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Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-1

1. Lopez vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros the same with a "court or justice." Filed elsewhere, as with some other body or office not a court of justice,
the claim may not properly be categorized under either term.
G.R. No. L-19613 April 30, 1966
An "action or suit" is essentially "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
FACTS: a wrong." (Rule 2, Sec. 1, Rules of Court). There is nothing in the Insurance Law,which empowers the
Insurance Commissioner to adjudicate on disputes relating to an insurance company's liability to an insured
Plaintiff applied with the defendant company for the insurance of his properties: Biederman truck tractor and under a policy issued by the former to the latter. The validity of an insured's claim under a specific policy, its
a Winter Weils trailer from loss or damage in the amount of P20,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively. amount, and all such other matters as might involve the interpretation and construction of the insurance
During the application, the defendant company inquired of the plaintiff the ff: (1)Has any company in respect policy, are issues which only a regular court of justice may resolve and settle. Consequently, the complaint
of the insurance of any car or vehicle; (2) (A) declined, cancelled or refused to renew your insurance?(B) filed by the appellant herein with the Office of the Insurance Commission could not have been an "action or
increased your premium renewal? suit."

Plaintiff answered in negative but the truth was that the American International Underwriters of the 2. De Lima v. Gatdula
Philippines (AIU) had already declined similar application for insurance by the plaintiff with respect of the
above-mentioned vehicles.The defendant issued to the plaintiff two Commercial Vehicle Comprehensive 691 SCRA 226
Policies covering the said properties. The vehicles mentioned figured in an accident resulting in the total
loss of the tractor and partial damage to the trailer. Plaintiff demand upon the defendant for the payment to Short Version:
him the total amt. of damages resulting from the accident.
The judge in this case required an Answer (instead of a Return) from De Lima et al and did not follow the
On April 28, 1960, defendant rejected the claim on the ground of concealment of a material fact: that the correct procedure in issuing the writ and privilege of Writ of Amparo.
insured property previously been declined insurance by another company.May 27, 1960, the plaintiff filed
with the Office of the Insurance Commissioner a complaint against the said company. As suggested, the Facts:
plaintiff was willing to submit his claim to arbitration but was contested by the defendant since "the claim of
the plaintiff cannot be resolved by arbitration, as recourse to arbitration referred to in the policy contract, On February 27, 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
envisioned only differences or disputes, 'with respect to the amount of the company's liability,' and not to Amparo in the RTC of Manila (In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty.
cases where the company does not admit its liability to the insured. With this rejection, the plaintiff filed his Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405) The case was raffled to Judge Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.
complaint with the CFI of Manila on September 19,1961.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners De Lima et al. Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al “to cease and
Against the above complaint, the defendant-appellee filed on September 29, 1961 a motion to dismiss on desist from framing him up for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frusrated Murder against
the ground of prescription. The latter argued that the plaintiff's claim had already prescribed since it was not Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident”
filed within twelve months from its rejection by the insurance company as stipulated under paragraph 9 of
the General Conditions of Commercial Vehicle Comprehensive Policy Nos. 5598 and 5599, to wit:If a claim Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De
be made and rejected and an action or suit be not commenced within twelve months after such rejection or Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held
(in case of an arbitration taking place as provided herein) within twelve months after the arbitrator, allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel
arbitrators, or umpire shall have made their award then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparocases
been abandoned and shall not thereafter be recovered hereunder.
In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that “[s]ince no writ has been issued, return is
ISSUE: Whether the complaint filed by the plaintiff-appellant with the Office of the Insurance Comm. on May not the required pleading but answer.”The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in
27,1960 a commencement of an "action or suit" within the meaning and intent of general condition? No. Amparocases. He opined that

RATIO: Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012.10 Even without a
Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days
 "Action" and "suit": after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that
the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer
Rule 2, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a “Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The
Section 1. Action defined.—Action means an ordinary suit in a Court of Justice by which one party RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and inspection
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. orders. The production and inspection orders were in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-
(Emphasis supplied.) going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the
records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of
Jurisprudence the respondent Gatdula. RTC denied MR filed by De Lima, et al. De Lima, et al thus came to the SC
assailing the March 20 RTC Decision via Rule 45.
Suit is the prosecution or pursuit of some claim or demand in a court of justice or any proceeding in a court
of justice in which a plaintiff pursues his remedy to recover a right or claim. (Emphasis supplied.) ISSUE:

- Upon the authorities, therefore, it is settled that the terms "action" and "suit" are synonymous. Moreover, it Whether the Writ of Amparo can be executed and reviewed – No. RTC committed several
is clear that the determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into an "action or suit" is the filing of procedural errors on issuing the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-2

RATIO: petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon depriving
the petitioner of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the boundary line.
The Decision dated 20 March could not be the judgment to final order that is appealable under Sec. 19 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amapro. This Decision pertained to the issuance of the writ, not the judgment. The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out
of the country. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno (respondent's brother), who
There were irregularities in the RTC procedures and are as follows: received the same.

The insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive The court rendered judgment against the respondent.The respondent failed to appeal the decision.
pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.
the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are
violated or are threatened to be violated. A writ of Amparois a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC for the annulment of the
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the decision of the MTC on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons on
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced. The holding of a hearing on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. Respondent
the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could claimed she was a resident of Oslo, Norway and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno
not have been properly joined. The court required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) received the summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales. She avers further
of De Lima, et al. The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a that Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint for and in her behalf.
hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a
synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of Barangay
submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was when
in facilitating the suit. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo The the Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by
privilege of the Writ of Amparo is different from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo The substituted service on the respondent was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered
privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outline in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her
behalf.
After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the
summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The trial court declared that
totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty or security. there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the respondent considering that she left the
Philippines for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said
complaint and summons for and in her behalf.
A judgment which simply grants the “privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. Petition for Review –not the
proper remedy. Petition for Certitorari is prohibited. However, simply dismissing the present petition will
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the appealed decision with modifications. The
cause grave injustice to the parties involved. The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1)
CA ruled that the complaint was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the
ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint
merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of
suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of
and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the
CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the respondent, the
DISPOSITIVE:
defendant in Civil Case No. 879.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the trial court Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES
to:
ISSUES:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after
respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint on the respondent. Whether or not
the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent herein is an action in personam or quasi in
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty- eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution
rem.
whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparois proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on Judge Silvino T. RULING:
Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a
WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be
meted with severe consequences. The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner against the respondent
is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one
3. DOMAGAS V. JENSEN in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under
Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical
possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use
FACTS: or occupation of the property.

Petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in
the MTC alleging that the respondent by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-3

only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against
the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to
of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons at the former’s dwelling house,
mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a residence or place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the
court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be
compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant
action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant.
distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the process as of jurisdiction.
person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and As gleaned from the service return, there is no showing that the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno
obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried
affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam. to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of
the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not
property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.
loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular
property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a resident of No. 572
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and
therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action. OrlandoMacasalda cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of
Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the house of the respondent as lessee
On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the summons and complaint by the Sheriff: since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the
said house.
In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.
appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any
of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) 4. TING vs HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court;
or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983,the then Court
of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 .The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and
executory on January 29, 1977 as the Court directed on November 10, 1982 the Land Registration
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his marriage to Jarl Jensen on
Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the
August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the
spouses Lirio.
respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service under Section
application for registration of title to the same lot. The heirs of Diego Lirio were afforded the opportunity to
7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
file an opposition to petitioner’s application and filed their answer calling attention to the December 10, 1976
decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
argued, barred the filing of petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata.
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, on motion of respondents, the Trial Court dismissed
the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
Issue:
Whether The Decision In LRC No. N-983 Constitutes Res Judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and
strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective. As the
HELD
Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :

… The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of The petition fails.
service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be
upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a
method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides:
authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply
with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-4

SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The judgment It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have a land registered in his name has the burden
rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted of proving that he is its owner in fee simple, even though there is no opposition thereto.
from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as
in ordinary civil cases. In this case, records disclose that petitioner itself manifested during the proceedings before the RTC that
there subsists a decision in a previous cadastral case, which covers the same lots it applied for registration.
Since it had been duly notified of an existing decision which binds over the subject lots, it was incumbent
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith upon petitioner to prove that the said decision would not affect its claimed status as owner of the subject lots
issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of in fee simple.
the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged
entitled to registration As the CA correctly pointed out, land registration proceedings are in rem in nature and, hence, by virtue of
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court’s approval in the publication requirement, all claimants and occupants of the subject property are deemed to be notified
LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s application for registration of the lot of the existence of a cadastral case involving the subject lots. 28In this regard, petitioner cannot, therefore,
settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner. In a registration take refuge on the lack of any personal knowledge on its part previous to its application. Case law dictates
proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the that a cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world.Under this doctrine, parties are
court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment.
name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within
the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. The RTC’s decision and Amended Order was issued in violation of the doctrine of judicial stability. This
G.R. No. 169461, September 02, 2013 doctrine states that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court
of concurrent jurisdiction-- a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
5. FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondent. incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment.
Facts:

The Court’s duty to uphold the principles of law and jurisprudential pronouncements as herein discussed
Through a Petition filed before the RTC, petitioner sought for the original registration of two parcels of land. remains staunch and unyielding. Definitively, the Court cannot sanction the registration of the subject lots
Initial hearing was conducted. However, no oppositor appeared during the said hearing except Prosecutor when there stands an existing decision binding over the same. Neither can the Court allow the RTC to set
Amelia Panganiban who appeared in behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (respondent). aside the ruling of a co-equal and coordinate court. Based on these reasons, the Court is therefore
Consequently, the RTC issued the corresponding Order of Special Default. constrained to sustain the nullification of the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as the final decree
of registration issued in favor of petitioner.
For land registration purposes, the subject lots were both investigated and inspected separately by Special
Land Investigator Rodolfo A. Fernandez and Forester I Loida Y. Maglinao of the Department of Environment 6. [G.R. No. 122269. September 30, 1999]
and Natural Resources (DENR). Based on their findings, the subject lots are within the alienable and
disposable zone. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner, vs.
During the reception of evidence, the government, through respondent OSG, was given the opportunity to THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO A. BANTUGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional
examine the authenticity of the documents presented by petitioner in support of its application for land Trial Court, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan, and HEIRS OF ZENAIDA BUSTRIA-TIGNO,
registration as well as cross-examine the latter’s witnesses. Without any objection from the former, all represented by CAMILO TIGNO, respondents.
exhibits offered by petitioner were admitted by the RTC. Meanwhile, respondent did not present any
evidence to contradict petitioner’s application. FACTS:

The RTC granted petitioner’s application for the registration of the subject lots and directed the issuance of Sometime in 1957, one Matias Bustamante filed with the then CFI of Pangasinan an application for
the corresponding decree by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) . It found that petitioner was able to registration under Act No. 496, as amended, of a tract of land containing an area of 880,000 square meters,
substantiate its bona fide claim of ownership over the subject lots as it was shown, that: (a) petitioner more or less.
purchased subject lands from its previous owners, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale ( b) petitioner and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, peaceful, continuous, public, and uninterrupted possession of Both the Director of Forestry and the Director of Fisheries filed oppositions to the aforecited application,
the subject lots even before 1945; and (c) the subject lots had already been declared for taxation purposes alleging among others, that said parcel of land, with the exception of 97,525 square meters, is a part of the
under the name of petitioner and the corresponding realty taxes have been equally paid by it Timber Land Block A Land Classification Project 44, which is converted into fish ponds. Isidro Bustria
[private respondents predecessor-in-interest] and Julian Bustria, also opposed the said application for land
CA granted respondent’s certiorari petition and thereby, annulled and set aside the RTC Decision and registration, alleging that they have in the year 1943 occupied in good faith their respective portions having
Amended Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner over the subject lots. a total area of fifty (50) hectares, more or less x x x converted their respective portions into fish ponds x x x
On the ground that there exist a previous decision for the application for registration of the said lots in a and actually possessed and occupied their respective portions x x x exclusively against all persons, except
cadastral case. the Director of Forestry & Director of Fishery. After trial, the lower court rendered a Decision in favor of
applicant Bustamante.
ISSUE: WON, the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as
the final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner over the subject lots. CA found that 783,275 square meters of the land applied for were accretions added to applicant
Bustamantes riceland of 9.7525 hectares, and that said accretion was caused by the sea on the southward
HELD:NO! portion of said riceland. This being so, the said accretion belongs not to the riparian owner but the State. All
lands thrown up by the sea and formed upon the shores, belong to the national domain and are for public
use, in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Waters.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-5

The subject lot contains an area of 49,999 square meters, more or less. This lot has been leased to Mr. FACTS:
Porfirio Morado by the [Republic of the Philippines], represented by the Secretary of Agriculture, for a period
of twenty-five (25) years, under Fishpond Lease Agreement. Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros were lawfully married. Out of this marital union were
born Maria Concepcion and Abelardo, Jr. Ironically, marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable
On July 6, 1988, the late Zenaida Bustria [daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed a complaint against Porfirio conflicts transpired between the spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed
Morado in the Regional Trial Court for ownership and possession over the lot in question. Herein petitioner, and board.
the Republic of the Philippines, was not made a party to that suit.
In 1982, Margarita left for the United States and there, to settle down with her two (2) children. In the United
In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria claimed absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful possession of several States, on April 26, 1989, Margarita applied for divorce before the Superior Court of California, County of
lots surveyed in the name of her father, Isidro Bustria. She further asserted that said Porfirio Morado San Mateo where she manifested that she does not desire counseling at that time. Margarita was granted
maliciously applied for a fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources well-knowing the decree of divorce together with a distribution of properties between her and Abelardo.
that said lot had always been occupied, possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-in-interest.
Not long after, Abelardo and Margarita executed an Agreement of Separation of Properties. This was
Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that the lot in question is part of the public followed-up by a petition filed before the Regional Trial Court for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
domain which he developed and converted into a fishpond. Due, however, to Porfirio Morados and his of gains of the spouses and for the approval of the agreement of separation of their properties. A decision
counsels failure to appear at the pre-trial and subsequent court hearings, the trial court subsequently was issued granting the petition and approving the separation of property agreement.
declared Porfirio Morado as in default.
For his part, Abelardo commenced a Civil Case, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita,
Petitioner, invoking 9 of B.P. Blg. 129,[3] filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. As Margarita was then residing at 96
trial courts decision; that the land in question is within the classified/zonified alienable and disposable land Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., Abelardo initially moved that summons be served through the
for fishpond development; and that since the land formed part of the public domain, the Bureau of Fisheries International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons
and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) has jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance with P.D. No. 704. be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks,
at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a
CA dismissed the petition. The judgment rendered in a case may be annulled on any of the following copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all
grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) it was at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive
obtained through extrinsic fraud. pleading.

ISSUE: Process Server, Maximo B. Dela Rosa, submitted his Officers Return---that he have served a copy of
summons and complaint upon Margarita thru the Department of Foreign Affairs clerk.
1.) whether the government can bring such action even though it was not a party to the action in which
the decision sought to be annulled was rendered. Almost nine (9) years later, Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo
Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name Licaros inasmuch as her
marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court.

HELD: YES! To begin with, an action to recover a parcel of land is in personam. As such, it is binding only The Court of Appeals rejected Margaritas claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide
between the parties thereto. the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for improper service of summons on her. The case involves
the marital status of the parties, which is an action in rem or quasi in rem. The Court of Appeals ruled that in
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action such an action the purpose of service of summons is not to vest the trial court with jurisdiction over the
against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in person of the defendant, but only to comply with due process. The Court of Appeals concluded that any
personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly irregularity in the service of summons involves due process which does not destroy the trial courts
heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former jurisdiction over the res which is the parties marital status. Neither does such irregularity invalidate the
are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the judgment rendered in the case.
thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole
world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a ISSUE: Whether Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her
particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. marriage with Abelardo

The decision sought to be annulled is solely between the private respondents [the Bustrias] and Porfirio HELD: YES! Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against
Morado). Petitioner Republic was not a party in the case and is not bound by the judgment rendered him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
therein. It is settled, a real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit. As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot
try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
However, [A] person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in
can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be Section 15 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In
adversely affected thereby. such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident defendant is not essential.
7. [G.R. No. 150656. April 29, 2003]
Actions in personam[ and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed
MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO B. LICAROS, respondent. against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-6

rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto on the payment of their loan, BPI Family foreclosed the mortgage. BPI Family was the highest bidder at
as against the whole world. the auction sale of the subject property. The spouses Go failed to exercise their right of redemption within
the prescribed period, thus, BPI Family was finally able to register the subject property in its name on
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United October 23, 1987 under TCT No. 370364.
States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a Apparently, the original copy of TCT No. 370364 was among those razed in the fire at the
non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of Quezon City Register of Deeds.. As a result of the administrative reconstitution of the lost title, TCT
the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the No. RT-54376 (370364) was issued to BPI Family.BPI Family executed in favor of the spouses Samuel
Rules of Court. The term personal status includes family relations, particularly the relations between Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan) a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property for and
husband and wife.[14] in consideration of P3,350,000.00. Consequently TCT No. 53297 was issued in the spouses Chan’s names.
The spouses Chan obtained a loan from BPI Family on October 2, 1992 for the construction of a
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be building on the subject property, and to secure the same, constituted a mortgage on the subject property in
served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the favor of BPI Family.
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the RTC-Branch 95 rendered its Decisionin Civil Case No. Q-28580, against Emilia M. Ching, Yee
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief L. Ching, and the spouses Go (Emilia M. Ching, et al.). It found that Muñoz’s signature on the Deed of
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972 was forged; that Muñoz never sold the subject property to
Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines. her sister, Emilia M. Ching; and that the spouses Go were not innocent purchasers for value of the
subject property.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by The spouses Chan, who bought the subject property from BPI Family, then came forward and filed
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the before the RTC-Branch 95 on October 22, 1993 an Urgent Motion to Stop Execution, opposing the writ of
summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address, also with leave of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The spouses Chan asserted ownership and possession
court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. of the subject property on the basis of a clean title registered in their names under TCT No. 53297. In
its Order dated December 28, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the spouses Chan’s urgent motion to
The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second mode stop the execution. According to the RTC-Branch 95, the photocopy of TCT No. 370364 in the name of
specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to any other means that the judge BPI Family, submitted by the spouses Chan with their motion, could hardly be regarded as satisfactory
may consider sufficient. proof that Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated therein were also missing from the
original copy of said certificate of title. Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of lis pendens were annotated
on TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Go’s names . On January 3, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 issued an
The Process Servers Return shows that the summons addressed to Margarita together with the complaint
Alias Writ of Execution.27 On January 10, 1994, the writ was enforced, and possession of the subject
were sent by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs with acknowledgment of receipt. The compliance
property was taken from the spouses Chan and returned to Muñoz.
with the jurisdictional requirements have been duly established. We hold that delivery to the
Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial
Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses Chan’s motion for reconsideration and
court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third mode of
notice of appeal in Civil Case No. Q-28580, Muñoz instituted before the MeTC on February 4, 1994 a
extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14.
Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction 30 against Samuel Go
Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muñoz alleged in her complaint that she had been in actual and physical
8. MUNOZ v YABUT JR
possession of the subject property since January 10, 1994. She hired a caretaker and two security guards
for the said property. On February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other men,
FACTS
some of whom were armed, ousted Muñoz of possession of the subject property by stealth, threat,
The subject property is a house and lot Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M. Ching
force, and intimidation. Muñoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
(spouses Ching), Muñoz’s sister. Muñoz lived at the subject property with the spouses Ching. As
directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and all persons claiming right under them to vacate the subject
consideration for the valuable services rendered by Muñoz to the spouses Ching’s family, Yee L. Ching
property
agreed to have the subject property transferred to Muñoz. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, seemingly
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muñoz’s allegations, insisting that Samuel Go Chan is the
executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of Muñoz, 9 the latter acquired a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
valid, lawful, and true legal owner and possessor of the subject property
186306 covering the subject property in her name on December 22, 1972However, in a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated December 28, 1972, Muñoz purportedly sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching.
Issue
As a result, TCT No. 186306 was cancelled and TCT No. 186366 was issued in Emilia M. Ching’s name.
Whether or not the action of Munoz for the reconveyance of property is in personam or in
Emilia M. Ching, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, sold the subject property to spouses Go
rem
Song and Tan Sio Kien (spouses Go), hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
HELD
258977 in the spouses Go’s names.
On October 15, 1979, Muñoz registered her adverse claim to the subject property on TCT
No. 258977 of the spouses Go. The next day, , Muñoz filed a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has
absolute sale dated December 28, 1972 and July 16, 1979, the cancellation of TCT No. 25897. In an been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name. Although the decree is recognized
Order dated December 17, 1979, the RTC-Branch 95 granted the spouses Go’s motion for the issuance as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered the sheriff to put the spouses Go in
liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice
possession of the subject property. The writ was implemented by the sheriff on March 26, 1980, driving
Muñoz and her housemates away from the subject property. Muñoz filed a petition for certiorari and and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has
prohibition before the Court of Appeals..The appellate court dismissed Muñoz’s petition on January 4, 1980. not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the
In the meantime, Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 was certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will
cancelled on October 28, 1982 on the basis of an alleged final judgment in favor of the spouses Go. avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.
The spouses Go obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family), they
constituted a mortgage on the subject property on November 23, 1982. When the spouses Go defaulted
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-7

The rule is that:(1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a Yes. It is admitted that the proceeding is a quasi in rem proceeding and that the presence of Teresa is not
land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and required because the trial court was able to acquire jurisdiction over the res (mortgaged property ).
their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a HOWEVER, her constitutional right to due process is superior over the procedural matters mentioned. Her
property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by right to due process was violated when she did not receive summons. Teresa, as a resident defendant, who
title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery does not voluntary appear in court must be personally served with summons as provided under Section 6,
of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Even if the action is quasi in rem, personal service of summons is essential in
particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the sheriff at her husband’s office cannot
only upon the parties properly impleaded. be deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve summons
upon her but that such efforts failed. Further, the order of the trial court compelling Teresa to pay off the debt
using her personal property is a judgment in personamwhich the court cannot do because it only
acquired jurisdiction over the res and not over the person of Teresa.

9. BIACO, Petitioner, vs.PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK

10. SANTOS VS. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION 566 SCRA 272, 278

FACTS:
Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa Biaco, acquired several loans from Philippine Countryside Rural
Bank (PCRB) from 1996 to 1998. To secure the loans, he mortgaged certain property in favor of the bank. PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money representing petitioners
He was able to pay loans from 1996 to 1997 but he defaulted in loans obtained in 1998 which amounted to unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of
more than a million pesos. directors in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.

Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known
Eventually, PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure against the spouses Biaco. Summons were issued by
address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed
the trial judge. The Sherriff served the summons to Ernesto at the latter’s office. No summons was served to service of summons by publication.
Teresa.
Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation
Ernesto did not file a responsive pleading (so did Teresa because she was not aware sans the summons in the Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the
being served her). The case was heard ex-parte and the spouses were ordered to satisfy the debt and advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of respondents employee to the effect that he
failure to do so will authorize the Sheriff to auction the mortgaged the property. sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known address.

Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned for P150k which is not sufficient to cover the P1 M+ debt. When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved that the
case be set for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the motion.
Upon motion by PCRB, a notice of levy was issued against the personal properties of Teresa to satisfy the
deficiency.
Petitioner alleged that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section
19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the previous ex parte proceedings. She then sought to have
the judgment annulled as she now claims that she was deprived of due process when she did not receive
Respondent naturally opposed the motion and said that petitioner was already deemed in default
summons; that it was only her husband who received the summons; that there was extrinsic fraud because for failure to file an answer within the prescribed period.
her husband deliberately hid the fact of the foreclosure proceeding.

Trial court: denied petitioners MR. It held that the rules did not require the affidavit of
PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem, hence Teresa’s participation is not complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due process
required so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res which is what happened in the case at bar; was observed bec. order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also denied the
that Teresa cannot invoke extrinsic fraud because such situation cannot occur in her case because she is a motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
co-defendant of Ernesto.
CA: sustained trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the trial court should be annulled.
ISSUE: WON service of summons was valid.
HELD:
HELD: YES.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-8

Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his - complaint was actually a real action as it affected title to or possession of real property. Accordingly, the
whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by basis for determining the correct docket fees was the fair market value of the real property under litigation
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by as stated in its current tax declaration or its current zonal valuation, whichever was higher. Considering that
publication.
ASB did not state the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of the real properties involved, as
well as the amount of actual damages and attorney’s fees it prayed for, the trial court was of the view that
The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any action where the defendant is designated ASB purposely evaded the payment of the correct filing fees.
as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
- action for rescission had already prescribed. It stated that an action for rescission grounded on fraud
should be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of fraud. ASB filed the action for rescission only on
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court simply speaks of the following: an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons October 14, 2005 or after four (4) years from the time the Deed of Donation was registered.
and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to
his last known address. CA

Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or
- agreed with ASB that its complaint should not have been dismissed on the ground that it failed to pay the
principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the
summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered correct docket fees. It stated that the lack of specific amount of actual damages and attorney’s fees in ASB’s
mail to the defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit complaint did not, by itself, amount to evident bad faith. The CA noted that ASB had previously manifested
showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, before the trial court that it was willing to pay additional docket fees should the same be found insufficient.
directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
- Considering the subsidiary nature of an action for rescission, the CA found that the action of ASB had not
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the yet prescribed, but was premature. The CA noted that ASB failed to allege in its complaint that it had
clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty resorted to all legal remedies to obtain satisfaction of its claim.
to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by
publication.
- To stress, an action for rescission or accion pauliana accrues only if all five requisites are present, to wit:
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him. 1) That the plaintiff asking for rescission, has a credit prior to the alienation, although demandable later;
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to
Admit Attached Answer. This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. 2) That the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person;

11. ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK VS. FURIGAY


3) That the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim, but would benefit by rescission of the
FACTS: conveyance to the third person;

Petitioner filed a verified complaint for sum of money and damages with application for replevin against 4) That the act being impugned is fraudulent; and
Ciudad Transport Services, Inc. (CTS), its president, respondent Henry H. Furigay; his wife, respondent
Gelinda C. Furigay; and a "John Doe."
While Civil Case was pending, respondent spouses donated their registered properties in Alaminos, 5) That the third person who received the property conveyed, if by onerous title, has been an accomplice in
Pangasinan, to their minor children, respondents Hegem G. Furigay and Herriette C. Furigay. As a result, the fraud.
Transfer Certificate of Titles were issued in the names of Hegem and Herriette Furigay.

Claiming that the donation of these properties was made in fraud of creditors, ASB filed a Complaint for
Rescission of Deed of Donation, Title and Damages. In the instant case, the plaintiff-appellant failed to satisfy the third requirement considering that it did not
allege in its complaint that it has resorted to all legal remedies to obtain satisfaction of his claim. It did not
RTC even point out in its complaint if the decision in the previous Civil Case has already become final and
executory and whether the execution thereof yielded negative result in satisfying its claims.
- service of summons by publication made by ASB was valid because respondents’ whereabouts could not
have been ascertained with exactitude and because Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court did not
distinguish what kind of action it would apply.
ISSUE: WON the complaint failed to allege the fact that it had resorted to all other legal remedies to satisfy
its claim.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-9

Under consideration is the administrative complaint filed by Rey C. Mutia (Mutia) charging Lucila
C. Pacariem (Pacariem), Court Stenographer III of RTC Manila, with grave misconduct in relation to an
alleged libelous remark made by her in a letter addressed to their Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Lyn L.
HELD: YES. Llamasares.
It seems that the controversy sprang from a Memorandum issued by Atty. Llamasares to
Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that every ordinary civil action must be based on Pacariem regarding her work inefficiency. It was only after the memorandum was filed with the Supreme
a cause of action. Section 2 of the same rule defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a Court Administrative Division that Pacariem received a copy. It is in this same answer that the alleged
party violates the right of another. In order that one may claim to have a cause of action, the following libelous remark against Mutia was made.
elements must concur: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it Mutia feels alluded to in the letter, as he was the only new employee in said office at that time.
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such Mutia avers that Pacariems totally baseless and malicious accusation against him, Atty. Llamasares and
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or Presiding Judge Marquez, of falsifying his DTR, amounts to libel and constitutes grave misconduct for which
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an she should be disciplined.
action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. In other words, "a cause of action arises when Pacariem admits authorship of the letter but denies that she was motivated by malice to destroy
that should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done." the good name and reputation of Mutia. She opines that the letter is privileged, the same being a private
communication between her and the persons and authorities concerned in relation to her duties and
obligations as court stenographer. As to the portion of her letter concerning Mutias DTR, she avers that it
All valid conditions precedent to the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed
was an honest mistake or misapprehension of facts made in good faith and apologizes for her lapse of
by agreement of the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with before commencing the judgment.
action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or
ISSUE: WON there was a cause of action in an administrative case.
excuse non-performance of the condition.
HELD:
OCA made no findings as to Pacariems alleged grave misconduct.
Moreover, it is not enough that a party has, in effect, a cause of action.
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer, amounting to either maladministration, or
essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. "The test of the sufficiency of the facts willful intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. Although an officer may be
suspended or dismissed for malfeasance which is not related to, or connected with, the functions of the
alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment
office, such as commission of a crime, the officer may not be proceeded against administratively based
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff." The focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, thereon until a final judgment of conviction is rendered by a court of justice. The exception is when the crime
of the material allegations. Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint or act committed also constitutes a violation of administrative rules; there no conviction is required.
warrants its dismissal.
It cannot be gainsaid that the issue in administrative cases is not whether the complainant
has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employees have breached the norms
In relation to an action for rescission, it should be noted that the remedy of rescission is subsidiary in nature; and standards of the judiciary. While the records show that Pacariems statement in her letter regarding
it cannot be instituted except when the party suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain Mutias DTR is in fact false, we are not prepared to make a finding as to whether or not Pacariem is guilty of
reparation for the same. libel inasmuch as libel per se is not an administrative offense. Neither is it shown that a criminal complaint
for libel had been filed against her and that she had been convicted thereof so as to be the basis of a
disciplinary action against her. As to whether her act of making such a false statement in her answer to her
Consequently, following the subsidiary nature of the remedy of rescission, a creditor would have a cause of superiors memorandum amounts to grave misconduct, we rule in the negative.
action to bring an action for rescission, if it is alleged that the following successive measures have already Nevertheless, we cannot countenance Pacariems imprudent and ill-suited insouciance in making
been taken: (1) exhaust the properties of the debtor through levying by attachment and execution upon all false actuations against her superiors and co-employee. After a careful perusal of the records, we find
the property of the debtor, except such as are exempt by law from execution; (2) exercise all the rights and nothing that could have provoked such a response from Pacariem.
actions of the debtor, save those personal to him (accion subrogatoria); and (3) seek rescission of the
contracts executed by the debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana). We find Lucila C. Pacariem GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a court employee.

A cursory reading of the allegations of ASB’s complaint would show that it failed to allege the ultimate
13. SPS GUANIO VS MAKATI SHANGRI-LA
facts constituting its cause of action and the prerequisites that must be complied before the same may
be instituted. ASB, without availing of the first and second remedies, that is, exhausting the properties of
CTS, Henry H. Furigay and Genilda C. Furigay or their transmissible rights and actions, simply undertook FACTS
the third measure and filed an action for annulment of the donation. This cannot be done.
Spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio (petitioner) booked at the Shangri-la Hotel
Makati (respondent) for their wedding reception. Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc.
(respondent) scheduled an initial food tasting.
12. MUTIA VS. PACARIEM Three days before the event, a final food tasting took place then parties agreed on a final price ─ P1,150
per person for the food.
FACTS: A day before the event or on July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and entered their contract.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-10

Sps Guanio claim that during the reception, Makati shang representatives, Catering Director Bea What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:
Marquez and Sales Manager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they would; their
guests complained of the delay in the service of the dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
unavailable; the hotels waiters were rude and unapologetic when confronted about the delay; and despite delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Alvarezs promise that there would be no charge for the extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight,
they were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for the three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next The pertinent provisions of the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract between the parties read:
day.
4.3 The ENGAGER shall be billed in accordance with the prescribed rate for the minimum
They further claim that they brought wine and liquor in accordance with their open bar guaranteed number of persons contracted for, regardless of under attendance or non-appearance of the
arrangement, but these were not served to the guests who were forced to pay for their drinks. expected number of guests, except where the ENGAGER cancels the Function in accordance with its Letter
of Confirmation with the HOTEL. Should the attendance exceed the minimum guaranteed attendance, the
Thus they sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. and received an ENGAGER shall also be billed at the actual rate per cover in excess of the minimum guaranteed
apologetic reply from Krister Svensson, the hotels Executive Assistant Manager in charge of Food and attendance.
Beverage. Then they filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the RTC of MakatiCity.
xxxx
In its Answer, respondent claimed that contrary to petitioners claim, Marquez and Alvarez were
present during the event, albeit they were not permanently stationed thereat as there were three other hotel 4.5. The ENGAGER must inform the HOTEL at least forty eight (48) hours before the scheduled
functions; that while there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was occasioned by the date and time of the Function of any change in the minimum guaranteed covers. In the absence of such
sudden increase of guests to 470 from the guaranteed expected minimum number of guests of 350 notice, paragraph 4.3 shall apply in the event of under attendance. In case the actual number of
to a maximum of 380, as stated in the Banquet Event Order (BEO) and that Banquet Service Director, in attendees exceed the minimum guaranteed numberby ten percent (10%), the HOTEL shall not in any
fact relayed the delay in the service of the meals to petitioner Luigis father, Gil Guanio. way be held liable for any damage or inconvenience which may be caused thereby. The ENGAGER
On Svenssons letter, respondent, denying it as an admission of liability, claimed that it was meant shall also undertake to advise the guests of the situation and take positive steps to remedy the
to maintain goodwill to its customers. same.

RTC: rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, disposing as follows: Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a
contract. It is also defined as the [f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the
The trial court relied heavily on the letter of Svensson: whole or part of the contract.

Upon receiving your comments on our service rendered during your reception here with us, we are in fact, To the Court, the foregoing explanation of the hotels Banquet Director overcomes any
very distressed. Right from minor issues pappadums served in the soup instead of the creutons, lack of presumption of admission of breach which Svenssons letter might have conveyed.
valet parkers, hard rolls being too hard till a major one slow service, rude and arrogant waiters, we have
disappointed you in all means.
The Court notes that respondent could have managed the situation better, it being held in high
esteem in the hotel and service industry. Given respondents vast experience, it is safe to presume that this
Indeed, we feel as strongly as you do that the services you received were unacceptable and definitely not
is not its first encounter with booked events exceeding the guaranteed cover. It is not audacious to expect
up to our standards. We understand that it is our job to provide excellent service and in this instance, we
that certain measures have been placed in case this predicament crops up. That regardless of these
have fallen short of your expectations. We ask you please to accept our profound apologies for causing
measures, respondent still received complaints as in the present case, does not amuse. To the Court, the
such discomfort and annoyance.
delay in service might have been avoided or minimized if respondent exercised prescience in scheduling
events. No less than quality service should be delivered especially in events which possibility of repetition is
close to nil. Petitioners are not expected to get married twice in their lifetimes.
The trial court observed that from the tenor of the letter admits that the services were unacceptable and
definitely not up to their standards.
14. VANGIE BARRAZONA, Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY and
Court of Appeals : reversed the trial courts decision, holding that the proximate cause of petitioners injury SAN-AN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by RODRIGO CHUA
was an unexpected increase in their guests. The said proximate cause, which is entirely attributable to Sps TIU, Respondents.
Guanio set the chain of events which resulted in the alleged inconveniences them. Given the circumstances FACTS
only the Sps. Guanio may bear whatever consequential damages that they may have allegedly suffered.

ISSUE : Whether respondent Makati Shang breach their contract of obligation? San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent, owns a building. Vangie Barrazona, petitioner,
has been leasing portions of the building identified as Units 203 A and B at the second floor. The period of
RULING : YES the lease is for two (2) years, commencing July 15, 2001 and ending June 30, 2003. The monthly rental
is P400.00 per square meter for Unit 203 A and P500.00 per square meter for Unit 203 B.
The Court finds that since petitioners complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of proximate cause finds
no application to it:
Starting August 2001, Barrazona defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals and failed to pay despite
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions demands by San-an Realty. On May 14, 2002, the latter filed with the RTC, a Complaint for Collection of
involving breach of contract. x x x The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where Sum of Money with Damages.
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-11

On June 3, 2002, Barrazona filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no This allegation clearly shows that respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay her
jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the allegations clearly indicate that the action is one for overdue rentals and to vacate the premises; and that the last demand to pay and vacate in writing was
ejectment (illegal detainer) which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) She on March 27, 2002.
pointed out the following allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint showing that it is not for sum of
money but for ejectment: San- an thus complied with Section 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides:
4. That the defendant has failed to pay the rentals for the said leased premises for the month of August
2001 up to the present; Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by
the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to
5. That the plaintiff has demanded the defendant to pay her overdue account, now amounting vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the
to P971,838.15, the last demand to vacate and payment of arrears having been made in writing on March premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to
27, 2002 xxx. comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. (2a)

RTC : denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Indeed, while the complaint is captioned "Collection of Sum of Money with Damages," the allegations
therein show that respondent’s action is for ejectment. All ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of the
Barrzona filed Petition for Certiorari alleging that: (1) the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion MTC.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Dismiss (2) the Resolution denying her
Motion to Dismiss is unconstitutional as it does not state its legal basis. 15. SARMIENTA VS MANALITE HOMEOWNERS

FACTS
On the other hand San-an Realty in praying for the dismissal of the petition, contends that the complaint is
for the collection of unpaid rentals as there is absolutely no allegation that its intent is to eject petitioner from MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land with an area of 9,936
the premises square meters situated in Sitio Manalite, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City.Through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy and stealth, petitioners entered the premises and constructed their temporary houses and
an office building.Petitioners even filed a civil case to annul MAHAs title but the case was dismissed by the
ISSUE:
trial court. After said dismissal, MAHA demanded that petitioners vacate the land. Petitioners pleaded that
they be given one year within which to look for a place to transfer, to which request MAHA acceded. The
Whether the complaint indicate that the action is one for ejectment or for collection of sum of money said one-year period, however, was repeatedly extended due to the benevolence of MAHAs
members. Later on, petitioners came up with a proposal that they become members of MAHA so they can
be qualified to acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the Community Mortgage Program
RULING (CMP).MAHA again agreed and tolerated petitioners possession, giving them until December 1999 to
comply with the requirements to avail of the CMP benefits. Petitioners nonetheless failed to comply with
said requirements. Thus, MAHA sent formal demand letters to petitioners to vacate the property. Upon the
The action is one for EJECTMENT.
latters refusal to heed the demand, MAHA filed the complaint for Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer.

Barrazona stated in her motion that respondent’s allegations in its complaint show that it is one for
ejectment cognizable, not by the RTC but, by the MTC of Baguio City. In their Answer with Counterclaims,[11] petitioners denied the said allegations and averred that they are the
owners of the subject lot, having been in actual physical possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years
before MAHA intruded into the land. They claimed that as the years went by, they established the AMARA
In Herrera, et al. v. Bollos, et al.: and bought the subject property from Julian Tallano. The property later became known as the Tallano Estate
and registered. They likewise argued that the allegations in the complaint do not confer jurisdiction upon the
court acting as an ejectment court, and that the complaint was irregular and defective because its caption
The basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the states that it was forForcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer. MAHA, additionally, had no legal capacity to sue and
allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to was guilty of forum shopping. Its officers were likewise fictitious.
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. MTCC : dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. The MTCC held that the complaint filed was one of
forcible entry, but MAHA failed to establish the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in its
complaint.Also, the trial court held that MAHAs failure to initiate immediate legal action after petitioners
It bears reiterating paragraph 5 of the complaint, thus: unlawfully entered its property and its subsequent declaration of benevolence upon the petitioners cannot
be construed as tolerance in accordance with law as to justify the treatment of the case as one for unlawful
detainer.
5. That the plaintiff has demanded the defendant to pay her overdue account, now amounting
to P971,838.15, the last demand to vacate and payment of arrears having been made in writing on March
27, 2002. RTC : reversed the decision of the MTCC.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-12

The RTC held that the lower court erred in dismissing the case by considering the complaint as one of In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical
forcible entry which required prior physical possession. The RTC found that MAHA was able to allege and possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means
prove by preponderance of evidence that petitioners occupation of the property was by mere provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. [20] In
tolerance. MAHA tolerated the occupation until all those who wanted to acquire MAHAs rights of ownership unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started
could comply with membership obligations and dues. Petitioners, however, failed to comply with said or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or
obligations within the given period; thus, their occupation became illegal after MAHA demanded that they building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express
vacate the property. or implied.

CA : affirmed the decision of the RTC. In the present case, the complaint reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer:

The CA held that while the complaint in the beginning alleged facts which make out a case for forcible entry, The evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners stay and gave them
the rest of the averments therein show that the cause of action was actually for unlawful detainer. The CA the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners continued stay on
noted that the complaint alleged supervening events that would show that what was initially forcible entry the premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus,
was later tolerated by MAHA thereby converting its cause of action into one for unlawful when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as
detainer. Accordingly, the complaint was filed within the required one-year period counted from the date of their right of possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required
last demand. The CA further held that the fact that the complaint was captioned as both for forcible entry petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land.Well settled is the rule that a
and unlawful detainer does not render it defective as the nature of the complaint is determined by the person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract
allegations of the complaint. between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled
in favor of MAHA.
ISSUE: Whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to make up a case of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially,
possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually,
such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of
RULING : The case is UNLAWFUL DETAINER. possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

What determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the
allegations in the complaint.In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to 16. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, Bonifacia Mercado, Damian Mercado and Emmanuel Mercado
bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Bascug (petitioners) VS Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina (respondents) GR. No. 173987
Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides:
Facts:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.-- Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
The petitioners claim to be the owners of a 338 sq. meter parcel of land now owned by the
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
respondents located in Poblacion, Maasin, Southern Leyte being the heirs of the original owners (late
or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building
spouses) Santiago and Sofronia Mercado. Sometime in 1996, the respondents alleged that they have
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
purchased the said land from Josefa Mercado, who bought it from Genivera Mercado Kavanaugh, who
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
bought it from Escolastico Mercado who also bought it from Santiago Mercado (the original owner). The
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
petitioners claim that all these contracts and transactions never happened and they asked the court to
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
nullify the Transfer Certificate of Title and award them actual, moral and exemplary damages plus atty’s
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
fees.
such possession, together with damages and costs.

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction because
There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit: the petitioners failed to state the assessed value of the property and that the action is barred by
prescription, and that the case holds no sufficient cause of action
because respondents are deemed to be in good faith because petitioners did not allege bad faith in their
(1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant case. The RTC denied the motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the case was
whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, brought to CA via certiorari assailing the orders of RTC. The CA has denied the case and the subsequent
threat, strategy or stealth; motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners have filed an Amended Complaint in the RTC to include the assessed value of the
(2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from the defendant whose property. The respondents, on the other hand filed a motion to dismiss amended complaint due to
possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the prescription, laches, indefeasibility of title and lack of cause of action.
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right
thereunder. The RTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondents filed an action for certiorari before the CA assailing the latest ruling or the RTC. The CA
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-13

GRANTED the petition and set aside the ruling of the RTC and enjoined it from the proceedings. Petitioners That from the time the said decision was distributed to said homeowners, the respondent became
filed a motion for reconsideration, but such was denied. This is why the petitioners brought the case before the subject of conversation or talk of the town and by virtue of which, greatly damaged respondent’s good
the Supreme Court via PETITION for REVIEW on CERTIORARI. name within the community; his reputation was besmirched;suffered sleepless night and serious anxiety;
and was deprived of his political career.
Issues:
Substantively, WON CA erred in ordering RTC to dismiss the case and enjoin it from the proceeding on the A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of
ground of indefeasibility of title, prescription/laches. the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
Held: defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
The court ruled that the case lacked sufficient cause of action because petitioners failed to alleged bad faith plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. We find that all three elements
of the respondents. There was a mention of fraud in the course of the transactions but the petitioners did not exist in the case at bar. Respondent may not have specifically identified each element, but it may be
allege that those were committed by respondents. Also, since this land is covered by the Torrens System, sufficiently determined from the allegations in his complaint.
the respondents are not really compelled to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. When they got
the title, it was a clean title (allegations of fraud pertained to an earlier purchase). They are considered When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be
innocent purchaser for value (again because there was no allegation to the contrary). determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider
other matters aliunde. The test, therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be
Petition for review on certiorari is denied. true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein.

17. Manaloto vs Veloso


18. Domondon vs Lopez
This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case. It was alleged that they are the lessors of a
residential house located at No. 42 Big Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City which was leased Facts: The complainants in this case were the students of AMA Computer College in QC and members of
to respondent at a monthly rental of P17,000.00. The action was instituted on the ground of respondents editorial board of the official school publication called dateline. These students published a spoof edition of
failure to pay rentals from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite repeated demands. Respondent dateline, which they called amable tonite. After conducting an investigation the school recommended the
denied the non-payment of rentals and alleged that he made an advance payment of P825,000.00 when he expulsion of the complainants from the school.
paid for the repairs done on the leased property.

The first cause of action was for damages because the respondent supposedly suffered
embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners distributed copies of the above-mentioned MeTC decision On march 14, 1997, complainants filed complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village while respondents appeal was still preliminary mandatory injunction against AMA.
pending before the Quezon City RTC-Branch 88.

The second cause of action was for breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to
make continuing repairs on the subject property to preserve and keep it tenantable. Complainant alleged that they had been expelled in a despotic and oppressive manner in violation of
their constitutional rights to due process and to free speech as well as campus journalism act of 1991.
Petitioners contend that respondent has no cause of action against them since the MTC decision in
the unlawful detainer case was part of public records.

RTC issued a Resolution dismissing respondents complaint for violating the rule against splitting of They sought an award of damages in their favor and the issuance of temporary preliminary mandatory
cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the pendency of a related case. It adjudged that injunction to enjoin the defendant in the meantime to allow them to attend to their classes and to take their
the case involved the same facts, parties, and causes of action as those in the unlawful detainer case, and exams.
the MeTC had already properly taken cognizance of the latter case.

On appeal, the CA decreed that although court decisions are public documents, distribution of the
same during the pendency of an appeal was clearly intended to cause respondent some form of The school filed an OPPOSITION stated that the publication were slanderous and derogatory also against
harassment and/or humiliation so that respondent would be ostracized by his neighbors. campus journalism act (R.A. 7079.
Subsequently, the CA dismissed the second cause of action.

Issue:
However on the basis of the pleadings of the parties respondent judge issued a resolution
WON respondent is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages? dismissing the case itself after finding that the expulsion of the complainants was for cause and was
effected only after an investigation during which they were duly heard.

Ruling: Hence, complainants file administrative case against judge Percival Mandap Lopez.
YES!
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted with gross ignorance of the law.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-14

HELD:YES.It is undisputed that no trial was ever conducted by respondent judge before issuing his complaint, Consing, Jr. claimed that the incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon him by Unicapital
resolution, dated June 14, 1997, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 for lack of merit. and PBI to return to them the purchase price they had paid for the subject property constituted
Respondent judge, however, justifies his action on the ground that the defendants’ rejoinder sought the harassment and oppression which severely affected his personal and professional life. He also
dismissal of the case for lack of merit and the same was in the nature of a motion to dismiss the case for averred that he was coerced to commit a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as Unicapital and PBI
lack of cause of action. kept on forcing him to issue a post-dated check in the amount sought to be recovered, notwithstanding their
knowledge that he had no funds for the same. He further alleged that Unicapital and URI required him to
To be sure, the defendants did not file a motion to dismiss. What they filed was an "Opposition," dated sign blank deeds of sale and transfers without cancelling the old one is in violation of the laws on land
March 25, 1997, in which they raised factual matters and affirmative defenses to answer the allegations in registration and real estate development.
the complaint against them and prayed for the denial of the writ prayed for. The fact that the defendants filed Accordingly, Consing, Jr. prayed that:
a responsive pleading seeking affirmative relief and setting up defenses 18 negates the intent on their part to (a) he be declared as a mere agent of Dela Cruz, and as such, devoid of any obligation to
file a motion to dismiss. Unicapital, URI, and PBI for the transactions entered into concerning the subject property;
(b) Unicapital, URI, and PBI be enjoined from harassing or coercing him, and from speaking
about him in a derogatory fashion; and
It is apparent that respondent judge failed to distinguish between a motion to dismiss for failure of the (c) Unicapital, URI, and PBI pay him actual and consequential damages in the amount of
complaint to state a cause of action and a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is P2,000,000.00, moral damages of at least P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages of P1,000,000.00, all per
governed by Rule 16, §1(g), while the second by Rule 33 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. 19 month, reckoned from May 1, 1999 and until the controversy is resolved, and attorney's fees and costs of
The distinction between these two has been explained thus: suit.
PETITIONER’s CONTENTIONS:
. . .The first [situation where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action] is raised in a motion For their part, Unicapital, URI, and Martirez (Unicapital, et al.) filed separate Motions to Dismiss
to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the Consing, Jr.’s complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, considering that:
allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matters aliunde. The second [situation (a) No document was attached against which Consing, Jr. supposedly derived his right and
where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged] is raised in a demurrer to evidence under against which his rights may be as certained;
Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has (b) The demands to pay against Consing, Jr. and for him to tender post-dated checks to cover the
presented in support of his claim. The first does not concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations amount due were well within the rights of Unicapital as an unpaid creditor, as Consing, Jr. had already
while the second arises precisely because the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations admitted his dealings with them;
and has found the evidence wanting. (c) The utterances purportedly constituting libel were not set out in the complaint; and
(d) The laws supposedly violated were not properly identified. Moreover, Unicapital, et al. posited
that the RTC-PasigCity did not acquire jurisdiction over the case given that Consing, Jr. failed to pay the
Hence, a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has proper amount of docket fees. In the same vein, they maintained that the RTC-Pasig City had no
presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a motion jurisdiction over their supposed violations of the Corporation Code and Revised Securities Act,
to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of which, discounting its merits, should have been supposedly lodged with the Securities and Exchange
the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of Commission.
insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case. The RTC-Pasig City issued a Resolution denying the above mentioned motions to dismiss,
holding that Consing, Jr.’s complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages
pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. It ruled that where there is abusive behavior, a complainant, like
19.UNICAPITAL V CONSING GR NOS 175277 & 175285 Consing, Jr., has the right to seek refuge from the courts. It also noted that the elements of libel in a criminal
case are not the same as those for a civil action founded on the provisions of the Civil Code, and therefore,
FACTS: necessitates a different treatment. Aggrieved, they elevated the denial of their motions to dismiss before the
Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained an CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
loan from Unicapital. The said loan was secured by Promissory Notes and a Real Estate Mortgage parcel of The CA rendered a Joint Decision holding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed
land located at Imus, Cavite, registered in the name of Dela Cruz. Prior to these transactions, Plus Builders, by the RTC-Pasig City in refusing to dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint.At the outset, it ruled that while
Inc. (PBI) was already interested to develop the subject property into a residential subdivision. PBI entered the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment will not
into a joint venture agreement with Unicapital, through its real estate development arm, URI. The loan and automatically cause the dismissal of the case. Moreover, it upheld the order of the RTC-Pasig City for
mortgage over the subject property was later on modified into an Option to Buy Real Property and, after Unicapital and PBI, et al. to submit their comment due to the alleged existence of a similar case filed before
further negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. the RTC-Makati City.
Eventually, Unicapital, through URI, purchased one-half of the subject property while PBI bought The CA concurred with the RTC-Pasig City that Consing Jr.'s complaint states a cause of action. It
the remaining half for the price. In this relation, Dela Cruz caused TCT No. T-687599 to be divided into three found that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s purportedly abusive manner in enforcing their claims against Consing,
separate titles as follows: (a) TCT No. T-851861 for URI; (b) TCT No. T-851862 for PBI; and (c)TCT No. T- Jr. was properly constitutive of a cause of action. Furthermore, it noted that Consing, Jr. does not seek to
51863 which was designated as a road lot. However, even before URI and PBI were able to have the recover his claims against any particular provision of the corporation code or the securities act but against
titles transferred to their names, Juanito Tan Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital the actions of Unicapital and PBI, et al.; hence, Consing, Jr.’s complaint was principally one for damages
that they are the lawful owners of the subject property; that they did not sell the subject property; and over which the RTC has jurisdiction, and, in turn, there lies no misjoinder of causes of action.
that Dela Cruz’s title thereto was a mere forgery. Prompted by Teng and Yu’s assertions, PBI conducted
further investigations on the subject property which later revealed that Dela Cruz's title was actually of ISSUE:
dubious origin. PBI and Unicapital sent separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing, Jr., seeking the Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion
return of the purchase price they had paid for the subject property. to dismiss.
The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285
RESPONDENT’s CONTENTIONS: HELD:
Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for Declaratory Relief and later NO. A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
amended to Complex Action for Injunctive Relief(Consing, Jr.’s complaint) before the RTC-Pasig City another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General Manager Martinez, Dela Cruz and Does 1-20. In his complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-15

appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the Petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case
allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, then the same should not be because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one year had elapsed from petitioners
dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. forcible entry; (2) she was a rent-paying tenant protected by PD 20; (3) her lease constituted a legal
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges encumbrance upon the property; and (4) the lot was subject of expropriation.
facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid MeTC ruled in favor of respondent Tan Te. RTC rendered its judgment setting asidethe
judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material Decision of the Manila MeTC and dismissed respondent Tan Tes Complaint on the ground that it was
allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should the RTC and not the MeTC which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The RTC
not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. believed that since Tan Tes predecessor-in-interest learned of petitioners intrusion into the lot as early as
In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint in SCA No.1759 properly states a cause February 21, 1994, the ejectment suit should have been filed within the one-year prescriptive period which
of action since the allegations there insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of expired on February 21, 1995. Since the Reyes did not file the ejectment suit and respondent Tan Te filed
the Civil Code. the action only on September 8, 1997, then the suit had become an accion publiciana cognizable by the
Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the RTC.
abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him. Among others, the The CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondent Tan Te reversing the Manila RTC Decision
complaint states that Consing, Jr. "has constantly been harassed and bothered by Unicapital and PBI, et al.; and reinstated the Manila MeTC.
x x x besieged by phone calls from them; x x x has had constant meetings with them variously, and on a
continuing basis, such that he is unable to attend to his work as an investment banker."In the same ISSUES:
pleading, he also alleged that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s act of "demanding a postdated check knowing fully Whether Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit.
well that he does not have the necessary funds to cover the same, nor is he expecting to have them is whether or not respondent is entitled to the ejectment of petitioner Dela Cruz from the premises.
equivalent to asking him to commit a crime under unlawful coercive force."Accordingly, these specific
allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages pursuant to Article 19 of the HELD:
Civil Code. YES. Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article with the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must embraces an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession of any
beheld responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because it is recognized or granted by law as such, land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In actions for forcible entry, three
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must
the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he allege their prior physical possession of the property. Second, they must also assert that they were deprived
acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed within
prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of physical
was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. possession of the land or building.
Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the The essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract
Civil Code. express or implied; (2) the expiration or termination of the possessors right to hold possession; (3)
withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the right
20. DELA CRUZ V CA 510 SCRA 103,115 to possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and
FACTS: vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received
The Reyes family owned the lot located at No. 1332 Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Petitioner by the defendant.
Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of their lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a portion of the lot for well Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te ejectment complaint is after
over 40 years. Sometime in 1989, a fire struck the premises and destroyed, among others, petitioners all a complaint for unlawful detainer.
dwelling. After the fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the said lot and rebuilt their respective From the foregoing jurisprudence, it is unequivocal that petitioners possession after she intruded
houses; simultaneously, the Reyes family made several verbal demands on the remaining lessees, into the lot after the firewas by tolerance or leniency of the Reyeses and hence, the action is properly an
including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did not comply. Petitioner was served a written demand to unlawful detainer case falling under the jurisdiction of the Manila MeTC.
vacate said lot but refused to leave. Despite the setback, the Reyes family did not initiate court proceedings Even if we concede that it is the RTC and not the MeTC that has jurisdiction over the Tan Te
against any of the lessees. complaint, following the reasoning that neither respondent nor her predecessor-in-interest filed an ejectment
suit within one (1) year from February 21, 1994 when the Reyeses knew of the unlawful entry of petitioner,
The disputed lot was sold to respondent Melba Tan Te by virtue of tDeed of Absolute Sale. and hence, the complaint is transformed into an accion publiciana, the Court deems it fair and just to
Respondent bought the lot in question for residential purposes. Despite the sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did suspend its rules in order to render efficient, effective, and expeditious justice considering the nine (9) year
not give up the lot. pendency of the ejectment suit. More importantly, if there was uncertainty on the issue of jurisdiction that
arose from the averments of the complaint, the same cannot be attributed to respondent Tan Te but to her
Petitioner was sent a written demand to relinquish the premises which she ignored, prompting counsel who could have been confused as to the actual nature of the ejectment suit. The lawyers apparent
respondent Tan Te to initiate conciliation proceedings at the barangay level. While respondent attempted to imprecise language used in the preparation of the complaint without any participation on the part of Tan Te
settle the dispute by offering financial assistance, petitioner countered by asking PhP 500,000.00 for her is sufficient special or compelling reason for the grant of relief.
house. Respondent rejected the counter offer which she considered unconscionable. As a result, a YES. Petitioner fully knows that her stay in the subject lot is at the leniency and magnanimity of Mr.
certificate to file action was issued to Tan Te. Lino Reyes and later of respondent Tan Te; and her acquiescence to such use of the lot carries with it an
implicit and assumed commitment that she would leave the premises the moment it is needed by the owner.
Respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages before the Manila MeTC. The When respondent Tan Te made a last, written demand on January 14, 1997 and petitioner breached her
complaint averred that: (1) the previous owners, the Reyeses were in possession and control of the promise to leave upon demand, she lost her right to the physical possession of the lot. Thus, respondent
contested lot; (2) the lot was sold to Tan Te; (3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with Tan Te should now be allowed to occupy her lot for residential purposes, a dream that will finally be realized
strategy and/or stealth; (4) the petitioner unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession of the after nine (9) years of litigation.
property and continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent sent several written demands to petitioner to
vacate the premises but refused to do so.
21. HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON V RICAFORTE GR NO. 198680
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-16

FACTS: 22. ALBERTO VS CA


Petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. FACTS: Respondent spouses Epifanio and Cecilia Alano retained the legal services of petitioner Atty. Zaida
"Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso). In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died Ruby S. Alberto to represent them before the SEC in an action to recover real properties, money and other
intestate and childless leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer assets that may pertain to them by virtue of their stockholdings in the Natalia Realty, Inc. Petitioner filed on
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso behalf of respondent-spouses with SEC an action for liquidation, accounting and damages against Eugenio
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of S. Baltao and five other persons of Natalia Realty, Inc., and appeared at the hearings thereof.
title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638 to the prejudice of On January 3, 1989, petitioner learned that respondent-spouses moved to dismiss which motion was
petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest. confirmed. It appeared that during the pendency of the case, the opposing parties reached a settlement
Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of without consulting petitioner. Petitioner only learned of the settlement on when she received a copy of a
Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. Further, SEC order giving Baltao and Natalia Realty, Inc. three days to comment on respondent-spouses’ motion to
by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the dismiss on account of said settlement. Accordingly, the said case was dismissed. When confronted,
complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, respondent-spouses admitted that a settlement had indeed been reached and that they expected to receive
as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs. 35 hectares of land. Petitioner demanded the payment of the fees stipulated in their retainer agreement,
The RTC found that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It however, respondent-spouses refused to pay despite repeated demands.
observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous Petitioner was thus constrained to file a Complaint for collection of sum of money with damages against
special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be respondent-spouses.
considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established
the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary RTC: in favor of petitioner
evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia
Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport. When the decision became final and executory, petitioner caused the issuance of a writ of execution.
However, per Sheriff’s Return, only P3,500.00 of personal properties of respondent-spouses were levied.
ISSUE: Apparently, Natalia Realty, Inc. had sold to private respondent Yolanda Alano, respondent-spouses’
Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case thus erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s daughter, 23 hectares out of the 32.4 hectares given to them as settlement of the SEC case. This discovery
heirship. prompted petitioner to file a complaint, to declare the deed of sale null and void ab initio. Petitioner likewise
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the transfer certificates of title.
HELD:
YES. As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Trial court: in an Omnibus Order, dismissed petitioner’s Complaint for insufficiency of cause of action. The
Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be annotations of the notice of lis pendens as well as the attorney’s lien on the transfer certificates of title were
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While cancelled.
the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said
complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding CA: affirmed the dismissal of the complaint as well as the cancellation of the notice of lispendens and the
special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from annotation of attorney’s lien.
granting the same.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be ISSUE: whether or not the complaint of the petitioner is impressed with sufficient cause of action
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and HELD: petitioner has sufficient cause of action. In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the Appeals, the Court held:
civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section "To determine the sufficiency of a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint and no other
3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another should be considered; and that the test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a petition or complaint to
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special constitute a cause of action is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition or complaint.
then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as A cause of action exists if the following elements are present:
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special damages.
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re- In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be
opened. borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. To sustain a motion to
Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist"
parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246. A right in her favor was created by virtue of the retainer agreement executed between her and respondent-
Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made spouses. Correspondingly, respondent-spouses had the obligation to honor and not to violate the provisions
in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 of the retainer agreement it entered into with petitioner. Unfortunately, respondent-spouses breached their
was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s obligation under the retainer agreement when they refused and failed to pay petitioner’s attorney’s fees in
heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special accordance with their agreement. Complaint constitute a sufficient cause of action on the part of petitioner.
proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
As a general rule, in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, only
the averments in the complaint and no other are to be consulted. The rule admits of exceptions.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-17

the Ombudsman. In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the
First: All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not denied petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling. Accordingly, we are compelled to consider
under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing the instant petition as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
evidence thereon.
Attached to the second Amended Complaint is the Deed of Sale the due execution and genuineness of 24. QUADRA VS CA
which were never denied by respondents. While admittedly, petitioner is not a party to the Deed of Sale,
nevertheless, she anchors her right upon the allegation that her share in the 35 hectares of land awarded to FACTS: Petitioner Geronimo Q. Quadra was the Chief Legal Officer of respondent Philippine Charity
respondent-spouses was prejudiced by the simulated sale to Yolanda P. Alano. Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) when he organized and actively participated in the activities of Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Employees Association (CUGCO) and then later, the Association of Sweepstakes
Second: Other pleadings submitted by the parties, in addition to the complaint, may be considered in Staff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]). In April 1964, he was administratively
deciding whether the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. charged before the Civil Service Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and Rules for neglect of
In the instant case, aside from the original and the amended complaint, the lower court had every duty and misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. CSC rendered a decision
opportunity to study the merits of the case by examining the other pleadings submitted by the parties such finding petitioner guilty of the charges and recommending the penalty of dismissal. The following day, the
as General Manager of PCSO, sent petitioner a letter of dismissal, in accordance with the decision of the
-Motion for Cancellation of the Notices of Lis Pendens and Attorney’s Lien CSC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. At the same time, petitioner, together with ASSPS
Answer to Interrogatories of Plaintiff, (CUGCO), filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a complaint for unfair labor practice against
-Opposition to Motion for Cancellation of the Notices of Lis Pendens and Attorney’s Lien, respondent PCSO and its officers.
-Answer with Counterclaim, Answer with Counterclaim and Special/Affirmative Defenses,
-Reply to Special/Affirmative Defenses and Answer to Counterclaim of Defendant Spouses Epifanio and CIR issued its decision finding respondent PCSO guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered the
Cecilia Alano, reinstatement of petitioner to his former position. Respondent PCSO complied with the decision of the
-Answer of Defendant Natalia Realty, Inc., CIR. But while it reinstated petitioner to his former position and paid his backwages, it also filed with the
-Answer to Counterclaim of Defendant Natalia Realty, Inc., Interrogatories to Defendant Natalia Realty, Inc., Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari entitled Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, et al. v. The
-Amended Answer with Counterclaim to Defendant Yolanda P. Alano and Opposition to Admit Amended Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel, et al. assailing the decision of the CIR. During the pendency of
-Answer for Yolanda P. Alano. the case in the Supreme Court, petitioner filed with the CIR a Petition for Damages. He prayed for moral
and exemplary damages in connection with the ULP Case. Respondent PCSO moved to dismiss the
It is only logical for the lower court to consider all these pleadings in determining whether there was a petition for damages on the ground that he cause of action is barred by prior judgment, it appearing that two
sufficient cause of action as the order of dismissal is summary in nature. 16 So long as those attached complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action. Petitioner resigned from PCSO. The
pleadings are procedurally responsive to the complaint, then they may be considered in evaluating the petition for damages and the motion to dismiss, however, remained pending with the CIR until it was
sufficiency of the cause of action in the complaint. In addition, since the dismissal of a complaint by virtue of abolished and the NLRC was created. So, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding moral and
a motion to dismiss for failure to state or for insufficiency of cause of action would be tantamount to a exemplary damages to petitioner.mThe NLRC affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
summary judgment, the lower court should at least have considered the attached documents and pleadings NLRC. It held that there was no basis for the grant of moral and exemplary damages to petitioner as his
as a matter of due process. Strictly limiting the evaluation of the merits of the complaint to its averments or dismissal was not tainted with bad faith. It was the Civil Service Commission that recommended petitioners
allegations would be too constricting an interpretation of the rule. It must be remembered that the complaint dismissal after conducting an investigation. It also held that the petition claiming moral and exemplary
itself is accompanied by documentary evidence attached as annexes. The responsive pleadings, in addition, damages filed by petitioner after respondent PCSO had complied with the CIR decision of reinstatement
though not attachments to the complaint, clarify its merits since they are already part of the records of the and backwages amounted to splitting of cause of action.
case and should therefore be considered.
Petitioner contend that the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the claims for moral and exemplary damages
of the petitioner is allegedly tantamount to splitting of cause of action under Sec. 4, Rule 2 of the 1997
23. FLORES VS OMBUDSMAN Rules of Civil Procedure is contrary to law. When petitioner filed with the CIR his complaint for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice, the prevailing law and jurisprudence was that the CIR did not have
FACTS: The instant petition stemmed from a case instituted by Johnny K.H. Uy with the SEC against jurisdiction to grant moral and exemplary damages. Petitioners claim for moral damages was filed with the
petitioner Ban Hua Flores, among others, for accounting and turnover of corporate funds of UBS Marketing. CIR in the same case by virtue of the ruling of the High Court in Rheem v. Ferrer, 19 SCRA 130 holding that
Petitioner, instead of filing an answer, moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of the CIR has jurisdiction to award moral and exemplary damages arising out of illegal dismissal and unfair
jurisdiction. This was denied. Likewise, the appeal to such is denied. Petitioner was declared in default upon labor practice.
motion by complainant Uy. Thereafter, Uy presented evidence ex parte. Hearing Officer Enrique L. Flores
Jr. rendered a decision in favor of Ban Hua Flores. ISSUE: whether there was an existence of splitting of action

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman accusing respondent HELD: NONE. The filing of a petition for damages before the CIR did not constitute splitting of cause of
Hearing Officer Enrique L. Flores, Jr. of rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised action under the Revised Rules of Court. The Revised Rules of Court prohibits parties from instituting more
Penal Code and violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt than one suit for a single cause of action. Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single cause of
Practices Act. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence, action, claim or demand into two or more parts, and bringing suit for one of such parts only, intending to
ratiocinating that here is no showing that respondent rendered the Decision maliciously and deliberately to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purpose of the rule is to avoid harassment and vexation to
do an injustice to the complainant. the defendant and avoid multiplicity of suits. The prevailing rule at the time that the action for unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal was filed and tried before the CIR was that said court had no jurisdiction over
ISSUE: whether or not Rule 65 and not Rule 45 shall be applied as regards with the procedural concern of claims for damages. Hence, petitioner, at that time, could not raise the issue of damages in the
the party proceedings. However, the Supreme Court rendered its ruling in Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al.
v. Ferrer, et al., upholding the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims for damages incidental to an employees
HELD: The nature of the instant petition emerged as a procedural concern that is needed to address. The illegal dismissal. Petitioner properly filed his claim for damages after the declaration by the Court and before
instant petition was captioned as a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of the ruling on their case became final. Such filing could not be considered as splitting of cause of action.
Court. However, the arguments raised refer to alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-18

25. Bacolod vs. San Miguel (page 254, Riano)


In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to pay the difference in bottling charges such act of
FACTS: appellant in violation of the right of appellee to be paid said charges in full under the Ordinance, was one
On February 17, 1949, the City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949 imposing upon single cause of action, but under the Ordinance, appellee became entitled, as a result of such non-payment,
"any person, firm or corporation engaged in the manufacturer bottling of coca-cola, pepsi cola, tru orange, to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic charges; and (2) the payment of the
lemonade, and other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, ... a fee of ONE TWENTY- corresponding surcharges, the latter being merely a consequence of the failure to pay the former.
FOURTH (1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case
to exceed 24% for one whole year," upon "such local manufacturers or bottler above-mentioned who will be The obligation of appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by said appellant of the same
delinquent on any amount of fees due" under the ordinance. This ordinance was subsequently amended by right of appellee from which the obligation to pay the basic charges also arose. Upon these facts, it is
Ordinance No. 150 by increasing the fee to 1/8 of a centavo for every bottle thereof. Such increase was obvious that appellee has filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs related to the same single cause
opposed by the appellant San Miguel. Appellee CoB sued appellant SM. Court rendered judgment in favor of action, thereby splitting up the said cause of action.
of CoB ordering SM to pay it the sum of P26K and the tax at the rate of 3 centavos per case. Appellant SM
appealed from the said decision to this Court where it pressed the question of the invalidity of the 26. Umale vs. Canoga Park Development Corp. (page 255, Riano)
abovementioned taxing ordinances. In that appeal, however, the Court affirmed the decision appealed from
and upheld the constitutionality of the questioned ordinances and the authority of the appellee to enact the Facts: The parties entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the petitioner agreed to lease, for a period of
same. For reasons not extant in the record, it was already after this decision had become final when two (2) years starting from January 16, 2000, a prime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the
appellee moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying that the same be amended so as to include the respondent. The respondent acquired the subject lot through a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to the
penalties and surcharges provided for in the ordinances. Said motion was denied, for the reason that "the following conditions: (1) that no shopping arcades or retail stores, restaurants, etc. shall be allowed to be
decision is already final and may not be amended." When execution was had before the lower court, the established on the property, except with the prior written consent and (2) that the respondent and/or its
appellee again sought the inclusion of the surcharges referred to; and once again the move was frustrated successors-in-interest shall become member/s of the Ortigas Center Association, Inc.(Association), and
by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which denied the motion. Failing thus in its attempt to shall abide by its rules and regulations. On October 10, 2000, before the lease contract expired, the
collect the surcharge provided for in the ordinances, appellee filed a second action to collection the said respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-
surcharges (P36K). Appellant SM filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that: (1) the cause of Branch 68, Pasig City. The respondent used as a ground for ejectment the petitioner’s violation of
action is barred by a prior judgment, and (2) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. The MTC-Branch 68 decided the
of action. This motion was denied by the court a quo so appellant filed its answer wherein it substantially ejectment case in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the RTC-Branch155, Pasig City affirmed in toto the
reiterated, as affirmative defenses, the above-mentioned grounds of its motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the MTC-Branch 68 decision but the case was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 267, Pasig City when the Presiding
parties submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings, whereupon, the court rendered judgment ordering Judge of the RTC-Branch 155, upon motion, inhibited himself from resolving the petitioner’s motion for
the defendant San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P36,519.10 representing the reconsideration. The RTC Branch 267 granted the petitioner’s motion, thereby reversing and setting aside
surcharges as provided in section 4 of Ordinance 66, series of 1949 of the City of Bacolod. the MTC-Branch 68 decision. The respondent filed a petition for review with the CA on April 10, 2002 and
during the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed another case for unlawful detainer
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s act of filing another action for surcharges constitutes splitting of action? against the petitioner before the MTC-Branch 71,Pasig City on the ground of expiration of the parties’ lease
contract.
RULING: YES. Appellant SM’s position was upheld by the Court. There is no question that appellee split up
its cause of action when it filed the first complaint seeking the recovery of only the bottling taxes or charges ISSUE: Whether there is litis pendentia.
plus legal interest, without mentioning in any manner the surcharges.
HELD: There is no litis pendentia. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a
The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one
force then provided: of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. We rule that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different
causes of action. Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. — A single cause of action cannot be split up into two or more action, such as whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
parts so as to be made the subject of different complaints. . complaint. To which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment
SEC. 4. Effect of splitting. — If separate complaints were brought for different parts of a single cause of case was grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the
action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in second
either is available as a bar in the others.
case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment
Indeed, this rule against the splitting up of a cause of action is an old one. In fact, it preceded the Rules of complaint the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. Thus, the cause of action in the second
Court or any statutory provision. case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.

The classical definition of a cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by which the rights of the plaintiff 27. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Cuenca (page 266, Riano)
are violated by the defendant." Its elements may be generally stated to be (1) a right existing in favor of the
plaintiff; (2) a corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or Facts: Sometime on January 1998, Marañon filed a complaint in the RTC against the Cuencas for the
omission of the plaintiff which constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to collection of a sum of money and damages. The RTC granted the application for the issuance of the writ of
respect. In the last analysis, a cause of action is basically an act or an omission or several acts or preliminary attachment conditioned upon the posting of a bond of P1,000,000.00 executed in favor of the
omissions. A single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act Cuencas. Less than a month later, Marañon amended the complaint to implead Tayactac as a defendant.
constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. On the other hand, it can On February 11, 1998, Marañon posted SICI Bond No. 68427 JCL (4) No. 02370 in the amount of
happen also that several acts or omissions may violate only one right, in which case, there would be only P1,000,000.00 issued by Stronghold Insurance. Two days later, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary
one cause of action. Again the violation of a single right may give rise to more than one relief. In other attachment. The sheriff served the writ, the summons and a copy of the complaint on the Cuencas on the
words, for a single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is same day. The service of the writ, summons and copy of the complaint were made on Tayactac on February
the filing of separate complaints for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting up of the cause of action. 16, 1998. Enforcing the writ of preliminary attachment on February 16 and February 17, 1998, the sheriff
This is what is prohibited by the rule.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-19

levied upon the equipment, supplies, materials and various other personal property belonging to Arc Metrobank posted the required bond (P100K). Consequently, a writ of possession was issued and
Cuisine, Inc. that were found in the leased corporate office-cum-commissary or kitchen of the corporation. implemented on the three parcels of lands. Meanwhile, in 2002, petitioner Rayo filed a complaint against
On February 19, 1998, the sheriff submitted a report on his proceedings, and filed an ex parte motion Metrobank for Nullification of Real Estate Mortgage Contract(s) and Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, in
seeking the transfer of the levied properties to a safe place. The RTC granted the ex parte motion on
the RTC, Quezon City. In 2004, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition11 for Annulment of Judgment on the
February 23, 1998. On February 25, 1998, the Cuencas and Tayactac presented in the RTC a Motion to
Dismiss and to Quash Writ of Preliminary Attachment on the grounds that: (1) the action involved intra- ground of "absolute lack of due process." Petitioner alleged that his predecessor, Louisville, was not
corporate matters that were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange notified of the proceedings and that Section 712 (ex parte motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of
Commission (SEC); and (2) there was another action pending in the SEC as well as a criminal complaint in possession) of Act No. 3135 is unconstitutional. The CA denied the petition for lack of merit. The CA ruled
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City. On March 5, 1998, Marañon opposed the motion. On that petitioner is neither the registered owner nor the successor-in-interest of the registered owner; hence,
August 10, 1998, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Writ of Preliminary Attachment, not a real party-in-interest. It also ruled that there is no basis to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7 of
stating that the action, being one for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, was within its Act No. 3135, as amended as it constitutes a collateral attack against said provision. Further, petitioner
jurisdiction. On September 3, 1998, the Cuencas and Tayactac moved for the reconsideration of the denied
availed of the wrong remedy in filing the Civil Case. Petitioner sought reconsideration, but was likewise
Motion to Dismiss and to Quash but was again denied by the trial court. Thus, on October 14, 1998, the
Cuencas and Tayactac went to the CA on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the August 10, 1998 and denied. Hence, this petition.
September 16, 1998 orders of the RTC on the basis of being issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 49288). On June 16, 1999, the CA ISSUE: WON, the petitioner have the legal personality in the annulment of judgment proceedings?
promulgated its assailed decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 49288, granting the petition. It annulled and set
aside the challenged orders, and dismissed the amended complaint. On December 27, 1999, the CA
remanded to the RTC for hearing and resolution of the Cuencas and Tayactac’s claim for the damages HELD: NO. While petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, we find that petitioner has no
sustained from the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment. After the report of the sheriff to the present substantial interest to institute the annulment of judgment proceedings and nullify the order
RTC, Cuencas and Tayactac filed a motion requiring the sheriff to deliver the attached property and set case granting the writ of possession. First, there was no violation of petitioner's right to constitutional due
for hearing praying that the attached properties be immediately delivered to them; the insurance company process. In a long line of cases, 18 we have consistently ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession in
be directed to pay them the damages; Marañon be held personally liable because of the insufficiency of the
favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amount of the surety bond; and other payments for damages. After filing answers for both parties, the RTC
commanded Marañon to surrender all the attached properties to the RTC and directed the Cuencas and amended is a ministerial duty of the court. The purchaser of the foreclosed property, upon ex
Tayactac to submit affidavits of their witnesses in support of their claim for damages. parte application and the posting of the required bond, has the right to acquire possession of the foreclosed
property during the 12-month redemption period and with more reason, after the expiration of the
Issue: Whether the Cuencas and Tayactac is considered real party-in-interest in this case. redemption period.

Held: Accordingly, a person, to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted,
should appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a An ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly
present substantial interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential speaking, a "judicial process" as contemplated in Article 433 19 of the Civil Code. It is a judicial proceeding for
interest. Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit
cause of action. The reason for this is that the courts ought not to pass upon questions not derived from any filed in court, by which one party "sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the
actual controversy. prevention or redress of a wrong." It is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended, and is brought for the benefit of one party only, and
Indeed, considering that all civil actions must be based on a cause of action, defined as the act or omission without notice to, or consent by any person adversely interested. It is a proceeding where the relief is
by which a party violates the right of another, the former as the defendant must be allowed to insist upon
granted without requiring an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. No
being opposed by the real party in interest so that he is protected from further suits regarding the same
claim. Under this rationale, the requirement benefits the defendant because “the defendant can insist upon notice is needed to be served upon persons interested in the subject property. 20Second, in the deed of
a plaintiff who will afford him a setup providing good res judicata protection if the struggle is carried through assignment, petitioner also acknowledged that the subject real properties were already sold at various
on the merits to the end.” extrajudicial foreclosure sales and bought by Metrobank. Clearly, petitioner recognized the prior existing
right of Metrobank as the mortgagee-purchaser over the subject real properties. 21 Actual knowledge of a
28. RAYO VS METROBANK prior mortgage with Metrobank is equivalent to notice of registration 22 in accordance with Article 212523 of
the Civil Code. Conformably with Articles 1312 24 and 212625 of the Civil Code, a real right or lien in favor of
Doctrine: To be a real party in interest, the interest must be real, which is a present substantial interest as Metrobank had already been established, subsisting over the properties until the discharge of the principal
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent subordinate or consequential interest. obligation, whoever the possessor(s) of the land might be. 26 As petitioner is not a party whose interest is
adverse to that of Louisville, there was no bar to the issuance of a writ of possession to Metrobank. It
FACTS: Midas Diversified Export Corp. (Midas), thru its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee, obtained six (6) does not matter that petitioner was not specifically named in the writ of possession nor notified of such
loans from respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), amounting toP588,870,000 as proceedings. Third, we also note that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing Civil Case, for
evidenced by promissory notes. To secure the payment of an P8,000,000 loan, Louisville Realty & nullification of real estate mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale, more than six (6) months after the
Development Corporation (Louisville), thru its president, Mr. Lee, executed in favor of Metrobank, a real issuance of the writ of possession considering the mandate of Section 8 27 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
estate mortgage over three parcels of land situated in Quezon City, with all the buildings and improvements Hence, even petitioner's action for annulment of judgment cannot prosper as it cannot be a substitute for a
thereon. When Midas failed to pay, Metrobank extra-judicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. lost remedy. Now, petitioner is challenging the constitutionality of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
Thereafter, in a public auction, Metrobank was the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale 4 was registered with He avers that Section 7 violates the due process clause because, by the mere filing of an ex parte motion in
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. When Louisville refused to turn over the real properties, Metrobank the proper cadastral court, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is allowed to obtain possession of the
filed before the RTC, Quezon City, an ex parte petition5 for the issuance of a writ of possession. Thereafter, foreclosed property during the redemption period. We fully agree with the appellate court's ruling. For
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-20

reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot be attacked collaterally. 28WHEREFORE, the executed by the late Felix R. Francisco in favor of petitioner Dr. Fernando Periquet, Jr. is hereby declared
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed of the Court of Appeals 95 are hereby AFFIRMED. valid and effective. The petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
29. PERIQUET VS IAC (Dec 5, 1994)
30. STONEHILL V DIOKNO (19 June 1967)
DOCTRINE: A person, who is not a party to a compromise agreement, cannot seek the amendment or
modification of the same
DOCTRINE: The objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
FACTS: Spouses Fernando and Petra Periquet were left childless after the death of their only child, by third persons. A corporate officer is not a real party in interest to question the search of a corporation.
Elvira, 1 so they took in a son out of wedlock 2 of Marta, sister of Petra (Mrs. Periquet). Though he was not
legally adopted, the boy was given the name Fernando Periquet, Jr. and was reared to manhood by the FACTS: Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
spouses Periquet. In1966, Fernando Periquet died. He left a will dated March 28, 1940 wherein he named petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the any peace officer, to
his wife Petra as his universal heir. Thereafter, Petra died. Then, a Special Proceedings "In the Matter of search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and
the Intestate Estate of Deceased Petra Francisco Vda. de Periquet" was instituted by her nephew, to seize and take possession of their personal property. On March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the
Florentino Zaragoza. In the meantime, a few days before her death, Petra asked her lawyer to prepare her SC this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
last will and testament. However, she died before she could sign it. In the said will, Petra left her estate to disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
petitioner and provided for certain legacies. On August 3, 1966, Felix executed an Assignment of Hereditary Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any
Rights. On the same date, Marta executed a Deed of Assignment of Hereditary Rights in favor of Fernando copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
Periquet, Jr. 4 A joint affidavit was likewise executed by them (Marta and Felix) appointing herein petitioner rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding
as administrator of the testate estate of Fernando Periquet 5 in lieu of Petra Francisco Vda. de Periquet. On the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, the documents, papers,
August 11, 1966, Zacarias and Gloria executed similar deeds assigning their hereditary rights to things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question. On March 22, 1962,
petitioner. 6 On January 26, 1967, Josefa and Felix did the same. 7 On December 13, 1969, petitioner this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated
entered into a compromise agreement with the Zaragozas and the intervenors, the Periquets, in special June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
Proceedings. Signatories to the compromise agreement were the petitioner, the Zaragozas (Florentino, seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
Zacarias, Alberta and Gloria), the Periquets (Aurelio, Alfonso, Consuelo, Natividad, Marcelina, Francisco, maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
Dolores, Belen and Milagros) and their respective counsels. On December 20, 1969, the same agreement herein.7Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
was approved by the trial court. Another order of even date was issued ordering the adjudication and question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
transfer of the residue of the estate to herein petitioner. aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

On May 16, 1970, Felix, brother of Petra, filed the instant action to annul the Assignment of Hereditary ISSUE: WON, the petitioners are the real party in interest to assail the legality of the warrants of the
Rights he executed in favor of Fernando Periquet, Jr. and to recover his one-fourth (1/4) share in the seizures made in their offices?
estate of the late Petra. The action for annulment was based on "gross misrepresentation and fraud,"
"grave abuse of confidence," "mistake and undue influence," and "lack of cause and/or consideration" in the
HELD:NO. We hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
execution of the challenged deed of assignment. On May 8, 1976 the trial court rendered judgment, in favor
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
of Felix. On appeal to the then IAC, the said judgment was "modified" which still favors Felix
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
ISSUE: WON, the respondent (Felix) who is not a party to the compromise agreement may annul or rescind offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
such agreement? contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners
HELD: NO. We agree with the petitioner that respondent court erred in disturbing the proceedings herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
conducted in Special Proceedings, and the decrees and orders issued pursuant thereto. It cannot be denied seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
that a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties in that case in order to end the suit already admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
filed in court. The same was approved by the trial court in the order dated December 20, 1969. 26 Well- belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
settled is the rule that a compromise agreement, once approved by the court, cannot and should not be capacity. With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery, it being the obvious purpose of such compromise the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by
agreement to settle, once and for all, the claims of the parties, and bar all future disputes and controversies this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence
thereon. 27 A compromise agreement cannot bind persons who are not parties thereto. 28 Neither would a against petitioners herein.
person not party to a compromise agreement be entitled to enforce the same. 29 Similarly, a person who is
not a party to an agreement, as in this case, cannot seek the amendment or modification of the same. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
Neither can a court of law rule that the compromise agreement be amended and modified pursuant only to shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
the wishes of a person not party to the said agreement. All told, the assignment of hereditary rights and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-21

been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that
the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had After 3 years, DBP and PNBs financial exposure both in loans and in equity in MMIC had reached
been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were tremendous proportions, and MMIC was having a difficult time meeting its financial obligations. Thus, a
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the Financial Restructuring Plan (FRP) designed to reduce MMIC' interest expense through debt conversion to
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party equity was drafted by the Sycip Gorres Velayo accounting firm. The FRP was approved by the Board of
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given Directors of the MMIC.However, the proposed FRP had never been formally adopted, approved or ratified
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any by either PNB or DBP.
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or
As the various loans and advances made by DBP and PNB to MMIC had become overdue and since
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that any restructuring program relative to the loans was no longer feasible, and in compliance with the directive
the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of of Presidential Decree No. 385, DBP and PNB as mortgagees of MMIC assets, decided to exercise their
June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of right to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgages in accordance with the Mortgage Trust Agreement.
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, The foreclosed assets were sold to PNB as the lone bidder and were assigned to three newly formed
denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, corporations, namely, Nonoc Mining Corporation, Maricalum Mining and Industrial Corporation, and Island
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in Cement Corporation. These assets were transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

31. Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals

Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., together with the other stockholders of MMIC, filed a derivative suit
against DBP and PNB before the RTC for Annulment of Foreclosures, Specific Performance and Damages.

Topic: The Corporation is the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit is only nominal party.

In the course of the trial, Cabarrus et.al and APT, as successor of the DBP and PNBs interest in
MMIC, mutually agreed to submit the case to arbitration by entering into a Compromise and Arbitration
Facts: Agreement.

Republic of the Philippines thru the Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, granted Marinduque Mining The Compromise and Arbitration Agreement limited the issues to the following:
and Industrial Corporation (MMIC) the exclusive right to explore, develop and exploit nickel, cobalt and other
minerals in the Surigao mineral reservation. MMIC is a domestic corporation engaged in mining with 5. Issues. The issues to be submitted for the Committees resolution shall be: (a) Whether PLAINTIFFS
respondents Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr. as President and among its original stockholders. have the capacity or the personality to institute this derivative suit in behalf of the MMIC or its
directors; (b) Whether or not the actions leading to, and including, the PNB-DBP foreclosure of the MMIC
assets were proper, valid and in good faith.

MMIC, PNB and DBP executed a Mortgage Trust Agreement whereby MMIC, as mortgagor, agreed to The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of Cabarrus in both issues submitted. The same was confirmed by
constitute a mortgage in favor of PNB and DBP as mortgagees, over all MMIC’s assets, subject of real the RTC:
estate and chattel mortgage executed by the mortgagor, and additional assets described and identified,
including assets of whatever kind, nature or description, which the mortgagor may acquire whether in (a) Ordering the defendant APT to the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC, except the
substitution of, in replenishment, or in addition thereto. DBP, the sum of P3,811,757,425.00, as and for actual damages, which shall be partially satisfied from the
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-22

funds held under escrow in the amount of P503,000,000.00 pursuant to the Escrow Agreement dated April It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because-
22, 1988. The Balance of the award, after the escrow funds are fully applied, shall be executed against the
APT; x x x. Not only is the corporation an indispensible party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served
with process. The reason given is that the judgment must be made binding upon the corporation and in
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay to the MMIC, except the DBP, the sum of P13,000,000.00 as and moral order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring a subsequent suit against the
and exemplary damages; same defendants for the same cause of action. In other words the corporations must be joined as party
because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res ajudicata against
it.

APT filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari annul and declare as void the
Orders of the RTC for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion. But CA denied and dismissed the petition for certiorari. The reasons given for not allowing direct individual suit are:

(1) x x x the universally recognized doctrine that a stockholder in a corporation has no title legal or equitable
to the corporate property; that both of these are in the corporation itself for the benefit of the stockholders. In
Issue: other words, to allow shareholders to sue separately would conflict with the separate corporate entity
principle;

(2) x x x that the prior rights of the creditors may be prejudiced. Thus, our Supreme Court held in the case
of Evangelista v. Santos, that the stockholders may not directly claim those damages for themselves for that
Whether or not Arbitration Committee exceeded their authority in awarding damages to MMIC, which would result in the appropriation by, and the distribution among them of part of the corporate assets before
is not impleaded as a party to the derivative suit. the dissolution of the corporation and the liquidation of its debts and liabilities, something which cannot be
legally done in view of section 16 of the Corporation Law xxx;

(3) the filing of such suits would conflict with the duty of the management to sue for the protection of all
Held: concerned;

(4) it would produce wasteful multiplicity of suits; and

Civil case filed before the RTC being a derivative suit, MMIC should have been impleaded as a (5) it would involve confusion in a ascertaining the effect of partial recovery by an individual on the damages
party. It was not joined as a party plaintiff or party defendant at any stage of the proceedings. As it is, the recoverable by the corporation for the same act.
award of damages to MMIC, which was not a party before the Arbitration Committee, is a complete nullity.

32. United Church of Christ in the Philippines v. Bradford United Church of Christ
Settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while
the stockholder filing suit for the corporations behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should Topic: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
be included as a party in the suit. the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Facts:United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines

An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), formerly known as Bradford Memorial Church, is
wherein he holds stock in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials of the likewise a religious corporation with a personality separate and distinct from UCCP.
corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued or hold the control of the corporation. In such
actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party UCCP has three (3) governing bodies namely: the General Assembly, the Conference and the Local
in interest. x x x. Church, each having distinct and separate duties and powers. As a UCCP local church located in Cebu,
BUCCI belonged to the Conference (CCI) with whom it enjoyed peaceful co-existence.A series of
events happened which lead the break-up of BUCCI from UCCP.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-23

BUCCI disaffiliated from UCCP. BUCCI filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws which and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
provided for and effected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the same. Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-
staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
UCCP filed before SEC a complaint/protest for rejection/annulment of Amended Articles and presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Incorporation alleging that the separate incorporation and registration of BUCCI is not allowed under the
UCCP Constitution and By-laws. Petitioners in this case assail the constitutionality of Pork Barrel System.

SEC en banc dismissed UCCPs petition to declare as null and void the amendments made to the Procedural Issue:
Articles of Incorporation of BUCCI. SEC found that UCCP is not the real party in interest to question
the amendments made by BUCCI to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws.

CA affirmed the decision of SEC.

Issue: Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue.
Whether SEC and Court of Appeals correctly ruled that UCCP has no locus standi to question the
amendments to BUCCI’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
Held:
Held:
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
Yes. The doctrine requires a litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In private
suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a real party in interest, which is defined as the party who stands law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites, case law states
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. that the first two are the most important and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.

A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest.

After a review of the evidence on record, the SEC, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, correctly
ruled that UCCP, not being a member of BUCCI, is not the proper party to question the validity of the
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
amendments of the latters Articles of Incorporation and By-laws. While UCCP stands to be affected by the
disaffiliation, the same is admitted and accepted by UCCPs polity by the very establishment of its liberal
structure.

33. G.R. No. 208566 Belgica v. Ochoa, Abad, De Leon, Drilon, Belmonte
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. This is
G.R. No. 208493 Social Justice Society v. Drilon, Belmonte embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
G.R. No. 209251 Napumoceno v. Aquino, Abad demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
Topic: Judicial Review distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
Facts: jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness,"
meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is
Before the Court are consolidated petitions 2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which
assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch
Recently, or in July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
that "the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects." constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or
The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN moot questions."
Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the
NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money
was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts. Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy,
criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder,
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-24

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF" 130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
these cases. underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as
not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases
are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in
the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a
definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection
moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. Accordingly, there
merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance
reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized
matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already in accordance with constitutional principles.
"abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design,
the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing
law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and
passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The
relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for
2014." The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a
academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." different collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the government had already backtracked on a previous
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the prevent similar questions from re- emerging." The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most
public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation
of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies ‖ carries the
assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved– Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the
the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable
matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that
the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-25

them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
a solution at this stage." affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission. Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." Clearly, as
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel
System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that
petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the
of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of
importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." The CoA Chairperson‘s
essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure"
any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be but a "complete breakdown of controls" amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the
established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of invalid statute. All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
the Government."

34. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR.


It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution." To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms Facts:
undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must
faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application for Free Patent No. 5-1414 covering two parcels of land
not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that in Nueva Ecija which was granted. The heirs of Eusebio Perez caused the annotation on the said OCT of
the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the an adverse claim in their favor over a portion of 15.1593 hectares of the property and a formal protest was
people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving later filed. An investigation was conducted and it was ascertained that OCT No. P-4522 was improperly and
a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed fraudulently issued. Upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the heirs executed a Deed of
respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint. Extrajudicial Partition with Sale in favor of Joaquin Sangabol. The OCT was cancelled and transfer
certificate was issued. Various transactions were made causing the heirs of Perez to file a supplemental
protest. During investigation, it was found that prior to the issuance of free patent, an OCT was already
existing covering the subject land. This brought the Republic, through the OSG, to file a case against
C. Locus Standi. several defendants who were successor-in-interest of Agunoy.

RTC ruled in favor of the Republic. Appeal was granted and the decision of the trial court was
reversed and set aside. Hence, present petition.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-26

Issue: respondent Salenga to retain possession of the fishpond, operate it, harvest the produce, and keep the
sales under the safekeeping of other private respondents. Moreover, petitioner maintains that respondent
Whether the Republic is a real party-in-interest? Ilao, Jr.(adjudicator of DARAB) had no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case filed by respondent
Salenga as there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga and Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the
complaint was dismissible on its face.
Rule:

Ombudsman recommend the filing of an information for violation of RA 3019. Re-investigation was
No. Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the conducted and dismissal was thereafter of the complaint.
name of the real party-in-interest, meaning the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in
whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought Thus, the instant petition is before us.
to enforced. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Issue/s:

With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are Whether the petitioner Baltazar has the authority and locus standi to pursue the instant petition?
already private properties of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and are, therefore, no
longer disposable public land over which the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, no Rule:
longer had any jurisdiction and control, the Court simply at a loss to understand how petitioner Republic
can still profess to be the real party-in-interest in this case, and insists that the disputed properties are still
part of the public domain. If ever, the real party-in-interest could be none other than the heirs of Eusebio Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice x x x on a given question." In
Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the petitioner. private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule found in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or
And the government, not being the real party-in-interest, is without personality to institute reversion injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiffs’
proceedings standing is based on their own right to the relief sought.

The records show that petitioner is a non-lawyer appearing for himself and conducting litigation in
person. Petitioner instituted the instant case before the Ombudsman in his own name. Filing the petition in
35. BALTAZAR VS OMBUDSMAN
person before this Court is another matter. The Rules allow a non-lawyer to conduct litigation in person and
appear for oneself only when he is a party to a legal controversy (Section 34, Rule 138).
Facts:

He is not a real party in interest. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure stipulates,
Paciencia Regala owns a seven (7)-hectare fishpond located at Sasmuan, Pampanga. Her thus:
Attorney-in-Fact Faustino R. Mercado leased the fishpond to Eduardo Lapid for a three (3)-year period.
Lessee Eduardo Lapid in turn sub-leased the fishpond to Rafael Lopez during the last seven months of the
original lease. Respondent Ernesto Salenga was hired by Eduardo Lapid as fishpond watchman. In the sub- SEC. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
lease, Rafael Lopez rehired respondent Salenga. judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Thereafter, Salenga sent a demand letter to Rafael Lopez and Lourdes Lapid for unpaid salaries
and non-payment of the 10% share in the harvest. Rafael Lopez informed Salenga that the last two months Petitioner asserts that he is duly authorized by Faustino Mercado to institute the suit and
of the sub-lease, he had given the rights over the fishpond to Mario Palad and Ambit Perez. This prompted presented a Special Power of Attorne from Faustino Mercado. However, such SPA is unavailing for
respondent Salenga to file a Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board petitioner. For one, petitioner’s principal, Faustino Mercado, is an agent himself and as such cannot further
(PARAB),San Fernando, Pampanga. He amended his complaint and prayed for the issuance of TRO and delegate his agency to another. The legal maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest; a power once
preliminary injunction. delegated cannot be re-delegated, while applied primarily in political law to the exercise of legislative power,
is a principle of agency.

Faustino Mercado filed a motion to intervene which was granted. RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit; appealed at DARAB. Not being an agent of the parties in the agrarian case, he has no locus standi to pursue this
petition. He cannot be likened to an injured private complainant in a criminal complaint who has direct
interest in the outcome of the criminal case.
Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case was instituted by petitioner Antonio
Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Mercado, before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of RA
3019. Petitioner charged private respondents of conspiracy through the issuance of the TRO in allowing
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-27

More so, we note that the petition is not pursued as a public suit with petitioner asserting a "public right" in was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, and doing so as a representative of the general public. He is cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties.
pursuing the instant case as an agent of an ineffective agency.
To determine if said agency has jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action, an examination of the
laws defining the HLURBs jurisdiction and authority becomes imperative. P.D. No. 957 specifically Section
Even if we consider the instant petition as a public suit, where we may consider petitioner suing 3, granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer," still petitioner has not adequately shown that and business." Then came P.D. No. 134 expanding the jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB).
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, petitioner has not made out a sufficient interest in In this case, the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that apparently are not
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer"; more so when there cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action and the reliefs sought. A perusal of the
complaint discloses that petitioners are actually seeking to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts
is no showing that he was injured by the dismissal of the criminal complaint before the Sandiganbayan.
of PHCC - the April 29, 2005 Agreement entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its Board Resolution which
authorized the acceptance of the proposed offsetting/settlement of DPDCIs indebtedness and approval of
the conversion of certain units from saleable to common areas--- which is an intra-corporate controversy,
36. PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIM vsDISTINCTION PROPERTIES falling under the RTC jurisdiction.
DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Yes. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
Facts: interest.
Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered individual owners of From all indications, PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded, either as
condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium located at Pasig City. Respondent Distinction a plaintiff or as a defendant, in the complaint filed before the HLURB as it would be directly and adversely
Properties Development and Construction, Inc. (DPDCI) and was incorporated to Phoenix Heights. affected by any determination therein.
Petitioner Pacifico Lim, executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR) of Phoenix Without PHCC as a party, there can be no final adjudication of the HLURBs judgment. The CA
Heights Condominium, which was filed with the Registry of Deeds. As the developer, DPDCI undertook, was, thus, correct in ordering the dismissal of the case for failure to implead an indispensable party.
among others, the marketing aspect of the project, the sale of the units and the release of flyers and
brochures. 37.VIRGILIO G. CAGATAO, Petitioner, vs. GUILLERMO ALMONTE, ARTHUR AGUILAR, SPS. ERNESTO
FERNANDEZ AND AVELINA FERNANDEZ, MARVIN JOHN FERNANDEZ, MARSON FERNANDEZ, and
In 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before the HLURB against MARJUN FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DPDCI for unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR. They alleged that DPDCI committed
misrepresentation in their circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be
available in the condominium and failed to perform its obligation to comply with the MDDR. FACTS:
In defense, DPDCI denied that it had breached its promises and representations to the public
concerning the facilities in the condominium. It alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was a In 1949, a homestead patent over the land was issued in favor of Gatchalian. Gatchalian sold it to Manzulin
mere preparatory draft and not the official one actually distributed to the public, and that the said brochure
in a barter agreement in exchange for a carabao. Such agreement was lost due to the war. Manzulin then
contained a disclaimer as to the binding effect of the supposed offers therein.Also, DPDCI questioned the
petitioners personality to sue as the action was a derivative suit. executed in 1990 a private document in Ilocano dialect, transferring ownership to his son in law, herein
petitioner Cagatao. When Cagatao was to take possession, Respondent Fernandez Siblings attempted to
After due hearing, the HLURB rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. It held as invalid the take such possession. Thus, an action for annulment of sale, cancellation of title and damages was
agreement entered into between DPDCI and PHCC, as to the alteration or conversion of the subject units instituted by Cagatao in the RTC. Spouses Fernandez contend that they acquired the land thru purchase
into common areas, which it previously approved, for the reason that it was not approved by the majority of from Almonte and Aguilar who had tax declarations over the property. Furthermore, they purchased again
the members of PHCC as required under Section 13 of the MDDR
the same from Emmaculada Carlos for P220K who had a TCT#1. A deed of Sale was executed. A TCT#2
The CA ruled that the HLURB had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners as the
controversy did not fall within the scope of the administrative agencys authority under P.D. No. 957. then was issued to theFernandez 3 children (Fernandez Siblings.) RTC held in favor of Respondent
The CA held that jurisdiction over PHCC, an indispensable party, was neither acquired nor waived Fernandez and said that there was no public document that was produced by Cagatao to prove his title and
by estoppel. It was once held that the action should be dismissed because the absence of PHCC, an that the TCT#1 of Carlos is valid proof of title and that the subsequent Deed of Sale made by Carlos in favor
indispensable party, rendered all subsequent actuations of the court void, for want of authority to act, not of Fernandez is valid. Also it declared TCT#2 which was issued to Fernandez Siblings is void due to some
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. defects. The CA upheld the validity of the TCT#1 of Carlos and the subsequent Deed of Sale in favor of
Respondents, however, stressed that Cagatao’s possession of the subject property should be respected.
Issue:
Any party, including the respondents, who would like to assert their claim of ownership or a better right over
1. Does HLURB have jurisdiction over the complaint?
2. IS PHCC an indispensable party? the lot should assert their right in an appropriate action in court against him. Hence, Cagatao’s petition to
Rule: the SC which asserts that the TCT in the name of Carlos is fake and should be declared void due to a
1. No. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred falsified annotation at the back of such TCT.
by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or
body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the ISSUE:
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to WON the TCT of Emmaculada Carlos is void.
be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Thus, it
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-28

RULING: cancellation of all liens on JEWM Corp.’s property. It held that the failure of Spouses Crisologo to file their
motion to intervene under Rule 19 rendered Rule 65 inapplicable as a vehicle to ventilate their supposed
NO. The registered owner of a lot whose title the plaintiff seeks to nullify is an indispensable party. right in the case.
An attack on the validity of the title is considered to be a collateral attack when, in an action to obtain a
different relief and as an incident of the said action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the ISSUE:
title. Cagatao’s original complaint before the RTC was for the cancellation of TCT#2 in the name of the
Fernandez Siblings and the nullification of the deeds of sale between the Fernandez Siblings and Spouses WON the CA correctly ruled that RTC acted without grave abuse of discretion in failing to recognize
Fernandez, and the earlier one between the latter and Almonte and Aguilar. Nowhere in his complaint did Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien.
Cagatao mention that he sought to invalidate TCT#1. It was only during the course of the proceedings,
when Spouses Fernandez disclosed that they had purchased the property from Carlos, and that Cagatao
thought of questioning the validity of TCT of Emmaculada Carlos. HELD:

Emmaculada Carlos, as the registered owner of the lot whose title Cagatao seeks to nullify, should have NO. There must be compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Undisputed is the fact that Spouses
been impleaded as an indispensable party. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons
indispensable parties to be "parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action." with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of
It is clear in this case that Cagatao failed to include Carlos in his action for the annulment of TCT#1. Basic is annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final
the rule in procedural law that no man can be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger and disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders. As indispensable parties,
strangers to a case cannot be bound by a judgment rendered by the court. It would be the height of injustice Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of
to entertain an action for the annulment of Carlos’ title without giving her the opportunity to support her claim the Rules of Court, to wit:
of ownership.
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final
38. JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners, vs. JEWM AGRO- determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all
FACTS: possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be
affected by the judgment. Clearly, the cancellation of the annotation of the sale without notifying the buyers,
Sps. Crisologo, is a violation of the latter’s right to due process. Since this is the second time that Judge
This case stems from various cases of collection for sum of money filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of Omelio has issued an order which fails to notify or summon the indispensable parties, we find Judge Omelio
various properties including two parcels of land. Petitioner Spouses Crisologo were the plaintiffs in two guilty of gross ignorance of the law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a stiffer
collection cases before RTC of Davao against So Keng Koc, et al. Respondent JEWM Agro-Industrial penalty in the future.
(JEWM Corp) was the successor-in-interest of a certain Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case
before RTC of Davao against the same defendants So Keng Koc, etal. The Sy Sen Ben case had a
compromise agreement in which the parties were directed to transfer the subject properties in favor of Sy 39. PAMPLONA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC. and/or JOSE LUIS BONDOC, petitioners, vs. RODEL
Sen Ben. Sy Sen Ben sold to Lam such properties and Lam sold to JEWM Corp, both of which still bearing TINGHIL, MARYGLENN SABIHON, ESTANISLAO BOBON, CARLITO TINGHIL, BONIFACIO TINGHIL,
the same annotations of lis pendens in connection with other pending cases against So Keng Kok. Spouses NOLI TINGHIL, EDGAR TINGHIL, ERNESTO ESTOMANTE, SALLY TOROY, BENIGNO TINGHIL JR.,
Crisologo collection case held that So Keng Koc and Limso were solidarily liable to Crisologo. Acting on the ROSE ANN NAPAO, DIOSDADO TINGHIL, ALBERTO TINGHIL, ANALIE TINGHIL, and ANTONIO
same, the Sheriff issued an auction notice which included properties with TCT annotations in the name of ESTOMANTE,respondents.
JEWM. JEWM filed a third party claim and was denied. Crisologo posted a bond in order for the auction
sale to proceed. JEWM filed an action to cancel the lien and prayed for injunction to stop the auction sale. FACTS:
“The Register of Deeds of Davao, Sheriff Medialdea, John and Jane Does and all persons acting under their
direction" were impleaded as defendants. Spouses Crisologo’s counsel submitted a Manifestation to "Sometime in 1993, Petitioner Pamplona Plantations Company, Inc. was organized to take over coconut
question such authority of restraining execution. JEWM opposed on the ground that Spouses Crisologo and sugar operations in Hacienda Pamplona, Negros Occidental and was formerly owned by Mr. Bower
were not parties in the case. Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the denial of the who had several agricultural workers. It did not absorb all hacienda workers but it made them work as
application for writ or preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their recognition as party seasonal workers for harvest activities and the likes. Subsequently, Pamplona Plantation Leisure
defendants. No motion to intervene was filed as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was unnecessary Corporation was established for the purpose of engaging in the business of leisure facilities. In time, an
since they were already the John and Jane Does named in the complaint. RTC upheld the preliminary organizational meeting was conducted by the Pamplona Labor Union wherein several respondents are
injunction and denied the Omnibus Motion of Crisologo as there was no notice of appearance on their part. either union members or officers participated in said meeting. The manager of the company, upon knowing
Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the RTC orders which such labor union meeting, refused to allow these employees to work for the company anymore.
denied their motion to be recognized as parties. They also prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Respondents filed an action against Petitioners for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment,
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stay such orders. CA affirmed the RTC overtime pay, premium pay for rest day and holidays, service incentive leave pay, damages, attorney’s fees
ruling that the action for cancellation may proceed without Crisologo being impleaded. CA ordered and 13th month pay. Carlito Tinghil (one of the respondents) amended his complaint to implead Pamplona
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-29

Plantation Leisure Corporation. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Respondents granting them separation thereby depriving it of its right to be heard. The CA ruled then in there favor. Issue: Whether or not HPMC is
pay. Upon appeal by Petitioner company to the NLRC, it reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and a real party in interest or an indispensable party. Held: HPMC is an indispensable party. An indispensable
dismissed their complaint, except for Carlito Tinghil’s somplaint, for failure to impleadPamplona Plantation party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the litigation and without whom no final
Leisure Corporation, an indispensable party and that ‘there exist no employer-employee relation between determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief
the parties.’ Respondents elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.The CA sought are so inextrincably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the
ruled in favor of Respondent workers and upheld the existence of employee-employer relationship and the proceeding is an absolute necessity. Based on the agreement between the parties involved, PEA would
illegal dismissal committed by it. Hence, this petition filed by the Pamplona Plantation company. turnover to the HPMC all the contracts relating to the Heritage Park. At the time of the filing of the case at
CIAC, PEA is no longer a party of interest. Petitioner was duly informed of these incidents through a letter. It
ISSUE: is now the private respondent HPMC who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment of the suit.

WON CA acted with GAD in not dismissing the respondents’ complaint for failure to implead Pamplona 41. REPUBLIC VS SANDIGAN and TEODORO Q. PEÑA, GORGONIO MACARIOLA, ORLANDO
PACIENCIA, JESUS TUPALAR SEVERINO DELA CRUZ, and FE CORTEZO
Plantation Leisure Corp., which is an indispensable party to this case.
FACTS: petitioner filed with respondent Court a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
HELD: restitution and damages against Alfredo (Bejo) T. Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Jose
D. Campos, Jr. and forty five (45) other defendants including private respondents, seeking to 'recover from
them ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property which had acquired and accumulated in
NO. NLRC’s outright dismissal of the Complaints is erroneous. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers in brazen violation of the
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding or at such times as are just, Constitution, including the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nations wealth,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the abuse of power, as more fully described in the Complaint thus 'resulting in their unjust enrichment during
defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos' 20 years of rule at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of
complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed
Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
to be indispensable. In this case, the NLRC did not require respondents to implead the Pamplona Plantation Later, defendant Jose D, Campos, Jr., having been served with summons, filed with the respondent Court
Leisure Corporation as respondent; instead, the Commission summarily dismissed the Complaints. an undated 'Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Respect to Jose D. Campos' praying that
he be removed as party defendant from the complaint on the grounds that he had 'voluntarily surrendered or
(Piercing the veil of Corporate Entity) In any event, there is no need to implead the leisure corporation turned over any share in his name on any of the corporations referred to, aside from claiming any interest,
ownership or right thereon to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines' and that he was 'entitled to
because, insofar as respondents are concerned, the leisure corporation and petitioner-company are one
the immunity granted by the Presidential Commission on Good Government pursuant to Executive Order
and the same entity. An examination of the facts reveals that, for both the coconut plantation and the No. 14. Petitioner filed with the respondent Court a 'Motion' seeking to drop defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr.
leisure corporation, there is only one management which the laborers deal with regarding their work. A from the Complaint on the ground that the PCGG granted immunity to Mr. Jose Y. Campos and his family,
portion of the plantation (also called Hacienda Pamplona) had actually been converted into a golf course which immunity necessarily extends to defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. The private respondents opposed
and other recreational facilities. The weekly payrolls issued by petitioner-company bore the name petitioner's motion. Respondent Court issued a Resolution which denied petitioner's and Jose D. Campos,
"Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc." It is also a fact that respondents all received their pay from the same Jr.'s motions to drop him from the complaint.
person, Petitioner Bondoc -- the managing director of the company. Since the workers were working for a
ISSUE: whether or not the petitioner can validly drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as party defendant in Civil Case
firm known as Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc., the reason they sued their employer through that name was
natural and understandable. HELD: YES. The PCGG did not then and does not now have the power to grant civil immunity; The Solicitor
General asserts that the name of Jose D. Campos, Jr. was included as defendant in the complaint through
40. Uy vs Court of Appeals (494 SCRA 535) mistake or oversight and that pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court it has a right to
drop him as defendant without prior consent of any party. The Solicitor General also maintains that although
the defendants in the case were charged solidarily, Campos, Jr. was not an indispensable party since Article
Facts of the case: - the parties of the case are as follows: BCDA as the project owner, PEA as the project 1216 of the Civil Code allows the petitioner as solidary creditor to choose among the solidary debtors
manager and the PNB as the trustee. After the selling period, the owners of each certificate of holder against whom it win enforce collection.
organized themselves into a non-stock non-profit organization. - the heritage memorial park was the
The well-settled doctrine is that amicable settlements and/or compromises are not only allowed but actually
flagship project of the BCDA in fort bonifacio, as the project owner they are tasked to sell to the public. The
encouraged in civil cases. Article 2028 of the Civil Code categorically states: "A compromise is a contract
PNB as trustee shall protect the values of the assets in the trust, receive and have custody over the whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
proceeds of the sale of the certificates. PEA as project manager is tasked to implement and complete the commenced."
various engineering works and improvements of heritage park. - on nov.20, 1996, PEA and thr petitioner
edison development executed a landscaping and construction agreeement whereby the petitioner PCGG's motion to drop Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case No. has legal basis under Executive Order
undertook to do all the landscaping and thr construction of thr terrasoleum of the park. -on oct 1999, it was No. 14. The fact that Campos, Jr. and all the other defendants were charged solidarily in the complaint does
found out that there was delay and a huge discrepancy between the accomplishment report and the actual not make him an indispensable party. SC have ruled in the case of Operators Incorporated v. American
Biscuit Co., Inc., that "Solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the
physical accomplishment of petitioners firm. The executive committee terminated the two construction
creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor 'may proceed against anyone of the solidary
contract awarded to the petitioner. -hence the petitioner filed a case with CIAC which rendered a decision in debtors or some or all of them simultaneously."
there favor. -private respondent HPMC then filed a petition for injunction and prohibition before the CA on There is no showing that the dropping of Jose Campos, Jr. as in defendant would be unjust to the other
the ground that CIAC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter since HPMC was not impleaded as a party defendants in the civil case because, the other defendants can still pursue the case and put up their
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-30

defenses. In the case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, (supra), the main reason why we did not allow the dropping complaint included Lim Tanhu’s son Lim Teck Chuan, as well as the spouses Alfonso Ng Sua and Co Oyo,
of two defendants who were charged solidarily with the other remaining defendants, despite the motion of and their son Eng Chong Leonardo. Tan Put claims in her complaint that after Tee Hoon died, there was no
the plaintiff, is the fact that the latter filed such motion after the two remaining defendants defaulted. liquidation of the company assets made and that she owns one third of the company shares. However, Lim
Moreover, under the law, the solidary debtor who pays shall have a right of action against the others for the Tanhu, Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan, and Eng Chong Leonardo continued to manage the company and used
amount of their respective shares. And, with the dropping of a defendant who pays his share, the other the company funds to acquire lands and buildings in several areas. Allegedly, the defendants also used the
solidary co-defendants are also benefited to the extent of that paid share. Truly, each solidary debtor ends company assets to organize another corporation known as Glory Commercial, Inc.
up paying his own share, including the defendant who had been dropped. Hence, there is no justice.
Subsequently, Tan Put amended her complaint and added other averments. According to Tan Put,
she had asked the defendants to liquidate the business of the defunct partnership including real estate
42. Alternative defendants Rizal Surety and Insurance company vs. Manila railroad corporation (70 investments in Hong Kong. The defendants did not make good in their promise to liquidate the said
scra 187) properties, and instead, induced her to execute a quitclaim of all her rights and interests in the same. After
the quitclaim was executed, Lim Tanhu allegedly offered to pay her P65,000 and issued a receipt to her
Facts of the case: - On april 3, 1961, greene and associates shipped on board the SS president cleaveland bearing the said amount. She signed the receipt but was not given a copy of it and had not received the
at san francisco, california, 51 package of poultry tonic and feed supplement consigned to superior poultry said money. When she eventually made a formal demand for the accounting and liquidation of the
and livestock supply corp in manila. - the shipment was insured by the petitioner, on april 17, 1961, the partnership company’s assets, the defendants refused and stated that they will not give her share.
shipment was discharge into the custody of manila port service, a subsidiary of the manila raidroad
corporation, as arrastre operator. - when the cargo was delivered 23 packages were found short or missing Lim Tanhu, et. al.: The amended complaint (2nd paragraph) should not be admitted as there were material
and 4 packages were in bad order. As a consequence of such loss and damage, the petitioner, as the modifications of the causes of action previously alleged.
insurer of the package was obliged to pay the consigee the corresponding amount of php 699.17
representing its liability. - the insurance company then in turn filed a claim with both vessel and arrastre CFI: The judge allowed the amendment and said that the present action is for accounting of real and
operator for the reimbursement of the said amount. - defendants american president lines denied liability personal properties as well as for the recovery of the same with damages. The amended complaint only
claiming that any loss or dmaage suffered by the cargo must have occured after the said cargo was alleged facts that merely amplified the material averments constituting the cause of action in the original
discharged into the custody of the manila port services. - manila railroad company and manila port services complaint. It likewise include necessary and indispensable defendants without whom no final determination
moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, invoked by can be had in the action and in order that complete relief is to be accorded as between those already
plaintiff, by reason of the contrsct of affreightment, does not apply to the manila railroad company and parties. Thus, the amendments were allowed because they did not change the main causes of action in the
manila port services which are not parties to the contract and the action being one of recovery of a sum of original complaint.
money involving less thsn php 5,000, the municipal court and not thr court of first instance has jurisdiction
over the matter. Issue: Whether or not the can the instant case be taken cognizance of by the former upon ---Trial continued
the theory that both defendants are sued in alternative. Held: - The petition has merit. The cause of action The defendants filed a single answer with counterclaim. They assert that Tan Put was not Tee
against the alternative defendants arises out of the same trasaction which is the recovery of the value of the Hoon’s legitimate wife as the real Mrs. Tee Hoon, Ang Siok Tin, is in Hong Kong. They also denied the
lost merchandise and the nature of loss could not be determined at the moment. As according to sec 5 of allegations of fraud and claimed that proper liquidation had been regularly made of the business of the
rule 2 of the rules of court which provides that: Sec 5 Joinder of the causes of action - subject to rules partnership and Tee Hoon regularly received his share until his death. After which, the partnership was
regarding jurisdiction, venue and joider of parties, a party may in one pleading state, in the alternative or dissolved and his supposed share were all given to Ang Siok and their children.
otherwise as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party a) if the said causes of
action arise out of the same contract or b) if the cause of action is for the demand of money or are the same Lim Tanhu, et.al.: (By way of COUNTERCLAIM) The case should be dismissed since Tan Put is not the
nature and character. - In cases falling under the clause (a) the proceeding paragraph, the action shall be legitimate wife, and thus, lacks the legal capacity to sue them. Further, even before the death of Tee Hoon,
filed in the inferior court unless any of thr causes joined falls within the jurisdiction of the court of first Tan Put was no longer the decedent’s common law wife and the ‘quitclaim’ was only offered to her by Lim
instance in which case it shall be filed in the latter court. - In cases falling under the clause (b) the Tanhu out of the latter’s kindness and generosity. Thus, in the event that Tan Put is filing the case under Art.
jurisdiction shall be determined by the aggregate amount of the demands, if for money or by their nature 144 of the Civil Code (this part was already removed in the present Civil Code and was replaced by the
and character or if otherwise. - this is done in this case because of the uncertainty of the place of where the Family Code), then, her acceptance of the ‘quitclaim’ constitutes a waiver for her claims.
disappearance of the shipemnt occured, plaintiff brought the case in the alternative before the court of first
instance upon the theory thst it may occurred while the shipment was in transit or while in custody of the The newly acquired properties of the defendants were bought out of their own personal funds and
arrastre operator. not from the funds belonging to the partnership. Further, since Tee Hoon and Tan Put did not have a child
together, there was no one who is lawfully entitled to succeed to the properties left by Tee Hoon together
43. LIM TAN HU v RAMOLETE with the widow and the legitimate children.

TOPIC: A DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT AS AGAINST ONE OF THE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, Tan Put: The said counterclaim should be dismissed as it is merely permissive and the corresponding filing
WILL RESULT TO DISMISSAL AS TO THE OTHERS fee was not paid.

NATURE OF THE CASE: The case was elevated to the SC by way of petition for certiorari to annul and set CFI: (Ruling on the motion of Tan Put to dismiss the counterclaim of the defendants) Overruled. The
aside certain actuations of the CFI; specifically, its granting of the motion to drop the two non-defaulted counterclaim was accepted by the court and declared to be a compulsory counterclaim.
defendants and proceeding to hear to hear the rest of Tan Put’s (plaintiff’s) evidence ex-parte, and
subsequently rendering judgment by default against the defaulted defendants. Tan Put: Denied all the allegations in the defendants counterclaim.

FACTS: --- However, on the date set for the pre-trial, the spouses Lim Tanhus and Ng Suas did not appear, it being
their belief that they were all compulsory parties and that the defense of one is the defense of all of them.
Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, Alfonso Ng Sua and Antonio Lim Tanhu were partners in the commercial Thus, they were all “declared in DEFAULT”. The said spouses tried to lift the order thru a motion for
partnership of Glory Commercial Company with Tee Hoon as the manager. When Tee Hoon died, Tan Put, reconsideration, but the court denied such. During the trial, while her allegedly adopted son Antonio Nuñez
claiming to be the widow, filed a complaint against spouses Antonio Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay. Later, the was testifying and was up for re-cross-examination, Tan Put suddenly filed a motion to drop Lim Teck Chuan
and Eng Chong Leonardo as defendants to the case without justifications, which was granted by the court.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-31

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record to legally justify the dropping of the non-defaulted
CFI: With the granting of the motion to drop Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo as defendants, the defendants, Lim and Leonardo. Even Tan Put’s motion dropping them as defendants did not provide any
case against the two was dismissed upon order. However, since the spouses Lim Tanhus and Ng Suas justification. From all appearances, Tan Put just decided to ask for it, without any relevant explanation at all.
were declared to be in default for their non-appearance in the pretrial, they remain to be defendants in the Usually, the court in granting such a motion inquires for the reasons and in the appropriate instances directs
complaint. Aside from giving the said order, the court proceeded to hear ex-parte the rest of Tan Put’s the granting of some form of compensation for the trouble undergone by the defendant in answering the
evidence. complaint, preparing for or proceeding partially to trial, hiring counsel and making corresponding expenses
in the premises. Nothing of these, appears in the order in question. Most importantly, the judge ought to
--- The dropped defendants separately filed a motion for reconsideration over the said orders of the RTC, have considered that the outright dropping of the non-defaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo, over their
but were all denied. However, the denial of their motions was received after the RTC’s judgment was objection at that, would certainly be unjust not only to the petitioners, their own parents, who would in
promulgated. consequence be entirely defenseless, but also to Lim and Leonardo themselves who would naturally
correspondingly suffer from the eventual judgment against their parents. Respondent court paid no heed at
Thus, all the defendants filed a motion to quash the order dropping the 2 defendants, but was later all to the mandate that such dropping must be on such terms as are just" — meaning to all concerned with
declared to be abandoned by the defendants. Hence this present petition for certiorari to annul the decision its legal and factual effects.
and actuations of the CFI. Thus, it is quite plain that respondent court erred in issuing its order of dismissal of the order
dropping the non-defaulted defendants in the complaint as well as its order denying reconsideration of such
Lim Tanhu, et.al. : There was a compulsory counterclaim in the common answer of the defendants and it is dismissal. Though Lim and Leonardo are not parties to the herein petition, such consideration is
the nature of such that it cannot be decided in an independent action. Under Sec.4 Rule 18, the CFI has no inconsequential. The fate of the case of petitioners is inseparably tied up with said order of dismissal, if only
authority to divide the case before it by dismissing the case against the non-defaulted defendants, and because the order of ex-parte hearing of the case which directly affects and prejudices said petitioners is
thereafter proceeded to hear the case ex-parte and subsequently rendering judgment against the defaulted predicated thereon.
defendants. Further, under the said rule, when a common cause of action is alleged against several
defendants, the default of any of them is a mere formality by which those defaulted are not allowed to take
part in the proceedings. But otherwise, all the defendants, defaulted and not defaulted, are supposed to 44. LAVINA v COURT OF APPEALS
have but a common fate, win or lose. Thus, there shall only be one common judgment for or against all the
defendants, whether defaulted or non-defaulted. Following such argument, either the CFI dismiss the case Facts: Maria Carmen Gabriel y Paterno executed a donation mortis causa in favor of her widowed sister-in-
against all the defendants or resume the proceedings and allow the non-defendants to defend the case for law, Josefina C. Gabriel over a parcel of land with improvements in Sampaloc, Manila. The donation was
all the defendants.
thumbmarked by Carmen before Notary Public Jose T. Constantino and was accepted by the donee in the
Tan Put: The spouses Lim Tanhu and the spouses Ng Suas were properly declared in default. Thus, they same instrument. Four months later, Carmen, who was already gravely ill with breast cancer, executed a
have no personality or interest to question the dismissal of the case as against their non-defaulted co- Last Will And Testament in which she bequeathed the same Sampaloc property to her cousin and
defendants and should suffer the consequences of their own default. companion, Remedios C. Muyot, and willed a small lot in Antipolo, Rizal to Josefina. She named a friend,
Concepcion M. De Garcia, as executrix of her will. Thereafter, Carmen executed a General Power of
ISSUE: Whether or not, by virtue of the nature of the counterclaim of the defendants, either the dismissal of Attorney appointing Remedios M. Muyot, as her attomey-in-fact and the latter hired Atty. Celso D. Lav iña as
the complaint be applied to all the defendants or the proceedings be resumed and the non-defaulted Carmen's counsel.Carmen thumbmarked an "AFFIDAVIT OF DENIAL" repudiating the donation of the
defendants be allowed to present defense on behalf of all of them.
Sampaloc property to Josefina because it was allegedly procured through fraud and trickery. She alleged
HELD: Yes. The defendants’ counterclaim is a compulsory one because the same evidence to sustain it will that in April 1983, she still could sign her name, and that she had no intention of donating the property to
also refute the cause or causes of action alleged in plaintiff's complaint. Moreover, it is compulsory because Josefina who had not done her any favor and in fact abandoned her during her illness and as well
it is obvious that the same cannot "remain pending for independent adjudication by the court." .thumbmarked a "REVOCATION OF DONATION" before Notary Public James Beltran. However, Remedios
Further, under the rules, "(i)f a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service Muyot, as Carmen's attorney-in-fact, sold the Sampaloc property to Virgilio D. Cebrero.
upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's
objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court." In the
instant case, it was evident that the judgment against the defaulted defendants was rendered before the When Carmen passed away,Josefina filed a complaint in the RTC against Carmen's estate and the Register
non-defaulted defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the order dropping them as defendants in the case of Deeds of Manila to annul the Deed of Revocation of Donation She alleged that the deed of revocation,
was received by them. made only ten (10) days before Carmen's death, was false and fictitious. She asked the court to appoint an
It should be noted that when Tan Put earlier questioned the defendants’ counterclaim, the CFI administrator ad litem for the estate of Carmen P. Gabriel. Upon filing the complaint, she caused to be
ruled that the same was permissive, and yet, contrary to the nature of compulsory counterclaim, it granted recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on the title of the property. Without appointing a special administrator for
the dropping of the non-defaulted defendants and proceeded in hearing Tan Put’s evidence ex-parte.
Carmen's estate, the court caused summons to be served on the estate. The Cebreros registered the sale
Moreover, it is clear that all the defendants are indispensable parties and under the rules of court
and according to jurisprudence, “when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should of the Sampaloc property to them and obtained TCT No. 158305 in their names.
be dismissed."
Additionally, the order dropping the non-defaulted defendants “was not predicated on Section 2 of On February 6, 1984, Josefina's complaint was amended to implead Muyot and the Cebrero spouses as
Rule 17 but more on Section 11 of Rule 3. But the truth is that nothing can be more incorrect.” To start with,
additional defendants. In addition to the original causes of action, the amended complaint sought the
the latter rule does not comprehend whimsical and irrational dropping or adding of parties in a complaint.
What it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder and misjoinder of parties. No one is free to nullification of Muyot's General Power of Attorney and the sale of the Sampaloc property to the Cebrero
join anybody in a complaint in court only to drop him unceremoniously later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. spouses.Atty. Laviña filed an Answer for the Estate and Muyot.
The rule presupposes that the original inclusion had been made in the honest conviction that it was proper
and the subsequent dropping is requested because it has turned out that such inclusion was a mistake. And Thereupon, Josefina filed a motion to disqualify him on the ground that his authority as counsel for Carmen
this is the reason why the rule ordains that the dropping be "on such terms as are just" — just to all the
was extinguished upon her death. She also assailed the service of summons to the decedent's Estate
other parties.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-32

through Muyot and reiterated her motion for the appointment of a special administrator for the Estate. Atty. 45. LAWAS v COURT OF APPEALS
Laviña opposed the motions.
Facts: Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a Complaint against petitioner's father, Pedro Sepulveda,
Judge Vicencio denied Josefina's motion to disqualify Atty. Laviña. He also denied the motion to appoint a for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. Defendant Pedro Sepulveda filed his Answer resisting
special administrator for the Estate "since the deceased left a Will naming an administratrix (executrix) and the claim and raising the special defenses of laches, prescription and failure to ventilate in a previous
the latter has accepted the trust." He sustained his court's jurisdiction over the Estate based on the service special proceeding. During the presentation of evidence for the plaintiff, the defendant died on March 25,
of summons upon Muyot. 1975. On May 21, 1975, counsels for the deceased defendant filed a notice of death wherein were
enumerated the thirteen children and surviving spouse of the deceased.
Cebrero filed a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the Sampaloc property and before Judge
Vicencio could act on it, Josefina filed a petition for certiorari on February 6, 1987 in the Court of Appeals On May 5, 1975, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration and she was appointed judicial
assailing Judge Vicencio's order of September 23,1986 and praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to administratrix of the estate of her late father in July, 1976.
stop him from further proceeding in Civil Case No.. The Court of Appeals issued a restraining order on
February 10, 1987, ordering the lower court to "desist from proceeding with Civil Case No. 83-21629 until At the hearing of the case, Attys. Domingo Antigua and Serafin Branzuela, former counsels for the
further orders. deceased defendant, manifested in open court that with the death of their client, their contract with him was
also terminated and none of the thirteen children nor the surviving spouse had renewed the contract, but
However, in spite of the restraining order, Judge Vicencio issued an order cancelling the notice of lis instead they had engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate proceedings.
pendens because he believed the Appellate Court's restraining order of February 10, 1987 expired on
March 3, 1987. Notwithstanding the manifestation of the former counsels of the deceased defendant, the respondent trial
judge set the case for hearing and sent the notice of hearing to said counsels. Thereafter, the respondent
Issue: Whether or not Attorney Celso Laviña's authority as counsel for Carmen P. Gabriel was extinguished trial judge rendered a decision against the heirs of the deceased defendant.
upon her death.
Ten of the children of the deceased defendant, who apparently did not know that a decision had already
Ruling: The Court of Appeals held that Attorney Laviña may not appear "as counsel for the estate of been rendered, filed an Answer in-substitution of the deceased defendant through their counsel Atty. Jesus
Carmen P. Gabriel because his authority as her counsel was extinguished upon Carmen's death" (Art. 1919, Yray. This was denied admission by the respondent trial judge for being already moot and academic
Civil Code). It also held that "respondent Remedios Muyot was not capacitated to receive summons for the because of the earlier decision.
estate because the general power of attorney constituting her as agent of the deceased became inoperative
upon the death of the principal." The service of summons upon her was void. Petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the proceedings in
the respondent trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
However, the Court held that a special administrator need not be appointed for the estate as the last will and
testament of Maria Carmen P. Gabriel had been allowed probate on 3 February 1987 in Sp. Proc. No. Issue: Whether or not the service of the counsel of the deceased is extinguished?
8423954 and letters testamentary had been issued to the duly designated executrix, Concepcion M. De
Garcia to represent the Estate.
Ruling: The former counsels for the deceased defendant, Pedro Sepulveda, complied with Section 16 of
Rule 3 by filing a notice of death on May 21, 1975. They also correctly manifested in open court at the
The petitioners' argument that service of the summons on Remedios Muyot was valid and sufficient to vest hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, that with the death of their client their contract with him was
jurisdiction in the Court over the Estate of Carmen P. Gabriel, because Muyot was Carmen's attorney-in- also terminated and none of the heirs of the deceased had renewed the contract, and the heirs had instead
fact, is not correct. The estate of a dead person may only be summoned through the executor or engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate proceedings. Both the respondent trial judge and the
administrator of his estate for it is the executor or administrator who may sue or be sued (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Court of Appeals erred in considering the former counsels of the deceased defendant as counsels for the
Rules of Court) and who may bring or defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights heirs of the deceased. The statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals that "the appearance of the
of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court). The general power of attorney appointing Remedios as lawyers of their deceased father in court on January 13, 1976 carries the presumption that they were
Carmen's agent or attorney-in- fact was extinguished upon Carmen's demise. Thereafter, Remedios was authorized by the heirs of the deceased defendant" is erroneous. As this Court held in People vs. Florendo
bereft of authority to represent Carmen. (77 Phil. 16), "the attorneys for the offended party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the
death of the latter, the principal. " Moreover, such a presumption was not warranted in view of the
The petitioner's contention that the agency was "constituted in the common interest of the principal and the manifestation of said lawyers in open court on November 27, 1975 that they were not representing the heirs
agent" and that hence it was not extinguished by the death of the principal (Art. 1930, Civil Code) is refuted of the deceased defendant.
by the instrument itself which explicitly provided that the powers conferred on the agent were to be
exercised for the "sole benefit" of the principal, Carmen P. Gabriel. It was only at the hearing that the respondent trial judge issued an order substituting the deceased
defendant with his fourteen heirs.
Carmen's death likewise divested Attorney Laviña of authority to represent her as counsel. A dead client has
no personality and cannot be represented by an attorney . As this Court has held:
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-33

... Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a party's death and the claim is not contract for the lawyer's services up to judgment, or when his fees are on a contingent basis, and also when
thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to appear within his appearance is coupled with an interest. Since not one of the above exceptions obtains in this case, it is
a period of 30 days or such time as it may grant. Since no administrator of the estate of the deceased obvious that when Attorney Javier filed the notice of appeal after his client's death, he no longer had any
authority to appear for him. Hence, the notice of appeal filed by him was a mere scrap of paper and without
appellant had yet been appointed as the same was still pending determination in the Court of First Instance
any legal effect.
of Quezon City, the motion of the deceased's counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within
which to file appellant's brief was well-taken. More, under the Rule, it should have set a period for the ISSUE:
substitution of the deceased party with her legal representative or heirs, failing which, the court is called
upon to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased at Whether or not the judgment which the trial court rendered after the death of said defendant was null and
the cost of the deceased's estate, and such representative shall then 'immediately appear for and on behalf void.
of the interest of the deceased.
RULING:
Respondent court gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the appearance of the legal Under the rules, it is the duty of the attorney for the deceased defendant to inform the court of his client's
representative of the deceased and instead dismissing the appeal of the deceased who yet had to be death and to furnish the court with the names and residences of the executor, administrator, or legal
substituted in the pending appeal Thus, it has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives, representative of the deceased.
and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the
deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been In the case at bar, no such notice of death, nor a motion for substitution of the deceased defendant, was
effected, the trial held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered ever made. Hence, the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of
defendant, Maximo Regoso, without the proper manifestation from his counsel. It must be remembered that
after such trial are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
the fault or negligence was Attorney Javier's alone
representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. (Ordoveza vs.
Raymundo, 63 Phil 275 [1936]; Obut vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 70 SCRA 546) (Vda. de Haberer vs. Court The supervening death of the defendant, Maximo Regoso, did not extinguish his wife's action for partition of
of Appeals, supra, p. 541. their conjugal assets, for it is an action that survives. The trial of the case on the merits was already finished
before the defendant died. Since it was not informed about that event, the trial court may not be faulted for
proceeding to render judgment without ordering the substitution of the deceased defendant. Its judgment is
Under the said Rule, priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the executor or
valid and binding upon the defendant's legal representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest
administrator of his estate. It is only in cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or in the property subject of the action is concerned
administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, that the court
may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased. Attorney Javier's appeal from the decision of the trial court was correctly dismissed by the appellate court
for upon the death of Maximo Regoso, Attorney Javier's authority to represent him also expired. Then notice
of appeal, which Attorney Javier filed on behalf of the decedent was an unauthorized pleading, hence,
46. HEIRS OF MAXIMO REGOSO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BELEN CRUZ
invalid.
REGOSO, respondents.
47. MANUEL A. TORRES, JR., (Deceased), GRACIANO J. TOBIAS, RODOLFO L. JOCSON, JR.,
FACTS:
MELVIN S. JURISPRUDENCIA, AUGUSTUS CESAR AZURA and EDGARDO D. PABALAN, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, TORMIL REALTY &
The case involves an action for judicial partition of property with accounting and damages , which was filed DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ANTONIO P. TORRES, JR., MA. CRISTINA T. CARLOS, MA. LUISA T.
by Belen Cruz-Regoso against her husband, Maximo Regoso, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XV of MORALES, and DANTE D. MORALES,respondents.
Malolos, Bulacan.
FACTS:
The Trial Court rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
The late Manuel A. Torres, Jr. (Judge Torres for brevity) was the majority stockholder of Tormil Realty &
Regoso died on January 17, 1985 after the case had been submitted for decision, but he was not Development Corporation while private respondents who are the children of Judge Torres deceased brother
substituted as defendant by his heirs because, apparently, the trial court was not informed of his death until Antonio A. Torres, constituted the minority stockholders.
the decision had been promulgated on November 14, 1988.
In 1984, Judge Torres, in order to make substantial savings in taxes, adopted an estate planning scheme
On November 29, 1988, Regoso's counsel, Attorney Adriano Javier, Sr., filed a notice of appeal which the under which he assigned to Tormil Realty & Development Corporation (Tormil for brevity) various real
trial court approved. properties he owned and his shares of stock in other corporations in exchange for 225,972 Tormil Realty
shares. Hence, on various dates in July and August of 1984, ten (10) deeds of assignment were executed
The plaintiff, Belen Cruz-Regoso, through counsel, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the by the late Judge Torres
deceased defendant ceased to have legal personality and that Attorney Javier's authority to represent him
was terminated or expired upon his demise, hence, the notice of appeal filed by said counsel was invalid, a
worthless piece of paper. Due to the insufficient number of shares of stock issued to Judge Torres and the alleged refusal of
private respondents to approve the needed increase in the corporations authorized capital stock (to cover
The Court of Appeals issued a resolution on October 6, 1989, dismissing the appeal. It held that: the shortage of 972 shares due to Judge Torres under the estate planning scheme), on 11 September 1986,
Judge Torres revoked the two (2) deeds of assignment covering the properties in Makati and Pasay City .
It is a well-established rule that a lawyer-client relationship is terminated upon the death of the client. The
lawyer's authority to appear for his client automatically ceases). The only exceptions are when there is a
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-34

Noting the disappearance of the Makati and Pasay City properties from the corporations inventory of assets represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. In the present case,
and financial records private respondents, on 31 March 1987, were constrained to file a complaint with the this purpose has been substantially fulfilled (despite the lack of formal substitution) in view of the peculiar
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) docketed as SEC Case No. 3153 to compel Judge Torres to fact that both proceedings involve practically the same parties. Both parties have been fiercely fighting in
deliver to Tormil Corporation the two (2) deeds of assignment covering the aforementioned Makati and
the probate proceedings of Judge Torres holographic will for appointment as legal representative of his
Pasay City properties which he had unilaterally revoked and to cause the registration of the corresponding
titles in the name of Tormil. estate. Since both parties claim interests over the estate, the rights of the estate were expected to be fully
protected in the proceedings before the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals. In either case, whoever
shall be appointed legal representative of Judge Torres estate (petitioner Pabalan or private respondents)
Consequently, on 10 April 1987, private respondents instituted a complaint with the SEC (SEC Case
would no longer be a stranger to the present case, the said parties having voluntarily submitted to the
No. 3161) praying in the main, that the election of petitioners to the Board of Directors be annulled.
jurisdiction of the SEC and the Court of Appeals and having thoroughly participated in the proceedings.

On 6 March 1991, the Panel of Hearing Officers of the SEC rendered a decision in favor of private
It is appropriate to mention here that when Judge Torres died on April 3, 1991, the SEC en banc had
respondents.
already fully heard the parties and what remained was the evaluation of the evidence and rendition of the
judgment.
Petitioners promptly appealed to the SEC en banc (docketed as SEC-AC No. 339). Thereafter, on 3
April 1991, during the pendency of said appeal, petitioner Manuel A. Torres, Jr. died. However, notice
thereof was brought to the attention of the SEC not by petitioners counsel but by private respondents in a Further, petitioners filed their motions to suspend proceedings only after more than two (2) years from
Manifestation dated 24 April 1991.[9] the death of Judge Torres. Petitioners counsel was even remiss in his duty under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court.[19] Instead, it was private respondents who informed the SEC of Judge Torres death
through a manifestation dated 24 April 1991.
On 8 June 1993, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on grounds that no administrator or
legal representative of the late Judge Torres estate has yet been appointed by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati where Sp. Proc. No. M-1768 (In Matter of the Issuance of the Last Will and Testament of Manuel A. For the SEC en banc to have suspended the proceedings to await the appointment of the legal
Torres, Jr.) was pending. representatives by the estate was impractical and would have caused undue delay in the proceedings and a
denial of justice. There is no telling when the probate court will decide the issue, which may still be
On 19 July 1993, the SEC en banc issued an Order denying petitioners aforecited motions on the appealed to the higher courts.
following ground:
In any case, there has been no final disposition of the properties of the late Judge Torres before the
Before the filing of these motions, the Commission en banc had already completed all proceedings and had SEC. On the contrary, the decision of the SEC en banc as affirmed by the Court of Appeals served to
likewise ruled on the merits of the appealed cases. Viewed in this light, we thus feel that there is nothing left protect and preserve his estate. Consequently, the rule that when a party dies, he should be substituted by
to be done except to deny these motions to suspend proceedings. [10] his legal representative to protect the interest of his estate in observance of due process was not violated in
this case in view of its peculiar situation where the estate was fully protected by the presence of the parties
who claim interest thereto either as directors, stockholders or heirs.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the decisions of the SEC are null and void for being rendered without the necessary 48. SPOUSES CHRISTOPHER and MARIBETH CORDOVA, complainants, vs. JUDGE RICARDO F.
substitution of parties (for the deceased petitioner Manuel A. Torres, Jr.) as mandated by Sec. 17, Rule 3 of TORNILLA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Bacolod City,respondent.
the Revised Rules of Court.

RULING: FACTS:

It has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the Court for the This is an administrative complaint filed by the spouses Christopher and Maribeth Cordova against Judge
appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, Ricardo F. Tornilla, presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Bacolod City in relation to
and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been effected, the trial held by the court without such a writ of demolition he issued in Civil Case No. 18761.
legal representative or heirs, and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void because the court
acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representative or of the heirs upon whom the trial and
the judgment are not binding. Tomas and Marietta Laguardia (Laguardias) filed an ejectment case against Luz Cordova and Rudy
Kubchan, docketed as Civil Case No. 18761, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Bacolod
City. A decision was rendered in favor of the Laguardias. The defendants appealed the decision to the
As early as 8 April 1988, Judge Torres instituted Special Proceedings No. M-1768 before the Regional Trial Regional Trial Court, which affirmed the decision of the inferior court.
Court of Makati for the ante-mortem probate of his holographic will which he had executed on 31 October
1986. Testifying in the said proceedings, Judge Torres confirmed his appointment of petitioner Edgardo D.
Pabalan as the sole executor of his will and administrator of his estate. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court both affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

It should be recalled that the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the The writ of execution was implemented with the delivery of the premises subject of the case to the
right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly Laguardias.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-35

Luz Cordova died after the writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court. from contract. The suit involves alleged tortious acts. And the action is embraced in suits filed "to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal", which survive.
On March 2, 1994, the Laguardias filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, alleging that the 50. ISMAEL MATHAY, JOSEFINA MATHAY, DIOGRACIAS T. REYES and S. ADOR DIONISIO
defendants failed to remove their house from the premises. vs.
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, JOSE MARINO OLONDRIZ, WILFRIDO C.
On March 7, 1994, the heirs of Cordova, complainants herein, opposed the motion for issuance of a writ of TECSON, SIMON R. PATERNO, FERMIN Z. CARAM, JR., ANTONIO P. MADRIGAL, JOSE P.
MADRIGAL, CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, and ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, defendants-appellees.
demolition.
CIPRIANO AZADA, MARIA CRISTINA OLONDRIZ PERTIERRA jointly with her husband ARTURO
PERTIERRA, and MARIA DEL PUY OLONDRIZ DE STEVENS
On April 6, 1994, respondent issued the writ of demolition
Facts: Petitioners alleged that they are stockholders in respondent company and the board of respondent
passed a resolution which provides that all stockholders should exercise their right to subscribe within 30
Complainants charged that respondent, in granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition over days from the date fixed by the board, otherwise, said right is deemed waived in favor of the Board of
the house, had issued an unjust order and committed gross ignorance of the law. organizers. The artices of incorporation indicated an original subscription by individual defendants herein,
excluding petitioners who are also stockholders. They claim that this is a class suit in behalf of other
stockholders other than the individual respondents herein, predicated upon the breach of trust by
ISSUE: respondents because their act was a means to gain control over respondent corporation.
Whether or not the successors-in-interest were parties to the case and whether the court acquired A motion to dismiss was filed by respondents on the ground that the action cannot be maintained as a class
jurisdiction over their persons. suit.
RULING: Issue: Whether or not the present petition may be considered a class suit in behalf of other stockholders of
the company?
It is the duty of the lawyer to inform the court of his client's death, incapacity or incompetency during the
pendency of the action and to give the name and address of the executor, administrator, guardian or other Held: No
legal representatives of the decedent. The court, if the action survives, shall then order upon proper notice
the legal representatives of the decedent to appear and be substituted for him within the time granted in
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject matter of
said order.
the controversy be one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court. An action does not become a class suit
Complainants have voluntary appeared albeit by the informal method, when they filed an opposition to the merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class quit depends
motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, alleging therein that they were substituting for defendant Luz upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the
Cordova. existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the
existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class,in order that the court might be enabled
to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them
Tcase law is that a judgment of eviction can be executed against a third party who has derived his right of all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to
possession of the premises from the defendant determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or
common interest.
49. Board of Liquidators vs Heirs of Kalaw

Facts: Kalaw was Board Chairman of the National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO). NACOCO was unable
to fulfill some of its contractual obligations, which among others, is for the delivery of copra to various The complaint in the instant case explicitly declared that the plaintiffs- appellants instituted the "present
corporations. NACOCO (through Board of Liquidators) seek to recover from Kalaw what was paid during the class suit in behalf of CMI subscribing stockholders" ut did not state the number of said CMI subscribing
settlements, charging Kalaw with negligence, bad faith and/or breach of trust for having approved the void stockholders so that the trial court could not infer, much less make sure as explicitly required by the
contracts for delivery of copra. sufficiently numerous and representative in order that all statutory provision, that the parties actually before
it were interests concerned might be fully protected, and that it was impracticable to bring such a large
The Heirs of Kalaw contend that instant action is personal to the deceased Maximo M. Kalaw, and may not number of parties before the court.
be deemed to have survived after his death.

Issue: Whether or not the action based on alleged negligent acts may survive even after the death of the
defendant? The statute also requires, as a prerequisite to a class suit, that the subject-matter of the controversy be of
common or general interest to numerous persons. Although it has been remarked that the "innocent
Held: Yes. 'common or general interest' requirement is not very helpful in determining whether or not the suit is
proper", the decided cases in our jurisdiction have more incisively certified the matter when there is such
The suit here revolves around the alleged negligent acts of Kalaw for having entered into the questioned common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. By the phrase "subject matter of the
contracts without prior approval of the board of directors, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff; and is action" is meant "the physical facts, the things real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in
against Kalaw for having subsequently approved the said contracts in bad faith and/or breach of trust." relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong committed by the defendant."
Clearly then, the present case is not a mere action for the recovery of money nor a claim for money arising
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-36

The interest that petitioners had in the subject matter of this suit which is the portion of stocks offering of the The instant petition for review on certiorari suffers from a basic infirmity for lack of the requisite imprimatur
Bank left unsubscribed by CMI stockholders who failed to exercise their right to subscribe, was several, not from the Office of the Solicitor General, hence, it is dismissible on that ground. The general rule is that only
common or general in the sense required by the statute. Each one of the appellants and the CMI the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that
stockholders had determinable interest; each one had a right, if any, only to his respective portion of the actions filed in the name of the Republic, or its agencies and instrumentalities for that matter, if not initiated
stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which another was entitled. by the Solicitor General, will be summarily dismissed.

Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the appellants and the CMI stockholders suffered The authority of the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Republic of the Philippines, its agencies
wrongs that had been committed by similar means and even pursuant to a single plan of the Interim Board and instrumentalities is embodied in Administrative Code.
of Organizers of the Bank, the wrong suffered by each of them would constitute a wrong separate from
those suffered by the other stockholders, and those wrongs alone would not create that common or general As an exception to the general rule, the Solicitor General, in providing legal representation for the
interest in the subject matter of the controversy as would entitle any one of them to bring a class suit on government, is empowered under the Administrative Code to "deputize legal officers of government
behalf of the others. departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the
Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision
51. COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.
vs.
DOLEFIL AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE, INC., ESMERALDO A. DUBLIN, 52. NICOMEDES IBAÑES, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC
ALICIA SAVAREZ, EDNA URETA, ET AL., CHURCH, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Facts: Petitioner received from certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative 1. IMAGE OF THE HOLY CHILD OF TERNATE. — The history of the image of the Holy Child of Ternate.
(DARBCI) several complaints alleging mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the
then incumbent officers and members of the board of directors of the cooperative, some of whom are herein 2. ID.; NUMEROUS PARTIES TO AN ACTION. — Section 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure apparently is
private respondents. Before private respondents could file an answer, CDA Administrator Zingapan issued not applicable to a case in which it is claimed that all of the inhabitants of a town are the owners, as
an order freezing the funds of DARBCI and creating a management committee to manage the affairs of the individuals, of an article of personal property.
said cooperative.
3. ID.; ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION; PARTIES. — Seventeen residents of the town of Ternate,
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC of South Cotabato, against CDA, which primarily which has a population of 2,460 persons, can not maintain an action under section 118 of the Code of Civil
questioned the jurisdiction of the CDA to resolve the complaints against the private respondents, specifically Procedure to recover possession of the image of the Holy Child of Ternate, when it appears that the
with respect to the authority of the CDA to issue the "freeze order" and to create a management committee contention is really between the Roman Catholic Church and the Independent Filipino Church, and that the
that would run the affairs of DARBCI. CDA Administrator Lozada issued another resolution which directed seventeen plaintiffs do not represent the membership of both churches.
the holding of a special general assembly of the members of DARBCI and the creation of an ad hoc election
committee to supervise the election of officers and members of the board of directors of DARBCI. FACTS: About 1863 a church was built in Ternate and the image was immediately located therein, where it
remained until 1896. At the outbreak in Cavite of the rebellion against Spain of that year, the parish priest, a
With the issuance of the two (2) restraining orders by the Court of Appeals, the scheduled special general native of the Islands, fled to the mountains and from that retreat ordered the president of the pueblo of
assembly and the election of officers and members of the board of directors of DARBCI did not take place. Ternate to take the image from the church and bring it to the mountains. This was done and it there
Nevertheless, the majority of the 7,511 members of DARBCI, on their own initiative, convened a general remained until the amnesty of 1897, when it was returned to the church of Ternate. It there remained until
assembly and held an election of the members of the board of directors and officers of the cooperative, 1903, when a party of men, among whom were some of the plaintiffs, entered the church during the
thereby effectively replacing the private respondents. Hence, the private respondents filed a Twin Motions absence of the priest, seized the image, carried it out and placed it in a chapel of the Independent Filipino
for Contempt of Court and to Nullify Proceedings with the CA. The CA granted the petition. Church in the same pueblo of Ternate. Under orders of the executive branch of the Government it was taken
therefrom by a military force of scouts, placed in the church of Maragondon, and the persons taking it from
Petitioner CDA claims that it is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes in view the church of Ternate were prosecuted for robbery. That case was dismissed, and the image ordered to
of its powers, functions and responsibilities. The petitioner avers that when an administrative agency is remain in the custody of the Roman Catholic priest of Maragondon in the church of that pueblo until the right
conferred with quasi-judicial powers and functions, such as the CDA, all controversies relating to the subject thereto could be determined in a civil judicial proceeding. Thereupon this action was brought.
matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be covered within the jurisdiction of said administrative
agency. The courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government The plaintiffs are thirteen in numbers and inhabitants of the town of Ternate, for themselves and in the name
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities undertaken upon their special technical knowledge and of all the other inhabitants of said town, appear before the court and bring complaint against the defendants,
training. alleging as a cause of action that:

In their Comment,private respondents contend that the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by CDA There are no other allegations in the complaint as to the right of the plaintiffs to represent the inhabitants of
Administrator Alberto Zingapan should be dismissed and struck down as a mere scrap of paper for lack of Ternate, nor is there any proof whatever in the case upon this point. The claim of the plaintiffs is that the
authority to file the same from the Office of the Solicitor General and for having been filed without approval persons who were at the time of the presentation of the complaint the inhabitants of Ternate were the
from the Board of Administrators of CDA. The private respondents also contend that, contrary to the claim of owners in common of the image considered as a piece of personal property. There is no evidence to show
the petitioner, the powers, functions and responsibilities of the CDA show that it was merely granted that the present plaintiffs, or any one of the present inhabitants of Ternate, were the heirs or in any way
regulatory or supervisory powers over cooperatives in addition to its authority to mediate and conciliate related to any one of the two hundred Mardicas who came to the Philippines nearly two hundred and fifty
between parties involving the settlement of cooperative disputes. years ago. The claim of the plaintiffs is apparently not rested upon the proposition that they are entitled to
relief because they are such heirs, but because they live in the pueblo. Their view seems to be that the heirs
Issue: Whether or not the petition is proper absent any delegation from the Solicitor General to the CDA to of the Mardicas living in other pueblos have no interest in the image.
bring about the action?
Nor is there any evidence in the case to show how many, if any, of the plaintiffs or of the present inhabitants
Held: NO of Ternate, who are some 2,460 people, belong to the Roman Catholic Church.
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-37

ISSUE: (3) that defendant-appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc. be ordered to pay to plaintiff the damages therein
specified.
Whether the Roman Catholic Church is not the owner of the image?
Defendant-appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds
HELD: that (1) the complaint states no cause of action; and (2) the cause of action, if any, is barred by prescription
and laches. Paradise Farms, Inc. and Hacienda Caretas, Inc. filed motions to dismiss based on the same
The plaintiffs rely upon article 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is as follows: grounds. Appellee National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority did not file any motion to dismiss. However, it
pleaded in its answer as special and affirmative defenses lack of cause of action by the plaintiff-appellant
"When the subject-matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the and the barring of such action by prescription and laches.
parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or
defend for the benefit of all. But in such case any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in The lower court issued an Order requiring plaintiff-appellant to furnish the appellees copy of said motion,
protection of his individual interests, and the court shall make sure that the parties actually before it are defendant-appellant's motion and, consequently, prayed that the said motion be denied for lack of notice
sufficiently numerous and representative so that all interests concerned are fully protected. and for failure of the plaintiff-appellant to comply with the Order. Similarly, defendant-appellee paradise
Farms, Inc. filed, a manifestation information the court that it also did not receive a copy of the afore-
No case has been called to our attention in which this section or the rule which it enunciates has been mentioned of appellant. the trial court issued an Order dismissing the amended complaint.
applied where the ownership of personal property is involved and where it is claimed to belong to persons
who at a particular time reside in a particular place, or where the ownership changes as persons move in or Appellant filed a motion to reconsider the Order of dismissal on the grounds that the court had no
out of such locality. jurisdiction to issue the Order of dismissal. that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action because the
subject matter of the controversy in one of common interest to the members of the corporation who are so
no one of the inhabitants of Ternate has a vested interest in the property in question which would survive his numerous that the present complaint should be treated as a class suit; and that the action is not barred by
removal from the town and in which another person, by moving into the town, acquired an interest. the statute of limitations because (a) an action for the reconveyance of property registered through fraud
does not prescribe, and (b) an action to impugn a void judgment may be brought any time. This motion was
It sufficiently appears from the record in this case that it is a controversy between the Roman Catholic denied by the trial court. From the afore-mentioned Order of dismissal and the Order denying its motion for
Church on one side and the Independent Filipino Church on the other. That it is the purpose if the plaintiffs, reconsideration, plaintiff-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
if they secure possession of the image, to place it in the chapel of the Independent Church is also very
clear. What number of the inhabitants of the town (2,460 according to the census) are members of the the Court of Appeals, upon finding that no question of fact was involved in the appeal but only questions of
Roman Catholic Church and what part are members of the Independent Filipino Church does not appear. law and jurisdiction, certified this case to this Court for resolution of the legal issues involved in the
But it is very apparent that many of the inhabitants are opposed to the transfer of the image from the Roman controversy.
Catholic Church. Under the circumstances, the thirteen plaintiffs do not fairly represent all of the inhabitants
of the town. Their interest and the interests of some of the others are diametrically opposed. For this reason of First Instance, but only "authorized" it for the reason given by plaintiff's counsel that the transfer would be
this action can not be maintained. convenient for the parties. The trial court is not without power to either grant or deny the motion, especially
in the light of a strong opposition thereto filed by the defendant. We hold that the court a quo acted within its
53. SULO NG BAYAN INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., PARADISE FARMS, authority in denying the motion for the transfer the case to Malolos notwithstanding the authorization" of the
INC., NATIONAL WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, HACIENDA CARETAS, INC, and same by the Secretary of Justice.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, defendants-appellees.
ISSUE:
FACTS: On April 26, 1966, plaintiff-appellant Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. filed an accion de revindicacion CFI of
bulacan against defendants-appellees to recover the ownership and possession of a large tract of land in WON lack of cause of action raised in the motions to dismiss refer to the lack of personality of plaintiff.
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, registered in the name of defendants-appellees' predecessors-in-interest.
The complaint alleged that plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, HELD:
with its principal office and place of business at San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that its membership is
composed of natural persons residing at San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that the members of the plaintiff The rules require that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
corporation, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had pioneered in the clearing of the interest and that all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
fore-mentioned tract of land, cultivated the same since the Spanish regime and continuously possessed the demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs (Sec. 2, Rule 3).
said property openly and public under concept of ownership adverse against the whole world;
A non-stock corporation may not institute an action, in behalf of its individual members, for the recovery of
that defendant-appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc. through force and intimidation, ejected the members of the certain parcels of land allegedly owned by its members and for the nullification of title issued in favor of
plaintiff corporation from their possession ; they found out for the first time in the year 1961 that the land in defendants.
question "had been either fraudelently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, which title is
fictitious, non-existent and devoid of legal efficacy due to the fact that "no original survey nor plan It has not been claimed that the members have assigned or transferred whatever rights they may have on
whatsoever" appears to have been submitted as a basis thereof and that the Court of First Instance of the land in question to the plaintiff corporation. Absent any showing of interest, therefore, a corporation, like
Bulacan which issued the decree of registration did not acquire jurisdiction over the land registration case plaintiff-appellant herein, has no personality to bring an action for and in behalf of its stockholders or
because no notice of such proceeding was given to the members of the plaintiff corporation who were then members for the purpose of recovering property which belongs to said stockholders or members in their
in actual possession of said properties; personal capacities.

that as a consequence of the nullity of the original title, all subsequent titles are therefore void. Plaintiff-
appellant consequently prayed (1) that Original Certificate of Title No. 466, as well as all transfer certificates
of title issued and derived therefrom, be nullified; (2) that "plaintiff's members" be declared as absolute
owners in common of said property and that the corresponding certificate of title be issued to plaintiff; and
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-38

Appellant maintains, however, that the amended complaint may be treated as a class suit, pursuant to respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders. the respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for
Section 12 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, hence this petition.

In order that a class suit may prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the subject matter of ISSUES:
the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; and (2) that the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. 1) whether or not the private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action; and

Moreover, as correctly stated by the appellees, a class suit does not lie in actions for the recovery of 2) whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a motion to
property where several persons claim ownership of their respective portions of the property, as each one dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
could alleged and prove his respective right in a different way for each portion of the land, so that they
cannot all be held to have Identical title through acquisition prescription. no cause of action in favor of the HELD:
plaintiff exists.
First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the
54. NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner, vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding sugarcane
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only against
INC., ASOCIACION DE AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC., individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is
DONEDCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a
MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH MARANON, specific, individual group member's reputation.
ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO, PEDRO YULO,
MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, respondents. In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit,
it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962), although it is
FACTS: not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared that" ... defamatory
matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground
Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified the personality of the
individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).
It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in
Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed a class suit This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of persons,
in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of as in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the collectivity, the more
petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d.
1384).
The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the
publication of the article "An Island of Fear". The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros
Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the
impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with imprunity. It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or
class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual
Complainants therein alleged that it showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them
objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay
vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class interest
They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages, and such affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party
amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine, plus expenses of (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and
litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of
the controversy.
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article sued upon is not actionable in
fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much less support a cause of action. The second issue to be resolved here is whether or not the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is
It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a available to petitioner whose motion to dismiss the complaint and subsequent motion for reconsideration
cause of action. Private respondents filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a reply. were denied.

the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which the motion to dismiss are As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of
predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid cause of action; and the question appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary procedure to be followed
as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of evidence. Petitioner's motion in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal
for reconsideration was denied. from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of
filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court for grave abuse of discretion as amounting to
lack of jurisdiction and praying for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to
quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition
lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
Civil Procedure Case Digests Batch 3-39

expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal
proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

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