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values of network spot prices in large power systems, are
presented. Let also the network regulation be such that the optimal
investment rule is followed: To invest in transmission facilities in
The results have been checked in large networks and are order to reduce as much as possible the operation costs of the
illustrated with numerical examples. system, but only while the incremental investment cost is smaller
than the resulting savings in operation expenses.
1. INTRODUCTION.
It happens that, when the optimal network investment rule is
The lack of a satisfactory procedure for pricing network services followed, conditions for perfect competition exist and there are
is a major obstacle in the current debate on transmission no economies of scale in transmission, expression (1) allows the
regulation that is taking place in different parts of the world. network to recover exactly its total costs (i.e., investment costs,
with the associated O&M costs), see [5].
The problem being addressed here is the allocation of the total
costs (i.e., capital and maintenance costs) of a transmission One problem with using expression (1) to remunerate the
network among all its users. This is different from the "wheeling network entity is that its value increases when the network
problem", see [1 to 4] for instance, where the objective is to performance deteriorates, i.e., more losses and congestion,
determine the extra costs of (typically) a vertically integrated therefore creating perverse incentives for the network entity
utility because of a given power transit within or across its regarding new investments and maintenance practices. This has
borders. to be dealt with via adequate regulation schemes: standards of
network performance with associated penalties or credits and,
The former problem arises when access to a transmission most importantly, a remuneration method that guarantees the
network (regardless of the number of its owners) is made fully recovery of rightly incurred network costs; some elements of
available to all the system agents, without discrimination, for a competition, e.g., via competitive bidding for new investments,
fee. This is the situation in some of the countries with an may also be useful.
independently owned transmission network and a liberalized
electricity market, like Chile, England and Wales, New Zealand The second problem with (1) is that in actual systems, because of
or Argentina. This may also be the case of the Single Electricity the existence of important effects of economies of scale and other
Market of the European Community under some of the schemes deviations from the ideal conditions stated above, the network
of third party access (TPA) that have been proposed. revenues from (1) fall significantly short from recovering the
total costs of the network. Therefore the variable charges in (1)
Transmission pricing is a complex matter that has to meet several must be topped with a complementary charge that allows full
and often conflicting requirements: financial viability of the recovery. This last charge must take the form of lump sums, so
network entity itself, promotion of economic efficiency of the that they interfere as least as possible with the optimal economic
electricity market in the short and long term and quality of signals and do not distort them [6].
supply in the provision of transmission services.
In this paper it is analyzed, both theoretically and ∂Z
computationally, the potential use of a decomposition of the spot λm + ∑ µ ∂d
k
price ρk of any node k into a generator component γ and a ρk =γ + γ ∂L - ∑ µ ∂Z , with γ= (3)
∂dk ∂dk ∂L
1+
network component ηk: ∂dm
where ρk = spot price at node k.
ρk = γ + ηk (2) dk = load demand at node k.
m = marginal generator.
The motivation for such a breakdown is multifold. First, because L = Total ohmic losses in the system.
even in markets that are based on marginal pricing, it may be Z = Vector of voltage magnitudes and line power
decided to price transmission services separately from generation flows.
services (this is currently the case of England and Wales, for γ
instance). Moreover, in systems where transactions are priced at = Lagrange multiplier associated to the global
the full spot price ρk (such as Chile or Argentina), there is often energy balance equation.
µ = Vector of Lagrange multipliers associated to the
a node that, because of its relevance as the centre of mass of the
corresponding constraints of Z.
market (this is exactly the case with Santiago or Buenos Aires),
is chosen as the reference for the computation of spot prices and λm = Incremental cost of the marginal generator.
transmission charges, therefore suggesting that γ could be
adopted as the marginal price at the reference node. Also, there is The interpretation of the several terms in (3) is not obvious and
the case of systems where electricity prices are not based on related material in the technical literature does not help in
marginalistic principles but there is the need to find a convincing clarifying this issue. In the first place it must be realized that (3)
transmission pricing method; this situation may result when has been derived from a specific formulation of the composite
trying to implement third party access to a network. Finally, generation-transmission optimal dispatch problem. In particular
fundamental to any transmission cost allocation method that is the formulation in [1] contains a global energy balance equation
based on marginal prices is the ability to recognize and compute (with γ being its multiplier) and a slack node. Alternative
the several components of the spot prices, so that the formulations are possible (see later), resulting in different
contributions of each user to the network costs can be identified expressions for γ in (3).
and understood.
In the original references [1,8] γ has been loosely referred to as
More specifically, the paper makes the following contributions: the 'system λ', which is defined in the classical coordination
equations of economic dispatch as the system marginal operation
i) To demonstrate the physical meaning and the numerical cost when the total load demand is increased by a unit according
properties of the "generation" and "transmission" to a predetermined distribution among the nodes [12,13]. This is
components of the spot price, describing their calculation
procedure and showing the dependence of their numerical in part due to the coincidence of γ in (3) with the classical
value on the formulation of the computation model that is definition of the 'system λ' when µ is null (the classical
adopted. coordination equations ignore the network limit constraints so
that µ does not exist). On the other hand γ has also been
ii) To generalize the notions of "slack node" and "system interpreted as the spot price of the node chosen as the slack [1],
lambda" so that the user can precisely define the meaning of which is in conflict with the previous definition even if the slack
the generation component of the spot price and adapt it to is always chosen as the node with the marginal generator. To
the particular type of market regulation. these complications we must add the existing controversy about
the right meaning of the 'system λ' and the correct method to
iii) To present several still unpublished properties of the compute it [10].
spot prices, which can be useful in interpreting the
numerical values of network spot prices in large power These discussions are very meaningful because, from inspection
systems. of equation (3), one may decompose the spot price into a
component γ that only depends on time, and a both time and node
These concepts are illustrated with numerical examples that have
dependent component ηk:
been obtained using JUANAC, see [7], a computer program that
can calculate spot prices in large power networks.
∂L ∂Z
ρk = γ + ηk , where ηk = γ ∂d - ∑ µ ∂d (4)
2. COMPUTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF SPOT k k
PRICES. Since the spot price coincides with γ when a single node model is
used, in some instances this component has been identified as the
The objective of this section is to extend previously published
"generation" component of the spot price and ηk as the
results [1,8,9,10] while placing a particular emphasis on the
contributions of the network to the spot prices. Recent activity in "network" component of the spot price [1]. This decomposition
this area is reported in [7,11], for instance. We ignore for might be useful in cost assignment schemes, as the one being
simplicity the reactive component of the spot price. However, the discussed later in this paper. In the next subsection the precise
conclusions, interpretations and properties derived below can be meaning of each term of (3) is made clear, its relationship to the
easily extended to the reactive component. particular model formulation is established and the validity of the
proposed decomposition of the spot price into a generation and a
2.1 Summary of previous results. network component is discussed in depth.
The spot price can be defined as the spatially and temporarily 2.2 Interpretation of the spot price expression.
varying short term marginal cost with respect to changes in
demand. The mathematical derivation of the active component of 2.2.1 Basic formulation.
the spot price leads to the well known expression [1,8]:
It is important to realize that expression (3) and the definition of We can then express ρk as
spot price only make sense in the context of an optimization
problem, in which the operation costs are minimized while
subject to network and other operating constraints. ρk = ρs (1 + ∂L ) - ∑ µ ∂Z (7)
∂dk |s ∂dk |s
As it was mentioned before, the starting point of the analysis on
that is independent of the premise of existence of a slack bus (see
the meaning of γ in equation (3) is that it is the Lagrange the appendix for a demonstration):
multiplier corresponding to the total power balance equation in
the corresponding power flow model. Any further interpretation
ρk = ρk (1 + ∂L ∂Z
∂dk1 |k ) - µ ∂dk1 |k
depends on this specific model formulation. In the context of ∑ (8)
1 2
geographically differentiated marginal costing, the most pertinent 2 2
power flow models are those making use of the Jacobian matrix The interest of this equation is that all of its terms are
[12,13] or simplifications of it such as the DC load flow independent of the way the power flow equations are formulated;
equations [12,13], or extended DC formulations that take into one typically sets up the n-1 node power balance equations plus
account ohmic losses [2,7]; in all of these models typically a the global power balance equation (this is usually done in load
power balance equation is established for all nodes except for flows), or alternatively sets up the n node power balance
one that is called the slack node. This is equivalent to equations (as it is usually done in optimal load flows). Therefore
recognizing that all the generator outputs are independent (8) is independent of the model formulation.
variables of the model, except for the output of the slack bus.
Another important result of this subsection is to show that the
Let us work first under this premise of an explicit slack bus. It term γ appearing in definition (3) of the spot price is model
implies that any partial derivatives will measure the sensitivity of dependent, and that, under the two modeling options described
a function with respect to an independent variable while above, it coincides with the spot price of the slack node.
maintaining all the remaining independent variables fixed, and
therefore the outputs of all the generators must be kept fixed, Therefore, in these cases γ could hardly be interpreted as the
except for the slack one. This rule has a direct physical 'system λ' or as the generation component of the spot price. We
interpretation: the slack generator shifts its output in order to can point out, however, that it will coincide with the improperly
maintain the electric balance of the system. These considerations called 'system λ' that is obtained from the classical coordination
are extensively exposed in [12,10,14]. In order to make explicit equations, when they are based on a loss formula (B loss
this important issue, we will use all along this section a notation coefficients) derived from the inverse of the Jacobian [12]. The
∂F losses in this formula are expressed in function of n-1 injections,
borrowed from [14]: ∂x represents that the partial derivative of with a slack node being in charge of maintaining the electric
|y
balance.
a function F with respect to an independent variable x is
computed while letting the dependent variable y to vary as
2.2.2 The spot price and the 'system λ'.
needed.
Our objective now will be to express the spot price as a function
This leads us to mathematically precise and physically
of the "total system incremental cost" (TSIC), defined as the
meaningful expressions for both the spot price and γ: increment in the operation cost when the total demand is
increased by a unit according to a predeterminated distribution ti
∂Z
λm + ∑ µ ∂d among the nodes (ℜti=1). Note that this is a generalization of the
m|s
ρk = γs + γs ∂L - ∑ µ ∂Z γ procedure to compute the 'system λ' in the classical coordination
∂dk |s ∂dk |s ; s = ∂L (5)
equations when a loss formula (B loss coefficients), function of
1 + ∂d
m|s all injections, is used [12]. Here, besides the flexibility in the
where we have added a subscript s to γ indicating that its value definition of the distribution factors ti, the network limits (line
will depend on the selection of the slack node s. The spot price power flows and voltage magnitudes) are considered. From the
ρk, however, must obviously be independent of the selection of s, definitions of spot price and TSIC one can write:
which is just a numerical artifice in the model formulation. This
is proved in the appendix. TSIC = ℜ ti.ρi , (9)
Thus we arrive to the conclusion that ρk = γs + ηk,s , which where an obvious choice for ti is ti = di / dj
∑
j
clearly shows that the proposed breakdown of ρk into a This is an obvious extension of the system incremental cost
generation and a network component depends on the choice of derived in [9,14], when network limits are considered. If now,
the slack bus s. Moreover, from (5) it can be written according to previous notation, we define γt1,...,tn = TSIC, it can
be proved (see the appendix) that:
ρs = γs (1 + ∂L ) - ∑ µ ∂Z = γs
∂ds |s ∂ds |s (6) ρk = γt ,...,t (1 + ∂L ∂Z
∂dk |t ,...,t ) - µ ∂dk |t ,...,t
∑ (10)
1 n
1 n 1 n
which is consistent with the definition of γs as the Lagrange
multiplier of the global power balance equation which completes where we have generalized the notation (∂F/∂x)|y so that y may
the n-1 individual node power balance equations in the model;
note that a unit change in the demand at the right hand side of the represent several variables which respond all together, according
total power balance equation, amounts to a unit change only in to a predetermined distribution in order to maintain the global
ds, since the remaining demands are explicitly set to a fixed power balance.
value in each one of the individual power balance equations. If m is a marginal generator, we can then express the total system
incremental cost (the extended 'system λ') as
∂L
∂Z system, γt1,...,tn, and a node specific term ηk = γt1,...,tn (∂d
λm + ∑ µ ∂d k
m|t1,...,tn ∂Z
γ ) - ∑ µ (∂d ), where the mechanisms for the
t1,...,tn = ∂L (11) |t1,...,tn k |t1,...,tn
1 + ∂d
m|t1,...,tn computation of each term and the relationships with the model
formulation have been unambiguously defined.
where the multipliers µ are null when the network limits do not
constrain the solution, leading then again to the well known
2.2.4 Some additional properties of spot prices.
expression of the classical 'system λ', but this time with all the
terms being unambiguously defined. Equations (10) and (11) can i) The preceding expressions make use of two kinds of terms:
be seen as an extension of (5) where a fictitious node t1,...,tn is
used as slack. All the properties that have been derived for the - The spot prices ρk and the Lagrange multipliers µ, which
standard spot price formulation also apply here (see the
depend on both the operation point (i.e., the current values of
appendix). In particular from this expression we can also recover
generator outputs, flows, etc.) and the status of the constraints
(8), as it could be expected since (8) was independent of the
(i.e., generation limits, line capacity limits, etc.). They are
model formulation.
univocally defined.
2.2.3 Decomposition analysis of the spot price.
- Terms such as (∂L/∂dk)|Ω and (∂Z/∂dk)|Ω, where Ω may
The following conclusions concerning the proposed represent a node or an ensemble of nodes with the associated
decomposition of the spot prices, can be derived from the results distribution factors ti , which only depend on the present
obtained in the previous subsections: operating point, regardless of the status of the constraints. They
depend on the choice of Ω and ti.
i) The spot price decomposition in distinct terms is rather a
mathematical artifice than a physically meaningful reality. It is
not possible to extract a generation and a network component, ii) When several generators mi, i Im are at their margin it is
not even a purely loss component or a component that captures immediate from (10), since the spot prices at these nodes must be
all the contribution related to the network limits. The more equal to their marginal generation cost, that:
general expression is (8) where
∂L ∂Z
• ρk2 ∂d measures the contribution of the losses to the λmi + ∑ µ ∂d
k1 |k2 mi|t1,...,tn
γ ∀i, i Im
difference between the spot prices at nodes k1 and k2. t1,...,tn = ∂L , (12)
1 + ∂d
∂Z mi|t1,...,tn
• µ ∂d
∑ measures the contribution of the network limits
k1 |k2 Note that, even if there are several generators at their margin and
to the difference between the spot prices at nodes k1 and k2. widely different values of ρk's, there is a single value of γt1,...,tn,
whose easiest interpretation is probably obtained from (9).
One can conclude that this is still far from the concept of a global
generation component, a global loss component or a global
iii) Some interesting properties can be derived when no network
network limit component.
constraints are binding. The spot price equations become
ii) In order to obtain a more significant decomposition of the spot ρk = ρk (1 + ∂L γ ∂L
1 2 ∂dk1 |k ) = t1,...,tn (1 + ∂dk1 |t ,...,t ) (13)
prices we can refer them to some more or less arbitrarily defined 2 1 n
"average marginal cost", which we decide characterizes an
electric system. The first candidate is obviously the previously where only a multiplicative factor, that is not node-specific and
defined total system incremental cost TSIC (which corresponds does not depend on the status of the constraints, accounts for all
to an extension of the classical 'system λ' as shown before), the differences between the two spot prices. Therefore this spatial
which is the spot price of the fictitious node t1,...,tn. Then difference will change smoothly with the operating point. The
∂L spatial distribution of spot prices will be maintained
equation (10) applies, and the terms γt1,...,tn (∂d ) and proportionally even when the spot prices experience discrete
k |t1,...,tn
changes, for example because of a substitution of the marginal
∂Z generator. Moreover, since the operating point immediately
∑ µ (
∂dk |t ,...,t ) measure the respective contribution of the before and after the change (respectively without and with
1 n
losses and the network limits to the difference between the spot apostrophes in the expression below) is the same, the
price at node k and the spot price at the fictitious node. These multiplicative factor remains unmodified, resulting in:
terms, as well as γt1,...,tn, become meaningful if we agree in
ρk - ρ'k ρk - ρ'k γ γ
chosing this fictitious node as the standard reference point of an 1 1 2 2 t1,...,tn - 't1,...,tn
= = (14)
electric system. ρk ρk γ
1 2 t1,...,tn
Still it will not be accurate to speak of a generation component, a showing that when there are no binding network constraints, the
node-specific component ηk of the spot price is not directly
loss component and a network limit component because γt1,...,tn,
affected by the changes in location of the marginal generators.
as any spot price, contains in itself information on generation,
losses and network limits in an inseparable meshed form. 2.3 Spot price computation.
However we are now able to distinguish a term that is common
to all the nodes and is sufficiently characteristic of the electric Since the spot prices and their components are marginal costs,
they can usually be derived from dual variables of the solution of
the specific optimization model being employed for a particular Four different cases have been run: In the first one losses and
application [7,15]. Thus spot prices can be derived, at least network limit constraints have been ignored; losses have been
conceptually, from most optimal power flow programs. included in the second run; the operating points of cases 2 and 3
are identical, but the capacity limit constraint in line 1-2 is now
For example in JUANAC [7] the spot prices are computed just binding while in run 2 it was not; finally in case 4 the line
directly as a subproduct of a modified DC optimal power flow, flow 3-5 is strongly limited. Two solutions are given for each one
through combinations of the dual variables associated to the of the cases 2 and 3, which only differ in the choice of the slack
optimal solution. bus.
To obtain the decomposition between the chosen γ (γt1,...,tn in its Table 3 summarizes the main results that have been obtained. All
the values presented have been computed independently:
more general formulation) and ηk it suffices with computing - γ defined as the Lagrange multiplier associated to the global
γ energy balance equation coincides with the spot price of the
t1,...,tn through (9) in any model and then simply substracting it
slack node.
from each ρk to obtain the node-specific component of the spot
- All the terms in the table except for γ are independent of the
price ηk. choice of slack.
- The partial derivatives in the table only depend on the
2.3.1 Case example 1. operating point.
- Expressions (5) to (12) and (A-1) to (A-12) have been
Examples are provided to illustrate the major points that have numerically verified.
been made in the previous subsections. The data and the system - In the first case all the spot prices are identical, as expected.
configuration are summarized in fig. 1 and tables 1 and 2. The The values of the spot prices are equal to the marginal cost of
results have been obtained with JUANAC [7]. the generating unit that is on the margin, which is the second
unit at node one.
Figure 1 - In the second case the spot prices vary spatially due to the
losses, although the same generating unit is still at the margin.
2 3 The direction of the flows clearly indicates in which way the
1
spot prices increase. Observe that in this case with no binding
network constraints only the losses are accountable for the
8
spatial differences between spot prices, see (13). For instance,
4 ρ2 = ρ1 (1 + 0.1924).
5 - The differences between the spot prices of cases 2 and 3, even
if they have the same operating point, are due to the just
6 activated capacity constraint of line 1-2, which in case 3
forces the dispatch to deviate from the optimal unconstrained
solution of case 2. Now the partial derivatives of the power
7 9
flow through line 1-2 measure the contribution of this
saturated line to the spatial differences between spot prices,
Table 1 see (8). For instance, ρ2 = ρ1 (1 + 0.1924) + 2.2132x0.66.
Capacity
LINE Reactance Resistance
Limit Notice that the partial derivatives maintain their values.
(P.U.) (P.U.)
From To (MW) - In the fourth case there is a generalized increase in the spot
1 2 0.2913 0.0777 500 prices because the system is dispatched far from the
1 4 0.2041 0.0544 500
2 3 0.1695 0.0424 500
unconstrained optimum, due to line capacity limits. An
2 4 0.4 0.1 500 important amount of power that node 3 cannot generate now
2 5 0.2 0.05 500
2 6 0.4 0.1 500
because line 3-5 is at its limit must be generated by node 1.
3 5 0.099 0.0248 500 The spot price at node 3 has come down to 61 because the
3 8 0.4 0.1 500
4 6 0.6 0.15 500
marginal unit at this node is now a less expensive unit. On the
5 6 0.2 0.05 500 contrary, the spot price at node 1 has increased because a
5 8 0.4 0.1 500
6 7 0.6 0.15 500
more costly unit is now generating at the margin.
6 9 0.2 0.05 500 - From cases 3 and 4 it is important to note that strong
7 9 0.2 0.05 500
differences may exist between spot prices even in the absence
of non supplied power, because of the limitations imposed to
Table 2
the optimal dispatch by the active operating constraints. We
Hydro Thermal generation Load have even found realistic examples where some spot prices
generation
Bus (MW) Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Demand Unserved were negative.
(MW) (Cost) (MW) (Cost) (MW) (Cost) (MW) (Cost)
$/MW $/MW $/MW
$/MW
Table 3
1 300 75 65 125 70 100 75 1 15000
2 - 100 59 50 67 50 74 240 15000
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
3 160 100 61 50 76 50 80 40 15000
Slack Node 1 1 3 1 2
4 - 160 15000
Marg. Nodes 1 1 1 1,3 1,3
5 - 240 15000
6 150 80 15000
γ 65 65 74.73 65 78.84
7 - 100 15000 µ1-2 0 0 0 -2.21 -2.21
8 100 15 15000 ∂L/∂d2|1 0 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
9 - 100 15000
∂L/∂d1|2 0 -0.161 -0.161 -0.161 -0.161
∂L/∂d3|1 0 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149
∂L/∂d3|2 0 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 chosen as the value of γ, the figure specifically shows the
∂Z1-2/∂d2 |1 0 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 corresponding annual average value for the "network"
component ηk. Observe that according to (2) the points below
∂Z1-2/∂d1 |3 0 -0.514 -0.514 -0.514 -0.514
the reference value correspond to a negative ηk and those above
∂Z1-2/∂d1 |2 0 -0.522 -0.522 -0.522 -0.522
it to a positive ηk. It is very interesting to observe that, according
∂Z1-2/∂d3 |2 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 to (15) below, typically all the nodes contribute to the network
ρ1 65 65 65 65 65 70 income. As it will be explained in detail in the next section, the
ρ2 65 77.48 77.48 78.84 78.84 86.54 nodes that are net energy importers should typically have a
negative ηk, while those that are net importers have typically a
ρ3 65 74.73 74.73 76 76 61
positive ηk.
ρ4 65 78.77 78.77 79.41 79.41 88.75
ρ5 65 81.54 81.54 82.91 82.91 113.76 Figure 2
ρ6 65 86.24 86.24 87.57 87.57 109.62
5,4
ρ7 65 102.58 102.58 104.16 104.16 130.38
5,2
ρ8 65 72.25 72.25 73.47 73.47 80.39
ρ9 65 98.75 98.75 100.27 100.27 125.52 5
γ1....9 (Eq. 9) 65 83.95 83.95 85.23 85.23 102.81
4,8
61
81
in a general increase of the spot prices. However as it is shown in
21
41
101
121
141
the third column the relative change is constant for all the nodes.
Figure 3
Table 4 7,5
7
Node ρ ρ' (ρ' - ρ) / ρ
1 54.53 56.73 4.033 6,5
2 64.40 67.00 4.035
6
3 61.00 63.46 4.037
4 64.62 67.24 4.039 5,5
5 66.10 68.77 4.039
5
6 69.14 71.93 4.035
7 80.49 83.74 4.038 4,5
8 58.67 61.04 4.039
4
9 77.85 81.00 4.046
3,5
1
101
121
141
21
41
61
81
t
ρk(t) (Gk(t) + Dk(t)) ] / (Gk(t) + Dk(t)) ).
The values shown in fig. 2 and 3 correspond to annual time
∑
t
average values obtained through a deterministic simulation of 42 The dispersion in the values is now much larger, but the pattern
scenarios representing different load conditions, scheduled characterizing importer and exporter nodes is also very clear.
maintenance of generators and also forced outages. Both the The outliers on the generation side can be easily explained: they
optimization of scenarios and the computation of yearly results correspond to purely generation nodes with expensive generation
are performed by JUANAC [7]. that is only rarely used, precisely when the marginal cost of the
system is high.
Fig 2 represents the annual average in time of spot prices for all
generating and/or load nodes ( ρk(t) / t ). The nodes have been
∑ ∑ 3. IMPLICATIONS ON TRANSMISSION PRICING.
t t
ordered according to their annual energy injection to the system In power systems where the bulk electricity market is based on
(in descending order), that is according to (Gk(t) - Dk(t)) where
∑
Since ηk is typically positive in areas where the load exceeds the ∑ ρk.dk + ∑ ρk.gk
generation and negative when the opposite conditions prevail, as γ= k k
, (16)
dk + gk
∑ ∑
REFERENCES ∂L ∂Jj
(1 - ∂J ) = - ∂J (A-1)
i |j i
1. Schweppe, F.C., M. Caramanis, R.D. Tabors, R.E. Bohn,
∂L ∂L ∂L
Spot Pricing of Electricity, Kluwer Academic Publishers, (1 - ∂J ) (1 - ∂J ) = (1 - ∂J ) (A-2)
1988. i |j j |k i |k
2. Caramanis, M., N. Roukos, F.C. Schweppe, "WRATES: A
Tool for Evaluating the Marginal Costs of Wheeling", IEEE where Ji is any positive power injection at node i. Applying
1988 PES Summer Power Meeting, paper 88 SM 649-6, superposition in the limit of increments of line flows and bus
July 1988. injections in the network and using (A-1):
3. Kelly, K., Henderson, J.S., Nagler, P.A., "Some Economic
Principles for Pricing Wheeled Power", National ∂Z ∂Z ∂Z ∂Jk ∂Z ∂Z ∂L
Regulatory Research Institute, NRRI 87-7, August 1987. ∂Ji |j = ∂Ji |k+ (∂Jk |j)(- ∂Ji ) = ∂Ji |k+ (∂Jk |j)(1- ∂Ji |k) (A-3)
4. Pérez-Arriaga, I.J., "A Conceptual Regulatory Framework
of Transmission Access in Multi-Utility Electric Power
Systems", 15th Annual International Conference of the
International Association of Energy Economists, Tours, From (5), (A-2) and (A-3):
France, May 1992.
5 Pérez-Arriaga, I.J., "A Conceptual Model for Pricing ρi = γs (1 - ∂L ) + ∑ µ ∂Z = (A-4)
Analysis of Transmission Services", Working Paper IIT-91- ∂Ji |s ∂Ji |s
006, Instituto de Investigación Tecnológica, Universidad
Pontificia Comillas, October 1990. ∂L ∂L ∂Z ∂Z ∂L
= γs (1 - ∂J )(1 - ∂J ) + ∑ µ [∂J + (∂J )(1 - ∂J )] =
6. Trans Power, "Principles for Pricing Electricity i |j j |s i |j j |s i |j
Transmission", Trans Power Limited of New Zealand,
1989.
∂L ∂Z ∂L ∂Z which is independent of the choice of the slack bus. Similarly
= [γs (1 - ∂J ) + ∑ µ (∂J )] (1 - ∂J ) + ∑ µ ∂J
j |s j |s i |j i |j
∂Z ∂Z ∂TJt1,...,tn
And with (A-4) this becomes (6): ∂Ji |t ,.....,t = ( ∂TJt1,...,tn |i ) ( ∂Ji )=
1 n
ρi = ρj (1 - ∂L ) + ∑ µ ∂Z q.e.d. (A-5) ∂Z ∂L
∂Ji |j ∂Ji |j = - [ n(∂J ) tk ] (1 - ∂J ) (A-7)
k=1 k|i i |t1,...,tn
∑
∂L i| s i |s k=1
1 - ∂J
m|s
∂L ∂L ∂L
(1- ∂J ) = [ n(1 - ∂J ) tk ] (1- ∂J ) (A-8)
i |s k | i |t1,..,tn
∑
∂Z
∂Ji |t ,...,t = - =
1 n n(1 - ∂L )tk
∂Z ∂Z ∂L ∂Jk|i ∑
k=1
+∑µ[ ∂Ji |s'+ (∂Js' |s) (1 - ∂Ji |s')] = ∂Z n ∂L n ∂Z
∂Ji|s[ (1- ∂Jk|i)tk] + (∂Jk|i)tk
∑ ∑
∂Z k=1 k=1
∂Z = ∂J - =
λm - ∑ µ ∂J i |s n(1 - ∂L
m| s' ∂L ∂Jk|i)tk
(1 - ∂J ) - ∑ µ (∂J∂Zs' | ) (1 - ∂J
∂L ∑
= )+ k=1
∂L
(1 - ∂J ) i|s' s i| s'
m|s' n[∂Z (1- ∂L ) + ∂Z ] tk
k=1 i|s
∂J ∂Jk|i ∂Jk|i
∑
∂Z
= ∂J -
∂Z ∂Z ∂L i |s n(1 - ∂L )tk
+ ∑ µ ∂J + ∑ µ (∂J ) (1 - ∂J ) = ∂Jk|i
i |s' s' |s i |s'
∑
k=1
m|s'
∂Z ∂Z n ∂Z ∂L
∂Ji |s = ∂Ji |t ,...,t + [ (∂Jk |i) tk)] (1 - ∂Ji |t ,...,t ) (A-9)
which is again (5) with the slack s'. ∑
1 n k=1 1 n
Expression (10) that extends the standard spot price equation so
that the fictitious node t1,...,tn can be used as the slack bus will Now all the pieces are put together to obtain (10). Starting again
be proved next. Now a change ∆Ji in Ji will result in a response from (A-4) and using (A-8) and (A-9):
∆Jk of all the remaining injections in order to maintain the global
balance and according to distribution factors tk, with a total ρi =γs (1-∂L ) +∑ µ ∂Z =ρs [ n(1- ∂L ) tk](1-∂L
∂Ji |s ∂Ji |s ∂Ji |t ,...,t ) +
k=1 k|s
∂J ∑
∆Ji + ∆TJt1,...,tn = ∆L 1 n 1 n
∂L ∂Z ∂L
= ρs { n [(1-∂J ) + ∑ µ ∂J ]tk} (1-∂J )
It immediately follows in the limit that k=1
∑
k | s k | t1,...,tn i |t1,...,tn
∂Z
∂TJt1,...,tn + ∑ µ ∂J and using (A-4)
∂L
1 - ∂J =- =
1
= i |t1,...,tn
i |t1,...,tn ∂Ji ∂Ji
- ∂TJt ,...,t
1 n ∂L ∂Z
= ( n ρktk ) (1 - ∂J ) + ∑ µ ∂J
1 1 i| i |t1,...,tn
∑
k=1 ∂L ∂Z
∑
1 . 1
= ∂L ∂L , so that
n(1 - (1 - ∂J )
∑
∂Jk|j)tk j| i
k=1
∂L ∂L ∂L
(1 - ∂J ) (1 - ∂J ) = (1 - ∂J ) (A-11)
j |i i |t1,...,tn j |t1,...,tn
1 n 1 n
∂Z ∂L ∂L
= - ∂J [ n(1 - ∂J ) tk] (1 - ∂J )-
j |i k=1 k| j i |t1,...,tn
∑
-[ n( ∂Z ) tk] (1- ∂L
∂Ji |t ,...,t ) = ( see A-6,11)
k=1 k |j
∂J
∑
1 n
∂L
1 - ∂J
∂Z 1 j|t1,...,tn
= - ∂J ( ) ( )
j |i 1 - ∂L ∂L
1 - ∂J
∂Jj|t ,...,t j|i
1 n
∂L
1 - ∂J
j |t1,...,tn
- [ n(∂J∂Zk| ) tk ] ( ∂L ) = ( see A-7)
1 - ∂J
∑
k=1 j
j|i
∂Z ∂Z
∂Jj|i ∂Jj|t ,...,t
1 n
=- ∂L + ∂L ; then
1 - ∂J 1 - ∂J
j| i j| i
∂Z ∂L ∂Z ∂Z
∂Ji |t ,...,t (1 - ∂Jj |i ) + ∂Jj |i = ∂Jj |t ,...,t (A-12)
1 n 1 n
∂L ∂Z
1 - ∂J
j|t1,...,tn
(∂J - ∂Z )
j|t1,...,tn ∂Jj|i
ρi = γt ,...,t ( )+∑µ
1 n ∂L ∂L
1 - ∂J (1 - ∂J )
j| i j| i
γ ∂L ∂Z
t1,...,tn(1 - ∂Jj| ) + ∑µ ∂J
t1,..,tn j|t1,...,tn
= ∂L -
(1 - ∂J )
j| i