Corpus v. Sto. Tomas ......................
48 When God created man, He made him in the likeness of
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Marriage as a Special Contract
Silverio v. Republic ......................... 1
Marriage as a Social Institution
Essential Requisites of Marriage
Silverio v. Republic ......................... 1
Formal Requisites of Marriage
Authority of Solemnizing Officer
Navarro v. Damagtoy ........................ 6
A.O. No. 125-2007 .......................... 7
Valid Marriage License
Alcantara v. Alcantara & CA ............... 10
Republic v. CA & Castro ................... 13
Sevilla v. Cardenas ....................... 15
Sec. 15, RA 10354 ......................... 19
Marriage Ceremony
Morigo v. People .......................... 20
Ronulo v. People .......................... 23
Effect of Defect in the Essential Requisites of
Marriage
Republic v. Albios ........................ 26
Effect of Defect in the Formal Requisites of
Marriage
Casco v. Palaypayon ....................... 29
Effect of Absence of Certificate of Legal
Capacity
Garcia-Recio v. Recio ..................... 36
Proof of Marriage
Vda. De Avenido v. Avenido ................ 40
Presumption of Marriage
Mariategui v. CA .......................... 43
Art. 26 of Family Code
Republic v. Orbecido ...................... 46
Fujiki v. Marinay ......................... 52
Republic v. Manalo ........................ 59
Retroactive application of Art. 26
San Luis v. San Luis ...................... 68
Article 34
Rationale
Ninal v. Bayadog .......................... 73
Requisites for Application
Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez .................. 76
Falsity of Affidavit of Cohabitation
Republic v. Dayot ........................... 78
Santiago v. People .......................... 84
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala
and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo.
"Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the
voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All
of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other
was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong)
and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In
particular, does the law recognize the changes made by
a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully
petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the
birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed
as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar
of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in
the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio"
in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate).
His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that
is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body,
he consulted several doctors in the United States. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when
he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon
in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel
Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
1
An order setting the case for initial hearing was
published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil
registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional
requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also
presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé,
Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in
favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade
any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose
of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting
the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual
[re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be
trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and
should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury
[or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary,
granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause
or ground to deny the present petition despite due
notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila
to change the entries appearing in the Certificate
of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a
decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the
trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no
law allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment
through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the
Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his
name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground
for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by
the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to
evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely
for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the
physical features of a female, he became entitled to the
civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048
(Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests
the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of
first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down
the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum,
the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of
first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change
of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or
Nickname. – The petition for change of first name
or nickname may be allowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that
first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
2
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first
name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his
first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or
civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it
prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not
within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition
should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where
his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had
no merit since the use of his true and official name
does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth
Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his
birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412
of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this
provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
register.23 Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground
typographical error" is:
of sex reassignment.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove
Act, the following terms shall mean:
the faults or error from" while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind
xxx xxx xxx or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
to a mistake committed in the performance of necessary.
clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil
register that is harmless and innocuous, such Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in
as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth the civil registry of certain acts (such as
or the like, which is visible to the eyes or legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children
obvious to the understanding, and can be and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
corrected or changed only by reference to other naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as
existing record or records: Provided, legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations
however, That no correction must involve the of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss
change of nationality, age, status or sex of or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) determination of filiation and changes of name). These
acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is
typographical error. It is a substantial change for not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law,
of Court. expressly or impliedly.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality
Code:24 and his family membership.27
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees The status of a person in law includes all his
concerning the civil status of persons shall be personal qualities and relations, more or less
recorded in the civil register. permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable
at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
civil register: comprehensive term status… include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality,
capacity to have rights in general, family
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal relations, and its various aspects, such as
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
judgments declaring marriages void from the marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and
judicial determination of filiation; (15) family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
changes of name. 413 of the Civil Code provides:
3
 ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law)
provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of
births. – The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register.
Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the
local civil registrar not later than thirty days
after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of
the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned
shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of
infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of
the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents;
(e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such
other data as may be required in the regulations
to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined
at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be
given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence
of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex,"
"male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law
and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all
other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is
defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the
distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the
sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the
sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female"
in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words
that are employed in a statute which had at the time a
well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in
that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil
Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as
used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded
in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition
for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First
Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition
was in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would
cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
First, even the trial court itself found that the
petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his
eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage,
one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner
will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship
in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates
that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty
of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines
becomes particularly important in this case where the
claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions
for change of first name and for correction or change of
entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed,
what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his
name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has
to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to
write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court
has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word
of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also
entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions
of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
4
14
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name"
refers to a name or nickname given to a person
which may consist of one or more names in
addition to the middle names and last names.
Thus, the term "first name" will be used here to
refer both to first name and nickname.
15 The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048
provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil
Registrar General. – xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city
or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general, the petitioner may either
appeal the decision to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate
petition with the proper court.
16 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and
Where. – Any person having direct and personal
interest in the correction of a clerical or
typographical error in an entry and/or change of
first name or nickname in the civil register may
file, in person, a verified petition with the
local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be
corrected or changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to
another place in the country and it would not be
practical for such party, in terms of
transportation expenses, time and effort to
appear in person before the local civil registrar
keeping the documents to be corrected or changed,
the petition may be filed, in person, with the
local civil registrar of the place where the
interested party is presently residing or
domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars
concerned will then communicate to facilitate
the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently
residing or domiciled in foreign countries may
file their petition, in person, with the nearest
Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal
civil registrar or the consul general shall be
processed in accordance with this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical
errors and/or change of first names or nicknames
may be availed of only once.
17 SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the
Petition. – The petition shall be in the form of
an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any
person authorized by the law to administer oaths.
The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to
establish the merits of the petition and shall
show affirmatively that the petitioner is
competent to testify to the matters stated. The
petitioner shall state the particular erroneous
entry or entries, which are sought to be
corrected and/or the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the
following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the
certificate or of the page of the
registry book containing the entry or
entries sought to be corrected or
changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private
documents showing the correct entry or
entries upon which the correction or
change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner
or the city or municipal civil registrar
or the consul general may consider
relevant and necessary for the approval
of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the
petition shall likewise be supported with the
documents mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be
published at least once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall
submit a certification from the appropriate law
enforcement agencies that he has no pending case
or no criminal record.
29 This, of course, should be taken in
conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the
Civil Code which authorizes the recording of
acts, events and judicial decrees or the
correction or change of errors including those
that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such
cases, the entries in the certificates of birth
are not be corrected or changed. The decision of A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
the court granting the petition shall be
annotated in the certificates of birth and shall RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
form part of the civil register in the Office of vs.
the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
of Manila, supra note 24)
30 The error pertains to one where the birth
ROMERO, J.:
attendant writes "male" or "female" but the
genitals of the child are that of the opposite
sex. The complainant in this administrative case is the
31
Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
man-made. The body that he inhabits is a male Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two
body in all aspects other than what the specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
physicians have supplied. Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge
solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is
merely separated from his first wife.
5
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-
Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at
the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area
of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located
some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court
Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office
and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used
by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly
concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a
private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed
for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon
v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge
seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated
from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other
for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage
between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate
Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states
that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the
case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for
investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud
on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently
proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained
of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice
and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove
the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between
Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's
civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration,
the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge.
He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio
A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent
judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their
affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda
in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida
Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia,
Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of
for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the
presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the
aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for
him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not
agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Articles
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in
this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage
subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the
previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse
is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the
joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the
beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling
under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a
marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly
in the chambers the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of
the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the
case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases
of marriages contracted on the point of death or
in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of
this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions
as the justification for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted
provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request
of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del
Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario. 4
6
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying
this provision is the authority of the solemnizing
judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer."
Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local
ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by
his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long
as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing
Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge
again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in
gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude
that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack
of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not
experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and
applying the law. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect
them to know and apply the law
intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests
on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors
committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for
which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in
an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is
considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its
Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that
one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous
union and therefore void, and the other lacked the
necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court
adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be
more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a
deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007
GUIDELINES ON THE SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE BY THE
MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
WHEREAS, marriage under the Constitution, is an
inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State (Section 2,
Article XV, 1987 Constitution);
WHEREAS, the Family Code likewise provides that the
nature, consequences and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to any stipulation
(Article 1, Family Code);
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has declared that the State
has surrounded marriage with safeguards to “monitor its
purity, continuity and permanence”;1
WHEREAS, for the above purposes, there is a need to lay
down rules to enable solemnizing authorities of the
Judiciary to secure and safeguard the sanctity of
marriage as a social institution;
NOW, THEREFORE, the following Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary are hereby promulgated:
A. Justices of the Supreme Court and other appellate
courts and Judges of the Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts
Section 1. Authority of solemnizing officer. — a.
Incumbent Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals have
authority to solemnize marriages in any part of the
Philippines, regardless of the venue, provided the
requisites of the law are complied with;2 and
b. Judges of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts have authority to solemnize marriages within the
court’s jurisdiction.3
Sec. 2. Raffle of requests for solemnization of
marriages in multiple-sala courts. — Requests for
solemnization of marriages submitted to first and second
level courts in stations with two or more branches shall
be governed by the rules and procedures in the raffle of
cases prescribed by existing resolutions and issuances.
Raffle of requests shall be effected upon payment of the
appropriate legal fees.
Sec. 3. Venue of marriage ceremony solemnized by Judges.
— As a general rule, a marriage shall be solemnized
publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court
except in the following instances:
a. A marriage contracted at the point of death or
solemnized in a remote place under Article 29 of the
Family Code; or
b. A marriage where both parties submit a written request
to the solemnizing officer that the marriage be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to this effect.
Sec. 4. Duties of solemnizing officer before the
performance of marriage ceremony. — Before performing
the marriage ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the parties appear personally and are the
same contracting parties to the marriage;
b. Personally interview the contracting parties and
examine the documents submitted to ascertain if there is
compliance with the essential and formal requisites of
marriage under the Family Code; and
7
c. Personally examine the marriage license presented,
unless a marriage license is not required under the
relevant provisions of the Family Code, to determine the
authenticity, completeness and validity of the said
license;
In the event that either or both of the contracting
parties be citizens of a foreign country, the
solemnizing officer shall also examine the certificate
of legal capacity to contract marriage issued by the
respective diplomatic or consular officials and attached
to the marriage license.
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the
solemnization of the marriage in legal ratification of
cohabitation. — In the case of a marriage effecting legal
ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer
shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties
to determine their qualifications to marry; (b)
personally examine the affidavit of the contracting
parties as to the fact of having lived together as
husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the
absence of any legal impediments to marry each other;
and (c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance
with (a) and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Sec. 6. Duty of solemnizing officer during the
solemnization of the marriage.– The solemnizing officer
shall require the contracting parties to personally
declare before him and in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age that the said parties take
each other as husband and wife.
Sec. 7. Duties of solemnizing officer after
solemnization of the marriage. — After performing the
marriage ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the marriage certificate is properly
accomplished and has the complete entries, i.e., (1) the
declaration that the contracting parties take each other
as husband and wife; (2) the true and correct information
and statements required under Article 22 of the Family
Code; (3) it is signed by the contracting parties and
their witnesses; and (4) it is attested by him;
b. See to it that the marriage is properly documented in
accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code, as
follows:
(1) By furnishing either of the contracting parties with
the original of the marriage certificate referred to in
Article 6 of the Family Code;
(2) By transmitting the duplicate and triplicate copies
of the marriage certificate not later than fifteen (15)
days after the marriage to the local civil registrar of
the place where the marriage was solemnized; and
(3) By retaining in the court’s files (1) the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, (2) the
original of the marriage license, and, in proper cases,
(3) the affidavit of the contracting parties regarding
the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than
the Justice’s/judge’s chambers or in open court.
Sec. 8. Other duties of solemnizing officer after the
solemnization of the marriage where marriage license is
not required. — In cases of marriage in articulo mortis
or a marriage in a remote or distant area referred to
under Articles 27 and 28, respectively, of the Family
Code, the solemnizing officer shall prepare an affidavit
stating the following:
(a) that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis
or that the residence of either party, specifying the
barrio or barangay, is so located that there are no means
of transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar;
(b) that the necessary steps were taken to ascertain the
ages and relationship of the contracting parties; and
(c) that there are no legal impediments to the marriage.
The solemnizing officer (a) shall execute the affidavit
before the local civil registrar or any other person
legally authorized to administer oaths; and (b) shall
file or send the original of the affidavit, together
with a legible copy of the marriage contract, to the
local civil registrar of the municipality where it was
performed within the period of thirty [30] days after
the performance of the marriage.
Sec. 9. Recording of marriages solemnized and
safekeeping of documents. — a. The solemnizing officer
shall cause to be kept in the court a record book of all
marriages solemnized. Marriages conducted shall be
entered sequentially and each entry shall set forth the
names of the contracting parties, their respective
nationalities and current actual places of residence,
the date of marriage and the date of the marriage
license.
b. The solemnizing officer shall cause to be filed in
the court the quadruplicate copy of the marriage
certificate, the original of the marriage license, the
certificate of legal capacity when one or both parties
are foreigners or a copy thereof, and, when applicable,
the affidavit of the contracting parties regarding the
request for change in the venue for the marriage. All
documents pertaining to a marriage shall be kept in one
file which file shall be properly labeled, catalogued
and their integrity and safety secured.
B. Judges of the Shari’a District Courts and Shari’a
Circuit Courts
Sec. 10. Authority to Solemnize Marriages. — a.
Incumbent Judges of the Shari’a District Courts and
Shari’a Circuit Courts and any person designated by the
judge, should the proper wali (guardian for marriage)
refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the
solemnization, shall have authority to solemnize
marriages within the court’s jurisdiction (Article 18,
Code of Muslim Personal Laws).
Sec. 11. Venue of the Marriage Ceremony. — The marriage
shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Shari’a judge, office of the District or Circuit
Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any
other suitable place agreed upon by the parties (Article
19, Code of Muslim Personal Laws).
Sec. 12. Marriages among Muslims without marriage
license. — Marriages among Muslims may be performed
validly without the necessity of a marriage license,
provided that they are solemnized in accordance with
their customs, rites or practices. (Article 33, Family
Code).
Sec. 13. Duties of the solemnizing officer before the
marriage ceremony. — Before performing the marriage
ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the parties appearing personally before
him are the same contracting parties to the marriage to
be solemnized; and
b. Personally interview the contracting parties to
satisfy himself that the essential requisites for the
marriage prescribed by Article 15, Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, are present.
Sec. 14. Other duties of the solemnizing officer before
the marriage ceremony. –In case where one of the
contracting parties is a female who though less than
fifteen but not below twelve years of age has attained
puberty, the solemnizing officer shall check whether or
not, upon petition of a proper wali, an order has been
issued by a judge of the Shari’a District Court for the
solemnization of the marriage (Article 16, Code of
Muslim Personal Laws).
8
Sec. 15. Duty of the solemnizing officer during the
marriage
ceremony. –The solemnizing officer shall ensure that the
ijab (offer) and the qabul (acceptance) in marriage are
(a) declared publicly in his presence and of two
competent witnesses; (b) set forth in an instrument (in
triplicate) signed or marked by the contracting parties
and the said witnesses; and that the declaration is
attested by him (Article 17, Code of Muslim Personal
Laws).
Sec. 16. Duty of the solemnizing officer after the
marriage ceremony. — The solemnizing officer shall (a)
give one copy of the declaration to the contracting
parties; (b) sent another copy of the declaration to the
Circuit Registrar; and (c) keep the third copy (Article
17, Code of Muslim Personal Laws).
C. Miscellaneous Common Provisions
Sec. 17. Cases not covered by the Guidelines. — In all
other cases
not covered by the Guidelines, the solemnizing officer
shall comply and act in accordance with the requirements
prescribed by the relevant provisions of the Family
Code, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, and Sections 37-45, Republic Act No. 3631
or the Marriage Law Act of 1929.
Sec. 18. Fees for the Solemnization of Marriages. — For
the performance of marriage ceremony and issuance of
marriage certificate and subject further to the
provisions of AM No. 04-2-04-SC (16 August 2004) the
legal fees in the following amounts shall be collected:
(a) For marriages solemnized by Justices of the Supreme
Court and other appellate courts – Three hundred
(P300.00) pesos;
(b) For marriages solemnized by Judges of the Regional
Trial Courts and Shari’a District Courts – Three hundred
(P300.00) pesos; and
(c) For marriages solemnized by Judges of the
Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts; Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Shari’a
Circuit Courts – Three hundred (P300.00) pesos.
All fees collected for the solemnization of marriage
shall accrue to
the Judiciary Development Fund.
Sec. 19. Payment of legal fees in Philippine legal
tender. — All fees shall be paid in Philippine currency
and such fees collected shall be properly officially
receipted.
Sec. 20. Unauthorized demand for and receipt of marriage
solemnization fees. — The demand for or solicitation,
collection or receipt of fees for the solemnization of
any marriage in excess of the amounts stated herein shall
be considered a violation of these Guidelines and shall
subject the solemnizing authority to administrative
disciplinary measures.4
Sec. 21. Facilitation of marriage ceremony. — Any judge
or employee of the court who, alone or with the
connivance of other court personnel or third persons not
employed by the court, intervenes so that the marriage
of contracting parties is facilitated or performed
despite lack of or without the necessary supporting
documents, or performs other acts that tends to cause G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007
the solemnization of the marriage with undue haste shall
be subjected to appropriate administrative disciplinary
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
proceedings.
vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF
Sec.22. Reporting of marriages solemnized. –All APPEALS, Respondents.
marriages solemnized shall be duly entered and indicated
in the monthly report of cases to be accomplished by the
solemnizing officer. D E C I S I O N
Sec.23. Posting of the Guidelines. –All Executive CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Judges/Presiding Judges shall post copies of these
Guidelines (a) in conspicuous places in their respective Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
Halls of Justice or courthouses; and (b) on the bulletin filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the
board of each court at the entrance to the courtroom. Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and
Sec.24. Violations of the Guidelines. — Violations of affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
any of the provisions of the Guidelines shall be ground of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325
for the appropriate administrative disciplinary dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for
proceedings. annulment of marriage.
Sec. 25. – Repealing clause. — The provisions of The antecedent facts are:
administrative orders, circulars and other issuances of
the Supreme Court inconsistent herewith are deemed A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by
amended or revoked. petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent,
Sec. 26. Effectivity. –These Guidelines shall take without securing the required marriage license, went to
effect immediately. the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met
a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before
August 9, 2007. a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel
of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got married on the same day,
8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through
another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit
Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage
was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a
9
marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured
in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract,
is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona,
and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license
with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14
October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose
Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived
separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due
hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage
void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of
marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license
issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office
of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to
petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to
their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October
1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara
on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom
he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent
prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be
denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143,
rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered
follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the
sum of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) per
month as support for their two (2) children on
the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of
the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and
petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome
the presumption. Moreover, the parties’ marriage
contract being a public document is a prima facie proof
of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the
following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it ruled that the Petition
for Annulment has no legal and factual basis
despite the evidence on record that there was no
marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it gave weight to the
Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact
that the same was not identified and offered as
evidence during the trial, and was not the
Marriage license number appearing on the face of
the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it failed to apply the
ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the
case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No.
127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and
promote the substantial rights of the party
as litigants.14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his
marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was
no marriage license because he and respondent just went
to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who
arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took place
at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR
Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the
marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to
Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was
issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a
resident of the place. The certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be
given weight because the certification states that
"Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but
their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for
their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on
8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine its
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law
applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is
the State’s demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage
license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases
where the court considered the absence of a marriage
license as a ground for considering the marriage void
are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the
Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the
effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to
the parties. The Court held that the certification of
"due search and inability to find" a record or entry as
to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Based on said certification, the Court held that there
is absence of a marriage license that would render the
marriage void ab initio.
10
In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage
of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal
that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. The court held that the certification issued by
the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having
been solemnized without the necessary marriage license
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was
issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held
that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was
indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a
marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this
case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local
civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification
moreover is precise in that it specifically identified
the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to
the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino
L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of
Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara
and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of
Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be
the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at
official business.27 The presumption of regularity of his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a
presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. faith.34
Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to
ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing
an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
the same marriage license. There is no claim that he
should be in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly,
went through the second wedding ceremony in church under
apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that
duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed
a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona,
without nary a whimper on the part of the
Cavite.29
petitioner.lavvphi1
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and
value of the marriage license, claims that neither he
respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit
nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even
Church the marriage contract executed during the
then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to
previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall.
annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of
This is confirmed in petitioner’s testimony as follows—
a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of WITNESS
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day
period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the
marriage.30 An irregularity in any of the formal necessary document prior to the wedding.
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity COURT
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31
What particular document did the church asked you to
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit
marriage license number in the certification of the church.
Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the
marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133,
WITNESS
while the marriage contract states that the marriage
license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once
more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not I don’t remember your honor.
impossible to assume that the same is a mere a
typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the
marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers COURT
0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either
as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage
from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance License?
of said marriage license to the parties.
WITNESS
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come
with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was
not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration I think they asked us for documents and I said we have
which he now insists took place without the requisite already a Marriage Contract and I don’t know if it is
marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your
marriage took place because he "initiated honor.
it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a
mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and
COURT
voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
11

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de
Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage
Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the
same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued
which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable
and a willing participant to all that took place at that
time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of
their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they
appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain
Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the
solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate
whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license
has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said
official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of
law.38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is
always in favor of the validity of the marriage.39 Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity
of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is
Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City,
25
dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Article 70 of the Civil Code, now Article 25
petitioner. Family Code, provides:
Footnotes The local civil registrar concerned shall
enter all applications for marriage
13 licenses filed with him in a register
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. –
book strictly in the order in which the
Entries in official records made in the
same shall be received. He shall enter in
performance of his duty by a public officer of
said register the names of the
the Philippines, or by a person in the
applicants, the dates on which the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
marriage license was issued, and such
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
other data as may be necessary.
stated.
27 Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – x x x
18(3) Those solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character. (m) That official duty has been regularly
performed. (Rule 131, Rules of Court.)
19Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title,
but not those under article 75, no marriage shall
be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.
20
Now Article 3 of the Family Code.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage
are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in
the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place
with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they
take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
12

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for
private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by
private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F.
Cardenas.1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no
marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to
file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in
default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F.
Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City.
The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended
to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement
of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract
itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued in the name of the contracting parties on June
24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband
and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro
discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to
live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only
for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was
adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent
Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow
her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted
a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the
possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's
efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage
license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a
certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS
and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in
the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an
alleged (s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182
allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970
cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does
not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil
registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order
to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any
application therefor. She affixed her signature only on
the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the
above certification was inadequate to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the
celebration of the marriage between the parties. It
ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to
locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show
that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to
respondent appellate court. She insisted that the
certification from the local civil registrar
sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license.
of As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed
the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the
marriage between the contracting parties null and void
and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the
subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that
respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the
certification issued by the civil registrar that
marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record
adequately proved that no such license was ever issued.
Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying
on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of
private respondent Castro that she had no part in the
procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner
thus insists that the certification and the
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are
insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption
regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage
between the parties as null and void, respondent
appellate court disregarded the presumption that the
solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly
performed his duties when he attested in the marriage
contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly
presented to him before the solemnization of the subject
marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed
jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether
or not the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent are sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June
24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the
New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall
be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by
a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license
would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local
civil registrar of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that marriage license no.
13
3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to
prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such
certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A
written statement signed by an officer
having custody of an official record or
by his deputy, that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of
his office, accompanied by a certificate
as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the
date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find"
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and
inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office
did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the
contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not
a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any
other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due
to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be
remembered that the subject marriage was a civil
ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a
"secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was
initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro
testified during the trial cannot be held against her.
Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with
notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition.
Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same.
For failure to answer, he was properly declared in
default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record
to show that there was collusion between private
respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the
appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a
marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed,
a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by
the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by
Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the
case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent Castro sufficiently established
the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no
showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the
reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O.
Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed
upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's
father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the
City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain
Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the
Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused
him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the
said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never
applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage
to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage
license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing
officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of
Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly
on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on
31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon
City. Both marriages were registered with the local
civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics
Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage
license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime]
testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev.
Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at
the city hall in Manila where they executed a
Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A
certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged,
was an aide of defendant's father accompanied
them, and who, together with another person,
stood as witness to the civil wedding. That
although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly
14
issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was
fictitious for he never applied for any marriage
license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made
by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola,
with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a
Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E")
was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license
no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On
May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed,
this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan
Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church
in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they
executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F")
with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used
and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the
church wedding and reception were jointly shared
by his and defendant's parents. After the church
wedding, he and defendant resided in his house
at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose
Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents
continued to support him financially, he and
defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his
medical studies. Eventually, their marital
relationship turned bad because it became
difficult for him to be married he being a
medical student at that time. They started living
apart in 1976, but they underwent family
counseling before they eventually separated in
1978. It was during this time when defendant's
second son was born whose paternity plaintiff
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981
and later secured a judicial separation of their
conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the
plaintiff, himself manifested that when his
service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the
latter narrated to him the circumstances of his
marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of
Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed
marriage license was obtained and with the Church
of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the
religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His
request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"),
March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh.
"M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent
to and received by the Civil Registrar of San
Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"),
and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20,
1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon
his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church
issued him a certified copy of the marriage
contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F")
and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11,
1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a
"purely religious ceremony, having been civilly
married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila,
under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San
Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of
the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994
and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad,
Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified
that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have
been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she
and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship
after they met and were introduced to each other
in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by
her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty
pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose
her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio.
Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on
her family and decided to follow plaintiff in
Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and
plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in
Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs.
Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were
hostile when they learned of the elopement, but
Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take
care of everything, and promised to support
plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still
fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry
him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her
family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4)
on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she
was made to sign documents. After the civil
wedding, they had lunch and later each went home
separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church
wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared
and arranged, since defendant's mother just came
from hospital. Her family did not participate in
the wedding preparations. Defendant further
stated that there was no sexual consummation
during their honeymoon and that it was after two
months when they finally had sex. She learned
from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one
of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was
undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12
(TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem
compounded by his drug habit. She found out
plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his
obsession over her knees of which he would take
endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff
preferred to have sex with her in between the
knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while
real sex between them was far and between like 8
months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage,
plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which
defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive
liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks
things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs
like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like,
"speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then
would take barbiturates or downers, like
"mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep
plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has
become a habit to him. They had no fixed home
since they often moved and partly lived in Spain
for about four and a half years, and during all
those times, her mother-in-law would send some
financial support on and off, while defendant
worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was
supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their
marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
physically and verbally abused her, and this led
to a break up in their marriage. Later, she
learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia
in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified
that he was not aware of the civil wedding of
his daughter with the plaintiff; that his
daughter and grandson came to stay with him after
they returned home from Spain and have lived with
him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance,
and he has supported his daughter's expenses for
medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9"
and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister,
testified and corroborated that it was
plaintiff's family that attended to all the
preparations and arrangements for the church
wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that
she didn't know that the couple wed in civil
rites some time prior to the church wedding. She
also stated that she and her parents were still
civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital
differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff
testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them
to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce
each other; that when he applied for and obtained
a divorce decree in the United States on June
14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge
and consent of defendant who in fact authorized
a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN,
12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony,
plaintiff identified a recent certification
dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the
15
 Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the
marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage
license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh.
"A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be
fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the
nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court
made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for
the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence
of a license renders the marriage void ab initio.
It was shown under the various certifications
(Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent
one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by
that office, hence, the marriage license no.
2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May
31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the
rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil
marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita
N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales
at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well
as their contract of marriage solemnized under
religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the
Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and
VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license.
Let the marriage contract of the parties under
Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of
the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in
the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record
and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In
a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025,
February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita
Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee
handling is already retired." With said
testimony We cannot therefore just presume that
the marriage license specified in the parties'
marriage contract was not issued for in the end
the failure of the office of the local civil
registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the
marriage license was attributable not to the fact
that no such marriage license was issued but
rather, because it "failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book
were available for scrutiny, there is a strong
possibility that it would have contained an entry
on marriage license no. 2720792.
x x x x
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the
parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with
defendant is defective with respect to an
essential requisite of a marriage contract, a
perception that ultimately was not substantiated
with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January
2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution
dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by
Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was
issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages
in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly
applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the
issuance of a marriage license, arising solely
from the contents of the marriage contracts in
question which show on their face that a marriage
license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly
invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of
a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of
whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License
No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the
parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their
marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the
negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law
in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are
Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is
an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The
marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily
dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based
on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar
of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño
v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all date relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could
16
 have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings
before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and
chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot
stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar
should be read in line with the decision in the earlier
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held
that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in
his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter
all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil
Registrar must categorically state that the document
does not exist in his office or the particular entry
could not be found in the register despite diligent
search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of
lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written
statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the
certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied
with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be
accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March
1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic)
ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic)
to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert
all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give
you our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994
and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license
Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office
with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792,
we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give
you our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July
states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records
of this office, no Marriage License Application
was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792
allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said
application and license do not exist in our Local
Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to
be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of the interested party for whatever
legal intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the
statement that "hope and understand our loaded work
cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem." It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine
the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its
"loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to
state with absolute certainty whether or not such
license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated
that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that
the person in charge of the said logbook had already
retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was
not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record
that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or
missing, or that his testimony could not be secured.
This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the
logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been
exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
2000,
17
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were
required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic)
for marriage licenses received by the Office of
the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province
of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did
you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3
of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only
book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register
of marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of
the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion
marked by the witness.
x x x x
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question
whether marriage license 2880792 is the
number issued by their office while with
respect to license no. 2770792 the office
of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
is very definite about it it was never
issued. Then ask him how about no.
2880792 if the same was ever issued by
their office. Did you ask this 2887092,
but you could not find the record? But
for the moment you cannot locate the
books? Which is which now, was this
issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired,
sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the
effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate
the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have
been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil
Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively
rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed is among the disputable
presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a
species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to
uphold the contention for which it stands, or
one which may be overcome by other evidence. One
such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that
an official act or duty has been regularly
performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence
as in the case at bar where the presumption has been
effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second
certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive
proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792.
It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at
bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the
absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the
said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of
the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries
therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of
the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and
wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime
several years before he filed the petition for
declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another
individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward
petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and
give him his freedom and in the process allow him to
profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of
the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction
is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation,
an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such
is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always
presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based
on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are
not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As
we have said in Carating-Siayngco v.
Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this
one, where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answers to every individual problem.
18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.
Footnotes
10
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized
unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting
parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing
the marriage; and
(4) a marriage license, except in a
marriage of exceptional character.
11 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title,
but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall
be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.
12 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
charater.
20
Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
x x x x
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The
following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other
evidence;
x x x x
(m) That official duty has been regularly
performed;
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10354
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A NATIONAL POLICY ON RESPONSIBLE
PARENTHOOD AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
Section 15. Certificate of Compliance. – No marriage
license shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
unless the applicants present a Certificate of
Compliance issued for free by the local Family Planning
Office certifying that they had duly received adequate
instructions and information on responsible parenthood,
family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition.
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse
the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No.
8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed
in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate
court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion
for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are
as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period
of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a
card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The
former replied and after an exchange of letters,
they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but
left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they
were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her
work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario
Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court
on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint
for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed
as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic)
among others, the declaration of nullity of
accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that
no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with
Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment
on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in
the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
19
8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its
judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy
and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court
discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to
Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v.
Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a
valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed
to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial
court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court
of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled
and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for
the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction
to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As
such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good
faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial
court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone
is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does
not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law
does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place.
No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became
final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed
decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the
appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration
of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case
No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what
is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised
Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the
CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce
decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could
not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to
Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it
is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under
Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public
policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate
court’s decision, contending that the doctrine
in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult
question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce
decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the
motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial was by a
split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s
original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by
Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that
as the first marriage was validly declared
void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the
date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner
was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our
resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES
PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL
INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58
PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or
not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for
relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the
Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted
the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person
intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner
further argues that his lack of criminal intent is
material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant
case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies
punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se,
and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are
allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is
a difference between the intent to commit the crime and
the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a
second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit
bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a
convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General
relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing
that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-
marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to
know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s
contention that he was in good faith because he relied
on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by
his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith
and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine
20
whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this
case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note
that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the
RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision
in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo
and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar,
Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus
held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance
with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly
puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage
to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the
date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law,
never married."24 The records show that no appeal was
taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to
Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak
of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage
is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument
to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the
instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be
distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case,
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage
was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first
marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but
twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate
was duly issued and then again six months later before
a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although
later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at
all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed
to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he
first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before
he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to
liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused
and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that
petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also
find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity
of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent,
which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of
the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying
herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y
Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral
certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
12ART. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
13
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
14Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed
before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
21
 19
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
22
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in
the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place
with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they
take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
23
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites
shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18,
Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and
Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on
March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the
wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning
that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As
a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together
with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to
the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also
known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony
to which the latter agreed despite having been informed
by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass
for the couple on the same date. He conducted the
ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their
parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the
rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against
the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the
crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere,
testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was
the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in
the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride
walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange
their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a
document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the
principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract.
Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and
took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also
identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she
heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they
take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the
wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R.
Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no
marriage license was issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a
ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was
tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as
contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him
a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613.
It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing
constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as
husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing
a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage
license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC
which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or
the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the
Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation
of any of its provisions that is not specifically
penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall
be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos
or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both,
in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and
provides the penalty for violation of the latter law.
Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a
fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that
the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner
in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a
marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that
the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses
deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative
statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of
the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of
the Marriage Law.
22
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA
observed that although there is no prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the
law provides minimum standards in determining whether a
marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
contracting parties must appear personally before the
solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to
the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements.
It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is
not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal
liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is
not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or
found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the
imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law
since it covers violation of regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following
grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is
vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal
marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony
principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55
of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these
provisions require the verbal declaration that the
couple take each other as husband and wife, and a
marriage certificate containing the declaration in
writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties
and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The
petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution
failed to prove that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of
church and State, the State cannot interfere in
ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of
matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he
conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of
giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the
couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended,
should preclude the filing of the present case against
him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered
by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was
not found violating its provisions nor a regulation
promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an
authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of
this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the
solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an
illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize
a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is
whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage
ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what
constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and
6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These
provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil
Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 324 of the
Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article
625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however,
for the contracting parties to appear personally before
the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and
particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which
takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no
prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found
by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be
the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir
declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted
that the parties appeared before him and this fact was
testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we
find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the
prosecution has proven, through the testimony of
Florida, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked
insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to
persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a
witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test
the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth.
He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony
though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the
position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be
taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to
destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning
of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely
register this bars it from belatedly invoking any
irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne,
and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the
circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s
testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by
the couple that they take each other as husband and wife.
The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as
husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and
convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense
failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph
and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the
principle of separation of church and State precludes
the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a
marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by
Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any
religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting
its respective marital rites, subject only to the
requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the
Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and that our family law is based on the
23
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested.
The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of
its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power
to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of
acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of
marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the
petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the
minimum requirements set by law were complied with.
While the petitioner may view this merely as a
"blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law
constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by
the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the
essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a
valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no
marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of
their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage
ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The
marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The
petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these
requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack
of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability
in the present case. For purposes of determining if a
marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements provided
by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint
against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed
is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides
that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision
of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the
Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as
follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any
priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being
authorized by the Director of the Philippine National
Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to
exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to
do so by the parties or parents, grandparents,
guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or
sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns
or publications previous to the solemnization of a
marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized
the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is
subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or
minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one
month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less
than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos.
[emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states
that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any
provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of
the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
[emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find
merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the
penalty imposable in the present case is that covered
under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage
Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do
not include the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found
by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the
provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty
for the violation of this provision which is referred to
the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls
squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No.
3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of
the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which
was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such
regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of
fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage
Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
23
Art. 55. No particular form for the ceremony
of marriage is required, but the parties with
legal capacity to contract marriage must
declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of
legal age, that they take each other as husband
and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in
an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature
or mark by the contracting parties and said two
witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing
the marriage.
24Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the
ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties
with legal capacity to contract marriage must
declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of
legal age, that they take each other as husband
and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in
an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature
or mark by the contracting parties and said two
witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing
the marriage.
25
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite
for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for
the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife. This declaration shall be contained in
the marriage certificate which shall be signed
by the contracting parties and their witnesses
and attested by the solemnizing officer.
26This provision was taken from Article 55 of
the New Civil Code which was, in turn, a
reproduction of Section 3 of the Marriage Law.
27Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
24
 (2) A valid marriage license except in
the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place
with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they
take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
29Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly,
it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the
State.
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29,
2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite
(RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void
from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and
wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his
answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to
set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief.
The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation and determine the existence of
a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make
a determination for failure of both parties to appear at
the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the
pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the
marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and
Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As
a necessary consequence of this pronouncement,
petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent
as she never acquired any right over it and so as to
avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not
pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion
for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit.
It explained that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the
CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the
CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their case was
similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that
the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was
primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to
obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios
to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be
paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent
to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered
into that marriage and knew the benefits and
25
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG,
consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall
within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties
here intentionally consented to enter into a real and
valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of
Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the
petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was
similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore,
void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating
its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question
of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose
of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first
examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant
benefits. This has led to the development of marriage
fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular
benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire
specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage
is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at
the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter
out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration
status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test
for determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham
if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a
life together at the time they were married. "This
standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA),
which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate
that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose
of evading the immigration laws of the United States."
The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention
to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be
noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to
rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage
declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose
of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The
early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United
States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable
case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein
in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the
parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and
to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through
Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the
country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never
married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the
parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do
not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this
rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x
x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to
a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such
to the outside world and with the understanding that
they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its
purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be
married at all. They must assent to enter into the
relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of
Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized
that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of
consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic.
The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At
present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where
a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose,
and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC
ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose
other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s
motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain
that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used
it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature
and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only
entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and
never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on
the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2
of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must
be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the
sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
26
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a
real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish
their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of
consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage
by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended
marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with
no real intention of entering into the actual marriage
status, and with a clear understanding that the parties
would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to
be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete
absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because
the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound
in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a
marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the
very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus,
an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal
and family life. The possibility that the parties in a
marriage might have no real intention to establish a Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage.
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences,
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred
and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
Fringer to be declared void would only further
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by
trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties
is entered into for purposes other than what the
fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the
use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she
should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and out of an inconvenient situation.
complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as
to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of
an in violable social institution, is the foundation of
their right to privacy and would raise serious
the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
allows married couples to structure their marriages in
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live
leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
apart, to have children or no children, to love one
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as
another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into
easily nullified when no longer needed.
for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title,
provided that they comply with all the legal WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29,
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is
valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
SO ORDERED.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s
attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It
cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not
void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the
ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-
disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation
or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for
the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud
may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In
the present case, there is no injured party because
27

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30,
1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and
APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and
NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of
the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C.
Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I,
Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server,
respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon,
Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the
Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to
wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3)
bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court;
(4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5)
infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted
entities. 1 that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court
respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply
to Answers of Respondents was filed by
complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to
Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial
Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to
First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when
Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his
wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the
factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as
culled from the records thereof, are set out under each
particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized
marriages even without the requisite marriage license.
Thus, the following couples were able to get married by
the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin,
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina
Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts
(Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not
reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the
reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with
the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who
prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of
respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its
effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted
to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was
appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court
were already hostile to her, especially complainant
Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest
against her appointment. She avers that it was only
lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage
Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was
Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the
marriage contract and to register these with the local
civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these
marriage contracts in preparation for this
administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims
by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had
instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the
contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part
of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the
marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin
falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is
exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish
the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file
the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed
to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses
subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract,
a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that
the other five marriages alluded to in the
administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized
because the marriage contracts were not signed by him
and they did not contain the date and place of marriage;
that copies of these marriage contracts are in the
custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage
of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga,
and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in
the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of
Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of
the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their
guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their
marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the
present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for
July, 1991 regarding the number of
marriages solemnized and the number of
documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that
he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July,
1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those
marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise
made it appear that they have notarized only six (6)
documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will
show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and
that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50
for each document, although in fact they collected
P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage
registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent
judge are entered is under the exclusive control and
28
custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only
one who should be held responsible for the entries made
therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on
the payments made as solemnization fees which are in the
custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it
is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial
Register; that she cannot be held accountable for
whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial
fees because she is liable only for those payments
tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees
she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the
P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the
Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund
and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court
which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the
discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by
complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in
charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous
number of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed
by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages
solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees
paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for
are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there
were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the
month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official
receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo
who should be held accountable for any unreceipted
payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge
of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by
complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his
failure to be appointed as the clerk of court.
Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not
the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and
that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an
appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of
the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the
Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon
Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised
when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court
on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent
Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-
new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga
City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she
was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to
Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air
conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent
judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in
his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the
applications for the position of clerk of court to the
Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such
appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment
of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-
conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992,
eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of
court. He claims that he would not be that naive to
exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended
as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled
"People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara
was allowed by respondent judge to change her property
bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00
but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made
to appear in the records that the bond has been paid;
that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never
returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been
shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was
deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned
over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to
her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is
deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman
desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper
procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438
was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the
body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he
has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as
this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got
detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom
was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while
Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former
escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to
conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an
order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that
he never employed detention prisoners and that he has
adequate household help; and that he had to order the
case archived because it had been pending for more than
six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket
fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the
payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding
receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the
amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited
the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate
Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick
leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket
fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check
for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine
National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was
instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for
clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her
account; and that after the check was cleared, she
remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other
P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-
Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted
to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994,
together with the administrative matter. We have
perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably
impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation
and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report.
We commend the investigating judge for his industry and
perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report
which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and
supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and
hereunder reproduce at length the material portions
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal
solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is
charged with having solemnized without a marriage
license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina
Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin
(Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh.
C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D),
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank
space in the marriage contracts to show the number
of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article
22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the
contracting parties and their witnesses signed their
marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix
his signature in the marriage contracts, except that
of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed
29
their marriage certificate as he claims that he
solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages
the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of
their marriage contract and the Local Civil
Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage
certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family
Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have
been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a
marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself
and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the
marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs
taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their
marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that
Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage.
Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their
marriage was solemnized and bring with them their
marriage license. In the meantime, they already
started living together as husband and wife
believing that the formal requisites of marriage
were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the
marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties
allegedly did not have a marriage license. He
declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage
certificate, there was no date stated on it and both
the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not
have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he
solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte,
Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as
if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually
a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real
one. This happened because of the pleading of the
mother of one of the contracting parties that he
consent to be photographed to show that as if he was
solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food
for the wedding reception was already prepared,
visitors were already invited and the place of the
parties where the reception would be held was more
than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion
of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to
believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the
marriage certificate or contract, the same did not
bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage
certificate, do not by themselves show that he did
not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated
testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of
Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others,
that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their
marriage license and whose credibility had not been
impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding
ceremony up to the signing of the marriage
certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his
table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a,
K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and
K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a simulated
solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may
convince a person of the explanation of Judge
Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe
that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be
photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on
a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know
for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly
improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to
be used as an instrument of deceit by making it
appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him
when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their
marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin
(Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he
solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was
under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage
license was not required. The contracting parties
here executed a joint affidavit that they have been
living together as husband and wife for almost six
(6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any
date either when it was solemnized, it was stated
that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2)
months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had
been living together as husband and wife for almost
six (6) years already before they got married as they
stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must
ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when
he started living with Edralin as his wife and this
is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve)
been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage
as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of
the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a
false joint affidavit in order to have an instant
marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already
filed, Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and
Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB).
The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he
solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the
second time is that he did not consider the first
marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family
Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon
Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date
should be placed in the marriage certificate to show
when he solemnized the marriage and that the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of
their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the
marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time
with a marriage license already only gave rise to
the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the
marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was
not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had
already signed the marriage certificate. If it was
true that he solemnized the first marriage under
exceptional character where a marriage license was
not required, why did he already require the parties
to have a marriage license when he solemnized their
marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first
marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage
at all as the marriage certificate did not state the
date when the marriage was solemnized and that the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of
their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they
are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35,
36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a
marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one,
however, received a copy of the marriage
certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs.
H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot
just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming
his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his
official function and under Article 23 of the Family
Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting
parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and
Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that
Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage
(Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario
testified for the respondents that actually Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they
did not have a marriage license. On cross-
examination, however, both admitted that they did
not know who prepared their affidavits. They were
just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon,
and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go
to the Municipal building and sign their joint
30
affidavits there which were already prepared before
the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract was
signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty.
Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-
2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt
dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy
(Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the
marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there
was no marriage license. On her part, respondent
Baroy at first denied that the marriage was
solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she
sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered
that she thought the marriage was already solemnized
(TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is
highly improper and irregular, if not illegal,
because the contracting parties are supposed to be
first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare
that they take each other as husband and wife before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least
two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign
their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge
Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure
before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown
by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya
and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony
of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the
practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the
contracting parties and their witnesses sign the
marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has
solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
(6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his
capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-
1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were
actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents
notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month
(Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no
falsification of the monthly report of cases for
July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized
documents that were paid (for) as shown by official
receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of
the alleged official receipts showing that the
notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid.
Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to
the number of documents notarized should not be based
on how many notarized documents were paid of the
notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or
recorded in the notarial register.

Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of
also that he was really solemnizing three (3) to four verifying and checking anymore the correctness of
Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract
(4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly the monthly reports because he relies on his co-
of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal
report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has
sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that
had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he assumed to have checked and verified the records. He
she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole merely signs the monthly report when it is already
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very
month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for signed by respondent Baroy.
difficult to believe.
September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only
four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having
because he is required to have close supervision in
solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized the preparation of the monthly report of cases of
(Exh. D). The contracting parties and their
marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented which he certifies as to their correctness. As a
witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid
and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of judge he is personally responsible for the proper
the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon
other persons, affidavits of persons and discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's
allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera
lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted
(Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge
the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of
affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14).
Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mismanagement of his court personnel."
Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so
mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not
his affidavit has no probative value.
charged of having solemnized these marriages
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame
illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages
of the falsification of the monthly report of cases
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and he solemnized were all illegal.
on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to
practice have been that before the contracting
prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but
parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in
The second charge against herein respondents, that the preparation and custody of marriage contracts,
order to get married, he already required
of having falsified the monthly report of cases notarized documents and the notarial register. By
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task
submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in her own admission she has assigned to complainant
of preparing the marriage contract, to already let
the monthly report the actual number of documents Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet
the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage
notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of according to her she never bother(ed) to check the
contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and
the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by notarial register of the court to find out the number
Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to
the complainants insofar as the monthly report of of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-
save his precious time as he has been solemnizing
cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned. 23-93).
marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times
everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94). The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the
Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the preparation of the monthly report of cases to Sambo,
respondents, show that for said month there were six which was denied by the latter as he claims that he

31
only typed the monthly report based on the data given
to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and
check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was
the one in custody of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and notarial register, among other things,
is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court
she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents
and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for
Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from
January, 1992 she was already in full control of all
the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p.
11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with
the charge of falsification, however, also shows
that respondent Baroy did not account for what
happened to the notarial fees received for those
documents notarized during the month of July and
September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case
also sufficiently show that she received cash bond
deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or
to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued
temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents
reported to have been notarized by Judge Palaypayon
although the documents notarized for said month were
actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in
the notarial register. For September, 1992, there
were only five (5) documents reported as notarized
for that month, though the notarial register show(s)
that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually
notarized. The fee for each document notarized as
appearing in the notarial register was P18.50.
Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was
actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy
declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and
P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show
that she really sent to the Supreme Court the
notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized
and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional
notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted
for considering that Baroy herself declared that
some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own
discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the
solemnization fees have not been accounted for by
Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n
those instances where the marriages were not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license the
solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless
the contracting parties made a demand for their
return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not
know of any instance when solemnization fee was
returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to
lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did
not turn over to her some of the notarial fees. This
is difficult to believe. It was not only because
Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the
conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac
dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy
informed the personnel of the court that she was
taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo,
particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7).
The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn
over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n
July and September, 1992 already. Besides there
never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over
some notarial fees supposedly in his possession.
Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this
matter, in spite of the fact that she has been
holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the
personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2,
FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-
S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October
29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara in
the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was
turned over to her after she assumed office and for
this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt
(Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any
bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it
in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the
parties in that case where the cash bond was
deposited informed her that they would settle the
case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited
the aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this
administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-
28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that
actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga
Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an
amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to
8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000)
Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of
Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping
to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos for around one year and five months when she
finally deposited it because of the filing of this
case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days
after she finally deposited the One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew
it from the bank without any authority or order from
the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after
almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when
she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that
on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also
a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from
a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180.
For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued
only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-
1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not
deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal
Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in
Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would
settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993,
or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon
issued an order for the release of said cash bond
(Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she
assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to issue
temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and
other payments and collections she received. She
further admitted that some of these temporary
receipts she issued she failed to place the number
of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit
X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did
not know that she had to use the official receipts
of the Supreme Court. It was only from February,
1993, after this case was already filed, when she
only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in
order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave
Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The
evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show
that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air
conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six
Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The
same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-
2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to
court in order to be installed in the chamber of
Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same
box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge
Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on
installment basis with a down payment of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the
respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated
May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by
both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as
witness.
32
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond accused escaped while in the custody of Judge payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money
suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time when she Palaypayon. cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of
Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with
October, 1991. From the time she bought the air
6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case the payment of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of
conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed
appears to be without basis. The order states: "this Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them
in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used
case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick
yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced
that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid
by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when
accused, but up to this moment there is no return of voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however,
this case was already filed. The receipt could have
service for the warrant of arrest issued against said shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the
been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did
however, show that in fact there was a return of the effect that if the bank would not pay she would
not testify in this case. The sale is between the
service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6,
Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All
showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0- comment by respondent Baroy).
these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at
3).
least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action
as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the
conduct should be free from the appearance of Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt from the
impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27). April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720,
only to one of the accused who remained at large. as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have
The explanation cannot be accepted because the two its cases be submitted to the court in order to have
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon
other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees
received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand
Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred
(P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without
of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal
issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue
regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not
claim is true that he did not take custody of Alano. delay again in complying with her obligation as
give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she
accountable officer.
deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no
probative value as she did not show that this cash The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he
bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of ordered the case archived was because he heard from In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence
respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is presented by the complainants sufficiently show that
for it and this has been discussed earlier. not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had
and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy
the former should have been required to explain in Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the
writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the license, and that it having been shown that he did
getting of detention prisoners to work in his house
explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he not comply with his duty in closely supervising his
and one of them escaped while in his custody and was
should have issued an order for his arrest. It is clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly
never found again. To hide this fact, the case
only later on when he could not be arrested when the report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court,
against said accused was ordered archived by Judge
case should have been ordered archived. The order particularly for the months of July and September,
Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to
archiving this case for the reason that he only heard 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for
this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No.
that Alano escaped is another circumstance which said two (2) months were falsified with respect to
5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano
gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really the number of documents notarized, it is
and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe
escaped while in his custody only that the respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine
were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the
complainants could not present records or other of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning
municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0,
documentary evidence to prove the same. that the same or similar offenses will be more
0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented
severely dealt with.
that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from
the municipal jail where said accused was confined The last charge against the respondents is that they
and that he escaped while in custody of Judge collected filing fees on collection cases filed by The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the
Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was marriage contracts or certificates of those
of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under marriages he solemnized without a marriage license,
of Tinambac. existing laws and that the filing fees received was there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts
deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal to show when they were solemnized, the contracting
account in the bank. The evidence presented show that parties were not furnished their marriage contracts
Herein investigator finds said evidence not
on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any
sufficient. The complainants should have presented
ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him
records from the police of Tinambac to show that
and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage
Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail
(P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The without a marriage license he as the solemnizing
Alex Alano where he was under detention and said
complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, officer is the one responsible for the irregularity
as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of

33
marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code
of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his
negligence or failure to comply with his duty of
closely supervising his clerk of court in the
performance of the latter's duties and functions,
particularly the preparation of the monthly report
of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His
explanation that he only signed the monthly report
of cases only when his clerk of court already signed
the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to
closely supervise her, to check and verify the
records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk
of court do not contain false statements. It was held
that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel
(Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent
Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
has been found to have falsified the monthly report
of cases for the months of July and September, 1992
with respect to the number of documents notarized,
for having failed to account (for) the notarial fees
she received for said two (2) months period; for
having failed to account (for) the solemnization
fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized,
but the solemnization fees were not returned; for
unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of
which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash
bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued
only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing
it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on
March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in
her possession and after this case was already filed;
for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court
order or authority and redepositing it only on July
23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim.
Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for
which she issued only an unnumbered temporary
receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it
with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it
was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees
on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed
against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the
Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is
respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the
of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the
conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
service.
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits
shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue
official receipt to the provincial, city or
municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court
deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the
court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for
Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual
for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that
the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an
official receipt upon receipt of deposits from party
litigants and thereafter deposit intact the
collection with the municipal, city or provincial
treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn
upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ
Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for
Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular
No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all
collections of funds of fiduciary character
including rental deposits, shall be deposited
immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon
receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no
withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made
except upon lawful order of the court exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with
the foregoing circulars, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By
her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern
for the obligations and responsibility of her duties
and functions as a clerk of court and accountable
officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by
her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which
warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of
Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court,
MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414;
August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court
is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody;
monies received by him/her shall be deposited
immediately upon receipt thereof with the City,
Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court
Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated
December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit
the cash bail bonds and fine she collected
constitutes serious misconduct and her
misappropriation of said funds constitutes
dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty
of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and (the Court)
ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
x x x x x x x x x
the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be
beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a
judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to
rank or position, from the judge to the least of its
personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting
norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of
justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family
Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license
except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence
of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that,
while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties
and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we
are providing for herein pertains to the administrative
liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides
that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall
be punished in accordance with the provisions of the
Marriage Law."9 This is of course, within the province
of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative
sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should,
therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the
charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does
appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually
trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of
marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil
status. This, and his undeniable participation in the
other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in
detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct
and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial
duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00
on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a
stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar
offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt
with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in
34
any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records
and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage
between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City
as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-
quoted Decision.
that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had
been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity
was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.17

The Facts
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision and Order.
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on Ruling of the Trial Court
March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife
in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
Australian family court. ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
Citizenship" issued by the Australian
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual
marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to
Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In
nullify or annual.
their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Hence, this Petition.18
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA- lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of Issues
RECIO, petitioner, their marriage. While the two were still in Australia,
vs. their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents. accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
consideration:
Australia.9

PANGANIBAN, J.: "I

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized
in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However,
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo,
on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a The trial court gravely erred in finding that
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent ipso facto terminated his first
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
1997. him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as
1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior "2
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended

35
 The failure of the respondent, who is now a
naturalized Australian, to present a certificate
of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence
of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the
application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53
of the Family Code as the applicable provisions
in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that
the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that
the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of
the judgment granting the divorce decree before
our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of
this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones:
(1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven
to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because
of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity
to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that
the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may
be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon
proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to
establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In
effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in
question to the legal requirements of the place where
the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal
principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the
Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and
a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn
v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52
of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required,
each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license
with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
x x x x x x x x x
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where
the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
x x x x x x x x x
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting
parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead
of the birth of baptismal certificate required
in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of annulment or declaration of
nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the children's
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect
their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
Australian divorce decree is a public document – a
written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports
to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand,
a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must
be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel
36
for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family
Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens,
freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian
divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the
party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original
of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the
party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden
of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon
the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient
proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab
initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree,
which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict
legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing
in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of
divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from
bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow
after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes and practices, still
restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions,
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty
party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The
court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis
for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce
decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48,
Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason
that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of
the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of
the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish
the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented
it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to
marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
A review of the records before this Court shows that
only the following exhibits were presented before the
lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" –
Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and
Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" –
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office
of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification
that no information of annulment between Rederick A.
Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e)
Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" –
Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d)
Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit
"5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
37
Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian
law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe
that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing
in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of
the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there
being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the
parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
22
"ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad."
23
"ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
x x x x x x x x x
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country."
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a).
"Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." (As amended by EO
227, prom. July 27, 1987).
30"SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the
purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
"Public documents are:
"(a) The written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a
foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x."
31
Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of
Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p.
3511; §3, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides that "when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document
itself."
32
"SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the
purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
"(a) The written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a
foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x."
33"Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must
state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record
is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court."
34
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The
record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record
is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in
a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office."
49"SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
"(b) In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent
title.
"In either case, the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
38
 the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact."
50
In passing, we note that the absence of the
said certificate is merely an irregularity in
complying with the formal requirement for
procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of
the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect
the validity of a marriage celebrated on the
basis of a marriage license issued without that
certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126);
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 197 reprint, p. 17; Rufus
Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines
Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria
Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed.,
p. 146.).
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in
a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both
claiming to have been validly married to the same man,
now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11
November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido
(Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful
wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In
her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to
Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest
of the said town. According to her, the fact of their
marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of
Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records
were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued
by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union,
they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H.
Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido,
born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July
1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December
1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and
his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her
children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City
living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura
Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got
married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for
being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the
rights of her children over the properties acquired by
Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the
complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially averring that
she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died
on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having
been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in
Davao City. She also contended that the case was
instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in
her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence
consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno
(Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla
herself to substantiate her alleged prior
existing and valid marriage with (sic)
Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of
Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944
issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar, Municipality of Talibon,
Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy
of Certificate of Marriage to the Office
of the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay
Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry
records of births, deaths and marriages
that were actually filed in the Office of
the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila,
started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry
records submitted to the Office of the
Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932
to the early part of 1945, were totally
destroyed during the liberation of
Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario
Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio
Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha
Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between
Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the
Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30
September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth
from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by
Second World War issued by the Office of
the Municipal Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that they cannot furnish as
requested a true transcription from the
Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco
indicating that he was born on 30 March
1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage
Contract between Eustaquio and
Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others,
her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City
on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took
care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as
well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife,
but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina
likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate
39
her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to
wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the
late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3
March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March
1985 declaring himself as single when he
contracted marriage with the petitioner although
he had a common law relation with one Tecla
Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely:
Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr.,
all surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April
2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by
Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina
averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as
to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own
right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement
to damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying
Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA
against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby
DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error
the trial court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on
the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor
of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to
Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous,
and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it
disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister
of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed
the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol;
[Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who
testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the
documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should
be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine
qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of
its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial
court has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as
error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate
the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008, raises the following
legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on
the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the
validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be
considered and/or taken cognizance of, without
proof of the execution or existence and the cause
of the unavailability of the best evidence, the
original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage
issued by the church has a probative value to
prove the existence of a valid marriage without
the priest who issued the same being presented
to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not
the evidence presented during the trial proves the
existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her
prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s
failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court
considered as useless the certification of the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no
more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944.
The same thing was said as regards the Certification
issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The
trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil
Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a
Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4,
1945. What are presently filed in this office are records
from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the
city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office
has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested,
certified true copy of the records of marriage between
[Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on
30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court
did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her
witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving
assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact
that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the
said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial
court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence
of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a
presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and
Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and
wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption,
supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same
Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well
as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina
Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient
proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial
court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of
the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the
trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate
Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing
precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
40
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the
marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be
accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v.
Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the
conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence
they have disregarded. They have thus confused the
evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary"
evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the
Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding
that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument
was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which
may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution
are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of
the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of
the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be
shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary
evidence of the contents.
x x x x
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last
analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It
generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic
papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its
authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol
evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document,
when available, to establish its execution may effect
the weight of the evidence presented but not the
admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried
to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim
Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage
may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the
parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the
parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has
also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person
who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or
papers of similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost was, and has The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this
that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the
presumption:
In the present case, due execution was established by
the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during
The basis of human society throughout the civilized
the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a
world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this
party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
marriage.30
reason is that such is the common order of society, and
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
As correctly stated by the appellate court: out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
[Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec.
evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be
334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always
present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla]
presume marriage.
herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of
Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina,
loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of
evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy
documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444
competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina
the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is
to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to
the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the costs.
solemnization is also competent to testify as an
eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
SO ORDERED.
x x x x
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it
disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister
of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed
the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol;
[Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who
testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the
documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should
be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine
qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of
its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial
court has disregarded.31
41

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN
MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the
heirs of the late Maria del Rosario Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December 24,
1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui,
et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.,"
reversing the judgment of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro
Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953
(Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his
lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3)
marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who
died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children,
namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo.
Baldomera died and was survived by her children named
Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left
a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana
Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who
was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife)
got married sometime in 1930. They had three children,
namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on
February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938.
Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain
properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried
(Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These
properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos.
163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo,
Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and
second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana,
Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico,
all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot
No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No.
163 was the subject of a voluntary registration
proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496,
and the land registration court issued a decree ordering
the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT
No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned
heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the
subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-
H, for which separate transfer certificates of title
were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage
with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed
with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that
Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154
were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and
that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-
heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were
deprived of their respective shares in the lots.
Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967
(Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas,
Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were
impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants as
they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs
although they acknowledged the status and rights of the
plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of
land as well as the accounting of their fruits
(Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with
counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13).
Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of lack of cause of action and prescription. They
specifically contended that the complaint was one for
recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the
motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an
order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court
that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil
Code cited by counsel for the defendants
are of erroneous application to this
case. The motion to dismiss is therefore
denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as
petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed by the trial
court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends
upon the acknowledgment or recognition of
their continuous enjoyment and
possession of status of children of their
supposed father. The evidence fails to
sustain either premise, and it is clear
that this action cannot be sustained.
(Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
on the ground that the trial court committed an error ".
. . in not finding that the parents of the appellants,
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully
married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not
legitimate children of their said parents, thereby
divesting them of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp.
14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision declaring all the children and descendants of
Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian
and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled
to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui;
directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial
partition of real properties who eventually acquired
transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds
of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third
persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said
adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair
market value of their shares; and directing all the
parties to submit to the lower court a project of
partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after
payment of taxes, other government charges and
outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for
reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for
lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due
course by the court on December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following
issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred private
respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate
of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private
respondents, who belatedly filed the action for
recognition, were able to prove their successional
rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues
hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary
42
matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the
private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that
"plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses
Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during
his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly
acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children
and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such
status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their
relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in
accordance with the law on intestate succession,
plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the
foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It
prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared as
children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication
in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate
of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint,
however, shows that the action is principally one of
partition. The allegation with respect to the status of
the private respondents was raised only collaterally to
assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence,
the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule
that the nature of an action filed in court is determined
by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the
cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282
[1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the
proper one which may be granted under the law, it does
not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs'
action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled
based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint,
although it is not the relief demanded, is what
determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127,
1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil.
120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents'
demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui,
the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private
respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have
been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is
based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui
to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was
still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he
and (his) mother were able to get married before a
Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known
in the community to be such. Although no marriage
certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence
was likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present (People vs.
Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to
have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws
presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is
legitimate; and that things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of
Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v.
Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v.
City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great
favor as it is founded on the following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only
a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special
to that case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order
of society and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43
Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs.
City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230
[1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as
husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor
contradicted, the presumption of their being married
must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which
legitimate filiation may be proven. However, considering
the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines,
the case at bar must be decided under a new if not
entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties
have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase
(Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October
26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there
are only two classes of children — legitimate and
illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types
of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation
of legitimate children may be established by the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of
the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is
a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again,
no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained
therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case
of the two other private respondents, Julian and
Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of
the documents required by Article 172 but they
continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be
inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain
dates and names of relatives with whom their family
resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact
is that for a considerable length of time and despite
the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and
Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should
be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its
decision the admission made in the affidavit of
Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners
herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other
conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate
children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the
time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an
action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against private
respondents with respect to the filing of the action for
partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit
prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by
the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco,
117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
43
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to
the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del
Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand,
an action for partition may be seen to be at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of
the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118
[1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-
ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition
excluding the private respondents and registered the
properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo,
p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by
petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents.
Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in
1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership,
prescription had not yet set in when private respondents
filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza
vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in
spite of their demands, petitioners, except the
unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and
refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in
the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6).
This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in
their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully
refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of
petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship
to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs,
petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's
share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to
respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring
from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their
(respondents) share in the property left by their
deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria
del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some
shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163
without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their
names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of
the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157
SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a
relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-
ownership). The act of repudiation, in
turn, is subject to certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation
is clearly made known to the other co-
owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by
law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the
Torrens system is constructive notice of
title, but it has likewise been our
holding that the Torrens title does not
furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore
no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule
that registration operates as a universal
notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in
their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can
only be deemed to have commenced from the time private
respondents discovered the petitioners' act of
defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by
petitioners because private respondents commenced the
instant action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the lots
involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980
is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens,
where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves
the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently
novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General
assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion
for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that
herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated
to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of
the divorce decree obtained against him by his American
wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry
under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court,
are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros
M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz
V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized
as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by
44
him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26
OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because
it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to
file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that
this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not
directly applicable to his case but insists that when
his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree
which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority
to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
. . . Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
controversy must be between persons whose interests are
(Emphasis supplied)
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.8 On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to
govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
institution of marriage while respondent, a private
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing
citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
in the U.S.A.
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also
ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
question the validity of his second marriage. Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections
to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able
provision had come about in the first place, and what
was the intent of the legislators in its enactment? to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly
divorce them abroad can.
Brief Historical Background
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the
validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
will also be considered to be validly divorced here and
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made
Article 26 thereof states:
into law only after more widespread consultation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where Legislative Intent
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35, 37, and 38. Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid
original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
37 and 38.
45
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains
a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen
in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The
Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is
no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph
2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far
as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within
the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
remarry. divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
his favor.
has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the No pronouncement as to costs.
proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either
a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
SO ORDERED.
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious
process, and in this particular case, not even feasible,
considering that the marriage of the parties appears to Footnotes
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would
7 Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of
not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated
family life and shall protect and strengthen the
Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.
naturalized alien spouse.
It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent natural and primary right and duty of parents in
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s and the development of moral character shall
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has receive the support of the Government.
the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein
must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized
as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage. GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. GENERAL, Respondents.
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted
to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a D E C I S I O N
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in
46
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino
citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18,
2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas,
a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and
has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying
his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert
went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists
under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No.
4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading
but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation
to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied
Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was
not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order
for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads: jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the THE COURT’S RULING
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
37 and 38.
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
legislative history and intent behind the second
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision
other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the
union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
citizens.18
Filipino spouse."11
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
THE PETITION
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted
petition.13 Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is
essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
determination of his rights under the second paragraph country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
of the Family Code, he contends that the provision 37 and 38.
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest,
law.
to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil
General and Daisylyn, in their respective v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position. acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital
rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between
the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
47
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn
v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included
in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage
to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in
a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as
a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do
not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the
policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse
is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
already established by the decree), whose status and
legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis
to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against
a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of
the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party
with the requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no
less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce
is valid according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to
a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official
acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition
a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under
this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course
of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time,
will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served
by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of
48
the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This
same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the
Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule
that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded
the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events
and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations,
more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate
or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and
status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically
requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established
for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall
be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars
shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper
entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered
not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce
decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission
of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize
the decree’s registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition
of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was
aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it
cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 –
both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving
a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but
it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the
foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any
legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not
the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article
412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing
must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC
as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should
not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings
for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the
civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign
decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in
a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of
a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on
certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as
well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND
of the case to the trial court for further proceedings
in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No
costs.
49
SO ORDERED. This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in
Footnotes Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
6
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for
Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states: Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru
It would therefore be premature to Fujiki, to file the petition.
register the decree of annulment in the
Register of Annulment of Marriages in The Facts
Manila, unless and until final order of
execution of such foreign judgment is
issued by competent Philippine court. Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national
who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
25
(Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The
See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents.
the Civil Code: Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
and legal capacity of persons are binding (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
upon citizens of the Philippines, even Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
though living abroad. City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
x x x x Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
concerning persons, their acts or reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
property, and those which have for their Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
object public order, public policy and which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
good customs shall not be rendered void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki
ineffective by laws or judgments filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
promulgated, or by determinations or Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
conventions agreed upon in a foreign Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
country. Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of
26
Parenthetically, we add that an alien’s legal the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC
capacity to contract is evidenced by a MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
certificate issued by his or her respective vs. annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
diplomatic and consular officials, which he or MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and
she must present to secure a marriage license CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
(Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino spouse AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort OFFICE, RESPONDENTS. National Statistics Office (NSO).6
to a judicial action for a declaration of
authority to remarry.
D E C I S I O N The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

CARPIO, J.: A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC
immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The
The Case RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

50
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner
or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a
non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the
petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that
"[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of
the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case either
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare
their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a
special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status,
a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other
words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1)
the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay
as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of
the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the
ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of
the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36
of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not,
of course, difficult to realize that the party
interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a
nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore
the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court
is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil
Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court
to the local registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject
to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also
asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on
its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the
concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court
to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial
court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to
object to the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied
with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC
stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue
and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third
person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the
husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not
explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said
that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as
a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x
which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of
the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in
Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the
trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x
x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages
as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack
on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional
ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the
verification and certification against forum shopping of
the petition was not authenticated as required under
Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file
their comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor
General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General
filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He
prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner
failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x
be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the
trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-
Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
51
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden
to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always
be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or
a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family
Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons"
in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the
Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry
in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment
directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen
and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage
under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal
v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a
void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the
Court to comply with the directive for them to comment
on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed
from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form
of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay
wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for
fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven
as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody
is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification
may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition
for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the
trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the
petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation
of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial
court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case
anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f
every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity
of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in
private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts
can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides
that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a
52
Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of
party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine
courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between
a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully
proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves
the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize
a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made
in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or
a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify
facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These
are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording.
As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or
a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the
person interested in any act, event, order or
wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
the personality to file a petition for declaration of
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied) Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares
bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil
aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status
crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which
as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the
to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the
Family Court.
public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he
is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal of protecting his marriage.
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted and the property relations
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
therefore interested in the judgment of the
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
public record of his marriage. The interest derives from
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve
only threatens the financial and the property ownership
(or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes
human relation, but also to protect his property
an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in
in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
with the financial capacity of the family"70 and
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
Property rights are already substantive rights protected impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage
by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage in the civil registry.
extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and III.
Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of
the spouse to maintain the integrity of his In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11- Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court
10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under
union recognized by law. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of
marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude
on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of
a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the
foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
between Marinay and Maekara.
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that
"[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve
wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
53
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of
an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among
these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation
of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where
the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage
by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage
in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction
or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts
under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment
is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define
the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws
of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts
to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective
measure to address the anomaly that results from a
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow
divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the
effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies
in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage
on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a
petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the
foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will
be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while
the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy,
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to
him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution
for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine
courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on
how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot
decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the
status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether
to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine
(1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should,
by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this
right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event
that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that
needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise,
there will be an inconsistency between the recognition
of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and
94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription
[of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender
is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
54

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no
longer sees the need to address the questions on venue
and the contents and form of the petition under Sections
4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
5 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as
amended):
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
x x x x
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
falling under Article 41;
x x x x
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person
during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
8 Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC) provides:
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The
petition shall allege the complete facts
constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the
common children of the parties and specify the
regime governing their property relations, as
well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written
agreement between the parties, the petitioner may
apply for a provisional order for spousal support,
custody and support of common children,
visitation rights, administration of community or
conjugal property, and other matters similarly
requiring urgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a
certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be
filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-
in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the
verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly
authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or
legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul
or consular agent in said country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The
petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five
days from the date of its filing and submit to
the court proof of such service within the same
period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition.
11
FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35.
The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
x x x x
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
falling under Article 41;
x x x x
13FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
17Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage.
- All civil officers and priests or ministers
authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a
copy of each marriage contract solemnized by them
to the local civil registrar within the time limit
specified in the existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it
shall be the duty of the successful petitioner
for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a
copy of the final decree of the court to the local
civil registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered
the full name and address of each of the
contracting parties, their ages, the place and
date of the solemnization of the marriage, the
names and addresses of the witnesses, the full
name, address, and relationship of the minor
contracting party or parties or the person or
persons who gave their consent to the marriage,
and the full name, title, and address of the
person who solemnized the marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages,
there shall be recorded the names of the parties
divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date
of the decree of the court, and such other details
as the regulations to be issued may require.
18
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries
subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the
civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (o) changes of name.
29Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in
part:
Contents and form of petition. – x x x
x x x x
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a
certification against forum shopping. The
55

verification and certification must be signed
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be
filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-
in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the
verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly
authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or
legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul
or consular agent in said country.
x x x x
Failure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition.
49RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of
official record. — The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. —
Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or
final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order, is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against
a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
60 Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x
x x x x
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
61
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386.
"Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it
seeks to protect party expectations resulting
from previous litigation, to safeguard against
the harassment of defendants, to insure that the
task of courts not be increased by never-ending
litigation of the same disputes, and – in a larger
sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s
Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law:
‘rest and quietness.’" (Citations omitted)
62 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The
rules of comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among civilized
states by which final judgments of foreign courts
of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries."
(Citations omitted)
65
FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
66Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil
register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a)
births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments
of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural
children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of
name.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries
subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the
civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (o) changes of name.
72CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law x x x."
74CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme
Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
76
Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended),
Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prisión mayor
shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
56
78RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution
of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
x x x x
79
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in
interest. — A real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.
84
FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of
the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the support
of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral and material
welfare of said children and their choice of the
parent with whom they wish to remain as provided
to in Title IX. It shall also provide for
appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
85
FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for
by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43
and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper
cases to marriages which are declared ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide
for the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery
of third presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far
lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated as practicable, applicable in special
in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 proceedings.
and 129.
Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If suspended. — x x x
the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree
If the criminal action is filed after the said
of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
civil action has already been instituted, the
be issued by the court only after compliance with
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
may be found before judgment on the merits. The
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
suspension shall last until final judgment is
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the
x x x x civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal
86 action in the court trying the criminal action.
FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment
In case of consolidation, the evidence already
or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
automatically reproduced in the criminal action
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
without prejudice to the right of the prosecution
State to take steps to prevent collusion between
to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
the parties and to take care that evidence is not
offended party in the criminal case and of the
fabricated or suppressed.
parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be
In the cases referred to in the preceding tried and decided jointly.
paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the
running of the period of prescription of the civil
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation action which cannot be instituted separately or
report of public prosecutor. — (1) Within one whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
month after receipt of the court order mentioned tolled.
in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
The extinction of the penal action does not carry
stating whether the parties are in collusion and
with it extinction of the civil action. However,
serve copies thereof on the parties and their
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
respective counsels, if any.
extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion omission from which the civil liability may arise
exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his did not exist.
report. The parties shall file their respective
comments on the finding of collusion within ten
days from receipt of a copy of the report The
court shall set the report for hearing and if
convinced that the parties are in collusion, it
shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no
collusion exists, the court shall set the case
for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-
trial.
93See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec.
2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In
the absence of special provisions, the rules
57

G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
R E S O L U T I O N
peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside
the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal
is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial
Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo
(Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan ,
Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese
court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in
substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April
25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing
were published once a week for three consecutive weeks
in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary
evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated
January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues
of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for
purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan
to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and
Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of
the petition considering that based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition,
which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the
Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO
as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein
[petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a
divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by
the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree,
petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no
longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her
daughter are living separately from said Japanese former
husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of
marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese
husband's marriage was previously registered, in order
that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still
married to the said Japanese national who is no longer
her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall
not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the
purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese
national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of
the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together
with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage,
that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname,
MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was
scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among
the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the
petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form
and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27,
2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former
Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to
rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition
for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained
by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined
that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to
file for a divorce whether they are in the country or
living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to
foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another
country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues
related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together
with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held
that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who
filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because
the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer
58
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary
Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should
be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of
the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married
to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer
married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that
it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van
Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a
foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by
the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the
decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules
exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the
New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute
divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed
into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known
as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect
on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227
was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph
was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally
deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee
(Committee),but it was presented and approved at a
Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
where country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on
CA
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by
our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to
his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the former because he or she had obtained a
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national
law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of
many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are
still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them
under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce
proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court
therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is
no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph
2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and
obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within
the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties
at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the
same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition
of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the
Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of
marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it
would not appear anymore that she is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband
or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that
[she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
59
and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her
maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an
Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter.
Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his
Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it
was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their
child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the
divorce decree is binding following the "nationality
rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved
to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained
by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling
that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the
suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void,
this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged
invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated
Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by
his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's
enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by
holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by
a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed
the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of
alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the
Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x
x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into
effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband
, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to
render an accounting of a business that was alleged to
be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to
manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action was barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she
initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his
part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree
issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary
to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in
the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that
the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton
vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation
of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the
former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign
divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is
implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et
al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her
husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain
a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the
marriage between her and her second husband, who is a
Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In
resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a
prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy,
We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status
as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the
civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the
public record of his marriage. The interest derives from
the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve
(or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage
included the right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family" and preserving the
property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected
by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her
Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
60
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition
before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant
to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition
on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his
capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance
with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that,
consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia
v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing
the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to determine and
resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-
mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the
Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the
issues of child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of
the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce
is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a
mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital
bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality
principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence,
the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law
cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is
said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only
the intention of the framers of the law, but also that
of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution.
The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the
prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift
the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be
a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in
the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in
the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words
as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should
be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the
alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be
so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils.
et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately
reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly
literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation
or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in
mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the
law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that
the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure
is free to marry under the laws of his or her
countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her
alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances
as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of
the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital
ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of
their alien spouses are severed by operation on the
latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is
erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the
City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In
fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
is a testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the
nationality principle must be disallowed if it would
cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce
the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only
if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing
for a valid classification and that its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the court of
justice, such classification may be subjected to
judicial review.44 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court
must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and
more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny
is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means
to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those
basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in
the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the
right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other
hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is
measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to
the paramount interest of the state for which some
individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the
general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right
or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides
individual rights, and allows the former to take
precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress,
the same principle applies with respect to the acts of
the President which have the force and effect of law
unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We
find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision
only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien
spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial,
arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
61
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not
similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national
who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with.
More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad
by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void,
a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her
Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with
the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce
decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In
the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2
of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence,
to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed,
the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26
is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because
a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained
by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse
would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar
to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In
filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino
spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed
with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's
comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her
martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the
mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is
anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench
and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how
they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those
who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that
our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides,
such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted.
All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father
foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this
initiating divorce proceedings against their alien point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
spouses.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that
The supposition is speculative and unfounded. Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas
no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends is recognized.
to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good
faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence,
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it
it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a
the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be
person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person
understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce?
takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence
His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the
resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was
legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily
has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage
any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily
a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue
foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr.
that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine Presiding Officer.
love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and
this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
conservative in nature and that they are more often the
victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it
is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was
said:
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our
complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the
country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt
could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of
to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of
adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the
their right to privacy and would raise serious
part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the
constitutional questions. The right marital privacy
Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to
allows married couples to structure their marriages in
the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-
almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live
Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines
apart, to have children or no children, to love one
and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No.
for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title,
provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as
provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at
are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
to such an extent as to make further living together
may validly support a marriage.63
impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When
the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an Government was restored, it ceased to have force and
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August
family and shall be protected by the 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836
State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
62
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer
recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from
various sectors of the Philippine society to re-
institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the
currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of
representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B.
No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce
and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the
House Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved
on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor,
57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the
grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as
follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel
the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of a
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro
chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a
child with another person other than one's spouse
during the marriage, except when upon the mutual
agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them
by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife
bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of
the petitioner, a common child or a child of a
petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial
decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both
spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute
divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of
the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have
the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of
age or over but below twety-one (21), and the
marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents guradian or personl having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21)
such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such
party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable;
and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually
transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed
either at the time of the marriage or supervening after
the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least five (5) years at the time the petition for
absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is
highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided
for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the
incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of
the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender
reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for
absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as
respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts
which have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated
efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman
Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact
a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our
customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon
marriage and family as an institution and their nature
of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause
restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They
can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they cause the government to restrict other groups. To
do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus establish a state
religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs
and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are
good for country.77 While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect,
bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State
has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not
63
be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with
other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening
the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is
equally mandated to actively promote its total
development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among
others, the right of children to special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To
Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these
obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2
or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by
the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women
and children are almost always the helpless victims of
all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among
the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if
not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A.
No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking
in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the
Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the
constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every
human person, guarantee full respect for human rights,
and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do
more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen
who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him
or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under
the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or
she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as
illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any
child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer
the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely,
these are just but a few of the adverse consequences,
not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are
to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of
the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of
marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage,
but without denying State protection and assistance to
live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities
of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost
instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and
that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the
unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of
the individual's full human potential and self
fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of
a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the
quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten
quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and
shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly
be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in
his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the
Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by
its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes.
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently
of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the sord and the will,
that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by
Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."
x x x x
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined
justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in
ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will
render justice, presuming that it was the intention if
the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended
to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet
write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree
rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry
of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine
courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce
must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports
to be written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand,
a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his
office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
64
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the SO ORDERED 56
Art. 35 The following marriages shall be void
court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court from the beginning:
allowing the divorce; 2)
Footnotes
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the
(1) Those contracted by any party
Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of
below eighteen years of age even
the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate 11
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. with the consent of parents or
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
guardians;
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. (2) Those solemnized by any
Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese 12 person not legally authorized to
Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93 Art 17. The forms and solemnities of
perform marriages unless such
contracts, wills and other public instruments
marriages were contracted with
shall be governed by the laws of the country in
either or both parties believing
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in which they are executed.
in good faith that the
this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a
solemnizing officer had the leagl
a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the
When the acts referred to are executed authority to do so;
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the
OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court before the diplomatic or consular
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged officials of the Republic of the
(3) Those solemnized without a
on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of Philippine laws shall be observed in
license, except covered by
fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95 their execution.
preceding Chapter;

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be Prohobited laws concerning persons,
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous
proved. their acts or property, and those which
marriage not falling under
have for their object public order,
article 41;
public policy and good customs shall not
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who be rendered ineffective by laws or
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in judgements promulgated, or by (5) Those contracted through
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, determinations or conventions agreed mistake of one contracting party
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material upon in a foreign country.(11a) as to the identity of the other;
defendants have the burden of proving the material and
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. x x x To be valid, the classification must conform to
the following requirements: (6) those subsequent marriages
that are void under Article 53.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any 1.) It must rest on substantial
other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The distinctions. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any
power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, party who, at the time of the
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be celebration, was psychologically
2.) It must be germane to the purpose of
resolved in the negative.96 incapacitated to comply with the
the law.
essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of 3.) It must not be limited to existing such incapacity becomes manifest only
proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as conditions only. after solemnization. (As amended by E.O.
well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall 227)
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino 4.) It must apply to all members of the
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial same class. Art 37. Marriages between the following
function. are incestuous and void from the
54
beginning, whether the relationship
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution between the parties be legitimate or
WHEREFORE, the petition for review states: illegitimate:
on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals Section 1. No person shall be deprived of
in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The (1) Between ascendants and
life, liberty, or property without due descendants of any degree; and
case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further process of law, nor shall any person be
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant denied the equal protection of the laws.
Japanese law on divorce. (2) Between brothers and sisters,
whether of full or half blood.

65
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood
relatives, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, up to the fourth
civil degree;
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of

(2) Between step-parents and
absolute nullity of the marriage, the
step-children;
partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and he
(3) Between parents-in-law and delivery of the children's presumptive
children-in-law; legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the
(4) Between the adopting parent same shall not affect third persons.(n)
and the adopted child;

Art. 53 Either of the former spouses may

(5) Between the surviving spouse marry again after complying with the
of the adopting parent and the requirements of the immediately
adopted child; preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null and
(6) Between the surviving spouse void.
of the adopted child and the
adopter; 641987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2. This
echoed the Family Code provision, which
(7) Between the adopted child and provides:
a legitimate child of the
adopter; Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman
(8) Between the adopted children entered into in accordance with law for
of the same adopter; and the establishment of conjugal and family G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution
(9) Between parties where one, whose nature, consequences, and EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
with the intention to marry the incidents are governed by law and not vs.
other, killed that other person's subject to stipulation, except that FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
spouse or his her own spouse. marriage settlements may fix the property
(82) relations during the marriage within the
x ----------------------------------------------------
limits provided by this Code.
x
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
been absent for four consecutive years vs.
and the spouse present has well founded FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
belief that the absent spouse was already LUIS, Respondent.
dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions D E C I S I O N
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
sufficient.

66
Before us are consolidated petitions for review
assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and
set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31,
1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May
15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married
Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration 8 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing
at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the
decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that
the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be issued
to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge
the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also
a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it
that the petition for letters of administration should does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this
was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an
He further claimed that respondent has no legal
Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was
personality to file the petition because she was only a
re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
Arcangel.
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and
parties to submit their respective position papers on
joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of
the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent
the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court
to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and
evidence set forth in his previous motion for
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang,
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at
Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence,
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed
was without legal capacity to file the petition for
that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by
letters of administration because her marriage with
virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found
and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2,
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code applied because it would impair the vested rights of
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because
this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
256 16 of the Family Code.
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions
were denied. 28
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo
from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in
the case.
its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because 29
the trial court for further proceedings.
then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by
Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion. The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of
67
the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence
or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
petition for letters of administration was properly
filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It
found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee
was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article
26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph
2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines,
the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there
is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
— sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that
"Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the
basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force
and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x
x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For
this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the
instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo
later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo
insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters
of administration was improperly laid because at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings
in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7,
Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one intends to return. They claim
that a person can only have one domicile at any given
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2,
Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous
marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the
surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was
properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court
of the province "in which he resides at the time of his
death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence – as contradistinguished from
domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
– residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that
"residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous
with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve
election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.
In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence"
of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which
may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine
Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the address of
Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s
children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently,
the subject petition for letters of administration was
68
validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The
subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that
time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal
personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue,
we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering
that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing
us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a
divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the
divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien
spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from
their conjugal partnership should be protected. The
Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce
and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the
divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife,
the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations.
It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity
of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was
held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in
filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The
Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court
stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998,
the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when
the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development
of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines
cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted
as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed
marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry
as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of
a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating
that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to
Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the
historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the
original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and
39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
69
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein
that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment
of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof,
our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad
against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil
Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine
law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in
light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed
above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to
be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by
its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes.
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently
of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of
its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are
not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by
Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."
x x x x
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined
justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every
case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will
render justice, presuming that it was the intention of
the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained
by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree
is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that
letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2,
Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of
administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs
the property relations between parties who live together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides
that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to
the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven. 77
70
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of
both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
Footnotes
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code
by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code
took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described
the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing
the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during
said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares
shall be presumed to be equal.
x x x x
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s
defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February
28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
13
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
16This Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
rights or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
39
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be
settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
65
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
66
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in
a foreign country.
74SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of
administration granted. – If x x x a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as
the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to
serve; x x x.
76 Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:
When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of
the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL
& PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and
8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in
a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause
of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article
47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition
71
after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent,
obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of
action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of
this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of
plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is
null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from
assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father's
death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action
for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of
law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-
compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to
state the basis of petitioner's averment that the
allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It
was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces
no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition
for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite
of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article
58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license
is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. 9 This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which
shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just
an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the
Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring
to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious
eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them
from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners'
father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of
majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we
now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that
needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five-year continuous period or should
it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to
their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party
was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity
— that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware
or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the
two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to
the marriage to advice the local civil registrar
thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged
impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall
request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or
present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
72
multiple marriages by the same person during the same
period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil
law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and
the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in
this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have
the personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the
Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by
the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file
an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either
party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment
suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and
cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except
in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either,
in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That
is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal
effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation
to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of
the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of
petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is
erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there
was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two.
It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it
is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of
either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though
no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as
well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though
no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral,
in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like
a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during
the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only
on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either
party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground
for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family
Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order
of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
6
Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage
shall be solemnized unless all the requisites
are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting
parties; their consent, freely given;
(2) Authority of the person performing
the marriage; and
73
 (3) A marriage license, except in a (2) the first spouse had been absent for
marriage of exceptional character.
7Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The
following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
x x x x x x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character.
x x x x x x x x x
8
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title,
but not those under article 75, no marriage shall
be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.
12Art. 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a
special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal or family
life. . . .
14
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No
marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire
to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to
the marriage.
18
Art. 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage
subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or
dissolved; or
seven consecutive years. . . .
Art. 41 of the Family Code reads: "A
marriage contracted by any person during
the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years. . ."
20
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage
must be filed by the following persons and within
the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of
Article 45 by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent,
within five years after attaining the age
of twenty-one; or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge of
the minor, at any time before such party
has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of
Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had
no knowledge of the other's insanity; or
by any relative or guardian or person
having legal charge of the insane, at
anytime before the death of either party,
or by the insane spouse during a lucid
interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of
Article 45, by the injured party, within
five years after the discovery of the
fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of
Article 45, by the injured party, within
five years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased;
For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6
of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years after the marriage.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting
parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage
is the bone of contention of the instant complaint
against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal
Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent
Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the
late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that
marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his
Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested
in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known
that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised
the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano)
could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment,
the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
with more severely.
74
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case
for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.
Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation
reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint
and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein
invites the attention of the Court to two separate
affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were
allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his
instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married
to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and
that since their respective marriages had been marked by
constant quarrels, they had both left their families and
had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage
of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath
that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital
cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to
marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment
between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule
that they have lived together for at least five 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
years [and are without legal impediment to marry embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
each other]; and It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with
the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law
transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.6 ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court
Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION
that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at
Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda SO ORDERED.
Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing
marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in
his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge
cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart
from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows
spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation
to live separately from each other, but in such a case
the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated,
legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds
true all the more when the separation is merely de facto,
as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint
Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
marriage license. It could not serve as a justification
for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance
of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no
75
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No.
175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose
Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and
Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage
was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that
both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that
being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as
no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties;
that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that
he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least
five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events
which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose,
he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately
thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s
house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks
later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay
City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent
to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay
City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them.
They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so
that the package could be released to Felisa. He
initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him,
and told him that his refusal could get both of them
killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of
paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It
was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw
a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala
of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he
discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract
with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter
feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s
allegations and defended the validity of their marriage.
She declared that they had maintained their relationship
as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the
early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting
marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 In
her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of
the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees
of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The
Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him
the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing
the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of
the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds
and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-
entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and
Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s
version of the story as implausible, and rationalized
that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily
suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet
of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that
something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City
Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who
was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of
the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could
have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill
them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took
him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the
pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in
for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage
was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson
as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly
notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled
up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and
false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the
name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case
of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only
reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was
because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand,
under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage
certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she
further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother
that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when
she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she
believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her
brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister
all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that
Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of
the New Civil Code which requires that the action for
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured
party within four years after the discovery of the fraud.
Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his
consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery
and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest
possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the
alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not
take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11
August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be
without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
76
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the
marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The
appellate court observed that the circumstances
constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage
under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud
was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by
law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in
the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or
intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent
to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof
had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the
Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was
obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the
discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from
the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as
the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February,
1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which
to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it
was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint
for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the
marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil
Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties
executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the
period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity
of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was
misled by the statements contained therein. In this
manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the
falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of
marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally,
the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that
neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court
of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not
require that either one of the contracting parties to
the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s
church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which
does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose
filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His
central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited
the legal condition that the man and the woman must have
been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the
fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is
RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring
the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson
void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on
the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and
reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the
basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age
of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived
together for at least five (5) years and that they
desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as
follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date
of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license
is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local
civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the
absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision,
but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition
for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying
that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of
merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be
declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474,
similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to
consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION
OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM
HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
77
 III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court
of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the
case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the
parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a
circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation
with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought
the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case
for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed
against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises
that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would
exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage
between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on
the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments
vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part,
Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this
Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November
1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, which they used in
lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position
that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does
not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential
and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as
to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is
not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a
fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years.
In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’
marriage contract states that their marriage was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses,
and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage.
To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces
the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement
of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he
wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated
25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone
ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said
barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May
1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule
on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing
rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa
was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil
Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a
contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of
an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code,
but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the
old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage
license did not make the marriage void. The rationale
for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by
the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character
are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles
72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in
articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or
war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation,
(4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a
man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in
an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons who have lived in a
state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and
Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they
have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years; and that because of this union, they desire
to marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an
affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties
have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules
of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general
rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably
construed.39 They extend only so far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by
statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non
thereto that the man and the woman must have attained
the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years.
78
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76
leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law
as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage
license under Article 76 applies only to those who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in
no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement
of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the
law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under
Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be
dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a
directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that
Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties
shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and
that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have
not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.
The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of
Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own
testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to
whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite
is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when
there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are
ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is
already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized
exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and
the trial court, or in this case the administrative body,
make contradictory findings. However, the exception does
not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals
and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported
by the record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24
November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt
them from the requirement of a marriage license, is
beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the
falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will
not affect the validity of marriage, since all the
essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be
denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit
legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of
marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we
speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference
to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more
explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married.50 The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs
to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa
actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil
Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards
the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’
marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a
violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa
was entered into without the requisite marriage license
or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a
clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils
that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license
a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to
take the place of a marriage license is to allow an
abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to
protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we
must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of
the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for
at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the
absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at
all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper,
without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was
no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts
forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be
denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication,
and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is
a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity
finds no room for application where there is a
law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to
their criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of
error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the
legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license.
It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together
from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent
marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that
it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration
of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion
can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this
case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not
prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid
down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation
period under Article 76 means a five-year period
79
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage,
and refers to a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006
in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose
Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability,
if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
11
ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage
must be commenced by the parties and within the
periods as follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of
Article 85, by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent,
within four years after attaining the age
of twenty or eighteen years, as the case
may be; or by the parent or guardian or
person having legal charge, at any time
before such party has arrived at the age
of twenty or eighteen years;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of
Article 85, by the spouse who has been
absent, during his or her lifetime; or by
either spouse of the subsequent marriage
during the lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of
Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had
no knowledge of the other's insanity; or
by any relative or guardian of the party
of unsound mind, at any time before the
death of either party;
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by
the injured party, within four years
after the discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by
the injured party, within four years from
the time the force or intimidation
ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by
the injured party, within eight years
after the marriage.
14
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances
shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4
of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity
of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Nondisclosure of the previous
conviction of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and the
penalty imposed was imprisonment for two
years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact
that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;
No other misrepresentation or deceit as
to character, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
16ART. 76. No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, desire to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties
and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
17
ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court;
(2) The Presiding Justice and the
Justices of the Court of Appeals;
(3) Judges of the Courts of First
Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the
peace;
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the
gospel of any denomination, church,
religion or sect, duly registered, as
provided in Article 92; and
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs,
military commanders, and consuls and
vice-consuls in special cases provided in
Articles 74 and 75.
18
ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court’s jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister
of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious
sect and registered with the civil
registrar general, acting within the
limits of the written authority granted
him by his church or religious sect and
provided that at least one of the
contracting parties belongs to the
solemnizing officer's church or
religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief
only in the cases mentioned in Article
31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to
which a chaplain is assigned, in the
absence of the latter, during a military
operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32; or
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-
consul in the case provided in Article
10.
27
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title,
but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall
be solemnized without a license first being
80
issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.
28
ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens
abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-
consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The
duties of the local civil registrar and of a
judge or justice of the peace or mayor with
regard to the celebration of marriage shall be
performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
29ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character.
31The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No.
3613, requires the following essential
requisites: (1) legal capacity of the
contracting parties; and (2) their mutual
consent.
32
Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see
also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code Annotated,
1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.
33Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code
which provides:
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
Title, but not those under Article 75, no
marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually
resides.
35
In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-
669), this Court articulated the spirit behind
Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:
"However, there are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one
of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for
a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and
contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement."
36The Report of the Code Commission states that
"No marriage license shall be necessary when a
man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five
years desire to marry each other. In such case,
the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons from legalizing their
status," Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
42
The first part of Article 76 states, "No
marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire
to marry each other x x x."
51
ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions
favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the
authority of parents over their children, and
the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression.
55Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in
A Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines
(1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If the parties
falsify their affidavit in order to have an
instant marriage, although the truth is that they
have not been cohabiting for five years, their
marriage will be void for lack of a marriage
license, and they will also be criminally
liable." Article 76 of the Civil Code is now
Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary
for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on
29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos
faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded
"not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the
criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had
been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked
petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-
old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite
the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that
if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who
was "without responsibility." 7
81
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she
could not be included as an accused in the crime of
bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos
was still single when they got married. She also averred
that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second
marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case,
the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met
petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal
wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and
averred that she met Galang only in August and September
1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner
married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang
that she had already introduced herself as the legal
wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court
rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she
had not known of the first marriage. It also held that
it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner
to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of
Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need
for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of
the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited
with Santos long before the celebration of their
marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner
as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the
accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against
her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one
(1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that
her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having
been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which provides an exemption from the
requirement of a marriage license if the parties have
actually lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to the celebration of their marriage.
In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had
not lived together as husband and wife for five years
prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the
absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their
marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from
bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held
thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her
co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing
that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment
on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos,
something this court cannot do. The best support to her
argument would have been the submission of a judicial
decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such
proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and
void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her
conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable
doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and
insisted that the former had not known of the previous
marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the
prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of
a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated
that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of
her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA
affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot
be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not
aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main,
she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy,
a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her
marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a
marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage
does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from
a marriage license, because they have not previously
lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at
least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the
records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four
years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the
five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage
without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the
instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising
factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent
marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any
knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent
reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports
the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew
about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the
elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender
has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential
in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in
the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that
she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting
marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the
knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's
existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her
responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of
Santos's first marriage
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The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint
liability of two persons who marry each other while the
previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting.
As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses
may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the
accused without being aware of his previous marriage.
Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous
undissolved marriage of the accused could she be
included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis
supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained
petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang.
Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first
marriage as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and
visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they
openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not
know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was
the more credible witness compared with petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two
occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason
to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R TC,
less so in the present case in which its findings were
affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment
of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect,
since it had the important opportunity to observe
firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses
during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this
Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower
courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To
recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her
the penalty within the range of prision correctional as
minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong.
Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in
the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In
referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent
authority in criminal law, writes that "a person,
whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees
to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock
is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that
for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is
prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one
day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of
petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence
imposable on her is the penalty next lower in
degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of
six months and one day to six years. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two
years, four months and one day to four years and two
months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month
and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her
marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to
be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity
of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of
defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial
proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner
has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her
marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage
license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the
issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on
the validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that
the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos
was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly
overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that
an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open
for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the
error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the
marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this
requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union
was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The
provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties are found
no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew
Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after
six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July
1997. Without any objection from the prosecution,
petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited
her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage.
However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing
in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her
previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination,
respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that
sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who
sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner
and Santos had only known each other for only less than
four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could
not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their
marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact
opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records
do not show that they submitted an affidavit of
cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family
Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had
actually cohabited for at least five years before they
married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this
lie was the issuance of the Certificate of
Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated
under oath that no marriage license was necessary,
because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of
the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act
to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and
Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by
them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation
wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based
on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not
satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law;
and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her
marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is
basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort
to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on
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marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of
deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
character of this special bond between spouses.38 In
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the
emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should
falsification of public documents in order to contract
not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed
fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs
basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our
of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot
commitment."
regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance

No less than the present Constitution provides that
petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in
"marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity
State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and
of marriage. 40
caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously
and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause
by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The
of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall
G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As
be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result,
modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found
litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
issue. 43
minimum to four years of prision correctional as maximum
plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her
affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is
SO ORDERED.
that her marriage with Santos was void for having been
secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated
earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate Footnotes
of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted
from the license requirement based on their fabricated 44
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and REVISED PENAL CODE, Arts. 349-352 .Art. 350
wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In punish the crime of illegal marriages as follows:
violation of our law against illegal Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions
marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing of laws. - The penalty of prison correctional in
full well that they had not yet complied with the five- its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the upon any person who, without being included in
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of the provisions of the next proceeding article,
absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her shall have not been complied with or that the
illegal act to escape criminal conviction. marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.
If either of the contracting parties shall obtain
the consent of the other by means of violence,
The applicability of People v. De Lara intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by
the maximum period of the penalty provided in
the next preceding paragraph.
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence
involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the
second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license.
In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara
married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August
1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their
marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the

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