Laws, Rules and Jurisprudence that support the Case (For Plaintiff)

The first paragraph of the Article 365 of Revised Penal Code says that “Imprudence and Negligence

is committed by any person who by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been

intentional would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period

to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of

arresto mayor in its minimum and maximum periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted of

arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed”.

The Revised Penal Code also in the same article defined reckless imprudence as “one consisting in

voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason

of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act,

taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and

other circumstances regarding persons, time and place”.

The Civil Code on both the Spanish and American Laws on Damages stipulates that actual or

compensatory damages for the negligent act or omission are confined to one as “were foreseen or as a

direct and immediate consequences of the act or omission”.

In the case of Albenson Enterprises Corp.et al. vs . Court of Appeals (GR No. 88694, January 11,

1993), the court clearly states in its ruling that “actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable

because of pecuniary loss such as in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation”. In addition,

the court ruling on Public Estates Authority vs. Chu (GR No. 14529, September 21, 2005) reinforces the

liability of the defendant for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff stating that “the defendants shall be liable

for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of,

whether or not such damages have been forseen by the defendant.

Prepared by:

Melva S. Amosig LLB-I

Laws, Rules and Jurisprudence that support the Case (For Plaintiff)

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code defined reckless imprudence as “one consisting in

voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason

of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act,

taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and

other circumstances regarding persons, time and place”.

The Civil Code on both the Spanish and American Laws on Damages stipulates that actual or

compensatory damages for the negligent act or omission are confined to one as “were foreseen or as a

direct and immediate consequences of the act or omission”.

 The court ruling on Albenson Enterprises Corp.et al. vs . Court of Appeals (GR No. 88694,

January 11, 1993), the court clearly states in its ruling that “actual or compensatory damages are those

recoverable because of pecuniary loss such as in business, trade, property, profession, job or

occupation”. In addition, the court ruling on Public Estates Authority vs. Chu (GR No. 14529, September

21, 2005) reinforces the liability of the defendant for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff stating that “the

defendants shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or

omission complained of, whether or not such damages have been foreseen by the defendant”.

It also stressed that the Civil Code under Chapter II of Title XVIII on the case of M.D. Transit and

Taxi Co., Inc vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. L-23882, February 17, 1968) which refers both consequential

damages and actual damages as the same.

Prepared by:

Resty Longanilla LLB-I

Phoenix Construction v. IAC

Facts:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from
cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford
dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector
devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio
tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown.
Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by
imputing the accident to respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights,
and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:

Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s own negligence

Held:

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of
the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the
petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as
not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away
from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by
private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at
"bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show
that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of
reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than
he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road
lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the
dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been
"almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage
possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the
result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention
in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer
to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent
safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and
"condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the
risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a
defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to
the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently
driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility
when another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only
contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"
and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by
the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last
clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept
of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to
determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The
relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only
one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the
negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for
the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to
allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very
bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.
Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance
of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix
is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced
award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

Married or not you should read this...

“When I got home that night as my wife served dinner, I held her hand and said, I’ve got something to
tell you. She sat down and ate quietly. Again I observed the hurt in her eyes.

Suddenly I didn’t know how to open my mouth. But I had to let her know what I was thinking. I want a
divorce. I raised the topic calmly. She didn’t seem to be annoyed by my words, instead she asked me
softly, why?

I avoided her question. This made her angry. She threw away the chopsticks and shouted at me, you are
not a man! That night, we didn’t talk to each other. She was weeping. I knew she wanted to find out
what had happened to our marriage. But I could hardly give her a satisfactory answer; she had lost my
heart to Jane. I didn’t love her anymore. I just pitied her!

With a deep sense of guilt, I drafted a divorce agreement which stated that she could own our house, our
car, and 30% stake of my company. She glanced at it and then tore it into pieces. The woman who had
spent ten years of her life with me had become a stranger. I felt sorry for her wasted time, resources and
energy but I could not take back what I had said for I loved Jane so dearly. Finally she cried loudly in
front of me, which was what I had expected to see. To me her cry was actually a kind of release. The
idea of divorce which had obsessed me for several weeks seemed to be firmer and clearer now.

The next day, I came back home very late and found her writing something at the table. I didn’t have
supper but went straight to sleep and fell asleep very fast because I was tired after an eventful day with
Jane. When I woke up, she was still there at the table writing. I just did not care so I turned over and
was asleep again.

In the morning she presented her divorce conditions: she didn’t want anything from me, but needed a
month’s notice before the divorce. She requested that in that one month we both struggle to live as
normal a life as possible. Her reasons were simple: our son had his exams in a month’s time and she
didn’t want to disrupt him with our broken marriage.

This was agreeable to me. But she had something more, she asked me to recall how I had carried her
into out bridal room on our wedding day. She requested that every day for the month’s duration I carry
her out of our bedroom to the front door ever morning. I thought she was going crazy. Just to make our
last days together bearable I accepted her odd request.

I told Jane about my wife’s divorce conditions. . She laughed loudly and thought it was absurd. No matter
what tricks she applies, she has to face the divorce, she said scornfully.

My wife and I hadn’t had any body contact since my divorce intention was explicitly expressed. So when I
carried her out on the first day, we both appeared clumsy. Our son clapped behind us, daddy is holding
mommy in his arms. His words brought me a sense of pain. From the bedroom to the sitting room, then
to the door, I walked over ten meters with her in my arms. She closed her eyes and said softly; don’t tell
our son about the divorce. I nodded, feeling somewhat upset. I put her down outside the door. She went
to wait for the bus to work. I drove alone to the office.

On the second day, both of us acted much more easily. She leaned on my chest. I could smell the
fragrance of her blouse. I realized that I hadn’t looked at this woman carefully for a long time. I realized
she was not young any more. There were fine wrinkles on her face, her hair was graying! Our marriage
had taken its toll on her. For a minute I wondered what I had done to her.

On the fourth day, when I lifted her up, I felt a sense of intimacy returning. This was the woman who
had given ten years of her life to me. On the fifth and sixth day, I realized that our sense of intimacy was
growing again. I didn’t tell Jane about this. It became easier to carry her as the month slipped by.
Perhaps the everyday workout made me stronger.

She was choosing what to wear one morning. She tried on quite a few dresses but could not find a
suitable one. Then she sighed, all my dresses have grown bigger. I suddenly realized that she had grown
so thin, that was the reason why I could carry her more easily.

Suddenly it hit me… she had buried so much pain and bitterness in her heart. Subconsciously I reached
out and touched her head.

Our son came in at the moment and said, Dad, it’s time to carry mom out. To him, seeing his father
carrying his mother out had become an essential part of his life. My wife gestured to our son to come
closer and hugged him tightly. I turned my face away because I was afraid I might change my mind at
this last minute. I then held her in my arms, walking from the bedroom, through the sitting room, to the
hallway. Her hand surrounded my neck softly and naturally. I held her body tightly; it was just like our
wedding day.
But her much lighter weight made me sad. On the last day, when I held her in my arms I could hardly
move a step. Our son had gone to school. I held her tightly and said, I hadn’t noticed that our life lacked
intimacy. I drove to office…. jumped out of the car swiftly without locking the door. I was afraid any
delay would make me change my mind…I walked upstairs. Jane opened the door and I said to her, Sorry,
Jane, I do not want the divorce anymore.

She looked at me, astonished, and then touched my forehead. Do you have a fever? She said. I moved
her hand off my head. Sorry, Jane, I said, I won’t divorce. My marriage life was boring probably because
she and I didn’t value the details of our lives, not because we didn’t love each other anymore. Now I
realize that since I carried her into my home on our wedding day I am supposed to hold her until death
do us apart. Jane seemed to suddenly wake up. She gave me a loud slap and then slammed the door and
burst into tears. I walked downstairs and drove away. At the floral shop on the way, I ordered a bouquet
of flowers for my wife. The salesgirl asked me what to write on the card. I smiled and wrote, I’ll carry
you out every morning until death do us apart.

That evening I arrived home, flowers in my hands, a smile on my face, I run up stairs, only to find my
wife in the bed -dead. My wife had been fighting CANCER for months and I was so busy with Jane to
even notice. She knew that she would die soon and she wanted to save me from the whatever negative
reaction from our son, in case we push through with the divorce.— At least, in the eyes of our son—- I’m
a loving husband….

The small details of your lives are what really matter in a relationship. It is not the mansion, the car,
property, the money in the bank. These create an environment conducive for happiness but cannot give
happiness in themselves.

So find time to be your spouse’s friend and do those little things for each other that build intimacy. Do
have a real happy marriage!

If you don’t share this, nothing will happen to you.

If you do, you just might save a marriage. Many of life’s failures are people who did not realize how close
they were to success when they gave up.
— with Alex Arceo, Imee Menggay, Rob Ganzon RNand 42 others.
PLDT vs. CA
Facts: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their jeep ran over a sand of earth and fell into
an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. Respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered
because of the creeping darkness and the lack of warning light or signs. Respondent spouses suffered
physical injuries and their jeeps windshield was shattered. PLDT alleged that the respondents were
negligent and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Company which undertook said
conduit system to be the one liable.The latter claimed to have complied with its contract and had installed
necessary barricades.

Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.

Ruling: Private Respondent´s negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the
accident, hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered. Private
respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT considering that he had
¨the last clear chance¨, to avoid the injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the
burden of proof to show existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
For the Plaintiff

legal Dispute of the Case

1. The plaintiff accuses the defendant for negligence resulting to physical injuries sustained by the
plaintiff after being run over by a truck owned by the defendant.
2. The defendant disputes negligence on their part and wants to invoke the negligence on the part of the
plaintiff where the accident could have been avoided.

The Issue of the Case

1. Whether there was negligence on the part of the defendant to cause harm to the plaintiff.
2. Whether there was also negligence on the part of the plaintiff where he could have avoided the
accident to happen.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

On March 16, 1979, the plaintiff left his home at about 8:15 a.m. and walked along the 8th Avenue and
49th Street to report to work. As he was about to cross the 8th Avenue to get to the road to Broadway, a
truck, estimated to be running about 40 km/hr suddenly came around the corner about 10 ft away and in
seconds struck the plaintiff by its front part on the back and on the side. The plaintiff said he did not hear
any horn blowing before the truck struck him.
The plaintiff went unconscious and was bleeding. He was brought down by the crowd to the drug store
where a policeman came and called an ambulance. He was then brought to the GSIS Hospital still
unconscious.
The ambulance surgeon and intern who attended to the plaintiff said the victim only regained
consciousness at the hospital. X-rays were taken. He enumerated the injuries sustained by the plaintiff as
follow: severe laceration on the back of his head, a cut on his right eye, bruises over the right side,
fracture on his left leg and left arm and contusions on his back. He further attested that the plaintiff was
confined in the hospital from March 16 to July 9 (a period of 4 months).
The plaintiff was asked to sign the complaint on March 22, 1979, 6 days after the accident. Upon
discharge from the hospital, the patient condition improved but cannot walk unassisted. He saw a doctor
for 2 months, at first twice a week and then later once a week.
On August 1979, the defendant’s doctor examined the plaintiff and reported that the plaintiff is fully
recovering from the fracture on his left leg and arm. He can also walk well unassisted. Plaintiff complains
pain on his lower back upon palpation and concluded it is merely due to soreness. When asked if he
looked at the plaintiff’s x-ray result he admitted of not being aware x-rays were taken. His second
examination, which was two months before the trial, was less thorough and took only 5 minutes of
examination.
In November, after continuous treatment, the condition of the plaintiff improved and his physician
reported he has less complaint of pain on his back but it remains sore. Upon x-ray, a fractured vertebra
on his spine was diagnosed.
The plaintiff was out of work from March to December after sustaining injuries from the accident.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Point of View
On March 16, 1979, plaintiff went to work at 8:15 am. As he was about to cross the street, he was struck
by a car that suddenly came from around the corner. The plaintiff did not hear any horn blowing nor did
he see the truck coming in his direction before he crossed the street. The truck was estimated to be
running at 40 km/hr and in seconds, the truck struck the plaintiff at the back and on the sides by its front
rear. It knocked down the plaintiff unconscious and he was bleeding. Plaintiff sustained the following
injuries: severe laceration on the back of his head, a cut on his right eye, bruises over the right side,
fracture on his left leg and left arm and contusions on his back. He was confined at the GSIS Hospital
where he stayed from March 16 – July 9 (about 4 months).
Plaintiff signed the complaint 6 days after the accident at the hospital. He was discharged with the
condition of not being able to walk unassisted. He went further treatment as an outpatient at the Medical
City in Pasig under Dr. Antonio Rivera. By November, the plaintiff condition improved except for
persistent soreness on his back. X-ray confirmed he sustained a spinal fracture. Physician attested the
accident may have caused the spinal fracture on the plaintiff’s back and the injury may be permanent.
Plaintiff was out of work for a period of 8 months between March-December after the accident.

Defense Point of View

On March 16, 1979, plaintiff went to work at 8:15 am. He might be in a hurry to get to work. He was
struck by a truck that was almost halfway down the block as he was crossing the street on his way to
work. Some witness claimed to have heard a horn blowing but he continued to cross the street even if he
was able to take a brief glance at the incoming truck before it struck him. He was knocked unconscious
and was bleeding when he was brought to the GSIS Hospital. On examination, he sustained injuries that
include severe laceration on the back of his head, a cut on his right eye, bruises over the right side,
fracture on his left leg and left arm and contusions on his back. He stayed confined in the hospital for 4
months between March 16 and July 9. Plaintiff signed the complaint only 6 days after the accident while
confined on the hospital bed under his condition. Upon discharge, the plaintiff has improved condition
except needing assistance to walk but without the need for an assistive device such as crutch. No other
treatment was prescribed during his discharge. He continued treatment for two months as an outpatient
under Dr. Antonio Rivera of Medical City and regained improved condition. He continued to work again
for 2 years after the accident. It is possible that the continuous pain on his back may be due to work
related injuries or possibly caused by an organic disorder. Upon examination of the plaintiff 2 weeks
before the trial, he was in good condition with only pain and soreness on his back. Upon further
assessment, the pain on his back is caused by a spinal fracture.
Plaintiff earns on an hourly rate of P2/hr at 40 hrs/wk = P80/wk. But plaintiff sometimes make less
especially during lean seasons from June to August where only about 20 hrs/wk of service is usually
rendered at work. Plaintiff was out of work from March to December after the accident.

Laws, Rules and Jurisprudence Applicable to the Case

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code defined reckless imprudence as “one consisting in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution
displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest.”
The Civil Code on both the Spanish and American Laws on Damages stipulates that actual or
compensatory damages for a negligent act or omission are confined to one as “were foreseen or might
have been foreseen or as a direct and immediate consequences of the act or omission.”
The court ruling on Albenson Enterprises Corp. et al. vs Court of Appeals et. al. (G.R. No. 88694, January
11, 1993) clearly states that “actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of
pecuniary loss such as in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation.”
It may also be stressed that the Civil Code under Chapter II of Title XVIII refers both consequential
damages and actual damages as the same. (M.D. Transit and Taxi Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals et al., G.
R. No. L-23882, February 17, 1968)
The court ruling on Public Estates Authority vs Chu with G. R. No. 14529, September 21, 2005 reinforces
the liability of the defendant for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff stating that “the defendants shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of, whether or not such damages have been foreseen by the defendant.”
Article 2205 of NCC further states that “damages may be recovered for loss or impairment of earning
capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury.”

Republic of the Philippines

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
Panitan, Capiz, Branch 18

JUAN A. DE LA CRUZ
Plaintiff,

- versus –
PEDRO GARCIA (driver) and
CONCEPCION REFRIGERATING CO.
Defendants.

X --------------------------------------------X

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff, by counsel, respectfully submits its memorandum in the case:

The Case

Plaintiff Juan de la Cruz, files this action to collect actual, compensatory, and moral damages arising from
reckless imprudence resulting to physical injuries against the defendants, Pedro Garcia and Concepcion
Refrigerating Co. The negligent act of Garcia, who is employed as driver by Concepcion Refrigerating Co.,
inflicted injury to the plaintiff resulting to his physical injuries, disability, mental, and emotional anguish
due to temporary loss of job caused by the physical injuries he suffered from the accident.

The Facts

On March 16, 1979, plaintiff went to work at 8:15 am. As he was about to cross the street, he was struck
by a car that suddenly came from around the corner. The truck was about 10 feet away from the plaintiff
who was crossing the street and is already 3 feet away from the sidewalk. “Exhibit 1” (photograph of the
exact location where the incident occurred) Plaintiff did not hear any horn blowing nor did he see the
truck coming in his direction before he crossed the street. The truck was estimated to be running at 40
km/hr and in seconds, the truck struck the plaintiff at the back and on the sides by its front rear. It
knocked down the plaintiff unconscious and he was bleeding. Plaintiff sustained the following injuries:
severe laceration on the back of his head, a cut on his right eye, bruises over the right side, fracture on
his left leg and left arm and contusions on his back. He was confined at the GSIS Hospital where he
stayed from March 16 – July 9 (about 4 months).

Plaintiff signed the complaint 6 days after the accident at the hospital. He was discharged with the
condition of not being able to walk unassisted. He went further treatment as an outpatient at the Medical
City in Pasig under Dr. Antonio Rivera. By November, the plaintiff condition improved except for
persistent soreness on his back. X-ray confirmed he sustained a spinal fracture. Plaintiff’s physician
attested the accident may have caused the spinal fracture on the plaintiff’s back and the injury may be
permanent. Plaintiff was out of work for a period of 8 months between March-December after the
accident.

The defense counsel was trying to interject that the plaintiff might be in a hurry to report to work and did
not exercise precaution when crossing the street. They further assert that the driver blew his horn to
warn the plaintiff. Moreover, they insinuate that the current condition of the plaintiff may be due to other
causes such as organic disease or work related injury and not directly due to the injuries he sustained
during the accident 2 years ago. They further counterclaim that the plaintiff suffered too serious injuries
under the circumstance that the plaintiff was able to sign his complaint 6 days after the accident.
“Exhibits 2 and 3” (summons and complaints, respectively)

The Issues

1. Whether or not there was negligence on the part of the defendant

2. Whether or not there is contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff

2. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to claims for actual, compensatory, and moral damages against
the defendant.
.Arguments
I.

PEDRO GARCIA DID NOT OBSERVE DUE DILIGENCE IN PERFORMING HIS DUTIES AS A DRIVER OF A
HEAVY VEHICLE WHICH IS AN OBVIOUS GROUND FOR NEGLIGENCE

With due consideration of the location of the incident which took place on a public thoroughfare which is
an intersection of main highways for public transport, and the truck defendant Garcia was driving was
turning around a corner, there is obvious negligence on Garcia’s part to observe precautions in terms of
speed when driving the truck in this instance. Section 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992,
provides that “no person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway in these Islands recklessly or
without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic grades, crossings, curvatures, visibility and other
conditions of the highway and to the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the
property or the safety or rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the
highway.”

The defendant obviously failed to observe precaution of speed while driving the truck at 40 km/hr while
turning around a corner of a main street. This act reflects failure to observe due diligence required by
nature of his obligation as a driver to do something that a reasonable man would do under the
circumstance, which is to drive with caution at a reasonable speed while driving around a corner. And 40
km/hr speed is an unreasonable speed to drive considering he is driving on a curb and could not
anticipate what could possibly be ahead around the corner. Inability to foresee harm is considered to be
an indispensable requirement to determine negligence.

The injury sustained by the plaintiff is a result of accident by which the truck that hit the plaintiff was
under the control and management of its driver. Had it not been due to the driver’s negligence, the
accident would not have occurred and the plaintiff would have been spared from sustaining injurious
outcome that arose from failure of the defendant to exercise reasonable care. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is hereby and further invoked by the petitioner where under the circumstances, the accident
would not have occurred in the absence of negligence by the defendant. It thus produces a prima facie
negligence on the part of the defendant.

II.

THERE IS NO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE

CIRCUMSTANCES

Blame could not be afforded to the plaintiff for contributory negligence as the moment he steps down
from the sidewalk, the area was clear for him to cross. The sudden appearance of the truck from around
the corner, and the rate of speed the truck was running, could not prevent the plaintiff from backing
down from where he is (3 feet away from the sidewalk) on the street while crossing. More so, that there
is no ample time for him to react immediately when the truck suddenly appeared from the corner which
is only 10 feet away from him and running at a speed of 40 km/hr, a considerably fast speed for a heavy
vehicle to run when turning around a curb. Furthermore, it is but natural as a human reaction to be in a
sudden state of shock when confronted with the unexpected threat of being hit by a careening vehicle.

Negligence is a want of care required by the circumstance and its application depends upon the situation
of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose. (U.S. vs
Juanillo GR No. 7255, October 3, 1912) It is the truck driver’s duty to exercise the most prudent act to
reduce speed while driving around the corner in order to gain full control of the truck in case anything
obstructs his way that could significantly avert possible accident to occur.

Carrying along the responsibility of safe driving, Garcia is obliged to take notice of the conditions before
him and to adopt safety means to prevent injurious outcome of neglect of duty while driving the truck in
consideration to the speed of the automobile while driving on a highway more so when driving around a
curb. Moreover, the plaintiff is already crossing the street of about 3 feet away from the sidewalk. Garcia
would have seen him already almost halfway the lane where he was driving and should be bound to
reduce speed. But the mere fact that the rate of speed he was driving the truck, it would be impossible
for him to gain complete control of reducing the speed of the truck.

III.

CONCEPCION REFRIGERATING CO. MAY LIKEWISE BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS
EMPLOYEE

Art. 2180 NCC, paragraph 4 states that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter is employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers are bound to be liable for all
damages caused by their employees when acting within the scope of performing their duties. The same
article further provides for the solidary liability of the employer for the quasi-delic committed by its
employee giving primary emphasis on the responsibility of the employers for the negligence of their
employees and the injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of
their employees (Victory Liner vs. Heirs of Malecdan, GR No. 154278, December 27, 2002).

The employer should have exercised prudent selection of their employees in like manner as would be
invoked from diligence of a good father doctrine. It is the responsibility of the employer to provide proper
training and to observe highest standards of guidelines on the selection of the qualifications of their
employees, in this case, specifically to provide training to understand the proper traffic rules and ethics to
observe while driving. This responsibility is indispensible for an employer to observe most especially in
consideration of the nature of work of their employee which is to drive a heavy vehicle. Employers should
observe strict implementation as to the scrutiny on their employee’s qualifications and experience.
IV.

JUAN DE LA CRUZ IS ENTITLED FOR ACTUAL, COMPENSATORY, AND MORAL DAMAGES

The elements of quasi-delic has been sufficiently met in this instance case where (1) the plaintiff suffered
physical injuries resulting to loss of job from the time the accident occurred and the recuperation period
of the plaintiff; (2) the negligence of the defendant can be fully established by the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor and the mere fact that the defendant failed to act what a reasonable man would do while driving
around a corner of a highway in terms of reckless driving with neglect to observe reasonable speed; (3)
the effect of such injuries arising from the act of negligence of the defendant resulted to emotional and
mental anguish suffered by the plaintiff owing to his inability to work and to earn an income which is the
sole means by which he can provide for his family’s needs, in addition to the physical sufferings and
injuries he seriously suffered caused by his injuries.

Moreover, Article 2176 of the Civil Code states that “whoever by act of omission causes damage to
another, there being fault and negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.”

WHEREFORE, plaintiff Juan De la Cruz respectfully prays for this honorable court to render judgment:

1. To indemnify plaintiff for the physical, emotional and mental sufferings he incurred arising from the
incident;

2. That the defendants Garcia and Concepcion Refrigerating Co. be jointly held liable to pay the plaintiff
for actual, compensatory, and moral damages.

Roxas City, Capiz, Philippines, March 20, 2010.

EVELYN B. CHUA
Counsel for Juan De La Cruz
3rd Floor Grand Tower Bldg.
23954 Legaspi St.
Roxas City
IBP 478592 12-21-02
PTR 7700034 1-5-02

Copy furnished:

Atty. Shakira Reyes

395 Burgos St.

AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR.G.R. No. L-12219, 15 March 1918STREET,

J.
:FACTS:On 12 December 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, AmadoPicart was
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half wayacross, Frank Smith Jr. approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile,going at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles per hour. As Smith
neared the bridge hesaw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
Hecontinued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two moresuccessive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him wasnot observing the rule of the road. Picart saw
the automobile coming and heard thewarning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or therapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on theright side
of the bridge instead of going to the left. As the automobile approached,Smith guided it toward his left,
that being the proper side of the road for themachine. In so doing Smith assumed that the horseman
would move to the otherside. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign
forthe automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, insteadof veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued toapproach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he hadgotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting
across to theother side, Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting thehorse
alongside of the railing where it was then standing; but in so doing theautomobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightenedand turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. In so doing, itwas struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the
limb wasbroken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries
the horse died. Picart received contusions which caused temporaryunconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.ISSUE:Whether or not Smith is guilty of negligence.RULING: Yes. Smith,
in maneuvering his car in the manner described, was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done. In thenature of things the control of the situation had passed
entirely to Smith, and it washis duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were
noother persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far awayfrom the horse to
avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ranstraight on until he was almost upon
the horse. When Smith exposed the horse andrider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the
law. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case maybe stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use thatperson would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.What would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in
view of the

facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot be of much value;as reasonable men
govern their conduct by the circumstances which are beforethem or known to them, and hence they can
be expected to take care only whenthere is something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Reasonable foresightof harm is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. In fine,
theproper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:Conduct is said to
be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasorwould have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable towarrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences

(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted
upon the advice of counsel;

(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;

(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the
plaintiff's loss or injury.

CHAPTER 3
OTHER KINDS OF DAMAGES
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages,
except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances
of each case.

SECTION 1. - Moral Damages

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

Art. 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental value of property, real or
personal, may be considered.

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same
rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

SECTION 2. - Nominal Damages

Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any
source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been
invaded.

Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the
right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their
respective heirs and assigns.
 SECTION 3. - Temperate or Moderate Damages

Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty.

Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.

SECTION 4. - Liquidated Damages

Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be
paid in case of breach thereof.

Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be

equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.

Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one
contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall
determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.

SECTION 5. - Exemplary or Corrective Damages

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.

Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary
in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court
may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the
plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null
and void.

Title XIX. - CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE

OF CREDITS

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art. 2236. The debtor is liable with all his property, present and future, for the fulfillment of
his obligations, subject to the exemptions provided by law. (1911a)
Art. 2237. Insolvency shall be governed by special laws insofar as they are not inconsistent
with this Code. (n)

Art. 2238. So long as the conjugal partnership or absolute community subsists, its property
shall not be among the assets to be taken possession of by the assignee for the payment of
the insolvent debtor's obligations, except insofar as the latter have redounded to the
benefit of the family. If it is the husband who is insolvent, the administration of the
conjugal partnership of absolute community may, by order of the court, be transferred to
the wife or to a third person other than the assignee. (n)

Art. 2239. If there is property, other than that mentioned in the preceding article, owned by
two or more persons, one of whom is the insolvent debtor, his undivided share or interest
therein shall be among the assets to be taken possession of by the assignee for the
payment of the insolvent debtor's obligations. (n)

Art. 2240. Property held by the insolvent debtor as a trustee of an express or implied trust,
shall be excluded from the insolvency proceedings. (n)

CHAPTER 2
CLASSIFICATION OF CREDITS

Art. 2241. With reference to specific movable property of the debtor, the following claims or
liens shall be preferred:
(1) Duties, taxes and fees due thereon to the State or any subdivision thereof;

(2) Claims arising from misappropriation, breach of trust, or malfeasance by public

officials committed in the performance of their duties, on the movables, money or
securities obtained by them;

(3) Claims for the unpaid price of movables sold, on said movables, so long as they
are in the possession of the debtor, up to the value of the same; and if the movable
has been resold by the debtor and the price is still unpaid, the lien may be enforced
on the price; this right is not lost by the immobilization of the thing by destination,
provided it has not lost its form, substance and identity; neither is the right lost by
the sale of the thing together with other property for a lump sum, when the price
thereof can be determined proportionally;

(4) Credits guaranteed with a pledge so long as the things pledged are in the hands
of the creditor, or those guaranteed by a chattel mortgage, upon the things pledged
or mortgaged, up to the value thereof;

(5) Credits for the making, repair, safekeeping or preservation of personal property,
on the movable thus made, repaired, kept or possessed;

(6) Claims for laborers' wages, on the goods manufactured or the work done;

(7) For expenses of salvage, upon the goods salvaged;

(8) Credits between the landlord and the tenant, arising from the contract of
tenancy on shares, on the share of each in the fruits or harvest;

(9) Credits for transportation, upon the goods carried, for the price of the contract
and incidental expenses, until their delivery and for thirty days thereafter;

(10) Credits for lodging and supplies usually furnished to travellers by hotel
keepers, on the movables belonging to the guest as long as such movables are in the
hotel, but not for money loaned to the guests;

(11) Credits for seeds and expenses for cultivation and harvest advanced to the
debtor, upon the fruits harvested;
 (12) Credits for rent for one year, upon the personal property of the lessee existing
on the immovable leased and on the fruits of the same, but not on money or
instruments of credit;

(13) Claims in favor of the depositor if the depositary has wrongfully sold the thing
deposited, upon the price of the sale.

In the foregoing cases, if the movables to which the lien or preference attaches have
been wrongfully taken, the creditor may demand them from any possessor, within
thirty days from the unlawful seizure. (1922a)

Art. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights of the debtor, the
following claims, mortgages and liens shall be preferred, and shall constitute an
encumbrance on the immovable or real right:
(1) Taxes due upon the land or building;

(2) For the unpaid price of real property sold, upon the immovable sold;

(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well as of

architects, engineers and contractors, engaged in the construction, reconstruction or
repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other
works;

(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction, reconstruction, or

repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other
works;

(5) Mortgage credits recorded in the Registry of Property, upon the real estate
mortgaged;

(6) Expenses for the preservation or improvement of real property when the law
authorizes reimbursement, upon the immovable preserved or improved;

(7) Credits annotated in the Registry of Property, in virtue of a judicial order, by

attachments or executions, upon the property affected, and only as to later credits;

(8) Claims of co-heirs for warranty in the partition of an immovable among them,
upon the real property thus divided;

(9) Claims of donors or real property for pecuniary charges or other conditions
imposed upon the donee, upon the immovable donated;

(10) Credits of insurers, upon the property insured, for the insurance premium for
two years. (1923a)

Art. 2243. The claims or credits enumerated in the two preceding articles shall be
considered as mortgages or pledges of real or personal property, or liens within the
purview of legal provisions governing insolvency. Taxes mentioned in No. 1, Article 2241,
and No. 1, Article 2242, shall first be satisfied. (n)

Art. 2244. With reference to other property, real and personal, of the debtor, the following
claims or credits shall be preferred in the order named:

(1) Proper funeral expenses for the debtor, or children under his or her parental
authority who have no property of their own, when approved by the court;

(2) Credits for services rendered the insolvent by employees, laborers, or household
helpers for one year preceding the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency;

(3) Expenses during the last illness of the debtor or of his or her spouse and children
under his or her parental authority, if they have no property of their own;
 (4) Compensation due the laborers or their dependents under laws providing for
indemnity for damages in cases of labor accident, or illness resulting from the nature
of the employment;

(5) Credits and advancements made to the debtor for support of himself or herself,
and family, during the last year preceding the insolvency;

(6) Support during the insolvency proceedings, and for three months thereafter;

(7) Fines and civil indemnification arising from a criminal offense;

(8) Legal expenses, and expenses incurred in the administration of the insolvent's
estate for the common interest of the creditors, when properly authorized and
approved by the court;

(9) Taxes and assessments due the national government, other than those
mentioned in Articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242, No. 1;

(10) Taxes and assessments due any province, other than those referred to in
Articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242, No. 1;

(11) Taxes and assessments due any city or municipality, other than those indicated
in Articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242, No. 1;

(12) Damages for death or personal injuries caused by a quasi-delict;

(13) Gifts due to public and private institutions of charity or beneficence;

(14) Credits which, without special privilege, appear in (a) a public instrument; or
(b) in a final judgment, if they have been the subject of litigation. These credits shall
have preference among themselves in the order of priority of the dates of the
instruments and of the judgments, respectively. (1924a)

Art. 2245. Credits of any other kind or class, or by any other right or title not comprised in
the four preceding articles, shall enjoy no preference. (1925)

CHAPTER 3
ORDER OF PREFERENCE OF CREDITS

Art. 2246. Those credits which enjoy preference with respect to specific movables, exclude
all others to the extent of the value of the personal property to which the preference refers.

Art. 2247. If there are two or more credits with respect to the same specific movable
property, they shall be satisfied pro rata, after the payment of duties, taxes and fees due
the State or any subdivision thereof. (1926a)

Art. 2248. Those credits which enjoy preference in relation to specific real property or real
rights, exclude all others to the extent of the value of the immovable or real right to which
the preference refers.

Art. 2249. If there are two or more credits with respect to the same specific real property or
real rights, they shall be satisfied pro rata, after the payment of the taxes and assessments
upon the immovable property or real right. (1927a)

Art. 2250. The excess, if any, after the payment of the credits which enjoy preference with
respect to specific property, real or personal, shall be added to the free property which the
debtor may have, for the payment of the other credits. (1928a)

Art. 2251. Those credits which do not enjoy any preference with respect to specific
property, and those which enjoy preference, as to the amount not paid, shall be satisfied
according to the following rules:

(1) In the order established in Article 2244;

(2) Common credits referred to in Article 2245 shall be paid pro rata regardless of dates.
(1929a)

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Art. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall
have no retroactive effect.

For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are not specified elsewhere in
this Code, the following articles shall be observed: (Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions).

Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating,
under said laws, from acts done or events which took place under their regime, even
though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize them. But
if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even
though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred
under prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or
acquired right, of the same origin. (Rule 1)

Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against
the law or which infringe upon the rights of others. (n)

Art. 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or period,
which were executed or entered into before the effectivity of this Code, even though the
condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of laws goes into effect. (n)

Art. 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws, if they are valid in
accordance therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as provided in the same, with the
limitations established in these rules. But the revocation or modification of these acts and
contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be subject to the
provisions of this new body of laws. (Rule 2a)

Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of
rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by the former laws, are not applicable
to those who, when said laws were in force, may have executed the act or incurred in the
omission forbidden or condemned by this Code.

If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be
applied.

If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced before the beginning of the
effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or is maintained or repeated after this body
of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code shall be
applied, even though the previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty
therefor. (Rule 3a)

Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the
effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but
their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code
and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the action was commenced
under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure
was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may
choose which method or course to pursue. (Rule 4)

Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is governed by
this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the former laws. (n)

Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this
Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws. (n)

Art. 2261. The exemption prescribed in Article 302 shall also be applicable to any support,
pension or gratuity already existing or granted before this Code becomes effective. (n)
Art. 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by the courts before this Code
goes into effect, shall continue to act as such, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 320.
(n)

Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws,
and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the
beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance
with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall
be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes,
betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be
reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according
to this Code. (Rule 12a)

Art. 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction referred to in article 89
and illegitimate children mentioned in Article 287, shall also be acquired by children born
before the effectivity of this Code. (n)

Art. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code
becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor's possession before
said date. (n)

Art. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect:

(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal case, to

testify against his parents and ascendants;

(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal separation and
annulment of marriage;

(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation;

(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the testator himself;

(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments;

(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title;

(7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromise. (n)

Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those
pending on the date this Code becomes effective:
(1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;

(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. (n)

Art. 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the time this
Code goes into effect shall be suspended, under such terms as the court may determine, in
order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of legal separation proceedings,
for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a reconciliation. (n)

Art. 2269. The principles upon which the preceding transitional provisions are based shall,
by analogy, be applied to cases not specifically regulated by them. (Rule 13a)

REPEALING CLAUSE

Art. 2270. The following laws and regulations are hereby repealed:
(1) Those parts and provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which are in force on the
date when this new Civil Code becomes effective:
(2) The provisions of the Code of Commerce governing sales, partnership, agency,
loan, deposit and guaranty;

(3) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription as far as

inconsistent with this Code; and

(4) All laws, Acts, parts of Acts, rules of court, executive orders, and administrative
regulations which are inconsistent with this Code. (n)

Approved, June 18, 1949.