the cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s petitions should be dismissed because its filing
was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed against him; and she is not
engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC
granted Neri’s petition and ordered the turn-over of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from
reproducing the same. It disregarded Joy’s defense that she is not engaged in the collection,
gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of reproducing the same and showing it to other
persons (Napolcom) violated Neri’s right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling
only on the return of the video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the
instant petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data was proper
HELD: NO.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived
as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals], which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of data about oneself.”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition
for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the
petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other
words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations
in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears
pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and
doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy
in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the
suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded
in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such
interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate
or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the
matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the
cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure
on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan
submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the
substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing
therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of
violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even
lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to
achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s
reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the
allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to
reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
41. Marynette Gamboa v Marlou C. Chan et al., July 24, 2012

FACTS: On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative

Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country”, forming the Zeñarosa Commission to investigate
the existence of private army groups (PAGs) with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May
2010 elections and permanently in the future.
Gamboa alleged that without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the
Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa
averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed
for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte
database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of
the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified
reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.
ISSUES:
Whether or Not her right to privacy was violated and,
Whether or not the writ of habeas data is the proper remedy for the violation of her rights.
HELD: The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment
of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection
and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law
and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating
entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. That it was leaked to third
parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that
Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure.
In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary
and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which
she failed to overcome.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
42. Felipe Navarro v Court of Appeals, August 26, 1999
FACTS: The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley
Jalbuena and Enrique Ike Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City,
together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was
showing nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a
scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her
brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. At that point, the floor
manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded
to know why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job.
Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him.
This angered Lingan. The two then had a heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said: Masyado kang
abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo. petitioner Navarro hit him with
the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his
face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which
floored him. Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang
testigo, si Ike Lingan ang naghamon. He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa
harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon. He then poked his gun at
the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. Jalbuena could not
affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. Capt.
Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman
took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada,
arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan
died from his injuries.Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the
exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping
HELD: SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act
shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording
is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by
the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape
played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally
made the voice recording;that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;]and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.A sufficient foundation was thus laid
for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry
against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner
Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
43.. Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590
Ramirez v CA G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her
in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim,
petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney’s
fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs,
interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on which the
civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From
the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and
void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of the
party is a violation of R.A. 4200.
Ruling: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it
shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions,
one does not distinguish.
44.. Zulueta v Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 669
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence obtained can be held inadmissible as it violated his right of privacy
of communication.
HELD:
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
45. Waterous Drugs Corporation v NLRC, October 16, 1997
FACTS:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at
P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is
P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that
the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.
YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents
refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms.
Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.
Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants. In the light of the
decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot
be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence

HELD:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was
insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not
among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
46. Marquez v Desierto, June 27, 2001
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas
Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are Account
Nos. 011-37270, 240-020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with
the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et.
al.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor for the Ombudsman.
Marquez prayed that the previous decisions be set aside and the issuance of TRO and/or
preliminary injunction to the order of the Ombudsman and court decisions.
ISSUE: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the
questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A.
No.1405).
HELD: No. SC ruled that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly
identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be
present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the
pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending case before any court of competent authority. What
is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the
Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado
Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which
would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
47. Ople v Torres, July 23, 1998
FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued AO No. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL
COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”. Petitioner Senator Blas Ople assailed its
constitutionality on the grounds that the administrative order issued by the executive is
deemed to be a law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative
power of the congress to make laws, and it impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional
right of privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AO No. 308 violates a person’s right to privacy.
RULING:
The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. Administrative Order No. 308 violates the
constitutional right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will put people’s
right to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper
safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics
and other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination;
it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

43. TELEBAP v COMELEC, supra

44. ABS-CBN Broadcasting v COMELEC, January 28, 2000
FACTS:
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or
any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution
was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make
an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President
and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body
believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that
it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. Two days before the
elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In
fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or
problem.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not ABS-CBN, in holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results
validly exercises freedoms of speech and of the press.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It, cited the following: First, by the very nature of a
survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much
as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community
or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official
Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in
general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals.
Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are
exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting
of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part
of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to
minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the
fundamental rights of our people.
45. Social Weather Station v COMELEC, May 5, 2001

FACTS:

Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields. Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation., on the other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a
newspaper of general circulation and features items of information including election surveys.
Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair
Election Act), especially section 5.4 which provides the surveys affecting national candidated
shall not be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall
not be publishes 7 dyas before the election. SWS wanted to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the
media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its part,
intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint
on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint.

HELD:

Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of

speech, expression, and the press. The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited
to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable
rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among
candidates. here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this
section pass the O'brient test for content related regulation because (1) it supresses one type of
expression while allowing other types such as editorials, etc.: (2) the restriction is greater than
what is needed to protect government interest because the interest can be protected by
narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment punishment. Justice Kapunan's dissenting
opinion basically says that the test of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use in order
to test the validity of this section. Instead, he purports to engage in a form of balancing by
weighing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of
the free enjoyment of the rights. However, he failed to show why, on the balance, the other
considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression.
46. A.M. 01-4-03 SC Radio TV Coverage of the Trial in Sandiganbayan, June 29, 2001
FACTS:
The Kapisanan ng mga Broadkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), sent a letter requesting the court to allow
live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history. The petitioners
invoked that in involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the
entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of. Moreover, the live radio
and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the
desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the
supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-received attempts on the
part of the present dispensation, to railroad the instant criminal cases against the former
President Estrada. However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 23, 1991, in a case for
libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to
due process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of
public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.
HELD:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone
else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that
he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not
too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be
totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. The courts recognize the
constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also
approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of
conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process
in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the
paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions. Television can work profound changes in the
behavior of the people it focuses on. There will be conscious and unconscious effect that such
coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be
evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to
yield to it. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's
attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence
but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm
ambiance is demanded. It may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can
bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it does so in so many
ways and in varying degrees. With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also
the very life of an accused, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible
evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or
subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to
ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,8 and decreed by a judge with an
unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.
47. Newsounds Broadcasting Networks, Inc. v Hon. Cesar Dy, April 2, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Newsounds) and Consolidated Broadcasting
System, Inc. (CBS) operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC) and Star FM DWIT
Cauayan in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation in Minante
2, Cauayan City, Isabela. The HLURB and OMPDC affirmed and certified that the commercial
structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the
location is classified as a “commercial area”.
The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter. However in 2002, petitioners’
renewal of mayor’s permit was denied on the ground that they have not submitted conversion
papers showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked
the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the same was denied. In the meantime,
DAR Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property
from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the
DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, denied the same, claiming that it was void on the
grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order. The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15,
2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia closed the radio station. Due to the
provision of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the
pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate
before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Cesar Dy on the grounds
that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until
June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of
mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ constitutional right of freedom of expression was violated
HELD:
In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to
2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are
estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was
wrong.
It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to
secure “approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was
converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land.” Respondents closure of
petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. Petitioners have been aggressive in
exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored
respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that
respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is commercial and
merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and
suppress the latter’s voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
48. Hector C. Villanueva vs. PDI, March 15, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner was a mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the 1992
elections. Two months prior the elections, Ricardo Nolan, petitioned for the disqualification of
petitioner before the COMELEC. Nolan’s petition however, was denied. Two days prior the
elections, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation published a story that
COMELEC had disqualified petitioner. A day prior the elections, respondent Philippine Daily
Inquirer, Inc. also came out with a similar story. Subsequent the articles, when the results of the
elections came out, petitioner lost. Under the belief that said articles led to his defeat,
petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin, alleging that the articles were maliciously
timed to defeat him. He sued for actual damages worth P270,000, moral damages worth
P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees of P300,000.
Respondents disclaimed liability, asserting that they acted without malice, stressing that the
stories were privileged in nature.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondents, being members of the press, abused the freedom of the
press.
HELD: The Court did not consider that the respondents had abused the freedom of the press.
Newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith
and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. For liability to arise without offending the
freedom of the press, the test to meet is whether or not the constitutional guarantees require a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct, unless it be proven that the statement was made with ‘actual
malice,’ or with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. Absent proof that they were obtained from a press conference or release, respondents
were not impelled by malice. Still, the news items were derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s
reputation and candidacy. The Court simply faulted respondents for failing to verify the truth of
the news tips they published and held them respondents liable for negligence. Petitioner was
awarded damages, as amended.
49. GSIS & Winston Garcia v. Dinnah Villaviza et al., July 27, 2010
FACTS:
PGM Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges
against respondents and eventually found them guilty for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meting out the penalty of one (1) year
suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto. The charges contained that
respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the
latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.
On appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red
shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action
prescribed above. CSC added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate
therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an unruly mass gathering of employees to protest the prohibition against the
appearance of their leader as counsel in the administrative case, falls within the constitutional
purview of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.
HELD:
Yes. As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political
rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action prescribed must
be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands of force concession. Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing
at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even
badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect
work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to
voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests.
Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited.
Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of
their constitutional right to freedom of expression. Civil Service does not deprive them of their
freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the
members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably
regulated only but can never be taken away.
Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs Resolution
No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or
regulated these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents actuations did not
amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action.
50. Southern Hempisphere Engagement Network v Anti-Terrorism Council, October 5, 2010
FACTS:
Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 9372 otherwise
known as Human Security Act of 2007. The petitioners raise that the law suffers vagueness and
overbreadth. There is vagueness when the law lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two aspects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcements unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. There is overbreadth when the law is too sweeping
that it restricts even those rights that are protected. The petitioners assail that the definition of
the crime of terrorism under the said law was vague and broad.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RA 9372 suffers vagueness or overbreadth that should be grounds for a
facial invalidation or challenge.
HELD:
No penal laws should be subject to a facial challenge. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed
only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly accepted.
The petitioners invoked that the law penalizes speech, contending the element of “unlawful
demand” in the definition of terrorism must be necessarily be transmitted through some form
of expression protected by free speech clause. The court held that the notion of the petitioners
is entirely inaccurate, as it
focused on just one element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails
consideration of every word in the elements and mincing of the words of the offender.
51. The Diocese of Bacolod v COMELEC et al., G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.

HELD:

Yes.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those
who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other
hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

52. Bayan, Karapatan, et.al. vs. Ermita, et.al., G.R. No. 169838.April 25, 2006

FACTS: The Petitioners alleged the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880. They alleged
that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rallies, marches and
protests that they have participated were violently dispersed, by policemen implementing BP
No. 880.

The Petitioners come in three groups: First is Bayan, et al in GR No. 169838, second is Jess del
Prado, et al in GR No. 169849 and third is Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al in GR No. 169881.
The Petitioners seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy.
They contended that: 1) BP No. 880 is a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which Philippines is a
signatory; 2) That the provisions of BP No. 880 are not mere regulations but prohibitions as it is
allegedly a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of
grievances; 3)That BP No. 880 requires permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger and that it is not content-
neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government; 4) That two
standards stated in the law, the clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger were
inconsistent.

ISSUE: Whether or not BP No. 880 is constitutional.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of BP. 880. The Supreme Court
ruled that the right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances are fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the
constitution but it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies
that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society.

The Court further reiterated that the power to regulate is vested to the government through
police power. The permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health and that is the
recognized exception to the exercise of right even under the Universal Declaration on Civil and
Political Rights.

The SC ruled that BP No. 880 is only a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. The law provides a precise and sufficient standard - the clear and
present danger test and that the reference to "imminent and grave danger of substantive evil
substantially means the same thing and is not inconsistent standard. A fair and impartial
reading of BP No. 880 readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would
use public places that the reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because
assemblies have to be for lawful causes otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to
protection.
53. IBP VS. HON. LITO ATIENZA, FEBRUARY 24, 2010

FACTS: In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally
permit with the office of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be
staged at the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is
only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.

IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled
rally. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza
did was only a partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to
freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.

Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge.
Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly
violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a place different from what
was indicated in the rally permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within
his power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.

Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the criminal
case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question
to the criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).

2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s power to modify the rally permit without
consulting with the IBP.

HELD: 1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in
this certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the
criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal
proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial
question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the
Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil action.

2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place
different from that applied for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest
opportunity. This is in order to give the applicant some time to determine if such change is
favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial remedies) – Section 6 of the
Public Assembly Act.

It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the matter. In
this case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the
venue without any reason therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the
freedom of expression.

54. Batasang Pambansa Blg 880

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

55. Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1, June 22, 2006

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty-five years and had a son
with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it
will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize
their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD: The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights
in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights.
The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order
to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has
not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus, the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation
of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the
OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has
used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus, the conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
56. Soriano vs. Laguardia, April 29, 2009

FACTS: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating
Daan, which then aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against Iglesia ni Cristo (INC). Two
days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged
by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo,
against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host
of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” program a
part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III of the 1987
Constitution?

HELD: No. The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected
speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis
should be “context based” and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of
television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show,
which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court
emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather
than in the context that they were used.” The SC also said “that the suspension is not a prior
restraint, but rather a “form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.”
In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it
is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the
free speech clause.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension “is not a
prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a
permit was already issued to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent
contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.”

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation
of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang
Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s
suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as
a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above, a requirement that indecent
language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less
offensive language.
57. Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999

FACTS: The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated. On various occasions from August up to October, 1991, petitioner received several
communications from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to
admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife,
Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the
Negros Mission. The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since
it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since
he was very ill to be able to do the collecting.

A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of

dismissal citing:

Misappropriation of denominational funds; Willful breach of trust; Serious misconduct; Gross

and habitual neglect of duties; Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly
authorized representative as grounds for the termination of his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for
reinstatement and back wages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner. SDA
appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical
affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state.

2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed
by petitioner against the SDA.

HELD: 1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee,
which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code.

2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an
employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was
expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.
58. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003

FACTS: On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46
creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee
its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification"
was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA
warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those
without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could
contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking
them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109.As a
result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.

Hence, this petition for prohibition.

Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation
of Church and State. It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to
petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual
and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A
government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function
like certifying qualified food products as halal.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation in Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

HELD: We grant the petition. OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO
697) "to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with
due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the societal,
legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural
community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier
between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into
purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of
religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."
59. Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,
G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12,
2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief filed before the RTC-
Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike
Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo,
Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition prayed
for the resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein
respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring
the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the
constitutional provisions.

ISSUE: May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from
endorsing candidates for public office?
HELD: The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF
CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious
consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount
interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its
people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this
Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to
entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual
and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the
assailed Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for
its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual
allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed
Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it
merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional
mandate and jurisdiction.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made
no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally
inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just
modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount
question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality
of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned.
60. DOMINADOR L. TARUC vs. BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ, G.R. No. 144801. March 10,
2005

FACTS: The petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro,
Surigao City. Petitioners led by Taruc clamored for the transfer of parish priest Rustom Florano
for the reason that the family of Fr. Floranos wife belonged to a political party opposed to
petitioner Tarucs. However, Bishop De la Cruz found this reason too flimsy so he denied their
request. Things worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass for the town Fiesta celebrated
by Fr. Ambong who was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao. Petitioners were
then expelled/excommunicated from the PIC for the reason of (1) disobedience to duly
constituted authority, (2) inciting dissension resulting in division of the Parish of Our Mother of
Perpetual Help and (3) threatening to forcible occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety among
the General Membership.

Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop De la Cruz
and impleaded Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for conspiring with the Bishop. They said
that their rights to due process were violated because they were not heard before the order of
expulsion was made

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution.

HELD: Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides
that:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

The case at bar is purely ecclesiastical matters which is considered to be outside the providence
of the court due to the form of government where the complete separation of civil and
ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon. Hence, the civil courts must not allow themselves to
intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature. Civil Courts will not interfere in the
internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights.
Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to
determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property. Those who
unite to an ecclesiastical body do so with implied consent to submit to the Church government
and they are bound to submit to it.

The power to exclude membership from the church of those considered unworthy lies solely to
the Church thus it is outside the province of the civil court. The expulsion of membership of the
petitioners was legally made. They have not violated the due process of law because they were
given opportunity to be heard when they were also warned of the consequences of their
actions.
LIBERTY OF ABODE

61. Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap v Robredo, G.R. 200903, July 22, 2014

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

62. CHAVEZ, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who
initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated
plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy, alleges
that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged
discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state
to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of
recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a
debilitating effect on the countrys economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioners action is
premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the
negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make
any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become
effective and binding.

ISSUE: Whether or not recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest.

HELD: The Court ruled in affirmative. Executive Order No. 1, , created the PCGG which was
primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly
amassed by former President Marcos. Under Executive Order No. 2, all persons and entities
who had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned. On May 7,
1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG which,
taking into account the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people,
there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of
public concern and imbued with public interest.

We may also add that ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public character.
Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, ill-gotten wealth refers to assets and
properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or
illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their
public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the
government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such,
upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction
of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another
declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may
be used for national economic recovery.
 Also, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily
to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.
There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in
general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

63. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008

FACTS: On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and
testified on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project
awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions
relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be
specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve it. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not
appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive
privilege. Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive
privilege.

HELD: The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which
the government may withhold from the public," that there is a "governmental privilege against
public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national
security matters"; and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3)
specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the
importance of public accountability and transparency. First, the communications relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President. Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test. Third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
64. CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 189546,
September 21, 2010

FACTS: On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG),
a non-government organization, wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source
code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national,
and congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house
COMELEC programs called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.
On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request for the source code of the PCOS and the
CCS, but denied that for the DCS, since the DCS was a system used in processing the Lists of
Voters which is not part of the voting, counting and canvassing systems contemplated by R.A.
9369. According to COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous
individuals might change the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit certain
candidates or parties.
Rejecting COMELEC’s excuse, on October 5, 2009 CenPEG filed the present petition for
mandamus, seeking to compel COMELEC to immediately make its source codes available to
CenPEG and other interested parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC violated the constitutional right to information

HELD: Yes. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES
technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source
code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which
may conduct their own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with
this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that
it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be
done, apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed
and that reason is already stale.
The Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and directs the COMELEC to make the source
codes for the AES technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369
immediately available to CenPEG and all other interested political parties or groups for
independent review.
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

65. In Re: Edillon, A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

FACTS:
Marcial Edillon is a duly licenced practicing lawyer in the Philippines. In 1975, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board Board of Governors recommended the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing
the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.
The respondent argues that the said provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillon to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD:
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. Assuming
that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
66.MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO, 129 SCRA 359

FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M.
to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they
held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court
(VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at
the second-floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language
their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture.
The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally.
It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving
utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in
the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-
academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created.
The demonstration also went beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the
same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly.
Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive
suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof
was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private
respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento
found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the
violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The
penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Student’s Councils constitutional right to form association has been
violated.

HELD: Yes, with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear
and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of
disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of
educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment
unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has
a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the
placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may
be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be
held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of
the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may
be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its
terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
67. UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION VS LAGUESMA

FACTS: On March 20, 1995 the United Union of Pepsi Cola, who is the Petitioner of this case
filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc.
However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and,
therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, citing the ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization right of
supervisory employees.
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any Labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-
and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed. Hence, this petition.
Pushing through for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions,
which is in contrast of Art. III, Section 8 of the Constitution which provides that the right of the
people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the right of the Union consisting of supervisors to
form an association.

HELD: The Court ruled that the right of the people whether employed by the State or Private
establishments to form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section 8 infringed by a
ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, Section 8 is
subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes “not contrary to law.” In the
case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining Labor organizations. Petition therefore must be denied. Their right to association has
not been violated.
68. ACOSTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 132088, 28 JUNE 2000

FACTS: Petitioners are teachers from different public school in Metro Manila. On various dates
in September and October 1990, petitioner did not report for work and instead, participated in
mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning
the government for redress of their grievances. Petitioners were administratively charged with
such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law,
rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without
official leave. Petitioners failed to answer these charges. Following the investigations conducted
by the DECS Investigating committees, Secretary Cariño found petitioners guilty as charged and
ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed and the CSC modified
the said orders of Secretary Cariño to six months suspension without pay. Petitioners appealed
the orders of Secretary Cario to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and later to the
CSC. Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners questioned the matter
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied their petition.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner’s participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their
constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.

HELD: Petitioners' contentions are without merit. The character and legality of the mass actions
which they participated in have been passed upon by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila
Public School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr. wherein we ruled that "these 'mass
actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons." The ability to strike is not essential to
the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to
engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for
whose education they are responsible. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, “It is not the
exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila.
For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in
question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.”
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably
derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied
government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble
intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice
of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work
stoppage.
In the case at bar, petitioners initially assailed the alleged non-observance of due
process by the DECS Investigating Committees only upon appeal to the MSPB. Significantly,
however, it has been our consistent ruling that an appeal is curative of any supposed denial of
due process. Thus, after full ventilation of their case before the MSPB and CSC, and later on
before the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot now allege denial of due process to justify their
claim for back wages.
Non-Impairment Clause

69. Pacific Wide Realty and Dev’t. Corp. vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc., November 25, 2009

FACTS: Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex
situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business involves the development of Puerto Azul into a satellite
city with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers with recreational areas.
In order to finance its operations, it obtained loans from various banks. PALI and its
accommodation mortgagors, i.e., Ternate Development Corporation (TDC), Ternate Utilities, Inc.
(TUI), and Mrs. Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, secured the loans. In the beginning, PALIs business did
very well. However, it started encountering problems when the Philippine Stock Exchange
rejected the listing of its shares in its initial public offering which sent a bad signal to the real
estate market. This resulted in potential investors and real estate buyers shying away from the
business venture. The situation was aggravated by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the decline
of the real estate market.
Consequently, PALI was unable to keep up with the payment of its obligations, both current and
those that were about to fall due. One of its creditors, the Export and Industry Bank (EIB), later
substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation (PWRDC), filed foreclosure
proceedings on PALIs mortgaged properties. Thrust to a corner, PALI filed a petition for
suspension of payments and rehabilitation, accompanied by a proposed rehabilitation plan and
three (3) nominees for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. EIB and the other creditors
of PALI filed their respective comments/opposition to the report/recommendations of the
rehabilitation receiver. On November 2, 2005, EIB, together with another creditor of PALI,
Tranche I (SPV-MC), Inc., filed an urgent motion to disqualify the appointed rehabilitation
receiver. The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated December 9, 2005.

ISSUE: Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in violation of the non-
impairment clause

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is no merit in PWRDCs contention that
there is a violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates
that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law
or an executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its
creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be
invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even assuming that the same may be
invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights
and contractual rights are not absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State for the common good of
the general public.
Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors,
employees, and the economy in general. The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over
the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its
judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is
manifestly unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is binding upon the debtor and
all persons who may be affected by it, including the creditors, whether or not such persons have
participated in the proceedings or have opposed the plan or whether or not their claims have
been scheduled.
70.Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs PICOP Resource, Inc.

FACTS:
PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the
middle of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to attend further
meetings with the DENR.
Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP
seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign,
execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to issue the corresponding IFMA assignment
number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended; b) to issue the
necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43,
sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioner’s pulp and paper mills in
accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the government and
PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the Government Warranties and
contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated
July 29, 1969 between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest.

The Respondent Secretary Alvarez is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum of P10
million a month beginning May 2002 until the conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, to IFMA is
formally effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non -impairment
clause by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA).

HELD:
The court ruled that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-
impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the
due process clause of the Constitution. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed." cannot be invoked.
The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not because the local
government has control over such project, but because the local government has the duty to
protect its constituents and their stake in the implementation of the project. Facts: PICOP filed
with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into
an IFMA. PICOP initially sought to comply with the requirement under Sections 26 and 27 of the
Local Government Code to procure prior approval of the Sanggunians concerned.
71. Diaz vs. Secretary of Finance (2011), G.R. No. 193007 July 19, 2011

FACTS: Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol (petitioners) filed this petition for
declaratory relief assailing the validity of the impending imposition of value-added tax (VAT) by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the collections of toll way operators. Court treated the
case as one of prohibition. Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the
NIRC, intend to include toll fees within the meaning of "sale of services" that are subject to VAT;
that a toll fee is a "user's tax," not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would
amount to a tax on public service; and that, since VAT was never factored into the formula for
computing toll fees, its imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
The government avers that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of services of franchise
grantees, including toll way operations; that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of
the law from the words used in the statute; and that the imposition of VAT on toll way
operations has been the subject as early as 2003 of several BIR rulings and circulars. The
government also argues that petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of
contracts clause since they clearly have no personal interest in existing toll operating
agreements (TOAs) between the government and toll way operators. At any rate, the non-
impairment clause cannot limit the State's sovereign taxing power which is generally read into
contracts.

ISSUE: May toll fees collected by toll way operators be subjected to VAT (Are toll way
operations a franchise and/or a service that is subject to VAT)?

HELD: The toll way operator is no different from the service providers under Section108 who
allow others to use their properties or facilities for a fee. Toll way operators are franchise
grantees and they do not belong to exceptions that Section 119 spares from the payment of
VAT. The word "franchise" broadly covers government grants of a special right to do an act or
series of acts of public concern. Toll way operators are, owing to the nature and object of their
business, "franchise grantees." The construction, operation, and maintenance of toll facilities
on public improvements are activities of public consequence that necessarily require a special
grant of authority from the state.
A tax is imposed under the taxing power of the government principally for the purpose
of raising revenues to fund public expenditures. Toll fees, on the other hand, are collected by
private toll way operators as reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred in the
construction, maintenance and operation of the toll ways, as well as to assure them a
reasonable margin of income. Although toll feesare charged for the use of public facilities,
therefore, they are not government exactions that can be properly treated as a tax. Taxes may
be imposed only by the government under its sovereign authority; toll fees may be demanded
by either the government or private individuals or entities, as an attribute of ownership.
FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

72. RE: Request of the National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Clients from Paying Filing,
Docket and other Fees, August 28, 2009

FACTS: On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008. The resolution requested the
IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of
filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters.
Resolution No. 24, series of 2008
At the outset, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its effort to help improve the
administration of justice, particularly, the access to justice by the poor. Its Resolution No. 24,
series of 2008 in fact echoes one of the noteworthy recommendations during the Forum on
Increasing Access to Justice spearheaded by the Court last year. In promulgating Resolution No.
24, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its duty to participate in
the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
administration of justice.
The means and merit tests appear to be reasonable determinants of eligibility for
coverage under the legal aid program of the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be improved to ensure
that any exemption from the payment of legal fees that may be granted to clients of the NCLA
and the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters will really further the right of access to
justice by the poor. This will guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor
trivialized. Towards this end, the following shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid
offices in IBP chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the said clients.

ISSUE: Whether the Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts
and to adequate legal assistance.

HELD: Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there
is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also
readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to
adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of
IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the
service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by
exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint
or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of
Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and
removing a major roadblock.
The Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby
Commended for helping increase the access to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis
Oriental Chapter for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of the
clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters is Granted. The Rule on the Exemption
From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA)
and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
(which shall be assigned the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this
resolution is hereby Approved. In this connection, the Clerk of Court is Directed to cause the
publication of the said rule in a newspaper of general circulation within five days from the
promulgation of this resolution.
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

73. UN Convention Against Torture

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution
39/46 of 10 December 1984
entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1)

The States Parties to this Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations, recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Recognizing that those rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,

Considering the obligation of States under the Charter, in particular Article 55, to promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which provide that no one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

Having regard also to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the
General Assembly on 9 December 1975,

Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world,

Have agreed as follows:

PART I

Article 1

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which
does or may contain provisions of wider application.

Article 2

1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.

2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal

political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of
torture.

Article 3

1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.

2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities
shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in
the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
rights.

Article 4

1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The
same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes
complicity or participation in torture. 2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable
by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.

Article 5

1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases:

(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or
aircraft registered in that State;

(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;

(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.

2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory
under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in paragraph I of this article.

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with
internal law.

Article 6

1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available to it, that the
circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose territory a person alleged to have
committed any offence referred to in article 4 is present shall take him into custody or take
other legal measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other legal measures shall be as
provided in the law of that State but may be continued only for such time as is necessary to
enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.

2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.

3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph I of this article shall be assisted in

communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which
he is a national, or, if he is a stateless person, with the representative of the State where he
usually resides.

4. When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately
notify the States referred to in article 5, paragraph 1, of the fact that such person is in custody
and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes the preliminary
inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article shall promptly report its findings to the said
States and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.

Article 7

1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed
any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does
not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary
offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5,
paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in no way
be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 1.

3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any of the offences
referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.

Article 8

1. The offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences

in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include
such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between
them.

2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a
request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may
consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such offences.
Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall
recognize such offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions
provided by the law of the requested State.

4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if
they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territories
of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1.

Article 9

1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences referred to in article 4, including
the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.

2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph I of this article in conformity
with any treaties on mutual judicial assistance that may exist between them.

Article 10

1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition
against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military,
medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody,
interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or
imprisonment.

2. Each State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or instructions issued in regard to
the duties and functions of any such person.

Article 11
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods
and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to
any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view
to preventing any cases of torture.

Article 12

Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial
investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been
committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.

Article 13

Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to torture
in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly
and impartially examined by, its competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that the
complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a
consequence of his complaint or any evidence given.

Article 14

1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means
for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act
of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.

2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to compensation
which may exist under national law.

Article 15

Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a
result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person
accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.

Article 16

1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as
defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In particular,
the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for
references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.

2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other
international instrument or national law which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment or which relates to extradition or expulsion.

PART II

Article 17

1. There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter referred to as the

Committee) which shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided. The Committee shall
consist of ten experts of high moral standing and recognized competence in the field of human
rights, who shall serve in their personal capacity. The experts shall be elected by the States
Parties, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the usefulness
of the participation of some persons having legal experience.

2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons
nominated by States Parties. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own
nationals. States Parties shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who are also
members of the Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and who are willing to serve on the Committee against Torture.

3. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at biennial meetings of States
Parties convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At those meetings, for which
two thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the
Committee shall be those who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of
the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting.

4. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the date of the entry into force
of this Convention. At. Ieast four months before the date of each election, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit
their nominations within three months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in
alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have
nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties.

5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. They shall be
eligible for re-election if renominated. However, the term of five of the members elected at the
first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election the names
of these five members shall be chosen by lot by the chairman of the meeting referred to in
paragraph 3 of this article.

6. If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or for any other cause can no longer perform
his Committee duties, the State Party which nominated him shall appoint another expert from
among its nationals to serve for the remainder of his term, subject to the approval of the
majority of the States Parties. The approval shall be considered given unless half or more of the
States Parties respond negatively within six weeks after having been informed by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations of the proposed appointment.

7. States Parties shall be responsible for the expenses of the members of the Committee while
they are in performance of Committee duties.

Article 18

1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be re-elected.

2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter
alia, that:

(a) Six members shall constitute a quorum;

(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the members present.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities
for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under this Convention.

4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the initial meeting of the
Committee. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall meet at such times as shall be
provided in its rules of procedure.

5. The States Parties shall be responsible for expenses incurred in connection with the holding
of meetings of the States Parties and of the Committee, including reimbursement to the United
Nations for any expenses, such as the cost of staff and facilities, incurred by the United Nations
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article.

Article 19

1. The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to their undertakings
under this Convention, within one year after the entry into force of the Convention for the
State Party concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary reports every
four years on any new measures taken and such other reports as the Committee may request.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the reports to all States Parties.

3. Each report shall be considered by the Committee which may make such general comments
on the report as it may consider appropriate and shall forward these to the State Party
concerned. That State Party may respond with any observations it chooses to the Committee.

4. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide to include any comments made by it in
accordance with paragraph 3 of this article, together with the observations thereon received
from the State Party concerned, in its annual report made in accordance with article 24. If so
requested by the State Party concerned, the Committee may also include a copy of the report
submitted under paragraph I of this article.

Article 20

1. If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it to contain well-founded

indications that torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a State Party, the
Committee shall invite that State Party to co-operate in the examination of the information and
to this end to submit observations with regard to the information concerned.

2. Taking into account any observations which may have been submitted by the State Party
concerned, as well as any other relevant information available to it, the Committee may, if it
decides that this is warranted, designate one or more of its members to make a confidential
inquiry and to report to the Committee urgently.

3. If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the Committee shall seek
the co-operation of the State Party concerned. In agreement with that State Party, such an
inquiry may include a visit to its territory.

4. After examining the findings of its member or members submitted in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this article, the Commission shall transmit these findings to the State Party
concerned together with any comments or suggestions which seem appropriate in view of the
situation.

5. All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in paragraphs I to 4 of th is article s hall be

con fidential , and at all stages of the proceedings the co-operation of the State Party shall be
sought. After such proceedings have been completed with regard to an inquiry made in
accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee may, after consultations with the State Party
concerned, decide to include a summary account of the results of the proceedings in its annual
report made in accordance with article 24.

Article 21

1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes
the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a
State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention.
Such communications may be received and considered according to the procedures laid down
in this article only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in
regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be dealt with by the
Committee under this article if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.
Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the following
procedure;

(a) If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions ofthis
Convention, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State
Party. Within three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall
afford the State which sent the communication an explanation or any other statement in
writing clarifying the matter, which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent,
reference to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending or available in the matter;

(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States Parties concerned within six
months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall
have the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Committee and to
the other State;

(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it under this article only after it has
ascertained that all domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in
conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the
rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring
effective relief to the person who is the victim of the violation of this Convention;

(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this
article; (e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph

(e), the Committee shall make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with a
view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the obligations provided for
in this Convention. For this purpose, the Committee may, when appropriate, set up an ad hoc
conciliation commission;

(f) In any matter referred to it under this article, the Committee may call upon the States
Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), to supply any relevant information;

(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be
represented when the matter is being considered by the Committee and to make submissions
orally and/or in writing;

(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months after the date of receipt of notice under
subparagraph (b), submit a report:

(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine its
report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached;

(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached, the Committee shall
confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and record of the
oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report.

In every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned.

2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States Parties to this Convention
have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited
by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit
copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by
notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration
of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this article;
no further communication by any State Party shall be received under this article after the
notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General,
unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.
Article 22

1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes
the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf
of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of
the provisions of the Convention. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it
concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.

2. The Committee shall consider inadmissible any communication under this article which is
anonymous or which it considers to be an abuse of the right of submission of such
communications or to be incompatible with the provisions of this Convention.

3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, the Committee shall bring any communications
submitted to it under this article to the attention of the State Party to this Convention which
has made a declaration under paragraph I and is alleged to be violating any provisions of the
Convention. Within six months, the receiving State shall submit to the Committee written
explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been
taken by that State.

4. The Committee shall consider communications received under this article in the light of all
information made available to it by or on behalf of the individual and by the State Party
concerned. 5. The Committee shall not consider any communications from an individual under
this article unless it has ascertained that:

(a) The same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under another procedure of
international investigation or settlement;

(b) The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies; this shall not be the rule
where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring
effective reliefto the person who is the victim of the violation of this Convention.

6. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this
article.

7. The Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual.

8. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States Parties to this Convention
have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited
by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit
copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by
notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration
of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this article;
no further communication by or on behalf of an individual shall be received under this article
after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the
SecretaryGeneral, unless the State Party has made a new declaration.

Article 23

The members of the Committee and of the ad hoc conciliation commissions which may be
appointed under article 21, paragraph I (e), shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and
immunities of experts on mission for the United Nations as laid down in the relevant sections of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Article 24

The Committee shall submit an annual report on its activities under this Convention to the
States Parties and to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART III
Article 25

1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. 2. This Convention is subject to
ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.

Article 26

This Convention is open to accession by all States. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of
an instrument of accession with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.

Article 27

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or
accession.

2. For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the twentieth
instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force onthe thirtieth day
after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 28

1. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession
thereto, declare that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee provided for in
article 20.

2. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph I of this article may,
at any time, withdraw this reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.

Article 29

1 . Any State Party to this Convention may propose an amendment and file it with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. The SecretaryGeneral shall thereupon communicate
the proposed amendment to the States Parties with a request that they notify him whether
they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering an d voting upon the
proposal. In the event that within four months from the date of such communication at least
one third of the States Parties favours such a conference, the SecretaryGeneral shall convene
the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a
majority of the States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be submitted by the
Secretary-General to all the States Parties for acceptance.

2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph I of this article shall enter into force
when two thirds of the States Parties to this Convention have notified the Secretary-General of
the United Nations that they have accepted it in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes.

3. When amendments enter into force, they shall be binding on those States Parties which have
accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of this Convention and
any earlier amendments which they have accepted.

Article 30

1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application
of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of
them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from thc date of the request for
arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of
those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in
conformity with the Statute of the Court.

2. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Con vention or accession
thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph I of this article. The other
States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph I of this article with respect to any State Party
having made such a reservation.

3. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may
at any time withdraw this reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.

Article 31

1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. Denunciation becomes effective one year after the date of receipt of-
the notification by the Secretary-General .

2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party from its obligations
under this Convention in regard to any act or omission which occurs prior to the date at which
the denunciation becomes effective, nor shall denunciation prejudice in any way the continued
consideration of any matter which is already under consideration by the Committee prior to the
date at which the denunciation becomes effective.

3. Following the date at which the denunciation of a State Party becomes effective, the
Committee shall not commence consideration of any new matter regarding that State.

Article 32

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States Members of the United
Nations and all States which have signed this Convention or acceded to it of the following:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under articles 25 and 26;

(b) The date of entry into force of this Convention under article 27 and the date of the entry
into force of any amendments under article 29;

(c) Denunciations under article 31.

Article 33

1. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of this Convention
to all States.
74. RA 9745, Anti Torture Act of 2009

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Fourteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand nine.

REPUBLIC ACT N0. 9745

AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND

DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. - This Ad shall be known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009".

Section 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State:

(a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human
rights;

(b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including suspects, detainees and
prisoners are respected at all times; and that no person placed under investigation or held
in custody of any person in authority or, agent of a person authority shall be subjected to
physical, psychological or mental harm, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any act
that impairs his/her free wi11 or in any manner demeans or degrades human dignity;

(c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms
of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity, are prohibited; and

(d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the absolute condemnation and
prohibition of torture as provided for in the 1987 Philippine Constitution; various
international instruments to which the Philippines is a State party such as, but not limited
to, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) and the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other
relevant international human rights instruments to which the Philippines is a signatory.

Section 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her
or a third person information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/she or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating or
coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include
pain or Buffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

(b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" refers to a deliberate
and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act,
inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority against a person under
 his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or
debasement to the latter.

(c) "Victim" refers to the person subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment as defined above and any individual who has suffered
harm as a result of any act(s) of torture, or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
or punishment.

(d) "Order of Battle" refers to any document or determination made by the military,
police or any law enforcement agency of the government, listing the names of persons
and organizations that it perceives to be enemies of the State and that it considers as
legitimate targets as combatants that it could deal with, through the use of means allowed
by domestic and international law.

Section 4. Acts of Torture. - For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not be limited to,
the following:

(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in authority

or agent of a person in authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe pain,
exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of the body, such as:

(1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon

or rifle butt or other similar objects, and jumping on the stomach;

(2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human
excreta and other stuff or substances not normally eaten;

(3) Electric shock;

(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the
rubbing of pepper or other chemical substances on mucous membranes, or acids
or spices directly on the wound(s);

(5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine,
vomit and/or blood until the brink of suffocation;

(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;

(7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex
organ or rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals;

(8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the
genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.;

(9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;

(10) Pulling out of fingernails;

(11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold;

(12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the point of
asphyxiation;

(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory. alertness
or will of a person, such as:

(i) The administration or drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental

competency; or

(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease; and

(14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and

 (b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by a person in authority or
agent of a person in authority which are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or
undermine a person's dignity and morale, such as:

(1) Blindfolding;

(2) Threatening a person(s) or his/fher relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or

other wrongful acts;

(3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;

(4) Prolonged interrogation;

(5) Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or public humiliation of
a detainee or prisoner;

(6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place to
another, creating the belief that he/she shall be summarily executed;

(7) Maltreating a member/s of a person's family;

(8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person's family, relatives
or any third party;

(9) Denial of sleep/rest;

(10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in
public places, shaving the victim's head or putting marks on his/her body against
his/her will;

(11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of

his/her family; and

(12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.

Section 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. - Other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or
agent of a person in authority against another person in custody, which attains a level of severity
sufficient to cause suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The assessment of the
level of severity shall depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the
treatment or punishment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, religion, age
and state of health of the victim.

Section 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, An Absolute Bight. - Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability, or any other public emergency, or a document or any determination
comprising an "order of battle" shall not and can never be invoked as a justification for torture
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.

Section 7. Prohibited Detention. - Secret detention places, solitary confinement, incommunicado

or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity. Are hereby
prohibited.

In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and other law enforcement. agencies concerned shall make an updated list of all detention
centers and facilities under their respective jurisdictions with the corresponding data on the
prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others, names, date of
arrest and incarceration, and the crime or offense committed. This list shall be made available to
the public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at the respective national
headquarters of the PNP and AFP. A copy of the complete list shall likewise be submitted by the
PNP, AFP and all other law enforcement agencies to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
such list to be periodically updated, by the same agencies, within the first five (5) days of every
month at the minimum. Every regional office of the PNP, AFP and other law enforcement
agencies shall also maintain a similar list far all detainees and detention facilities within their
respective areas, and shall make the same available to the public at all times at their respective
regional headquarters, and submit a copy. updated in the same manner provided above, to the
respective regional offices of the CHR.

Section 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. - Any confession, admission or

statement obtained as a result of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings,
except if the same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of committing torture.

Section 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other Persons Involved. - A victim of
torture shall have the following rights in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture:

(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and by agencies of
government concerned such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO), the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the AFP. A
prompt investigation shall mean a maximum period of sixty (60) working days from the
time a complaint for torture is filed within which an investigation report and/or resolution
shall be completed and made available. An appeal whenever available shall be resolved
within the same period prescribed herein,

(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of harassment; threat
and/or intimidation as a consequence of the filing of said complaint or the presentation of
evidence therefor. In which case, the State through its appropriate agencies shall afford
security in order to ensure his/her safety and all other persons involved in the
investigation and prosecution such as, but not limited to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and
relatives; and

(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she testifies and
presents evidence in any fora in order to avoid further trauma.

Section 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and Habeas Data Proceedings and
Compliance with a Judicial 07'der. - A writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of habeas
data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the victim of torture or other cruel, degrading and
inhuman treatment or punishment shall be disposed of expeditiously and any order of release by
virtue thereof, or other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be executed or
complied with immediately.

Section 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. - The CHR and the PAO shall render legal
assistance in the investigation and monitoring and/or filing of the complaint for a person who
suffers torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or for any
interested party thereto.

The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance from the Barangay Human Rights
Action Center (BRRAC) nearest him/her as well as from human rights nongovernment
organizations (NGOs).

Section 12. Right to' Physical, Medical and Psychological Examination. - Before and after
interrogation, every person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall have the right
to he informed of his/her right to demand physical examination by an independent and competent
doctor of his/her own choice. If such person cannot afford the services of his/her own doctor,
he/she shall he provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor to conduct
physical examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the victim with psychological
evaluation if available under the circumstances. If the person arrested is a female, she shall be
attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore, any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation, including his/her immediate family, shall have the right to immediate
access to proper and adequate medical treatment. The physical examination and/or psychological
evaluation of the victim shall be contained in a medical report, duly signed by the attending
physician, which shall include in detail his/her medical history and findings, and which shall he
attached to the custodial investigation report. Such report shall be considered a public document.
Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked to conduct physical,
psychological and mental examinations, the medical reports shall, among others, include:

(a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim;

(b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or victim;

(c) The name and address of the person who brought the patient or victim for physical,
psychological and mental examination, and/or medical treatment;

(d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim's injury, pain and disease
and/or trauma;

(e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were
sustained;

(f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;

(g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and

(h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the patient.

Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this pr<;lvision may knowingly and
voluntarily waive such rights in writing, executed in the presence and assistance of his/her
counsel.

Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who actually participated Or induced
another in the commission of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as principal

Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government official who
issued an order to any lower ranking personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall be
held equally liable as principals.

The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior
public official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal
to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment for any
act or omission, or negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or
allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If he/she
has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that acts of
torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is
being committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates or by others within his/her area
of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or corrective action either
before, during or immediately after its commission, when he/she has the authority to prevent or
investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment
but failed to prevent or investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to
negligence shall also be liable as principals.

Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she has knowledge that
torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is being committed and
without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice, takes part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manner:

(a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the
act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;

(b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment and/or destroying the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its
discovery; or(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting m the escape of the principal/s in
the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment:
 Provided, That the accessory acts are done with the abuse of the official's public
functions.

Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
perpetrators of the following acts:

(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;

(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;

(3) Torture with rape;

(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of torture, the
victim shall have become insane, imbecile, impotent, blind or maimed for life;
and

(5) Torture committed against children.

(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who commit any act of
mental/psychological torture resulting in insanity, complete or partial amnesia, fear of
becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim due to guilt, worthlessness or
shame.

(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who commit any act of
torture resulting in psychological, mental and emotional harm other than those described
1n paragraph (b) of this section. '

(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have lost the power of speech or the power
to hear or to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have
lost the use of any such member; Or shall have become permanently incapacitated for
labor.

(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed if,
in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become deformed or shall have lost any
part of his/her body other than those aforecited, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall
have been ill or incapacitated for labor for a period of more than ninety (90) days.

(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have
been ill or incapacitated for labor for mare than thirty (30) days but not more than ninety
(90) days.

(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be
imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for
labor for thirty (30) days or less.

(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment as defined in Section 5 of this Act.

(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those who establish, operate
and maintain secret detention places and/or effect or cause to effect solitary confinement,
incommunicado or other similar forms of prohibited detention as provided in Section 7 of
this Act where torture may be carried out with impunity.

(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the responsible officers or
personnel of the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement agencies for failure to perform
his/her duty to maintain, submit or make available to the public an updated list of
detention centers and facilities with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees
incarcerated or detained therein, pursuant to Section 7 of this Act.
Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. - Torture as a crime shall not absorb
or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a means
in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be treated as a separate and
independent criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to any other
criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws.

Section 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty Law. - In order not to depreciate
the crime of torture, persons who have committed any act of torture shall not benefit from any
special amnesty law or similar measures that will have the effect of exempting them from any
criminal proceedings and sanctions.

Section 17. Applicability of Refouler. - No person shall be expelled, returned or extradited to

another State where there are substantial grounds to believe that such person shall be in danger of
being subjected to torture. For the purposes of determining whether such grounds exist, the
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of the DOJ, in
coordination with the Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all relevant considerations
including, where applicable and not limited to, the existence in the requesting State of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.

Section 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. - Any person who has suffered torture shall
have the right to claim for compensation as provided for under Republic Act No. 7309: Provided,
That in no case shall compensation be any lower than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). Victims
of torture shall also have the right to claim for compensation from such other financial relief
programs that may be made available to him/her under existing law and rules and regulations.

Section 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. - Within one (1) year from the effectivity
of this Act, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the DOJ and the
Department of Health (DOH) and such other concerned government agencies, and human rights
organizations shall formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation program for victims of torture and
their families. The DSWD, the DOJ and thc DOH shall also call on human rights nongovernment
organizations duly recognized by the government to actively participate in the formulation of
such program that shall provide for the physical, mental, social, psychological healing and
development of victims of torture and their families. Toward the attainment of restorative justice,
a parallel rehabilitation program for persons who have committed torture and other cruel,
inhuman and degrading punishment shall likewise be formulated by the same agencies.

Section 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. - An Oversight Committee is hereby created
to periodically oversee the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall be headed by a
Commissioner of the CRR, with the following as members: the Chairperson of the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the respective Chairpersons of the House of
Representatives' Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and the Minority Leaders of both
houses or their respective representatives in the minority.

Section 21. Education and Information Campaign. - The CHR, the DOJ, the Department of
National Defense (DND), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and
such other concerned parties in both the public and private sectors shall ensure that education
and information regarding prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment shall be fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel,
civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in
the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest,
detention or imprisonment. The Department of Education (DepED) and the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) shall also ensure the integration of human rights education courses in
all primary, secondary and tertiary level academic institutions nationwide.

Section 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
insofar as they are applicable shall be suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission of any
crime punishable under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes Against
Personal Liberty and Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by any of the acts
constituting torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined
herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period.
Section 23. Appropriations. - The amount of Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00) is hereby
appropriated to the CHR for the initial implementation of tills Act. Thereafter, such sums as may
be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.

Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOJ and the CHR, with the active
participation of human rights nongovernmental organizations, shall promulgate the rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of tills Act. They shall also ensure the full
dissemination of such rules and regulations to all officers and members of various law
enforcement agencies.

Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and
effect.

Section 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations
contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Section 27. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
75. RA 7438

Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR

UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every
human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of

Public Officers. –

(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.

(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform
the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall
at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he
must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating
officer.lawphi1Ÿ

(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating
officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested
or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately
explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating
officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise,
such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel
or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents,
elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such
extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.

(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void
and of no effect.

(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed
visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor
or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family
or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by
the Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization
duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall
include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent
or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation"
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected
by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the
prosecution of crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;

(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf

(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;

(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with a capital offense.

The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the
custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay
such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided,
That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the
fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.

In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected
person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating
officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not
less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting
upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent
and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own
counsel.

(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or
from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour
of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos
(P4,000.00).

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.

Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed.
Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in
the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
76. New Rules on Inquest, Department of Justice Circular No. 61, September 21, 1993

77. People vs. Galit

Facts: Before us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused
Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said
court.
The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow,
was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a
result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. More
than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused,
Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of
the murder. On the following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited
facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI
where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. He had been detained
and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his
innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to
be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him
and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will have to be
broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. They
covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner
could not take it anymore. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the
indignities he had to suffer. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and
he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed
by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment. The following day, September 9, 1977,
Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the
crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. As a result,
he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

Held:
The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries
or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall over do
himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the
imposition of punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some information from
the prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period,
temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability
for the physical injuries or damage caused.
There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and
not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the
accused is his alleged confession. It behoves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The alleged
confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because
they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.vTrial courts are cautioned to look carefully into
the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims
having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the
same must be rejected in toto.
78. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PACITO ORDOO and APOLONIO MEDINA, G.R. No. 132154
June 29, 2000

Facts: On 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a 15-year-old girl named Shirley Victore was
found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union who three (3)
days before was reported missing. According to a post-mortem examination conducted by Dr.
Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, the victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime.
However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go
home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina returned to the
police station one after another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime.
Acting on their admission, the police immediately conducted an investigation and put their
confessions in writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer
to assist the two (2) accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing
lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. The
investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police
and other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of
the voluntary statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted their participation in the crime.

Issue: Whether or not their confession is inadmissible due to the lack of counsel to assist them
during custodial investigation

Held: Under the Constitution and the rules laid down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the
confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and, (d) the
confession must be in writing.
Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's
right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the otherwise
condemning nature of a custodial investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted
by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the
offense. Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement
elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
79. People vs Lugod, GR No. 136253. February 21, 2001

FACTS: On September 15, 1997 at around 7 PM, Helen Ramos, the victim’s mother, was asleep
in her house together with her husband and their children, Nemrod, Neres and Nairube. At
around 12:30 a.m., they noticed that Nairube was gone.
The backdoor of their house was left open where a pair of slippers that did not belong
to the family was found. In the morning, the police began their search for Nairube wherein a
panty belonging to the victim was found, as well as a black colored shirt belonging to the
accused , Lugod. Witnesses testified that both slippers and shirt were worn by Lugod. Lugod
was then brought to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. Although he
admitted to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube, Lugod refused to make a
statement regarding the same.
On September 19, 1997, the Vice Mayor visited the accused in his cell. In the course of
his conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of the offense. He
was charged for rape with homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lugod’s confession can be used against him.

HELD: At the time of the arrest, records reveal that the accused was not informed of his right to
remain silent and his rights to counsel. There was also no evidence that he intended to waive
these rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no
matter how brutal the crime is.
The records do not support the confession allegedly made by the accused to the Mayor
and Vice Mayor. The records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not appear in trial. Moreover,
the testimony of the Vice Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made by the accused is
not conclusive.
The accused merely responded to the questions that the Vice Mayor propounded to
him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. Amidst
such a highly coercive atmosphere, accused- appellant’s claim that he was beaten up and
maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his
alleged confession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment dated October 8, 1998 of
the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28 in Criminal Case No. SC-6670 finding
the accused, Clemente John Lugod alias HONASAN, guilty of the crime of rape with homicide is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
the ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless
held for some other legal cause.
80. People v Taboga, G.R. Nos. 144086-87. February 6, 2002

FACTS: Francisca Tubon, a widowed septuagenarian, was robbed, stabbed and burned beyond
recognition when her house built of strong materials was set on fire. Edralin Taboga was
charged with Robbery with Homicide.
On April 1, 1998, in the Municipality of Magsingal, Province of Ilocos Sur, the accused
Taboga entered the house of Tubon and killed her. Then after he take/steal three finger rings,
one necklace with pendant and one vial of perfume and four gantas of rice belonging to Tubon.
He also set the house on fire. Taboga was arrested and brought to the police station for further
investigation.
Taboga confessed to SPO1 Panod but he did not sign the confession upod advice of his
lawyer.
The following day, April 2, 1998, Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS, went to
the Magsingal Municipal Police Station to interview the suspect, Edralin Taboga. Again, Taboga
admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Taboga to the radio announcer is admissible as
evidence.

HELD: YES, there is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the
police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there
anything on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by
the police to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter
even asked permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the
information obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what
was going on. He was informed at the outset by the radio announcer that he was a reporter
who will be interviewing him to get his side of the incident
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Branch 24, in Criminal Case Nos. 1818-K, is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant
Edralin Taboga is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00
as exemplary damages, in addition to the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P115,960.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
81. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUANITO BALOLOY, G.R. No. 14740 April 12, 2002

FACTS: Juanito Baloloy was convicted by the trial court of rape with homicide and imposed on
him the penalty of death for having raped and killed an eleven-year old Genelyn Camacho.
The facts of the case show that on August 3, 1996, Genelyn was asked by her father Jose to
borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog whose house was about 200 meters
away. She left their house but never returned. Jose looked went to Wilfredo’s house to look for
his daughter but was informed that she already left with one ganta of rice with her. Together,
they looked for Genelyn but was not able to find her. When Jose got home, his neighbors
Ernesto Derio and Juanito Baloloy arrived and told him that Juanito saw the dead body of
Genelyn at the waterfalls. They went to the waterfalls and informed Barangay Captain Ceniza
who ordered the members of the Bantay Bayan to retrieve the body and reported the incident
to the police station.
The next day, a black rope was found at the spot where Genelyn’s body was found. Brgy.
Captain Ceniza, who at that time was at the wake of the victim, asked the people present as to
who owns the rope. Juanito claimed ownership of the same, hence, he and Brgy. Captain Ceniza
had a private talk where he confessed having committed the crime. He was brought to the
police headquarters.
On the same day, they went to Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon’s office to swear to
their affidavits before him. Brgy Captain Ceniza pointed to Juanito as the culprit in her affidavit.
Judge Dicon turned to Juanito and asked him whether the charge against him was true. Juanito
responded that he was demonized, and he spontaneously narrated that after he struck
Genelyn’s head with a stone, he dropped her body into the precipice. The following day, a
complaint was filed against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence against the accused the
alleged confession of the latter to Brgy. Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon.

HELD: Jurisprudence provides that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime.
Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a
crime before he is placed under investigation.
In the case at bar, the accused, after admitting ownership of the black rope, voluntarily
narrated to Ceniza that he raped Genelyn and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This
narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was
given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the
commission of the offense.
However, as for Judge Dicon’s questioning, Juanito’s rights were violated when he was
propounded with incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is
settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police
officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. Thus, his extrajudicial confession
before Judge Dicon made without a counsel is inadmissible in evidence, however, it could be
treated as a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through the
testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.
RIGHT TO BAIL

82. Gov’t of the USA v Purganan, supra.

FACTS: The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application
for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.

Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for
his provisional liberty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

HELD: No. The court agrees with the petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
“conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114
of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws.

It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the
jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was
hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws.

His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that
opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
of innocence is not at issue.
83. NARCISO vs. STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000

FACTS: After a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of
Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended
and thereafter filed the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso. Narciso thereafter
asked for a review of the prosecutor’s resolution before the Department of Justice (DOJ) which
was however denied. He moved for reconsideration, which was still denied by the DOJ. The
Motion was granted and the case was set for reinvestigation by another prosecutor.
Accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte to Allow Accused Joselito Narciso to Post Bail. On November 3,
1992 private complainant moved for the postponement of the trials set on November 9, 16 and
23 and the subsequent hearings thereon pending the resolution of their Urgent Motion to Lift
Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail.
On November 9, 1992, the court issued the first assailed order stating therein to wit: On
November 16, 1992, the court cancelled the hearing upon motion of the public prosecutor
because no prosecution witness was available. In the hearing of November 23, 1992, the
private prosecutor again moved for postponement because of the pendency of his Motion to
Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail. On the same date, the court issued the second assailed
order which reads:"Not obtaining any resolution on her Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused
to Post Bail, private complainant filed this petition before the CA."

As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted private respondents Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was lawfully granted with his right to bail.

HELD: As to the validity of the grant of bail, Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:
"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:
"No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution." Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is
punishable with reclusion perpetua, he argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail
because the evidence of his guilt was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor's
conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding that the prosecution evidence
against him was not strong. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for
such finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail summary or
otherwise.
The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the
Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed
sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.
Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary
thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.
Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of
discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.
84. Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, G.R. Nos. 99289-90

FACTS: Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
An order of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed
an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of
P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and
that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance.
The Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure
order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she made, which was widely publicized
in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship
at Harvard University. She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from
Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC.
She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not
acquired jurisdiction over her person as she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered. The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing.
She likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to
travel and freedom of speech.

ISSUES:Whether or not Miriam Defensor-Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

HELD: By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case.
Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond, she holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited
from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the
very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such
applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with
the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.
WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution,
the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

85. AGULLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001

FACTS: Elvira Agullo, the disbursing officer of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways,
Region 8, Palo Leyte was charged of the crime of malversation of public funds thus paid,
collected and received by her in her official capacity, and by reason of which she is accountable
thereof, taking advantage of her official position, for her own personal use and benefit she had
in her possession in the amount of (P26,404.26), belonging to the government of the Republic
of the Philippines. On arraignment, Agullo, assisted by her counsel de officio, Anonio
Manzanoo, pleaded not guilty. When this case was called for pre-trial, the accused personally
and through her counsel Atty. Antonio Manzano of the CLAO readily entered into stipulations
insofar as her official position in government as well as the fact of audit of her accounts are
concerned. In a letter[7] dated 25 August 1986, addressed to the Resident Auditor of the
MPWH, petitioner complied with the directive by explaining that the cash shortage was, in
effect, due to a fortuitous event where the amount could have been stolen/taken by somebody
on the day she suffered a stroke on 22 October 1985. With petitioners admission of the fact of
cash shortage, the prosecution then rested its case. During trial, the defense offered to present
the testimony of witness Austero for the purpose of proving the said amount was withheld
from the salary and other compensation of petitioner Agullo. At the witness stand, petitioner
Agullo unrelentingly maintained her innocence and vehemently denied the accusation against
her. Striking down the defense as incredible and without basis, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of

substance which violates the petitioner’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven otherwise.

HELD: The pieces of evidence presented against petitioner in this case do not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction. Aside from the
aforementioned documents, the prosecution opted not to present a single witness to buttress
its bid for conviction and relied merely on the prima facie evidence of conversion or
presumption of malversation. To put it differently, the presumption under the law is not
conclusive but disputable by satisfactory evidence to the effect that the accused did not utilize
the public funds or property for his personal use, gain or benefit. if the accused is able to
present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property
to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is
effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to
the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the
presumption is never deemed to have existed at all. Worth noting is that the Sandiganbayan, in
its impugned decision, admitted that conversion or the placing of malversed government funds
to personal uses has, indeed, not been proven in the case at bar. the Sandiganbayan
undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance which, to a large extent,
bear considerable weight in the adjudication of petitioners guilt or the affirmation of her
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Notably, the
Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the flaws and deficiencies in
the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit of the prosecutions
evidence. This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution clearly
cannot sustain a conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The constitutional presumption of
innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights.Its purpose is to
balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual
pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command.
86. PEOPLE v BATO, G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998.

FACTS:
This postulate is applied by this Court in reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
finding Sergio and Abraham Bato guilty of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
The trial court ruled that the prosecution witness, Ernesto, Jr., positively identified the accused
who invited him and his father for a drink. He witnessed how they tied the hands of Ernesto Sr.
before they took him away. That the police blotter failed to state the names of the assailants
did not negate appellant’s participation in the slaying. Further, the entry was based on the
information relayed not by the witness himself but by the barangay chairman, who had not
witnessed the incident. The trial court further appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
treachery.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Appellants raised the defense
of denial. They maintained that their identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernestos
murder is merely an afterthought, necessitated by a death of strong evidence on the part of the
prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is circumstantial evidence as to evoke moral certainty that
appellants is guilty.

RULING: The Supreme Court pored over the entire records of both lower courts and concluded,
after careful deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. The circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution fails to evoke moral certainty that appellants are guilty.
It has been held that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that the defendants are guilty, to the exclusion of any other conclusion.
The circumstances proved must be concordant with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis
other than that of guilt.
In the instant case, the totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an
unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused. In acquitting the
herein appellant, this Court is not decreeing that he did not participate in the killing. It is merely
ruling that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant ABRAHAM BATO is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
78. PEOPLE VS. DE GUZMAN G.R. NO. 186498

FACTS: Accused-appellant Ronaldo De Guzman was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs by a lower court, and such decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Appellant argued that the technical provisions required by RA No. 9165 was not
complied with by the police officers, namely: that the seized items were not marked
immediately after the arrest; that the police officers failed to make an inventory of the seized
items in his presence or in the presence of his counsel; and that no photographs were taken of
the seized items. Appellant also claimed that the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence
was not established. Appellant contended that the failure of the police officers to enter the
buy-bust operation in the police blotter before the said operation, the lack of coordination with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, and the failure to observe the requirements of R.A.
No. 9165 effectively overturned the presumption of regularity of the police officers in the
performance of their duties. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the degree of proof has been met.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court correctly determined that the buy-bust
transaction took place. The buyer, SPO1 Llanillo, and seller, appellant De Guzman, were both
identified. The purported sale of the illegal drugs that took place were clearly demonstrated.
Therefore, the prosecution positively established the first and third elements of the
crime. Nonetheless, the prosecution failed to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti. In a
prosecution for violation of the RA 9165, the existence of the dangerous drug is an essential
condition for conviction as the dangerous drug is the very heart of the crime. The requirement
of the chain of custody ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence would be
removed. The failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR
(Implementing Rules and Regulations) must be explained satisfactorily as courts cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. In the case at bar, it was said that
SPO3 Yadao marked the seized items, and only when he saw the items at the police station for
the first time.
Moreover, there was no physical inventory made nor photographs of the seized items
taken. Neither was there any mention that media or DOJ representatives, nor any elected
official, were present during the inventory. The prosecution never explained the reasons for
these lapses. The failure to observe the proper procedure negates the operation of the
presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. Despite the general rule that the
testimonies of apprehending police officers are accorded full faith due to the presumption that
they have performed their duties regularly, when the performance of their duties is tainted
with failure to comply with the procedure and guidelines prescribed, the presumption is
effectively destroyed. Thus, even if the defence’s evidence is weak, the prosecution’s whole
case still falls. Appellant was acquitted.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD

79. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELOY MAGSI ET AL, . G.R. No. L-32888 August 12, 1983

FACTS:
Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled
before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and
rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite
appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing
was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it
because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing,
Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court
on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio
and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for
the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the
accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court,
so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only.
The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he
committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other co accused.
Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death penalty.

ISSUE:
Whether the court had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on an
improvident plea of guilty.

HELD:
Of the six hearing dates held relative to the case, accused at two instances entered a qualified
plea of guilty. De officio counsel Atty, Rivera and accused were hardly afforded by the Court any
opportunity to discuss the case together, and the qualified plea of guilty resulted from the
Court's proddings rather than from accused's spontaneous volition. The Court knew that
accused's prior plea of guilty was qualified by alleged duress employed on him by the other
accused. It behooved the Court to allow the accused an opportunity to present evidence on the
alleged duress, as well as discover for itself the reasons for accused's change of mind regarding
his plea. But more importantly, the Court could have complied, as it failed to do so the first
time, with its bounden duty to apprise and advise the accused of the seriousness of the
charges, the meaning of the qualifying and modifying circumstances, and gravity of the penalty
that may be imposed on him despite the plea of guilty, as well as received prosecution's
evidence on the alleged aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense
charged. But these considerations notwithstanding, sans any evidence whatsoever from the
prosecution nor from the defense, after Atty. Cariaso's manifestation, and its trite queries
addressed to the accused whether he confirmed the same or not, the Court proceeded to
decide the case. The Court has consistently enjoined strict and substantial adherence to its
rulings in cases where defendants are charged with capital offenses. Mere pro-forma
appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused,
resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was
conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges
and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance with the Court's injunctions. The
conduct of the trial court clearly established the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the
accused, who was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty.
80. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ROLANDO RIVERA, G.R. No. 139180. July 31, 2001

FACTS:
On March 1997 in Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga Rolando Rivera raped his 13-year-old
daughter, Erlanie. Rolando pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented Erlanie as its witness like-
wise her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin, who conducted the physical exami-
nation. The court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
charged sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection and is also
ordered to indemnify the offended party for compensatory and moral damages.
Rolando appealed and con-tends that he was denied of due process because the trial
judge disallowed his lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie concerning the latter’s sworn
statements on the ground of irrelevance and im-materiality; the trial court denied the motion
made by accused-appellants counsel to postpone the cross-examination because of which the
said counsel consequently waived the cross-examination of Dr. Barin; the judge propounded
numerous questions to accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the prosecutor; and
the decision was promulgated just one day after accused-ap-pellant submitted his
memorandum.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of Rolando’s right to be heard.

HELD:
Procedural due process simply means that a person must be heard before he is
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of person’s basic rights, not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. With both the evidence and
the law applicable to this case, the Supreme Court hold that Rolando has been accorded his
right to due process.
After private complainant testified on direct-examination, counsel for accused
attempted to cross-examine her on matters relevant to the complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness
which was objected to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the ground that
private complainant did not testify on that matter but limited her testimony on the rape case
only. Counsel for the accused argued that although that is correct nonetheless because [of] the
sworn statement executed by pri-vate complainant identified by said witness in her direct
examination and marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution, he is at liberty to cross-examine the
witness on all matters stated in her sworn statement including that portion touching on the
acts of lasciviousness subject matter of another case before another court.
The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence pro-
vides that the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in
the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accu-racy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue.
The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not testify anything about acts of
las-civiousness committed upon her person. She may not therefore be questioned on this
matter be-cause it is not connected with her direct testimony nor has any bearing upon the
issue. To allow adverse party to cross-examine the witness on the acts of lasciviousness which is
pending trial in another court and which the witness did not testify is improper.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed with the modification.
81. People of the Philippines vs. Oscar Alcanzado, G.R. No. 138335, May 20, 2014

FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court of Makati found accused Oscar Alcansado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder. This petition for a review on certiorari assailing the said decision
was filed. A careful examination of the records reveals that the assailed decision will have to be
set aside and the records remanded back to the RTC for reception of evidence for the defense.
The RTC committed a serious error in promulgating a decision after denying the demurer to
evidence filed by the appellant upon prior leave of court, without first giving appellant the
opportunity to present his evidence.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be heard
on his defense.

HELD:
The court held that the appellant has not been accorded due process and his right to be
heard was violated. The Supreme Court ruled that contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision
that the demurer to evidence was denied, the records of the case do not reveal that there was
any prior order denying appellant’s demurer to evidence before rendition of the assailed
judgment. Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling
of the proceedings in the trial court.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED

82. People vs. Rodrigo Bayya, G.R. No. 127845. March 10, 2000

FACTS: In 1994, Rosie Bayya claimed in her testimony in court that when she was still 12 years
old, her father, Lodrigo Bayya, forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with
him. He repeated the bestial act in their house about twice a week afterwards, and then later
used her four (4) times a month, the last she remembered being on July 5, 1995.
During the trial, the accused-appellant admitted having carnal knowledge of his
daughter twice but theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he committed the incestuous
rape. Having admitted the authorship of the offense charged, the appellant does not dispute
the trial courts finding of guilt. In view of the facts established, the trial court rendered
judgment of conviction, sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.
Upon appeal, Lodrigo Bayya questioned the penalty imposed under R.A. 7659,
considering that the Information filed against him was silent about the applicability of the
same. He alleged denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him, in view of the fact of information is silent about the
applicability of R.A. No. 7659.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled affirmed the conviction of rape with the modification
that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Supreme Court claimed that a careful perusal of the Information indicting the
appellant reveals a crucial omission in its averments of the minority of the victim. The
objectives of the defendant's right to be informed are: (1) to furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense; (2) to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the same
cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they were
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
The Court claimed that the information does not allege the minority of the victim
although the same was proven during trial as borne by the records. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any
offense not charged in the Complaint or Information on which he was tried or therein
necessarily included.
The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent are the special qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority which had the capacity of increasing the penalty by
degrees.
83. People vs. Malansing, 378 SCRA 685

FACTS:
This is an automatic review for the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City convicting appellants of two counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of death for each count. Appellants are brothers. Joey Manlansing denied
participation in the killing, but he admitted boxing Jorja in the face to prevent her from
shouting, while Mario was assaulting her husband. Mario Mallansing claimed he alone was
responsible for the deaths. In open court, Mario affirmed his confession and insisted that his
brother had nothing to do with the deaths
He claimed that Joey woke up only after he killed Magin and that Joey tried to
unsuccessfully stop him from attacking Jorja. He said he killed the couple out of anger after
Jorja told him that he was going to be ejected as a tenant. Mario said Joey knew nothing of his
motive.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of night-time.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that none of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in
the informations nor in the amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance
elevating either killing to murder. Thus, conformably with Gario Alba, the offenses committed
by appellants only constitute two counts of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for
homicide under 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence
both appellants to death. In evaluating the circumstances that qualified the crimes to murder,
the trial court considered, aside from evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime, and use of a
deadly weapon, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and dwelling The
Supreme Court note that abuse of superior strength and dwelling were not alleged in the
informations.
In accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, abuse of superior strength and dwelling may not be appreciated to convict the
brothers. Further, should there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of superior strength is
absorbed by the former. We are thus left to review only the allegation that the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, and nocturnity were present in the
commission of the crimes.
At the outset, we shall discount nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance, since in this
case, the darkness of the night was not purposely sought by the offenders to facilitate the
commission of the crime nor to ensure its execution with impunity.
84. People v. Alvarado, 379 SCRA 475

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 52, finding accused-appellant Armando Alvarado guilty of rape of his 14-year old daughter
Arlene and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.
Accused-appellant argues that complainant’s testimony should not have been given
credence. He contends that, although Dr. Villarosa found that complainant had sexual
intercourse recently, it could not have been with accused-appellant since the examining
physician testified that complainant might have had sexual intercourse either a week or a month
before her examination on September 19, 1997, and complainant had sexual relationships with
different men in August 1997. He contends that the trial court should have given greater weight
to his defense as the same purportedly conformed to the findings of the expert witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled to disagree with the petitioner's contention. It is a time-
honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses
deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative,
denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their
testimonies.
The only exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the
case. In this case, the Supreme Court find no compelling reason to depart from this rule. Indeed,
complainant proved herself to be a credible witness.
Her narration of how she was sexually assaulted by her own father remained, as also
noted by the trial court, plain, candid, straightforward, and unflawed by serious contradictions in
spite of the lengthy and tedious cross-examination by the defense counsel. It is also noteworthy
that, in the course of her testimony, Arlene’s eyes overflowed with tears, which only revealed
the depths of the shame and suffering she endured as a consequence of the violation of her virtue
and personhood, and the truthfulness of her charge.
She was not impelled by any bad motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant, as
shown by the admissions by the latter and his mother that they did not know of any reason why
Arlene filed the rape charge against him. The reasons offered by accused-appellant that Arlene
had many boyfriends and that he would always scold her for attending dances and entertaining
suitors are flimsy. In fact, when the trial judge asked her if her accusation against her father was
true considering that the death penalty could be imposed on him, Arlene unhesitatingly
answered in the affirmative.
85. Teves vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z.
Teves seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting them of
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia. Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997,
the petitioners pleaded “not guilty.” On 23 February 1998, the petitioners filed their
Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the prosecution and moved for leave of court
to file a demurrer to evidence.

On 29 July 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits “A” to “S” of the prosecution’s
evidence but rejected Exhibits “T,” “U,” and “V.” It also denied petitioners’ demurrer to
evidence, as well as their motion for reconsideration On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated a decision. The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and
palpable errors in convicting them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful
intervention of Mayor Teves in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. But they were convicted of having a direct
financial or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different from the offense with which they
were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them was transgressed because they were never
apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being charged
with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991. The variance doctrine invoked by
the respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioners'constitutional right to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that petitioners can be convicted of second mode of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest considering that
it was not charged in the information.

When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. It is clear that the
essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting the
offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as
alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved.

Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to
this case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL, AND PUBLIC TRIAL

86. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

FACTS: From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on
October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner,
went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords.

On October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal

gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the House of
representatives and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate
during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and
were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment
trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate
President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine. At noon of April 14, 2001, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence
of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him
not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.

HELD: No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible.
Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and
legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity.

The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the
publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform.
Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge
and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
87. RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC June
14, 2011

FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were
killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindana Touted as the worst election-related
violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which
came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder
and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr.

On November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual
journalists from various media entities, and members of the academ filed a petition before this
Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be
allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the
courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern
the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.

Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense
media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the
number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and searched
for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial
court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the
courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation on the exercise of the freedom of the press.

HELD: The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ [a] trial of any kind or in any court is a
matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of
entertainment so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from
the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The
observation that massive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can
so alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.

The Court concluded in Aquino:

Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair
and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and
the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading
and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be
allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to
shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted
during the trial proper.

Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of
the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the
Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video
footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.
RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESS FACE TO FACE

88. JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO
LIGHT and POWER CO. G.R. No. 143561. June 6, 2001
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 11, which convicted
petitioner Jonathan Cariaga of the crime of Qualified Theft. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, Systems Analyst
of the Davao Light & Power Company, Inc. (DLPC), initiated a covert operation. Aboitiz sought
the assistance of Sgt. Fermin Villasis, Chief, Theft & Robbery Section, San Pedro Patrol Station
and also hired one Florencio Siton, as his undercover agent under the pseudonym Canuto
Duran.
Canuto Duran struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, at
the Miguel Store, situated in front of the DLPC office. Canuto purchased small electrical wires
which, according to Ricardo, came from his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga, nicknamed Totoy. Ricardo
introduced Canuto to Jonathan who was then assigned driver of DLPC Service Truck S-143.
Sitons undercover work came to an abrupt end on February 1, 1989 when members of Sgt.
Villasis team apprehended Canuto and turned him over, including the electrical wires that he
previously purchased from Jonathan through Ricardo, to the San Pedro Patrol Station.
The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not
be personally served upon him as according to his wife, Antonieta Cariaga, he was in Sultan
Kudarat and the date of his return to Davao City was not certain. Petitioner argues that the
sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented in court is inadmissible. The
prosecution presented in evidence, Ricardo Cariagas sworn statement which was attached as
Annex 8-A to DLPCs position paper in the labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga against the latter
for illegal dismissal.
The trial court admitted the same in evidence despite the timely objection of the
defense counsel; and the Court of Appeals upheld the admission thereof citing as basis, Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the fundamental right of the accused to meet the
witnesses against him face to face.
RULING: “In Toledo, Jr. vs. People, this Court emphasized that the preconditions set forth in
Section 47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony given by a witness out of court must be
strictly complied with and that there is more reason to adopt such a strict rule in the case of
Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of evidence with additional specific
requisites to those prescribed by Section 47, more importantly, said provision is an
implementing translation of the constitutional right of an accused person to meet the witnesses
(against him) face to face.
In Tan vs. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that unable to testify or for that
matter unavailability, does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not
appear. It may refer to inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as
when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. It does not refer to tampering of
witnesses.” The threshold question then is the admissibility of the sworn statement of Ricardo
Cariaga which was attached to DLPCs position paper in the labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga
against it for illegal dismissal.
The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did not
appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner.
Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact, the private
prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat and previously, his wife informed the
sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four-hour drive from Davao
City. Against this backdrop, can this witness be categorized as one that cannot be found despite
due diligence, unavailable or unable to testify.
 We are inclined to rule in the negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this point. It
must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases, hence, mere
sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The
Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest. In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to
have the witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances
where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear.
On this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have been
admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects
of this rule. DECISION is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
89. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU
G.R. No. 137348. June 21, 2004

FACTS: Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the
afternoon of July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division
(SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius Ferro about the alleged
illicit drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of
Chief Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI
confirmed the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped
packages rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the
accused Ong and boodle money placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales,
thereafter, the latter arrested Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De
Ming.

The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking
sheets and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance,
was referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive
for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

However, appellants denied the story of the prosecution and maintained innocence to
the crimes charged. On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and
imposed on them the penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1
million pesos. However, the case was on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence.
They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them was violated.

HELD: Yes. Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides: SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.-

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information
was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or
clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same
in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.

The arraignment of appellants violates the above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals.
Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the accusations against
them. It does not, however, indicate whether the Information was read in the language or
dialect known to them. Moreover, after arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower
court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter. What leaps
from the records of the case is the inability of appellants to fully or sufficiently comprehend any
other language than Chinese and any of its dialect.

Despite this inability, however, the appellants were arraigned on an Information written
in the English language. The Court emphasized that the requirement that the information
should be read in a language or dialect known to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly
complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The constitutional protection is part of
due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment. Therefore, the
appellants were acquitted of the crime charged.
90. PEOPLE vs. RICARDO BOHOL. G.R. No. 171729, July 28, 2008

FACTS: On August 2, 2002, between 9:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. of the same day, there was a buy-
bust operation against Bohol,headed by the informant, PO2 Estrada Consequently, the police
officers brought Bohol to the police station and the confiscated four plastic sachets of white
crystalline substance were subjected to laboratory examination. The specimens were confirmed
to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu.

Upon arraignment, Bohol entered a plea of "not guilty" to both charges. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.

ISSUE: Whether Bohol’s arrest and the search on his person were illegal.

RULING: The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable arrests and
provides in the Bill of Rights that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by competent judicial authority.

However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an arrest made after an entrapment
operation does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and
valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

In the present case, the arresting officers were justified in arresting Bohol as he had just
committed a crime when he sold the shabu to PO2 Estrada. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of
the Dangerous Drugs Law.

Considering the legality of Bohol’s warrantless arrest, the subsequent warrantless

search that resulted in the seizure of the shabu found in his person is likewise valid. In a
legitimate warrantless arrest, the arresting police officers are authorized to search and seize
from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of

certain exceptions. This Court has ruled that the following instances constitute valid warrantless
searches and seizures: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5)
search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.