STONEHILL VS.

DIOKNO

FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government, Respondents-Judges — issued on different dates a total
of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the
any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law, the said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the
present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or
representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases
already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and
cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3)
that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

ISSUE: WON the search warrants issued are valid.

HELD: With regard the search issued in the corporation – valid; with regard the search in the houses – void.

RATIO: As regards the first group(In the offices), we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. Second in their houses: Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a
matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It
would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications
— without reference to any determinate provision of said laws. the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal
or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be
seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Page 1 of 9
IN RE: VICENTE CHING
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to
take his oath.

Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married
before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires
the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that
he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a
municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching
should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he
only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. In conclusion, the
OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be
beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to
taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time"

HELD: No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time.
The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from “upon reaching the age of majority",
which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the
court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

*****
The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a
criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the
warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an
accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani
vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S.,
132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using
them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold
that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.

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Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, G.R. No. L-45358, January 29, 1937)

Facts:

Mariano Almeda, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, applied for a search warrant and presented to
Judge David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information,
petitioner Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used
by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In
his oath at the end of the affidavit, Almeda stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon
the information received by him from a reliable person. On the basis of such affidavit, Judge David issued a warrant
ordering the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents
above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law.

With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and residence at 7:00 pm and
seized articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals, cash bonds, check stubs, memorandums,
blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes
and checks.

Alvarez filed a petition praying that the search warrant be declared illegal and that all the articles in question be
returned to him. He claimed that the search warrant was illegal for the following reasons: (a) it was based solely upon
Page 2 of 9
the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause; (b) it was not supported
by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant; (c) it authorized its execution at night; (d) lack of an
adequate description of the books and documents to be seized; and (e) it was issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against him for violation of the
Anti-Usury Law.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search
warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in
proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding
or proceedings.

The CFI ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search warrant.

Issues:

1. Is the search warrant illegal when the affidavit is based on hearsay?

2. Is there a need for affidavit of another witnesses to support the application for search warrant?
3. Can the search warrant be executed at night?
4. Did the search warrant satisfy the particularity of description as required by the law?
5. Is fishing evidence is valid?
6. Did Alvarez waived his constitutional right to question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings when he
offered a compromise or settlement of the case?

Held:

1. Yes. The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a
search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and
the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true
test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.

It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant
in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way
warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.

2. No. It is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a complainant in cases
where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts. However, when the applicant's or complainant's knowledge of
the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine
whether probable cause exists.

3. Yes. The search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or
in the place ordered to be searched. In this case, it does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in
the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated; hence, the search and seizure could not be made at night.

4. Yes. A detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is necessary, but
where, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. The only description of the articles
given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender,
charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so
described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because
it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with
the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling
him to identify the articles, which he did.

5. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents
had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the
articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure
of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case
against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
Page 3 of 9
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an
accused to testify against himself. Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were
seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for
violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to
him.

6. No. The petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or settlement attributed to
him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search and seizure. The waiver would have been a
good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in
question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in
writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.

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Mata vs. Bayona

G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984

FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information
against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets
known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the
government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere
from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge
Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then handed
the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the
search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and
that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal
case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the
records. Mata’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court,
with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles
confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him?

HELD:YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing,
and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore,
hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites
of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

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Burgos vs. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-64261)
Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search
warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and
other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We
Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
Page 4 of 9
prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to
enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as
evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance of search
warrants.

Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In
mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less
than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously
being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended” is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating
with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will
not suffice.

**************************************************************************************************************************************
BACHE & CO (PHIL) and FREDERICK E. SSEGGERMAN vs HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ
GR No. L-32409

FACTS:
Respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of Section 46 of National Internal Revenue
Code and authorizing Revenue examiner Rodolfo de Leon, to make and file the application for Search Warrant which
was attached to the letter. At that time Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note he instructed the
Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents de Leon and Logronio. The stenographer, upon request
of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked responded
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could
be charged for perjury.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz conducted a personal examination?

HELD:
No. The petition for Certiorari, prohibition and Mandamus are granted. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by
respondent Judge is declared null and void.

RATIONALE:
Personal examination by the Judge of the complainant and the witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause, the determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for
the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of
any rule to the contrary.

In this case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant and his
witnesses.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was
thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes to a few words of warning against the commission
of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal
examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was one conducted by the
Deputy Clerk of Court

Section 4 (Examination of the Applicant):

Page 5 of 9
The Judge or Justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complaint and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attached them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.

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Paper Industries Corp. v. Asuncion (1999)

J. Panganiban
Facts:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition (nullification of search warrant and orders andissuance of a TRO or an injunction
against State Prosecutor). An application for a search warrantwas made before RTC of QC by Chief Inspector.
Attached to the application were the jointdeposition of two witnesses and the summary of the information and
supplementary statements.After propounding several questions to one of the witnesses, Judge issued search
warrant.The police implemented the search warrant and seized several firearms and ammunitions.Petitioners then
filed for a Motion to Quash before RTC, believing that the warrant was invalid andthe search conducted unreasonable.
Subsequently they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to theMotion to Quash and a Motion to Suppress Evidence.
RTC denied petitioners’ motions. It alsodenied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the search warrant is valid.
Held:
No, it is not. To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonablesearches and seizures, the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be followedstrictly. Where the judge fails to personally

examine the applicant for a search warrant and thelatter’s witnesses, or where the witnesses testify on matters not of
their own personal knowledge,the search warrant must be struck down.Requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such presence isdetermined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produceare personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4)
the applicantand the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specificallydescribes the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. (Sec. 3 and 4, Rule 126)In this case, the search warrant was invalid
because (1) the trial court failed to examine personallythe complainant and the other deponents; (2) one of the
witnesses, who appeared during thehearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were notlicensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity.Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court,all the
firearms, explosives and other materials seized are inadmissible. They are the fruits of the poisonous tree.Petition
GRANTED. Search warrant NULL and VOID.

ISSUE:
Whether the Search Warrant is Valid?

HELD:
No, petition for Certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted and Search Warrant No. 799 accordingly declared null and
void, TRO permanent.

RATIONALE:
There is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

Main Issue: Validity of Search Warrrant (Article III, Section 2, 1987, 1987 Constitution & Rule 126, Sections 3&4 of
Rules of Court).

Requisites of Valid Search Warrant are:

1. Probable Cause is present
2. Such presence is determined personally by the Judge
3. The complainant and the Witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the Judge, in writing
and under oath or affirmation
4. The applicant and the Witnesses testify on facts personally known to them
5. The Warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and things to be seized
a. Present case, the Search Warrant is INVALID because
i. The Trial Court failed to examine personally the complainant and the
other dependents
ii. SP03 Bacolod had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not
licensed to possess the subject firearms
iii. The place to be searched was not described with particularity

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses does are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attached them to the record.
Page 6 of 9
Particularity of the Place to be searched:
The belief to value privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.
The aforementioned premises, did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place and that is Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound. However; it was made of 200 offices / building,
15 plants, 84 staffs houses, airstrip, 3 piers / wharves, and 23 warehouses.

Jurisprudence: People vs CA
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants
had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the Court issuing the warrant.
- It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not delineated in the
warrant
- The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done by the Judge, and only in
the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

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Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano Case Digest
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group
(CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August
6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes
were seized.

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly
an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion
by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive
materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that
the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of
searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described
and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books
and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what
items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize
as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description
of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered
null and void for being too general.

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20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in
connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro
Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old
Intellectual Property Law).
Page 7 of 9
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed
three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court
issued the desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and
seized the items described in the three warrants.

Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized properties, which was
granted by the lower court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the
trial court.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.]

YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.

The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private
respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application for search warrant did not
have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of
piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who was also a witness during the application stated
that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes
taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of
petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not
shown to the court during the application.

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was
necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause
exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or
copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works
to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis
for the issuance of a search warrant.

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Escobedo v. Illinois Case Brief
Statement of the facts:

Escobedo was arrested as a murder suspect and taken down to the police station for questioning. En Route,
Escobedo requested to speak to his lawyer on the way to the station in addition to several other times once at the
station. At this time, Escobedo’s lawyer was present at the police station and asked to speak with Escobedo, however
the request was denied. A second murder suspect, Di Gerlando, was also in custody at the station and implicated
Escobedo as firing the deadly shot. After putting both Escobedo and Di Gerlando in the same room for further
questioning, Escobedo confessed to murdering the victim. At trial Escobedo was found guilty of murder and appealed
to the supreme court of Illinois.

Procedural History:

The state supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision and Escobedo appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

Once a suspect has been taken into police custody for purposes of questioning, if the suspect asks for and is denied
an attorney, and the police have not provided the suspect with the proper Miranda warning, confessions procured from
the interrogation, made after the denial are inadmissible.
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Issue and Holding:

Whether a confession is admissible once the suspect has been taken into custody by the police, asked for counsel
and was denied and received no Miranda warning? No.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court’s judgment.

Reasoning:

The Court held that once the interaction shifts from “investigatory to accusatory –when its focus is on the accused and
its purpose is to elicit a confession — our adversary system begins to operate….” and, under the facts set out in the
present case, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.
When the initial inquiry moves from investigatory to accusatory, the accused must be provided access to his lawyer.
Any confession made during the remainder of the interrogation becomes inadmissible.

Here, the overall investigation began to shift in focus to specifically accusing Escobedo and Di Gerlando as the
suspects. At this point, Escobedo was in custody and requested his lawyer several times. The Court held that such a
police’s refusal violates Escobedo’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and renders the subsequent incriminating
statement inadmissible.

The Court also addressed the concern of the right to counsel attaching pretrial where many feel that the right attaching
pretrial would be devastating to law enforcement since they obtains many confessions at that stage. However, this
very reasoning fortifies the argument that the right to counsel should attach early on in the judicial process to prevent
injustice.

Concurring or Dissenting opinion:

Dissenting (Stewart):

The Court improperly disregards an important fact which distinguishes the present case from the precedent set out in
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Here, the interrogation happened before any formal legal proceedings
occurred. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches where the formal judicial proceedings begin and the criminal
investigation is over.

Dissent (Harlan):

The Majority’s decision “seriously and unjustifiably fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement.”

Dissenting (White):

Here, Escobedo’s knew that he had the right to remain silent. His statements were not compelled by the police and
the Court should continue to use the totality of the circumstances test to guide its decision.

Significance:

This case stressed the importance of permitting the accused to utilize his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to an
attorney once the initial police inquiry shifts from investigatory to accusatory in nature.

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