G.R. No.
124862 December 22, 1998 required the submission of the records of birth of the
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA
DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos,
were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.
They were not however blessed with children.
Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July
1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately
from each other and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31
August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance
of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to
as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later
replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted
certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private
writing and the final judgment of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the
immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing
on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the
six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear
despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents,
the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed
period lapsed without the required documents being
submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which
held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed
the view that their marriage subsisted until the
death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider
valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal
properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3On
the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown
that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with
her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only
petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate
heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication
of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor
of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the
Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the
deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis
who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had
been made in their respective records of birth.
Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan
children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to
one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto
Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private
respondent was not declared an heir. Although it
was stated in the aforementioned records of birth
that she and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina
and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the
circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the
Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground
alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27
November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand
of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual
issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to the
decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between
petitioner and private respondent is the proper
hier of the decedent is one of law which can be
resolved in the present petition based on establish
facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied
upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists
either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
to inherit from the decedent because there are
proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as
heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving
spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties
other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the
motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order
requiring the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would
be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's
motion private respondent raised, among others,
the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled
to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact
had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner
replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the
divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the
lines, the implication is that petitioner was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the
aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as
well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the
lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her
favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez
v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside
and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. She prayed therefore that the
case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the
motion but failed to squarely address the issue on
her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant
private respondent's prayer for a hearing but
proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding
that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino
citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in
Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the
finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the
time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's
citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt
persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino
citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial
court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from
Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on
petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the
present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent.
She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during
the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of
a certain transfer certificate title as well as the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof
before another trial court. When asked whether
she was an American citizen petitioner answered
that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree
of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained
in the same year. Petitioner however did not
bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the
uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of
their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to
be conducted by the trial court. Consequently,
respondent appellate court did not err in ordering
the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from
Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private
respondent's claim to heirship was already
resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage
of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby
resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void
from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving
spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for
petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be
dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions
must involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances. There must also
be identical causes of action, subject matter and
issue. 22 The present petition deals with
declaration of heirship while the subsequent
petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts
concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to
the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason
to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings and declaring null and void
its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and
Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court
modifying its previous decision by granting one-
half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan
children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of
Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.
The Court however emphasizes that the reception
of evidence by the trial court should he limited to
the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel
in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006
ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN
A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-
CATINDIG, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25, 2003
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74456 which set aside and declared as null and void
the September 30, 2002 Order2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, granting
petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention and
admitting the Complaint-in-Intervention3 in Civil
Case No. Q-01-44847; and its January 23, 2004
Resolution4 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily
Gomez Catindig5 twice on May 16, 1968. The first
marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central
Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,
Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes
Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The
marriage produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital
problems that they decided to separate from each
other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided
to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a
Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of
the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws.6
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents
filed a joint petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican
Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of
Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133,
ordered the complete separation of properties
between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O.
Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States7 and both lived as husband and wife until
October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.8
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the
divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican
Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between
Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the
Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was
deemed void under Philippine law. When she
confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her
that he would legalize their union after he obtains an
annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further
promised the petitioner that he would adopt their son
so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his
estate as that of each of his children with Lily.9
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as
Case No. Q-01-44847.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to
File Intervention10 claiming that she has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation because she knows
certain information which might aid the trial court at
a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment
case, which the trial court granted on September 30,
2002. Petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention was also
ordered admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the order
dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The
Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared as
null and void the September 30, 2002 Order of the
trial court granting the motion for leave to file
intervention and admitting the complaint-in-
intervention.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the
annulment case between Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.
Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party
from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. However, if the error subject of the recourse is
one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
granted by a court with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged
in this case, the proper remedy is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.11This is
based on the premise that in issuing the assailed
decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals acted
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effect of the judgment and the acts of the lower
court.12
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to
establish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed decision
and resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of
discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion
is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.13 The word "capricious," usually used in tandem
with the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of
willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking
the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of
caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion
is imperative.14
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a
person, not a party to a case can intervene, thus:
Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is
so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.15
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal
interest in the matter in litigation; and [b]
consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or
prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not.16
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene,
must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect
of the judgment.17Such interest must be actual, direct
and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant.18
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and
companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the
requisite legal interest required of a would-be
intervenor under the Rules of Court.
Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. Under the law,
petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence
her claim of legal interest has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14,
1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The
divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from
the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage
bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.19 Regardless of where a citizen of the
Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by
Philippine laws with respect to his or her family
rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and
legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of
whether he or she was married here or abroad,
initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute
divorce from spouse and eventually becomes
successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the
Philippines will not recognize such absolute
divorce.20
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968,
their marriage was governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code21which took effect on August 30, 1950. In
the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22 we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is
the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country.
(Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan
even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks
merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal
interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based.
Since petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention
was bereft of the indispensable requirement of legal
interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order
granting the same and admitting the complaint-in-
intervention was attended with grave abuse of
discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
correctly set aside and declared as null and void the
said order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution
dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Tenchavez v. Escano (Digest)
Facts:
 February 24, 1948, Vicente Escano, 2nd yr
student of commerce, from a well-to-do
and prominent family in Cebu, married
petitioner Pastor Tenchavez, an
engineer, without the knowledge of her
parents.
 o Their marriage was the
culmination of a love affair, and
was duly registered with the local
civil register.
 Their plan to elope was disrupted by her
mother who took her home, where she
admitted the marriage. Her parents were
surprised and disgusted.
 A letter was handed to Mamerto Escano
which discloses an amorous relationship
between Tenchavez and Pacita Noel,
their friend. Thereafter, the couple
became estranged.
 June 24, 1950, without informing her
husband, Escano applied for a passport
for which she indicated that she was
single, and after approval, she left for the
US.
 In the District Court of Nevada, she filed
for divorce, which was eventually
granted, on the ground of extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character.
 Sep.13, 1954, Escano married an
American, Russel Leo Moran, in Nevada,
with whom she had children. She
acquired US citizenship.
 July 30 1955, Tenchavez initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint on the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for
legal separation and damages.
 But Escano claimed that her divorce was
valid, and so is her marriage to her
present husband.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce was valid
Held: No. It is not valid.
Ratio:
 Tenchavez and Escano were validly
married to each other, under the civil law.
o age of majority, valid consent,
Catholic priest
 The valid marriage between Tenchavez
and Escano remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the divorce obtained
from the Court of Nevada.
 At the time the divorce was issued,
Escano, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.
o Thus, she was then subject to
Philippine law.
 Art. 15 of the Civil Code (Nationality rule):
Laws relating to family rights and
duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the
Philppines, even though living
abroad.
 The Civil code of the Philippines does not
allow absolute divorce. It only allows
legal separation.
 The Philippine courts cannot recognize a
foreign decree of absolute divorce. Art. 17
of Civil Code:
Prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order,
policy and good customs, shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated or by
determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
 The policy of our law cannot be nullified
by acts of private parties, hence Escano’s
divorce and second marriage are not
entitled to recognition as valid.
 Her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically
“intercourse with a person not her
husband” from the standpoint of
Philippine law, and entitles plaintiff
Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery.”
Velayo vs Shell (Digest)
Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed
P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its
C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane
was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it
thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In
1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called
upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that
meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint
representatives to a working committee that would
determine the order of preference as to how each
creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file
suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file
insolvency proceedings should its assets be not
enough to pay them up. Shell Company was
represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man
working committee. Later, the working committee
convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be
divided amongst the creditors but while such was
pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell
USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is
assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of
$79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not
the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines.
Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54
plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before
a California court to have the plane be the subject of
a writ of attachment which was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were
unaware of the assignment of credit made by
Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on
to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the
Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other
creditors learned of the assignment made by
Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file
their own complaint of attachment against
CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency
proceedings to protect its assets in the
Philippines from being attached. Alfredo
Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was
approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In
order for him to recover the C-54 plane in
California, it filed for a writ of injunction against
Shell Philippines in order for the latter to
restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the
attachment and in the alternative that judgment
be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double
the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane
was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is
not liable for damages because there is nothing
in the law which prohibits a company from
assigning its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for
damages considering that it did not violate any
law.
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the
absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code
which states:
“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage”.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing
rule is approved (as it was approved), would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold numbers of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or
injury, even if it does not constitute a violation
of a statute law, should be compensated by
damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be
recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability
for damages arises from a willful or negligent act
contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE vs CA (digest)
August 25, 1989
Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of
pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior
Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice
President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A
day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was
number one suspect and ordered him one week forced
leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave,
Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”,
ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for
police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a
private investigator. Private investigation was still
incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative
results; reports from Manila police investigators and
from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document
Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed
with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but
were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his
employment from petitioners in January 1973,
effective December 1972. He sought employment
with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO);
but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that
Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to
dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through
Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor
of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him
eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs;
hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damages to
private respondent.
Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and
considering certain significant circumstances, finds
that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that
they invoke, causing damage to private respondent
and for which the latter must now be indemnified:
when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases against
him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful
remarks about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be
trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”, and
“swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO
stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay
due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases
by petitioners against private respondent. All these
reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage
to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without
basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil
Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is
liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners
clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their
right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to
recover damages under Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the Civil Code
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with
dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning
and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration
and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer,
following their mutual promise of love, decided to
get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day.
On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding —
My mother opposes it. Am leaving
on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people
about the reason why — That
would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the
following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST
ASSURED RETURNING VERY
SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA
PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard
from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer
and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner,
and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as
actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief
from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion
for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to
strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955,
ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear
before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage
of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an
amicable settlement." It added that should any of
them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for
resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before
court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed
a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on
defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that
he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro
City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of
an amicable element. The court granted two weeks
counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two
weeks given by the court had expired on September
8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed
to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by
the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the
parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956.
This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the
court that chances of settling the case amicably were
nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying
defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21,
1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable
negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed
no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement
was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits
stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of
merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated:
"That he has a good and valid defense against
plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the
plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous
event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An
affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions
or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs.
Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P.
Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit
of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set
aside was null and void, it having been based on
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In
Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519,
October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as
commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by
Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as
to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did
not have to be obtained for he was declared in default
and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas,
40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-
14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and
reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment
is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is
no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action
for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-
14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a
promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated
from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions
that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to
which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated
with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff
and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A,
A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased
(Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the
flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given
and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was
then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My
mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city
in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon." But he never returned and
was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to
marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary
to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the
damages awarded were excessive. No question is
raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert hereunder is that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, in the
amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to
exemplary damages, defendant contends that the
same could not be adjudged against him because
under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit
as under the above-narrated circumstances of this
case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless
[and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion,
however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-
indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
Wassmer vs Velez Digest
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer
planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it
on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made
preparations such as: making and sending wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and other
apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a
letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able
to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed
to said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he
sent another message to Wassmer advising her that
nothing has changed and that he will be returning
soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against
Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court
awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of
Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the
scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events.
He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable
for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because
there is no law upon which such an action may be
grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary
and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is
proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised
by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is
true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a
simple breach of promise to marry. because of such
promise, Wassmer made preparations for the
wedding. Velez’s unreasonable withdrawal from the
wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported
under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in
part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21
entitles the injured party to receive an award for
moral damages as properly awarded by the lower
court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary
damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of
this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive
manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.
G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE
GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL
LUGATIMAN, and GERTRUDES
GONZALES, respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioners.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The constitutional protection of our people against
unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a
pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our right to privacy
and dignity against undesirable intrusions committed
by any public officer or private individual. An
infringement of this right justifies an award for
damages.
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments,
Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout
uniforms and other scouting supplies." 1
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation
received information that private respondents Agnes
Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes
Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de
Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was
tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to
make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner
de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and two (2)
other constabulary men of the Reaction Force
Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City
went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina
Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the
boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on
display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a
commotion and embarrassed private respondents.
Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items
were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to
petitioner corporation for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then
filed against private respondents. 2 During its
pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from private
respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,100.00)
in order to be dropped from the complaint. On
December 6, 1983, after a preliminary investigation,
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint
against all the private respondents. On February 6,
1984, he also ordered the return of the seized items.
The seized items were not immediately returned
despite demands. 3 Private respondents had to go
personally to petitioners' place of business to recover
their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were
returned. The other items returned were of inferior
quality.
Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144
against the petitioners for sums of money and
damages. 4 In its Decision dated January 9, 1987, the
trial court ruled for the private respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against defendants, ordering the
latter jointly and severally:
1. To return the amount of
P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol
Lugatiman with interest at 12% per
annum from January 12, 1984, the
date of the last receipt issued, until
fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa
Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the
26 pieces of girl scout items not
returned;
3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of
P50,000.00 for and as moral
damages and P15,000.00 for and as
exemplary damages; and
 4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
The decision was appealed to the respondent court.
On January 18, 1989, its Fifth Division, 5 affirmed
the Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION; and, as
modified, the dispositive portion
thereof now reads as follows:
Judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs (private
respondents) and against
defendants (petitioners), ordering
the latter jointly and severally;
1. To return the amount of
P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent)
Mirasol Lugatiman and cancel her
application for distributor's license;
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent)
Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of
P2,000.00 for the unreturned 26
pieces of girl scouts items with
interest at 12% per annum from
June 4, 1984 (date the complaint
was filed) until it is fully paid;
3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents)
the amount of P10,000.00 each, or
a total of P30,000.00, for and as
moral damages; and P5,000.00
each, or a total of P15,000.00, for
and as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents)
P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.
Costs of the case a quo and the
instant appeal are assessed jointly
and severally against defendants-
appellants (petitioners) MHP
Garments, Inc. and Larry de
Guzman.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN IMPUTING
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO
THE PETITIONERS WHO DID
NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE OF
THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF
ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT MADE A
FINDING THAT THE MANNER
WITH WHICH THE
CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WAS
TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED
INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS
WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE
ACT OF CONFISCATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AND AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS.
We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our
people from unreasonable search and seizure. It
provides:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever
nature for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to
 be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
This provision protects not only those who appear to
be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but
are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. 6 In the case at bench, the seizure
was made without any warrant. Under the Rules of
Court, 7 a warrantless search can only be undertaken
under the following circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful
arrest. - A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search
warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the
warrantless search and seizure of private respondents'
goods. Petitioner corporation received information
that private respondents were illegally selling Boy
Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The
specific date and time are not established in the
evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de
Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of
private respondents. They reported to the Philippine
Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was
made on the stores of private respondents and the
supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression
of time between the receipt of the information and the
raid of the stores of private respondents shows there
was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding
party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the
sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant
and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing
so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the
seizure would be proved to violate the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
In the case at bench, the search and seizure were
clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the
seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined
as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched." 8 These facts and
circumstances were not in any way shown by the
petitioners to justify their warrantless search and
seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint
for unfair competition and later ordered the return of
the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the
argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that
conducted the raid and their participation was only to
report the alleged illegal activity of private
respondents.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding
team should have been included in the complaint for
violation of the private respondents' constitutional
rights, still, the omission will not exculpate
petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for
the recovery of damages for violation of
constitutional rights and liberties from public officer
or private individual, thus:
Art. 32. Any public officer
or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter
for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's
person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral
damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be
recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in
Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
 Pursuant to the foregoing
provisions, a person whose
constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to
actual and moral damages from the
public officer or employee
responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be
awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that
the wrong may be civil or criminal.
It is not necessary therefore that
there should be malice or bad faith.
To make such a requisite would
defeat the main purpose of Article
32 which is the effective protection
of individual rights. Public officials
in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article
is to put an end to official abuse by
plea of the good faith. In the United
States this remedy is in the nature
of a tort. (emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the
Court En Banc explained the liability of persons
indirectly responsible, viz:
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in
our view, is the language of Article
32. The law speaks of an officer
or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights
and liberties of another. Thus, it is
not the actor alone (i.e., the one
directly responsible) who must
answer for damages under Article
32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.
xxx xxx xxx
While it would certainly be too
naive to expect that violators of
human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing
damages suits, it should
nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of
the Civil Code makes the persons
who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only
those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable.
Article 32 of the Civil Code
encompasses within the ambit of its
provisions those directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for its
violations. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases,
the respondent court correctly granted damages to
private respondents. Petitioners
were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of
private respondents against unreasonable search and
seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to
their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to
undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal
sources of scouting supplies. 11 As correctly observed
by respondent court:
Indeed, the acts committed by the
PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing
appellees' (respondents')
merchandise and of filing the
criminal complaint for unfair
competition against appellees
(respondents) were for the
protection and benefit of appellant
(petitioner) corporation. Such being
the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair
to infer from those acts that it was
upon appellant (petitioner)
corporation's instance that the PC
soldiers conducted the raid and
effected the illegal seizure. These
circumstances should answer the
trial court's query — posed in its
decision now under consideration
— as to why the PC soldiers
immediately turned over the seized
merchandise to appellant
(petitioner) corporation. 12
The raid was conducted with the active participation
of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a
finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts judge, or such other responsible
items. By standing by and apparently assenting officer as may be authorized by
thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the law; and to impound the said
officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner paraphernalia to be used as
corporation which even received for safekeeping the evidence in court or other
goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team appropriate administrative body.
and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for Orders the immediate and strict
quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for compliance with the Instructions. 14
unfair competition.
Under the above provision and as aforediscussed,
Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful
precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard not peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the
only the privilege of franchise holder of scouting Philippines for the proper application of a warrant.
items but also the citizen's constitutional rights, Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot
to wit: be sacrificed to transient needs. 15 Petitioners did not
have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of
TITLE: respondents' goods without any warrant.
APPRE
HENSI And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the
ON OF raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint
UNAUT against the raiding team for contribution or any other
HORIZ relief, 16 in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery
ED of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
MANUF
ACTUR We have consistently ruled that moral damages are
ERS not awarded to penalize the defendant but to
AND compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have
DISTRI suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs.
BUTOR Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be
S OF awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt
SCOUT that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights,
PARAP serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the
HERNA tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private
LIA respondents' avowals of embarrassment and
AND humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise
IMPOU were supported by their testimonies. Respondent
NDING Cruz declared:
OF
SAID
I felt very nervous. I was crying to
PARAP
loss (sic) my goods and capital
HERNA because I am doing business with
LIA. borrowed money only, there was
commotion created by the raiding
ABSTRACT: team and they even stepped on
some of the pants and dresses on
Directs all law enforcement display for sale. All passersby
agencies of the Republic of the stopped to watch and stared at me
Philippines, to apprehend with accusing expressions. I was
immediately unauthorized trembling and terribly ashamed,
manufacturers and distributors of sir. 18
Scout paraphernalia, upon proper
application by the Boy Scouts of the Respondent Lugatiman testified:
Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of
the Philippines for warrant of
I felt very nervous. I was crying
arrest and/or search warrant with a
and I was very much ashamed
 because many people have been
watching the PC soldiers hauling
my items, and many/I (sic) heard
say "nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for
which I am claiming P25,000.00
for damages.19
While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:
I do not like the way the raid was
conducted by the team sir because
it looked like that what I have been
selling were stolen items that they
should be confiscated by uniformed
soldiers. Many people were around
and the more the confiscation was
made in a scandalous manner;
every clothes, T-shirts, pants and
dresses even those not wrapped
dropped to the ground. I was
terribly shamed in the presence of
market goers that morning.20
Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful
seizure justifies the award of exemplary
damages. 21 It will also serve as a stern reminder to
all and sundry that the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile
reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all
encompassing protection extends against intrusions
directly done both by government and indirectly by
private entities.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a
SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987
on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for
the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts
items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in
lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount
upon finality of this Decision until the payment
thereof. 22 Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MHP GARMENTS, INC vs. CA
September 2, 1994
G.R. No. 86720
PETITIONERS: MHP Garments Inc, and Larry De
Guzman
RESPONDENTS: CA, Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol
Lugatiman, Gertrudes Gonzales
FACTS:
In February 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc.,
was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official
Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias.
In their Memorandum Agreement, MHP was given
the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout
uniforms and other scouting supplies." Sometime in
October 1983, MHP received information that
private respondents were selling Boy Scouts items
and paraphernalia without any authority. Larry de
Guzman (“Larry”), an employee of MHP, was then
tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to
make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., Larry,
Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and 2 other constabulary
men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the
stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
WITHOUT any warrant, they seized the boy and girl
scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion
and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were
issued for the seized items and the items were then
turned over to MHP for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then
filed against private respondents but during its
pendency, Larry exacted from respondent Lugatiman
P3,100.00 in order to be dropped from the complaint.
However, after the preliminary investigation, the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint
against all the private respondents and ordered the
return of the seized items. The seized items were not
immediately returned despite demands. Private
respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place
of business to recover their goods, and even then, not
all the seized items were returned and the other items
returned were of inferior quality.
Private respondents filed a civil case for sums of
money and damages against MHP and Larry (note:
the PC officers were not sued for damages). The RTC
ruled in favor of the private respondents which was
later on affirmed by CA.
ISSUES:
1. Did CA err in imputing liability for damages
to petitioners who did not effect the seizure?
NO. While undoubtedly, the members of the PC
raiding team should have been included in the
complaint for violation of the private respondents'
constitutional rights, still, the omission will not
exculpate petitioners. Despite the sufficiency of time,
they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods
of private respondents. In doing so, they took the
risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would
be proved to violate the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case
at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal.
There was no probable cause for the seizure.
The raid was conducted with the active participation
of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a
finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts
items. By standing by and apparently assenting
thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the
officers themselves.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the
recovery of damages for violation of constitutional
rights and liberties from public officer or private
individual. The very nature of Article 32 is that the
wrong may be civil or criminal. It is NOT necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith.
To make such a requisite would defeat the main
purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights.
In, Aberca vs. Ver, the court held that in Art. 32, the
law speaks of an officer or employee or person
"directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation
of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also
to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party… it should nonetheless be made
clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the
Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as
well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression
joint tortfeasors.
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT
and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the
name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION
AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1 dated April 28, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
56345 which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
San Fernando, Pampanga (RTC) in Civil Case No.
10538, granting the complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages filed by Carlito Lacap
(respondent) against the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner).
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly
published an "Invitation To Bid" dated January 27,
1992. Respondent, doing business under the name
and style Carwin Construction and Construction
Supply (Carwin Construction), was pre-qualified
together with two other contractors. Since respondent
submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the
contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.3 On
November 4, 1992, a Contract Agreement was
executed by respondent and petitioner.4 On
September 25, 1992, District Engineer Rafael S.
Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the concreting
of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.5 Accordingly, respondent
undertook the works, made advances for the purchase
of the materials and payment for labor costs.6
On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the
District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga
conducted a final inspection of the project and found
it 100% completed in accordance with the approved
plans and specifications. Accordingly, the Office of
the District Engineer issued Certificates of Final
Inspection and Final Acceptance.7
Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for
the completed project.8 The DPWH prepared the
Disbursement Voucher in favor of
petitioner.9 However, the DPWH withheld payment
from respondent after the District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final
release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s
license of respondent had expired at the time of the
execution of the contract. The District Engineer
sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal Department
on whether the contracts of Carwin Construction for
various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were
valid and effective although its contractor’s license
had already expired when the projects were
contracted.10
In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D.
Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal Department
opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No.
4566), otherwise known as the Contractor’s License
Law, does not provide that a contract entered into
after the license has expired is void and there is no
law which expressly prohibits or declares void such
contract, the contract is enforceable and payment may
be paid, without prejudice to any appropriate
administrative liability action that may be imposed on
the contractor and the government officials or
employees concerned.11
In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer
requested clarification from the DPWH Legal
Department on whether Carwin Construction should
be paid for works accomplished despite an expired
contractor’s license at the time the contracts were
executed.12
In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar D.
Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department,
recommended that payment should be made to
Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal
opinion.13 Despite such recommendation for
payment, no payment was made to respondent.
Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint
for Specific Performance and Damages against
petitioner before the RTC.14
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since
respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of
the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.15
Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition
to Motion to Dismiss,16 the RTC issued an Order
dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to
Dismiss.17 The OSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the
RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.19
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer
invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-
suability of the State.20
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19,
1997 its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the
latter, thru its District Engineer at Sindalan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, to pay the following:
a) ₱457,000.00 – representing the contract for the
concreting project of Sitio 5 road, Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga plus interest at 12% from
demand until fully paid; and
b) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay
the contract price since it has accepted the completed
project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold
otherwise would be to overrun the long standing and
consistent pronouncement against enriching oneself
at the expense of another.22
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the
CA.23 On April 28, 2003, the CA rendered its
Decision sustaining the Decision of the RTC. It held
that since the case involves the application of the
principle of estoppel against the government which is
a purely legal question, then the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply;
that by its actions the government is estopped from
questioning the validity and binding effect of the
Contract Agreement with the respondent; that denial
of payment to respondent on purely technical grounds
after successful completion of the project is not
countenanced either by justice or equity.
The CA rendered herein the assailed Decision dated
April 28, 2003, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the
interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum
computed from June 21, 1995.
SO ORDERED.24
Hence, the present petition on the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE
OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER,
CONSIDERING THAT:
(a) RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND
(b) IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH
HAS THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO
RESOLVE RESPONDENT’S MONEY CLAIM
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.25
Petitioner contends that respondent’s recourse to
judicial action was premature since the proper
remedy was to appeal the District Auditor’s
disapproval of payment to the COA, pursuant to
Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No.
1445), otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines; that the COA has primary
jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s money claim
against the government under Section 2(1),26 Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2627 of P.D.
No. 1445; that non-observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of
cause of action.
Respondent, on the other hand, in his
Memorandum28 limited his discussion to Civil Code
provisions relating to human relations. He submits
that equity demands that he be paid for the work
performed; otherwise, the mandate of the Civil Code
provisions relating to human relations would be
rendered nugatory if the State itself is allowed to
ignore and circumvent the standard of behavior it sets
for its inhabitants.
The present petition is bereft of merit.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all
the means afforded him by administrative
processes.29 The issues which administrative agencies
are authorized to decide should not be summarily
taken from them and submitted to a court without
first giving such administrative agency the
opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.30
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.31
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public
policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible
rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively small so as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice;32 (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the
issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot;33 (j) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong
public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.34Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to
the present case.
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH
Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that
payment to a contractor with an expired contractor’s
license is proper, respondent remained unpaid for the
completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly,
there was unreasonable delay and official inaction to
the great prejudice of respondent.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired
license at the time of the execution of its contract is
entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a
pure question of law. It does not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties. There is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or
the falsehood of alleged facts.35 Said question at best
could be resolved only tentatively by the
administrative authorities. The final decision on the
matter rests not with them but with the courts of
justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply, because nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done.36 The issue does not
require technical knowledge and experience but one
that would involve the interpretation and application
of law.
Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor
of the COA disapproved respondent’s claim against
the Government, and, under Section 4837 of P.D. No.
1445, the administrative remedy available to
respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by
the District Auditor to the COA itself, the Court holds
that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above,
the complaint for specific performance and damages
was not prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction
of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. As the Court aptly stated in
Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu (Branch VIII):38
The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath
and wait until the Commission on Audit and the
Ministry of Public Highways had acted on the claims
for compensation for the lands appropriated by the
government. The road had been completed; the Pope
had come and gone; but the plaintiffs had yet to be
paid for the properties taken from them. Given this
official indifference, which apparently would
continue indefinitely, the private respondents had to
act to assert and protect their interests.39
On the question of whether a contractor with an
expired license is entitled to be paid for completed
projects, Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly
provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price,
commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to
submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or
undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a
supervisory capacity of a construction work within
the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license
certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind
to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a
certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an
expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be
deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than
five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand
pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without interpretation.40 This
rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo
est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intention
or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly,
and to have expressed its intent by use of such words
as are found in the statute.41 Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.42
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not
declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts
entered into by a contractor whose license had
already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable
for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
respondent should be paid for the projects he
completed. Such payment, however, is without
prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under
the law.
Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies
the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet
lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of
another’s injury) states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense
of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for
the stability of the social order, x x x designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society to
the end that law may approach its supreme ideal
which is the sway and dominance of justice." 43 The
rules thereon apply equally well to the
Government.44 Since respondent had rendered
services to the full satisfaction and acceptance by
petitioner, then the former should be compensated for
them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished
project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute
unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice
of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed
by law.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
56345 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO
CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside
the Resolution1 dated December 28, 1999 dismissing
the petition for certiorari and the Resolution2 dated
August 24, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil
Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario
Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other
owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for
brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan
("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As
a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas,
Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against
Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No.
002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo
filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was
then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya,
defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss
the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping
considering the pendency of the criminal case. The
MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26,
1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and
Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the
criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court
("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28,
1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of
dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which
disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy
should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further
held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC
declared that even on the premise that the MCTC
erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure
error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same
in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
"In a certain vehicular accident involving
two parties, each one of them may think and
believe that the accident was caused by the
 fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party,
believing himself to be the aggrieved party,
opted to file a criminal case for reckless
imprudence against the second party. On the
other hand, the second party, together with
his operator, believing themselves to be the
real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a
civil case for quasi-delict against the first
party who is the very private complainant in
the criminal case."4
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a
pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can
validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.
The Court’s Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No.
2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of
forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the
criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if
the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim
against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper
time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is
different from an action resulting from the crime of
reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal
case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising
from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case
can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the
only one who filed the independent civil action based
on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator
of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal
case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is
fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan
and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order
of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper
remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no
question of law to be resolved as the order of
dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari
is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that
the petition raises the legal question of whether there
is forum-shopping since they filed only one action -
the independent civil action for quasi-delict against
Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-
delict on the ground of forum-shopping under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal5 that
the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is
without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the
order of dismissal expressly states it is with
prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that the dismissal is
with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice.
Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the
matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order
dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to
file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of
Rule 41 expressly states that "where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65." Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing the
petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper
remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable
judgment.8 Forum-shopping is present when in the
two or more cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.9 However,
there is no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law and the rules expressly allow the
filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property based on
the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and
Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two
actions arose from the same act or omission, they
have different causes of action. The criminal case is
based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised
Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa
aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana
read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault
 or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles
provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence,
that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant
or the accused can file a separate civil action under
these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that
state only the private complainant in a criminal case
may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for
brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions. – (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action."
(Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a
criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended in
1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same
act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in
the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the
recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of
damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of
damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the
Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action
for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended
party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to
bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was
deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal action.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as
follows:
"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil
actions. – When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions
extinguishes the others. The institution of, or
the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the
others.
The reservation of the right to institute the
separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence
and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended
on December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
 "SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed
separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this
rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is
"deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only
the action to recover civil liability arising from the
crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no
longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even
without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is
not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the
Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code
continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles
of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in
the criminal action.10
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still
given the option to file a separate civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such
right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate
civil action before filing the criminal action. If the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the
civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not
apply to separate civil actions arising from the same
act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code.11
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985
Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the
criminal action, could not be filed until after final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the
separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil
action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing
of the criminal action until final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only
to the separate civil action filed to recover
liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to
independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed
independently regardless of the filing of the criminal
action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. – After the criminal action has
been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said
civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage
it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the
merits is rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended
party, be consolidated with the criminal
action in the court trying the criminal action.
In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right
of the prosecution to cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the offended party in
 the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall
be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action,
the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did
not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed
to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the
filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present
Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate
civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and
Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the
criminal case, can file a separate civil action against
the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3,
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. - In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart
in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the
"offended party" to bring an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the "offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the
criminal action can file an independent civil action
for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended
party" may not recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended
party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling
in Cabaero vs. Cantos12 where the Court held that the
accused therein could validly institute a separate civil
action for quasi-delict against the private complainant
in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the
criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for
malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted
the "absence of clear-cut rules governing the
prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and
the necessary consequences and implications
thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court
should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case
and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The
Court further ruled that the accused may file a
separate civil case against the offended party "after
the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance
with the new Rules which may be promulgated." The
Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or
third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only
unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay
the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was
incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
the lacunamentioned in Cabaero. Under this
provision, the accused is barred from filing a
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in
the criminal case. However, the same provision states
that "any cause of action which could have been the
subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil
action." The present Rule 111 mandates the accused
to file his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn
which shall proceed independently of the criminal
action, even as the civil action of the offended party
is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the
independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with
the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil
action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers
only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such
civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits
for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case
for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The
only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party
will have no reason to file a second civil action since
he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of
another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action
for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly
allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused
"may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is
only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is
prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the
civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended
party. If the accused does not file a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may
set in since the period continues to run until the civil
action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a
right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the
same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action.
To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize
his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him
due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed
separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The
order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No.
2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the
decision of the trial court in the criminal case may
vary with the decision of the trial court in the
independent civil action. This possibility has always
been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced
in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But
the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly
provides that the independent civil action "may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena
vs. Potenciano,13the Court declared:
"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the
civil action contemplated in the said articles
to the result of the criminal prosecution —
whether it be conviction or acquittal —
would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.’"
More than half a century has passed since the Civil
Code introduced the concept of a civil action separate
and independent from the criminal action although
arising from the same act or omission. The Court,
however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting
and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one
hearing the criminal case and the other the civil
action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and
irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than
real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under
the Rules of Court to deal with such remote
possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the
MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28,
1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule
that -
"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of
the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent."14
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special
Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and
Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CASUPANAN VS LAROYA CASE DIGEST G.R.
No. 145391 August 26, 2002
Topic: Criminal Procedure: Rule 111, Rules of
Court
FACTS: As a result of a vehicular accident between
two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya
and the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven
by Avelino Casupanan, two cases were filed before
the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal
case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property. This case was on its
preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the
ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the
civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration,
Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is
a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. Casupanan
and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But
the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by
the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case
and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an
appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this
petition.
Casupanan and Capitulo’s contention: that if the
accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against
the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim
in a separate civil action at the proper time. They
contend that an action on quasi-delict is different
from an action resulting from the crime of reckless
imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be
an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the
same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case
can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the
only one who filed the independent civil action based
on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator
of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal
case.
Laroya’s contention: that the petition is
fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan
and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order
of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper
remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no
question of law to be resolved as the order of
dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari
is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
ISSUE/HELD: WON an accused in a
pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can
validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.
AFFIRMATIVE
RATIO DICIDENDI:
The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil
action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its
order of dismissal that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the
order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
states that it is with prejudice. Thus, the MCTC's
dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal
without prejudice. Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that
an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is
to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly,
the Capas RTC's order dismissing the petition for
certiorari on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property based on
the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan
and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based
on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these
two actions arose from the same act or omission, they
have different causes of action. The criminal case is
based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised
Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa
aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code. And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111.
Since the present Rules require the accused in a
criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still
given the option to file a separate civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such
right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate
civil action before filing the criminal action. If the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the
civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not
apply to separate civil actions arising from the same
act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not
change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to
recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the
filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present
Rule 111 also prohibits the filing,
after commencement of the criminal action, of a
separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart
in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the
"offended party" to bring an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the "offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the
criminal action can file an independent civil action
for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended
party" may not recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended
party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits
for the same act or omission. The first a criminal
case where the civil action to recover civil liability
ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil
case for quasi-delict — without violating the rule on
non-forum shopping. The two cases
can proceed simultaneously and independently of
each other. The commencement or prosecution of the
criminal action will not suspend the civil action for
quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second
civil action since he cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the accused. In some
instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating
the filing of another case against his employer or
guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-
delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in
the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which
states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be
litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair
for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is
deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his
counterclaim against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-
delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the
period continues to run until the civil action for
quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a
right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the
same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action.
To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due
process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.Thus, the civil action based on
quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan
and Capitulo is proper.
G.R. No.148004 January 22, 2007
VINCENT E. OMICTIN, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twelfth
Division) and GEORGE I. LAGOS, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction seeking the nullification of
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA)
on June 30, 2000, and its resolution, dated March 5,
2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55834 entitled "George I.
Lagos v. Hon. Reinato G. Quilala, Presiding Judge of
RTC, Br. 57, Makati, Hon. Elizabeth Tayo Chua,
Asst. City Prosecutor, Makati City, and Vincent E.
Omictin."
In its assailed decision, the CA declared the existence
of a prejudicial question and ordered the suspension
of the criminal proceedings initiated by petitioner
Vincent E. Omictin on behalf of Saag Phils., Inc.
against private respondent George I. Lagos, in view
of a pending case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filed by the latter against the
former, Saag Pte. (S) Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo
and Alex Y. Tan.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager
Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a complaint for
two counts of estafa with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati against private respondent
George I. Lagos. He alleged that private respondent,
despite repeated demands, refused to return the two
company vehicles entrusted to him when he was still
the president of Saag Phils., Inc..
On February 26, 1999, public prosecutor Alex G.
Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of private
respondent, and on the same day, respondent was
charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315,
par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Makati
City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
99-633, entitled "People of the Philippines v. George
I. Lagos."
On June 4, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to
recuse praying that Presiding Judge Reinato G.
Quilala inhibit himself from hearing the case based
on the following grounds:
a) In an order, dated May 28, 1999, the
presiding judge summarily denied
respondent’s motion: 1) to defer issuance of
the warrant of arrest; and 2) to order
reinvestigation.
b) Immediately before the issuance of the
above-mentioned order, the presiding judge
and Atty. Alex Y. Tan, SAAG Philippines,
Inc.’s Ad Interim President, were seen
together.2
On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a motion
to suspend proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial
question because of a pending petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
involving the same parties.
It appears that on January 7, 1999, private respondent
filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for the declaration of
nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan
and petitioner as President Ad Interim and Operations
Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration
of dividends, recovery of share in the profits,
involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a
receiver, recovery of damages and an application for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction
against Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo,
Tan and petitioner. 3
In the action before the SEC, private respondent
averred that Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign
corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Singapore, and is fully owned by Saag Corporation
(Bhd). On July 1, 1994, he was appointed as Area
Sales Manager in the Philippines by Thiang Shiang
Hiang, Manager of Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. Pursuant to his
appointment, respondent was authorized to organize a
local joint venture corporation to be known as Saag
Philippines, Inc. for the wholesale trade and service
of industrial products for oil, gas and power
industries in the Philippines.
On September 9, 1994, Saag Philippines, Inc. was
incorporated with Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. as the majority
stockholder. Private respondent was appointed to the
board of directors, along with Rommel I. Lagos, Jose
E. Geronimo, Gan Ching Lai and Thiang Shiang
Hiang, and was elected president of the domestic
corporation.
Later, due to intra-corporate disputes, Gan and
Thiang resigned and divested their shares in Saag
Corporation (Bhd), thereby resulting in a change in
the controlling interest in Saag (S) Pte. Ltd.
Barely three months after, or on June 23, 1998,
private respondent resigned his post as president of
Saag Phils., Inc. while still retaining his position as a
director of the company.4 According to private
respondent, the joint venture agreement (JVA)
between him or Saag Phils., Inc. and Saag (S) Pte.
Ltd. provided that should the controlling interest in
the latter company, or its parent company Saag Corp.
(Bhd), be acquired by any other person or entity
without his prior consent, he has the option either to
require the other stockholders to purchase his shares
or to terminate the JVA and dissolve Saag Phils., Inc.
altogether. Thus, pursuant to this provision, since
private respondent did not give his consent as regards
the transfer of shares made by Gan and Thiang, he
made several requests to Nicholas Ng, who replaced
Gan as director, and Janifer Yeo, Executive Director
of Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., to call for a board meeting in
order to discuss the following: a) implementation of
the board resolution declaring dividends; b)
acquisition of private respondent’s shares by Saag (S)
Pte. Ltd.; c) dissolution of Saag Phils., Inc.; and d)
the termination of the JVA.
Ng and Yeo failed to appear, however, in the
scheduled board meetings. Instead, on September 30,
1998 they issued a letter appointing Alex Y. Tan as
President Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc. Tan, in turn,
appointed petitioner Omictin as the company’s
Operations Manager Ad Interim.
Citing as a reason the absence of a board resolution
authorizing the continued operations of Saag Phils.,
Inc., private respondent retained his possession of the
office equipment of the company in a fiduciary
capacity as director of the corporation pending its
dissolution and/or the resolution of the intra-
corporate dispute. He likewise changed the locks of
the offices of the company allegedly to prevent Tan
and petitioner from seizing company property.
Private respondent stressed that Tan’s appointment
was invalid because it was in derogation of the
company by-laws requiring that the president must be
chosen from among the directors, and elected by the
affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of
the board of directors.5 As Tan’s appointment did not
have the acquiescence of the board of directors,
petitioner’s appointment by the former is likewise
allegedly invalid. Thus, neither has the power or the
authority to represent or act for Saag Phils., Inc. in
any transaction or action before the SEC or any court
of justice.
The trial court, in an order dated September 8, 1999,
denied respondent’s motion to suspend proceedings
and motion to recuse.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the trial court in its order issued on October 29, 1999,
respondent filed with the CA the petition
for certiorari[6] assailing the aforesaid orders.
On June 30, 2000, the CA rendered its challenged
decision. The pertinent portion reads:
In a case for estafa, a valid demand made by an
offended party is one of the essential elements. It
appears from the records that the delay of delivery of
the motor vehicles by petitioner to Saag Corporation
is by reason of petitioner’s contention that the
demand made by Omictin and Atty. Tan to him to
return the subject vehicles is not a valid demand. As
earlier mentioned, petitioner filed a case with the
SEC questioning therein private respondents’
appointment.
If the SEC should rule that the dissolution of Saag
Phils. is proper, or that the appointments of private
respondents are invalid, the criminal case will
eventually be dismissed due to the absence of one of
the essential elements of the crime of estafa.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a prejudicial
question exists which calls for the suspension of the
criminal proceedings before the lower court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed
Order of September 8, 1999 and October 29, 1999,
are hereby MODIFIED. The motion to suspend
proceedings is hereby GRANTED and respondent
court is hereby enjoined from hearing Criminal Case
No. 99-633, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
George I. Lagos," until the termination of the case
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
denial of the motion to recuse is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
Incidentally, on January 18, 2001, the SEC case8 was
transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, pursuant to A.M.
No. 00-11-03-SC9 implementing the Securities and
Regulation Code (Republic Act No. 8799)10 enacted
on July 19, 2000, vesting in the RTCs jurisdiction
over intra-corporate disputes.11
Meanwhile, on March 5, 2001, the CA, addressing
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision, issued its assailed
resolution:
Considering that the petition for review on certiorari
of the 30 June 2000 decision of this Court, filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General before the
Supreme Court has already TERMINATED on
November 20, 2000 and a corresponding entry of
judgment has already been issued by the High Court,
that the same is final and executory, the private
respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the
decision 30 June 2000 before this Court is NOTED
for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this petition raises the following issues:
I more corporations are owned or controlled
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION -
A) WHEN IT DECREED THAT A PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION EXISTS IN THE SEC CASE FILED
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT AGAINST SAAG
(S) PTE. LTD., A FOREIGN CORPORATION,
ALTHOUGH THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IN
THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR ESTAFA (WHERE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE ACCUSED
THEREIN) IS ACTUALLY SAAG PHILIPPINES,
INC. A DOMESTIC CORPORATION WITH A
SEPARATE JURIDICAL PERSONALITY OF ITS
OWN AND WHICH IS NOT EVEN A PARTY IN
THE SEC CASE; AND,
B) WHEN IT ORDERED THE SUSPENSION OF
THE PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
99-633 AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II
THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS THE
ONLY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY IN THE PREMISES.
In support of the above, petitioner argues, as follows:
1. The action before the SEC and the
criminal case before the trial court do not
involve any prejudicial question.13 SEC
Case No. 01-99-6185 mainly involves the
dissolution of Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., the
appointment of a receiver, the distribution of
profits, and the authority of petitioner and
Tan to represent Saag Phils., Inc. The entity
which is being sued is Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., a
foreign corporation over which the SEC has
yet to acquire jurisdiction. Hence, any
decision that may be rendered in the SEC
case will neither be determinative of the
innocence or guilt of the accused nor bind
Saag Phils., Inc. because the same was not
made a party to the action even if the former
is its holding corporation;
2. Saag Phils., Inc. has a separate corporate
existence and is to be treated as a separate
entity from its holding or parent company,
Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. The mere fact that one or
by the same or single stockholder is not a
sufficient ground for disregarding separate
corporate personalities;
3. Private respondent’s petition with the
SEC seeks affirmative relief against Saag
(S) Pte. Ltd. for the enforcement or
application of the alleged terms of the joint
venture agreement (JVA) that he purportedly
entered into with the foreign corporation
while he was still its Area Sales Manager in
the Philippines. The foreign corporation is
not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, thus, a party to a contract with a
foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines without a license is not entitled
to relief from the latter; and
4. There is no pending civil or
administrative case in SEC against Saag
Phils., Inc. that warrants the application of a
prejudicial question and the consequent
suspension of the criminal action it has
instituted against private respondent. If any,
the action before the SEC was merely a ploy
to delay the resolution of the criminal case
and eventually frustrate the outcome of the
estafa case.
In sum, the main issue is whether or not a prejudicial
question exists to warrant the suspension of the
criminal proceedings pending the resolution of the
intra-corporate controversy that was originally filed
with the SEC.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises
in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein and the
cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.14 Here, the case which was lodged originally
before the SEC and which is now pending before the
RTC of Mandaluyong City by virtue of Republic Act
No. 8799 involves facts that are intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution is based.
Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the
intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or
innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa
filed against him by petitioner before the RTC of
Makati. As correctly stated by the CA, one of the
elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender:
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence
under subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315 are as
follows:
1. That money, goods, or other personal
property be received by the offender in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same;
2. That there be misrepresentation or
conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender.15
Logically, under the circumstances, since the alleged
offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the
demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests
upon the authority of the person making such a
demand on the company’s behalf. Private respondent
is challenging petitioner’s authority to act for Saag
Phils., Inc. in the corporate case pending before the
RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this
light, if the supposed authority of petitioner is found
to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made,
hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Moreover, the mere failure to return the thing
received for safekeeping or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver or to return the same or
deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give
rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime
of estafa. This is because the crime is committed by
misappropriating or converting money or goods
received by the offender under a lawful transaction.
As stated in the case of United States v. Bleibel:16
The crime of estafa is not committed by the failure to
return the things received for sale on commission, or
to deliver their value, but, as this class of crime is
defined by law, by misappropriating or converting the
money or goods received on commission. Delay in
the fulfillment of a commission or in the delivery of
the sum on such account received only involves civil
liability. So long as the money that a person is under
obligation to deliver is not demanded of him, and he
fails to deliver it for having wrongfully disposed of it,
there is no estafa, whatever be the cause of the debt.
Likewise, by analogy, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The issues
raised by petitioner particularly the status of Saag
Phils., Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the
question regarding the supposed authority of the
latter to make a demand on behalf of the company,
are proper subjects for the determination of the
tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which in this
case is the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These
issues would have been referred to the expertise of
the SEC in accordance with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction had the case not been transferred to the
RTC of Mandaluyong.
Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the
court.17 The court cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
resolving the same, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
special knowledge, experience and services in
determining technical and intricate matters of fact.18
While the above doctrine refers specifically to an
administrative tribunal, the Court believes that the
circumstances in the instant case do not proscribe the
application of the doctrine, as the role of an
administrative tribunal such as the SEC in
determining technical and intricate matters of special
competence has been taken on by specially
designated RTCs by virtue of Republic Act No.
8799.19 Hence, the RTC of Mandaluyong where the
intra-corporate case is pending has the primary
jurisdiction to determine the issues under contention
relating to the status of the domestic corporation,
Saag Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the
authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the
domestic corporation, the determination of which will
have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law
recognizes that, in place of the SEC, the regular
courts now have the legal competence to decide intra-
corporate disputes.20
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no
substantial basis in petitioner’s contention that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Absent a showing of
a despotic, whimsical and arbitrary exercise of power
by the CA, the petition must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 55834, dated June 30, 2000 and
March 5, 2001, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
FACTS:
Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own
the land and Petitioner through force, intimidation,
strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner
raised in his affirmative defense and as a ground for
dismissing the case that an administrative case is
pending before the Office of Land Authority between
the same parties and involving the same piece of
land.
In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right
of the Private Respondent over the property for
default in payments for the purchase of the lot.
Petitioner argue that the administrative case was
determinative of private respondents right to eject
petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial
question which bars a judicial action until after its
termination.
The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss
contained in the Petitioner’s affirmative defenses.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance.
Private Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing
there is no Prejudicial Question.
The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for
Leave to Intervene in the CFI praying that the
Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment
case be dismissed and the Office of the Land
Authority be allowed to decide the matter
exclusively.
The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue
involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior
possession and Motion to Intervene was denied for
lack of merit.
Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE PARTIES
INVOLVING THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF
THE EJECTMENT CASE CONSTITUTES A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHICH WOULD
OPERATE AS A BAR TO SAID EJECTMENT
CASE.
DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL
CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL COURT
OF MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY ORDERED
DISMISSED. No Costs.
Technically, No prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case
and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. (Zapata v. Montessa 4 SCRA 510 (1962); Pp
v. Aragon, 500 G. No. 10, 4863) The Doctrine of
Prejudicial Question comes into play generally in a
situation where civil and criminal actions are pending
and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so
closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively
resolved in the civil case before the criminal action
can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial
question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case
to cause the suspension of the latter pending final
determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as
provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court are:
the Civil Action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal action
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
However because of intimate correlation of the two
proceedings and the possibility of the Land
Authority in deciding in favor of Petitioner which
will terminate or suspend Private Respondents Right
to Eject Petitioner, the SC gave the lower court and
advise. This advise became the which became the
basis for deciding the case.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more
prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to
hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after
a determination of the administrative case. Indeed,
logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence dictate
such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial
notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner’s right of
possession being upheld in the pending
administrative case is to needlessly require not only
the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort
and money in what may turn out to be a sheer
exercise of futility. Thus, 1 AM Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in
another court, especially where the parties and the
issues are the same, for there is power inherent in
every court to control the disposition of cases on its
dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to
the second action cannot be properly determined until
the questions raised in the first action are settled the
second action should be stayed. (at page 622)
While the rule is properly applicable for instances
involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the
instant case of the same consideration of identity of
parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the
court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need
to resolve the parties right of possession before the
ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies
the rule’s analogous application to the case at bar.
Fortich-Celdran, et al vs. Caldran, et al, 19 SCRA
502, provides another analogous situation. In
sustaining the assailed order of the then CFI of
Misamis Oriental ordering the suspension of the
criminal case for falsification of public document
against several persons, among them the subscribing
officer Santiago Catane until the civil case involving
the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged
document shall have been decided, this Court cited as
a reason therefor its own action on administrative
charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:
It should be mentioned here also that an
administrative case filed in this Court against
Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by
Us in Abeyance, thus:
“As it appears that the genuineness of the document
allegedly forged by respondent attorneys in
Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran
vs. Santiago Catane, etc, et al.) is necessarily
involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu CFI,
action on the herein complaint is withheld until that
litigation has finally been decided. Complainant
Celdran shall inform the Court about such
decision.”(SC minute resolution April 27, 1962 in
Adm Case No. 77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs.
Santiago Catane, etc. et. al)
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the
nature of a prejudicial question to an administrative
case. We see no reason why the reverse may both be
so considered in the proper case, such as in the
petition at bar.
The SC even noted the Wisdom of Its advice.
Finally, events occurring during the pendency of the
petition attest to the wisdom of the conclusion herein
reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel for
petitioner, it was stated that he intervenor Land
Authority which later became the Department of
Agrarian REform had promulgated a decision in the
administrative case affirming the cancellation of
Agreement to Sell issued in favor of the private
respondent. Wit this development, the folly of
allowing the ejectment case to proceed is too evident
to need further elaboration.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D.
BOBIS digest
FACTS:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first
marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without
said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second
marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on
January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with
a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners
complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was
filed against respondent. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on
the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license.
ISSUE: Whether the subsequent filing of a civil
action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy.
RULING: No. He who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not
be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for
concubinage, it was held that the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by
analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence
of a marriage.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the
first marriage before the second marriage was
contracted rests upon the defense, but that is a matter
that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In
the meantime, it should be stressed that not every
defense raised in the civil action may be used as a
prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the
criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in
suspending the criminal case for bigamy.
Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy,
the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies
appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued
by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent
merely resorted to the civil action as a potential
prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or
delaying his criminal prosecution.
RULE 108; CASE #8
FUJIKI VS. MARINAY case digest
GR No. 196049
June 26, 2013
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
 Fujiki was a Japanese national who married
respondent in the Philippines.
 The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
 Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara.
Without the 1st marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
 Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they
were able to reestablish their relationship.
 Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy.
 Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
“Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).” Fujiki prayed (among others)
for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay
and Maekara and to endorse such annotation
to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).
 The RTC dismissed the petition. It based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-
 11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."
Apparently, the RTC took the view that only
"the husband or the wife," in this case either
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
 Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding,
which "seeks to establish a status, a right or
a particular fact," and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong."
 Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)
of the Rules of Court is applicable. Section 2
of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments
of annulments of marriage" and "judgments
declaring marriages void from the
beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction. The petition in the RTC sought
(among others) to annotate the judgment of
the Japanese Family Court on the certificate
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(2) W/N the RTC can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
(1) YES. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment
only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which
the State has an interest in recording.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any
person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality
to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
(2) YES. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not
an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law.
The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can
R.A. No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) define
the jurisdiction of the foreign court.