1. G.R. No.
193960 January 7, 2013 The Court’s Ruling
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE
MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF
THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA);
AND ABC,1 Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a
provision that would render it toothless in the pursuit of the
declared policy of the State to protect women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the Orders dated September 13, 2010 2 and October
5, 20103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City,
Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied
petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA
9262 before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59, in an
Information which states:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of
Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence on
the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s
back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and
degrading the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a
human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act
9262.4
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found
probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest
against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a
cash bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010,
filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that
at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was
no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent;
hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her
relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject
incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought
payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the
latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he
was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he
admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner
causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged
in the Information.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It did not consider
material the fact that the parties’ dating relationship had
ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the
parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction
of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence
against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of
RA 9262.
Issues
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1)
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense; 2) whether
RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the
accused; and 3) whether the Information alleging a fact
contrary to what has been admitted should be quashed.
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical
injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262
because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship.
Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls
under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence
against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who
is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting
qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as
a crime of violence against women through physical harm,
namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and
the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom
he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he
has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in
physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court enumerated the
elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another,
commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to her.6
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA
9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in
the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the
rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the
punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is
sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of
such relationship between the offender and the victim when
the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court
cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence
to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due
to the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of
petitioner using the rule of lenity 7 because there is no
ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any
construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA
9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the
same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher
penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to
purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders
whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they
have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their
children with the end in view of promoting the protection of
women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the
necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating
relationship between the petitioner and the private
respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner;
and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the
offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said
law which reads:

SEC. 7. Venue – The Regional Trial Court designated as a

Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of violence against women and their children
under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in
the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its
elements was committed at the option of the complainant.

Finally, the Court finds the Order 9 of the RTC, giving the
prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend the Information
to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the
petitioner and the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4
of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the

motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment,
the court shall order that an amendment be made.1âwphi1

Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court

provides that an information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused
petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in
denying the motion to quash the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated

September 13, 2010 and October 5, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case
No. 09-5210 are AF.FI RM ED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed
to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-
5210.

SO ORDERED.
 2. G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY
ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-
Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA,
for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-
ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines
boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus
Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives
as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave
himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the
pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence
comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence
and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed
by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and
live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited
advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
(VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e,
husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a
common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from
the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of
further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and
responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers,
prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government officials in responding
to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation
of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private
respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance
of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband,
Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She
claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation
of custody of her children and of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was
34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior.
They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17
years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom
private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years
old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful
wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other
hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is
dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from
his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray,
and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took
up law, and even when she was already working part time at
a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed
upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the
fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men,
at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing
her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair
with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is
the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the
affair when private respondent confronted him about it in
2004. He even boasted to the household help about his
sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told
private respondent, though, that he was just using the
woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In
one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent
on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding.
Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann,
who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and
whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the
chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent
decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay
for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up.
Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's
sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up,
he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private
respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private
respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005,
while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist.
She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner
simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days
in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week
and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of
Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the
bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing
the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private
respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told
private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the
family home, that private respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his
paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner
but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and
deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously
warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she
would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the
construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he
and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to
the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations,
private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of
₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than
₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by
the same corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of
₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade
her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the
businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby
depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has
not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses
the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against the private respondent and her
children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on
March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted
hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings
from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining
Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed
by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this
order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house
is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc.
(Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private
respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling
without any danger from the Respondent.
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are
given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the
Starex Van which they are using in Negros
Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and
occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued
use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever
they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond
to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner
provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus
rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) per month until the matter of support
could be finally resolved.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an
conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things,
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the
the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice
when re-entering the family home.
rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked
that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner private respondent and returning the same to its rightful
police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a
take her children from her when he arrives from more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
Manila and finds out about this suit.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
mother and all her household help and driver from a children.
distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the
gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet
temporarily residing.
again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed
for by private respondent:
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or
otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the
or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact
clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and
directly or indirectly her children, mother and
her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the
and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel,
subject of a modified TPO in the future.
otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM

caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the
Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives
Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel
all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also
be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in
his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and
the children, including rental of a house for them,
and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits,
bonuses and other cash he received from all the
corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March
2006, which himself and as President of the
corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the
Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an
accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the
court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the
Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of
Indirect Contempt of Court.
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of
furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the
Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove
Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight
(8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until
48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the
petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an
inventory of the household furniture, equipment and
other things in the conjugal home, which shall be
submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00
and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for
clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
indirect contempt of Court;

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and
granting support pendente lite, and considering the all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within
financial resources of the Respondent and his threat 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single Order by his counsel;
centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a
BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational
MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
expenses of the children upon presentation of proof
of payment of such expenses.23
On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private
respondent, the trial court issued an amended
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included
support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and
the following additional provisions:
committed new acts of harassment against her and their
children, private respondent filed another application 24 for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by
J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no
longer president, with the end in view of recovering the
Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and
the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long
firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and
Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to
school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go
back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly
grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann
subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for
violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the
filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a
complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed
with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's
belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's
(Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent
filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for
thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, acts of
violence against the offended party;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or
those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua
Garcia only and those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially
the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other
properties which are conjugal assets or those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2,"
including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325
and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod
City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this
TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered
not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or
disposition of these above-cited properties to any
person, entity or corporation without the personal
presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall
affix her signature in the presence of the Register of
Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her
signature will be forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud
her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court
extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and
gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show
cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or
modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he
has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its
Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a
copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day
earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO
dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder:
xxxx

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be
contacting or otherwise communicating in any form finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on
with the offended party, either directly or indirectly; August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty
(30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the
Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie
J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva After having received a copy of the foregoing Order,
Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing
security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's that it would only be an "exercise in futility." 33
other household helpers from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the Proceedings before the CA
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily
residing, as well as from the schools of the three
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed
children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not
before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for prohibition
contact the schools of the children directly or
(CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the
for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
will have access to the children through the schools
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity
and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an
unwanted product of an invalid law."
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .
9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day
Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental thereto.
for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006;
and support in arrears from March 2006 to August
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate
2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise
the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006- in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
Php25,000.00;
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan annul the protection orders issued by the trial court
Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with constituted a collateral attack on said law.
Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to
deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to
provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the
one taken by J Bros Tading;
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision
having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14,
2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN
NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO
PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner
against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle
the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the
petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by
petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that
the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
"inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality." 41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are
special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act
of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women
and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional
Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key
cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first
mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined
under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a
Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of violence against women and their children
under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in
the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its
elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of
Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of
general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. 44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute, 45 "this authority being embraced
in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their
conformity to the fundamental law." 46The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA 48 that,
"plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of
any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to
the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file
an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any
cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner
that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of
constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief
which a defending party may have against an opposing
party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one
party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein. 51Finally, a third-party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim. 52As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a
statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the
resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very
statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner
who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262
is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-
issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in
nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the
same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not
need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may,
Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others,
viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court
determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an
order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that
have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to
present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both
parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent
possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity
of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis
supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to
the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or
renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each
time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify
the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may
be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the
private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could
proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption
of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly
dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB -
SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an
honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he
could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j)
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a
petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-
day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the
case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and
summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari
before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a
judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid
only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional
or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same
enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 58 the Supreme Court of
the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in
their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course,
even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in
good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity
which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo
until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears
stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex
parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will
defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk
from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time
and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of
constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of
private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant
Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent
and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well
be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone
is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the
remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the
sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as
Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called
a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two
measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the
"Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act" 63 –
providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in
isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to
women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be
denied protection under the same measure. We quote
pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.
President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns
and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include
domestic violence apart from against women as well as other
members of the household, including children or the husband,
they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address
domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the
victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female
partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on
record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of
observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of
women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this
domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused
by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the
family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective
measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in,
common-law wives, and those related with the family. 65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the
discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families
which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding
that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather
than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator
Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of
the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that
there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the
domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless
women who have not had the opportunity to file a case
against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not
decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to
include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by
the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the
already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations,
concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will
agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is
an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where
the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger,
more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the
committee came up with this bill because the family members
have been included in this proposed measure since the other
members of the family other than women are also possible
victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended
victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on
women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases,
men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost
always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that
there may not be enough protection extended to other family
members particularly children who are excluded. Although
Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses
the special needs of abused children. The same law is
inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said
law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about
granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may
use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women.
However, we should also recognize that there are established
procedures and standards in our courts which give credence
to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and
whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family
relations and to protect the family as the basic social
institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations
between men and women in our society, I believe we have an
obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both
husband and wife and their immediate family members,
particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to
include other family members as a critical input arrived at
after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs,
experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr.
President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the
other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on
the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is
recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men
and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on
women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am
not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not
because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an
amendment to the amendment rather than object to the
amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the
amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the
amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the
rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may
maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At
saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan.
Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the
children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very
much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors.
The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I
have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children,
this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and
hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we
remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority
Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women
AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, the amendment, as amended, is
approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare
not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the
members of Congress in limiting the protection against
violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children
only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice
and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The
choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the
remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom
and expediency of any law. 68 We only step in when there is a
violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently
shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of
the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
(Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we
find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men;
the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of
true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to
be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between
women and men otherwise known as "gender-based
violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to
think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on
dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in
society. This perception leads to men gaining more power
over women. With power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
controlling women to retain power. 71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a
human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between
men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention
of the full advancement of women, and that violence against
women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which
women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with
men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and
social context of gender-based violence and developments in
advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during
the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules
last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are
quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of
violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members of the family
under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in
patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen
in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically
and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women
whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of
men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to
beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property
right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions
oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control
over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted
in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one
and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s
and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed
husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker
than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of
these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment
ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given
more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United
States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the
Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to
strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his
wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife
with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or
kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities,
is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is
entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband
can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement
became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it.
These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils
of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they
demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands'
other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723,
joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation official statistics on violence against women and children
movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, show that –
to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist
movement was on the roll.
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at
5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381
domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%.
transforming the issue into an important public concern. No xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted: and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417
physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608
cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female
two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and
male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
the past year. The [American Medical Association] views
husbands and live-in partners.73
these figures as "marked underestimates," because the
nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting
them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented
those who do not speak English well, and women who are comparative statistics on violence against women across an
homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW
violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
probably double the above estimates; or four million severely
assaulted women per year."
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against
Women, 2004 - 2011*
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third
of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-
partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the
United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual
assault... In families where wife beating takes place,
moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical
violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of 38 46 26 22 28 27 19
women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers,

perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many 194 148 185 147 204 167 268
abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return
to their husbands, in large part because they have no other
source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be
dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics
580 536 382 358 445 485 745
disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United
States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality 53 37 38 46 18 54 83

was no less successful. The United States Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality
of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly
adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993,
the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on 319 223 199 182 220 208 374
the role and rights of women have been regularly held in
Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself
established a Commission on the Status of Women.
62 19 29 30 19 19 25

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full –
steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section
121 102 93 109 109 99 158
14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention 17 11 16 24 34 152 190
on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all,
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262,
entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes."
(Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

90 50 59 59 83 703 183

victims of violence.

6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,10

*2011 report covers only from January to August relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and
accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of
absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children
betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender
Protection Center (WCPC)
sensitivity.

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps,
women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the
because many men will not even attempt to report the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or
situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
correcting discrimination through specific measures focused
ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or
on women does not discriminate against men. 82Petitioner's
more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and
men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and
that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men"
women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4
law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the
or more incidents of domestic violence. 75Statistics in Canada
CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less
measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of
likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a
men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that
woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of
"(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic
many years of physical or emotional abuse.76
violence from a private affair to a public offense will require
the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and police, the prosecution and the judges."85
abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same
cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance

requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather
and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged
by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways,
streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged
as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its
application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing
animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but
similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the
reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals
that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be
negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional,
compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community." 77 The mere fact that
the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is
not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not
thereby rendered invalid.78
The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the
State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of
the Child and other international human rights instruments of
which the Philippines is a party.

C. Gender bias and prejudices In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW,
which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial,
ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This
and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was
women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take all
argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a
on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines
valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the
its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and
widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized
their respective protocols.
historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic
violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at
the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79 III. The classification is not limited to existing

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence
occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be
women and their children are threatened by violence and
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved
abuse.
by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who
suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and
as:
biases against our women.

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against
the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A.
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It
includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is
not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's
body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing
the woman or her child to do indecent acts
and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife
and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room
with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the
victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing
or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim
such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or
psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business
or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of
financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community
or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or
properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the
aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts
described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what
constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent
action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts
enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct
is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in
its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like
"depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of
a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common
money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing
mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make
every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have
stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld –
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262
singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related
or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed
by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-
Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in
the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due
process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts
of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk
of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to
prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in
writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur. 100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but
also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged
as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of
her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests,103among which is protection
of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte,
the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given
to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within
five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order
that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on
the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless
order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon
the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the
petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself
shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his
side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened" is a mere product of an overactive
imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006.
Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26,
2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why
the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose
not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be
an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period
(30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued
renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor.
Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to
complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the
respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the
victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a
"blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her
conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any
stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The
protection order shall include any, some or all of the following
reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the
residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of
the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the offended party, or permanently where no property rights
are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement
agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain
there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort
him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from
private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such
removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no
property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for
herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill
arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling,
the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to
"protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall
not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The
reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic
and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring
parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for
protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not
a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties
mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because
the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with
the person against whom the protection order has been
sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise
of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon
the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be
established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of
power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. 111 The
pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue
and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5
(a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who
receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection
order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO,
the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall
be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or
Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same
on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its
personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in
any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO

issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by
any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman
or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong
Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of
his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all
laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the
barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required

by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect
private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains

through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the
Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would
necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with
the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that

since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies
are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and
abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain
objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are
nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided,

an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt
in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant
case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an
act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of
the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is
ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and
for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history

of the women's movement against domestic violence shows
that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against
the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not
again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality
but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
 3. G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of
violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the
girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face
on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang
(Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler,
Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an
information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria
Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless
conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS)
using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish
Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the
latter was attached to a completely naked body of another
woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who
is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture
thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological
distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish
Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at
Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish
and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end
of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken
a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with
Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that
he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish
rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his
responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish
changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow
managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan
used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages,
namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to
his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through
multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed
on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number,
stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the
picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in
Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for
him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text
messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my
chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng
chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who
referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan
to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria
Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it,
he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers
intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized
his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he
shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of
Technology, testified as an expert in information technology
and computer graphics. He said that it was very much
possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and
superimpose it on the body of another woman in another
picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by
computer to make it appear that the face and the body
belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had
two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to
the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the
picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the
picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how
this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to
a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began
visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted
until December of that year. He claimed that after their
relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in
December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at
that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked
out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking
him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in
selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police
officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the
contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because
Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was
sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s
number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person.
Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the
prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone.
This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared
to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims
that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit
A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he
identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was
sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she
received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8)
that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She
did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in
the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear
naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in
Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she
was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7,
the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely
credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The
RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience,
prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible
expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she
suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of
the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility
of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and
experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the
RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter
rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the
RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus,
Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused
Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her
face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between
Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending
of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation
of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was
obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the
obscene picture presented in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against
women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman
with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence
against women and these include any form of harassment
that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. –
The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman
or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the
elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an
act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution
needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating
relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating
relationship" includes a situation where the parties are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis
during the course of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the
parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved,"
implies that the offender and the offended woman have or
had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a
sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary
Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make
love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions
the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did
not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended
woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a
couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women
x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while
Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a
single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child." The dating relationship that the law
contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish
and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their
romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time
and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were
romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October
to December of 2003. That would be time enough for
nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is
a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that
the romantic relation between the two should be deemed
broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining
what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when
she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry
at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-
month romantic relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive
picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He
claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a
very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262
punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence
against women. This means that a single act of harassment,
which translates into violence, would be enough. The object
of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated
ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to
obscene communications that her getting one could not
possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial
emotional or psychological distress. He claims having
previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that
she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife
give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that
it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits
2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since
her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other
pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her
testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not
know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she
deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not
have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had
deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had
no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There
would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that
some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for
her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she
was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish.
Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her
testimony.1avvphi1
to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it
was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present
criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only
to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved
each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated
January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish

experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged
moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and
injurious to an offended woman can of course only be
determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here,
the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and
bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture
and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any
woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would
be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a
picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish
testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the
internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain

items were seized from him without any warrant, the
evidence presented against him should be deemed
inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not
present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that
the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest.
The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case.
Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting
the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which
cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial
conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him

consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene
picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had
been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police
used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess
Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not
have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to
prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text

messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself
received those messages from an unidentified person who
was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to
her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the
cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the
messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not
give credence to such version and neither will this Court.
Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on
Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish

through a text message constitutes an electronic document.
Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic
signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility

of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this
Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected
 4. G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor
child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
(RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People
of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at
the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16)
years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home
to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in
Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a
letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a
complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2)
of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his
minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his
counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted
her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and
raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more
or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue
to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a
fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due
him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO
LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu
issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without
the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged;
and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein
assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and
ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration
thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their
child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to
do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally
applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to
support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s
nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an
Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash
of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that
since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our
national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty
and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he
cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged
failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively
established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to
give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound
by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such
support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no
prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the
case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising
the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking
cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the
same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent
with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling
of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the
Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the
parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case
only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter
situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when
they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In
Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of
appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary
appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for
review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by
a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the
[Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA
on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme
Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and
the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve
questions of law – the response thereto concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or
not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition
highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a
foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation
to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual
milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive
ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a
guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the
instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only
waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in
the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in
the administration of justice should prevail over the
observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the
petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with
petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation
to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which
provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce
decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family
Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no
sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as
well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the
Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any
financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner
cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen,
since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle
of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy,
the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights
and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls
under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a
citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-
Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do
so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to
invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for
that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties
are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation
to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country
(cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before,
during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because
Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of
the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces
the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held
that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the
nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not
completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son
after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on
petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the
aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his
child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by
respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that
the national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is
not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and
SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law
on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-
Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary
to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said
foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is
the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the
splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
pertinent
— In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when
its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens
or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself,
respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court
ruled that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform
her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that
respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support
to petitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her
child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has
the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting
to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall
include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with
the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's
or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the
woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered anact of violence
against women and children.
the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14
of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it
is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent
in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are
residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts
have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that
granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the
criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262,
which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections
5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling
under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2)
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which
started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly,
the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has
provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the
truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby
remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu
which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated
February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
same court to conduct further proceedings based on the
merits of the case.
5. CHERRYL B. DOLINA, petitioner, vs. GLENN D. VALLE-
CERA, respondent.
G.R. No. 182367.  December 15, 2010
Support; Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act
(R.A. No. 9262); The petitioner evidently filed the wrong
action to obtain support for her child—the object of R.A. 9262
under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of
women and children who are victims of abuse or violence.—
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for
her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the
case is the protection and safety of women and children who
are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a
protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and
to legal support. Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had
been abusing her and her child. But it became apparent to the
RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary
to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with
Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was
to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim
being that he is the father. He of course vigorously denied
this.
Same; To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in
proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the
same is not admitted or acknowledged; Illegitimate children
are entitled to support and successional rights but their
filiation must be duly proved.—To be entitled to legal support,
petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of
the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since
Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim
that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not
entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until
Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The child’s
remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional
rights but their filiation must be duly proved.
Same; While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the
child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as
aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause
to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate
family.—While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the
child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as
aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause
to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate
family. Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a
hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth.
This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of
an unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for
the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought
against the supposed father.
The Facts and the Case
In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order
against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-07 1 for
alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.)
9262.2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-forma complaint,
Dolina added ahandwritten prayer for financial support 3 from
Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on
the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as
the child’s father. The petition also asked the RTC to order
Philippine Airlines, Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his
pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s
petition was essentially one for financial support rather than
for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was
not the child’s father; that the signature appearing on the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a
harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the
child as his and give it financial support; and that Vallecera
has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering
unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.
On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after
hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing the
filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support
as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support.
Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it
in its April 4, 2008 Order, 5 with an admonition that she first
file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a
prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present
petition for review directly with this Court.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the
RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary
protection and denied her application for temporary support
for her child.
The Court’s Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for
her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the
case is the protection and safety of women and children who
are victims of abuse or violence. (Go-Tan v. Tan, G.R. No.
168852, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 231, 238.)
Although the issuance of a protection order against the
respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support
for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled
to a protection order and to legal support.
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her
and her child. But it became apparent to the RTC upon
hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her
claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it
turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial
support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is
the father. He of course vigorously denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is
Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall
have proved his relation to him. 7 The child’s remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question,
support follows as matter of obligation. 9 In short, illegitimate
children are entitled to support and successional rights but
their filiation must be duly proved.10
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to
establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she
may directly file an action for support, where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. 11
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have
dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any
judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolina’s
child since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence
committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and
whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this
matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina failed to
raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to the
conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is
to obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in
cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of
the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the
privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate
family.12Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a
hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth.
This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS

the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City’s Order dated March
13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action
in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying
her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.
6. RALPH P. TUA, petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR A.
MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-
TUA, respondents.
G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.*
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004
(R.A. No. 9262); Protection Orders; Words and
Phrases; A protection order is an order issued to
prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and
to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their
life.—In Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 (2013) wherein
petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we
struck down the challenge and held: A protection order is
an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against
women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The
scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure
that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim.
This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to
prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004
(R.A. No. 9262); Protection Orders; Barangay
Protection Order (BPO); The issuance of a BPO by the
Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to
the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause
the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of
the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,”
and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”—As to
the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay,
Section 14 pertinently provides: SEC. 14. Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.—
BarangayProtection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5
(a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of
the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by
the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall
be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy
of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official
to effect its personal service. The parties may be
accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding
before the Punong Barangay. Hence, the issuance of a BPO by
the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator
to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,”
and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”
Same; Same; Temporary Protection Orders; The
court is authorized to issue a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) on the date of the filing of the application
after ex parte determination that there is basis for the
issuance thereof.—Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a
Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) on the date of the filing of
the application after ex parte determination that there is basis
for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent
need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the
issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion,
based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to
determine that the violent acts against women and their
children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
to annul the Decision1dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939.
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua
(respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition 2 for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and
Jezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection order,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her
husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent
claimed that she and her children had suffered from
petitioner’s abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to
cause her and the children physical harm for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually
deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and,
that she was threatened to be deprived of her and her
children’s financial support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10,
1998 in Makati City. They have three children, namely,
Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois,
born on June 27, 2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on
December 25, 2001. In her Affidavit 3 attached to the petition,
respondent claimed, among others, that: there was a time
when petitioner went to her room and cocked his gun and
pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to
convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case
she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared; there
was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the
fried chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and
spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner
would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that
she felt unsafe and insecure with the latter’s presence and
asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he wanted
or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner got
furious and threatened her of withholding his financial support
and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on
the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work,
petitioner with companions went to her new home and
forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to
her.
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO),4which we quote in full:
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise
known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004, a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) effective for thirty (30) days from date of
receipt is hereby issued against respondent Ralph P.
Tua.
For the purpose of the implementation of the
Temporary Protection Order, the respondent (herein
petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered to:
1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to
commit personally or through another,
physical, verbal and emotional harm or abuse
against the herein petitioner (respondent) and
other family and household members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting,
telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner
(respondent) whether directly or indirectly or
engaged in any psychological form of
harassment;
3. Stay away from the petitioner
(respondent) and other family and household
members at a distance of 100 meters radius
from the place of residence of the plaintiff and
likewise to stay away from the residence,
school, place of employment and other places
frequented by the herein petitioner
(respondent), and other family and household
members.
 4. Give and deliver the three (3) minor
children of the petitioner (respondent) to the
[latter] who shall have their temporary custody
pending the determination of whether or not a
permanent protection order shall issue.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY
LAW.
The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or
any Officers of the Law are hereby commanded to
effect this Order immediately and to use necessary
force and measures under the law to implement this
Order.
Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be
set on June 9, 2005 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.5
In his Comment6 to respondent’s Petition with Urgent
Motion to Lift TPO, petitioner denied respondent’s allegations
and alleged, among others, that he had been maintaining a
separate abode from petitioner since November 2004; that it
was respondent who verbally abused and threatened him
whenever their children’s stay with him was extended; that
respondent had been staying with a certain Rebendor Zuñiga
despite the impropriety and moral implications of such set-
up; that despite their written agreement that their minor
children should stay in their conjugal home, the latter violated
the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their
conjugal dwelling with their minor children and stayed with
said Zuñiga; and, that respondent is mentally,
psychologically, spiritually and morally unfit to keep the
children in her custody. Petitioner contended that the
issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for
being violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the
petition and motion to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction and hold departure order assailing the
May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC.
On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the
petition moot and to avoid grave and irreparable injury,
issued a temporary restraining order to temporarily enjoin the
parties and their agents from enforcing the assailed May 23,
2005 TPO issued in Civil Case No. 0464-05.
7
Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Manifestation, 8 praying
that the enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued by
the RTC and all the proceedings therein be restrained. A
hearing9 was, subsequently, conducted on the motion.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises,
the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the assailed Temporary Protection
Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case
No. 0464-05 is UPHELD.10
In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by
respondent under RA 9262 is still pending before the RTC;
thus, the factual matters raised therein could not be passed
upon in the petition for certiorari filed with it. The CA noted
that during the pendency of the herein proceedings, petitioner
filed an urgent motion to quash warrant issued by the RTC
and which matter could not also be a subject of this petition
which assails the TPO dated May 23, 2005 and that the
motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC.
The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was
validly issued by the RTC and found no grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance thereof as the same were in
complete accord with the provision of RA 9262.
As to petitioner’s argument that there was no basis for
the issuance of the TPO, considering that the provision
authorizing such issuance is unconstitutional, the CA ruled
that since the matter raised herein was the RTC’s alleged
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO, such matter
could be resolved without having to rule on the
constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions. And that the
requisites that the constitutionality of the law in question be
the very lis mota of the case was absent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the
following issues:
I accord the victim and any designated family or
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE
RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING AND
FINDING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER ISSUED THE
TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO) DATED 23
MAY 2005 WITHOUT OBSERVING DUE PROCESS OF
LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING
TO RULE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN
A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT
CONTRARY TO ITS FINDINGS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SAID LAW IS THE LIS
MOTA OF THE CASE.11
_______________
11 Id., at p. 25.
437
Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in
not deciding the issue of the constitutionality of RA 9262, the
issue presented is the very lis mota in the instant case.
The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by
petitioner in his Comment to respondent’s Petition with
Urgent Motion to Lift TPO dated May 23, 2005 filed with the
RTC. However, without awaiting for the resolution of the
same, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause
of the Constitution. Contrary to the CA’s finding that the
matter raised in the petition filed with it was the RTC’s alleged
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO which could be
resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA
9262 and its provisions, we find that since petitioner is
assailing the validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent’s right to
a protection order is based upon, the constitutionality of the
said law must first be decided upon. After all, the alleged
unconstitutionality of RA 9262 is, for all intents and purposes,
a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection
order.12Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit to
declare RA 9262 unconstitutional.
Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on
Section 15 of RA 9262 contending that had there been no ex
parteissuance of the TPO, he would have been afforded due
process of law and had properly presented his side on the
matter; that the questioned provision simply encourages
arbitrary enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights
which affects his life, liberty and property.
We are not impressed.
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders.—
Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the
protection order issued by the court on the date of
filing of the application after ex parte determination
that such order should be issued. A court may grant in
a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this
Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The
court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a
[Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the
date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order
the immediate personal service of the TPO on the
respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the
assistance of law enforcement agents for the service.
The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing
on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon,13wherein petitioner therein argued
that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and
held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent
further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to
grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their
life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is
broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access
by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to
household member safety in the family residence, and
to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that
jeopardize the employment and support of the victim.
 It also enables the court to award temporary custody
of minor children to protect the children from violence,
to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to
ensure their financial support.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in
writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but
also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged
as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of
her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of
women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte,
the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given
to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within
five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order
that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on
the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless
order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon
the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the
petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself
shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his
side. x x x. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.14
Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of
legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to
issue protection orders.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
“the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of
the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the
legislature.15 The act of Congress entrusting us with the
issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority
to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. 16
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong
Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May
Issue and How.—Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to
the protection order issued by the Punong Barangayordering
the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section
5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of
the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by
the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall
be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parteBPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy
of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official
to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in
any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in
his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening
to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function
of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature,
in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
“enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public
order in the barangay.”17
Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO dated
May 23, 2005 as the petition was bereft of any indication of
grounds for the issuance of the same. Petitioner claims that
while the issuance of the TPO is ex parte, there must be a
judicial determination of the basis thereof. He contends that
the allegations in respondent’s affidavit attached to the
petition, and without admitting the same to be true, are
nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a
husband and wife which are not grave or imminent enough to
merit the issuance of a TPO.
We are not persuaded.
We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference,
thus:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders.—
Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the
protection order issued by the court on the date of
filing of the application after ex parte determination
that such order should be issued. A court may grant in
a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this
Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The
court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a
PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the
TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court
sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law
enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall
include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits
of the issuance of a PPO.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of
the filing of the application after ex parte determination that
there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that
the respondent need not be notified or be present in the
hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the
court’s discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit
attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against
women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been
committed.
And Section 5 of the same law provides:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.—The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or
her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm;
 (c) Attempting to cause the woman or her
child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of
imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the
woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist
from or desist from conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman’s or her child’s freedom of movement
or conduct by force or threat of force, physical
or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, but not
limited to, the following acts committed with
the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman’s or her child’s
movement or conduct:
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We find that
the CA did not err when it found no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be
presented during the hearing on the merits on the issuance of
the Permanent Protection Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R.
SP No. 89939, upholding the Regional Trial Court’s issuance
of the Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2005,
is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite is
hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch respondent’s
Petition for a Permanent Protection Order.

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman

SO ORDERED.
or her child of custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman’s children insufficient
financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the
victim’s own money or properties, or solely controlling the
conjugal or common money, or properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical

harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling
her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman
or her child to engage in any sexual activity
which does not constitute rape, by force or
threat of force, physical harm, or through
intimidation directed against the woman or her
child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or
reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not
be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or

private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence
of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property
of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or
inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child;
and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish,

public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of minor
children of access to the woman’s
child/children.

In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e.,

he cocked the gun and pointed the same to his head in order
to convince respondent not to proceed with the legal
separation case; feeding his other children with the food
which another child spat out; and threatening the crying child
with a belt to stop him from crying which was repeatedly
done; and holding respondent by her nape when he got
furious that she was asking him not to come often to their
conjugal home and hold office thereat after their agreed
separation and threatening her of withholding half of the
financial support for the kids, while not conclusive, are
enough bases for the issuance of a TPO. Petitioner’s actions
would fall under the enumeration of Section 5, more
particularly, paragraphs a, d, e (2), f, h, and i.

It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion

when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic

7. G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center
(AFPFC), Petitioner,
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 which seeks to nullify and set aside the
Decision1 dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution 2 dated
March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station
in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN. The CA affirmed the orders
and decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 22 granting temporary and permanent
protection orders, and denying the motion to lift the said
temporary protection order (TPO).
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance
of protection order under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband,
S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006.
Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003.
The couple did not have any child but respondent has a
daughter with her previous live-in partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:
Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection
Order to be sufficient in form and substance and to prevent
great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, a TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER is forthwith issued to respondent,
S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON directing him to do the following
acts:
1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to
commit or committing further acts of physical abuse
and violence against the petitioner;
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters
from petitioner, her residence or her place of work;
3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating,
contacting or communicating with petitioner; 4.
Respondent is prohibited from using or possessing
any firearm or deadly weapon on occasions not
related to his job;
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to
the petitioner.
The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through
the Chairman in the area where the petitioner and respondent
live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and Bobuntogan,
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any
request for assistance from the petitioner for the
implementation of this order. They are also directed to
accompany the petitioner to their conjugal abode at Purok 2,
Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her personal
belongings in order to insure the safety of the petitioner.
The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately
serve the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) upon the
respondent personally and to seek and obtain the assistance
of law enforcement agents, if needed, for purposes of
effecting the smooth implementation of this order.
In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served
upon the respondent for him to file an OPPOSITION within a
period of five (5) days from receipt hereof and let a
Preliminary Conference and hearing on the merits be set on
October 17, 2006 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of
respondent’s retirement and other benefits, the following
agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any
retirement, pension and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT.
CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag,
Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance
Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp
Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St.,
Cagayan de Oro City.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE
DATE OF THE PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING ON
THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT
PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE
OR POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND
HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE
RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID
HEARING.
IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS
DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT SHALL ALLOW EX-
PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER
AND RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS
AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION OF THE
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the
TPO, appeared during the scheduled pre-trial but informed
the court that he did not yet have a counsel and requested for
time to hire his own counsel. However, he did not hire a
counsel nor file an opposition or answer to the petition.
Because of his failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of
the case, the RTC allowed the ex-parte presentation of
evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that
S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused to give her spousal support
as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of
livelihood since he had told her to resign from her job and
concentrate on keeping their house), the RTC issued another
order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal
support in the amount of ₱4,000.00 per month and fifty
percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be
automatically deducted and given directly to respondent. 5
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon
never complied with the TPO as he continued making threats
and inflicting physical abuse on her person, and failed to give
her spousal support as ordered by the court.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,6 as follows:
After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in
this case, this court finds that there is a need to permanently
protect the applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from further acts of
violence that might be committed by respondent against her.
Evidences showed that respondent who was a member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at the Headquarters
4ID Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City had been
repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal, emotional and economic
abuse and violence upon the petitioner. Respondent in several
instances had slapped, mauled and punched petitioner
causing her physical harm. Exhibits G and D are medical
certificates showing physical injuries suffered by petitioner
inflicted by the respondent at instances of their marital
altercations. Respondent at the height of his anger often
poked a gun on petitioner and threatened to massacre her
and her child causing them to flee for their lives and sought
refuge from other people. He had demanded sex from
petitioner at an unreasonable time when she was sick and
chilling and when refused poked a gun at her. Several police
blotters were offered as evidence by petitioner documenting
the incidents when she was subjected to respondent’s ill
temper and ill treatment. Verbally, petitioner was not spared
from respondent’s abuses by shouting at her that he was
wishing she would die and he would celebrate if it happens
and by calling and sending her threatening text messages.
These incidents had caused petitioner great psychological
trauma causing her [to] fear for her life and these forced her
to seek refuge from the court for protection. Economically,
petitioner was also deprived by respondent of her spousal
support despite order of the court directing him to give a
monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view of the foregoing,
this court finds a need to protect the life of the petitioner not
only physically but also emotionally and psychologically.
Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary,
and there being no controverting evidence presented by
respondent, this Court finds that the applicant has established
her case by preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered GRANTING the petition, thus, pursuant to Sec. 30 of
A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC, let a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER
be issued immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES
A.YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY R. YAHON
the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per
month by way of spousal support.
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007,
respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to
petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other
claims that may be due or released to him from the
government and the said share of petitioner shall be
automatically deducted from respondent’s benefits and claims
and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding
General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the
Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City
and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan
de Oro City for their guidance and strict compliance.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance
Center (AFPFC), assisted by the Office of the Judge Advocate
General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation
and Motion (To Lift Temporary Protection Order Against the
AFP)8 dated November 10, 2008. Stating that it was making a
limited and special appearance, petitioner manifested that on
August 29, 2008, it furnished the AFP Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate
action. The PGMC, on September 2, 2008, requested the
Chief, AFPFC the temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36)
Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on
October 29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a letter to the Chief of
Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO,
and requesting for legal opinion as to the propriety of
releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the
RTC that S/Sgt. Yahon’s check representing his 36 MLS had
been processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but
to date said check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged
its obligation under the TPO, the RTC had not acquired
jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of
summons, and hence the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said
court order. Additionally, petitioner contended that the AFPFC
is not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the
proceedings before the RTC on the issuance of TPO/PPO. Not
being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that it was
not afforded due process and it was thus improper to issue
execution against the AFPFC. Consequently, petitioner
emphasized its position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to
comply with the TPO without violating its right to procedural
due process.
In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the
aforesaid motion for having been filed out of time. It noted
that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007 Decision
granting Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had
long become final and executory.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
under the RTC’s Order10 dated March 6, 2009.
On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA praying for the nullification of the aforesaid
orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to
automatically deduct from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement and
pension benefits and directly give the same to respondent as
spousal support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Respondent filed
her Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction, manifesting that there is no information as to
whether S/Sgt. Yahon already received his retirement benefit
and that the latter has repeatedly violated the TPO,
particularly on the provision of spousal support.
After due hearing, the CA‘s Twenty-Second Division issued a
Resolution11 granting respondent’s application, viz:
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties,
the Court finds meritorious private respondent’s application
for the issuance of an injunctive relief. While the 36-month
lump sum retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has
already been given to him, yet as admitted by petitioner
itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned retirement
benefits has not yet been released to him. It appears that the
release of such pension could render ineffectual the eventual
ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION issue enjoining the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Finance Center, its employees, agents,
representatives, and any all persons acting on its behalf, from
releasing the remaining pension that may be due to S/Sgt.
Charles A. Yahon.
SO ORDERED.12
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the
petition for certiorari and affirmed the assailed orders and
decision of the RTC. The CA likewise denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether
petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically
deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its
enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the
latter’s lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a
protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent
further acts of violence against women and their children,
their family or household members, and to grant other
necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain
control of their life.13 The protection orders issued by the
court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order
that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a
Barangay Protection Order (BPO).14
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may
be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to wit:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or
indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from
the residence of the petitioner, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or
permanently where no property rights are violated,
and if respondent must remove personal effects from
the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to
 the residence, remain there until respondent has
gathered his things and escort respondent from the
residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from
petitioner and any designated family or household
member at a distance specified by the court, and to
stay away from the residence, school, place of
employment, or any specified place frequented by
the petitioner and any designated family or
household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner
of an automobile and other essential personal
effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the
appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany
the petitioner to the residence of the parties to
ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the
possession of the automobile and other essential
personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner’s or
respondent’s removal of personal belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a
child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to
the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal
support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary,
the court shall order an appropriate percentage of
the income or salary of the respondent to be
withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for
the same to be automatically remitted directly to the
woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any
delay in the remittance of support to the woman
and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render
the respondent or his employer liable for indirect
contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or
possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and
order him to surrender the same to the court for
appropriate disposition by the court, including
revocation of license and disqualification to apply for
any license to use or possess a firearm. If the
offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall
order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall
direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the
offender and take appropriate action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the
violence inflicted, including, but not limited to,
property damage, medical expenses, child care
expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to
provide petitioner temporary shelter and other social
services that the petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the
court deems necessary to protect and provide for the
safety of the petitioner and any designated family or
household member, provided petitioner and any
designated family or household member consents to
such relief. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s
directive for the automatic deduction of 50% from S/Sgt.
Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be given directly
to respondent, as it contravenes an explicit mandate under
the law governing the retirement and separation of military
personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1638,15 which states: Section 31. The benefits authorized
under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any
tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or
conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or
separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any
benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or
property accountabilities incurred while in the active service,
not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or
other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his
survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied
to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise
known as the "Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as
the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits
under this Act shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the
courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies
including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from
all financial obligations of the members, including his
pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned
by his exercise or performance of his official functions or
duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his
position or work except when his monetary liability,
contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that
a court order directing the Philippine National Bank to refrain
from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to
deliver one-half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the
latter’s conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it violates
Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts
retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which governs
execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule
39 enumerates those properties which are exempt from
execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.– Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property,
and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
xxxx
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property
obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the
Government;(Emphasis supplied.)
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of
irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment
must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative
will.17 Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with
other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be
harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later
enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the
legislative will.19
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later
enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception
to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are
exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the court
shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or
salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be
automatically remitted directly to the woman
"[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to
segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits was
illegal because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the
case of Pacific Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court
sustained the CA when it held that the garnishment of the
amount of ₱10,500 payable to BML Trading and Supply while
it was still in the possession of the Bureau of
Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void.
The CA therein relied on the previous rulings in Director of
Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion21 and Avendano v.
Alikpala, et al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void the
garnishment of the salaries of government employees.
Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in
Pacific Products:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that
money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due
government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these
employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that
the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be sued in its
own courts except by express authorization by the
Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would
be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another
reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as
they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And
still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that
every consideration of public policy forbids it.
We disagree.
occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of
the Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of
the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties
or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.28

Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term
"employer," which includes in its coverage the military
institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g)
applies to all employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and
child support, is a support enforcement legislation.1âwphi1 In
the United States, provisions of the Child Support
Enforcement Act24 allow garnishment of certain federal funds
where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal
obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed
"to avoid sovereign immunity problems" and provide that
"moneys payable by the Government to any individual are
subject to child support enforcement proceedings," the law is
clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders directed
against Government agencies attaching funds in their
possession."25
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is
constitutional and does not violate the equal protection
clause. In Garcia v. Drilon 26 the issue of constitutionality was
raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an
injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a
protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that
R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which
justify the classification under the law: the unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread bias and prejudice against women.
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of
restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic
violence and provide them continued protection against
threats to their personal safety and security.
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk
of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to
prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution dated
March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to

the purpose of the law, viz:

The distinction between men and women is germane to the

purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.– It is hereby declared that the

State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address

violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of
the Child and other international human rights instruments of
which the Philippines is a party.27

Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child

support specifically address one form of violence committed
against women – economic abuse.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to

make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:

1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the

victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
8. G.R. No. 182521 February 9, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO FRAGANTE y AYUDA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On appeal is the 28 September 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01980, affirming with
modification the 4 July 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Parañaque City, Branch 260, convicting appellant
Ernesto Fragante y Ayuda of nine (9) counts of acts of
lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape, all committed
against his minor daughter, AAA.3
The Facts
In ten (10) Informations filed on 14 July 1998, appellant was
charged with nine (9) counts of acts of lasciviousness and one
(1) count of rape all committed against his own minor
daughter AAA. The Informations4 read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-651 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That in between the period of April-May 1993, in Parañaque,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, by taking advantage of his then
ten (10) year old biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd
designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fondled
(sic) the breast of [AAA].
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 – 652 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in May 1993, in Parañaque, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his then ten (10) year old
biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fondled (sic) the breasts of
[AAA], touched (sic) and inserted (sic) his finger into the
vagina of said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 – 653 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in between the period commencing in June
1993 until August 1993, in Parañaque, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his then ten (10) year old
biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fondled (sic) the breasts of
[AAA], touched (sic) and inserted (sic) his finger into the
vagina of said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 – 654 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in between the period of October to December
1993 at Shaolin Chinese Restaurant located at Sucat Road,
Parañaque, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, by taking advantage
of his then eleven (11) year old biological daughter, [AAA],
and with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fondled (sic) and sucked the breasts of [AAA], and
thereafter touched the vagina of said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 – 655 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in December 1993 at Shaolin Chinese
Restaurant located at Sucat Road, Parañaque, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, by taking advantage of his then eleven (11)
year old biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs,
did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fondled (sic) and
sucked the breasts of [AAA], and thereafter touched the
vagina of said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 – 656 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in between the period commencing in January
1994 to August 1994, in Parañaque, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his then eleven (11) year old
biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched (sic) and sucked
the breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her vagina and inserted (sic)
his finger into the private part of said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 – 657 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in between the period commencing in August
1994 until September 1995, in Parañaque, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his then twelve (12) year old
biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched (sic) and sucked
(sic) the breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her vagina and inserted
(sic) his finger into the private part of said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 – 658 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in September 1997, in Parañaque, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, by taking advantage of his then
fifteen (15) year old biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd
designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched
(sic) and sucked (sic) the breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her
vagina and inserted (sic) his finger into the private part of
said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 – 659 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in (sic) October 25, 1997, in Parañaque, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, by taking advantage of his then
fifteen (15) year old biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd
designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched
(sic) and sucked (sic) the breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her
vagina and inserted (sic) his finger into the private part of
said minor-victim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 – 660 for Violation of Article 335 of
the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of
R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometime in September 1995, in Parañaque, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above named accused, by taking advantage of his then
thirteen (13) year old biological daughter [AAA], and with
lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lie
and had carnal knowledge with the said minor victim, against
her will.5
The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows:
Ernesto A. Fragante (Ernesto hereafter) married CCC on
October 6, 1975, in Sta. Cruz Manila, and such marriage was
ratified on December 7, 1995 celebrated in San Sebastian
Parish Church. That union, produced three offsprings. [AAA],
the victim herein, is their third child. She was born on August
23, 1982. x x x
Sometime in April 1993 to May 1993, three or four months
before her eleventh (11) birthday, [AAA] woke up one early
morning to prepare for the driving lessons which her father
Ernesto, promised to teach them that day. [AAA] was the first
to wake up. She was in her room when her father entered
and lay on her bed. He then asked [AAA] to lie beside him to
which [AAA] obeyed. While lying beside her, Ernesto was
talking to her about a lot of things, and as he talked he
started to fondle her breast and suck her nipples.
xxxx
The incident was repeated sometime between June 1993 and
August 1993. Ernesto told [AAA] to get inside his room, then
he would lock the door. Once inside the room, he would scold
[AAA] for reasons unknown to her. When she would start to
cry, her father would start to touch her breast, then he would
suck her nipples while he was rubbing her vagina.
On two occasions, between October 1993 and December
1993, at Shaolin Chinese Restaurant located in Sucat,
Parañaque, which the Fragante family owned, there was a
small back room used as an office which later was converted
into a room where they could rest. [AAA] was told by her
father to rest in that room and once inside, while talking to
her, he covered the windows with manila paper. He lay down
beside her in the folding bed. He fondled her breast, squeezed
them and then later inserted his hand under her shirt as he
pull it up and put his mouth on her breast to suck it
alternately. He started stroking her genitals with her shorts
on. She did not do anything as she was in shock at that time.
In December 1993, [AAA] and her father bought food from
Jollibee. She was instructed to eat it at the back room of their
Shaolin Chinese Restaurant so that other employees would
not see it. After eating, Ernesto asked her to lie down in the
folding bed and he again lay down beside her and massaged
her breast and sucked her nipples while continuously rubbing
her vagina by inserting his hand inside her shorts.
Sometime in January 1994, around 10 o'clock in the evening,
while [AAA] was sleeping in another room, Ernesto entered
her room. He lay beside her, and started sucking her breast.
He removed her shorts and then touched her vagina. He then
inserted his finger inside her vagina.
In August-September 1994, she was around twelve (12)
years old, Ernesto molested her again inside his room, by
massaging her private parts and sucking her nipples while
continuously rubbing her vagina and afterwards inserting his
finger inside it.
In September 1995, at the age of thirteen (13), [AAA] was
raped by her father Ernesto. She was told to get inside his
room and was scolded by him before she was made to lie
down in his bed. Her shirt was removed, and her breast and
vagina were fondled by him. Thereafter, he sucked her
nipples while continuously touching her vagina. He removed
her shorts and panty, then spreaded her legs and inserted his
penis in her vagina. She struggled and begged him to remove
his penis. She said she could not recall the exact details of
what her father was doing. He stayed on top of her despite
her pleas. x x x
Ernesto was not able to find time to molest [AAA] in
September 1995-1996, because he was hardly home and was
busy with his bookstore business in Visayas and Mindanao.
xxxx
In the evening of October 25, 1997, Irma, together with their
brother Marco accompanied their mother Gaudencia to a
wake of their mother's friend. [AAA] wanted to go with them
but she was left home alone with Ernesto who refused to
allow [AAA] to go with them. x x x
xxxx
Her father started massaging her breast and [AAA] removed
his hands and stood up but she was bitten and pushed
towards the bed. Her father strangled her and asked whether
she preferred to be strangled first and she answered no. He
started touching her private parts again and this time she
continued warding off his hands and when she heard their car
entering their garage, she told her father that her mother had
arrive. That was the only time she was allowed to leave but
was stopped by her father and warned not tell her mother
what happened.
x x x They later proceeded to the NBI, Taft Ave. Manila to
report the incidents and where [AAA] executed her complaint-
affidavit. Her mother and siblings also executed their
affidavits.6
xxxx
During arraignment on April 26, 1999, the accused entered
separate pleas of "Not Guilty" to all the crimes charged.
Joint trial ensued thereafter.
Prosecution presented the following witnesses: [AAA], BBB,
CCC, and Dr. Bernadette Madrid. The defense presented
Ernesto Fragante as the sole witness.7
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 4 July 2003, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting
appellant for the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of
the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after careful perusal of the evidence presented,
this Court finds as follows: for (sic)
Criminal Case No. 98-651 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC,
as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion temporal of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS
SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-652 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC,
as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion temporal of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS
SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-653 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC,
as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion temporal of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS
SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-654 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC,
as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion temporal of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS
SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-655 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC,
as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion temporal of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS
SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-656 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC,
as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion temporal of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS
SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-657 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC,
as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion temporal of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS
SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.
Criminal Case No. 98-658 for Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6)
YEARS.
Criminal Case No. 98-659 for Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6)
YEARS.
Criminal Case No. 98-660 for RAPE this court finds the
accused ERNESTO AYUDA FRAGANTE GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to DEATH. He
is ordered to pay the complainant ₱50,000.00 as civil liability
and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes charged. In upholding
appellant's conviction, the Court of Appeals gave credence to
AAA's testimony narrating how appellant sexually abused her
repeatedly. The Court of Appeals junked appellant's
contentions that (1) AAA's testimony lacked specific details
such as the actual date of commission of the acts of
lasciviousness, and was inconsistent with respect to the
charge of rape; (2) AAA was ill motivated in filing the criminal
complaints; (3) the charge of rape was unsubstantiated by
medical findings; and (4) the delay in reporting the incidents
to the proper authorities renders the charges dubious.
On 28 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, of
Parañaque City, Branch 260, dated July 4, 2003 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as follows:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 98-651, 98-652, 98-653,
98-654, 98-655, 98-656, 98-657, accused-appellant
Ernesto A. Fragante is hereby sentenced to suffer
Indeterminate Penalty, the minimum of which is
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal minimum and the maximum of
which is seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal medium, for acts of
lasciviousness under Article III, Section 5 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, and is also ordered to pay
[AAA] the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
for each count of acts of lasciviousness;
2. In pursuant with Section 31(f), Article XII, of
Republic Act No. 7610, a FINE in the amount of
Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00) Pesos for each
count of the nine (9) counts of lascivious conduct is
hereby imposed;
3. The penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 98-658
and Criminal Case No. 98-659 by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED without modification;
4. In Criminal Case No. 98-660, the penalty imposed
is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua by virtue of
R.A. No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of
death penalty.
5. In view of the jurisprudential trend, the amount of
moral damages for Criminal Case No. 98-660 is
hereby INCREASED to Seventy Five Thousand (Php
75,000.00) Pesos and the civil indemnity is likewise
increased to Seventy Five Thousand (Php 75,000.00)
and an additional amount of Twenty Five Thousand
(Php 25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming appellant's conviction for nine (9) counts of
acts of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape.
The Ruling of this Court
We sustain appellant's conviction for seven (7) counts of acts
of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape. We acquit
appellant for two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
Criminal Case No. 98-660 for Rape
Appellant contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
convicting him for the crime of rape since the prosecution
failed to overthrow the presumption of innocence. Appellant
alleges that (1) AAA's testimony was full of inconsistencies
and improbabilities which cast serious doubts on the
truthfulness of her account; (2) the medical findings do not
support the charge of rape; (3) AAA's delayed reporting of
the incident renders the charges dubious; and (4) AAA and
her mother harbored a grudge against appellant.10
We are not persuaded. The prosecution sufficiently
established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of rape.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code11 provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or
is demented.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the essential
elements of rape are present in this case. The evidence on
record clearly proves that appellant had carnal knowledge of
his own minor daughter AAA.
We reject appellant's contention that AAA's testimony was full
of inconsistencies. On the contrary, AAA's testimony that she
was raped by appellant was very consistent and
straightforward. Notably, appellant did not point out the
supposed inconsistencies, and proceeded in arguing that his
moral ascendancy over his daughter was insufficient to
intimidate AAA.
It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual
congress with a woman by force and without
consent.12 In People v. Orillosa,13 we held that actual force or
intimidation need not be employed in incestuous rape of a
minor because the moral and physical dominion of the father
is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly
desires.14 When a father commits the odious crime of rape
against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence
over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. 15 The
absence of violence or offer of resistance would not affect the
outcome of the case because the overpowering and
overbearing moral influence of the father over his daughter
takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in
rape cases committed by an accused who did not have blood
relationship with the victim.16
In this case, AAA's testimony clearly showed how appellant
took advantage of his relationship with and his moral
ascendancy over his minor daughter when he had carnal
knowledge of her. As found by the Court of Appeals, appellant
instilled fear on AAA's mind every time he sexually molested
her, thus:
[AAA] also admitted that after accused-appellant has started
sexually molesting her until she was raped, she was so
frightened of him. In fact she could not tell her mother of her
ordeal, mindful of the serious threats on her life and of the
chaos it would cause their family. 17
We likewise find appellant's claim that the medical findings do
not support the charge of rape untenable. Aside from AAA's
positive, straightforward, and credible testimony, the
prosecution presented the medical certificate issued by Dr.
Bernadette Madrid18 and the latter's testimony which
corroborate AAA's claim that appellant raped her.
The Court is not impressed with appellant's claim that AAA’s
failure to immediately report the incidents to the proper
authorities affected her credibility. 19 Delay could be attributed
to the victim's tender age and the appellant's threats. 20 A
rape victim's actions are oftentimes influenced by fear, rather
than reason.21 In incestuous rape, this fear is magnified
because the victim usually lives under the same roof as the
perpetrator or is at any rate subject to his dominance
because of their blood relationship.22
We also find appellant's imputation of ill-motive on the part of
the victim, including his wife and AAA's sister, in filing the
criminal charges devoid of merit. Suffice it to state that the
resentment angle, even if true, does not prove any ill motive
on AAA’s part to falsely accuse appellant of rape or
necessarily detract from her credibility as witness. 23Motives,
such as those arising from family feuds, resentment, or
revenge, have not prevented the Court from giving, if proper,
full credence to the testimony of minor complainants who
remained consistent throughout their direct and cross-
examinations.24
For appellant's guilt for the crime of rape committed against
his own minor daughter AAA, we sustain the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant. While the Court
of Appeals correctly reduced the penalty of
death25 to reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals failed to
indicate that the reduction of the penalty to reclusion
perpetua is without eligibility for parole in accordance with
Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.26
As regards appellant's civil liability, we affirm the award of
moral damages and civil indemnity, which are automatically
granted without need of proof or pleading, 27 each in the sum
of ₱75,000. However, we increase the award of exemplary
damages from ₱25,000 to ₱30,000 consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence.28
Criminal Case Nos. 98-651, 98-652, 98-653, 98-654,
98-655, 98-656, 98-657, 98-658, and 98-659 for Acts
of Lasciviousness
Appellant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting
him for nine counts of acts of lasciviousness since the
prosecution failed to establish with particularity the date of
the commission of the offense. Appellant contends that AAA's
testimony was a "sweeping generalization of the crimes
committed."29 According to appellant, AAA's statement "that
the said acts were allegedly committed so many times on
certain occasions is clearly inadequate and grossly
insufficient" to sustain a conviction.30
We are not convinced.
Appellant was charged with violation of Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b),
Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. These provisions state:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall
commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either
sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the
preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be:
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18
years of age.31
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of
sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are
present here.
First, appellant's repeated touching, fondling, and sucking of
AAA's breasts and inserting his finger into AAA's vagina with
lewd designs undoubtedly constitute lascivious conduct under
Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 7610, to wit:
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of
any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person.
Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over
his daughter, coerced AAA to engage in lascivious conduct,
which is within the purview of sexual abuse. In People v.
Larin,32 we held:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any
other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group.
Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, based on her testimony which was
corroborated by her Birth Certificate 33 presented during the
trial. Section 3(a), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -
(a) "Children" refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years
of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition;
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the
conviction of appellant for acts of lasciviousness was proper.
– As to the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish with
or particularity the date of the commission of the acts of
of lasciviousness, suffice it to state that the date and time of the
or commission of the offense are not material ingredients of
in such crime. Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. — It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
time at which the offense was committed except when time is
a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be
alleged to have been committed at any time as to the actual
date at which the offense was committed as the information
or complaint will permit.
In People v. Losano,34 the Court held:
Thus, as early as 1903, this Court has ruled that while the
complaint must allege a specific time and place when and
where the offense was committed, the proof need not
correspond to this allegation, unless the time and place is
material and of the essence of the offense as necessary
ingredient in its description. Evidence so presented is
admissible and sufficient if it shows 1) that the crime was
committed at any time within the period of the statute of
limitations; and 2) before or after the time stated in the
complaint or indictment and before the action is
commenced.1avvphi1
We agree with the Court of Appeals in debunking appellant's
claim that AAA's testimony was overly generalized and lacked
specific details on when appellant sexually abused the victim.
The records are replete with details on when and how
appellant sexually abused her. AAA testified that appellant
habitually molested her whenever he had the opportunity to
do so, to wit:
Atty. Rosanna Elepaño-Balauag:
How many times[,] because the witness answered that his
father was sexually abusing her.
Court:
Witness may answer.
Atty. Rosanna Elepaño-Balauag:
How many times if you remember?
A: Many times.
xxxx
Q: When was (sic) [did] the incident happened?
A: Sa bahay po namin at madaling araw po iyon dahil
nagpapaturo kami ng driving at ako po iyong unang nagising
at sabi ko nga po magdriving na turuan niya akong
magmaneho at tapos po pinahiga niya ako sa tabi nya at
tapos po kinausap po niya ako at habang kinakausap niya
ako, he started touching my private parts and later on he
sucked my nipple, mam.
Q: What else did he do?
A: That's all mam.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: He did you (sic) it again, mam.
xxxx
Q: What she did you to? [sic]
A: Ganoon pa rin po, he sucked my breast at tapos po niyon,
papasukin niya ako sa kanyang room at ila-lock niya iyong
pinto; minsan po naman, pagagalitan niya ako na walang
kabagay bagay at hindi ko naman po alam kung ano iyon;
ganoon po lagi, hinawakan niya iyong breast, papagalitan
ako, iyon paulit ulit na lang po, mam.
Q: After he scolded you what happened next?
A: Iyon pag umiiyak na po ako, uumpisahan po niyang
hawakan muli iyong mga private parts.
xxxx
Q: And after that incident what transpired next?
A: Paulit ulit po niyang ginagawa, lagi po niya akong
hinhahawakan ang breast ko at vagina and then nira-rub po
nang kamay niya.35
However, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-652 and 98-658, we agree
with the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the
People, that the prosecution failed to prove appellant's guilt
for acts of lasciviousness beyond reasonable doubt. While AAA
testified that appellant habitually molested her, there was no
specific evidence supporting the charge that appellant
committed acts of lasciviousness in May 1993 and September
1997, or on or about those dates. Hence, we find appellant
not guilty for two counts of acts of lasciviousness (Criminal
Case Nos. 98-652 and 98-658) on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
As regards the other criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness,
where appellant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt,
we affirm appellant's conviction. In these cases, the
alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of
the Revised Penal Code should be considered against
appellant.36 In People v. Fetalino,37 the Court held that, "in
crimes against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness,
relationship is considered aggravating." In that case, the
Court considered relationship as an aggravating circumstance
since the informations mentioned, and the accused admitted,
that the complainant is his daughter.
In the instant case, the informations expressly state that AAA
is appellant’s daughter, and appellant openly admitted this
fact.38 Accordingly, we modify the penalty imposed in Criminal
Case Nos. 98-657 and 98-659. Section 5, Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.39 Since
there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum
period – reclusion perpetua.40 Besides, Section 31 of Republic
Act No. 7610 expressly provides that "The penalty provided
herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is [a] x x x parent, x x x. In People v.
Montinola41 and People v. Sumingwa,42 where the accused is
the biological father of the minor victim,43 the Court
appreciated the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
relationship and accordingly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Thus, appellant herein is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. 98-657
and 98-659.
In Criminal Case Nos. 98-651,44 98-653,45 98-654,46 98-
655,47 and 98-656,48 where AAA was still below 12 years old
at the time of the commission of the acts of lasciviousness,
the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium
period in accordance with Section 5(b), Article III of Republic
Act No. 7610. This provision specifically states "[t]hat the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period."49 Considering the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of relationship, as explained, the penalty shall
be imposed in its maximum period. In People v.
Velasquez,50 which involved a two year old child sexually
abused by her grandfather, the Court imposed the
indeterminate sentence of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Accordingly, appellant herein is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Also, we modify the amount of moral damages and fine
awarded by the Court of Appeals. We reduce the amount of
moral damages from ₱50,000 to ₱15,000 and the amount of
fine from ₱30,000 to ₱15,000 for each of the seven (7) counts
of acts of lasciviousness.51 In addition, we award civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱20,000, and exemplary damages
in the sum of ₱15,000, in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship, 52 for each of the
seven (7) counts of acts of lasciviousness.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 28 September 2007 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01980
with MODIFICATIONS. We find appellant Ernesto Fragante y
Ayuda:

1. GUILTY of RAPE in Criminal Case No. 98-660. He

is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuawithout eligibility for parole and ordered to
pay AAA ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as
moral damages, and ₱30,000 as exemplary
damages.

2. GUILTY of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in

Criminal Case Nos. 98-657 and 98-659, with
relationship as an aggravating circumstance. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA (1) moral damages
of ₱15,000; (2) a fine of ₱15,000; (3) civil indemnity
of ₱20,000; and (4) exemplary damages of ₱15,000
for each count.

3. GUILTY of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in

Criminal Case Nos. 98-651, 98-653, 98-654, 98-655,
and 98-656, with relationship as an aggravating
circumstance. He is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum and ordered to
pay AAA (1) moral damages of ₱15,000; (2) a fine of
₱15,000; (3) civil indemnity of ₱20,000; and (4)
exemplary damages of ₱15,000 for each count.

4. NOT GUILTY of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in

Criminal Case Nos. 98-652 and 98-658 on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
9. G.R. No. 175830 July 10, 2007 xxxx
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs. Genitoperineal Area: triangular pubic hair distribution; hymen
MANUEL "BOY" HERMOCILLA, Appellant. circular with healed laceration at 3, 6 & 9 o’clock position.

Speculum Examination: cervix-smooth, (-) erosions, (-)

DECISION
lesions, (-) bleeding.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Court of Appeals’ Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 01294, which affirmed with modifications the
judgment2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La
Union, Branch 31, in Family Case Nos. A-435 and A-436,
convicting appellant Manuel "Boy" Hermocilla of two counts of
rape committed against M.3
On January 14, 2005, appellant was charged with two counts
of rape. The first Information reads as follows:
That on or about the year 1999, in the Municipality of x x x,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with his
stepdaughter M, an eight (8) year old minor, against her will,
to her damage and prejudice.
Internal Examination: Introitus admits 2 fingers with ease;
Cervix-firm, closed. Uterus-small, no palpable adnexal
mass/tenderness.
LABORATORY RESULTS:
xxxx
Gram stain: No spermatozoa seen. x x x.11
Appellant denied the charges against him and testified that
sometime in 2004 he was summoned by their barangay
captain to answer questions regarding a complaint lodged
against him by M. When he denied M’s accusations, appellant
claimed that he was mauled by several persons and was
forcibly taken to the Police Station at Rosario, La Union where
he was incarcerated.12 Appellant claimed that he treated M
like his own daughter. He bought her clothes and shoes and
attended to her other needs.13

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 On June 30, 2005, the trial court rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
The second Information reads:
rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death for
each count.
That on or about the year 2002, in the Municipality of x x x,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
After his motion for reconsideration was denied, appellant
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
modifications the decision of the trial court by reducing the
unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with his
penalty of death to reclusion perpetua and ordering appellant
stepdaughter M, a[n] eleven (11) year old minor, against her
to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as civil
will, to her damage and prejudice.
indemnity, for each count of rape.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5
In this appeal, appellant assails M’s credibility claiming that
her failure to confide the alleged rape to her mother, father
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. The two
and grandmother despite several opportunities to do so
cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
renders such accusations doubtful. We find this contention
untenable.
The records show that M was born out of wedlock on May 30,
1989 to S6 and L.7 After they separated, M stayed with her
Time and again, we have held that when a woman, more so if
mother L who subsequently cohabited with appellant.
a minor, states that she has been raped, she says in effect all
Sometime in 1999, while M was preparing dinner, appellant
that is necessary to show that rape was committed. For no
suddenly grabbed and pulled her to the bed. He ripped off her
woman, least of all a child, would weave a tale of sexual
shorts and underwear and made her lie on the bed. After
assaults to her person, open herself to examination of her
undressing himself, appellant inserted his finger into M’s
private parts and later be subjected to public trial or ridicule if
vagina then penetrated her with his penis. M cried and
she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and impelled to seek
begged appellant to stop.8
justice for the wrong done to her.14
Thereafter, appellant would insert his finger into M’s vagina
Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie
whenever her mother is out of the house. Such abuse
heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court because the
temporarily ceased when M lived with her father S in Baguio
trial judge enjoys the peculiar advantage of observing directly
City. But when he left to work abroad, M went back to live
and at first hand the witnesses’ deportment and manner of
with her mother and appellant. The abuse resumed and
testifying. He is, therefore, in a better position to form
culminated in a second rape incident which took place
accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof.15
sometime in 2002. On said day, while M was cleaning their
house, appellant suddenly grabbed and pulled her towards
The trial court found M’s testimony to be credible:
the bed. He took off her clothes, undressed himself and
inserted his finger into her vagina.9 The accused’s defense was denial. He said that the charges
were made up because M’s relatives did not like him. He was
Sometime in December 2004, appellant furiously hit M on the
once suspected of selling the fertilizers which he did not own.
head and chased her out of the house with a bolo because
He could not have done those charges against him because
she resisted his advances. M fled but appellant caught up with
he loved his stepdaughter, M.
her and forced her to come back to the house. When M went
to school the next day, her cousin saw her crying. M Who should be believed?
eventually broke down and revealed her ordeal.10
The Court believes the private complainant. She could not
M was subsequently examined by Dr. Donna C. Villanueva, a have made these stories up. x x x
Medical Officer at the Ilocos Training and Medical Center. The
examination showed the following: When she was testifying she cried several times. The Judge of
this Court observed that her cries were expressions of
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: outrage, reminding her, when being questioned by the
lawyer, of those incidents that her stepfather did to her. While
she could not pinpoint the exact dates, she could vividly
remember the things done to her.
It is the finding of the Court that accused Manuel "Boy"
Hermocilla raped his stepdaughter. x x x16
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court,
to wit:
The aforequoted testimony of the complainant reveals that
the same was marked by spontaneity, honesty and sincerity.
It is a cardinal rule that when the testimony of the victim is
simple and straightforward, the same must be given full faith
and credit. We reiterate the rule that the accused could be
convicted solely on the basis of the victim’s testimony if
credible. Here, We see no reason to deviate from the trial
court’s determination as to the credibility of complainant’s
testimony.17
Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and
conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.18 No such
facts or circumstances exist in the instant case.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found
appellant guilty of two counts of rape.1awphi1 In the rape
incident committed in 1999, the prosecution proved that
appellant had carnal knowledge of M by inserting his penis
into her vagina through force and intimidation. Under Art.
266-B, in relation to Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
carnal knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
Family Case No. A-435.
The second incident committed in 2002 whereby appellant
inserted his fingers into M’s vagina likewise constituted rape
through sexual assault. In People v. Palma,19 we held that
the insertion of the appellant’s finger into the victim’s vagina
constituted the crime of rape through sexual assault under
Republic Act No. 8353 or "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which
in part provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. - Rape is
committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the
genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)
Rape by sexual assault is punishable by reclusion temporal if
committed with any aggravating or qualifying
circumstances.20 The Information in Family Case No. A-436
mentioned the victim as appellant’s stepdaughter and an 11-
year old minor. A stepdaughter is a daughter of one’s spouse
by previous marriage, while a stepfather is the husband of
one’s mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of
which the person spoken of is the offspring. In the instant
case, appellant and M’s mother were never married. Hence,
appellant is not M’s stepfather; vice-versa, M is not
appellant’s stepdaughter. Appellant is the common law
spouse of M’s mother. However, since this relationship was
not specifically pleaded in the information, it cannot be
considered in the imposition of the proper penalty.
On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of minority
was specifically pleaded in the information and proved during
trial. Conformably with the ruling in People v.
Esperanza,21 when either one of the qualifying circumstances
of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which
is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence may
be considered as an aggravating circumstance. As such, M’s
minority may be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
However, it may not serve to raise the penalty in Family Case
No. A-435 because in simple rape by sexual intercourse, the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua which is single and
indivisible. In Family Case No. A-436, however, the penalty
for rape by sexual assault with any aggravating circumstance
is reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty should be within the range of prision mayor
or 10 years and 1 day to 12 years as minimum, and 17 years,
4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
As to the amount of damages, complainant is entitled in
Family Case No. A-435 to ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages for rape through sexual
intercourse. In Family Case No. A-436, M is entitled to
₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages for rape through sexual assault.22 Civil indemnity is
separate and distinct from the award of moral damages which
is automatically granted in rape cases. Moral damages are
additionally awarded without need of pleading or proof of the
basis thereof. This is because it is recognized that the victim’s
injury is concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the
odiousness of the crime to warrant per se the amount of
moral damages.23 In addition, we held in People v.
Catubig,24 that the presence of an aggravating circumstance,
such as M’s minority, entitles her to an award of exemplary
damages. The amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages
for each count of rape is appropriate under the
circumstances.25
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that in Family Case No. A-
435, appellant Manuel Hermocilla is found guilty of rape
through sexual intercourse and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay M the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. In Family Case No.
A-436, appellant is found guilty of rape through sexual
assault and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, up to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay M the amounts
of ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
10. G.R. No. 172226 March 23, 2007
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HERMINIGILDO SENIERES, Appellant,
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On automatic review is the Decision1 dated 6 December 2000
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6,
convicting Herminigildo Senieres of raping AAA2 on two (2)
occasions. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 16691-R, the Court finds the accused
Herm[e]nigildo Senieres guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of rape as charged in the Information, defined
and penalized under Section 2, Par. 1 (a) and (d) of Republic
Act [No.] 8353 which amended Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code* and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the complainant [AAA]
the sum of ₱100,000.00 as Moral Damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The accused Herm[e]nigildo Senieres, being a detention
prisoner, is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance
with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. In Criminal Case No. 16692-R, the Court finds the accused
Herm[e]nigildo Senieres Guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
(sic) the offense of rape committed on December 17, 1998 as
charged in the Information, defined and penalized under Sec.
2, Par. 2 of Republic Act [No.] 8353* and hereby sentences
him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as Maximum, to
indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of ₱20,000.00 as
Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Herm[e]nigildo Senieres, being a detention
prisoner, is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance
with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.3
Initiated by AAA’s sworn statement,4 accused Senieres was
charged with two (2) counts of rape in the following
Informations, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 16691-R
The undersigned accuses HERM[E]NIGILDO SENIERES
[a.k.a.] "EMING" of the crime of RAPE DEFINED AND
PENALIZED UNDER R.A. [No.] 8353, committed as follows:
That On or about the 22nd day of November 1998, in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of
force and intimidation lie down and have carnal knowledge of
the complainant [AAA], a minor[,] 11 years of age, against
her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 16692-R
The undersigned accused HERM[E]NIGILDO SENIERES
[a.k.a.] "EMING" of the crime of RAPE DEFINED AND
PENALIZED UNDER R.A. [No.] 8353, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of December 1998, in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force,
threat or intimidation, commit an act of sexual assault upon
the person of [AAA], a minor[,] 11 years of age, by inserting
his penis into the anal orifice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
At his arraignment on 18 June 1999 for both cases, Senieres
with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty
to the two (2) counts of rape.7 Joint trial on the merits of the
criminal cases ensued. The prosecution presented as
witnesses, the victim AAA, her aunt BBB8 and Dr. Vladimir
Villaseñor, the physician who conducted an examination on
AAA.
AAA testified that on the night of 22 November 1998, she fell
asleep on the floor of the sala of her aunt CCC’s house at T.
Alonzo Street, Baguio City.9 She awoke when she felt the
presence of someone beside her. When she opened her eyes,
she saw that it was Senieres, her uncle,10 who had then
started removing her shorts and underwear. She said, "No!"
but Senieres threatened to harm her younger sister if she did
not allow him to proceed. Next, Senieres turned her body to
face him. AAA clipped together her legs to resist him but
Senieres separated them using his feet. AAA shouted but
Senieres covered her mouth with her hands. Senieres then
inserted his penis into her vagina and made "push and pull"
movements. AAA cried in pain. AAA also felt a mucous-like
substance enter her vagina. After satisfying himself, Senieres
repeated his threat of harm to AAA’s sister and then went
back to sleep at the sofa in the sala. AAA put her panty and
shorts back on and went back to sleep still crying.11
When AAA awakened the following day, Senieres was no
longer around. She, however, did not report the incident to
her aunt CCC or to anyone else as she was afraid that
Senieres would make good his threat to harm her younger
sister.12
After the incident, AAA stayed at her godmother’s house
which is a few houses away. On 16 December 1998, she
returned to her aunt CCC’s house as she thought that
Senieres no longer stayed there.13
On 17 December 1998, while AAA was watching TV, Senieres
arrived. In fright, AAA invited her male cousin DDD to go to
sleep already. She and DDD slept on the floor facing each
other. Again, she awoke when she felt Senieres go down to
the floor next to her. Then she felt him remove her panty and
shorts.14 AAA kicked Senieres’ feet but he managed to
remove her shorts and panty. AAA tried to rouse DDD from
sleep by elbowing him but he could not be awakened. AAA
was lying on her left side, facing DDD, with her thighs bent
forward and lower legs bent backwards. Next, Senieres
inserted his penis into her anus. She felt a slippery substance
and then Senieres pulled his penis out of her anus. He went
back to sleep at the sofa. Senieres left the house the
following morning.15
Sometime after the incident, AAA left for her uncle EEE’s
house, in a town somewhere in Benguet, in order to be away
from Senieres.16 On 28 January 1999, her aunt BBB arrived
and took AAA to another town in Benguet.17
In April 1999, AAA reported for the first time what had
happened to her aunt BBB. AAA was emboldened by the
courage of a child who had reported a similar incident of
sexual abuse against her father.18 AAA and her aunt BBB
then traveled to Baguio City. On 27 April 1999, AAA,
accompanied by her aunt BBB, gave her sworn
statement19 to the Baguio City Police.20 On 28 April 1999,
she was examined by Dr. Vladimir Villaseñor.21
Dr. Villaseñor testified that he found a shallow, healed
laceration located at 7 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions and a
deep, healed laceration at 3 o’clock position.22 He explained
that a shallow laceration is a laceration that does not extend
to the base of the hymen while a deep laceration is a
laceration which extends from the periphery to the base of
the hymen. He also discussed that a healed laceration is one
that is more than seven (7) days old.23 He stated that based
on their number and depth, the lacerations could have only
been caused by the insertion of a male genital organ into the
vagina.24 Dr. Villaseñor issued a medico-legal report
containing his findings.25
For his part, Senieres denied the charges against him. He
claimed that he could not have raped AAA on 22 November
1998 as he was in the house of a relative in San Carlos
Heights, Baguio City26 and AAA was still in Manila.27 On 17
December 1998, he was likewise at his relative’s house in San
Carlos Heights, Baguio City.28
The trial court favored AAA’s version of the events and
convicted Senieres of the crimes charged, ruling in this wise:
The Court cannot give credence to the assertion of the
accused that he could not have raped AAA on the night of
November 22, 1998 at x x x T. Alonzo Street, because she
was not yet in Baguio City at that time.
AAA categorically testified that she arrived in Baguio on
November 7, 1998 and since then stayed at x x x T. Alonzo
Street until she was raped on the night of November 22,
1998. There is no reason to doubt her testimony since, as
already discussed previously, it bears the earmarks of
credibility.
xxx
Likewise, the Court cannot give weight to the claim of the
accused that on the night of November 22, 1998[,] as well as
December 17, 1998, he was at San Carlos Heights, Baguio
City with his relative Mary Jane Tumbagahan and the latter’s
family.
He failed to present his alleged relative Mary Jane or any
other member of the latter’s family or any other person to
corroborate his claim. It should not be difficult for him to
secure their presence in court if indeed he was with his
relatives on those nights or that he spent those nights at San
Carlos Heights.
Besides, granting for the sake of argument that he was at
San Carlos Heights on the nights of November 22 and
December 17, 1998, it is not impossible for him to be at T.
Alonzo at the precise time the sexual acts were committed.
San Carlos Heights is just a jeepney ride away from T. Alonzo
Street as both places are within Baguio City. Such that if
accused travels from San Carlos Heights to T. Alonzo Street,
or vi[c]e versa, it would only take him 20 minutes, more or
less.29
The judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for
automatic review. In a Resolution30 dated 27 September
2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 147286-87,31 the cases were
transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Court’s
ruling in People v. Mateo.32
In a Decision33 dated 20 December 2005, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. The appellate
court held that AAA’s story bears the marks of a credible
testimony coming from a truthful witness and, therefore,
must be given full faith and credit. AAA described in a
positive, natural, sincere and spontaneous manner how she
was forcibly ravished by Senieres on 22 November and 17
December 1998. The appellate court noted that AAA could not
have narrated her ordeal so convincingly if it was not true.
Moreover, medical evidence on record corroborates AAA’s
testimony.34
The Court of Appeals also held that Senieres defenses of
denial and alibi have no leg to stand on. Senieres failed to
present convincing proof that he was present at some other
place about the time of the alleged crime and that he was at
such other place for so long a time that it was impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime when the crime was
committed. Senieres likewise failed to substantiate his claim
that AAA was not in Baguio on 22 November 1998 and that
she was neither at T. Alonzo Street on 17 December 1998.35
The Court of Appeals, however, modified the award of moral
damages to ₱50,000.00 for each count of rape and imposed
an additional amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
each count of rape.36
In the Court’s Resolution37 dated 3 July 2006, the parties
were required to submit their respective supplemental briefs.
Senieres, through the Public Attorney’s Office,
manifested38 that he will adopt all the issues and discussion
in his appellant’s brief dated 16 April 2002. The Office of the
Solicitor General likewise manifested39 that it will adopt the
discussions in its appellee’s brief40 dated 4 September 2002
as its supplemental brief. The case is again before us for final
disposition.
After a careful and meticulous review of the records of the
case, the Court finds no reason to overturn the findings of
fact and conclusions commonly reached by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. The Court affirms Senieres’ conviction.
Senieres contends that no rape occurred on 22 November
1998 as AAA’s injuries could have been sustained even before
said date. He also maintains that AAA’s injuries could have
been caused only by a finger as it was not established that
what was inserted inside AAA’s vagina was Senieres’ penis. If
at all, he claims he should only be held liable for the crime of
acts of lasciviousness.
Senieres’ contentions are bereft of merit.
First, it should be reiterated that in a rape case, what is most
important is the credible testimony of the victim. A medical
examination and a medical certificate are merely
corroborative and are not indispensable to a prosecution for
rape. The court may convict the accused based solely on the
victim’s credible, natural and convincing testimony.41 In this
case, both the courts are in agreement that AAA was candid,
natural, forthright and unwavering in her testimony that
Senieres raped her on two occasions. AAA’s credibility is
strengthened by the absence of evidence showing that she
had any ill-motive in testifying against Senieres.
Secondly, Dr. Villaseñor’s report revealed that AAA suffered
shallow, healed lacerations at 7 and 9 o’clock positions and a
deep healed laceration at 3 o’clock position and that she was
in a non-virgin state. It should be noted that the examination
was made in April 1999, months after the incidents of rape
occurred in November and December 1998. The presence of
such healed lacerations is consistent with and corroborative of
AAA’s testimony that she had indeed been raped by Senieres
months before the date of the examination. Hymenal
lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of
forcible defloration.42 And when the consistent and forthright
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings,
there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the
essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been
established.43
Thirdly, AAA categorically said that Senieres inserted his penis
into her vagina and that she felt pain when he did.44 Dr.
Villaseñor’s testimony supports AAA’s assertion, to wit:
PROS. CENTENO:
Q Now, going back to the 7:00 o’clock, 9:00 o’clock and 3:00
o’clock deep healed lacerations which you found on the
hymen of the victim, Doctor, what could have been the
possible cause of these 7:00 o’clock, 9:00 o’clock and 3:00
o’clock lacerations?
A This is caused by [the] insertion of a foreign object or
instrument, sir.
Q Now, what would be the possible foreign object or
instrument which could have been inserted in the vagina of
the victim which could have caused these kinds of laceration?
A Possible instruments like a fully erect male genital organ,
finger, or any blunt object that is inserted into the genital
organ, sir.
Q Now, in your examination as a medico-legal officer of the
Philippine National Police, Doctor, what would be the most
possible foreign object that would cause [these kinds] of
lacerations?
He claimed that on both occasions, he was somewhere else
and could not have been at the scene of the crime.
Having been positively and unmistakably identified by AAA as
her rapist, Senieres’ weak defenses of denial and alibi cannot
prosper. The settled jurisprudence is that categorical and
consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill-
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying thereon,
prevails over the defenses of denial and alibi which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, as in the cases
at bar, constitute self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law.

A The [sic] fully erect male genital organ, sir.
Q Now, why do you say that the most possible foreign object
which could have cause [these kinds] of lacerations would be
a fully erect male genital organ?
A Considering, sir, that there were three lacerations and there
was a laceration that was considered deep, that may be
caused only by the insertion of a male organ, sir.45
AAA likewise clearly testified that Senieres inserted his penis
into her anus, to wit:
Q And after your uncle Eming was able to remove your shorts
and panty, what happened next?
Alibi, like denial, is also inherently weak and easily fabricated.
For this defense to justify an acquittal, the following must be
established: the presence of the appellant in another place at
the time of the commission of the offense and the physical
impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime. These
requisites have not been met. Senieres claimed to be at a
relative’s house on both occasions of rape. Considering that
this relative’s house is a jeepney ride away from the house
where the two (2) incidents of rape were committed, it would
have still been physically possible for him to be present at the
scene of the crimes at the time of their consummation.
In sum, the guilt of Senieres was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court therefore affirms his conviction for two (2)
counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 16691-R and 16692-R.

A Itudtodok na diay buto na diay ubet ko (He was inserting

his penis into my anus).46
It may be well to point out that the trial court found AAA’s
testimony to be truthful, viz.:
There is no reason to doubt [AAA’s] testimony. She was
candid, natural, forthright and unwavering. In short, her
testimony bears the earmarks of credibility.
Further strengthening [AAA’s] credibility is her lack of ulterior
motive against the accused and the absolute absence of
evidence that even remotely suggested that she could have
been actuated by ill motive. It is settled that where there is
no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that she was not so actuated and her
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.47
It is a settled principle that the trial court’s evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the
highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude,
having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’
demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in
which they gave their testimony. Unless the trial judge plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, his
assessment on credibility must be respected.48
With respect to Senieres’ civil liability, the Court affirms the
award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages in favor of AAA for being a victim of simple
statutory rape. However, the award of ₱50,000.00 civil
indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral damages adjudged by the
appellate court for the crime of rape by sexual assault are
excessive and should be reduced. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence, AAA is entitled to an award of ₱25,000.00 civil
indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages for being a victim
of rape by sexual assault.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 December 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01448 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. 16691-R, appellant
HERMENIGILDO SENIERES is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify AAA the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. In Criminal Case No. 16692-R, appellant
HERMENIGILDO SENIERES is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum;
and to pay AAA the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity
and ₱25,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

AAA’s alleged act of casually putting on her underwear after

the rape and her failure to immediately report the two (2)
incidents of rape do not vitiate the credibility of her account.
The Court has repeatedly observed that no standard form of
behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her
defilement, particularly by a child who could not be expected
to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. People react
differently to emotional stress and rape victims are no
different from them.

Moreover, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of

rape has not always been construed as an indication of a false
accusation. The principle applies with greater force where, as
in this case, AAA was only 11 years old and was, in all
likelihood, susceptible to intimidation and threats of physical
harm especially from a close relative.

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution,

Senieres merely interposed the defenses of denial and alibi.