Definition of Tort under Philippine Law
Naguiat v. NLRC
Naguiat v NLRC | G.R. No. 116123. March 23, 1997 |
Panganiban, J. | Definition of Tort under Philippine Law| by
Jecs
FACTS:
● Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFTI) held a
concessionaire’s contract w/ the Army Air Force
Exchange Service (AAFES) for operation of taxi
services within Clark Air Base and employed
individual respondents as taxicab drivers
● However, the AAFES was dissolved due to the
phase-out of US military bases
● The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, hereafter
referred to as drivers’ union, negotiated and
subsequently accepted separation benefits worth
P500/year of service
● Individual respondents refused to accept and
through private respondent National Organization
of Workingmen, subsequently filed for payment of
separation pay due to termination/phase-out
○ Alleged that they were regular employees
and thus, entitled to separation pay
● Petitioners countered that the cessation was due to
great financial losses and lost business opportunity
caused by the phaseout due to the eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo
● The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners pay
individual respondents P1,200/year for
humanitarian consideration
● Respondents also appealed to NLRC which was
granted
● Petitioners filed for MR which was denied; hence,
this petition for issuance of a TRO
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. W/N NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
increasing the amount of separation pay - NO
● Petitioner contend that NLRC unilaterally increased
the amount of severance pay
● The Court held that findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies
are generally accorded not only great respect but
even finality.
● Furthermore, the petitioner did not refute nor
offered evidence to controvert allegations of
private respondents as to work schedule and their
financial arrangement and the $240 monthly pay
● Petitioners also did not appeal the decision of the
labor arbiter, and thus are in estoppel
● Petitioners are not exempted from payment of
separation pay since they failed to prove business
losses or financial reverses with clear and
satisfactory evidence
● The Labor Arbiter also correctly found that
petitioners’ stopped the taxi business not because
of any great financial loss but because of the phase-
out of the US military presence
● Labor Code Art. 283 also provides that in case of
retrenchment to prevent losses due to
closure/cessation, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to 1 month pay or at least ½ month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher.
2. W/N NOWM has the personality to represent
individual respondents-employees - YES
● Petitioners are held in estoppel for not raising this
issue before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC
3. W/N petitioner Naguiat Enterprises is solidarily
liable - NO
● The Court agreed with the labor arbiter in that
individual respondents were regular employees of
CFTI
● No substantial evidence provided showing that
Naguiat Enterprises is neither an indirect employer
nor a labor contractor, let alone involved at all.
○ Failed to substantiate claim that Naguiat
Enterprises managed, supervised and
controlled their employment
○ Presumed that Sergio Naguiat, the
individual, was managing and controlling
the taxi business on behalf of Naguiat
Enterprises
● The Constitution of the drivers’ union provides that
the definite employer is CFTI
4. MAIN: W/N CFTI President Sergio Naguiat is
solidarily liable - YES
● LC Art. 212 (c) defines that the term employer also
includes any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer
○ It shall not include any labor org, officer or
agent EXCEPT when acting as employer
● AC Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v NLRC: Responsible
officer of an employer corporation can be held
personally, not to say even criminally, liable for
nonpayment of back wages
● Since petitioner President actively managed the
business, he falls within the meaning of employer
as put forth by the Labor Code.
● Corporation Code Sec. 100, par. 5 also provides that
when the stockholders are actively engaged in the
management or operation of a business, they shall
be held personally liable for corporate torts
● The Court then defined tort as the violation of a
right given or omission of a duty provided by law;
a breach of a legal duty
○ LC Art. 283 mandates the employer to
provide separation pay in cases of closure
or cessation not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses
● In the case at bar, CFTI failed to comply with such
obligation and consequently, its stockholder who is
actively engaged in the management and operation
shall be held personally liable
5. W/N CFTI VP Antolin Naguiat is personally liable -
NO
● While he also carried the title of general manager,
it had not been shown that he acted in such
capacity and there was also no evidence as to the
extent of his participation
6. W/N there was a denial of due process - NO
● Petitioners assail the resolution of NLRC in holding
them solidarily liable in that they were not
impleaded as parties to the complaint
 ● The Court held that the petitioners voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter when they filed a position paper
before the latter
○ Thus, they may not claim to have been
denied due process as they had the
opportunity to present their positions
RULING: NLRC decision MODIFIED. Petitioners CFTI and its
President, Sergio Naguiat, are ORDERED to pay $120 for
every year of service. Petitioner Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.
and VP Antolin Naguiat are ABSOLVED from liability
Vinzons-Chatto v. Fortune
Vinzon v Fortune Tobacco Corp | G.R. No. 141309. June 19,
2007 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Definition of Torts under
Philippine Law | by Jecs
FACTS:
● Before the enactment of RA 7654, respondent’s
cigarette brands “Champion”, “Hope” and “More”
were classified as local brands and charged an ad
valorem tax of 20%-45&
● 2 days prior before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner
issued RMC 37-93 which subjected the brands to
the provisions of Sec. 142, (c) (1):
○ Reclassified said brands as locally
manufactured but bearing a foreign brand
○ Subjected to an ad valorem tax of 55%
● After receiving said issuance via ordinary mail,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied in a letter
○ Said letter also assessed a payment of
P9.58M and demanded payment 10 days
from receipt thereof
● Respondent filed a petition for review before the
CTA, which then issued an injunction in that RMC
37-93 is defective, invalid and unenforceable
○ CA and SC AFFIRMED in that it has fallen
short of the requirements of a valid
admin issuance
● Respondent also filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner in her private capacity under NCC
Art. 32 since the issuance violated its constitutional
rights against deprivation of property
● Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss since the
issuance was in the performance of her official
function and w/in scope of her authority, acted
merely as an agent of the Republic, no cause of
action due to lack of allegation of malice/bad faith,
and forum shopping; the RTC DENIED.
● CA also DISMISSED said motion, holding that
liability may arise under NCC Art. 32 even if there
was no malice or bad faith and that the latter need
not be alleged in the complaint for damages
● Petitioner then filed this present action, arguing
that Sec. 38, Book I of Admin Code, and not NCC Art.
32, which should be applied; according to her:
○ Sec. 38 is a special law and that liability
only attaches when there is a showing of
malice, bad faith or gross negligence while
NCC Art. 32 is a general law
● Respondent on the other hand, countered that
○ Sec. 38 is a general law while NCC Art. 32
is a specific law and under the latter, it is
enough that there was a violation of consti
rights and doesn’t require that the public
officer acted with malice or bad faith
ISSUE/RATIO:
1. W/N a public officer may be sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the discharge of official
duties - YES
● General rule: officer acting in the performance of
his official duties within his authority is NOT liable
for damages
○ Exception: NOT immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in
bad faith
● Cojuangco, Jr. v CA: public officer who directly or
indirectly violates the consti rights of another may
validly sued for damages under NCC Art. 32 even if
there was no malice or bad faith
● The Court held that a public officer may be validly
sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
performance of his official duties when
1. Acted with malice, bad faith or negligence
2. Violated constitutional right of plaintiff
2. W/N there was a cause of action - YES
● The Court first discussed the relationship between
general and special law
General Special
Class of subjects Particular persons or
things
If the same subject, should be read in pari materia
and harmonized in order to give effect to both
If there is conflict,
prevails over general
law since it evinces
legislative intent more
clearly
If passed later, the If passed later, it
special statute will be becomes the
construed as an exception/qualification
exception
● However, in City of Manila v Teotico and Bagatsing
v. Ramirez, it was held that when the special law
treats a subject in general while a general statute
treats in particular, the general statute prevails
● The Court then discussed torts in relation to NCC
Art. 32, a general law and Sec. 38, a special law
DISCUSSION ABOUT TORTS
● NCC Art. 32 was patterned after the “tort” in
American Law
● Tort is a commission or omission of an act by one
w/o right, wherein one person directly or indirectly
suffers injury in person, property or reputation
● There are cases wherein civil liability in tort is
determined by conduct and not the mental state
and where the motive is rendered immaterial
 ● Liability in tort is not precluded by lack of evil kicked her out of their home, and refused to
intent uphold his engagement to her, eventually claiming
that he was already married to another woman in
Bacolod.
Sec. 38 Art. 32
- The petitioner, on the other hand, denies promising
Presence of bad faith, Provides a cause of to marry the respondent and mistreating her, and
malice and negligence action in the nature of claims that he asked her to stop coming to his home
are vital elements to tort for violation of because she was stealing from him.
make public officers consti rights, - The respondent filed a suit for P45,000 worth of
liable irrespective of motive damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs worth
or intent P600. The petitioner filed a counterclaim for
P25,000 worth of moral damages and P5,000 for
Particular with liability Specifies in clear and miscellaneous expenses.
of gov’t officials but the unequivocal terms the - Trial Court applied Article 21 of the Civil Code in
subject is general i.e. acts that may give rise awarding respondent a total of P25,000 (10k
did not specify which to action for damages moral, 5k attorney and litigation expenses).
action/omission may which would be a tort Decision affirmed by Court of Appeals.
give rise to a civil suit for impairment of rights - Petitioner finally appealed to the Supreme Court,
and liberties questioning whether or not Article 21 should
indeed apply to the case at bar.
ISSUE:
● In this case, the Court held that there was a cause - WON petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh actually
of action as it was brought under NCC Art. 32; thus, proposed to respondent Marilou Gonzales - YES
bad faith and malice are not necessary and failure - The Court held that this is a question of
to allege such would not amount to a failure to state fact which may not be raised in a petition
a cause of action for review on certiorari.
3. W/N there was non-compliance against forum - The trial court found through the
shopping - NO testimony of the respondent (she wouldn’t
● Petitioner alleges that there was such defect since expose her honor and reputation for a lie)
the certificate was signed by respondent’s counsel and her witnesses (family and coworkers
instead of the plaintiff/principal party (respondent testified about marriage preparations and
in the present case) relationship) that this was a fact.
● The defect in the certificate against forum shopping - SC found no reason to disturb these
was cured by the secretary’s certificate authorizing findings.
the counsel to sign & executed the certificate - WON respondent Marilou Gonzales is entitled to
against forum shopping damages - YES
RULING: Petition is DENIED. RTC and CA decisions in - The Court reiterated the existing rule that
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss is AFFIRMED. a breach of promise to marry per se is not
an actionable wrong (citing De Jesus v
Tort and Quasi-delict Syquia, Heart Balm legislation, etc.)
Baksh v. CA - However, the Court held that Article 21 of
Baksh v CA the Civil Code expands the concept of
Tort and Quasi-Delict |G.R. No. 97336 | Feb 19, 1993 torts and quasi-delicts, and serves as a
Davide, J. | Paulo Soller remedy for wrongs not specifically
enumerated by law.
FACTS: - The Court cited the Civil Code
- This case revolves around one can recover Commission in explaining how Article
damages from a breach of promise to marry. 2176 requires payment of damages for
- The respondent, 22-year-old Marilou Gonzales, quasi-delicts, or only negligent acts and
alleges that while working at the Mabuhay omissions. Article 21 (along with 19 and
Luncheonette in Dagupan City, she met the 20) punishes intentional and malicious
petitioner, Iranian Gashem Shookat Baksh, who acts.
was at the time a medical student. - It is not the breach of promise itself that
- They dated for a time, and he eventually proposed could justify awarding of damages, but
to her. After accepting his proposal, respondent the fraud and deceit behind it.
subsequently resigned from her job and began - The Court found that the petitioner made
cohabiting with the petitioner. She claims that she a false promise to marry that he had no
even introduced him to her parents who gave their intention of keeping in order to take
blessing and even began to procure livestock (pigs advantage of the respondent. Without
and chickens), find sponsors, and invite guests for such promise, respondent may never have
the wedding. quit her job, had sexual relations with him,
- Respondent claims that the petitioner’s demeanor or incurred expenses for a wedding.
changed soon after. He began to mistreat her,
 - The Court ruled that he was liable for
damages because of these wrongs that he
willfully inflicted on her.
- Minor Issue: Petitioner proposes that even if he did
propose to marry her, respondent is in pari delicto
for cohabiting with him before marriage. Court
disagreed, she was not driven by lust, but by a
sincere desire to marry him.
RULING: Petition Denied. Gashem Shookat Baksh is liable
for P25,000 worth of damages for fraud and deceit behind
his promise to marry Marilou Gonzales.
Elements of Tort
Garcia v. Salvador
Garcia v Salvador | G.R. No. 168512. March 20, 2007 |
Ynares-Santiago, J. | by Jecs
FACTS:
● Respondent Ranida Salvador, an Accounting Dept.
trainee at Limay Bulk Handling Terminal Inc.,
underwent a medical examination at the
Community Diagnostic Center as a prerequisite for
her regular employment
● Garcia conducted the HBSAg test, the result of
which showed that petitioner was “HBsAg:
Reactive”
○ Said result bore Garcia’s name and
signature and the rubber-stamp signature
of petitioner Castro (as the pathologist)
● Ranida then submitted said test result to her
company’s physician, who then informed
respondent that she was suffering from Hepatitis B
○ Company then terminated her
employment
○ Her father suffered a heart attack after
petitioner informed him of her condition
and was hospitalized
● Respondent then underwent further HBsAg tests
which yielded the ff results
○ Bataan Doctors’ Hospital: non-reactive
○ CDC (confirmatory testing): Negative
○ Bataan Doctors’ Hospital (via Micro-Elisa
Method): Negative
○ CDC: negative
● Ranida and her father then filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners, claiming that because
of the erroneous interpretation of the results, she
lost her job and suffered anxiety, trauma while her
father was hospitalized
● Petitioner Garcia denied allegations of gross
negligence & incompetence while Castro claimed
that the case was only referred to him & did not
examine respondent Ranida
● Trial court DISMISSED the complaint for failure to
present sufficient evidence to prove petitioners’
liability
● CA REVERSED, holding that petitioner Garcia is
liable for damages by way of negligently issuing an
erroneous HBsAg result but exonerated Castro
ISSUE/RATIO: W/N CA erred in holding petitioner Garcia
liable for damages by way of issuing an incorrect HBsAg
result - NO
● Petitioner argues that he shall not be held liable for
damages since he followed the appropriate lab
measure and did everything in his professional
competence to arrive at an objective, impartial and
impersonal resukt
● The Court did note that the issues raised are factual
in nature and is beyond the ambit of petition for
review on certiorari
● It then defined negligence as failure to observe for
the protection of the interest of another that
degree of care, precaution & vigilance which the
circumstances demand, whereby another suffers
injury
○ With regard to health care providers, there
is negligence if s/he failed to do something
which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or did
something that one would not have done
● Elements of actionable conduct are:
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate Causation
- All of which are present in the case at bar
● The Court held that where the law imposes upon a
perosn a duty to do something, his omission or non-
performance will render him liable to whoever may
be injured thereby
● To protect the public from substandard medical
examination, Sec. 2 of RA 4688, DOH AO No. 49-B
series 1998 and Sec. 29 (b) of RA 5527 provide that:
○ Clinical laboratory must be administered,
directed and supervised by a licensed
physician authorized by the DOH Secretary
○ Medical technologist must be under the
supervision of a pathologists/licensed
physician
○ Results may only be released only to the
requesting physician (or representative)
● In this case at bar, petitioner Garcia failed to follow
these standards
○ CDC was not administered, directed and
supervised by a licensed physician but by a
licensed medical technologist
○ Conducted the HBsAg test without the
supervision of Castro
○ Released said result without the
authorization of Castro
● While he did not intend the consequences, his
failure to comply with laws and rules for public
safety is failure to observe reasonably prudent
health care
○ As a result, Ranida suffered from injury
(terminated from work, anxiety, …)
● NCC Art. 20 provides the legal basis for award of
damages to a party who suffers damages whenever
one commits an act in violation of some legal
provision
○ Thus, respondent Ranida established her
right to be awarded damages
RULING: CA decision finding Garcia guilty of gross
negligence & liable to respondents is AFFIRMED
Lucas v. Tuano
Lucas v Tuaño
GR 178763, April 21, 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J. | by R. Leal
Doctrine:
In a medical negligence suit, the patient or his heirs, in order
to prevail, is required to prove by preponderance of
evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of
skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the
same profession; and that as a proximate result of such
failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.
Four essential elements must be established and must co-
exist in order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable
for damages:
-Duty
-Breach
-Injury
-Proximate causation
FACTS & Recit Summary:
• Sometime in 1988, petitioner Peter Paul Patrick
Lucas contracted "sore eyes" in his right eye.
• •
• Sept 2, 1988 - Upon consultation with Dr. Tuano,
Peter narrated that it has been 9 days since the
problem with his right eye began, and that he was
already taking Maxitrol to address the eye problem.
• According to Dr. Tuano, he performed "ocular
routine examination" on Peter's eyes, wherein:
o a cross examination Peter's eyes and their
surrounding area was made
o Peter's visual acuity were taken
o Peter's eyes were palpated to check the
intraocular pressure of each
o the mortility of Peter's eyes were
observed,
o the ophthalmoscopy on Peter's eyes was
used.
• •
• Dr. Tuano diagnosed that Peter was suffering from
conjunctivitis or sore eyes. He then prescribed
Spersacet C-eye drops for Peter.
• •
• Sept 9, 1988 - Dr. Tuano discovered that the right
eye developed Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis, EKC,
a viral infection.
o To address the problem, Dr. Tuano
prescribed Maxitrol, for a dosage of 6
times a day.
• •
• However, the EKC was getting worse and Dr. Tuano
still continued on advising the use of Maxittrol,
despite Peter's wife’s discovery of the inscribed
warning written in its label.
• •
• December 28, 1988 - Upon examination, Dr. Tuano
noted the hardness in Peter's right eye and
discovered that the tension in Peter's right eye was
39.0 Hg.
•
o Since the tension was way over the
normal IOP which only ranged from 10.0
Hg to 21.0 Hg, Dr. Tuano then ordered him
to immediately discontinue the use of
Maxitrol and prescribed to the latter
Diamox and Normoglaucon instead.
o He also required Peter to go for a daily
check-up in order for the former to closely
monitor the pressure of the latter' eyes.
•
• He referred Peter to Dr. Manuel Agulto, M.D.,
another opthalmologist specializing in glaucoma
treatment.
•
• January 13, 1989 - Prodded by his friends, Lucas
went to Dr. Aquino, another ophthalmologist who
confirmed Tuano’s findings of him having tubular
vision.
o It was also through dr. Aquino that Lucas
found that his condition would require
lifetime medication and follow ups
•
May 1990 and June 1991, Peter underwent two (2)
procedures of laser trabeculoplasty to attempt to
control the high IOP of his right eye.
• Eventually, Peter, in claiming to have "steroid-
induced glaucoma" and blaming Dr. Tuano for the
same, filed a complaint for damages against Dr.
Tuano.
•
• In their complaint, petitioners averred that as the
direct consequence of Peter's prolonged use of
Maxitrol, he suffered from steroid-induced
glaucoma which may cause blindness
o They also claimed that a direct result of
this was the deterioration of Lucas’
personal life, career, and his family’s
financial situation.
• Dr. Tuano asserted that the treatment made by him
more than three years ago has no causal connection
to Peter's glaucoma.
• He further explained that 'drug-induced glaucoma
is temporary and curable, steroids have the side
effect of increasing intraocular pressure. Steroids
are prescribed to treat Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis or EKC which is an infiltration of the
cornea as a result of conjunctivitis or sore eyes'.
• He also claimed that it was actually through his
prescriptions and action that a condition that barely
had any symptoms was able to be detected and be
treated earlier.
 • Petitioners sought pecuniary award for their pain
and suffering supposedly brought about by Dr
Tuano’s negligence.
o The amount of P2,000,000.00 to plaintiff
Peter Lucas as and by way of
compensation for his impaired vision.
o The amount of P300,000.00 to spouses
Lucas as and by way of actual damages
plus such additional amounts that may be
proven during trial.
o The amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by
way of moral damages.
o The amount of P500,000.00 as and by way
of exemplary damages.
o The amount of P200,000.00 as and by way
of attorney's fees plus costs of suit.
• •
• The RTC dismissed the Civil Case for insufficiency of
evidence.
o It was said that petitioners failed to prove
by preponderance of evidence that Dr.
Tuano was negligent in his treatment of
Peter's condition.
o The trial court reasoned that the
recognized standards of the medical
community has not been established in
this case, much less has causation been
established to render Dr. Tuano liable.
o Further, absence of any medical evidence
to the contrary, the RTC ruled that it
cannot accept petitioner's claim that the
use of steroid is the proximate cause of the
damage sustained by Peter's eye.
• by opinions of expert witnesses belonging
• The CA faulted petitioners because they failed to
present any medical expert to testify that Dr.
Tuano's prescription of Maxitrol and Blephamide
for the treatment of EKC on petiitioner's right eye
was not proper and that his palpation of Peter's
right eye was not enough to detect adverse reaction
to steroid.
o They testified what Dr Agulto had said
about not using the steroids but the same
doctor had not been presented as a
witness
• o that Dr. Tuaño failed in his duty to exercise
ISSUE:
WON the CA had committed a reversible error in deciding
that the petitioners had NOT amply proved that Dr. Tuaño
failed to exercise diligence in the performance of his duty
as petitioner Peter Lucas’ physician. – NO
• The issue at hand was a question of fact and only
questions of law may be raised under Rule 45 of the
ROC
o The said issue constitutes a question of
fact, as the Supreme Court is asked to
revisit anew the factual findings of the RTC
and the CA. While this general rule admits
of certain exceptions, such as the
circumstance when the finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence, but is
contradicted by the evidence on record.
• The fact of want of competence or diligence is
evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can best
be passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is
virtually impossible to ascertain the merits of a
medical negligence case without extensive
investigation, research, evaluation and consultation
with the medical experts.
•
• Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence
required of Dr. Tuaño under the circumstances, the
Court has no yardstick to evaluate the facts to be
able to state with confidence that the acts
complained of constituted negligence and should
be the subject of pecuniary reparation.
• In medical negligence cases there exist a physician-
patient relationship between the doctor and the
victim.
o But just like any other proceeding for
damages, four essential (4) elements i.e.,
▪ Duty
▪ Breach
▪ Injury
▪ proximate causation,
• must be established by the
plaintiff/s.
o All the four (4) elements must co-exist in
order to find the physician negligent and,
thus, liable for damages.
o From the foregoing, it is apparent that
medical negligence cases are best proved
in the same general neighborhood and in
the same general line of practice as
defendant physician or surgeon.
•
• In this case, there was absolute failure on the part
of petitioners to present any expert testimony to
establish:
o the standard of care to be implemented by
competent physicians in treating the same
condition as Peter's under similar
circumstances
said standard of care that any other
competent physician would use in treating
the same condition as Peter's under
similar circumstances;
o and that the injury or damage to Peter's
right eye, i.e., his glaucoma, was the result
of his use of Maxitrol, as prescribed by Dr.
Tuaño.
•
• Because of the lack of evidence- from the absence
of any expert opinion- of the petition, they were
able to determine, with certainty, that Tuano’s acts
were indeed negligent.
•
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated 27
September 2006 and Resolution dated 3 July 2007, both of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666, are hereby
AFFIRMED. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Ocean Builders v. Spouses
Ocean Builders v. Sps. Cubacub | G.R. No. 150898 | April 13,
2011 | Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS
● Bladimir Cabacub was employed as a maintenance
personnel by Ocean Builders (pet'r)
● Bladimir was infected with chickenpox and was
advised by Dennis Hao, the company's manager, to
take a 3-day rest
● 3 days later, Bladimir went back to work but later
that afternoon, he asked a co-worker to accompany
him to his house in Tarlac so he could rest
● The co-worker informed Hao of Bladimir's
intentions and Hao gave him 1,000 pesos with
instructions to take Bladimir to the nearest hospital
● Bladimir was confined in the hospital where he was
placed in the ICU; he died the next day
● Bladimir's parents (respondents) filed a complaint
for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao
was guilty of negligence which resulted in the
deterioration of Bladimir's health which led to his
subsequent death
● Tarlac RTC dismissed the case, holding that the
petitioner wasn't negligent
● Upon the respondents' appeal, the CA reversed the
trial court ruling, stating that Hao's failure to bring
Bladimir to a better equipped hospital was a
violation of Article 161 of the Labor Code
● Hence, the present petition
ISSUES
1. W/N Hao is liable for damages due to negligence -
NO
● Elements of torts
1. duty
2. breach
3. injury
4. proximate causation
● When the Labor Code mandates an employer to
provide immediate medical and dental attendance
to sick and injured employees, it does not specify
what "adequate and immediate" means.
○ Therefore, the determination is left to the
employer EXCEPT if the
company retained the services of a nurse
or physician
○ Herein company's size (employee-wise)
does not warrant the retention of either a
nurse or a physician under Art. 157 of the
Labor Code
○ Hence, Hao's advice for Bladimir to take a
3-day rest and his later initiative to have
the latter brought to a hospital sufficiently
fulfills the adequate and immediate
medical attendance required by Art. 160 of
the Labor Code
● In any case, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot
be considered to be the proximate cause of
Bladimir's death
○ Proximate cause is that which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces
injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred
○ An injury or damage is proximately caused
by an act or omission whenever it
appears from the evidence that the act or
omission played a substantial part in
bringing about the injury or damage, and
that the injury or damage was either a
direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission
○ The argument that the company's
negligence was the proximate cause of
Bladimir's death rests on the allegation
that he contracted chicken pox
from a co-worker, an assertion that finds
no support from the records
RULING
Appeal granted. The decision of the CA is reversed
and the complaint against the petitioner is dismissed
RELEVANT LAWS
Labor Code, ART. 161. Assistance of Employer - It shall be the
duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance
to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental
attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in
case of emergency.
ART. 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. - It shall
be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in
any locality with free medical and dental attendance and
facilities consisting of:
a. The services of a full-time registered nurse when
the number of employees exceeds fifty
(50) but not more than two hundred (200) except
when the employer does not maintain hazardous
workplaces, in which case, the services of a
graduate first-aider shall be provided for the
protection of workers, where no registered nurse is
available. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment shall provide by appropriate
regulations, the services that shall be required
where the number of employees does not exceed
fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order,
hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;
b. The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-
time physician and dentist, and an emergency
clinic, when the number of employees
exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than
three hundred (300); and
c. The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a
full-time registered nurse as well
as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency
 hospital with one bed capacity for every one
hundred (100) employees when the number of
employees exceeds three hundred (300).
BERSAMIN, J. (Dissenting Opinion)
● Disagrees with the majority opinion that the
petitioner was not negligent
● Argues that the size of Ocean Builders warrants that
they have a least a first-aid practitioner
○ The admitted failure to provide to the
employees, in general, and to
Bladimir, in particular, any of the several
free emergency medical and dental
services and facilities required by the
Labor Code and the implementing rules
and regulations of the Department of
Labor and Employment removed the
foundation for absolving the
petitioners from liability
● Hao's instructions for Bladimir to rest in the
company barracks falls short of the requires
standard of medical attention in the Labor Code as
the barracks is a poor place for recuperation, the
arrangement of which actually promotes
the spreading of the varicella virus
○ Hao's refusal to allow Bladimir to obtain
complete and proper rest led to the
latter's death
○ The former's attitude enabled the
complications of chickenpox to
set in and aggravate Bladimir's condition
○ Hao's insistence that Bladimir be brought
to the hospital was superficial, too little,
and too late
Concept of Quasi-Delict
Historical Background
Barredo v. Garcia
Sources of Obligation | G.R. No. 48006 July 8, 1942 | Bocobo,
J. | by Susano, J
FACTS
● May 3, 1936, 1:30 AM, road between Malabon and
Navotas
○ head-on collision between a taxi (Malate
Taxicab) driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis
○ Fontanilla was driving at a high speed on
the wrong side of the road
○ carretela was overturned and one of its
passengers, 16 y/o Faustino Garcia
suffered injuries from which he died 2 days
later
● criminal action filed against Fontanilla in CFI Rizal.
convicted
○ court in crim case granted the petition that
the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved
● CA affirmed sentence in crim case
● Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario (parents of
deceased) brought action in CFI Manila vs Faustino
Barredo (proprietor of Malate Taxicab, Fontanilla’s
employer)
○ CFI awarded damages in favor of the
parents (P2,000 with interest
● CA reduced damages to P1,000 with interest
○ undisputed that the cause of the accident
was Fontanilla’s negligence
○ as to Barredo: no proof that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage
○ he was careless in employing Fontanilla
who had been caught several times for
speeding
○ must indemnify plaintiffs under Art. 1903
CC
● main theory of the defense: Barredo’s liability is
governed by the RPC, therefore, subsidiary
○ since no civil action vs Fontanilla (person
criminally liable), Barredo can’t be held
responsible
ISSUE
WON plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly responsible
under Art. 1903 CC as employer of Fontanilla
HELD: YES
● quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) - separate legal
institution under CC; entirely apart and
independent from a delict
● art. 1902 CC seems to be broad enough to cover the
driver’s negligence in this case, but the same article
limits quasi-delicts to acts or omissions not
punishable by law
● but art. 365 RPC punishes simple and reckless
imprudence or negligence; fault or negligence
under 1902 CC is crowded out
● however, such a concurrence of scope in regard to
negligent acts does not destroy distinction between
civil liability arising from a crime and responsibility
for quasi-delicts
○ the same negligent act causing damages
may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under art. 100 RPC, or create an
action for quasi-delict under arts. 1902-10
CC
● differences between crimes (RPC) and quasi-delict
(CC)
○ crimes affect public interest, quasi-delicts
are private
○ RPC punishes/corrects a criminal act, CC
repairs the damage through
indemnification
○ crimes are punished only if there is a penal
law governing them, quasi-delicts include
all acts in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes
● in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a
quasi-delict has been fully and clearly recognized
 ○ the same act of negligence can be a proper
subject matter either of a crim action with
its corresponding civil liability arising from
crime OR of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for
fault/negligence
● cases regarding the liability of employers
○ Bahia v Litonjua and Leynes
■ when an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee there
instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on
the part of the employer either in
selection or supervision (or both)
■ this presumption is juris tantum
and may be rebutted by a
showing that the employer had
exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family
■ responsibility of the master based
ultimately on his own negligence,
not his servant’s
○ Court in Cerf v Medel
■ master liable for negligent acts of
his servant where he is the owner
or director of a business or
enterprise and the negligent acts
are committed while the servant
is engaged in his master's
employment as such owner
○ Cuison v Norton & Harrison Co
■ basis of civil law liability is
relationship of pater familias (not
respondent/superior)
○ Walter A. Smith & Co v Cadwallader
Gibson Lumber
■ presumption of liability against
the defendant may be overcome
by the exercise of the care and
diligence of a good father of a
family
● primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles to protect
society
● GOING BACK TO THE PRESENT CASE
○ defendant’s theory about his secondary
liability is negated by the aforementioned
cases
○ he is primarily and directly liable for
damages under art. 1903 CC
RULING: CA decision affirmed. Barredo is liable for damages.
Nature
Article 1157, CC
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
Definition, Elements
Article 2176, CC
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. (1902a)
Scope, Intentional Acts
Article 2176, CC
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. (1902a)
Cangco v. Manila Railroad
G.R.No.12191 October 14, 1918 | Cangco v Manila Railroad
Co. | Fisher, J | Lansangan, J.
Facts:
1. Jose Cangco was a clerk for Manila Railroad. At
7/8pm after work, he was about to get off the
station near home but slipped on a shipment of
watermelons.
a. The row of sacks of melons only had a
clearance of 2ft from the platform and he
didn’t see them due to the cover of night.
2. He rolled down because the platform rose gradually
and his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated
and he was drawn under the train in an unconscious
state.
3. He was hospitalized and his arm was amputated.
The result was unsatisfactory so he had to go to a
2nd hospital and it was amputated higher up.
4. Cangco instituted a proceeding to recover damages
from MR. He claimed that the negligence of the
employees of the MR in placing the melons
haphazardly compromised the safety and security
of passengers alighting from the coaches.
5. CFI judge ruled against him stating that he failed to
use caution in alighting.
6. The court does not doubt that the employees are
liable in not taking precaution and being negligent
in placing the shipment. The question is on the
liability of MR and if Cangco has any contributory
negligence.
Issues: W/N Manila Railroad is liable for the resulting
damages due to the negligence of its employees. -YES
1. As per Art 1903 (now Art ----) an employer’s liability
may be rebutted by proof of exercise of due care in
their selection of employees. In such case then only
the employee may be held liable (i.e. as long as the
damage does not amount to a breach between the
employer and the person injured).
2. However, as per Art 1903 (now Art ----) if the
contract is breached, then even if it is by the
employee’s negligence the employer may not
escape liability (if they were able to, then most
juridical entities would be untouchable since
employees would take the fall).
 3. In this case, MR’s legal liability is founded on its
contract of carriage and hence the burden of proof
that they were not negligent falls upon them.
a. MR had the duty to carry Cangco safely.
Since it is contractual in nature, it is
therefore direct and immediate (i.e. non-
excusable and cannot be imputed to its
employees).
W/N Cangco had any contributory negligence which may
hinder him from recovering damages. –NO
4. Test of negligence (Picart v Snith): was there
anything in the circumstances surrounding the
plaintiff at the time he alighted which would have
admonished a person of average prudence that to
get off the train under the conditions then existing
was dangerous?
a. As per Commentaries on Negligence by
Thompson, age, sex, and condition of the
passenger should also be taken into
consideration.
5. Cangco was young and strong. Athough he alighted
six meters prior to the train’s full stop, he was more
than capable to handle the landing.
6. Furthermore, people exit under these conditions
day in day out without harm.
7. Court found that it’s the placement of the shipment
that caused the injury. Cangco gets off at the same
stop every day without any problems and had every
reason to believe that the platform would be clear.
8. The platform was also dimly lit hence it would have
been difficult to see any obstacles. MR had the duty
to warn its passengers of the unusual circumstance
(melons).
Ruling:
9. Injuries permanently disabled him from his
employment; lower court decision is reversed,
damages should be awarded to Cangco (Php3290).
Dissent (Malcolm, J):
10. Malcolm cites this particular line from the majority
opinion: “It may be admitted that had plaintiff
waited until the train had come to a full stp before
alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could
not have occurred.”
11. Malcolm states that any attempt to alight from a
moving train is negligence per se. That said, Cangco
had contributory negligence and MR should be
absolved from the complaint.
Elcano v. Hill
Elcano v. Hill
Scope Intentional Acts | G.R. No. L-24803. May 26, 1977|
Barredo, J. | By Luy, C.
FACTS:
❖ This is an appeal from the order of the CFI of Quezon
City dated which dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs
for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a
minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his
father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was
living and getting subsistence
❖ In this case, the defendant-appellee Reginald Hill was
prosecuted criminally in the CFI of Quezon City for killing
Agapito, the son of plaintiffs-appellants.
❖ However, he was acquitted on the ground that his act
was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake."
ISSUES & RATIO:
1. W/N the present civil action for damages is barred
by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability was not
reversed?
❖ Citing the opinion from the Garcia case, the court here
elucidated that said opinion holds that the concurrence
of the Penal Code and the Civil Code contemplate not
only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary
acts but also extends to fault or culpa
❖ "ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
❖ According to the Code Commission: “Under Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall
not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery."
❖ The Court held that Article 2176, which defines a quasi-
delict, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers
not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent.
❖ Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted. So long as the
offended party is not allowed, to recover damages on
both scores (i.e. criminal prosecution and civil liability
from quasi-delict), and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
❖ The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused.
❖ It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill
in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.
2. W/N Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the
Civil Code may be applied against Atty. Hill, the
father of the offender notwithstanding the fact
that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald was
already legally married, although still a minor,
living with and getting subsistence from his
father?
❖ The court held that Atty. Hill, the father of the offender,
is not free from responsibility.
❖ While it is true that parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code),
and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear
that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage
of the minor is not really full or absolute.
❖ According to the court, Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is
that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom
to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action.
❖ Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company."
❖ In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald,
although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Thus, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father.
❖ According to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of parents with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent
to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons.
❖ Accordingly, in the court’s view, Article 2180 applies to
Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage
of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability
of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his
son.
RULING:
❖ WHEREFORE, the order appealed from which dismissed
the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages is
reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.
Separate opinion:
AQUINO, J., concurring:
❖ “Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any
culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by
accepted legal standards. "The idea thus expressed is
undoubtedly board enough to include any rational
conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be
developed in any society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs.
Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587,
600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the
infant tort feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured
person in the same manner and to the same extent as
an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in
Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).”
Andamo v. IAC
Andamo v IAC
GR 74761, November 6, 1990 | Fernan, J. | by R. Leal
Doctrine:
FACTS & Recit Summary:
• Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land in Biga,
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
respondent, Missionaries of our Lady of La Salette,
Inc., a religious corporation
• Within the land of the missionaries, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed
• Said structures allegedly inundated and eroded the
petitioner’s land, endangered the lives of Andamo’s
and laborers during the rainy season, and exposed
plants and other improvements to destruction
• Andamos then filed before the RTC a criminal action
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay, and Rutillo
Mallillin, officers and directors of the missionaries,
for destruction by means of inundation under Art
324 of RPC
• Another action was filed by the Andamos, a civil
action for damages with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction before the same
court
• Missionaries filed its answer to the complaint and
opposition to the issuance of a writ of prelim
injuction.
• RTC granted the motion to dismiss or suspend the
civil action filed by missionaries and issued an order
suspending further hearings in the civil action until
after judgement in the related criminal action.
o This is on the groud that Sec 3 (a), Rule III
of the ROC provides that criminal and civil
actions arising from the same offense may
be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced, the
civil action cant be instituted until final
judgement has been rendered in the
criminal action
• IAC affirmed RTC
•
ISSUE:
WON the corporation, by its actions (as found in the case),
be held civilly liable for damages under Art 2176 and 2177
of the Civil code on quasi-delicts- such that the resulting
civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case –
YES
• All elements of Quasi-delicts are present:
o Damages suffered by the plaintiff
o Fault or negligence of the defendant
o The connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the
damage incurred
• It is clear from the case that the waterpaths,
contrivances, and lake built by the missionaries
have inundated and eroded the land of the
complainant. Damage-fault-connection of cause
and effect exists in the case.
• It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is
not without limitations
• Art 431 of Civil code provides that ‘the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
 to injure the rights of a third person” “SIC UTERE
TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS”.
• Adjoining land owners have mutual and reciprocal
duties which require that each must use his own
land in a reasonable manner.
• Structures built on land must be constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining owners.
• relationship) that this was a fact.
• -
RULING:
Assailed decision of IAC affirming the order of dismissal of
RTC Cavite is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE
Baksh v. CA
Baksh v CA
Tort and Quasi-Delict |G.R. No. 97336 | Feb 19, 1993
Davide, J. | Paulo Soller
FACTS:
- This case revolves around one can recover
damages from a breach of promise to marry.
- The respondent, 22-year-old Marilou Gonzales,
alleges that while working at the Mabuhay
Luncheonette in Dagupan City, she met the
petitioner, Iranian Gashem Shookat Baksh, who
was at the time a medical student.
- They dated for a time, and he eventually proposed
to her. After accepting his proposal, respondent
subsequently resigned from her job and began
cohabiting with the petitioner. She claims that she
even introduced him to her parents who gave their
blessing and even began to procure livestock (pigs
and chickens), find sponsors, and invite guests for
the wedding.
- Respondent claims that the petitioner’s demeanor
changed soon after. He began to mistreat her,
kicked her out of their home, and refused to
uphold his engagement to her, eventually claiming
that he was already married to another woman in
Bacolod.
- The petitioner, on the other hand, denies promising
to marry the respondent and mistreating her, and
claims that he asked her to stop coming to his home
because she was stealing from him.
- The respondent filed a suit for P45,000 worth of
damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs worth
P600. The petitioner filed a counterclaim for
P25,000 worth of moral damages and P5,000 for
miscellaneous expenses.
- Trial Court applied Article 21 of the Civil Code in
awarding respondent a total of P25,000 (10k
moral, 5k attorney and litigation expenses).
Decision affirmed by Court of Appeals.
- Petitioner finally appealed to the Supreme Court,
questioning whether or not Article 21 should
indeed apply to the case at bar.
ISSUE:
- WON petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh actually
proposed to respondent Marilou Gonzales - YES
- The Court held that this is a question of
fact which may not be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari.
- The trial court found through the
testimony of the respondent (she wouldn’t
expose her honor and reputation for a lie)
and her witnesses (family and coworkers
testified about marriage preparations and
SC found no reason to disturb these
findings.
- WON respondent Marilou Gonzales is entitled to
damages - YES
- The Court reiterated the existing rule that
a breach of promise to marry per se is not
an actionable wrong (citing De Jesus v
Syquia, Heart Balm legislation, etc.)
- However, the Court held that Article 21 of
the Civil Code expands the concept of
torts and quasi-delicts, and serves as a
remedy for wrongs not specifically
enumerated by law.
- The Court cited the Civil Code
Commission in explaining how Article
2176 requires payment of damages for
quasi-delicts, or only negligent acts and
omissions. Article 21 (along with 19 and
20) punishes intentional and malicious
acts.
- It is not the breach of promise itself that
could justify awarding of damages, but
the fraud and deceit behind it.
- The Court found that the petitioner made
a false promise to marry that he had no
intention of keeping in order to take
advantage of the respondent. Without
such promise, respondent may never have
quit her job, had sexual relations with him,
or incurred expenses for a wedding.
- The Court ruled that he was liable for
damages because of these wrongs that he
willfully inflicted on her.
- Minor Issue: Petitioner proposes that even if he did
propose to marry her, respondent is in pari delicto
for cohabiting with him before marriage. Court
disagreed, she was not driven by lust, but by a
sincere desire to marry him.
RULING: Petition Denied. Gashem Shookat Baksh is liable
for P25,000 worth of damages for fraud and deceit behind
his promise to marry Marilou Gonzales.
Quasi-delict and Delict – Overlap
LG Foods v. Philadelfa
L.G. Foods v. Philadelfa | G.R. No. 158995 | Sept. 26, 2006 |
Garcia, J.
FACTS
● Charles Vallereja (victim), child of the present
respondents, was hit by a car owned by the
 petitioners and driven by their employee Vincent based on quasi-delict precisely because
Yeneza the death of the driver renders an action
○ Charles died because of the accident based on delict an impossibility
● A criminal case for reckelss imprudence resulting to ● The petitioners also argue that the respondents
homicide was filed against Yeneza but before the faield to reserve the right to file a separate civil
trial could be conclude, he committed suicide action and so when the criminal case was
○ The criminal case was subsequently dismissed, the civil case was dismissed with it
dismissed ○ the Court finds no merit in this argument
● The respondents filed a complaint for damages ○ since the criminal case was terminated
against petitioners, alleging that the latter failed to prematurely owing to the driver's death,
exercise due diligence in the selection and no pronouncement could be made as to
supervision of their employees the merits of the case; therefore, it is
● The petitioners responded with a Motion to as if there was no criminal case in the first
Dismiss, stating that the complaint is a claim for place
subsidiary liability against an employer under Art.
103 of the RPC RULING
○ The petitioners contend that a condition Petition denied.
sine qua non of such claim is a criminal
conviction of the driver
○ ergo, since the case was dismissed before
a conviction was pronounced, the
petitioners may not be held subsidiarily
liable
● The RTC denied the motion to dismiss
● Upon appeal, the CA upheld the RTC decision
● Hence, the present petition assailing the CA's
choice of upholding the RTC's ruling

ISSUES
1. W/N the cause of action of the respondents is
founded upon Art. 103 of the RPC - NO
● the petitioner's motion to dismiss lacks merit as the
respondents' claim was not founded upon RPC Art.
103; in fact, the respondents did not even try to
aver the basic elements of subsidiary liability under
said provision
● although not explicitly stated, it is clear from their
allegations that the respondents' remedy of choice
was quasi-delict
○ victims of negligence or their heirs have a
choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from culpa criminal
under Art. 100 of the RPC, and an action
for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Art.
2176 to 2194 of CC
○ If, like in the present case, the action
chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may
hold the employer liable for the negligent
act of its employee (subject to the
employer's defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father)
○ Under Art. 2180 of the CC, the liability of
the employer is direct/immediate and is
not conditioned upon a prior recourse
against an employeee
● In the present case, the respondents sufficiently
alleged that the death of their son was caused by
the negligence of the petitioners' driver and that
the petitioners themselves were civilly laible for
failing to exercise the necessary diligence in
selecting and supervising their driver
○ the court is constrained to conclude that
the action filed by the respondents is one