State AUTHORITY TO PUNISH CRIMES

ART. II, Sec. 5 of the constitution

ART. VI, Sec. 1 of the constitution

US vs. Pablo GR No. L-11676

Ponente: Justice Florentino Torres

Andres Pablo is a policeman of the Municipality of Balanga. On October 21, 1915 by the order of his chief
Jose D. Reyes, went to Barrio Tubo to raid a jueteng game conducted in that place. Before his arrival, the players
have already left the area. However, when he arrived at the place, he seized a tambiolo and a receptacle. He also
found Francisco Dato, Maximo Lalicsi and Antonio Rodrigo.
Despite having seen Maximo and Antonio in the area, he failed to arrest them, as there was no evidence as
to whether the game was played by them. He only arrested Francisco Dato in the process.
In his report to his chief, he stated that he saw the tow Cabecillas, Maxmimo and Antonio escape. On the
basis of this, Chief of Police Jose Reys filed a criminal case against Rodrigo, Malicsi and Dato.
During the trial, Pablo swore in legal form that he did not see Rodrigo and Malicsi during the raid, nor
did not see them run away. This was found to be false and Pablo was charged and convicted of false testimony.
Upon appeal, Pablo contends that Act. No. 1697, which is the basis of his conviction already repealed
Article 318-324 of the Penal Code regarding perjury, based on the recent interpretations of the supreme court.
Further, he asserts that Act No. 1697 was already repealed by the administrative Code and thus, no other penal law
provided for the punishment of the act of false testimony.

Issue: Whether or not Pablo can be convicted of a crime based on Act No. 1697, which has already been repealed?

Decision: Yes, Act No. 1679 did not expressly repeal the provisions of the Penal Coe pertaining to false testimony
and perjury and furthermore, the administrative code likewise did not expressly provide for the repeal of the above
mentioned articles. Considering the fact the crimes like perjury should not go unpunished, it must be conceded that
there must be a pre-existing law that punishes the same.

Doctrine: Penal Laws, unless expressly repealed, shall be considered enforceable and valid, notwithstanding its
application in previous court decisions.

People vs. Santiago GR No. 17584

Poente: Justice Norberto Romualdez

Gergorio Santiago was Charged with the crime of homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of prision correctional.
Santiago assails the above decision, contending that Act No. 2886, which was the basis of his conviction
was valid and unconstitutional since General Order No. 58 which it amended, partake the nature of constitutional
law and that the Phil. Legislature do not have the power to amend it.

Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional?

Decision: No, For practical reasons, the procedures in criminal matter is not incorporation in the constitution but
is left in the hands of the legislature, so that it falls within the realms of statutory Law. The powers of the
territorial legislatures are derived from congress. By act of congress their power extends to all rightful subjects
of legislation not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States, and this includes power to
define and punish crimes. It was from his power that the military government, functioning as a territorial
legislature, established a new rule of procedures in criminal matters by issuing General order No. 58.
The said order therefore cannot be in the nature of constitutional law. This means that the power of the
legislatures to amend it is self-evident.

Doctrine: The powers to define and punish crimes are lodged within the legislature. The constitution need not
specify what particular crimes are punishable. They are part of the states police power.

LIMITATIONS OF STATE AUTHORTITY

Pestigan vs. Angeles GR No. L-64279

Ponente: Justice Ramon Aquino

Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan transported 26 carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur to
Batangas. While passing at Basud, Camarines Norte the carabaos were confiscated by it. Arnulfo Zenarosa and Dr.
Bella Miranda inspite of the permit to transport issued to the petitioners. The basis of the confiscation was
executive order 626-A which was published on the official Gazette two months after the incident.

Issue: Whether or not the Pesigans can recover possession of the confiscated livestock?

Decision: Yes, EO 626-A is a penal statue because of its confiscation and forfeiture provision. As such, it falls
under the publication requirement under ARTICLE 2 of the civil code. Since it was published two months after the
incident, it should not be enforced against the Pesigans.

Doctrine: Circulars and Regulations that contains forfeiture provisions are penal in character and therefore, need
to be published before taking effect.

ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF CRIMINAL LAW GENERALITY:

United States vs. Sweet GR No.448

Ponente: Justice Feltcher Ladd

Defendant Philip Sweet was a member of the US Military who was charged of a crime punishable under the
Penal Code. He was convicted by the Court of First Instance.
The Defendant appealed his conviction, contending that as he was a military officer, and the crime
committed was against a prisoner of war, the nature of the offense is taken out of the Penal Code and therefore,
the military tribunal and not the civil tribunal, should have jurisdiction over the case as provided under Articles
4 and 5 of the Spanish Code of Military Justice.

Issue: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction over the case?

Decision: Yes, The criminal responsibility arose from the infraction of the general penal laws and since no
legislation limits the jurisdiction of the CFI, its jurisdiction is unaffected by the character of the person
charged.

Doctrine: A crime committed in violation of a penal statue is triable under the jurisdiction of the Civil courts
regardless of the nature, character or status of the offender if there is no law limiting the court’s jurisdiction.

Liang vs. People of the Philippines GR No. 125865

Ponente: Justice Consuelo Ynares – Santiago

Petitioner was an economist working for Asian Development Bank. In 1994, he was charged before the trial
court of allegedly uttering defamatory words against his fellow worker. After posting the required bail, he was
releasing. The next day, the court received an office of Protocal from DFA stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process by virtue of the agreement of ADB and the government. Thereafter, the judge dismissed
the case without giving notice to the prosecution.
The METC ruling was reversed by the RTG upon prosecution’s motion, thereby enforcing the warrant of arrest
previously issued by METC. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is immune from suit?

Decisin: No, First, the mere Innovation of immunity does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.
There has to be evidentiary basis.
Second, in the agreement entered into by the government and ADB, immunity only extended to official
capacity. It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner’s case falls within that ambit.
Third, slandering a person cannot be covered by immunity since our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime in the name of official duty.
Fourth, Under the Vienna Ornvention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic gent enjoys immunity from suit
except in case of actions relating to any professional or commercial activity of the diplomatic agent outside his
official functions.

Doctrine: 1. Immunity of a diplomatic agent must be proved by evidentiary rules.

2. Immunity of a diplomatic agent does not extend to acts estone outside his official function.

Minucher vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 142396

Ponente:Justice Jose Vitug

Petitioner Khosrow Minucher met respondent Arthur Sealzo in 1986. During their first meeting, respondent
expressed his interest in buying caviar as it was one of petitioner’s business. Petitioner learned that the
respondent was working in the US Embassy so he requested the latter to obtain a US Visa for his wife.
On the afternoon of May 27, 1986, Arthur Scalzo went into petitioner’s house where the latter handed him
$2000 as payment for the visa application of his wife. Respondent told him that he will be leaving the Philippines
soon so he requested petitioner to go down the house and come along with him so he could meet respondent’s causing
waiting in the cab outside. Upon reaching the cab, an American jumped out with a high-powered rifle. Together with
some 40-50 police and military companions, they arrested Minucher.
Minucher was subsequently charged for violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 but he was
later acquitted. For his besmirched reputation resulting from the arrest, petitioner filed a civil case for
damages against Arthur Sealzo.
In his defense, Scalzo moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that since the action is personal in
nature, the court does not have jurisdiction over him as he is not a Filipino Citizen. He further asserted that he
is immune from suit as a diplomatic agent of the US Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance
of foreigners who are suspected drug dealers responsible for bringing drugs into the United States. To bolster his
claiming, he presented documents Showing such capacity conferred upon him.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is Immune from suit.

Decision: Yes, while diplomatic exchanges between the Philippines and United States the certifications presented as
well as the participation of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the buy bust operation are inadequate his
diplomatic status, it is evident from these acts that the Philippine Government gave imprimatur to Scalzo’s
activities as an agent of the US Drug Enforcement Agency. He was tasked to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
dealers and would then report to the local authorities who will then make the arrest.
In acting as poser-lawyer, and a witness against Minucher, he is acting within his official duty or
function and immunity from suit is therefore in order.

Doctrine: A foreign agent, operating in a territory is immune from suit as long as he is acting within the
directives of the sending state. While consent of the host state is necessary, its absence cannot affect the
principle of immunity, if at the very least, it gave imprimatur to the acts done by the foreign agent.

United States vs. Ah Sing GR No. L-13005

Ponente: Justice George Malcolm

Ah Sing, a Chinese national, was employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang, a Vessel of foreign
registry. The ship arrived at the port of Cebu from Saigon. The defendant was caught possessing eight cans of
opium, which he bought from Saigon. It was hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer’s engine.
The trial court convicted Ah Sing of illegal importation of Opium.
Ah sing appealed the judgment, contending that in an earlier case of Look Chaw, the possession of
prohibited thing in this island, aboard a foreign vessel, does not constitute a crime tribal by the court of this
country.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court had the jurisdiction to try the case.
Decision: Yes, There is a marked difference between the Look Chaw case and the case at bar for in the favor, the
vessel was in transit. Importation is not the making entry of goods at the customs house but merely brining them
into port. Applied in the Opium Law, any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug when the drug is
found under the person’s control on a vessel coming from a foreign country.

Doctrine: The principle of territorially does not apply when the foreign vessel is not in transit and whe the crime
commited is importation of prohibited things.

Miquiabas vs. Commanding General GR No. L-1988

Ponente: Chief Justice Manuel Moran

Petitioner Jesus Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the US Army. He was charged
with disposing things belonging to the US Army, in violation of the US Articles of War. He was placed under court
martial and was sentenced to an imprisonment of 15 years.
Petitioner contends that such conviction was erroneous, asserting that regular courts have jurisdiction
over his case.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s conviction under court martial is proper.

Decision: No, Under the US-RP Military Base Agreement, only members of the US Military can be subjected to courts-
martial. Petitioner, being a civilian employee cannot be considered as a member of the US Armed Forces.

Doctrine: The Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within it
territory, but may by treaty or agreement, consent that other foreign nations shall exercise jurisdiction over
certain offenses committed within certain portions of its territory. The treaty shall only be applicable to those
persons specified therein.

PROSPECTIVITY

Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons GR No. L-30026

Ponente: Justice Enrique Fernando

Herein petitioner are charged and convicted with the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
After 13 years of incarceration, the Supreme Court. In the case of People vs. Hernandez, and affirmed in
the case of People vs. Lava, ruled that information’s of rebellion completed with murder is not warranted.
By virtue of such pronouncement, petitioners averred that they have already served the maximum penalty and
filed a petition for habeas corpus fro their release. In their petition they stressed that the t are convicted in
the very same law which convicted Hernandez and Lava but they have already been released. To allow them to suffer
life imprisonment is contrary to the mandate of equal protection.
They also pointed out that in People vs Lava, the rebel leaders, charged with the same offense, have been
freed, while them who are mere followers are made to languish in jail.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus will prosper.

Decision: Yes, Petitioners’ continued incarceration after the twelve-year period set as maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with the controlling doctrine, when other similarly convicted have been freed, is
violate of the equal protection laws under the constitution.
Ruling otherwise would mean that persons convicted with similar offense will be made to suffer different
penalties.
Being favorable to the accused, the doctrine in Hernandez is given retroactive effect in pursuance to
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. As a principle expressed in Director vs. Director of Prisons, the only means
of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused in through the writ habeas corpus.

Doctrine: Habeas Corpus is the remedy to give effect to the retroactivity of penal provisions and judgments in
favor of the accused.

Schneckenburger vs. Moran GR No. L-44896

Ponente: Justice Jose Abad Santos

Petitioner was an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila. He was duly accredited on June 11, 1934. He was
subsequently charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the court of fiest instance of
Manila.
He objected to the jurisdiction of the CFI on the ground that under the constitution of the United States,
the US Supreme Court has jurisdiction over his case and that even under the Constitution of the Philippines,
jurisdiction over such cases similar to his exclusively lodged in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try his case.

Decision: Yes, The constitution of the United States is no longer applicable by Virtue of the enactment of the 1935
Philippine Constitution.
The Original jurisdiction at the time of the enactment of the Philippine Constitution possessed by the
Supreme Court was derived from Sec. 17 of Act No. 136, which provides that the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction over cases regarding prohibition and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure.
Jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition was conferred to the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon the CFI
the original jurisdiction in all criminal cases imposable with a penalty of more than six months imprisonment. Such
jurisdiction includes the trial of criminal actions against consuls.
By virtue of Article XV, Section 2 of the constitution, all laws of the Philippines in force at the time of
the adoption of the constitution shall remain in force unless consistent with the constitution of until annulled,
amended, altered, modified or repealed.
There being no such inconsistency, the law providing for the jurisdiction of criminal cases shall remain
operative, unless otherwise altered, amended, modified or repealed.
Doctrine: Penal laws adopted before the constitution are operative unless otherwise amended, altered, modified or
repealed by succeeding laws.

CONSTRACTION OF PENAL LAWS

People vs. Comadre GR No. 153559

Per Curiam

On the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbaniong, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo
Eugenio were having a drinking spree at the house of Robert’s father.
As the drinking spree went on, Robert and the three others noticed appellants Antoino Comrade, George
Comadine and Danilo Lozano Walking. The three stopped in front of the house and while his companions looked on,
Antonio suddenly lobbed an object on the roof of the Terrance which out to be a hand grenade. It exploded, causing
the death of Robert and the injuries of the three others.
An appellant were found guilty of murder and was sentenced to cleath. Hence, this automatic reviews by the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction is proper.

Decision: No, as with regards to appellants George Comrade and Danilo Lozano. Their presences in the crime scene
are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the
crime.
On the other hand, the conviction of Antonio Comrade must be affirmed. It is worthy to note that aside from
treachery, the use of explosives was also alleged in the complaint.
While RA 8294 provides that the use of explosives becomes only an aggravating circumstance when a person is
killed by the use thereof, such is not applicable in this case.
A careful reading of Sec. 3 of PD 4866, as amended by RA 8294. Would reveal that what is made aggravating is
used of illegally possessed, manufactured, dispensed, or acquired explosive. The mere use is not.
Since it wasn’t proven by the prosecution that the explosive was unlawfully obtained, the conviction of murder
still stands and Antonio cannot benefits from RA 8294.

Doctrine: Before an accused can benefit from a penal law, it must first be proved or established that he is
entitled to benefit.

People vs. Pimentel GR No. 100210

Ponente: Justice Antonio Martinez

Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion
possession.
He was charged will illegal possession of
quash the information, on the ground that illegal
otherwise, a separate prosecution will tantamount
under RA 1700. Almost 7 years after, he was found in his
firearms under PD 1866. Antonio Tujan then filed a motion to
possession of firearms should be deemed absorbed in subversion
to double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not Antonio Tujan can be convicted of the two separate crimes.

Decision: Yes, what is punished under PD 1866 is the possession of unlicensed firearms. This is clear from the
title of the law itself. However, because of the enactment of RA 7636 which repealed RA1700, the crime of
subversion must be obliterated, and the charge should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearms.

Doctrine: A total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with
violation of the old law prior to the repeal.

NULLUM CRIMEN, NULLA ROENA SINE LEISE

Bernando vs. People GR No. L-62114

Ponente: Justice Lorenz Relova

A case of forcible entry was filed against petitioners for occupying a Riceland and constructing a house
thereon in violation of PD 772.
The petitioners lot in all inferior courts, hence this petition.
Petitioners submit that PD 772 applies only to urban communities and not to agricultural lands.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s conviction was proper.

Decision: No, In the case of People vs. Echars PD 772 applies only to urban lots and not to pasture lands.

Doctrine: No person should be bought. Within the terms of a penal statue who is not clearly within them.

ARTCILE 2

United States vs. Look Chaw GR No. L-5887

Poente: Chief Justice Cayetano Arellans

Look Chaw is a crew member of the steamship Errol. It had a stopover in the port of Cebu from Hong Kong and
is bound for Mexico. When the ship landed in Cebu, defendant sold some Opium.
Upon verification information, port and internal revenue authorities boarded the vessel and seized several
sacks and can of Opium all of which belongs to the defendant.
He was subsequently changed for importation of opium but he contends that the steamship being transit and
being of foreign registry, our courts do not have jurisdiction to try his case.

Issue: Whether or not court have jurisdiction to try defendants case.

Decision: Yes, Our courts have and can take organizance and jurisdiction of the case since although the vessel was
foreign and in transit, the opium, whose use is prohibited within Philippine Islands, is landed upon its soil.
Doctrine: When a prohibited article is landed upon the Philippine soil from a vessel of foreign registry, our
courts will have jurisdiction to try the case, even if the vessel is to transit.

People vs. Wong Cheng GR No. L-18924

Ponente: Justice Norberto Romualdez

Defendant Wong Cheng was accused of smoking opium while on board the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shoes of the city.
Defendant asserts that our courts do not have the jurisdiction to try the case.

Issue: Whether or not defendant’s case is triable by our courts.

Decision: Yes, the primary object of the opium law is to protect the inhabitations against its effects entailed by
the use of the said drug. Its mere possession inside a foreign ship without being used does not constitute public
disturbance which the law contemplates avoiding.
However, to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of public order. To allow smoking of opium in foreign vessel while at anchor in our territorial seas is
subversive to public order since it may invite foreign ships to come to our territorial sea and solicit people to
came and smoke opium inside.

Doctrine: Breach of Public Order committed inside a foreign vessel while in anchor in our territorial sea, is
triable by our courts.

ARTICLE 3

People vs. Temblor GR No. L-60884

Ponente: Justice Carolina Griño – Aquino

At about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, the victim Julius Cagampang, his wife and their two
children, were conversing in their store when accused Vicente Temblor arrived and asked to buy some cigarettes.
Suddenly, gunfire was heard and Cagampang’s wife saw him wounded and bleeding. The accused asked her to
take out her husband’s firearm. She handed out the suitcase containing the firearm to the accused, who later fled.
He was eventually captured and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The accused
appealed the decision, contending that the prosecution failed to prove his motive in killing the victim.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction was proper.

Decision: Yes, Defendant’s knowledge that the victim possess a firearm is a motive itself, considering that the
defendant was a member of the NBA and killings are perpetrated by the NPA for the purpose of acquiring more arms
and ammunitions.
Moreover, motive is not essential when the culprit is positively identified.

Doctrine: Motive is not essential to the conviction, especially when the culprit is positively identified.