Corazon Macapagal vs. People of the
The Motion for Reconsideration is bound to
Philippines
G.R. No. 193217 February 26, 2014
© Roz Camacho
FACTS:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision
finding Petitioner Corazon Macapagal guilty of the
crime of Estafa for misappropriating for her own
benefit 800,000 Php, the value of unreturned and
unsold jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on
January 13, 2009 then timely moved for
reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated
May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received
on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a notice of
Appeal on August 3, 2009 but the same was denied
on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.
Thus, this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the RTC of Manila gravely erred in
denying the Notice of Appeal filed by
petitioner-appellant
(2) WON the RTC erred in denying the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner-
appellant
HELD:
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
(1) NO. Petitioner availed of the wrong mode of
assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of
appeal. Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and
when appeal is taken. The disallowance of the notice
of appeal disallows the appeal itself. A petition for
review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal of a lower
court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme
Court. However the questioned order denying the
notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from
which an appeal may be taken. The petitioner should
have availed of a special civil action under Rule 65.
Thus, in availing the wrong mode of appeal under
Rule 45 instead of Rule 65, the petition merits an
outward dismissal.
Even if the petition was treated as one for Certiorari
under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of
the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and CA to
issue writs of certiorari, the petitioner has no
absolute freedom of choice of court to which the
application is directed. Direct Resort to the Supreme
Court is allowed only if there are special, important
and compelling reasons clearly and specifically
spelled out in the petition, which are not present in
this case.
(2) NO.
fail because of petitioner’s repeated disregard of the
Rules and Court’s lawful orders. Petitioner failed to
comply with the Court’s resolutions and Rule 7 Sec. 4
on Verification despite the giving of extension and
counsel’s unsatisfactory explanation for the
extension.
Design Resources International Inc.
and Kenneth Sy
vs.
Lourdes L. Estringcol
G.R. No. 193966 February 19, 2014
© Ash Salvoza
FACTS:
Design Sources International, Inc. ("Petitioner
Corporation") is a distributor of Pergo flooring.
Sometime in 1998, the Private Respondent bought
the said brand of flooring of the "Cherry Blocked"
type from the Petitioner Corporation. The flooring
was installed in her house.
On February 24, 2000, the Private Respondent
discovered that the Pergo flooring installed had
unsightly bulges at the joints and seams. The Private
Respondent informed the Petitioners of these
defects and the former insisted on the repair or
replacement of the flooring at the expense of the
latter.
After several inspections of the alleged defective
flooring, meetings between the parties and
exchanges of correspondence, the Petitioner
Corporation was given until May 31, 2000 to replace
the installed flooring. Nevertheless, on the deadline,
the Petitioner Corporation did not comply with the
demand of the Private Respondent. A complaint for
damages, docketed as Civil Case No.00-850, was thus
filed by the Private Respondent before the RTC on
July 13, 2000.
On February 8, 2006, Kenneth Sy, one of the
Petitioners' witnesses, testified in open
court.Immediately after his testimony, the following
occurred as evidenced by the transcript of
stenographic notes (“TSN”):
COURT : (To Atty. Posadas) Who will be your next
witness?
ATTY. POSADAS : Your honor, my next witness will
be Stephen Sy, also of Design Source.
ATTY FORTUN : Your honor, may I know if Mr.
Stephen Syaround [sic] the courtroom?
ATTY. POSADAS : (Pointing to the said witness) He is
here.
ATTY. FORTUN : So the witness is actually inside the
Courtroom.
ATTY. POSADAS : But, your honor, please, I was
asking about it, nahiyalangakokay Atty. Fortun.
ATTY. FORTUN : But I was [sic] asked of the exclusion
of the witness.
COURT : (To Atty. Posadas) You shall have to tell the
Court of your ready witness.
ATTY. FORTUN : He already heard the whole
testimony of his colleague.
ATTY. POSADAS : I'm sorry, your honor.
COURT : All right. When were you present him,
today or next time.
ATTY. POSADAS : Next time, your honor.
COURT : All right. Next time, Atty. Posadas, if you
have other witnesses present in Court inform us.
ATTY. FORTUN : No, your honor, in fact I will object
to the presentation of Mr. Stephen Sy, because his
[sic] here all the time when the witness was cross-
examined.
ATTY. POSADAS : Your honor, I will just preserve [sic]
my right to present another witness on the technical
aspect of this case.
COURT : Okay. All right. Order. After the completion
of the testimony of defendant's second witness in
the person of Mr. Kenneth Sy, [A]tty. Benjamin
Posadas, counsel for the defendants, moved for
continuance considering that he is not feeling well
and that he needs time to secure another witness to
testify on the technical aspect, because of the
objection on the part of plaintiff's counsel Atty.
Philip SigfridFortun on his plan of presenting of Mr.
Stephen Sy as their next witness due to his failure to
inform the Court and the said counsel of the
presence of the said intended witness while Mr.
Kenneth Sy was testifying. There being no objection
thereto on the part of Atty. Fortun, reset the
continuation of the presentation of defendant's
evidence to April 5, 2006 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.
On 22 March 2006, petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the Order, but their motion was
denied by the RTC on 1 June 2006 on the ground
that “the Court deems it no longer necessary to
allow Stephen Syfrom testifying when a different
witness could testify on matters similar to the
intended testimony of the former.” The Order also
stated that “to allow Stephen Sy from testifying *sic+
would work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff as he
already heard the testimony of witness Kenneth Sy.”
Petitioners filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration (with Leave of Court) dated 19 June
2006, which was likewise denied by the RTC in the
assailed Order dated 26 February 2007.
Petitioners sought recourse before the CA by way of
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court raising the issue whether or not the RTC has
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to allow Stephen Sy to testify.
At the outset, the CA found no sufficient basis that
herein respondent previously asked for the exclusion
of other witnesses. It was the duty of respondent’s
counsel to ask for the exclusion of other witnesses,
without which, there was nothing to prevent
Stephen from hearing the testimony of petitioners’
other witnesses. Nevertheless, following the
doctrine laid down in People v. Sandal (Sandal), the
appellate court ruled that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Orders considering that petitioners failed to show
that Stephen’s testimony would bolster their
position. Moreover, from the Manifestation of
petitioners’ counsel, it appears that petitioners had
another witness who could give a testimony similar
to Stephen’s.
Petitioners elevated the case to the SC assailing the
Decision of the CA. In the meantime, trial proceeded
in the lower court. On 11 February 2014, they filed a
Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction or Temporary Restraining
Order either to allow the presentation of Stephen as
a witness or to suspend the trial proceedings
pending the ruling in the instant Petition.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC has committed a grave abuse of
discretion for not allowing Stephen Sy to testify.
SC RULING:
Yes. Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On
any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the
court any witness not at the time under
examination, so that he may not hear the testimony
of other witnesses. The judge may also cause
witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented
from conversing with one another until all shall have
been examined.
There is nothing in the records of this case that
would show that there was an order of exclusion
from the RTC, or that there was any motion from
respondent’s counsel to exclude other witnesses
from the courtroom prior to or even during the
presentation of the testimony of Kenneth. We are
one with the CA in finding that under such
circumstances, there was nothing to prevent
Stephen from hearing the testimony of Kenneth.
Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen to
testify for petitioners.
Therefore, this Court finds that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in not allowing Stephen to
testify notwithstanding the absence of any order for
exclusion of other witnesses during the presentation
of Kenneth's testimony.
In view thereof, the RTC is hereby ordered to allow
the presentation of Stephen Sy as witness for
petitioners. Accordingly, petitioners' Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is now
rendered moot.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio E. Unica vs. Anscor Swire Ship
Management Corporation,
G.R. No. 184318 February 12, 2014
© Carl Deita
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed by respondent, a manning
agency for seafarers. His last contract was for a
period of nine months from January 29, 2000 to
October 25, 2000. However, since the vessel was still
at sea, Petitioner was only repatriated on November
14, 2000 which is twenty days after the expiration of
his contract. Petitioner assumed that the twenty day
extension was an implied renewal of his contract. On
November 14, 2000, after repatriation, he was
dismissed without a valid cause.
An illegal dismissal case was then filed by the
Petitioner.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the Petitioner. It
ruled that there was implied renewal when the
Petitioner was not repatriated after the expiration of
his contract. It directed Respondent to pay
Petitioner his salary for unexpired portion of his
impliedly renewed contract, medical benefits and
attorney’s fees.
Respondent appealed to NLRC but it affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter with modification.
NLRC deleted medical benefits and reduced the
amount of attorney’s fees.
Aggrieved by the decision, Respondent filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA where it annulled
and set aside the decision of NLRC. CA ruled that
there was no implied renewal of contract, it was due
to the mere fact that it cannot be done because the
ship was still at sea.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an implied renewal
of Petitioner’s contract.
HELD:
The Petition is without merit.
In the case at bar, although Petitioner’s contract
ended on October 25, 2000 and disembark only on
November 14, 2000 did not render automatic
renewal of contract. It was not done because the
said vessel was still at sea, thus It was deemed
impossible but only it was impossible the said
petitioner would have been repatriated by virtue of
the contract’s expiration because a seafarer partakes
the nature of a co-terminus employee.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO
VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY
VINGSON DEMAISIP, Petitioner,
vs.
JOVY CABCABAN, Respondent.
UDK No. 14817 January 13, 2014
© Monz Gestoso
FACTS:
September 23,2011 Shang KoVingson Yu (Shang Ko)
run away from their home as alleged by her mother
ShirlyVingdon (Shirly). November 2, 2011 Shirly went
to the police station in Bacolod City upon receipt of
information that Shang Ko was in the custody of
respondent JovyCabcaban (Cabcaban), a police
officer in that station.Shang Ko was no longer with
Cabcaban. Pura an NBI agent told Shirly that Shang
Ko was staying with a private organization called
Calvary Kids.
This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for
habeas corpus against respondent Cabcaban and the
unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of
Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City citing as reason several threats against
her life in that city.
December 18, 2012,the CA denies the petition for its
failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko.
According to the CA, habeas corpus may not be used
as a means of obtaining evidence on the
whereabouts of a person or as a means of finding
out who has specifically abducted or caused the
3
disappearance of such person. The CA denied
petitioner Shirly’s motion for reconsideration on
January 8, 2013, hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES:
Whether or not habeas corpus may be availed by the
petitioner?
Whether or not the case was properly file with CA?
HELD:
No
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the
writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases
involving the rightful custody over a minor. The
general rule is that parents should have custody over
their minor children. But the State has the right to
intervene where the parents, rather than care for
such children, treat them cruelly and abusively,
impairing their growth and well-being and leaving
them emotional scars that they carry throughout
their lives unless they are liberated from such
parents and properly counseled.
No.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the
parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it would be
best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in
that city.
WHEREFORE, thedecision of Court of Appeals was
set and the case forwarded to the Family Court of
Bacolod City for hearing and adjudication as the
evidence warrants. Meantime the minor Shang
KoVingson remain in the custody of Calvary Kids of
Bacolod City.
Further the Court ORDERS petitioner
ShirlyVingsonShirlyVingsonDemaisip to pay the
balance of the docket and other legal fees within 10
days from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Bignay EX-IM Philippines, Inc. Vs. Union
Bank of the Philippines / Union Bank of the
Philippines
Vs.
Bignay EX-IM Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 171590 & G.R. No. 171598.
February 12, 2014
© Geh Gabriel
FACTS:
Alfonso de Leon, married to Rosario,
mortgaged a real property in favor of Union Bank of
the Philippines in 1984. the given land is located in
Esteban Abada, Loyola Heights, Quezon City which
was later foreclosed and sold at the auction to Union
Bank. On the other hand, Rosario filed a case in 1988
against Alfonso and Union Bank for the annulment of
the prior mortgage, claiming that her husband
mortgaged the property without her consent and for
conveyance.
While the case was pending, Bignay Ex-Im
Philippines, Inc. (Bignay) offered to purchase the
disputed property. On December 20, 1989, the Deed
of Absolute sale was executed between Union Bank
and Bignay conveying the property to the latter for 4
million pesos.
On December 12, 1991, the case was
decided by the court in favor of Rosario annulling the
given contract and declaring her as the owner of the
undivided one-half of the subject property. As a
result, Bignay was evicted from the property.
On March 21, 1994, Bignay filed a case for
breach of warranty against eviction under articles
1547 and 1548 of the Civil Code, with damages
against Union Bank. The trial court rendered its
decision on March 21, 2000, in favor of Bignay,
ordering Union Bank to reimburse the cost of the
land and the value of the constructed building
thereon, since the bank has acted in bad faith. At the
same time, the trial court dismissed the bank’s
counterclaim without prejudice because it did not
acquire its jurisdiction since the bank did not pay the
docket fees.
The Union Bank appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals which ruled that Union Bank
had timely paid its docket fees at the time it filed its
Answer Ad Cautelam on November 4, 1994, as
evidenced by the receipts and the rubber stamped
mark on the face of the answer itself. Hence, the
trial court should have made a ruling thereon.
Bignay filed a Motion for Partial
reconsideration questioning the ruling on the bank’s
counterclaim. On the other hand, Union Bank took
an exception to the application of the decision of the
trial court through its Motion for Reconsideration.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals denied the
respective motions of both parties.
Thus, it lead Bignay to initiate its petition
for Review on Certiorari which was followed by the
filing of the same by Union Bank. These petitions
were then ordered consolidated by the Supreme
Court through its resolution.
ISSUES:
1. In a permissive counterclaim, when should
the docket fees be paid to enable the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over the case?
2. In the event of non-payment of docket fees
for permissive counterclaims, can the court
dismiss the said counterclaims?
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that docket fees
should be paid after the trial court had ruled
that the counterclaim is a permissive one. The
bank in this case never raised the given issue
that it had already paid the corresponding fees
in its motion for reconsideration considering
that the trial court had already dismissed its
 counterclaim. The opportunity to cause the
counterclaim be reinstated was only during the
time that such case was pending before the trial
court.
2. Yes. The SC upheld the trial court’s decision
in dismissing the counterclaims due to non-payment
of docket fees because it did not acquire its
jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, the SC dismissed the counterclaim
of Union Bank.
Penafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc., s. Sugar
Regulatory Administration
G.R. No. 208660
©Beverly Bulanday
FACTS:
Penafrancia Sugar Mill (PENSUMIL) is a corporation
engaged in the business of milling sugar. The Sugar
Regulatory Commission on the other hand (SRA) is a
government entity tasked to uphold the policy of the
State “to promote the growth and development of
the sugar industry through greater and significant
participation of the private sector and to improve
the working conditions of labourers.
SRA issued an order imposing a lien on all raw sugar
quedan permits, as well as any other form of sugar
such as improved raw, washed, blanco directo,
plantation white or refined, in order to fund the
Philippine Sugar Research Institute (PHILSURIN). The
order also provided that the lien shall be paid by
Manager’s Checks in the name of PHILSURIN to be
collected by the mill company concerned.
Thereafter, SRA released issuances extending the
effects of the mentioned order.
PENSUMIL filed a petition for prohibition and
injunction against SRA and PHILSURIN before the
Naga City-RTC. It alleged that the SRA order is
unconstitutional because it was issued beyond the
powers and authority granted to it by law and the
amount levied constitutes public funds and thus
cannot be legally channelled to a private corporation
(referring to PHILSURIN).
SRA and PHILSURIN in response, filed their
respective motions to dismiss on the ground of
forum shopping.
 SRA alleged that there is a pending case for
declaratory relief in the Quezon CitY-RTC and
that the main issue in both the Naga and QC
cases is the validity of the sugar order.
 PHILSURIN noted the existence of a pending
collection case that it filed against PENSUMIL
before the Makati City-RTC. It contended that
the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for in
the Naga and Makati cases are founded on the
same facts such that a final judgment in one will
constitute res judicata on the other.
The Naga City-RTC denied SRA and PHILSURIN’s
motions to dismiss. It held that it was PHILSURIN
and not PENSUMIL that initiated the Makati case and
that the latter only raised the validity of the sugar
order as a defense. The court found that although
the Naga and Makati cases would require the
appreciation of related facts, their respective
resolutions would nevertheless result in different
outcomes, considering that the former is a petition
for prohibition and injunction while the latter is a
simple collection case.
SRA and PHILSURIN moved for reconsideration but
1
the same was denied . Aggrieved, SRA filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA ordered the dismissal of the case on the
ground of forum shopping. The CA found that while
PENSUMIL is not a party in the QC case, the
determination of the validity of the assailed order
would nevertheless amount to res judicata.
PENSUMIL moved for reconsideration but the same
was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PENSUMIL committed forum
shopping.
HELD:
The case at bar should be dismissed for having
become moot and academic.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical value or use. In such an
instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a
petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts
generally decline over such case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness. This is because the judgment
will not serve any useful purpose or have any
practical legal effect because, in the nature of things,
it cannot be enforced.
In this case, the supervening issuance of another
order which revoked the effectivity of the assailed
order has mooted the main case.
1
The Naga City-RTC reiterated that PENSUMIL did not commit
forum shopping. It also held that there is no identity of parties
between the Naga and QC cases. The court explained that the fact
that the QC case involves the validity of the sugar order does not
preclude PENSUMIL’s right to institute an action to protect its
own interests against the same.
 CORAZON S. CRUZ under the name and
style, VILLA CORAZON CONDO
DORMITORY, Petitioner,
vs.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184732 September 9, 2013
© Ceril Lyn Burro
FACTS:
Cruz filed before the RTC of Pasig a
complaint for breach of contract, consignation and
damages against Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA). Cruz alleged that she executed a
contract of lease with MIAA to establish commercial
arcade to sublease to other businesses yet the latter
failed to inform her that part of the leased premise is
subject to an easement for public use. As a result,
she was not able to obtain a building permit as well
as a certification of electrical inspection.
Furthermore, some of Cruz’s stalls located along the
easement area was demolished by MMDA.
On MIAA’s part, it filed a motion to dismiss
stating that there is a violation of the certification
requirement against forum shopping since there is
another case filed in the RTC of Manila. It also added
that there is improper venue since Cruz indicated
that she is a resident of Manila and not Pasig.
The RTC dismissed Cruz’s complaint on the
ground that it constitutes forum shopping yet it
sustain MIAA’s argument on improper venue since
Cruz alleged to be a resident of Manila; therefore,
unless proven otherwise, the complaint shall be
taken on its face value.
On appeal, Cruz pointed out in her appellant’s brief
that the RTC erred in holding that there was forum
shopping, that Cruz is not a real party-in-interest and
that it did not deny MIAA’s motion to dismiss but
she did not raised the issue regarding improper
venue. The MIAA, on the other hand, refuted the
arguments and raised before the CA the argument
regarding improper venue. The CA affirmed the
decision of RTC with modification stating that Cruz
did not commit forum shopping yet the case is
dismissible on the ground of improper venue. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Cruz’s
appeal on the basis of improper venue.
HELD:
The CA committed a reversible error in sustaining
the dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of
improper venue because the same was not an error
raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. The
CA cannot take cognizance of MIAA’s position that
the venue was improperly laid since, being the
appellee, MIAA’s participation was confined to the
refutation of the appellant’s assignment of errors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
ATTY. MARCOS R. SUNDIANG
vs.
ERLITO DS. BACHO, Sheriff IV, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City
© Ariane Bobillo
FACTS:
Spouses Rene Castaneda and Nenita P. Castañeda
filed a complaint for accion publiciana against
defendants Pedro and Rosie Galacan, Vicente
Quesada, Pablo Quesada, Antonio and Norma
Bagares for allegedly depriving them of the use and
possession of a parcel of residential lot registered in
their name, located in Camarin, Caloocan City. After
trial, the RTC ruled that as owners of the subject
property, plaintiffs have a better right over the
property as against the defendants. As such,
defendants were ordered to vacate and surrender
peaceful possession to the plaintiffs of the subject
property,
Defendants appealed before the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
Defendants then sought recourse before the
Supreme Court, but the Court denied the petition
even their motion for reconsideration with finality.
A Writ of Execution was thereafter issued by the RTC
in favor of the plaintiffs. However, since the
defendants refused to vacate the premises and
remove the structures therein, the writ was not
implemented. Hence, plaintiffs filed a motion
praying for the issuance of writ of demolition. The
RTC issued the Writ of Demolition prayed for.
Complainant avers that prior to the issuance of the
writ of demolition, respondent sheriff demanded
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) for
the implementation of the writ. Despite receipt of
the amounts, however, respondent sheriff failed to
place the plaintiffs in possession of the subject
property because he failed to remove the structures
inside and in front of the subject property; hence,
ingress and egress to the property was hindered.
On the other hand, respondent sheriff averred that
he received the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000.00) from the complainant. However, he
denied that he demanded such payment for his
personal benefit. He explained that the amount was
used to pay for the food and fees of the laborers,
who were hired to undertake the demolition of the
concrete structures on the subject property and
those contracted to provide security for the workers
during the demolition. He found it difficult to evict
the defendants because the latter employed various
means to prevent the implementation of the writ of
demolition issued by the RTC. Nevertheless,
respondent sheriff claimed that he was able to fully
implement the writ and that the subject property
was delivered to the possession of the plaintiffs on
December 10, 2004, as evidenced by his Sheriff's
Return.
The Court referred the case to the Executive Judge
of the RTC, Caloocan City, for investigation, report
and recommendation. In her Report and
Recommendation, Investigating Judge
recommended that the complaint against
respondent sheriff be dismissed for want of
evidence. Said Report was referred to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report
and recommendation. However, the OCA
recommended that respondent sheriff be held liable
for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and that he be suspended for a period of
one (1) year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sheriff be held liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
RULING:
Yes.
It is clear from the Rule that before an
interested party pays the expenses of a sheriff, the
latter should first estimate the amount which will
then be submitted to the court for its approval.
Upon approval, the interested party deposits the
amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff.
The latter then disburses the amount to the sheriff
assigned to execute the writ. Thereafter, the amount
received shall then be liquidated and any unspent
amount shall be refunded to the party making the
deposit. From there on, the sheriff shall render a full
report.
The failure of the sheriff to observe the following:
(1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in
executing the writ; (2) ask for the court's approval of
his estimates; (3) render an accounting; and (4) issue
an official receipt for the total amount he received
from the judgment debtor, makes him
administratively liable. In the instant case, none of
these procedures were complied with by respondent
sheriff. He never submitted an estimate to the court
for approval, but, on his own, demanded and
received sums of money from the complainant.
Neither did he advise the complainant that the
sheriff's expenses approved by the court should be
deposited with the clerk of court and ex-officio
sheriff. Furthermore, no liquidation was ever
submitted to the court.
It must be stressed that sheriffs are not allowed to
receive any voluntary payments from parties in the
course of the performance of their duties. Nor can a
sheriff request or ask sums of money from a party-
litigant without observing the proper procedural
steps. Even assuming that such payments were
indeed given and received in good faith, this fact
alone would not dispel the suspicion that such
payments were made for less than noble purposes.
Neither will complainant's acquiescence or consent
to such expenses absolve the sheriff for his failure to
secure the prior approval of the court concerning
such expense. Any amount received by sheriffs in
excess of the lawful fees allowed in Section 10 is an
unlawful exaction. It constitutes unauthorized fees.
This renders them liable for grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Surviving Heirs of Alfredo R. Bautista
v.
Francisco Lindo and Welhilmina Lindo
G.R. No. 208232
March 10, 2014
© Donna Fresnido
FACTS:
Alfredo Bautista sold his free-patent land to several
vendees, including respondents Lindo. Three years
after the sale, Bautista filed a case in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in the exercise of his right to
repurchase the land within five years under Section
119 of Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public Land
Act.
Respondents Lindo later ceded to Epifania Bautista,
Alfredo’s successor-in-interest, a portion of the land
through a compromise agreement. However, other
respondents moved to dismiss the case, arguing that
the selling price of the land is only ₱16,500, which is
below the ₱20,000 jurisdictional threshold of the
RTC.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, finding that Bautista failed to allege that
the value of the land exceeds ₱20,000.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC correctly dismissed the case due to
lack of jurisdiction of subject matter.
HELD:
NO. The complaint to redeem a land subject of a free
patent is incapable of pecuniary estimation, it being
one for specific performance.
In Russel v. Vestil, it was held that if the complaint is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or the
RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But
where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, such actions are cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable
exclusively by RTCs.
Bautista sold his land covered by a free patent. The
right to repurchase in CA 141 was implicitly
integrated and made part of the deeds of sale, thus
being a binding prestation which he can enforce. He
did file a case to enforce this right, thus making his
action one for specific performance.
ONE NETWORK RURAL BANK, INC.
versus DANILO G. BARIC
GR No. 193684, March 4, 2014
© Kiefer Arguelles
FACTS:
This case sprung from the case initiated before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City captioned as
“Danilo G. Baric, Petitioner versus James S. Palado
and Network Rural Bank, Inc., Respondents” which
was the subject of a Petition for Review on Certiorari
seeking to set aside the January 29, 2009 Decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Jaime Palado (PALADO, hereafter) was the registered
owner of a real property with a building containing
commercial spaces for lease located at Barangay
Piapi, Davao City and covered by TCT No. 231531.
Respondent Danilo G. Baric (BARIC, hereafter) was a
lessee therein, operating a barber shop on one of
the commercial spaces. The lease was governed by a
written agreement, or “Kasabutan”.
In December 2000, BARIC demanded the return of
the leased commercial space. BARIC proceeded to
the Barangay for Conciliation and eventually got a
Certificate to Bar Action.
In February 2001, BARIC filed a case for Forcible
Entry against PALADO with paryer for Injunctive
Relief and One Network Rural Bank, Inc., (NETWORK
BANK, hereafter) before the MTCC of Davao City.
BARIC alleged that despite the agreement and
renovation of the property with the approval of
PALADO, the latter still fenced and enclosed the
premises, thereby denying BARIC access of the
property subject of lease. Network Bank purchased
the subject property on April 25, 2001 that’s why he
was impleaded as one of the respondents. The
latter bank alleged good faith when it purchased the
property subject matter of this case, and therefore
according to the same bank, they should not be held
liable.
April 20, 2011 MTCC issued an ORDER dismissing
BARIC’s Complaint for Forcible Entry considering that
BARIC’s voluntary departure from the premises and
his subsequent posting of a signboard informing that
his barber shop had transferred to a new address
within the Agdao Public Market, constituted clear
and categorical evidence of his intention to
voluntarily vacate the premises.
BARIC appealed the case to the RTC of Davao City
where the same court upheld the decision of MTCC
finding that there was no irreversible error
committed by the court-a-quo in its decision. BARIC
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City where the appeal was granted and the
challenged decision is hereby reversed. BARIC was
awarded Php 50,000.00 in NOMINAL DAMAGES for
which PALADO and NETWORK BANK were held
solidarily liable.
Case was elevated to the Supreme Court via Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. IS A THIRD PARTY WHO DID NOT COMMIT A
VIOLATION OR INVASION OF THE PLAINTIFF
OR AGGRIEVED PARTY’S RIGHTS MAY BE BE
HELD LIABLE FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES?;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN
REVERSING THE RULINGS OF MTCC AND
RTC?
DECISION:
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS GRANTED.
While the Petition does not squarely address the
true issue involved, it is nonetheless evident that the
CA gravely erred in holding NETWORK ABNK
solidarily Liable with PALADO for the payment of
Nominal Damages.
NETWORK BANK did not violate any of BARIC’s
rights; it was merely a purchaser or transferee of the
property. Surely, it is not prohibited from acquiring
the property even while the forcible entry case was
pending, because as the registered owner of the
subject property, PALADO may transfer his title at
any time and the lease merely follows the property
as lien or encumbrance. Any invasion or violation of
BARIC’s rights as lessee was committed solely by
PALADO and NETWORK BANK may not be implicated
or found guilty unless it took part in the commission
of illegal acts, which does not appear to be so from
the evidence on record. On the contrary, it appears
that BARIC was ousted through PALADO’s acts even
before NETWORK BANK acquired the property or
came into the picture. THUS IT WAS ERROR TO HOLD
THE BANK LIABLE FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES.
Resolution of Court of Appeals was MODIFIED.
NETWORK BANK is ABSOLVED from Liability.
 HERMINIA ACBANG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
01, SECOND JUDICIAL REGION,
TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, and
SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ and HEIDI L.
LOPEZ, Respondents.
© Kevin Buyco
To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in
an ejectment case, the defendant must perfect an
appeal, file a supersedeas bond, and periodically
deposit the rentals becoming due during the
pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, the writ of
execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff.
The Case
By petition for prohibition, the petitioner, a
defendant-appellant in Civil Case No. 6302 of the
Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 1, in Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan, assails the order issued on March 31,
2004 by respondent Judge Jimmy H.F. Luczon, Jr.
Judge Luczon) granting the motion for execution
against her and her co-defendants on the ground
that she had not posted any supersedeas bond to
stay the execution.1
Antecedents
Respondent Spouses Maximo and Heidi Lopez
(Spouses Lopez) commenced an ejectment suit
against the petitioner, her son Benjamin Acbang, Jr.
and his wife Jean (Acbangs) in the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Alcala, Cagayan (Civil Case No. 64).
The defendants did not file their answer. Thus, the
MTC rendered its decision on January 12, 2004 in
favor of the Spouses Lopez, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and as
against defendants as follows:
a) The plaintiffs are the true and lawful
owners of the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-139163.
b) The defendants are directed to vacate
immediately the land in suit which is
covered and described in TCT No. T-139163,
copy of the title is marked as Annex "A" of
the complaint.
c) The defendants are hereby ordered to
pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the
amount of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
d) The defendants are ordered to pay the
costs.2
The petitioner appealed to the RTC.
In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the
execution of the decision pending appeal in the
RTC,3 alleging that the defendants had not filed a
supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The
Acbangs opposed the motion for execution pending
appeal,4 insisting that the failure of the Spouses
Lopez to move for the execution in the MTC
constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate
execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing to
stay, rendering the filing of the supersedeas bond
unnecessary.
In his assailed order dated March 31, 2004, Judge
Luczon granted the motion for immediate execution,
viz:
The Motion for Execution is hereby granted, there
being no Motion to Fix Supersedeas bond filed by
[the Acbangs] as of the date of the filing of the
Motion.
The opposition of [the spouses Lopez] on the appeal
taken by [the Acbangs] is hereby denied because
under the rules the loosing [sic] party may appeal
the case even if they did not post their supercedeas
[sic] bond. [The spouses Lopez] then are given 15
days from today within which to file their
memorandum and [the Acbangs] are also given
similar period to file their reply on the memorandum
of [the spouses Lopez]. Afterwhich (sic) the case
shall be submitted for decision with or without the
memorandum from the parties.
SO ORDERED.5
The petitioner moved for reconsideration,6 stressing
that the filing of the supersedeas bond was for the
purpose of staying the execution; and that she as a
defendant would not be placed in a position to stay
the execution by filing a supersedeas bond unless
she was first notified of the filing of the motion for
immediate execution.
The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on April 26, 2004,7 viz:
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendant
Herminia Acbang is denied, for the reason that the
Court finds no cause or reason to recall the order
granting appellees’ motion for execution. There was
no supersedeas bond filed by [the Acbangs], so the
execution of the decision is proper.
As the office of the supersedeas bond is to stay the
execution of the decision, the same should be filed
before the Motion For Writ of Execution is filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The petitioner then brought the petition for
prohibition directly in this Court on July 2, 2004,
submitting that Judge Luczon thereby committed
grave error in granting the motion for immediate
execution of the Spouses Lopez without first fixing
the supersedeas bond as prayed for by the Acbangs.
It appears that the RTC rendered its decision in Civil
Case No. 6302 on July 30, 2004,9 finding that the
petitioner had not received the summons, and that
the sheriff’s return did not show the steps taken by
the server to insure the petitioner’s receipt of the
summons, like the tender of the summons to her;
that the non-service of the summons on her resulted
in the MTC not acquiring jurisdiction over her; and
that the MTC’s decision in Civil Case No. 64 dated
January 14, 2004 was void as far as she was
concerned. Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court
declares that the decision rendered by the Municipal
Trial Court of Alcala, Cagayan dated January 14, 2004
is null and void, as far as defendant Herminia Acbang
is concerned.
The MTC of Alcala is Ordered to reopen the case and
served [sic] the summons to Herminia Acbang and
conduct the proceedings without any delay.
It is so adjudged.10
In the petition, the petitioner insists that the
Spouses Lopez’s motion for execution pending
appeal should be filed before she posted a
supersedeas bond. She argues that even if the MTC’s
decision was immediately executory, it did not mean
that a motion for execution was dispensable; and
that the Spouses Lopez waived their right to the
immediate execution when they did not file a
motion for execution in the MTC.
On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez claim that the
issuance of a writ of execution was ministerial
because of the defendants’ failure to file a
supersedeas bond prior to or at the time of the filing
of their notice of appeal in the MTC.
Ruling
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure reads:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how
to stay same. — If judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon
motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a sufficient
supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial
Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay
the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with
the appellate court the amount of rent due from
time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit
with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined
by the judgment of the lower court on or before the
tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the
Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of
the Regional Trial Court to which the action is
appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be
deposited with said court or authorized government
depositary bank, and shall be held there until the
final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by
agreement of the interested parties, or in the
absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a
motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall
decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make
the payments above prescribed from time to time
during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate
court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof
of such failure, shall order the execution of the
judgment appealed from with respect to the
restoration of possession, but such execution shall
not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the
final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court,
any money paid to the court by the defendant for
purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed
of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it
appears that the defendant has been deprived of the
lawful possession of land or building pending the
appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of
the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such
deprivation of possession and restoration of
possession and restoration of possession may be
allowed the defendant in the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
Here, there was no indication of the date when the
petitioner filed her notice of appeal. Her petition
stated simply that she had filed a "timely notice of
appeal which was given due course without the
respondents filing a motion for execution in the
Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, the court a quo."11
On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez filed in the
RTC their motion for execution pending appeal on
February 19, 2004.
The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals12 is
instructive on the means of staying the immediate
execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to
wit:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in
order to prevent further damage to him arising from
the loss of possession of the property in question. To
stay the immediate execution of the said judgment
while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision
requires that the following requisites must concur:
(1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a
supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits
the rentals which become due during the pendency
of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply
with any of these conditions is a ground for the
outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the
court in this respect being "ministerial and
imperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant
perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas
bond, the immediate execution of the judgment
would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of
a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of
the judgment if the appeal is not perfected.
Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be
filed within the period for the perfection of the
appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an

ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the
defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1)
perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and
(3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due
during the pendency of the appeal. Although the
petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez
should file a motion for execution pending appeal
before the court may issue an order for the
immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses
Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they
were entitled to the immediate execution of the
judgment in view of the Ac bangs failure to comply
with all of the three abovementioned requisites for
staying the immediate execution. The filing of the
notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did
not suffice to stay the immediate execution without
the filing of the sufficient supersede s bond and the
deposit of the accruing rentals.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the R

TC favored the petitioner because it declared the
judgment of the MTC void as far as she was
concerned for lack of jurisdiction over her person.
The RTC thus directed the MTC to cause the service
of the summons on her and to conduct further
proceedings without any delay. In effect, the
supervening declaration of the nullity of the
judgment being sought to be executed against her
has rendered moot and academic the issue in this
special civil action as far as she was concerned.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for

prohibition for being moot and academic, without
pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.