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G.R. No.

83484 February 12, 1990 Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher
in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,

vs.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents. titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but
no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No.
09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207
for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows: On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and
lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were
transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:

a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his
plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a
mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the
scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;' foundation.

b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not limited to, Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties.
specific items already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother,
thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff; from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed
to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider
the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees plus costs.
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein
movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late
Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo) Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation,
besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each
other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel
"Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding
deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she
filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to
heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be
Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of 2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the fraud;
properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative
on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the
foundation would be facilitated.
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative
within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and

On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr.
Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and
proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be 4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo). Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement,
the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.

Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On I. The question of jurisdiction—
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the
denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court,
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said
estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
Javellana-Villanueva. terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).

On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that
Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the
Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial
possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
reconsideration.

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order
1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto. directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted
Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues: below:

1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and 2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated
recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these
proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court; proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It
further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold
died on February 26, 1977. that a separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of
the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v.
Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)

During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the late
Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is
the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the range of the
been living with [sic] during his lifetime. administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)

xxx xxx xxx A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)

2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445,
late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City. April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has
not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson,
supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an
action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a
(pp, 14-16, Record) proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another
court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742;
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch
Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-
23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself
14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
(Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her
in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of
Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a
separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement
filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they
claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled
to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial
court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a
in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On
court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v.
appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a
improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No.
daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed between her and her father in the
1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
partition. (p. 378).

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project
years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant
of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion
case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself
or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary
declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in
the interest of justice.
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted
in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and
pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings
in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-
heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix,
Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for 6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the
these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court. lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the
necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else required by
law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied
that they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record;
II. The question of extrinsic fraud— emphasis supplied)

Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by choice.
Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed
13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time. with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.

Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing party which 2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the petition
prevented a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of
from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197,
the judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate
submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977
was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole
the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as
through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96
Phil. 248)

... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared
as the sole heir. ... .
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the
defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting
fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required by law, despite which the
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22,
affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Record)
Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)

The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from judgment
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons: nor a motion for new trial.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who inherits by operation of
law property from his descendants.
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in rem no
subsequent errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the
third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his mother's
side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of
Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's
side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship 3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his
if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
fraud.

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in
such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio,
2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited
1149) by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not
apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article
891.

It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested
person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing
her own. Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving
spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003
and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:

III. On the question of reserva troncal—

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and
that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision
of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

ART. 891.The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the
from which said property came. whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that: agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend
to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).

Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the
collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly registered in
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
estate. (p. 57, Rollo)

1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving students as the
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share— Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State
College, and the University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.

However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of
his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and 2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist Community for a
confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
Proceeding No. 2540:

3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and enrichment of the
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation
Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each may be named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions.
other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away
for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)

4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community needs and be able
to alleviate partially or totally said needs.
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of
Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the
education of indigent but deserving students as well. 5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum
at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College,
as a token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which has made this
foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no masses or their equivalents will be offered every February and October, and Requiem masses every February
evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine 25th and October llth, their death anniversaries, as part of this provision.
National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018;
People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May
20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loans from
whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the income or
such part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in the case, objectives of the Foundation.
although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her
husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every kind and hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-
description or any interest herein. half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the
entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which
both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal
number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishments of any of purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an
the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.
corporation, including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular.
(pp. 9-10, Rollo)
SO ORDERED.

As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:

The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated
in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum
Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the most outstanding student
teacher.

The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which was donated
by the Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.

The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He studied at St.
Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist
Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist priests or
brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.

Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising
drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor
her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
[ GR No. L-11960, Dec 27, 1958 ] dated October 22, 1956, filed by appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned, such that one-
half of the same be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they
DIONISIA PADURA + inherit by right of representation from their respective parents, the original reservees. To this petition, appellees
filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all (the eleven reservees) be deemed as inheriting in their own
DECISION right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share.
G. R. No. L-11960

Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in its Special Proceedings Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reservees (without
No. 4551. distinction) "co-owners, pro-indiviso, equal shares of the parcels of land" subject matter of the suit.

The facts are simple and undisputed. Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios
wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom they named Manuel Padura, and with his second, Benita Garing; (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendant
he had two children named Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura. (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the
reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share
twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly probated in Special Proceedings No,
664 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children, Manuel,
Candelaria and Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under the probate proceedings, Fortunate The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of the property under Art, 891 of the new
was adjudicated four parcels of land covered under Decree No. 25960 issued In Land Registration Case No. 86 Civil Code (Art. 811 of the Code of 1889) the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share
G. L. R. O. No. 10818, object of this appeal. twice as large as that of the others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Arts.
949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on intestate succession.

"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half
Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a will; and not having any issue, the blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.(949)n
said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother, Benita Garing. She applied for and later was issued
a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, but subject to the condition that the properties were reservable in favor
of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, in accordance with the
applicable provision of law, under a decree of the court dated August 25, 1916, in Land Registration Case No. G. "Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stripes, in accordance
L. R. O. No. 10818. with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood, (951)"

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject. After mature
reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule
On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate children, the appellants designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line
herein, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino, Six years later, on October 6, 1940, Manuel from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
Padura also died. Surviving him are his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, ascendant (reservista). To this end, the Code provides:
and Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.
"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15, 1952, appellants and appellees took possession from which said property came. (811)"
of the reservable properties. In a resolution, dated August 1, 1953, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in
Special Proceedings No. 4551, the legitimate children of the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent in the law of Castile. The President of the
were declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original Spanish Code Commission, D. Manuel Alonso Martinez, explained the motives for the formulation of the reserva
reserveess Candelaria Padura and Manuel Padura, having predeceased the reservista). The instant petition,
troncal in the Civil Code of 1889 in his book "El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con las Legislaciones Forales" 'El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrativo de_ otro
(Madrid, 1884, Vol. 1, pp. 226-228, 233-235) in the following words: ascendiente ó de un hermano, se halla obligado á reservar los que hubiese adquirido por ministerio de la ley en
favor de los parientes del difunto que se hallaran comprendidos dentro del tercer grado y que lo sean por la parte
"La base cuarta, á más de estar en pugna con la legislacion española, es una desviacion del antiguo derecho de donde proceden los bienes.'
romano y del moderno derecho europeo, perfectamente conformes ambos con el tradicional sistema de Castilla.
En qué se fundó, pues, la Comision para semejante novedad? Que razones pudieron moverla á establecer la "No voy á discutir ahora si esta fórmula es más ó ménos feliz, y si debe aprobarse tal cual está redactada ó si há
sucesion lineal, separándose del cáuce secular? menester de enmienda ó adicion. Aplazo este examen para cuando trate de la sucesion intestada, á la cual tiene
mayor aplicacion. Por el momento me limito á reconocer. primero: que con esta base desaparece el peligro de
que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente y á titulo gratuito á manos extrañas por el
azar de los enlaces y de muertes prematuras; segundo: que sin negar que sea una novedad esta base del
"Lo diré en breves frases. Hay un case, no del todo raro, que subleva el sentimiento de cuantos lo imaginan ó lo derecho de Castllla, tiene en rigor en su abono la autoridad de los Códigos más niveladores y el ejemplo de las
ven: el hijo mayor de un magnate sucede á su padre en la mitad Integra de pingues mayorazgos, tocando á sus naciones más democráticas de Europe, si no en la extension en que lo presenta la Comision Codificadora, á lo
hermanos un lote modestisimo en la division de la herencia paterna; aquel hijo se casa y fallece al poco tiempo ménos en el principio generador de la reforma." (pp.233-235)
dejando un tierno vástago; la viuda, todavia jóven, contrae segundas bodas y tiene la desdicha de perder al hijo
del primer matrimonio heredando toda su fortuna con exclusion de la madre y los hermanos de su primer marido. The stated purpose o£ the reserva is accomplished once property has devolved to the specified relatives of the
No hay para qué decir que, si hay descendientes del segundo matrimonio, á ellos se trasmite en su dia la line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one
hereticia. Por donde resulta el irritante espectáculo de que los vástagos directos del magnate viven en la reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
estrechez y tal vez en la miseria, mientras gozan de su rico patrimonio personas extrañas á su familia y que, por respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
un órden natural, la son profundamente antipáticas. Esta hipótesis se puede realizar y se realize, aunque por lo succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
general en menor escala, entre propietarios, banqueros é industriales. labradores y comerciantes, sin necesidad ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those
de vinculaciones ni titulos nobiliarios. nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus) , excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree
(Florentine vs. Florentine, 40 Phil. 489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905).
And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates
in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
"Pues bien, la mayoria de la Comision se preocupó vivamente de esto, considerando el principio de familia como
superior al del afecto presumible del difunto. A esta impresion obedecia la propuesta del Sr. Garcia Goyena, para "Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are re1atives of the descendant within
que á los ascendientes se les diera su legitima tan sólo en usufructo: en idéntica razon se apoyaba el Sr. Franco the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista
para pedir con insistencia se declarase que, si un ascendiente tenia hecha una donacion á su descendiente, bien (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
fuese al contraer matrinionio ó bien con cualquiera otro motivo, y muriese el donatario sin sucesion, volvieran los representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
bienes donados al donante, sin perjuicio de la legitima que pudiera corresponderle en su calidad de ascendiente. among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
La Comision no se atrevió a ir tan allá como estos dos Sres. Vocales; pero, para eludir las consecuencias que á right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
las veces produce el principio de la proximidad del parentesco y que he puesto de relieve poco há, proclamó, no designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came.
sin vacilar, la doctrina de la sucesion lineal." (pp.226-227) Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the
law does not recognize them as such.

"Y este fué el temperamento que, por indicacion mia, adoptó la Comision Codificadora, norabrando una Sub-
comision que redactara las bases é que habia de sujetarse esta especie de reversion de los bienes inmuebles al In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as
tronco de donde procedan, lo mismo en la sucesion testamentaria que en la intestada, sin perjuicio del derecho reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
sacratisimo de los padres al disfrute de la herencia de sus hijos malogrados prematuramente. part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came. x x x." (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)
(Emphasis supplied) (see also Nieva and Alacala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
"Dicha Subcomision, compuesta de los Sres. Durán y Bás y Franco como defensores del régimen f oral, y de los Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule
Sres. Manresa y Garcia Goyena en representacion de la legislacion castellana, sometieron á la deliberacion de la that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.
Comision Codificadora la proposicion siguiente: If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of
nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be Scaevola, that later became known as the theory of reserva integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ. p. 332 et seq.). But,
likewise operative. as we have seen, the Supreme Courts of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and consider that
the reservable property should be succeeded by the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic
rules of intestacy. The refutation of the trial court's position is found in the following, passage of Manresa's
Commentaries (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 346):
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property
should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable "A esto se objeta que el derecho consignado en el articulo 811 es un derecho propio que nace de la mera calidad
rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened de pariente; no un derecho que se adquiere por sucesión. Ciertamente, el derecho se concede a los parientes
by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly lineales dentro del tercer grado; pero se les concede con motivo de la muerte de un descendiente y en la
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. sucesión de este. Ellos suceden por la procedencia especial de los bienes después de ser éstos disfrutados por
250): el ascendiente; pero suceden a titulo lucrativo y por causa de muerte y ministerio de la ley, lo cual es dificil
poderlo negar. Hasta podrlan estimarse esos parientes legitimarios o herederos forzosos, como el mismo autor
"creándose un verdadero estado excepcipnal del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino más bien restringirse, el reconoce en otro lugar de su obra. De modo que este argumento no es convincente."
alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepción mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la
disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentals del Código en materia de sucesión, en aquellos All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor keeping to a minimum the alterations introduced by
extremos no resueltos de un raodo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accián de la reserva que the reserva in the basic rules of succession mortis causa.
se crea."

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's hostility to successional
reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserve viudal and the reversion legal of the WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed and set aside, and the reservatarios who are
Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980). nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-
blood. Let the records be remanded to the court below for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are
the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything So Ordered.
that might frustrate their reversionary right: and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the
Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of
the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may
not dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The
latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservist, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios
are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol.
VI, Torao 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) Had the nephews of whole and half-
blood succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full-blood would undoubtedly receive a double share compared
to those of the half-blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.) Why then should the latter receive equal shares simply
because the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent
(causante) the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why the hereditary portions
should vary.

It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by distinguished commentators of the
Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Román (Estudios, Vol. 65 Tomo 2, p. 1008) and Mucius Scaevola
(Código Civil, Vol 14, p. 342). The reason given by these authors is that the reservatarios are called by law to
take the reservable property because they belong to the line of origin; and not because of their relationship. But
the argument, if logically pursued, would lead to the conclusion that the property should pass to any and all the
reservatarios, as a class, and in equal shares, regardless of lines and degrees. In truth, such is the thesis of
G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919 That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son,
the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver
and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs. That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina
Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes
Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother,
Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property, described in the complaint, which the said
Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena,
a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone the fruits of
Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the
lands described in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled to
minor Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes,
one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein, either by direct participation or by
Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose
representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino
and her husband, alleging as follows:

That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to deliver their corresponding
part of the reservable property; that without any justifiable motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the marriage he begot
deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent for
nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the
the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per
surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married the second time Severina Faz de Leon
bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-
with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio
eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the
Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon
value of the fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the
and the ten children first above mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th of
aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that all
March 1890.
the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same, in the
quantity and proportion mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants
Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in question,
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died single, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the
without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.
legitimate children of the deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now
deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino,
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of action is based on the
another son of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.
obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited from her deceased son
Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there
being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will before the notary public of the death of this husband nor have any natural child; that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in
Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his article 968 and the following articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the
widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property should be provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those extraneous to
divided among all of his children of both marriages. the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina Faz de Leon from her
deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated from his father and her husband) has
all passed into the hands of the defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common
ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is
evident that the property left at the death of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass
after the death of his mother Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said the parties, that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer would be the same which the defendants would
property having been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of allege in their answer — those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would have to decide — and
the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant Mercedes, by operation that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist — they could do no less — upon alleging
law, entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother Severina the same facts as those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were afterwards set up, he would be
Faz de Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the character of reservable property — obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs — in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the
there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right to bring the action stated in their complaint.
and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said property may not passed into the possession of strangers
are void, inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino is a forced
heiress of her mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the
plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary — as in this case what has
Leon who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime; that in been done does not prejudice the parties — the appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit according to its
the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the legitime of her daughter merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the question of law in controversy so that
Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be
legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the supreme followed, the suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion
court of Spain of January 4, 1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for its determination.
plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively to all the
property, rights and actions left by her legitimate mother, although the said defendant has a better right than the
plaintiffs; and that there would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the provisions of article 811
violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal protection.
of the Civil Code, and whether the same article is applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is
Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
necessary to determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of the nature of
reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina
Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited said property from her son
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the defendants from the complaint and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and
condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs. reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.

Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial; said motion was The above mentioned article reads:
overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified
and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property
ordering the latter to amend their complaint within the period prescribed by the rules — undoubtedly believing that came.
the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause of action, and that, as both parties were
agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of
the law, already submitted to the decision of the court — the said judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two children were born, namely
established by law, decided the case by absolving the defendants from the complaint and by condemning the
the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father). At the death of
plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he left, one of whom,
the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the aforementioned property enumerated in the
complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III died and was succeeded by his legitimate
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering the complaint of the plaintiffs, mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908, instituted
confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not by will as her sole heiress her surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took
constitute a cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the defendants, thereby making an end to possession of all property left by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the
the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy between property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and
which, at the death of the said posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
Even if Severina left in her will said property, together with her own, to her only daughter and forced heiress,
Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as
the common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
same (by operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon. part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came. These reservatarios have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third
degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his brothers, by a lucrative title
or by inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property
was inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article 811
of the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena
the line from which such property came. are the legitimate children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel,
Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his
deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose
Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of the deceased Espirita
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its enjoyment, use or Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their
trust, merely for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain aforementioned mother; and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their
designated persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration the nature of legitimate father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact,
the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in admitted by both parties, that the other children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II
the same manner as forced heirs (because they are also such) — said property reverts to said line as long as the died without issue so that this decision does not deal with them.
aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios
(person for whom property is reserved), and are relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from whom
the reservable property came.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III;
the posthumos son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first marriage —
Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their own
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living, within the third degree, twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are
relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, the relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being
however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable property and which constitutes his his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers).
legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of As the first four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from the common
property, by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance
at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of reservable to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the third degree
to the line from which such property came.lawphil.net

In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge refused to accept the theory
of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within said article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes Florentino survived
the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of her
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article
right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of 811 of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from the same line
designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or expectation on the part of the
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into existence because as said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve
there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property. and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.

The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil Code does not destroy the It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by operation of law all of the
system of legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case reservable property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or
would be permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which exclusively belongs to forms parts of the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to be the legitimate
the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides that and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes,
the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by law. Neither could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the
can he impose upon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions other relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself are entitled to such
concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, reservable property.
1911.

For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino, coming from the
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining whether they property left inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the application of article
at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino,
of reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property, there being no lawful or just reason which
serves as real foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree, to
participate in the reservable property in question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an
indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever, they should not be granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same
passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable
property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall
into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order of person other than those The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter Mercedes, the property received
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of reservable property; and that the mother,
property. If this property was in fact clothed with the character and condition of reservable property when Severina the said Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to reserve same for the relatives within the third degree of
Faz de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable
ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or property, left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the
return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her inheritance left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced heiress,
daughter, Mercedes Florentino. with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she
received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable property, held before the
reservatarios received same.

Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits and
receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate
of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took possession of the property in
(reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such character. question, same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the
only reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice why the other
reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within the third degree in accordance with the precept of
article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the property which, as reservable property, pertain
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of her only to them.
living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the
reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the
other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Spain on January 4,
1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.

Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the legitime of the forced heirs
cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.

However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not been shown, upon any
legal foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista,
there being relatives within the third degree of the person from whom same came; that said property, upon
passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former;
and that the said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive all of said
property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree of certain portions thereof.

Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the delivery of the fruits
collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no evidence of any damage which can give rise to the
obligation of refunding same. As to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the principal
part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-
sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the quantity expressed in
paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17, 1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh
part should go to the defendant Mercedes.

For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision appealed from we should
declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon
from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased
Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant
Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel
Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of
the land and of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one
thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913 Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of
property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs. The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the
land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved — a contention we regard
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees. as indefensible.

Francisco Dominguez for appellant. Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan
had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had
Crispin Oben for appellees. likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they
having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers. These
are admitted facts.
ARELLANO, C.J.:

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be reserved. title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in
Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third
Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 degree of blood relationship.
centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has
had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the
parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based
the application for registration of her ownership.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had
acquired without a valuable consideration — that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan — appeared in the Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the
case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they
granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
11, 12.)

But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of exceptions. operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is
required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application
Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her
before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their
right, admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).

Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro
Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two presumed to be acquired by operation of law — that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this
parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish
conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died and not by operation of law.
without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the
Civil Code:

Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right
required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following
exclusion of collaterals. statement of hers at the trial:

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said that
her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish.
The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and
not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811
of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with. The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that
the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right
required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they
really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would
not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a
legitimate ascendant.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant alleges
prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording
in the property registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the children Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190.
and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight
in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.) allegation.)

In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first
what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of
not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says. the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who
are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the
Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days,
for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking
here that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not
prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by law to
be reserved" (p. 69 of the record). Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968
thereof, where it says:

The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the
mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be
but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or
required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without
into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect a valuable consideration."
in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811
of the Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the
Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage
Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not
Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a
favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of
of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage.
guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of
accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.) November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:

The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being indisputable, That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be
even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not
enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which
the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the is the same in both cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that
property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and
as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with property required by law to be reserved,
subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the
essential points may not be out of place here. law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.

The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not the Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court has already
first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to
states: which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle
exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are found."

The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications necessary for its
adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred
regions the renovation of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit. of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to
institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that
article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again.
The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved,
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day. annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal
property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the proceeding to which
what is validly alienated. the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said
article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."

But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a
principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the
remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the
of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus: date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has
elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other
case, their legal representatives."

The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by
the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the
person who should legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the
be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no
reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in
respect to the father. question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute
proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be
sustained.

In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that said
article 168 reads as thus:
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring that the
property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the
proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of
Legal mortgage is established: the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting
proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved.
It is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up
by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
1. ...

Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set forth in
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required to be
its decision:
reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.

Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the deceased
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for
Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right
required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should
by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not
for the exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person
obligation of the person who must make the reservation. who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who
has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery
the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or
using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary
which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership. and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in
article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of
disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this: provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form
prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds
the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the
right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil
child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the
Code?
right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.

There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the person in
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of
whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for
the property itself:
registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does
not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May
21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the
enforcement thereof. Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving spouse after
contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the
first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct and the fee simple; the
remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive
emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition subsequent, to
what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.) wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive."

In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained — that is, that the If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily
surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer.
usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of
(Ibid., 238.) the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:

The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or alienate it,
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that
belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in right in the registration.
the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the
property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property.
If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a
limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the
consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must
disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no
that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right
required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can give what does not belong
absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will
children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not in their turn have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to
establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and
surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first they will complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the
marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the reservation. death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)

Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and obligations during The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the
the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words: rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although
under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the
property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it,
because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the
extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that
expectation to their heirs.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of
the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and,
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the
the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct. hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus
creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they
are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the
fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should,
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the
after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the
property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also
property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of
on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974
December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he
and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner
exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent
the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged
of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as
in the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that
may even become absolute should that person die."
the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to
continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the person required
by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all,
absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than
relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the time prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of
property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If December 30, 1897.)
they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a mere than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what
usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the
made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is
the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use
and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has
during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an
incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is
re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants,
the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest. recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents,
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to costs.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use,
enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can
alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:

Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is annexed to
his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in
whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two
parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:

The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)

If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it. This
title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed — that the alienation the
purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which
says:

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold,
with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he
recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this
condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way as
the owner of a thing mortgaged — that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the
consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in
the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected

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