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By Monica Zheng
At the cornerstone of the late economist Milton Friedman’s legacy is his magnum opus, the
1962 work Capitalism and Freedom. This classic work would go on to promote some of Friedman’s
most famous and contentious arguments, one of which is that capitalism is ideally suited for the
promotion of democracy. To understand where this claim comes from, we must first accept
Friedman’s notion that “there is an intimate connection between economics and politics” (8).
Friedman further asserts that economic freedom is a precondition for political freedom and is the
pathway to true freedom for the individual man. From there, Friedman denotes capitalism as the
economic system that best maximizes our economic freedom, as it “provides economic freedom
directly” (9).
From a historical standpoint, Friedman seems to be on the right path. We are reminded that
“the typical state of mankind is tyranny, servitude, and misery”, that is until the 19th and early 20th
century of the Western world when “political freedom...clearly came along with the free market and
the development of capitalist institutions” (9-10). This example, amongst others, begs us to
reconsider the idea that it could all just be “sheer coincidence that the expansion of freedom
occurred at the same time as the development of capitalist and market institutions” (11-12). Yet
history also shows us that employers or capitalists “have fought tooth-and-nail against the
Friedman’s argument, and by extension casts doubt on his ultimate claim that capitalism is ideally
first examining his claim that capitalism best maximizes economic freedoms before moving on to
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analyze his second claim that capitalism is ideally suited for the promotion of democracy. In so
doing, I find that Friedman’s arguments are valid, but does not embody the entire picture.
Friedman’s first claim is that capitalism maximizes our economic freedoms. This claim is
built on four propositions: a) that capitalism is based on exchange, b) that this exchange is for
mutual benefit, c) that exchange of this kind implies that no party can coerce the other, and d) that
The first proposition states that capitalism is based on exchange. Certainly, in a capitalist
system, exchanges are a common sight as customers and capitalists engage in transactions, the
customer giving the capitalist money in exchange for goods. Likewise, employers and employees
(otherwise known as a capitalist and his workers) also engage in exchanges behind the scenes. In this
case, the capitalist gives workers wages in exchange for their labor power. So, on the whole,
However, the critique I have toward the first proposition of Friedman’s first claim is not
what is stated, but what is left out. In short, Friedman’s first proposition does not paint the entire
picture. What the proposition does not state is that capitalism is, even more, a system based on
capital accumulation, profit maximization, and class struggle. When capitalists seek to accumulate
more capital and maximize their profit, one of the first places they take advantage of is labor. Labor
extraction becomes a science, as capitalists study how best to control, wield, and extract as much
labor power from their workers as possible (Braverman). To not highlight this vertical relationship
as a crucial element of capitalism is to ignore the significant and powerful role a capitalist plays in an
If capitalism is to be based on something, the topic of slavery is also something that cannot
be dismissed. In the history of American capitalism, there is little doubt that our current capitalist
system was built upon slavery, a practice that could hardly be called an exchange (Beckert and
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Rockman). The capitalist took, by force, his slaves’ labor, for which he made a profit off of. To
dismiss this entirely or to equate this part of American history with the word “exchange” is to be
ridiculously naive. All in all, Friedman’s failure to address these points shows that while the first
Friedman’s second and third propositions, that exchange is for mutual benefit and implies
that no party can coerce the other, go hand-in-hand. To break down these two propositions, one
must understand that Friedman believes every individual has two choices when it comes to an
exchange: to trade (to sell) or not to trade (leisure) (Chibber, Feb. 5). Thus, what results in an
exchange or trade is only to the mutual benefit, or gains, of both parties. Once again, however,
Friedman fails to address the whole picture. In this case, Friedman fails to acknowledge the weight
The weight of existing resources can do much to contribute to a party’s choice. For example,
the capitalist is able to use his resources to manipulate legislative policies and market demands in his
favor so that he can ensure the greatest benefit to himself. At the very least, the capitalist is able to
walk away from an exchange (if he does not find the trade appealing or beneficial enough) with no
harm, no foul, no loss. Someone with fewer resources than the capitalist would not have the same
ability or luxury to walk away and choose leisure. When push comes to shove, a worker may likely
trade his product—his labor power—for less than it’s worth, perhaps even at a loss. Would such an
exchange really be beneficial to the worker? Rather than experiencing a gain, it seems that the
worker may be experiencing a loss even as he makes an exchange. The truth is when a worker
engages in an exchange, there is no way of knowing if the outcome will be beneficial (his outcome is
determinant on the number of existing resources he has, thus influencing his ability to really choose
whether to sell or walk away). This same issue does not hold true for the capitalist; an exchange is
always to his benefit because he has the resources and ability to truly choose.
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Friedman maintains that an exchange — in his words stated as a situation when “both
parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bi-laterally voluntary and
informed—is possible due to the free market; “the consumer is protected from coercion by the seller
because of the presence of other sellers with whom he can deal” and “the seller is protected from
coercion by the consumer because of other consumers to whom he can sell” (13, 14). But how can a
transaction be voluntary if there are precisely there are no other parties around to trade with?
Journalist Spencer Soper presents this scenario in his article, “Inside Amazon’s Warehouse”,
as he brings attention to the harrowing and dangerous labor practices that occur in Amazon’s
Lehigh Valley warehouse. Lack of job security, impossible standards of production, and extreme
heat conditions that prompt Amazon to have paramedics waiting outside the warehouse….these are
only some of the issues that workers face working behind the scenes for the world’s largest e-
commerce marketplace. This situation begs the question, why would anyone choose to make such
an exchange. The answer is that no one actually chooses to make such an exchange. Soper tells us,
“They [Amazon] can do that because there aren't any jobs in the area” (2). And no one knows this
Amazon specifically goes out of its ways to locate warehouses in rural areas where jobs are
scarce and “eager applicants” are easy to be found “in the swollen ranks of the unemployed”, even
for temporary work lacking basic safety guidelines, ethical codes, or even a shred of dignity (Soper
3). In short, Amazon targets areas where there are many “buyers” (workers), but not enough sellers.
By targeting these areas, Amazon is essentially coercing workers to engage in an exchange that is not
mutually beneficial, and will likely result in the worker being overworked and injured, all at the
The coercion does not stop at recruitment alone; it is integrated into the workers’ daily
threaten and blackmail workers with the possibility of losing their jobs for infractions that range
from missing work to not being able to recuperate fast enough after suffering an injury caused by
Amazon’s very own disregard for the safety of its workers (Soper). If these actions do not count as
The final proposition is that power is dispersed in a free market. For Friedman, it was very
important that economic arrangements remained separate from political power. In Friedman’s eyes,
a free market was enough to maintain fair exchange that “gives people what they want” (15). The
government, on the other hand, was encouraged not to interfere with the market, except to
“determin[e] the ‘rules of the game’ and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on”
(15). In essence, the existence of a market was precisely for the benefit of “minimiz[ing] the extent
to which government need participate directly in the game” (15). In this way, Friedman could
guarantee that political power could remain decentralized as “economic power…[would] serve as a
Nearly a half-century after Capitalism and Freedom’s publication, it is ironically not political
power that is the problem, but economic power. Friedman was so focused on economic strength
being a check to political power that he didn’t give as much thought to the worthiness of political
momentary majority”, it is now the “many millionaires in one economy”—the power elite— that
holds the “power to coerce” and make key decisions for mass society (Gilbert & Friedman 15-16).
As the controllers of the market system, the power elite’s position is so significant that even
the government (i.e. politicians) must take in the businessman’s position for any decisions made. In
fact, the government’s job is essentially a juggle between two sides: to compel businessman to
continue to invest in the market, while making sure that conditions are still fair for general society
(Gilbert). All things considered, it is apparent that power is not dispersed in the free market. Rather,
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if one holds enough economic power, they can be sure to have political power in their back pocket
as well.
At this point, I conclude the discussion on Friedman’s first claim, which states that
freedoms; it just doesn’t do so for everyone. Rather, it is the people with the most resources or
capitalists who gain the most economic freedom and power from this economic system. They are the
only ones in this society who is able to engage in an exchange, voluntarily and by choice. If a trade is to
be made, the capitalist is guaranteed to have made a gain. If no trade is to be made, the capitalist can
still walk away, having lost nothing and gaining the opportunity for leisure.
Despite making this conclusion, I move forward to analyze Friedman’s ultimate claim that
capitalism is ideally suited for the promotion of democracy. If anything, we can observe what
Friedman’s ideal democracy looks like. To rehash, Friedman finishes his first claim with an emphasis
on the free market. It is primarily because of this free market that the economy can disperse power
and prevent the concentration of power, cementing capitalism as the economic system that best
promotes democracy (Chibber, Feb. 7). In Friedman’s democracy, four propositions must hold true
in order to best promote political freedom: a) that individual rights disperse power, b) that the
democratic state responds to numbers, c) that interest groups aggregate number, and d) that all
interest groups have an equal chance at success. I move forward to explain how each of these four
political freedoms does not hold true in a democracy such as the United States.
The first proposition that Friedman highlights for political freedom is that individual rights
disperse power. While this ideal is at the foundation of our democracy, it is simply not true. Statistics
show that the United States has the lowest democratic participation with only 53-57% of the
population consistently participating in national elections (the number is much lower for local
elections) (Chibber, Feb. 7). If this news isn’t bad enough, national election turnout is highly skewed
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by class; participation goes down with income level (Chibber, Feb. 7). This pattern holds true for
nearly all political activities; political participation increases with the socioeconomic status of an
individual, with the one exception being attending a protest (Schlozman, Verba, & Brady). Perhaps,
more importantly, the affluent are also especially likely to contribute generously to political
campaigns, which contributes to the skewing of the dispersal and power of individual rights
What this dispropriate number of political participation shows is that while all individual may
have rights, many do not utilize or even begin to understand how to utilize this power. The poor
may not have the knowledge or resources to understand the weight of their voice. Even if they did,
they are likely to agree with the majority of the population who have little faith in the government’s
openness to people’s preferences (65-80% of the population think the government favors the rich)
(Chibber, Feb. 7). Mass society may not be wrong, seeing as the affluent are more able to donate to
politicians’ campaigns, donations that likely have unspoken conditions attached to it.
The second political proposition for political freedom is that the democratic state responds
to numbers. If we take what we have learned from exploring the first proposition (political
participation is highly skewed toward the rich), logically, this means that what the democratic state
input (Schlozman, Verba, & Brady). Even more concerning is the fact that even if the voices of the
democratic state were more equally heard, this does not necessarily mean that the state will respond
to those voices.
In his work Affluence and Influence, scholar Martin Gilens finds a correlation between
individuals with increasing socioeconomic status and the ability to influence policy changes. Even
though it is shown that the middle-class preferences are the median, policy changes still mostly
reflect that of the affluent. As expected, the influence of the affluent's political preferences on policy
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changes is even more influential when middle-class preferences align more closely with that of the
affluent. However, what is surprising and concerning is that even when middle-class preferences are
more closely aligned with the poor, their influence on policy changes are still of little threat.
What this analysis shows is that the democratic state does respond to numbers, but this
number is related to wealth, not people. As individuals’ income level increases, the government
seems to hear and respond better to their input (Chibber, Feb. 7). In the end, what can be
concluded is that the government has no interest in what individuals say, except if one is rich or
The third political proposition for political freedom is that interest groups aggregate
numbers. Authors Schlozman, Verba and Brady show, once again, that the affluent and well
educated are overrepresented through organized interested groups while the poor and less educated
continue to be underrepresented. In the Washington Representative Study, the authors found that
only 12 percent of interest groups were membership organizations, and less than 5% were public
interest groups. Business interests were overwhelmingly represented at more than 75%. Meanwhile,
the interests of those less than affluent were disappointing; the poor had little to no representation,
and even those in the middle-class were underrepresented. These results exhibit yet again that the
The final proposition for political freedom is that all interests groups have an equal chance at
success, which is explicitly not true. The affluent and well educated are more apt to have successful
interest groups because they are better able to mobilize organizations with all the resources they
have. Schlozman, Verba, and Brady writes that “Not only are the affluent and well educated able to
afford the financial costs of organizational support but they are also in a better position to command
the skills, acquire the information, cultivate the media, and use the connections that are helpful in
getting an organization off the ground or keep it going” (316). In short, the affluent and well
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educated have more resources in the form of economic, social and cultural capital to ensure that
their voices are not only heard but are the loudest. In such a competition, how can there be an equal
chance at success?
We began our investigation into Friedman's claim because the knowledge that “employers
have fought tooth-and-nail against the establishment or extension of political democracy” put a well-
sized dent in Friedman’s argument that capitalism promotes democracy. Yet our study’s conclusion
shows that the answer was close all along. These same employers, or capitalists, are now in charge of
the very same “democracy” that they once fought so hard against.
In theory, democracies are meant to represent each and every individual in the state, but in
actuality, the modern democracy (especially that of the United States) is representative of only the
capitalists. Capitalists have created an economic system that gives them the greatest benefit (i.e.
more wealth) when engaging in exchanges, and a political system that allows them to pull the strings
behind the scenes. By constructing a system that keeps the poor and even the middle-class relatively
out of politics, the modern democracy is essentially a reconstruction of Athens’ direct democracy,
whereby property-owners were the only members of the state seen fit to participate in government
In the end, what can be seen is that Friedman’s claims are true. Capitalism does maximize
economic freedoms and promote democracy….but only for capitalists and capitalists alone.
Works Cited
Beckert, Sven, and Seth Rockman. Slavery's Capitalism: a New History of American Economic Development.
Chibber, Vivek. “Course Lecture - Feb. 5 .” Capitalism and Democracy, 5 Feb. 2019, New York,
Chibber, Vivek. “Course Lecture - Feb. 7 .” Capitalism and Democracy, 7 Feb. 2019, New York,
Friedman, Milton. “The relation between economic freedom and political freedom”, Capitalism and
Gilbert, Dennis. The American Class Structure in an Age of Growing Inequality, (Sage 2015), Chapter 8,
Gilens, Martin. Affluence and Influence, (Princeton, 2012), Chapter 3, The Preference/Policy Link”, pp.
70-96.
Schlozman, Kay, Sidney Verba and Henry Brady, The Unheavenly Chorus, (Princeton, 2012), Chapter
5, “Does Unequal Voice Matter?”, and Chapter 11, “Who Sings in the Unheavenly Chorus”,
Soper, Spencer. “Inside Amazon’s Warehouse”, The Call, September 18, 2011.