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The American Society for Aesthetics, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
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JEFFREY WIEAND
Putting Forward a
Work of Art
of putting forward works of art for the ap- preparation and selection prior to the delivery of
the utterance.2
preciation of others and the corresponding
attempts on the part of audiences to ap-
By "process of preparation and selection"
preciate them. "Putting forward" includes
Pratt means the process of submitting,
things like showing a work to someone, dis-
selecting, and preparing works of literature
playing it, submitting it to a competition, for publication. Thus she holds that works
submitting it for publication, and so on. My
which have not successfully undergone this
aim will be to identify the rules which gov-
process (and are therefore unpublished)
ern this practice or at least the conditions
are not "actual" or "full-fledged" literary
under which it is possible. An assumption
works.3 But this^seems implausible. Do we
throughout will be that the institution of art
want to say, for instance, that the poems of
is rational and can only be explained as
Emily Dickinson were not "actual" or "full-
such.
fledged" works of literature until they
JEFFREY WIELAND formerly taught at the University made
of their way through the publishing
Chicago and is now a student at Harvard Law School. houses? Something's being a work of art is
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412 WIE A ND
not contingent on its being accepted as one. diaries, marginal notations, and the like.
To hold that a painting does not become But poems are sometimes found in diaries
"actual" until displayed in a gallery or or in notebooks very much like diaries, and
museum, or a score or poem "actual" until there is no reason to suppose that all such
published is to advocate the crudest kind poems
of are, in some devious way, addressed
institutional theory. to an audience. There are people who write
Pratt compares "unratified and un- poetry who would sooner burn their poems
transmitted" works of literature to tele- than show them to anyone.
phone calls that fail to reach anyone. She We will distinguish, then, between works
gives an example of a report of such a call:4 of art per se and works which are put for-
ward. Since a work may be put forward
A: I called Bill today. without undergoing anything so elaborate
B: Oh? What did he say?
A: He wasn't home.
as a process of preparation and selection,
the class of works which undergo such a
process will be a sub-class of the class of
Pratt explains the relevance of this example
works which are put forward, and the class
in the following way: "A might have been
of works which are put forward (ignoring,
expected to say either 'I tried to call Bill' or
for the moment, forgeries, etc.,) will be, in
'I called Bill, but . .' In the same sense, it
turn, a sub-class of the class of works of art.
would seem that an unratified and un-
transmitted literary work is 'a literary
II. work,
Constitutive Rules
but .. ."'5 So the idea is that, just as A only
tried and did not really call B, something is Putting forward works of art is a practice,
only an attempted literary work if it is not,
but it is not, so to speak, a conventional
say, accepted for publication. But isn't the practice. In a conventional practice there
word "call" in Pratt's example ambiguous? are rules which must be followed in doing
In one sense of "call," A certainly did call something in order for it to count as an
(telephone) Bill ("I called him, but he wasn't instance of the practice. A person can be
home"); in another sense of "call" she did indicted, for example, only if certain things
not, since A did not actually speak to Bill ("I are said and done. It is clear, I think, that
tried to call Bill, but he wasn't home"). De- the act of putting forward works of art is not
pending on the sense, she either called him governed by rules of this kind. This does
or she didn't, but the expressions "literary not mean that just anything counts as "put-
work" or "work of art" (and similar expres- ting forward," but only that nothing in par-
sions) are not ambiguous in the same way. If ticular does. Like many practices, putting
I say, for example, that I have been unable forward can get along without conventions.
to publish my novel, no one would insist In the case of George Dickie's practice "con-
that I should have said "attempted novel" in ferring the status of candidate for apprecia-
order to indicate that my manuscript is not tion," the absence of conventions or rules
really a novel until it has been accepted and governing the conferring shows that there
readied for publication. Listening to the really is no such practice, since the confer-
phone ring on the other end can, in one ring of a status must be conventional.6 On
sense, be described as "trying to call so- the other hand, in the case of "putting for-
and-so;" waiting for a publisher's decision ward works of art for the appreciation of
cannot be described in the same way as others," the absence of conventions merely
"trying to write (or make) a novel." entails that the practice is not conventional,
Pratt's claim that "literary works belong and is therefore not institutional in a
to the class of utterances addressed to an theoretically interesting sense (i.e., a sense
Audience" can be disputed on similar which could figure in an institutional
grounds. Since "utterance" here presuma- theory of art). It does not entail that putting
bly refers to written as well as spoken lan- forward works of art is not an established
guage, Pratt must think that some written feature of our culture.
utterances are not addressed to an audi- But even if the act of putting forward is
ence. Obvious examples include entries in not a conventional practice, there may still
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Putting Forward a Work of Art 413
be rules which must be followed if the prac- meaning of the sentence B utters does not,
tice is to exist at all. The difference between however, display this relevance, since B's
such rules (which I will henceforth refer to information will be of no use to A if the
as "constitutive rules") and the conventions garage is closed or does not sell gasoline.
just discussed is that conventions determine Yet A isjustified in assuming that B believes
whether an act of a particular type has been and is implicating that the garage is open
successfully performed, whereas constitu- and sells gasoline. Thus Grice wonders how
tive rules determine the conditions for the conversational implicatures of this kind are
existence of a practice or a certain type possible.
of
act. To take a hackneyed example, the act of Grice's answer to this question has the
promising has constitutive rules as well Kantian
as flavor of the question itself. It is
conventional ones. Anyone who promises necessary to quote Grice in full:
to love someone forever has not complied
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a
with the conventions of promising (that you succession of disconnected remarks, and would not
must promise to do something, not to feel be rational if they did. They are, characteristically,
something), and has therefore not suc- to some degree at least cooperative efforts. Each
ceeded in making a promise at all. But al- participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a
common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a
though someone who makes an insincere
mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direc-
promise has still made a promise, he has tion may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial
nevertheless violated one of the rules gov- proposal of a question for discussion), or it may
erning promising which I am calling con- evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly defi-
stitutive. Sincerity is a constitutive condition nite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very
considerable latitude to the participants (as in a
of promising because if most promises were
casual conversation). But at each stage, some possible
not sincere, the practice of promising could conversational moves would be excluded as conver-
not survive; no one would be able to prom- sationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a
ise at all because no one would be willing to rough general principle which participants will be
trust or to accept a promise. It is unneces- expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, viz: "Make
your conversational contribution such as is re-
sary, however, that all promises be sincere;
quired, at the stage at which it occurs, by the ac-
it is only necessary that most of them are. So cepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
a practice is governed by constitutive rules which you are engaged." One might label this the
if there are rules which must in general be Cooperative Principle (CP).7
followed if the practice is to exist at all, that
After stating the CP, Grice lists a number of
is, if it is to be possible to perform an action
maxims and submaxims "the following of
which is an instance of the practice.
which will in general yield results in accor-
A good model for identifying constitutive
dance with the Cooperative Principle."8 In
rules of the institution of art is found in H.
a gesture to Kant, he groups these under
P. Grice's paper "Logic and Conversation,"
the headings Kant used to group his
where similar rules are specified for con-
categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and
versation. Grice introduces his rules-a
Manner:9
principle and a number of maxims-in
order to explain how it is possible to mean, Quantity: 'Make your contribution as informative
imply, or suggest (i.e., to "implicate") in an as required (for the current purposes of
the exchange).'
utterance what is not part of the conven-
and possibly:
tional meaning of the words uttered. Con- 'Do not make your contribution more
sider this example: informative than is required.'
Quality: 'Do not say what you believe to be false.'
A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and 'Do not say that for which you lack
is approached by B, and the following exchange adequate evidence.'
takes place:
Relation: 'Be Relevant.'
A: 'I am out of petrol.'
B: 'There is a garage round the corner.' Manner: 'Be perspicuous.'
'Avoid obscurity of expression.'
'Avoid Ambiguity.'
A is likely to assume that what B has said is 'Be brief (avoid unnecessary
relevant in various ways to what A has just prolixity).'
reported-that he is out of gas. The literal 'Be orderly,' etc.
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414 WIE AN D
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Putting Forward a Work of Art 415
their poetry for others without first believ- I will call this the Appreciation Principle, or
ing that their poems are good. Of course, a Ap.12
poet might show a poem to someone pre- The AP is intended to cover only those
cisely because he wants to know how good it cases where something is put forward as art.
is. But even in cases like this, the poet will Just as Grice's CP is not operative when
believe that the poem has attained some people talk to themselves, so the AP is not
level of quality: it is, anyhow, good enoughoperative when people make art for their
to show to someone. Moreover, the poet will own amusement. But the artist is not the
think that his poem has at least a reasonable only one who can put forward a work of art;
chance of being good or of meeting with it often happens, for example, that works
approval. If he gets a negative response, he are put forward posthumously. The AP is
will probably be embarrassed that he asked often intentionally violated in such cases for
for an opinion, that he presumed the poem the purposes of art-historical scholarship or
good enough to merit an opinion. (Notice criticism. Moreover, it is unnecessary for
that he can't just say: "Well, as I said, I had anyone actually to appreciate the work
no idea if it was any good" and be relieved which is put forward in order for com-
of any feelings of embarrassment. He is pliance with the AP to be secured. All that is
likely to say this because he is embarrassed.) required is that the person putting forward
These feelings of artistic pride and embar- the work have reason to believe that it is
rassment are the analogs of audience ex- worthy of appreciation, that is, that it ought
pectations and disappointments. to be appreciated. When I say that he must
It is important to notice that, like Grice, I have reason to believe this I am thinking, of
am concerned with the usual reactions course, that the person putting forward the
which people have and the usual things work will appreciate it himself. This will be
they do. I am not saying that no one ever the normal case, although it will be possible
goes to a poetry reading, say, merely to be to put forward something on the advice of
seen by the right people, or that a poet qualified people and still comply with the
never thinks that his poems are so far overmaxim. A painter's son, for example, may
the heads of his audience that all the con- come into possession of his late father's un-
tempt they can muster will not embarrass seen canvases and exhibit them at the urg-
him. A poet might even deliberately try toing of friends familiar with his father's
publish a poem which he knows his readers work. But again, the canvases will be works
will recognize as trash. He may do this be- of art regardless of whether or not the son,
cause he is destructive, or self-destructive, or anyone else, puts them forward as works
or crazy, or because he is being paid a lot of of art for the appreciation of others.
money. But it is doubtful that the institution The expression in the AP which will
of putting forward poetry-of reading and cause the most trouble, however, is "worthy
distributing it-could survive if poets on of appreciation." The AP is not committed
the whole did not put forward poems whichto a special kind of aesthetic appreciation,
attain a measure of quality. Putting forwardbut if anyone feels that the AP should dis-
something as a poem carries with it the im- tinguish between relevant and irrelevant
plication that the poet has conviction in its modes of appreciation, it is enough to say
quality. Poets are self-selective and appear that the AP refers to the appreciation ap-
to comply with the following principle: dopropriate to works of art. Since the AP is not
not read poetry which you do not have a definition of"art," there is no problem of
reason to believe is worthy of appreciation,circularity. But what are the criteria of
that is, which will not repay the time andbeing worthy of appreciation? The criteria
effort of an audience to appreciate it. cannot be so demanding that most works
If we generalize this, we arrive at the fol-which are put forward do not satisfy them.
lowing principle: If a work must be of unusually high quality
before it can be worthy of appreciation, the
Put forward something as a work of art of kind K AP will be a regulative, and not a constitutive
principle. That is, the AP would only be a
only if you have reason to believe that it is worthy of
appreciation as a K. principle which ought to govern the practice
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W IE AND
416
of putting forward works of art; it wouldA final point to be made about the
not be a principle which secures the exis-help to refine the notion of "wor
tence of this practice. somewhat further. The reason that the AP
Now someone might argue that the prac- says that a work of art must be worthy of
tice exists because the rewards of works of appreciation as a K is that not all works of
art which are worthy of appreciation in this art are intended to be worthy or of interest
regulative sense are great enough to com-to everyone. To appreciate a work of art is
pensate for the great mass of works which to appreciate it as a certain kind of thing-
are not. In this case, people would continue e.g., as a sonata, tragedy, film noir, or vil-
to pay attention to art for much the same lanelle. The popular song writer or folk
reason that people continue to play the singer who suddenly takes the songs of
lottery-the stakes are high and the payoff Schubert and Hugo Wolf as his standard of
(when there is one) is large. But there are worthiness of appreciation may die an im-
two difficulties with this way of taking the potent and penniless music-maker. A popu-
AP. First, it makes paying attention to art lar song-like a Broadway musical, a detec-
fundamentally irrational. Maybe this is thetive story, or a "B" movie-is intended to be
way it really is-playing the lottery, aftera good thing of its kind. All such genres
all, is fundamentally irrational considering have their peculiar audiences, and works
the odds, but people nevertheless keep on are put forward with this in mind.
playing. But the second difficulty is that it The AP, then, is what permits a person
just does not seem to be true that the hope reasonably to believe that the effort he ex-
of encountering a work of art of the highest pends to appreciate a work of art will be
order is what motivates our day-to-day en- correspondingly rewarded. This belief is
counters with art. Few people begin a novel reasonable because there is a connection
in the hope that it is the equal of, say, Anna between general compliance with the AP
Karenina, or go to a movie in the hope that it and general worthiness of works of art for
will be the equal of, say, Grand Illusion. appreciation. The connection is that artists
Sometimes, of course, we do have unusually (and everyone else who engages in the prac-
high expectations, but these are rare tice of putting forward) are usually right
occasions-occasions on which we have about whether their works are worthy of
reason to believe that the work may be appreciation. I have tried to capture this by
extraordinary. saying that the artist must have good reason
If this is correct, the criteria of "worthi- to suppose his work worthy. Similarly,
ness" in the AP will be considerably lower given that an important function of conver-
than those in a merely regulative principle. sation is the communication of truth,
They must be low enough that most artists Grice's maxim "Do not say what you believe
can intend to satisfy them and that most to be false" would have no force if people
works of art which are put forward are were not usually right about what they be-
worthy of appreciation, not in comparison lieved to be true. Hence Grice adds the
to most other works which are put forward, maxim, "Do not say that for which you lack
but to those works which are not put forward adequate evidence." Since these maxims
at all. But this does not mean that "worthi- are ordinarily observed, it is in general rea-
ness" is a comparative notion. It should still sonable for someone to believe what is said
be possible to say something more definite to him. The analog of this in the case of art
about what it means for works of art to be is the reasonableness of the assumption,
worthy enough to secure the existence of when approaching a work of art, that the
the institution of art. If it is not possible to work is worthy of appreciation. To a certain
say this, it will not be possible to give a extent, of course, we suspend judgment: we
non-question-begging answer to the ques- want to wait and see what the work has to
tion "How worthy?," since the only answer offer. But the fact that we are willing to wait
would seem to be "worthy enough to secure and see at all indicates that we already have
the existence of the institution of art." certain expectations of quality.
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Putting Forward a Work of Art 417
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418 W I E AN D
the understanding and appreciation of must offer what, in some sense, cannot be
others if artists were generally insincere,offered elsewhere, and this is what the
gratuitous, and fraudulent. The integrity maxim of tact requires. The notion of"tact"
of meaning in art must be preserved if theis borrowed from W.D. Snodgrass, who says
appreciation of meaning, and indeed that when a poet exercises tact his ideas and
meaning in art itself, are to be preserved.
emotions are repressed "from conscious
The maxims ofRelation are adapted from statement into details and facts; repressed
Grice's CP. The requirement of novelty againis from facts into the texture of lan-
obvious and important: no one is interested
guage, the choice of words, connotations;
in works which are mere copies or repressed finally into technical factors like
watered-down versions of existing works.'4rhyme and echoes of words."'16 The point,
But what counts as novel and what sort of then, of the maxim of tact, is not that an
novelty is appropriate depend at least in artist should eschew the obscene, the crude,
part upon historical considerations. Art the tasteless, and suchlike, but rather that
has a history, and different things are his thoughts should not ordinarily be stated
needed, appropriate, and perhaps possible in the manner of a treatise, discourse, or
at different times. We might, in fact, think simple conversation. More should be said
of the history of art as a kind of conversa- about this, but there is not time enough in
tion; in putting forward a work of art, an the present article.
artist is making a conversational contribu-
tion. He is asking or answering a question, V. Necessity
elaborating on what someone else has done
or disagreeing with it, demonstrating that So far I have suggested that unless artists
something is possible, and so on. The ar- in general put forward as art only those
tist's contribution should in this way be works which they regard as worthy of ap-
relevant to the existing practice, concerns, preciation, the institution of art could not
and interests of the kind of art he makes. exist. The force of this "could not," how-
Today, a new "Mozart" symphony or man- ever, needs to be investigated; there is, after
nerist painting does not count as a contribu- all, no reason why-given that the institu-
tion, no more than a veil by Morris Louis tion of art exists-that a massive fraud
would have counted as a contribution to could not be perpetrated on the audience of
painting in the fifteenth century. This is not art. Indeed, there are people who believe
to say that such things would not have been that something like this has actually oc-
possible or could not have been meant at curred in recent painting, sculpture, and
those times, but only that they would not music.17 Such a fraud might be perpetrated
have been contributions to the artistic because it is not possible to prove conclu-
conversation. sively that any given work was put forward
The last maxim-that of tact-is as prob- in violation of the AP. The same point can
lematic as it is important. For although I be made about promising, for it is difficult
wish to offer neither a theory of art nor a to prove beyond any doubt that a promise
theory of aesthetic appreciation, it cannot was insincere. Thus it is also possible, I sup-
be denied that in putting forward a work of pose, to imagine a world in which most
art an artist must be intending to do some- promises are, at least for a time, insincere,
thing substantially different from what is and most people are unaware of this. But
done in other human practices. If other the similarity between the institution of art
things can do what works of art do-and in and the institution of promising ends here.
the same or superior ways-then what is Sincerity is not the only condition of prom-
distinctively valuable about works of art? ising, for it must also be the case that most
Hegel notes, for example, that if works of promises are kept, and it is quite easy to
art are merely didactic, "the pictorial and determine whether or not they are. If there
sensuous element is only an external and is a great deal of doubt about the sincerity
superfluous adornment."'5 We might as of most promises, there will not be much
well be instructed by a manual. So the artist doubt about the frequency with which they
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Putting Forward a Work of Art 419
are kept. In art, on the other hand, it is tradition of observing these principles.
much more difficult to show that a given Moreover, it is extremely doubtful that
work is unworthy of efforts to appreciate such a situation could be indefinitely main-
it. For better or worse, the criticism of art tained. Whether such a situation now exists
is not an exact science. in any region of the artworld is a central
It is, then, not inconceivable that most concern of discussions of modernism in the
works of art which are put forward for the arts.
appreciation of others are unworthy of ap-
preciation. Under such circumstances, the VI. The Principle of Charity
audience must of course believe that they are
in fact worthy. (Similarly, if most promises The institution of art is, like conversa-
are insincere, it must still be the case that tion, a cooperative enterprise. An artist who
most people believe that they are sincere; complies with the maxims has tried to put
otherwise they would not accept them.) Or- forward something worthy of appreciation,
dinarily, this belief is a function of general and he has a right to expect that people will
compliance with the AP and general success not judge what he has put forward until
in making worthy works of art. The situa-they have tried to appreciate it. In general,
tion we are imagining, however, is one inthere would be no reason for artists to put
which the putting forward of works of art anything forward if they did not think that
has for the most part become a fraudulentin the long run judgments about works of
enterprise. Consequently, the belief that art are made on the basis of attempts to
most works are worthy of appreciation and appreciate them. This is not to say that an
that most artists put them forward because artist has a right to expect an audience, nor
they believe that they are must be based on that whatever audience he gets will imme-
the historical tradition. That is, beliefs diately invest as much time and effort in the
about present works are in this case a func- appreciation of his work as he would like,
tion of beliefs about past works. nor even that anyone ought to make an
Thus the possibility that for a time, at effort to appreciate his work. I am not re-
least, artists might in general not comply quired to spend time with every painting I
with the AP seems to rest on the fact that in come across. The point is rather that his
general they did comply with it in the past. audience ought to comply, and in general
Once the institution of art is established, it is does comply, with the following principle:
possible to abuse it. But when the practice is
so conceived and so dedicated, it cannot In approaching a work w of kind K for the first time,
long endure. For a time, perhaps, peopleassume that w is worthy of appreciation and that
your understanding and enjoyment of w will be
may be coaxed into paying attention to commensurate with your ability to appreciate works
works from which they derive no rewards, of kind K and your exercise of this ability.
or become adept at imagining or making up
their own rewards. People can, in much the I will call this the principle of charity, or PC.
same way, be coaxed into repeatedly accept- A corollary of the PC will be that, if you
ing insincere promises. In neither case must learn more about works of kind K
would we feel confident in predicting thatbefore you can adequately pass judgment
the institution will enjoy a long and happyon w, then you should do so before passing
life.
judgment on w.
In the light of these considerations, it
should be plain that when I say that the AP VII. Summary
is a constitutive condition of the institution
of art, I am not claiming that it is impossibleThe argument of this article may be
for the institution to exist for a period ofsummarized as follows: The institution of
time even though the AP is not generally art depends ultimately on (1) people's will-
observed. But a situation of this kind pre- ingness to devote their time and attention
supposes that the institution of art was to looking at and thinking about works of
previously established and that there is a art. People would not do this unless (2) they
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420 W IE A N D
nally, if it is worth talking about an institu-Versions of this paper were read at the University of
Chicago (October 1981) and at the annual meetings of
tion of art, it will also be worth investigating
the Illinois Philosophical Association (November,
the ways in which works of art implicate by 1981). I want to thank George Dickie, Charles Altieri,
means of the AP and the maxims. This is, as and Akeel Bilgrami for their helpful comments on a
draft of this paper.
I have said, a topic already being explored,
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