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Putting Forward a Work of Art

Author(s): Jeffrey Wieand


Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Summer, 1983), pp.
411-420
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/429875
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JEFFREY WIEAND

Putting Forward a
Work of Art

I. The Institution of Art It is important to notice that the institu-


tion of art does not encompass the whole of
IN A RECENT PAPER I argued that there can- art, for some works of art are not put for-
not be a truly institutional theory of art ward for the appreciation of others. Thus,
because there are no institutional groups or whereas proponents of the institutional
conventional practices associated with art theory held that somethingis a work of art if
which can be used to construct such a and only if it bears a certain relation to an
theory.1 Even on a fairly generous institution,interpre- being a work of art will be logi-
tation of the notion of an "institution" there cally independent from what I am calling
is no group of persons with an institutional the institution of art. Not everything which
structure which in general makes things is put forward as a work of art need be a
into works of art, nor is the making of a work of art, nor is every work of art put
work of art a conventional act. This does forward as one. The point of referring to an
not mean, of course, that there are no artis- institution of art, then, is simply to register
tic or "artworld" institutions. The Met- the fact that there is a widespread practice of
ropolitan Museum of Art is no less an in- putting forward works of art for the ap-
stitution than the state mental hospital. preciation of others.
Moreover, the fact that we cannot give an No matter how unexceptionable this dis-
institutional theory of art does not entail thattinction may seem, it is not admitted by
we cannot speak of art as an "institution." Ineveryone. Mary Louise Pratt, for example,
a perfectly admissible, though theoreticallywrites:
uninteresting, sense of "institution," art is
an institution because it is something which So far I have discussed what are probably the three
most obvious factors which an account of the liter-
has become over the years an established
ary speech situation would have to include: literary
feature of human culture. works belong to the class of utterances addressed to
In this paper I will use the expression an Audience; within this class they belong to the
"institution of art" to indicate the practice subclass of utterances that presuppose a process of

of putting forward works of art for the ap- preparation and selection prior to the delivery of
the utterance.2
preciation of others and the corresponding
attempts on the part of audiences to ap-
By "process of preparation and selection"
preciate them. "Putting forward" includes
Pratt means the process of submitting,
things like showing a work to someone, dis-
selecting, and preparing works of literature
playing it, submitting it to a competition, for publication. Thus she holds that works
submitting it for publication, and so on. My
which have not successfully undergone this
aim will be to identify the rules which gov-
process (and are therefore unpublished)
ern this practice or at least the conditions
are not "actual" or "full-fledged" literary
under which it is possible. An assumption
works.3 But this^seems implausible. Do we
throughout will be that the institution of art
want to say, for instance, that the poems of
is rational and can only be explained as
Emily Dickinson were not "actual" or "full-
such.
fledged" works of literature until they
JEFFREY WIELAND formerly taught at the University made
of their way through the publishing
Chicago and is now a student at Harvard Law School. houses? Something's being a work of art is

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412 WIE A ND

not contingent on its being accepted as one. diaries, marginal notations, and the like.
To hold that a painting does not become But poems are sometimes found in diaries
"actual" until displayed in a gallery or or in notebooks very much like diaries, and
museum, or a score or poem "actual" until there is no reason to suppose that all such
published is to advocate the crudest kind poems
of are, in some devious way, addressed
institutional theory. to an audience. There are people who write
Pratt compares "unratified and un- poetry who would sooner burn their poems
transmitted" works of literature to tele- than show them to anyone.
phone calls that fail to reach anyone. She We will distinguish, then, between works
gives an example of a report of such a call:4 of art per se and works which are put for-
ward. Since a work may be put forward
A: I called Bill today. without undergoing anything so elaborate
B: Oh? What did he say?
A: He wasn't home.
as a process of preparation and selection,
the class of works which undergo such a
process will be a sub-class of the class of
Pratt explains the relevance of this example
works which are put forward, and the class
in the following way: "A might have been
of works which are put forward (ignoring,
expected to say either 'I tried to call Bill' or
for the moment, forgeries, etc.,) will be, in
'I called Bill, but . .' In the same sense, it
turn, a sub-class of the class of works of art.
would seem that an unratified and un-
transmitted literary work is 'a literary
II. work,
Constitutive Rules
but .. ."'5 So the idea is that, just as A only
tried and did not really call B, something is Putting forward works of art is a practice,
only an attempted literary work if it is not,
but it is not, so to speak, a conventional
say, accepted for publication. But isn't the practice. In a conventional practice there
word "call" in Pratt's example ambiguous? are rules which must be followed in doing
In one sense of "call," A certainly did call something in order for it to count as an
(telephone) Bill ("I called him, but he wasn't instance of the practice. A person can be
home"); in another sense of "call" she did indicted, for example, only if certain things
not, since A did not actually speak to Bill ("I are said and done. It is clear, I think, that
tried to call Bill, but he wasn't home"). De- the act of putting forward works of art is not
pending on the sense, she either called him governed by rules of this kind. This does
or she didn't, but the expressions "literary not mean that just anything counts as "put-
work" or "work of art" (and similar expres- ting forward," but only that nothing in par-
sions) are not ambiguous in the same way. If ticular does. Like many practices, putting
I say, for example, that I have been unable forward can get along without conventions.
to publish my novel, no one would insist In the case of George Dickie's practice "con-
that I should have said "attempted novel" in ferring the status of candidate for apprecia-
order to indicate that my manuscript is not tion," the absence of conventions or rules
really a novel until it has been accepted and governing the conferring shows that there
readied for publication. Listening to the really is no such practice, since the confer-
phone ring on the other end can, in one ring of a status must be conventional.6 On
sense, be described as "trying to call so- the other hand, in the case of "putting for-
and-so;" waiting for a publisher's decision ward works of art for the appreciation of
cannot be described in the same way as others," the absence of conventions merely
"trying to write (or make) a novel." entails that the practice is not conventional,
Pratt's claim that "literary works belong and is therefore not institutional in a
to the class of utterances addressed to an theoretically interesting sense (i.e., a sense
Audience" can be disputed on similar which could figure in an institutional
grounds. Since "utterance" here presuma- theory of art). It does not entail that putting
bly refers to written as well as spoken lan- forward works of art is not an established
guage, Pratt must think that some written feature of our culture.
utterances are not addressed to an audi- But even if the act of putting forward is
ence. Obvious examples include entries in not a conventional practice, there may still

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Putting Forward a Work of Art 413

be rules which must be followed if the prac- meaning of the sentence B utters does not,
tice is to exist at all. The difference between however, display this relevance, since B's
such rules (which I will henceforth refer to information will be of no use to A if the
as "constitutive rules") and the conventions garage is closed or does not sell gasoline.
just discussed is that conventions determine Yet A isjustified in assuming that B believes
whether an act of a particular type has been and is implicating that the garage is open
successfully performed, whereas constitu- and sells gasoline. Thus Grice wonders how
tive rules determine the conditions for the conversational implicatures of this kind are
existence of a practice or a certain type possible.
of
act. To take a hackneyed example, the act of Grice's answer to this question has the
promising has constitutive rules as well Kantian
as flavor of the question itself. It is
conventional ones. Anyone who promises necessary to quote Grice in full:
to love someone forever has not complied
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a
with the conventions of promising (that you succession of disconnected remarks, and would not
must promise to do something, not to feel be rational if they did. They are, characteristically,
something), and has therefore not suc- to some degree at least cooperative efforts. Each
ceeded in making a promise at all. But al- participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a
common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a
though someone who makes an insincere
mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direc-
promise has still made a promise, he has tion may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial
nevertheless violated one of the rules gov- proposal of a question for discussion), or it may
erning promising which I am calling con- evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly defi-
stitutive. Sincerity is a constitutive condition nite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very
considerable latitude to the participants (as in a
of promising because if most promises were
casual conversation). But at each stage, some possible
not sincere, the practice of promising could conversational moves would be excluded as conver-
not survive; no one would be able to prom- sationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a
ise at all because no one would be willing to rough general principle which participants will be
trust or to accept a promise. It is unneces- expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, viz: "Make
your conversational contribution such as is re-
sary, however, that all promises be sincere;
quired, at the stage at which it occurs, by the ac-
it is only necessary that most of them are. So cepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
a practice is governed by constitutive rules which you are engaged." One might label this the
if there are rules which must in general be Cooperative Principle (CP).7
followed if the practice is to exist at all, that
After stating the CP, Grice lists a number of
is, if it is to be possible to perform an action
maxims and submaxims "the following of
which is an instance of the practice.
which will in general yield results in accor-
A good model for identifying constitutive
dance with the Cooperative Principle."8 In
rules of the institution of art is found in H.
a gesture to Kant, he groups these under
P. Grice's paper "Logic and Conversation,"
the headings Kant used to group his
where similar rules are specified for con-
categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and
versation. Grice introduces his rules-a
Manner:9
principle and a number of maxims-in
order to explain how it is possible to mean, Quantity: 'Make your contribution as informative
imply, or suggest (i.e., to "implicate") in an as required (for the current purposes of
the exchange).'
utterance what is not part of the conven-
and possibly:
tional meaning of the words uttered. Con- 'Do not make your contribution more
sider this example: informative than is required.'
Quality: 'Do not say what you believe to be false.'
A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and 'Do not say that for which you lack
is approached by B, and the following exchange adequate evidence.'
takes place:
Relation: 'Be Relevant.'
A: 'I am out of petrol.'
B: 'There is a garage round the corner.' Manner: 'Be perspicuous.'
'Avoid obscurity of expression.'
'Avoid Ambiguity.'
A is likely to assume that what B has said is 'Be brief (avoid unnecessary
relevant in various ways to what A has just prolixity).'
reported-that he is out of gas. The literal 'Be orderly,' etc.

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414 WIE AN D

cumstances, the social institution of lan-


It is important to notice for our purposes
that none of these maxims, nor indeed the guage as we know it would have disap-
CP itself, is inviolable. Everyone is familiar peared, and the little conversational groups
with the lies, irrelevancies, and loquacities that would take its place would each be gov-
of day to day conversation. But when erned by the CP and the maxims.
people are guilty of these offenses they Is it not reasonable to suppose that some-
have not ordinarily failed to mean some- thing very much like this obtains in what I
thing; indeed, it is precisely by understand- am calling the institution of art? In art, no
ing their meaning that we realize (or fail to less than in language, we have expectations
realize) that they are not complying with the of sincerity and relevancy. A work of art is
CP or maxims. not supposed to waste our time, and we do
not believe on the whole that artists will ask

III. The Appreciation Principle us, in putting things forward as works of


art, to expend time and effort in order to
Grice's rules have received a good deal of understand and appreciate their works un-
attention in recent aesthetics, particularly less they themselves think that their works
in the theory of literature.10 This attention are worthy of such time and effort, that is,
has been focused on the question of that they are worthy of appreciation. We
whether or not works of literature implicate can put this by saying that when an artist
(or are used to implicate) in the way that presents something to the world as a work
ordinary utterances do. The present essay of art he represents himself as believing
however, is concerned not with implica- that it is worthy of appreciation.
ture, but with the constitutive conditions of Suppose, for example, that we are going
the institution of art. Grice can be used to to a poetry reading by a poet with whom we
elucidate these conditions because his rules are unfamiliar. There are any number of
do more than account for conversational reasons we might be going (e.g., to sell Alan
implicature; they account in part for the Ginsberg T-shirts), but ordinarily people
possibility of conversation itself. Grice him- go to poetry readings because they enjoy
self is cautious at this point; he says that he hearing poets read their poems. Supposing
would like to show that it is rational to com- that this is our reason, we realize that there
ply with the CP and the maxims, and he is always the chance that the poet will turn
notes that someone who cares about the out to be excrutiatingly bad, but we can
central goals of conversation and com- hardly expect that this will happen. The fact
munication will have an interest "in partici- that we go to the reading at all is evidence
pation in talk exchanges which will be pro- for the fact that we have expectations of
fitable only on the assumption that they are quality. But why are these reasonable ex-
conducted in general in accordance with pectations to have? After all, the number of
the CP and the maxims."'1 But beyond this, potential miserable poets far exceeds the
it seems to me, it would be impossible for number of potential good ones. Wouldn't it
the institution of conversation to exist at all be reasonable, then, for us to expect that we
if conversational contributions were not on will encounter some pretty miserable
the whole in accordance with the accepted poetry? And if this is reasonable, wouldn't it
purpose and direction of talk exchanges. be irrational for us to attend a poetry read-
Similarly, conversation as we know it de- ing in the hope of enjoying it, unless we are
pends on the fact that people don't usually well acquainted with the poet's work?
lie to one another, that is, that they usually The truth, however, is that we would be
comply with the maxim of Quality. I am not disappointed if the reading were miserable.
denying, of course, that conversations can Our expectations and disappointments
exist in the world even though most people concerning the institution of art are the
are unwilling to comply with Gricean rules; sorts of things I am trying to explain, and I
it might still be possible to carry on conver- want to claim that we are entitled to expect
sations with people you trusted, though it is that we will enjoy a poetry reading and enti-
worth wondering how you could be certain tled to be disappointed if we do not because
they were trustworthy. But under these cir- few people read or otherwise put forward

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Putting Forward a Work of Art 415

their poetry for others without first believ- I will call this the Appreciation Principle, or
ing that their poems are good. Of course, a Ap.12
poet might show a poem to someone pre- The AP is intended to cover only those
cisely because he wants to know how good it cases where something is put forward as art.
is. But even in cases like this, the poet will Just as Grice's CP is not operative when
believe that the poem has attained some people talk to themselves, so the AP is not
level of quality: it is, anyhow, good enoughoperative when people make art for their
to show to someone. Moreover, the poet will own amusement. But the artist is not the
think that his poem has at least a reasonable only one who can put forward a work of art;
chance of being good or of meeting with it often happens, for example, that works
approval. If he gets a negative response, he are put forward posthumously. The AP is
will probably be embarrassed that he asked often intentionally violated in such cases for
for an opinion, that he presumed the poem the purposes of art-historical scholarship or
good enough to merit an opinion. (Notice criticism. Moreover, it is unnecessary for
that he can't just say: "Well, as I said, I had anyone actually to appreciate the work
no idea if it was any good" and be relieved which is put forward in order for com-
of any feelings of embarrassment. He is pliance with the AP to be secured. All that is
likely to say this because he is embarrassed.) required is that the person putting forward
These feelings of artistic pride and embar- the work have reason to believe that it is
rassment are the analogs of audience ex- worthy of appreciation, that is, that it ought
pectations and disappointments. to be appreciated. When I say that he must
It is important to notice that, like Grice, I have reason to believe this I am thinking, of
am concerned with the usual reactions course, that the person putting forward the
which people have and the usual things work will appreciate it himself. This will be
they do. I am not saying that no one ever the normal case, although it will be possible
goes to a poetry reading, say, merely to be to put forward something on the advice of
seen by the right people, or that a poet qualified people and still comply with the
never thinks that his poems are so far overmaxim. A painter's son, for example, may
the heads of his audience that all the con- come into possession of his late father's un-
tempt they can muster will not embarrass seen canvases and exhibit them at the urg-
him. A poet might even deliberately try toing of friends familiar with his father's
publish a poem which he knows his readers work. But again, the canvases will be works
will recognize as trash. He may do this be- of art regardless of whether or not the son,
cause he is destructive, or self-destructive, or anyone else, puts them forward as works
or crazy, or because he is being paid a lot of of art for the appreciation of others.
money. But it is doubtful that the institution The expression in the AP which will
of putting forward poetry-of reading and cause the most trouble, however, is "worthy
distributing it-could survive if poets on of appreciation." The AP is not committed
the whole did not put forward poems whichto a special kind of aesthetic appreciation,
attain a measure of quality. Putting forwardbut if anyone feels that the AP should dis-
something as a poem carries with it the im- tinguish between relevant and irrelevant
plication that the poet has conviction in its modes of appreciation, it is enough to say
quality. Poets are self-selective and appear that the AP refers to the appreciation ap-
to comply with the following principle: dopropriate to works of art. Since the AP is not
not read poetry which you do not have a definition of"art," there is no problem of
reason to believe is worthy of appreciation,circularity. But what are the criteria of
that is, which will not repay the time andbeing worthy of appreciation? The criteria
effort of an audience to appreciate it. cannot be so demanding that most works
If we generalize this, we arrive at the fol-which are put forward do not satisfy them.
lowing principle: If a work must be of unusually high quality
before it can be worthy of appreciation, the
Put forward something as a work of art of kind K AP will be a regulative, and not a constitutive
principle. That is, the AP would only be a
only if you have reason to believe that it is worthy of
appreciation as a K. principle which ought to govern the practice

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W IE AND
416

of putting forward works of art; it wouldA final point to be made about the
not be a principle which secures the exis-help to refine the notion of "wor
tence of this practice. somewhat further. The reason that the AP
Now someone might argue that the prac- says that a work of art must be worthy of
tice exists because the rewards of works of appreciation as a K is that not all works of
art which are worthy of appreciation in this art are intended to be worthy or of interest
regulative sense are great enough to com-to everyone. To appreciate a work of art is
pensate for the great mass of works which to appreciate it as a certain kind of thing-
are not. In this case, people would continue e.g., as a sonata, tragedy, film noir, or vil-
to pay attention to art for much the same lanelle. The popular song writer or folk
reason that people continue to play the singer who suddenly takes the songs of
lottery-the stakes are high and the payoff Schubert and Hugo Wolf as his standard of
(when there is one) is large. But there are worthiness of appreciation may die an im-
two difficulties with this way of taking the potent and penniless music-maker. A popu-
AP. First, it makes paying attention to art lar song-like a Broadway musical, a detec-
fundamentally irrational. Maybe this is thetive story, or a "B" movie-is intended to be
way it really is-playing the lottery, aftera good thing of its kind. All such genres
all, is fundamentally irrational considering have their peculiar audiences, and works
the odds, but people nevertheless keep on are put forward with this in mind.
playing. But the second difficulty is that it The AP, then, is what permits a person
just does not seem to be true that the hope reasonably to believe that the effort he ex-
of encountering a work of art of the highest pends to appreciate a work of art will be
order is what motivates our day-to-day en- correspondingly rewarded. This belief is
counters with art. Few people begin a novel reasonable because there is a connection
in the hope that it is the equal of, say, Anna between general compliance with the AP
Karenina, or go to a movie in the hope that it and general worthiness of works of art for
will be the equal of, say, Grand Illusion. appreciation. The connection is that artists
Sometimes, of course, we do have unusually (and everyone else who engages in the prac-
high expectations, but these are rare tice of putting forward) are usually right
occasions-occasions on which we have about whether their works are worthy of
reason to believe that the work may be appreciation. I have tried to capture this by
extraordinary. saying that the artist must have good reason
If this is correct, the criteria of "worthi- to suppose his work worthy. Similarly,
ness" in the AP will be considerably lower given that an important function of conver-
than those in a merely regulative principle. sation is the communication of truth,
They must be low enough that most artists Grice's maxim "Do not say what you believe
can intend to satisfy them and that most to be false" would have no force if people
works of art which are put forward are were not usually right about what they be-
worthy of appreciation, not in comparison lieved to be true. Hence Grice adds the
to most other works which are put forward, maxim, "Do not say that for which you lack
but to those works which are not put forward adequate evidence." Since these maxims
at all. But this does not mean that "worthi- are ordinarily observed, it is in general rea-
ness" is a comparative notion. It should still sonable for someone to believe what is said
be possible to say something more definite to him. The analog of this in the case of art
about what it means for works of art to be is the reasonableness of the assumption,
worthy enough to secure the existence of when approaching a work of art, that the
the institution of art. If it is not possible to work is worthy of appreciation. To a certain
say this, it will not be possible to give a extent, of course, we suspend judgment: we
non-question-begging answer to the ques- want to wait and see what the work has to
tion "How worthy?," since the only answer offer. But the fact that we are willing to wait
would seem to be "worthy enough to secure and see at all indicates that we already have
the existence of the institution of art." certain expectations of quality.

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Putting Forward a Work of Art 417

IV. The Maxims sent his feelings and convictions. A


filmmaker, for example, may re-edit his
The AP has the sort of emptiness film whichso that it conforms to the designs of his
Hegel complained of in artistic rules.13 Howbackers; a composer may succumb
financial
is an artist supposed to know if thetowork hecompositional values of some
alleged
wants to put forward is worthy of political apprecia-system; a novelist may lend cre-
tion? But it is possible to specify rules dencemore
to a religious view to which he does
specific than the AP (or "maxims") which not subscribe; a painter may be compelled
must be complied with if the AP is to be to portray his patron in a falsely favorable
complied with. Following Grice's following light. The greatest artists will sometimes
of Kant, which I hope is something more rise above such political, religious, or finan-
than the blind leading the blind, I will ar- cial obstacles, but there is no question that
range these maxims according to the the value and credibility of art are di-
groupings of Kant's categories: minished by such modes of insincerity, even
when imposed from without.
Quantity: Be economical. Another form of the failure to mean what
Quality: Mean what you do.
Be sincere.
is done occurs when something is done
gratuitously or pointlessly. (In this case, the
Relation: Make your contribution of a work of
kind K relevant to the current situation maxim of Quantity is violated as well, since
of K in the artworld. means are being squandered to no pur-
Be novel. pose.) If, for example, a character in a novel
Manner: Be tactful. is described as snub-nosed, there ought to
be some point to his being snub-nosed. The
This list may not be exhaustive, but as it is snub nose might indicate the character's
there is time only for some sketchy remarks Socratic wisdom or his plebian origin. But if
about the maxims I have listed. The maxim there is no particular reason for the nose to
of Quantity has both a positive and a nega- be snub, there is no reason to draw atten-
tive function. In its negative role, it pro- tion to the nose at all, provided the reader
hibits wasting the audience's time. We are has not in some way been led to believe that
prepared to read a thousand-page novel or the character might not have a nose, and
listen to a two-hour symphony only if we similar things. Thus there is nothing
believe that this expenditure of our time is worthwhile in the audience's registering
justified by the artist's purposes and mate- this fact about the character, and no reward
rial. On the other hand, we admire the pos- for trying to comprehend its point. The
itive ability to accomplish much with few same can be said for pointless allusions and
means, as in the first movement of Bee- references, and for the employment of de-
thoven's c-minor Symphony, or in some of vices with a conventional significance with-
the best poems of Yeats. The artist who out this significance being attached. Artistic
regards the maxim in this light may be more intentions and motivations can be intuitive
likely to produce superior work. The nega- or unconscious, but there are times when an
tive role, however, is what chiefly concerns artist decorates his work with devices he
us, since we are less concerned with how art does not mean or times when he is not at-
may best please its audience than with how it tentive to the conventional meaning of a
maintains an audience at all. My claim, device.
then, is that the time required for the ap- The connection between the maxims of
preciation of a work of art should be di- Quality and the AP is rather like that be-
rectly proportional to its rewards. tween Grice's maxims of Quality and his
The maxims of Quality require that every- CP. Just as conversation could not be an
thing in a work be meant and have signifi- exchange of information if people did not
cance. It is as crucial for the institution of on the whole say what they believed to be
art that an artist means what he does as it is true and had adequate evidence for believ-
for a conversation that a person means what ing, so art could not be a communication
he says. It is easy for an artist to misrepre- and expression of thoughts and feelings for

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418 W I E AN D

the understanding and appreciation of must offer what, in some sense, cannot be
others if artists were generally insincere,offered elsewhere, and this is what the
gratuitous, and fraudulent. The integrity maxim of tact requires. The notion of"tact"
of meaning in art must be preserved if theis borrowed from W.D. Snodgrass, who says
appreciation of meaning, and indeed that when a poet exercises tact his ideas and
meaning in art itself, are to be preserved.
emotions are repressed "from conscious
The maxims ofRelation are adapted from statement into details and facts; repressed
Grice's CP. The requirement of novelty againis from facts into the texture of lan-
obvious and important: no one is interested
guage, the choice of words, connotations;
in works which are mere copies or repressed finally into technical factors like
watered-down versions of existing works.'4rhyme and echoes of words."'16 The point,
But what counts as novel and what sort of then, of the maxim of tact, is not that an
novelty is appropriate depend at least in artist should eschew the obscene, the crude,
part upon historical considerations. Art the tasteless, and suchlike, but rather that
has a history, and different things are his thoughts should not ordinarily be stated
needed, appropriate, and perhaps possible in the manner of a treatise, discourse, or
at different times. We might, in fact, think simple conversation. More should be said
of the history of art as a kind of conversa- about this, but there is not time enough in
tion; in putting forward a work of art, an the present article.
artist is making a conversational contribu-
tion. He is asking or answering a question, V. Necessity
elaborating on what someone else has done
or disagreeing with it, demonstrating that So far I have suggested that unless artists
something is possible, and so on. The ar- in general put forward as art only those
tist's contribution should in this way be works which they regard as worthy of ap-
relevant to the existing practice, concerns, preciation, the institution of art could not
and interests of the kind of art he makes. exist. The force of this "could not," how-
Today, a new "Mozart" symphony or man- ever, needs to be investigated; there is, after
nerist painting does not count as a contribu- all, no reason why-given that the institu-
tion, no more than a veil by Morris Louis tion of art exists-that a massive fraud
would have counted as a contribution to could not be perpetrated on the audience of
painting in the fifteenth century. This is not art. Indeed, there are people who believe
to say that such things would not have been that something like this has actually oc-
possible or could not have been meant at curred in recent painting, sculpture, and
those times, but only that they would not music.17 Such a fraud might be perpetrated
have been contributions to the artistic because it is not possible to prove conclu-
conversation. sively that any given work was put forward
The last maxim-that of tact-is as prob- in violation of the AP. The same point can
lematic as it is important. For although I be made about promising, for it is difficult
wish to offer neither a theory of art nor a to prove beyond any doubt that a promise
theory of aesthetic appreciation, it cannot was insincere. Thus it is also possible, I sup-
be denied that in putting forward a work of pose, to imagine a world in which most
art an artist must be intending to do some- promises are, at least for a time, insincere,
thing substantially different from what is and most people are unaware of this. But
done in other human practices. If other the similarity between the institution of art
things can do what works of art do-and in and the institution of promising ends here.
the same or superior ways-then what is Sincerity is not the only condition of prom-
distinctively valuable about works of art? ising, for it must also be the case that most
Hegel notes, for example, that if works of promises are kept, and it is quite easy to
art are merely didactic, "the pictorial and determine whether or not they are. If there
sensuous element is only an external and is a great deal of doubt about the sincerity
superfluous adornment."'5 We might as of most promises, there will not be much
well be instructed by a manual. So the artist doubt about the frequency with which they

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Putting Forward a Work of Art 419

are kept. In art, on the other hand, it is tradition of observing these principles.
much more difficult to show that a given Moreover, it is extremely doubtful that
work is unworthy of efforts to appreciate such a situation could be indefinitely main-
it. For better or worse, the criticism of art tained. Whether such a situation now exists
is not an exact science. in any region of the artworld is a central
It is, then, not inconceivable that most concern of discussions of modernism in the
works of art which are put forward for the arts.
appreciation of others are unworthy of ap-
preciation. Under such circumstances, the VI. The Principle of Charity
audience must of course believe that they are
in fact worthy. (Similarly, if most promises The institution of art is, like conversa-
are insincere, it must still be the case that tion, a cooperative enterprise. An artist who
most people believe that they are sincere; complies with the maxims has tried to put
otherwise they would not accept them.) Or- forward something worthy of appreciation,
dinarily, this belief is a function of general and he has a right to expect that people will
compliance with the AP and general success not judge what he has put forward until
in making worthy works of art. The situa-they have tried to appreciate it. In general,
tion we are imagining, however, is one inthere would be no reason for artists to put
which the putting forward of works of art anything forward if they did not think that
has for the most part become a fraudulentin the long run judgments about works of
enterprise. Consequently, the belief that art are made on the basis of attempts to
most works are worthy of appreciation and appreciate them. This is not to say that an
that most artists put them forward because artist has a right to expect an audience, nor
they believe that they are must be based on that whatever audience he gets will imme-
the historical tradition. That is, beliefs diately invest as much time and effort in the
about present works are in this case a func- appreciation of his work as he would like,
tion of beliefs about past works. nor even that anyone ought to make an
Thus the possibility that for a time, at effort to appreciate his work. I am not re-
least, artists might in general not comply quired to spend time with every painting I
with the AP seems to rest on the fact that in come across. The point is rather that his
general they did comply with it in the past. audience ought to comply, and in general
Once the institution of art is established, it is does comply, with the following principle:
possible to abuse it. But when the practice is
so conceived and so dedicated, it cannot In approaching a work w of kind K for the first time,
long endure. For a time, perhaps, peopleassume that w is worthy of appreciation and that
your understanding and enjoyment of w will be
may be coaxed into paying attention to commensurate with your ability to appreciate works
works from which they derive no rewards, of kind K and your exercise of this ability.
or become adept at imagining or making up
their own rewards. People can, in much the I will call this the principle of charity, or PC.
same way, be coaxed into repeatedly accept- A corollary of the PC will be that, if you
ing insincere promises. In neither case must learn more about works of kind K
would we feel confident in predicting thatbefore you can adequately pass judgment
the institution will enjoy a long and happyon w, then you should do so before passing
life.
judgment on w.
In the light of these considerations, it
should be plain that when I say that the AP VII. Summary
is a constitutive condition of the institution
of art, I am not claiming that it is impossibleThe argument of this article may be
for the institution to exist for a period ofsummarized as follows: The institution of
time even though the AP is not generally art depends ultimately on (1) people's will-
observed. But a situation of this kind pre- ingness to devote their time and attention
supposes that the institution of art was to looking at and thinking about works of
previously established and that there is a art. People would not do this unless (2) they

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420 W IE A N D

were rewarded, that is, unless they enjoy


but all explorers should have a homeland,
and appreciate what they see. Thus and(3)I have tried to provide one for them.
works of art must be in general worthy of
such appreciation. Unless this is to happen
1 Jeffrey Wieand, "Can There Be an Institutional
merely by accident (which is, of course,Theory
log- of Art?" Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
ically possible), we must suppose (4) XXXIX,
that (1981), 409-17.
works of art are in general put forward only2 Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of
Literary Discourse (Indiana University Press, 1977), p.
when the artist believes that they are worthy
152.
of appreciation. He will have good reason
3 Ibid., p. 123. Cf. p. 121.
to suppose that his works are worthy4Ibid.,
of p. 121.
5 Ibid.
appreciation if (5) he makes them in accor-
dance with the maxims. 6 Cf. Wieand, sec. 5.
7 H. P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in The Logic
Why is any of this of interest? First, I
of Grammar, Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman,
think we can see in what sense it is useful
eds.to
(University of California Press, 1975), p. 70.
speak of an "institution of art." The notion 8 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
9 Ibid.
of"putting forward" is inspired by Dickie's
10 See Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary
"conferring status," and the notionDiscourse;
of a Charles Altieri, Act and Quality (University of
community of people who implicitly under-
Massachusetts Press, 1981); and Joseph Margolis, Art
stand and behave in accordance with the and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, 1980), chap. 11.
principles and maxims is loosely inspired byGrice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 69.
Danto's "artworld." Second, we can use the 12 In an earlier paper, "Quality in Art" (British Jour-
nal of Aesthetics 21 [1981]), I called this the Apprecia-
principles and maxims to account for thetion Maxim or AM. The present paper develops the
feeling that works of art are inherently
suggestions of the earlier paper.
valuable.18 Moreover, we can explain why 13 Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetws, T. M. Knox trans.
(with an interpretative essay by Charles Karelis)
people often have such violent reactions to
(Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 18.
bad art or what they take to be bad art. For14 Of course, the public appetite for sequels to popu-
when works violate the AP and maxims they lar movies and books, as well as new but derivative
endanger the institution of art itself-as a ones, is often for a time seemingly insatiable. Similarly,
false promise threatens the institution of people read the same book, listen to the same record,
and so on, over and over again. But then people will
promising. This helps to show why bad artalso listen to Uncle Phil tell his grizzley bear stories
is, in a sense, immoral. Third, with the aid again and again.
of the principles and maxims we can un- 15 Hegel's Aesthetics, p. 51.
derstand various things which have been 16 W. D. Snodgrass, In Radical Pursuit (New York,
1975), p. 20.
going on in contemporary art. To cite only 17 To cite only a few popular examples: Tom Wolfe,
the most obvious example, Duchamp's The Painted Word (New York, 1979) and From Bauhaus
readymades can be viewed as attempts toto Our House (New York, 1981); Henry Pleasants, The
flout the AP and the maxims-or, if you Agony of Modern Music (New York, 1955).
like, to force us to acknowledge them. Fi-
18 See my "Quality in Art."

nally, if it is worth talking about an institu-Versions of this paper were read at the University of
Chicago (October 1981) and at the annual meetings of
tion of art, it will also be worth investigating
the Illinois Philosophical Association (November,
the ways in which works of art implicate by 1981). I want to thank George Dickie, Charles Altieri,
means of the AP and the maxims. This is, as and Akeel Bilgrami for their helpful comments on a
draft of this paper.
I have said, a topic already being explored,

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