95. Parulan vs. Hon. Sotero Rodas and Luis B. Reyes; GR No.

L-1536, July 31, 1947

Issues:

Whether the two offences committed by the petitioner, Ricardo Parulan, constitute a complex
crime

Whether the court of first instance of Manila, from where the victim was kidnapped, has
jurisdiction over the offense committed

Whether the motion for reconsideration of resolution dated July 11, 1947 should be granted

Facts:

That on or about the 10th day of June, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating together and all helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and for the purpose of
extorting ransom from one Arthur Lee or of killing him if the desired amount of money could
not be given, kidnap, carry away in an automobile, detain, and later, after having taken him to
an uninhabited place by means of a motor boat, with treachery, to wit: while the said Arthur
Lee was deprived of his liberty and was very weak as a result of the physical injuries which
had been previously inflicted upon him by the said accused, fire upon him with a .45 caliber
pistol several shots thru the chest and head, fracturing the right 5th and 6th ribs and the skull
and lacerating the brain, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which directly caused
the death of the said Arthur Lee almost instantaneously.

That the crime was charged as a complex of kidnapping and murder, thus, the court of first
instance of Manila from where the victim was kidnapped, and where any one of the essential
elements of said complex offense has been committed has jurisdiction over the offense, for
the crime of kidnapping is a continuous offense committed in Manila and continued all the
way to the place where the victim was taken and murdered.

That the first motion for reconsideration was denied

Resolution:

Upon further analysis of the allegations of the information, as a matter of fact, two
independent crimes are imputed to the accused, i.e. kidnapping for the purpose of extorting
ransom, and murder as punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no specific provision of law describing the alleged complex crime of kidnapping with
murder with the following considerations:

-when a single act constitute 2 or more grave or less grave offenses

-when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other

The facts alleged in the information do not belong to neither of the two cases. The information
alleges several acts, so the first case does not exist.

There is nothing in the information to show that kidnapping was a necessary means for
committing murder, or vice versa.

In the first place, it was absurd to suppose that murder was committed as a necessary means
to commit kidnapping, as dead bodies cannot be the victim of kidnapping. And kidnapping
was not a necessary means for committing murder, because as alleged in the information, it
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. That purpose is incompatible with
murder.

If no more than physical injuries were alleged, there would be only one crime, kidnapping. In
that case, the deed would be a continuous offense triable either in Manila or Bulacan. When
murder is charged, a new independent crime is brought in, and only the court of the province
where the killing was committed has jurisdiction.
96. People of the Philippines vs Bernal j GR No. L-25623, May 8, 1969.

Issue/s:

Wether the decision rendered on July 7, 1961 by the court of first instance of Surigao del
Norte, declaring Pessumal Bhrojraj to be eligible to be admitted as a Filipino citizen, be
revised.

Weather the position for naturalization of Pessumal Bhrojraj be granted.

Facts:

A condition usually required before a petition for naturalization may be considered is that
petitioner should file with Bureau of Justice a declaration of bona fide intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines one year prior to the institution of the proceedings. One statutory
exception set forth in section 6 of the Revised Naturalization law, as amended by
Commonwealth Act 535, is accorded “those who have resided continuously in the Philippines
for a period of 30 yrs or more before filling their application.

Residence Requirement for Exception: Petitioner`s absence from Philippines must be proved
as compatible with continuous residence. By his own testimony, petitioner brought forth the
fact that since his arrival in the Philippines in 1917, he has visited his native Indian four times,
in 1919, 1923, 1938 and 1948, each lasting from to seven months. By the standard in Sy See
vs Republic, 5 SCRA 189, 192, petitioner “cannot be considered as having resided in the
Philippines continuously as required by Section 5 of the Naturalization Act”. These absences
impose on petitioner the burden of proving that they are compatible with continuous
residence. Remiss in this, his case must fail. He has not discharged this burden.

Requirement is Mandatory- the filing of a declaration of intention is mandatory. Without the

required declaration of intention, the court quo did not acquire jurisdiction to entertain his
petition. Such failure to file the declaration of intention “rendered the entire proceeding null
and void”.

Qualification: Lucrative trade, Profession, or Lawful Occupation, Non-Compliance therewith

disqualifies petitioner in instant case- amongst the qualifications for naturalization is that the
applicant “must have some known lucrative trade, profession, ow lawful occupation”. Neither
the avernments of the petition nor the evidence adduced by petitioner complies with this
indispensable requirement. This alone would suffice to disqualify petitioner.

Annual income of P6,000 does not meet requirement. With four children, three of them
studying and a wife to support, and the low purchasing power of the peso coupled with the
increased cost of living, petitioner`s annual income of P6,897.43 is short of being lucrative.

The income gauged as of the time of the filing application for naturalization is short of being
lucrative.

DECISION:

For the reason given, the judgment rendered on July 7, 1963 by the court of first instance of
Surigao del Norte, declaring Pessumal Bhrojraj eligible to be admitted as a Filipino citizen, is
hereby reversed.

The petition for naturalization of Pessumal Bhrojraj is hereby dismissed.