Stdprod 069405

DRAFT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY
Ministry of Natural Resources
Ministère des richesses naturelles
Technical Guidelines and Requirements for Approval

Under
The Lakes & Rivers Improvement Act
VOLUME THREE – LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT OF

DAMS
2010
NOTE:
The Ministry of Natural Resources is currently investigating ways to modernize
provincial requirements for the construction and management of dams.
The policies, standards and management practices contained within these draft
technical guidelines represent the changes to provincial requirements currently
being considered.
The purpose of these guidelines is to provide dam owners, members of the

public, and other interested parties an opportunity to provide feedback on the
requirements being considered.
The policies, standards and management practices contained within these draft
technical guidelines are being shared for discussion purposes only and do not
represent any commitment from the MNR to make any changes to existing
requirements for the construction and management of dams.
2010
Table of Contents
VOLUME THREE: LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT OF DAMS
Chapter 1: General
Chapter 2: Classification of Dams

2.1 General
2.2 Ontario’s Dam Classification System
2.2.1 Low Hazard Potential
2.2.2 Moderate Hazard Potential
2.2.3 High Hazard Potential
2.2.4 Very High Hazard Potential
2.2.5 Hazard Potential Classification Determination
2.2.6 Preliminary Hazard Potential Determination
2.3 Other Considerations
2.3.1 Advanced Warning Time
2.3.2 HPC Changes Over Time
Chapter 3: Inflow Design Floods

3.1 General
3.1.1 Future Development Potential
3.1.2 Determining the IDF
3.1.3 Statistically Determined or Event Based IDF
3.2 Selecting the Inflow Design Flood
3.3 Flood and Erosion Impacts
3.3.1 Upstream Flooding and Erosion Rights
3.3.2 Downstream Flooding and Erosion Rights
3.3.3 Dam’s Ability to Withstand Flood Flows
Chapter 4: Incremental Hazard Evaluation

4.1 Steps to Incremental Analysis
4.2 Flood Flow Estimates
4.2.1 Determining the PMF
4.2.2 Determining Flood Magnitudes
4.2.3 Determining the 1 in 1000 Year Flood
4.3 Flood Routing
4.4 Dam Break Analysis
4.4.1 Dam Break Studies
4.4.2 Computer Simulation Models
4.4.3 Initial Conditions
4.4.4 Definition of Breach Parameters
4.4.5 Incremental Increase
4.4.6 Area Affected
4.4.7 Cascade Effect
4.4.8 Concurrent Inflows
4.4.9 Sensitivity Analysis
4.5 Inundation Mapping
4.6 Incremental Loss Analyses
4.6.1 Incremental Increase in Downstream Water Surface Elevation
2010
Chapter 5: Spillways and Flood Control Structures
5.1 General
5.2 Critical Design Factors
5.3 Spillways and Other Discharge Facilities
5.3.1 Spillway Purpose
5.3.2 Classifying Spillways
5.4 Design Considerations
5.4.1 Design for Debris, Ice, and Sediment During Flood Events
5.4.2 Sediment Transport
5.5 Freeboard
5.5.1 Factors and Criteria Influencing Freeboard
5.5.2 Minimum Freeboard for Dams
5.5.3 Accounting for Earthquake and Landslide Effects
5.5.4 Minimum Freeboard Under IDF Conditions
5.5.5 Minimum Freeboard for High and Very High HPC Embankment
Dams
5.5.6 Minimum Core Elevation
5.5.7 Concrete Dams
5.5.8 Steps to Determine Freeboard
5.5.9 Appropriate Procedures for the Determination of Freeboard
5.5.10 Ice and Debris Considerations
Chapter 6: Structural Design and Factors of Safety

6.1 Loading Combinations
6.2 Sliding Stability Analysis for Gravity Concrete Dams
6.3 Position of the Resultant
Chapter 7: Geotechnical Design and Factors of Safety

7.1 Geotechnical Aspects
7.2 Embankment Dams
7.2.1 Loading Combinations for Embankment Dam Stability
Assessment
7.2.2 Embankment Dam Stability – Levels of Safety
7.2.3 Additional Considerations for Embankment Dams
7.3 Dam Foundations
7.3.1 Rock Foundations
7.3.2 Overburden Foundations
7.3.3 Reservoir Rim
7.3.4 Timber Crib Dams
7.4 Tailings Dams
7.5 Flow Through Rockfill Dams
Chapter 8: Seismic Hazard Criteria, Assessment and Considerations

8.1 General
8.2 Scope and General Outline
8.3 Determination of Seismic Evaluation Requirements
8.3.1 Earthquake Hazard and Losses
8.3.2 Terminology
8.3.3 Design Earthquake Criteria
8.3.4 Factors Influencing the Selection of Seismic Evaluation
Requirements
8.4 Seismic Hazard Evaluations
8.4.1 General Approach
2010
8.4.2 Identification of Earthquake Sources
8.4.3 Earthquake Occurrence Rates
8.4.4 Regional Ground Motion Relations
8.4.5 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment Methodology
8.5 Selection of Seismic Evaluation Parameters
Chapter 9: Preparation of Operations, Maintenance, & Surveillance Plans

9.1 Content of Operations, Maintenance, and Surveillance Plans
9.1.1 Project Description
9.2 Dam Operations Section
9.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities
9.2.2 Operating Criteria
9.2.3 Seasonal Reservoir Operating Rules
9.2.4 Data Requirements
9.2.5 Operating Procedures
9.2.6 Normal Operations
9.2.7 Unusual Operations
9.2.8 Emergency Operations
9.2.9 Compliance Monitoring Documentation
9.2.10 Flow Control
9.3 Maintenance Plan
9.3.1 Maintenance Programs
9.3.2 Concrete Structures
9.3.3 Embankment Structures
9.3.4 Steel Structures
9.3.5 Spillway Structures
9.3.6 Penstocks, Tunnels & Pressure Conduits
9.3.7 Other Dam Structures
9.3.8 Infrastructure
9.4 Surveillance Plans
9.4.1 General
9.4.2 Visual Inspections
9.4.3 Routine Inspections
9.4.4 Scheduled Engineering Inspections
9.4.5 Special Inspections
9.4.6 Dam Instrumentation
9.4.7 Effectiveness Monitoring and Adaptive Management
9.4.8 Documentation and Follow Up
9.4.9 Inspection, Maintenance and Testing of Flow Control Equipment
9.5 OMS Plan Administration and Control
Chapter 10: Emergency Preparedness Plans (EPP)

10.1 Introduction
10.2 Process to Develop an EPP
10.3 Content of the EPP
10.3.1 Description and Location
10.3.2 External Notification Contact Lists
10.3.3 Inundation Maps
10.3.4 Expected Roles During An Emergency
10.3.5 Termination of an Emergency
10.3.6 Communication Systems, Equipment, and Materials
10.3.7 Site Information & Access Routes
10.3.8 Debriefing/Follow-up Procedure
10.4 EPP Maintenance & Administration
10.5 Training
2010
10.6 Testing
10.6.1 Call Tests
10.6.2 Table Top Drills
10.6.3 Functional Drills
Chapter 11: Dam Safety Review

11.1 Dam Safety Reviews
11.1.1 Review Team
11.1.2 Independent Review
11.1.3 Frequency of Review
11.1.4 Level of Detail
11.2 Scope of a Dam Safety Review
11.3 Dam Safety Analysis
11.4 Site Inspection
11.5 Staffing Responsibilities
11.6 Documentation and Items to be Reviewed
11.6.1 Hazard Potential Classification
11.6.2 Records and Data Collection and Effectiveness Monitoring
11.6.3 Previous Dam Safety Reviews
11.7 Operation, Maintenance & Surveillance
11.8 Flow Control Equipment Testing
11.9 Emergency Preparedness
11.10 Security Requirements
11.11 Public Safety Around Dams
11.12 Dam Safety Reports
Chapter 12: Dam Safety Management Plans

12.1 Introduction
12.2 Terminology
12.3 The Overall Dam Safety Objective
12.4 Objective of the Dam Safety Management Plan
12.4.1 What Must Dam Owners to Meet the DSMP Objectives?
12.4.2 Types of Dams Requiring a Dam Safety Management Plan
12.4.3 What Impacts of Dam Safety Must be Included?
12.4.5 Benefits and Challenges of Risk Analysis for Dam Safety
12.5 Fundamental and Operating Principles
12.6 Risk Assessment
12.7 Risk Criteria
12.7.1 Potential Loss of Life
12.7.2 Damage to Physical and Real Property
12.7.3 Impact on the Natural Environment, and on Cultural and
Historical Resources
12.7.4 As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
12.8 Risk Analysis Approach
12.9 Demonstration of Safety Through Integrated Risk Management System
12.10 Reporting and Documentation
Chapter 13: Dam Registry

13.1 Purpose of the Dam Registry System
13.1.1 Emergency Management
13.1.2 Government Transparency
13.1.3 Dam Safety Regulation Enforcement
13.1.4 Dam Safety Program Measures
13.2 Access to the DRS
2010
13.3 Dam Owner
13.4 Others
13.5 Request an Account
13.5.1 Account Request Form
13.5.2 Account
13.5.3 User Name and Password
Chapter 14: Location Approval

14.1 General
14.2 Assessment of Upstream Impacts Within the Zone of Influence
14.2.1 General
14.2.2 Work Site and Area to be Flooded
14.2.3 Water Levels & Flows
14.2.4 Natural Amenities
14.2.5 Permit to Take Water
14.2.6 Navigable Waters
14.2.7 Historical, Architectural, and Archaeological Resources
14.2.8 Fill, Construction and Alteration to Water Crossings &
Channelizations
14.3 Assessment of Downstream Impacts within Zone of Influence
14.3.1 General
14.3.2 Flooding and Erosion
14.3.3 Total Diversions
14.3.4 Partial Diversions
14.3.5 Temporary Works
14.3.6 Low Flows
14.3.7 Turbidity and Sediment
14.4 Consultation and Environmental Assessment
14.4.1 General
14.4.2 Environmental Assessment
14.5 Consideration of Aquatic Ecosystems
14.5.1 MNR Review of Applications
14.5.2 Fish Passage
14.5.3 Timing Windows for Work In-Water
14.5.4 Referral of LRIA Applications to DFO
14.6 Assessment of Wildlife
14.7 Assessment of Species at Risk
14.8 Assessment of Wetlands
14.9 Waterpower
14.9.1 General
14.9.2 Applicability of Waterpower Site Release Policy
14.9.3 Water Management Planning for Waterpower
14.10 Social Considerations
14.10.1 Aboriginal and Treaty Rights
14.10.2 Riparian and Other Land Owners
Chapter 15: Plans and Specifications Approval

15.1 General
15.2 Information Requirements
15.2.1 Final Design Report
15.2.2 Hydrological Information
15.2.3 Reservoir Information
15.2.4 Hydraulic Information
15.2.5 Foundation Information
2010
15.2.6 Design Drawings & Details, Specifications & Construction
Schedule Information
15.2.7 Operational Information
15.2.8 Ecological Information
List of Tables
Table 3-1: Hazard Potential Classification
Table 3-2: Range of Minimum Inflow Design Floods
Table 3-3: Minimum Freeboard for Dams
Table 3-4: Design Winds under IDF Conditions
Table 3-5: Minimum Sliding Safety Factor for Concrete Dams (MSSF)
Table 3-6: Factors of Safety for Slope Stability – Static Assessment & Seismic Assessment
Table 3-7: Factors of Safety for Timber Crib Dams
Table 3-8: Design Earthquake Criteria
Table 3-9: Typical Content of OMS Plan
Table 3-10: Minimum Frequency of Inspections
Table 3-11: Maximum Period between Dam Safety Reviews
Table 3-12: Annual Probabilities for Risk Assessment
Table 3-13: Summary Checklist of Information Required for Volume 3 Location Approval
Table 3-14: Summary Checklist of Information Requirements for Volume 3 Plans & Specifications
List of Figures
Figure 3-A: Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment
Figure 3-B: Risk Management Overview
Figure 3-C: Societal Risk Requirements for Existing Dams
Figure 3-D: Economic Risk Requirements for Existing Dams
Figure 3-E: Environmental and Cultural Heritage Risk Requirements for Existing Dams
Figure 3-F: Steps of a Safety Management System
Appendices for Volume Three

Volume 3: References and Bibliography
2010
CHAPTER 1.0: GENERAL
This volume has been prepared to provide direction to MNR staff and guidance to dam
owners in the identification of all requirements for the safe life cycle management of
dams. Specifically, it outlines:
1. criteria and standards;

2. specific information requirements;
3. assessment, review, and approval requirements;
4. process and content to develop plans for the management of dams; and
5. plans and specifications requirements.
These requirements must be used when considering applications submitted for approval
under Section 14(5), 16(2), 17(2) and approval of Dam Safety Management Plans
(DSMP).
When referring to “Dams” within this Volume, this includes the control structure and all
appurtenant facilities (e.g. penstocks).
In many cases, several dams (including block or settle dams) may be required to contain
the stored contents of a reservoir. Dams must be identified as individual structures
where they are separated by undisturbed parent material such as earth or rock. These
dams can be separated by a significant distance or be adjacent to each other. Each of
these dams must be separately classified and appropriately managed in a safe manner
as required under the Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act (LRIA).
This volume must be read in conjunction with Volume 1, specifically, the LRIA Approval
Process Flow Chart.
2010 1
The changes in provincial policies, standards and practices contained within these draft technical guidelines
are being presented for discussion purposes only and do not represent any commitment by government to
change existing requirements for the construction and management of dams.
CHAPTER 2.0: CLASSIFICATION OF DAMS
2.1 General
In Ontario, dams are classified using the Hazard Potential Classification (HPC) system.
The HPC system categorizes dams according to the hazard potential presented by the
dam. The hazard potential is defined as the degree of losses that would result from an
uncontrolled release of the reservoir as a result of a dam failure or mis-operation with
respect to loss of life, and damage to property, the environment and built cultural
heritage sites at the dam site, upstream, downstream, or at other areas influenced by the
dam.
Ontario’s dam classification system is based on four (4) classification categories: Low,
Moderate, High and Very High that define incremental losses due to dam failure or mis-
operation on the basis of an increasing level of magnitude along a continuum.
Where necessary, MNR may seek input from appropriate agencies (e.g. Fisheries and
Oceans Canada) on the review of the applicant’s hazard potential classification.
The dam’s HPC is used to identify the design, construction, operation, maintenance and
emergency preparedness requirements for the structure in order to provide for the
purposes of the LRIA.
Section 2.2 and Table 3-1 outline the criteria for determining the Hazard Potential
Classification for individual dams.
2.2 Ontario’s Dam Classification System
The hazard potential classification assigned to a dam is a measure of the greatest

incremental losses that could result from the release of water or stored contents behind
a dam due to failure or mis-operation of the dam or its appurtenances based on the
worst-case but realistic failure condition. In defining incremental losses from dam failure
or mis-operation there must not be an account taken of warning time available to
mitigate the potential for these losses and the current condition of the dam.
Incremental losses refer to losses from dam failure or mis-operation which is above and
beyond those which may be expected to occur under the same natural conditions (flood,
earthquake or other event) with the dam in place, but without failure of the dam.
Two hazard potential classifications for dams are required: the first under a flood event,
and the second under normal (sunny day) conditions.
Evaluation of the hazard potential is based on both present land use and on anticipated
development over a time horizon of 20 years, or other duration as outlined in the
pertinent official planning documents (e.g. Official Plan).
2010 2
Table 3-1 Hazard Potential Classification
Affected Area
Hazard Life Safety Property Losses Environmental Losses Cultural – Built Heritage
Potential Losses
Very High Expected loss of life in Extensive damage, estimated losses in excess of Extensive loss of fish and/or wildlife
Permanent Dwellings $30 million, to buildings, agricultural, forestry, habitat or significant deterioration of
mineral aggregate and mining, and petroleum critical fish and/or wildlife habitat with
11 or more persons resource operations, infrastructure and services. very little or no feasibility of being able to
Typically includes destruction of or extensive apply natural or assisted recovery
damage to large residential, institutional, activities to promote species recovery to
concentrated commercial and industrial areas and viable population levels.
major infrastructure and services, or land
identified as designated growth areas as shown in Loss of a viable portion of the population
official plans. of plant, fish or wildlife species or
irreversible damage to habitat
Infrastructure and services includes highways, designated under OESA as Endangered
railway lines or municipal water and wastewater (Regulated).
treatment facilities and publicly-owned utilities.
High Expected loss of life in Appreciable damage with estimated losses not to Appreciable loss of fish and/or wildlife Irreversible damage to
Permanent Dwellings exceed $30 million, to agricultural, forestry, habitat or significant deterioration of provincially designated
1-10 persons mineral aggregate and mining, and petroleum critical fish and/ or wildlife habitat with cultural heritage sites under
resource operations, other dams or residential, reasonable likelihood of being able to the Ontario Heritage Act or
Downstream area commercial, industrial areas, infrastructure and apply natural or assisted recovery nationally recognized heritage
characterized by services, or land identified as designated growth activities to promote species recovery to sites
seasonal or significant areas as shown in official plans. viable population levels.
numbers of persons
present on a transitory Infrastructure and services includes regional Loss of a portion of the population of
basis. roads, railway lines, or municipal water and plant, fish or wildlife species or
wastewater treatment facilities and publicly- reversible damage to habitat designated
Day-use facilities and owned utilities. under Ontario Endangered Species Act
recreational activities (ESA).
based on historical
patterns.
2010 3
The changes in provincial policies, standards and practices contained within these draft technical guidelines are being presented for discussion purposes only and
do not represent any commitment by government to change existing requirements for the construction and management of dams.
Moderate No expected loss of life Moderate damage with estimated losses not to Minimal loss of or deterioration of fish Irreversible damage to
exceed $3 million, to agricultural, forestry, mineral and/or wildlife habitat with moderate municipally designated
Downstream Area aggregate and mining, and petroleum resource capability of natural restoration resulting cultural heritage sites as
characterized by nominal operations, other dams or structures not for in low likelihood of negatively affecting advised by the Municipal
numbers of persons human habitation, infrastructure and services status of population. Heritage Committee under
present on a transitory including local roads and railway lines. the Ontario Heritage Act
basis.
The inundation area is typically undeveloped or Reversible damage to
Limited day-use facilities predominantly rural or agricultural, or it is provincially designated
and recreational managed so that the land usage is for transient cultural heritage sites under
activities. activities such as with day-use facilities. the Ontario Heritage Act or
nationally recognized heritage
Minimal damage to residential, commercial, sites.
industrial areas, or land identified as designated
growth areas as shown in official plans.
Low No expected loss of life Very low Damage to property with estimated Minimal loss of habitat with high Reversible damage to
or no persons losses not to exceed $300,000. capability of natural restoration resulting municipally designated
foreseeably present in in very low likelihood of negatively cultural heritage sites as
the dam breach affecting status of population. advised by the Municipal
inundation zone based Heritage Committee under
on historic patterns. the Ontario Heritage Act.
Notes:
1. Losses refer to incremental adverse consequences resulting from dam failure or mis-operation above those impacts which would occur under the same
conditions (flood, earthquake or other event) with the dam in place but without failure of the dam
2. Expected loss of life. Refer to Technical Guide – River and Streams Systems: Flooding Hazard Limits, Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2002, for
definition of 2 by 2 rule. The 2 by 2 rule or its equivalent defines that people would be at risk to expected loss of life if the product of the velocity and the depth
exceeded 0.37 square metres per second or if velocity exceeds 1.7 metres per second or if depth of water exceeds 0.8 metres.
3. Where several dams are situated along the same watercourse, consideration must be given to the cascade effect of failures when classifying the structures,
such that if failure of an upstream dam could contribute to failure of a downstream dam, then the hazard potential classification of the upstream dam must be
the same as or greater than that downstream structure.
4. Losses refer to all direct losses to third parties; they do not include losses to owner, such as loss of the dam, revenue, or cultural heritage losses of built
heritage owned outright by the owner of the dam. The dollar losses, where identified, are indexed to Statistics Canada values Year 2000.
2010 4
5. The hazard potential classification assigned to a dam should be based on the higher classification as determined from the incremental effects of a potential
dam failure resulting from either the Inflow Design Flood or normal (sunny day) operations.
6. Losses must take into consideration a 20 year planned development horizon or as outlined in official planning documents. Under the Provincial Policy
Statement, ‘designated growth areas’ means lands within settlement areas designated in an official plan for growth over the long-term planning horizon
(specifies normal time horizon of up to 20 years), but which have not yet been fully developed. Designated growth areas include lands which are designated
and available for residential growth in accordance with the policy, as well as lands required for employment and other uses. (Italicized terms as defined in the
PPS, 2005)
7. Flooding and/or erosion rights may be acquired downstream to reduce the possibility of raising the hazard potential classification in the future and/or
increasing the IDF.
8. The classification is determined by the highest potential consequences, whether loss of life, property losses, environmental losses, cultural-built heritage
losses
2010 5
2.2.1 Low Hazard Potential

The failure or mis-operation of dams classified as Low Hazard Potential are those
dams where one or more of the following incremental losses will be expected to occur.
Loss of Life: there are no foreseeable persons present in the dam failure inundation
zone based on historical patterns and therefore there is no expected loss of life.
Property Losses: minor damage limited to third party losses of not more than $300,000
(Statistics Canada, 2000). Damages would be principally limited to the dam owner’s
property and in the immediate vicinity to the dam.
Environmental Losses: habitat losses would be minimal with a high capability of natural
restoration with no long term losses. There would be no measurable reduction in the
status of fish and wildlife populations after this period.
Cultural - Built Heritage Losses: Reversible damage to municipally designated cultural
heritage sites as defined by the Municipal Heritage Committee under the Ontario
Heritage Act. Losses to contents of cultural – built heritage structures must be included
in the above property losses limit.
2.2.2 Moderate Hazard Potential
The failure or mis-operation of dams classified as Moderate Hazard Potential are those
Loss of Life: there are no permanent dwellings in the dam failure inundation zone and
therefore no expected loss of life. Persons who may be engaged in transitory activities
within the inundation zone are on a limited and infrequent basis (limited day use and
recreational activities) and therefore their loss of life will be unlikely.
Property Losses: minimal property damage and limited to third party losses of not more
than 3 million dollars (Statistics Canada, 2000). The inundation zone is undeveloped
with the likelihood of forestry, mineral, aggregate, mining and petroleum resource
extraction or harvesting operations occurring or it is predominantly rural or agricultural.
In addition, it includes dams and other structures not for human habitation and
infrastructure and services associated with this land use such as local roads and
railways. Some minimal damage may occur to residential, commercial or industrial
lands along the fringe of the dam failure inundation zone and lands identified as
designated growth areas in official plans.
Environmental Losses: minimal loss of/or deterioration of fish and/or wildlife habitat with
moderate capability of natural restoration resulting in low likelihood of negatively
affecting the long term status of fish and wildlife populations. Losses are largely
marginal habitat only with no significant loss of important habitat.
Cultural - Built Heritage: irreversible damage to municipally designated cultural heritage

sites or reversible damage to provincial designated cultural heritage sites as defined by
the Municipal Heritage Committee under the Ontario Heritage Act. Losses to contents of
cultural heritage structures must be included in the above property losses limit.
2010 6
2.2.3 High Hazard Potential
The failure or mis-operation of dams classified as High Hazard Potential are those
Loss of Life: there is expected loss of life for 1 to 10 persons in permanent dwellings.
Person(s) will be exposed to flows and water levels greater than the 2x2 rule in
permanent dwellings or while removing themselves to safe areas (Natural Hazards
Technical Guide). Significant numbers of persons can be engaged in transitory activities
within the dam failure inundation zone on a seasonal basis (day-use facilities and
recreational activities based on historical patterns). Where persons are engaged in
these transitory activities during a dam failure or mis-operation in areas where the flood
waters are at a depth or velocity greater than the 2x2 rule, loss of life is possible or likely
in some situations.
Property Losses: appreciable property damage limited to third party losses of not more
than 30 million dollars (Statistics Canada, 2000). The inundation zone can contain
agricultural, forestry, mineral, aggregate, mining and petroleum resource operations or
other dams or residential, commercial or industrial areas, and services and infrastructure
associated with this land use including regional roads, railway lines or municipal water
and wastewater treatment facilities publicly-owned utilities or lands identified as
designated growth areas in official plans.
Environmental Losses: appreciable loss of fish and/or wildlife habitat or significant

deterioration of critical fish and/ or wildlife habitat with reasonable likelihood of being
able to apply natural or assisted recovery activities to promote species recovery to viable
population levels. Loss of a viable portion of the population of plant, fish or wildlife
species designated under Endangered Species Act (ESA) as Endangered (Non-
Regulated).
Cultural - Built Heritage Losses: reversible damage to nationally recognized heritage

sites or provincial designated cultural heritage sites under the Ontario Heritage Act.
Losses to contents of cultural heritage structures must be included in the above property
losses limit.
2.2.4 Very High Hazard Potential
The failure or mis-operation of dams classified as Very High Hazard Potential are
those dams where one or more of the following incremental losses will be expected to
occur.
Loss of Life: there is expected loss of life for 11 or more persons in permanent dwellings
and persons engaged in transitory activities. Person(s) will be exposed to flows and
water exceeding the 2x2 rule in permanent dwellings and in removing themselves to
safe areas.
2010 7
Property Losses: extensive damage limited to third party losses exceeding 30 million
dollars (Statistics Canada, 2000).
Environmental Losses: extensive loss of fish and/or wildlife habitat or significant

deterioration of critical fish and/or wildlife habitat with very little or no feasibility of being
able to apply natural or assisted recovery activities to promote species recovery to viable
population levels. Loss of a viable portion of the population of plant, fish or wildlife
species or irreversible damage to habitat designated under ESA as Endangered
(Regulated).
Cultural - Built Heritage Losses: irreversible damage to provincially designated cultural

heritage sites under the Ontario Heritage Act or nationally recognized cultural heritage
sites. Losses to contents of cultural heritage structures must be included in the above
property losses limit.
2.2.5 Hazard Potential Classification (HPC) Determination
The HPC for a dam is based on the incremental adverse losses to the current and future
planned conditions in the downstream channel and exiting upstream interests from the
dam to the headwaters of the reservoir resulting from dam failure or mis-operation and
is not related to any deficiencies in the:
1. current structural integrity

2. operational status
3. flood routing capability, or
4. physical condition of the dam or it appurtenances or
5. emergency preparedness
Advanced Warning Time

Dams must be classified on the assumption that Emergency Preparedness Plans (EPP),
if they exist, will not be activated and further, that warning time will be limited or will not
exist. The purpose of an EPP is to reduce the adverse effects of the eventual dam
failure or mis-operation where ever possible. The EPP cannot be used as support to
lower the required HPC and associated standards.
Flood and Sunny Day Scenarios

Dams must be classified separately for both flood and normal (sunny day) dam failures
or mis-operation. The combination of a seismic event with a flood event is so improbable
that it is not considered for determining the HPC.
Dam Classification
The HPC assigned to a dam must be based on the higher classification between the
flood and normal (sunny day) dam failure or mis-operation. The classification must also
be based on the worst-case scenario of failure or mis-operation of the dam and at the
worst possible time thereby resulting in the highest HPC of all realistic failure and mis-
operation scenarios. Each element of the dam or associated appurtenances of the dam
must be evaluated to determine which failure will produce the greatest possible
uncontrolled release of water in the determination of the HPC of the entire dam.
2010 8
Individual elements of the dam are not assigned separate classifications. Only separate
dams can have the same or different HPC’s on the same reservoir.
The HPC is assigned by aligning the category with the description of the highest
potential hazard, whether loss of life, property losses, environmental losses, or cultural-
built heritage losses. Once the highest category of loss has been determined there is no
further requirement to assess the losses within the other categories.
The capital losses contained in the HPC category are not used to assign the HPC
category. Capital loss values are used to assist in the selection of the IDF within the
range of protection provided in the IDF Table.
The assigned or (higher) HPC between the flood and normal (sunny day) dam failure or
mis-operation must be used to determine the requirements of the dam safety program
for the structure (e.g. EPP requirements, frequency of Dam Safety Reviews, Inspections
and Monitoring, etc.).
Using the HPC to Determine MDE

The HPC of a normal (sunny day) dam failure must be used to meet seismic
requirements and determine Maximum Design Earthquake (MDE), notwithstanding the
fact that the HPC of a flood event might be higher.
Using the HPC to Determine IDF

The HPC of a flood induced dam failure is used to determine the required Inflow Design
Flood, notwithstanding the fact that the HPC of a sunny day event might be higher.
Loss of Life and Permanent Dwellings

For the purposes of determining the HPC, the potential for expected loss of life is related
to the severity of the flood waters released as a result of a dam failure event.
In the event of an uncontrolled release of stored water, there is always a possibility that
a person(s) could be in its path regardless of how unexpected and be injured or lose
their life. The potential presence of a person(s) who is only temporarily or unexpectedly
in the inundation area, does not represent a condition of expected loss of one or more
human lives. This does not constitute a sufficient hazard to place the dam in the High
Hazard category.
For the purposes of establishing the HPC, application of the 2x2 rule (see Natural
Hazards Technical Guide, 2001) or its equivalent is used to determine when person(s)
are expected to lose their lives.
The 2x2 rule defines that people would be at risk to expected loss of life if the product of
the velocity and the depth exceeded 0.37 square metres per second or if velocity
exceeds 1.7 metres per second or if depth of water exceeds 0.8 metres.
The presence of permanent dwellings in the inundation zone means that there are
persons exposed to the hazard who cannot be considered as transients. Where those
occupants could be exposed to water levels and flows that exceed the 2x2 rule (or its
2010 9
equivalent) by either remaining in their dwelling or fleeing along escape routes during the
worst conditions, they are expected to lose their life for the purposes of HPC
determination.
Transient Persons
Although loss of life can occur in the dam failure inundation zone, loss of life is not
expected where transient persons are only temporarily in the inundation zone (i.e.
occasional overnight or recreational user of the river and downstream lands or passer-
by and persons working on or downstream of the dam).
Engineering Judgment
It should be understood that in any classification system, all possibilities can not be
defined in advance. High usage areas of any type should be considered appropriately.
Under flood conditions permanent dwellings include habitable buildings and trailer parks.
For dam failures under sunny day conditions permanent dwellings include habitable
buildings and trailer parks as well as seasonal (summer through fall) campgrounds.
However, occasional overnight camping along undesignated canoe routes or river parks
with low usage are not considered permanent dwellings.
Engineering judgment and common sense must ultimately be a part of any decision for
assigning a hazard potential classification.
Assessing Property Damage

Property losses must assess only direct third party losses to physical buildings,
property, other structures and municipal water and waste water treatment facilities and
publicly-owned utilities and services and contents of cultural heritage buildings.
It does not include indirect or ancillary costs associated with dam failure such as the
inconvenience of being relocated from a place of residence as a result of dam failure,
loss of the dam, loss of revenue, or cultural heritage losses of built heritage owned
outright by the owner of the dam, or cultural heritage sites.
Losses must be based on a 20 year development horizon or as outlined in official

planning documents.
The dollar losses, where identified, are indexed to Statistics Canada values Year 2000.
Cascade Dam Failure – Existing Dams

Potential failure or mis-operation of existing upstream dams will not be considered in
selecting the hazard potential classification of the dam under study while potential
impacts on downstream dams must be taken into account.
Where one or more existing dams are situated downstream along the same
watercourse, consideration must be given to the cascade effect of failures such that if
failure of an upstream dam could contribute to failure of a downstream dam, then the
hazard potential classification of the upstream dam must be the same as or greater than
that downstream structure.
2010 10
Cascade Dam Failure – New Dams

Where a new dam is constructed downstream of an existing dam and the new dam has
a higher hazard potential classification then the upstream dam, the downstream new
dam must be designed to safely pass flows from the failure of the upstream existing
dam.
Where a new dam is constructed upstream of an existing dam, the hazard potential
classification of the upstream dam must be the same as or greater than that downstream
existing dam. Although the HPC of the upstream dam can be the same, the IDF for the
new upstream dam may be different.
2.2.6 Preliminary Hazard Potential Determination
The determination of a HPC for a dam is carried out using a two-phased approach. The
HPC determination proceeds from the simplest method (preliminary) to detailed
(incremental hazard) assessments as more information is obtained and greater clarity is
required (see Chapter 4). In most cases, the preliminary method will be sufficient for an
informed and adequate hazard potential classification decision that can be used to
determine the requirements of a dam safety program.
A Preliminary HPC involves a qualitative assessment of the relative factors, such as
historical flooding, existing floodplain mapping, downstream development, recreational
activities, channel topography and hydraulics, characteristics of the dam and reservoir,
discharge facilities, and watershed features. Through assessment of these factors, the
preliminary HPC can be assigned for flood and normal (sunny day) dam failures or mis-
operation if the incremental losses are obvious. At this point, sufficient information
should also be available to proceed to Chapter 3.0 and undertake a determination of the
Inflow Design Flood (IDF) for the dam.
2.3.1 Advanced Warning Time

The HPC must not be adjusted based on warning time that may permit evacuation of
persons and movable property.
2.3.2 HPC Changes Over Time
The HPC for a dam may change over time. Downstream development in the
incremental flood zone, physical or operational alterations to a dam to change the
storage or discharge capability, the finding of a species at risk (plant or animal),
revisions to hydrology or hydraulic characteristics of the watershed or changes in the
magnitude or frequency of flood events require a re-assessment of the HPC of the dam.
Therefore, it is a requirement to review and confirm the assigned HPC of the dam
whenever major works requiring approval are being considered at the dam or a Dam
Safety Review is being conducted.
2010 11
CHAPTER 3.0: INFLOW DESIGN FLOODS
3.1 General
Inflow Design Flood (IDF)

The Inflow Design Flood (IDF) is the most severe inflow flood (peak, volume, shape,
duration, timing) for which a dam and its associated facilities are designed (CDA, 2007).
For Very High hazard dams, the IDF is based on multiple levels of expected loss of life
protection or the most severe inflow flood above which there would not be any further
incremental consequence to property and cultural heritage losses, or environmental
impacts as a result of a dam failure or mis-operation.
3.1.1 Future Development Potential
Evaluation of losses, as well as the selection of hydrologic and hydraulic parameters to

be used in the determination of IDF, should be determined on the basis of future
development potential within 20 years or other time horizon as specified in official
planning documents. Note that, with respect to natural flooding hazards, provincial
policy prohibits development within the 1:100 year or regional flood.
3.1.2 Determining the IDF
The degree of study required to define the hazard potential losses of dam failure will
vary with the extent of existing and potential downstream development, the type of dam
(size and shape or breach and breach time formation) and the available advanced
warning time of a pending dam failure.
Capital losses contained in the HPC Table are used to assist in the selection of the IDF
within the range of protection provided in the IDF Table. For example, if the capital loss
of a moderate HPC dam was close to 3 million, then the IDF standard should be at the
top of the IDF range.
The IDF may be able to be reduced based on advanced warning times of a minimum of
12 hours or greater for new and existing dams. In order to reduce the IDF, dam owners
will be required to prepare and submit an Emergency Preparedness Plan for
consideration and approval by the Ministry. The Emergency Preparedness Plan must
include details on how the dam owner will effectively and safely evacuate all persons at
risk from the incremental dam failure zone. The Emergency Preparedness Plan must
also demonstrate that persons at risk in the dam failure zone are not subject to further
intolerable risks that may occur during evacuation. The dam owner would also be
responsible for all direct and indirect losses incurred by persons in the dam failure zone.
A hazard evaluation (including dam-break analyses and flood routing studies) may not
provide precise results and therefore the selection of the IDF should be conservative.
3.1.3 Statistically Determined or Event Based IDF

2010 12
Inflow Design Floods will be determined by either statistical or event-based

methodologies. See chapter 4.2 for more detail.
3.2 Selecting the Inflow Design Flood
Table 3-2 identifies the range of minimum inflow design floods (IDF) that corresponds
with each of the four hazard potential classifications:
Table 3-2 – Range of Minimum Inflow Design Floods
Hazard Range of Minimum Inflow Design Floods

Potential
Life Safety Property and Environment Cultural – Built Heritage
Classification
Greater than PMF
Very High 100
11-100 2/3 between 1/3 between the 1000 Year

the 1000 year Flood and PMF to PMF
Flood and
PMF
High 1-10 1/3 between 1000 Year Flood or RF 1000 Year Flood or RF
the 1000 year whichever is greater to 1/3 whichever is greater
Flood and between the 1000 year flood
PMF and PMF
Moderate 100 Year Flood to 1000 year flood or RF whichever is greater
Low 25 Year Flood to 100 Year Flood
Notes:
1. The selection of the Inflow Design Flood (IDF) within the range of flows provided can also be
commensurate with the magnitude that most closely relates to hazard potential losses within the
HPC Table. The degree of study required to define the hazard potential losses of dam failure will
vary with the extent of existing and potential downstream development, the type of dam (size and
shape of breach and breach time formation) and the available advanced warning time of a pending
dam failure.
2. The IDF can also be determined by an incremental analysis. Incremental analysis is a series of
scenarios for various increasing flows, both with and without dam failure that is used to determine
where there is no longer any significant additional threat to loss of life, property, environment and
cultural heritage to select the appropriate IDF. See Chapter 4 for details.
3. The criteria shown above are for permanent structures. Lower design floods may be used for
temporary structures (i.e. coffer dams), commensurate with the hazard.
2010 13
4. The analysis should consider both peak flow and volume of runoff to determine the more critical
event from a dam safety perspective.
The methodology to compute the IDF hydrograph is as follows:
1. Compute the peak flow, total volume and hydrograph of the 1:1000 year Flood;
2. Compute the peak flow, total volume and hydrograph of the PMF;
3. Plot the 1:1000 year and the PMP hydrographs on one graph, adjusting the time origin of one
flood so the peaks of the hydrograph coincide;
4. For each time step of the hydrographs compute the IDF discharge with equation (3.1)
Equation (3.1) Q (IDF) = Q (1:1000) + A x (Q(PMF) - Q(1000))
Where:
1. Q (IDF) is the discharge of the IDF for the selected time step of the hydrographs
2. Q (1:1000) is the discharge of the 1:1000 year flood for the selected time step of the
hydrographs
3. A is a proportionality coefficient which is equal to 1/3 for the High HPC and 2/3 for the Very
High HPC (life safety 11 to 100) when Loss of Life poses the highest hazard potential.
When the HPC is determined by Property Loss, the coefficient A can be determined as a
proportionality factor based on the magnitude of loss with respect to the upper and lower
bound for all classes except Very High. Selection of A for Very High class has to be guided by
Note 2 above.
Since Environmental and Cultural-Built Heritage Loss is defined only in a qualitative
(descriptive) manner, a judgment based on magnitude of potential loss with respect to
descriptors for the class has to be used in selection of coefficient A.
4. QPMF is the discharge of the PMF for the selected time step of the hydrographs
5. The annual exceedance probability for the PMF is set to 1:1,000,000
6. The IDF can be reduced if there is a minimum of 12 hours advanced warning and a dam owner has
prepared a DSMP inclusive of an EPP that would effectively evacuate all persons at risk from the
incremental flood zone.
The upper bound of the IDF in the Very High class for Property and Environment is set
as the PMF with the understanding that such IDF should be reserved for catastrophic
losses only. Such understanding provides necessary flexibility in IDF selection in
recognition that only exceptional environmental or economic loss can be considered in
terms equivalent to the loss of life.
A dam owner may wish to select a higher IDF or MDE to protect the dam assets. An
assessment of dam owner losses in the event of a dam failure might indicate that the
risk cost of a dam failure justifies the adoption of higher standards then the minimum
standards contained in this guideline. These dam owner costs might include loss of
revenue and costs to replace or repair damages to the dam.
3.3 Flood and Erosion Impacts
The right to flood lands normally extends to the area flooded at the level of the inflow
design flood. Flooding rights may also be required to account for any backwater effects
and potential upstream damages beyond the inflow design flood level. Flooding of
developed land (existing or future) or flooding extending for considerable distance
upstream (streams with flat gradients) requires an assessment by backwater analysis.
2010 14
The need for reassessing flooding rights due to proposed works to a dam or change in
operations should be determined accordingly.
3.3.1 Upstream Flooding and Erosion Rights
No dam may cause flooding to lands owned by others, either directly or indirectly, by
backwater effect over and above that which may be expected to occur under existing
conditions, unless legal authority has been obtained to permit such activity to occur.
Legal Authority may take the form of:

1. A flood easement, right or zoning
2. lease or acquisition of property subject to flooding, or
3. legal agreement to compensate for any flood damage caused by the dam.
For earthfill dams, it is generally assumed that the dam will fail if the water level exceeds
the crest of the dam. To determine the upstream design flood level for this type of dam,
the crest of the dam is selected at an elevation such that no upstream flood damage or
flooding of land to be developed will occur. For concrete dams it is generally assumed
that failure occurs at a water depth over the crest of the dam which varies with dam
design and the erosion resistance of the foundation. To determine the upstream design
flood level for this type of dam, the overtopping depth on the dam above which failure
occurs is determined and the height or location of the dam is selected such that no
upstream flood damage or flooding of land to be developed occurs at this overtopping
level. Note that if a concrete dam is located on an erodible foundation, it should not be
designed to be overtopped. If a backwater effect is created by a dam, this must be
included and the upstream flood level for the dam lowered accordingly.
3.3.2 Downstream Flooding and Erosion Rights
The acquisition of flooding or erosion rights downstream (see legal authority above) will
reduce the possibility of hazard potential classification increasing in the future. It may
also have the effect of lowering the present HPC.
3.3.3 Dam’s Ability to Withstand Flood Flows
Once the appropriate IDF for the dam has been selected, it should then be determined
whether the dam can safely withstand or pass all flood flows up to and including the IDF.
If it can, then no further evaluation is required. If the dam cannot safely pass all flows up
to and including the IDF, then further assessments are required. A dam safety
management plan (see chapter 12 for more detail) must be prepared for existing dams
where the dam cannot safely pass the IDF.
2010 15
CHAPTER 4.0: INCREMENTAL HAZARD EVALUATION
The HPC classification system is used to determine the requirements that the dam
needs to be constructed, operated and maintained such that third party losses do not
exceed the required criteria and standards in the event of a dam failure or mis-operation.
In the case of a flood event, dam failure will not necessarily cause incremental losses.
For many smaller dams, for example, tail water levels during an extreme event, such as
approaching the probable maximum flood (PMF), can be well above the crest of the
structure. In these cases, the dam can become ‘drowned out’ such that, even if the dam
were to fail during the flood, the effects of the failure would be unnoticeable. In such
cases, there would be no benefit to design the dam to resist the effects of the PMF since
the same losses would occur with or without a dam failure. In this situation, an IDF less
than the PMF would be appropriate.
In cases where the dam owner wishes to explore the possibility of selecting a lower
magnitude IDF, an incremental analysis is performed using progressively higher
magnitude, lower frequency, floods as the candidate IDF. The object is to find the
smallest flood for which the incremental losses associated with dam failure during the
flood event, or for any larger floods, are considered to be acceptable (do not create
significant incremental increase in the threat to loss of life or damages to property,
environment and cultural heritage sites). These ‘incremental losses’ include any
environmental damages, property losses and/or cultural built heritage losses that could
occur within the dam breach area in the event of a dam failure, that would not occur if
the dam does not fail.
4.1 Steps to Incremental Analysis
The following steps are to be performed in order to properly assess the potential losses
that could occur in the event of a dam failure.
1. Flood Flow Estimates

2. Flood Routing
3. Dam Break analysis, including documentation of and rational for:
a) the Initial Conditions
b) the Dam Breach Parameters
4. Inundation mapping of each scenario with and without dam failure
5. Documentation of Incremental Losses
4.2 Flood Flow Estimates
Analyses should include estimates of peak flood flows and hydrographs for a range of
flood frequencies up to and including the PMF. The flood flows at any given site are a
function of watershed size and its hydrological characteristics (antecedent moisture
conditions, soil and land cover conditions, basin shape and slope, the time to peak, etc),
the storm volume, duration and distribution, the flood routing processes, the storage
volume of the reservoir and the outlet capacity.
2010 16
It should be noted that, in any given reservoir, the governing flood water level might be
the result of short duration, high intensity summer storms or of high runoff volume from
long-duration rainfall plus snowmelt events in spring. Establishing the critical storm
period is part of the incremental analysis and assessment.
In performing the flood flow analyses, appropriate consideration must be given to
seasonal variations that might affect the magnitude of the flood flows. The calculated
flood flow is then compared with any available records of historical high water levels and
flows. Various methods of estimating the flood flows (e.g. regional analysis and
hydrologic modeling) should be investigated and the results from these summarized for
comparison purposes. Additional flood analysis information can be found in such other
technical references as Appendix A of the Canadian Dam Association’s Technical
Practice, T200 – Hydrotechnical Considerations in Dam Safety Analysis and Applied
Hydrology (Chow, Maidment, and Mays, 1988).
4.2.1 Determining the PMF
A probable maximum flood (PMF) must be determined if it is needed for use in the
evaluation. If a previous PMF value is already available, it should be reviewed to
determine if it needs to be re-assessed based on current meteorological observed data
and flood events.
4.2.2 Determining Flood Magnitudes
The Technical Guide titled, “River and Stream Systems: Flooding Hazard Limit” released
by the MNR in 2002, provides quantitative precipitation and accepted methodologies for
the determination of statistically-based floods and event-based floods, including the
methods for flood routing, computation of flood levels, and snow-melt analyses that are
acceptable to the Ministry. Quantitative precipitation distribution for regulatory floods in
Ontario are also described in the publication. The Probable Maximum Precipitation
Study for Ontario, MNR 2006 1 must be used to obtain precipitation amounts for the
probable maximum precipitation (PMP) rainfall. Another reference is the Alberta
Transportation Guidelines on Extreme Flood Analysis, November 2004.
Frequency analysis and/or regional analysis to determine the flood magnitudes of the 1
in 25 year flood, the 1 in 100 year flood, the regulatory flood, the inflow design flood, and
probable maximum flood and subsequent hydraulic modeling of these flows,
are performed in accordance with the Technical Guide – River and Streams Systems:
Flooding Hazard Limits, Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2002.
4.2.4 Determining the 1 in 1000 Year Flood
The 1:1000 year flood is a flood having a .001 (or .1%) probability of occurrence being
exceeded in any year. The 1:1000 year flood is estimated using a number of different
methodologies. The preferred method to determine the 1:1000 year flood (peak flow and
1
The values contained within the Probable Maximum Precipitation Study for Ontario, MNR 2006,
are currently under review
2010 17
volume of runoff) is by interpolation between the 1:100 year flood and PMF. Details on
this procedure are contained in the document, “Guidelines on Extreme Flood Analysis”,
Alberta Transportation, Transportation and Civil Engineering Division, Civil Projects
Branch – November 2004. Where there is consistency in results between the
methodologies judgment and conservatism are used to derive the estimated 1:1000 year
flood. If there is no consistency between methods, the method that provides the most
conservative estimate is to be used.
4.3 Flood Routing
Once the peak flood flows and hydrographs have been estimated, corresponding flood
water levels at the affected dams and downstream areas are calculated by performing
flood routing, using appropriate computational modeling of this hydraulic process.
As part of this task it is necessary to develop stage-storage stage-discharge tables and

graphs or confirm their accuracy for each discharge facility at a dam including an
accumulated stage storage-discharge table. These storage discharge relationships for
each dam will then be used in the flood routing analyses. The choice of flood routing
methods will be based on channel and flood plain information required by the method
and the amount and accuracy of the estimates required. Acceptable models include:
HEC-RAS
HEC-HMS
HYMO
NWS FLDWAV
BOSS DAMBRK
MIKE-11
The models are used to determine flows and water levels at critical locations as the flood
moves down the waterway system. Because of the varied nature of the dams, more
than one hydraulic model might have to be applied. The following factors must be
considered during model selection:
In some cases, a simplified analysis approach can be taken using manual techniques
that can be sufficiently calibrated.
For High and Very High Hazard dams, where permanent dwellings may exist in the
inundation zone, it is necessary to obtain channel geometry data and use appropriate
numerical models such as the HEC-RAS model to determine or verify water levels.
Where the water levels and flows along a river system are mostly affected by reservoirs,
lakes and on-stream storage facilities, their effects can be analyzed with reservoir
routing models such as HEC-HMS or HYMO.
When dynamic backwater effects from reservoirs and tributary inflows need to be
included in the analysis, the National Weather Service (NWS) Flood Wave (FLDWAV)
model or the BOSS Dam Break (DAMBRK) model can be used, depending on the
2010 18
complexity of the stream network. These models have the ability to dynamically
simulate the progression and attenuation of flood hydrographs through multiple
connected channels and shallow reservoir reaches, when applicable.
All flood routing models shall be calibrated and validated using historical water level and
flow data where these are available. Where hydrologic and hydraulic modeling is being
used to determine damages to permanent dwellings and expected loss of life, sufficient
effort must be made to obtain and carry out sensitivity analyses and calibration to
support the analytical findings.
4.4 Dam Break Analysis
4.4.1 Dam Break Studies
Dam break studies should be performed in accordance with accepted

guidelines. A list of sources of information related to dam break studies can be
found in Appendix A of Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety – Selecting and
Accommodating Inflow Design Floods for Dams (FEMA, April 2004.)
4.4.2 Computer Simulation Models
Industry accepted computer programs that simulate the dynamic effects of dam failure
flood waves include, but are not limited to, the DAMBRK and FLDWAV models
developed by the National Weather Service.
4.4.3 Initial Conditions

For each assumed flood event it shall be assumed that the reservoir at the beginning of
the flood event is at the maximum normal operating level. Warning time and the
potential for drawing down the reservoir shall not be considered when establishing the
initial water level at the beginning of the flood event.
For dams that are normally drawn down at the time the flood event occurs, the starting
water level can be assumed to be at this lower level, if this is the critical flood case. It
might be necessary to derive other flood hydrographs for floods that could occur during
other periods of the year and that could, in fact, represent the most critical flood for
cases in which there is seasonal variation in the reservoir level.
4.4.4 Definition of Breach Parameters

Most of the methods used for estimating dam break hydrographs require the user to
select the size, shape and time of formation of the dam breach, as well as the river
reach characteristics to be used in the computations. In estimating the dam break flood,
the section of the dam that could realistically fail that would result in the greatest release
of floodwater will initially be assumed to fail. Other criteria, such as the selection of
breach parameters and critical overtopping heights, will be selected from the guidelines
and other reference materials. Dam breach parameters for embankment dams shall be
established in accordance with accepted modern methodologies such as that outlined in
Prediction of Embankment Dam Breach Parameters DSO-98-004 (USBR 1998). For
2010 19
concrete dams, an analysis of potential failure modes for the structure is required to
estimate dam breach parameters.
4.4.5 Incremental Increase
An incremental hazard evaluation should begin with the IDF at the lower end of the
range specified in Table 3.1. If the incremental rise in downstream flood water due to
dam failure results in a significant incremental increase in the threat to loss of life or
property, environment and built cultural heritage sites a larger IDF must be selected and
the analysis is repeated.
For each flood condition, water surface elevations (with and without dam failure), flood
wave travel times, water depth and flow velocity must be determined.
The type of dam and the mechanism that could cause failure require careful
consideration if a realistic breach is to be assumed. Consideration must be given to the
following factors:
1. Size and shape of the breach

2. Time of breach formation
3. Perched dam on erodable foundation
4. Hydraulic head
5. Storage in the reservoir
6. Reservoir inflow
7. Dam construction material
For each assumed flood inflow condition (which can be percentages between the lower
end of the range and the Probable Maximum Flood), assume that:
1. the dam remains in place during the non-failure conditions; and

2. the dam fails when the peak reservoir elevation is attained for the assumed
inflow condition.
It is not appropriate to assume that a dam fails on the rising limb of the inflow
hydrograph. Current methods cannot accurately determine the extent of overtopping
that an earth dam can withstand or how rapidly the dam will erode and ultimately breach
from overtopping. Therefore, a conservative approach must be followed which assumes
that failure occurs at the peak of the flood hydrograph.
The failure of a dam during a flood will increase the area flooded, alter the flow depth
and velocity and change the rate of rise of flood waters. To fully evaluate the hazard
potential created by a dam, a range of flood magnitudes needs to be examined. Water
surface profiles, flood wave travel times, and rates of rise must be determined for each
condition.
The range in flood magnitudes must be analyzed such that, the flood inflow condition at
the upper end of the range (up to the PMF, if applicable) will no longer result in
2010 20
unacceptable losses due to dam failure or mis-operation. The resultant flood flow is the
IDF. The maximum IDF is always the PMF, but in many cases the IDF will be less than
the PMF.
4.4.6 Area Affected
The surface area (water and land) affected by dam failure during a given flow condition
on a river is determined by the additional cross-sectional area inundated by the
incremental increase in flood elevation due to failure over that which would occur
normally by flooding without dam failure. The area affected by a flood wave resulting
from a theoretical dam breach is a function of the height of the flood wave and the
downstream distance and width of the river at a particular location. An associated and
important factor is the flood wave travel time. These elements are primarily a function of
the rate and extent of dam failure, but also are functions of channel and floodplain
geometry, roughness and channel slope.
The flood wave must be routed downstream to the point where the incremental effect of
a failure will no longer result in additional incremental adverse losses.
4.4.7 Cascade Effect
Where several dams are situated along the same watercourse, consideration must be
given to the cascade effect of dam failures.
To determine if failure of a dam could contribute to failure of downstream dams, the

timing of the dam break flood wave from the upstream dam must coincide with the worst
case conditions at the downstream dam.
4.4.8 Concurrent Inflows
When routing a dam break flood through the downstream reaches, appropriate
concurrent inflows must be considered in the computations. These inflows must be
taken into account when selecting breach timing and evaluation of the worst case
scenario. A dam breach flood wave which peaks downstream at the same time as the
peak of a concurrent inflow can result in the greatest incremental losses.
Estimation of concurrent inflows can be based on:
1. historical records
2. flood studies for downstream reaches
Adjustment of the timing or magnitude of the concurrent inflows must be consistent with
the characteristics of the inflow flood selected.
4.4.9 Sensitivity Analysis
2010 21
Sensitivity analyses of varying flood inflow conditions and breach parameters shall be
undertaken to understand the effects of these parameters on the predicted timing of the
flood wave peak and incremental increase in adverse losses.
A sensitivity analysis of the river reach characteristic parameters is also considered

necessary. Channel roughness and channel dimensions need to be varied to the extent
necessary to assess the sensitivity of the analysis with regards to timing of the dam
break flood wave peak and incremental hazards. Channel roughness parameters can
have significant effects on modeled flood wave travel times and therefore needs more
consideration for analysis of worst case scenarios if timing of the flood wave peak is a
crucial issue. If possible, model input channel roughness parameters should be
calibrated against known flood events to achieve agreement on flood wave timing as
well as water levels.
4.5 Inundation Mapping
The results of the downstream routing of the PMF and/or IDF flood and normal (sunny
day) scenarios must be illustrated on inundation maps, along with the normal water
surface and, for flood events, the incremental inundation due to the selected flood
without dam failure. In addition, the following information must be provided at critical
downstream locations with and without dam break:
1. distance from the dam

2. time of flood arrival
3. time to flood peak (from the initiation of the dam break)
4. maximum flood levels, and
5. maximum velocity.
The inundation maps must be developed at a scale sufficient to identify downstream

permanent structures within the impacted area.
4.6 Incremental Loss Analyses
4.6.1 Incremental Increase in Downstream Water Surface Elevation
The incremental increase in downstream water surface elevation between the cases
‘with failure’ and ‘without failure’ must be determined and the losses that could result
must be identified, including potential failure of downstream dams. This involves the
following steps:
1. identify the losses that occur as a result of dam failure, and

2. quantify the losses.
To adequately assess the losses, it is necessary to perform field surveys to determine

the lowest opening elevation, including basement and first floor elevations of potentially
affected permanent dwellings and other buildings (such as industrial and
commercial).The 2x2 rule or equivalent must be used to define expected loss of life. An
2010 22
incremental increase of less than 0.37 square metres per second (depth multiplied by
velocity) is not considered to result in expected loss of life. However, this should not
be considered to be an absolute decision-making point. Sensitivity analyses, the flood
velocity, the nature of the inhabited area (i.e., a smaller incremental depth would be
used for schools, nursing homes or hospitals that might be inundated) and engineering
judgment are the factors involved in making final decisions. For example, if it is
determined that a mobile home sitting on blocks can be moved and displaced by as
little as 15 cm of water, then the acceptable incremental impact may be much less than
the 0.37 square metres per second (FEMA, April 2004).
The Ontario Flood Damage Estimation Guide or its equivalent must be used to
determine the incremental increase in adverse loses to property. Appropriate scale of
flood plain maps must be used to identify the inundation zone for each incremental flood
inundation scenario. An accumulative dam failure discharge damage curve of the
inundation zone is required to determine and illustrate where the additional increase in
dam failure flood water depth no longer creates an incremental increase in property
losses that are unacceptable. Normally, this would appear as a distinctive flattening in
the slope of the damage curve. Where it is not evident, the dam owner may wish to
create individual damage curves for various representative cross-sections of the
inundation zone to ascertain where the majority of the adverse losses are being
generated for possible opportunities to reduce or eliminate those losses through flood
proofing or other opportunities.
2010 23
CHAPTER 5.0: SPILLWAYS AND FLOW CONTROL

STRUCTURES
5.1 General
Dams must be able to safely pass the Inflow Design Flood (IDF).
5.2 Critical Design Factors
During Dam Safety Reviews (DSR) of existing dams or the design of new dams, it is
important to ensure that flow control structures are in good operating condition, and that
their capacity is sufficient. The following should be considered:
1. The hydraulic capacity of the structure is correctly evaluated;

2. The flow control equipment will be functional up to the peak IDF (during a flood or
after an earthquake if applicable);
3. The capacity of the channels heading to the flow control are not likely to be
obstructed during at the passage of the flood;
4. Proper operating rules are in place and well understood;
5. Safe access and power supply to the control structures are maintained at all
times. This can be provided by alternate power sources or redundancy of control
system components.
5.3 Spillways and Other Discharge Facilities
5.3.1 Spillway Purpose:
The primary purpose of a spillway is to discharge flows that cannot either be used
immediately or stored in a reservoir for future use. The spillway is used to prevent
surcharge of the reservoir water level above the IDF elevation including providing for
freeboard requirements.
5.3.2 Classifying Spillways:
Spillways can be classified, based on the frequency of use, as either “service” or

“emergency” structures.
Service Spillways
A service spillway is the primary flood discharge structure that would be available to
handle discharge under any conditions. The spillway is operated either automatically or
by personnel assigned to the site.
The spillway should be designed so that operation could be considered to be an

everyday situation. This would require that any gate be easily operated and that energy
dissipation does not result in damage to the structure or discharge channel.
2010 24
Service spillways can be gated or ungated and typically include overflow, side channel,
shaft or chute-type structures.
Emergency Spillways
Emergency spillways (also known as auxiliary spillways) are used during unusually
high flow conditions.
Operations of an emergency spillway may result in some damage to structures or

erosion in the discharge channel. Operating procedures may also require mobilization of
additional equipment and personnel in excess of that normally at the dam. Examples of
emergency spillways include earthcut and fuse plug channels, and in some cases, may
incorporate gate controlled or stoplog sluice structures.
Other Discharge Facilities

Other discharge facilities, such as low level outlets, have a number of functions
depending on the specific circumstance of the particular project. The capacity of the
discharge facilities is determined by considering all of the expected operating
requirements.
Typical functional requirements include:
1. Release of minimum flows to sustain the aquatic regime, surface water drinking
water supplies and provincial water quality objectives. This function may be
needed when the flow release through a powerhouse is interrupted or when other
discharge facilities are not available.
2. Emergency discharges for reservoir drawdown. This capability is often

overlooked but is an important safeguard when considering mitigation
procedures in the event of faults in the dam or foundations. Emergency
discharge capability should be considered as an important element of the design
of any new dam and reservoir facility.
3. Controlled releases are often required during initial impoundment of a reservoir to

control the rate of filling. This function is intended to allow for monitoring of the
dam and foundations under the increasing load and pore pressure. The design
often requires that the reservoir level be held steady for flood inflows in the order
of a 10 year return period event.
4. Primary flow diversion works for releasing downstream water demands, as in the
case of many irrigation and water supply reservoirs where another outlet many
not be needed.
5. Provisions to by-pass or divert flows, which is normally required during

construction of a dam and for the maintenance of the spillways. The construction
period role would occur as the diversion tunnel is being closed at the start of
reservoir impoundment.
Discharge works such as low level outlets can be used during floods, provided that
operation is not impaired by high tailwater levels or the operation of other spillways.
2010 25
This would normally be a supplemental capacity to the service spillway discharge

capability.
For power dams, discharge facilities can include the powerhouse capability although this
is limited by the operations within the power system and the demand for plant output.
Low level outlets must meet the various functional requirements of the facilities and for
use when the powerhouse is not in service.
It should be assumed that the electrical transmission system will most likely suffer
serious damage during the storm that generated the IDF. Therefore, the power plant
must be assumed to be out of operation between the first day of the storm and the time it
takes to repair the transmission system. Therefore powerhouse discharge facilities
should be restricted to the speed-no-load capacity included to meet the IDF.
In some cases, the tailwater levels during the passage of the IDF may lead to flooding of
the power plant turbine floor. In this situation, the power pant must be assumed to be
shut down until the tailwater recedes.
5.4 Design Considerations
5.4.1 Design for Debris, Ice and Sediment During Flood Events
Design of spillways must consider requirements for passage of debris, ice and sediment
during flood events. Significant amounts of debris comprised of trees, brush, and other
floating material such as ice and logs can collect and obstruct a spillway structure
entrance, resulting in significant loss of discharge capacity. Debris control can be
achieved by the alignment of the spillway entrance, use of a floating debris boom, trash
sluices, and by routine maintenance such as reservoir clearing.
5.4.2 Sediment Transport
Sediment transported during a flood must also be considered in spillway design. This is
particularly the case for energy dissipating facilities. Gravel and boulders transported
during the a flood can cause significant damage to the concrete surfaces of spillways
structures and stilling basins as a result of abrasion and impact caused by the turbulent
eddying. Where sediment transport is a significant consideration, special design features
may be incorporated such as armoring of a spillways surface or modifications to the
layout and design of structures.
For further information on design considerations, water control, conveyance and energy
refer to CDA’s Technical Bulletin: Hydrotechnical Considerations for Dam Safety (2007).
5.5 Freeboard
Freeboard is defined as the minimum vertical distance that is required between the
reservoir level and the crest of the containment structure or the impervious core of an
embankment structure. Freeboard is required to protect the structure from overtopping
by large waves including allowance for reservoir setup, wave run-up, floods, settlement,
2010 26
protection of the impervious core of embankment structures and other factors that could
influence the level of the reservoir.
5.5.1 Factors and Criteria Influencing Freeboard
A number of factors influence the magnitude of the freeboard required to prevent

overtopping of dams. These include:
1. wind effects (wave run-up and wind set-up),

2. landslide effects, and
3. earthquake effects
Depending on the losses associated with dam failure, the following criteria should be
considered when evaluating minimum freeboard for dams:
1. No overtopping of the crest of the dam by 95% waves caused by the most critical
wind with a return frequency of 1:1000 with the reservoir at its normal maximum
operating level.
2. No overtopping of the crest of the dam by 95% of the waves caused by the most
critical wind with a return frequency of 1:2 with the reservoir at its maximum level
during passage of the IDF normal maximum operating level.
3. No overtopping of the core by a still pond water level with the reservoir at its peak
IDF operating level.
The largest calculated freeboard requirement must be adopted as the minimum

freeboard.
5.5.2 Minimum Freeboard for Dams
The minimum required freeboard depends on the type of structure and the foundation/
abutment conditions.
For Low and Moderate hazard potential dams, minimum freeboard can be based on a
risk analysis balancing the economics of potential damages that might result from a dam
failure in comparison to the costs of increasing the height of dam to prevent overtopping.
The freeboard must not be less than the following table of minimum freeboard
requirements unless a comprehensive analysis and assessment is undertaken.
2010 27
Table 3-3 Minimum Freeboard for Dams
Reservoir Fetch (Length) Freeboard
Under 200 m 300 mm
Up to 400 m 450 mm
Up to 800 m 600 mm
Over 800 m Comprehensive assessment

required
5.5.3 Accounting for Earthquake and Landslide Effects
In a more comprehensive assessment of normal freeboard requirements, the following

combinations may also need to be evaluated:
1. Earthquake effects (wave run-up + dam crest settlement)

2. Landslide effects (wave run-up + water level rise due to displacement)
3. Seiches
If any of these combinations produces a freeboard requirement greater than that given
by the wind effects alone, the greater value must be adopted. In estimating the effects
from this event, the reservoir should be considered to be at the normal maximum
operating level with reservoir set up being produced by a nominal 1:5-year wind.
The crest of the dam must be such that, following the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE)
the crest of the dam is above the:
1. normal maximum reservoir operating level plus an allowance for reservoir setup
and wave run up due to the effects of a nominal 1:5-year wind plus an allowance
for crest settlement due to earthquake;
2. normal maximum reservoir operating water level plus an allowance water level
rise due to displacement caused by a landslide.
5.5.4 Minimum Freeboard under IDF Conditions
To determine the required minimum freeboard (wave conditions and wind set-up) during
passage of the IDF, the most severe reasonable wind conditions for the reservoir at this
maximum extreme water level based on the IDF must be used. As the IDF is generated
by an exceptional storm with a relatively low probability of occurrence, it is not
reasonable to expect that extreme wind will occur simultaneously with the peak of the
IDF. Therefore, the maximum wind to be expected during the passage of an IDF should
not exceed a 1:100 AEP.
Conditions may be expected to be worse in the case of a small reservoir in a small

watershed, where the maximum level in the reservoir will occur shortly after the end of
the storm as compared with a large reservoir in a large watershed, where the maximum
2010 28
reservoir level will occur several days after the storm is over. For this reason, the criteria
for selecting wind intensity are related to the delay between the end of the storm and the
time of occurrence of the maximum reservoir level. The design wind intensity for
determining the minimum freeboard under IDF conditions is provided below:
Table 3-4 Design Winds under IDF Conditions
Duration Between the End of the Storm and Wind AEP

the Time of the Maximum Reservoir Level
Less than 6 hours 1:100
6 to 12 hours 1:20
12 to 48 hours 1:5
More than 48 hours 1:2
Under peak IDF conditions, some splash-over may be allowed for existing dams,
provided the safety of the dam is not compromised. No splashing or overtopping must
be permitted in new dam design under peak IDF conditions, unless specific measures
are included in the design to prevent erosion of the crest, downstream slope of the dam
and downstream of the dam.
5.5.5 Minimum Freeboard for High and Very High HPC Embankment Dams
The minimum freeboard required for significant and high hazard potential embankment
dams should be sufficient to meet all of the following criteria:
1. No overtopping of the crest of the dam by 95% waves caused by the most critical
wind with a return frequency of 1:1000 with the reservoir at its normal maximum
operating level.
2. No overtopping of the crest of the dam by 95% of the waves caused by the design
wind as defined herein or, if information to calculate the design wind is not
available, a critical wind with a return frequency of 1:100 with the reservoir at it’s
maximum level during passage of the IDF.
3. No overtopping of the core by the still pond water level can occur, including an
allowance for reservoir setup under the effects of a 1:5 year wind with the reservoir
at its normal operating level.
4. No overtopping of the crest of the dam that could occur as a result of waves
generated as a result of a landslide or earthquake induced landslide.
Overtopping may be allowed if it can be shown that such overtopping would not
endanger the stability of the dam.
Freeboard must also be sufficient such that, under the normal operating and protracted
flood conditions, with allowance for reservoir setup, the containment core of the structure
is not overtopped.
5.5.6 Minimum Core Elevation

2010 29
The impervious core of an embankment dam shall be designed such that it is not
overtopped by the normal operating reservoir level. The minimum core elevation must
meet the following criteria:
1. Maximum reservoir operating water level + wind set-up under the effects of a
nominal 1:5-year wind;
2. Possible settlement due to consolidation of foundations embankment material;
3. Degradation of the core due to frost action, weathering, and incidental loading such
as traffic.
This requirement is based on the principle that steady state or quasi-steady state water
levels (i.e. excluding waves) should not exceed the top of the impervious core.
However, for earth/rock fill dams that have been designed for overtopping, the minimum
freeboard requirement may be reduced or overtopping may be allowed provided that the
integrity of the structure is not compromised.
The minimum crest elevation is then determined on the basis of the amount of cover
needed to provide confinement and protection of the top of the core to resist damage
due to the effects of desiccation due to frost, vehicular traffic, etc. The thickness of core
protection fill needed will vary depending on the characteristics of the site, climatic
conditions and the frost susceptibility of the core materials. The core of the dam mav be
overtopped by waves during wind events or the quasi steady state of the reservoir water
level during passage of the IDF flood event if the increased level is of short duration or if
the core is adequately protected from erosion during overtopping.
5.5.7 Concrete Dams
Concrete dams situated on a bedrock foundation can usually resist overtopping without
serious damage. Accordingly, the minimum freeboard requirement may be reduced or
overtopping may be acceptable provided that the stability of the dam, its abutments, any
ancillary structures and access to flow control structures are not compromised.
When the crest of a concrete structure is used as an access to outflow control

structures, no overtopping should be permitted:
1. during the passage of the IDF. Judgment is required regarding the acceptability
of allowing waves to slash over the structure. However, as a minimum, the
freeboard should be designed to prevent overtopping by 95% of the waves
generated by the effects of the 1:10-year wind.
2. under normal operating conditions, no overtopping of the crest of the dam by
95% of the waves caused by the most critical wind with a return frequency of
1:1000 with the reservoir at its normal maximum operating level
3. as a result of waves generated by a landslide or the DBE
5.5.8 Steps to Determine Freeboard
The elevation reached by wave run-up against a structure is determined using the
following steps:
2010 30
1. Select the appropriate wind frequency

2. Compute the wind set-up, which is the maximum reservoir surface tilting due to
the effect of a sustained wind in a specific direction
3. Compute the effective fetch for each structure
4. Compute the resulting waves
5. Compute the run-up of the breaking waves based on the slope and material of
the structure.
5.5.9 Appropriate Procedures for the Determination of Freeboard
Wind data and frequency information appropriate for the calculation of freeboard are
available for wind stations throughout Ontario from Environment Canada.
The Canadian Dam Association several United States agencies have produced
documents and procedures that can be used to estimate the wind/wave effects required
for determination of freeboard. Because of the probabilistic nature of wind and wave
events, each of these procedures is designed to produce conservative results.
The most current of these are found in the United States Army Corps of Engineers
Coastal Engineering Manual. A sample list of documents containing calculations that
may be used is as follows:
1. Coastal Engineering Research Center, USACE. “Coastal Engineering Manual”.

Washington DC. 2002.
2. Coastal Engineering Research Centre, USACE. “Automated Coastal
Engineering System”. Vicksberg, MI. 1992. Computer Program.
3. US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. “Freeboard Criteria and
Guidelines for Computing Freeboard Allowances for Storage Dams”. ACER
Technical Memorandum No. 2. Denver. 1992.
4. Construction Industry Research and Information Association. “Manual on the
use of rock in coastal and shoreline engineering”. London. 1991.
5. Coastal Engineering Research Centre, USACE. “Shore Protection Manual”.
Washington, DC. 1984.
6. Canadian Dam Association. “Technical Bulletin: Hydrotechnical Considerations
for Dam Safety” Canadian Dam Association Dam Safety Guidelines. 2007
5.5.10 Ice and Debris Considerations
In assessing the required freeboard, due consideration shall be made of the potential for
debris and ice to reduce the discharge capacity of the flow control equipment during
passage of the IDF.
Reservoir Ice
Reservoir ice can create a hazardous situation. The extent of the hazard potential would
depend on the amount and thickness of ice and the characteristics of the dam and
discharge facilities. For example, ice could jam or block discharge facilities, thereby
reducing discharge capability, damaging facilities so that safe operation is not possible,
or adding loads to the dam and appurtenant structures.
2010 31
Reservoir Debris
If not restrained from reaching discharge facilities, reservoir debris could also create a
hazardous situation. The extent of hazard would depend on the amount and size of the
debris and the size and type of the discharge facilities. For example, debris could jam or
block hydraulic conveyance structures, thereby reducing discharge capacity or causing
damage that prevents safe operation of facilities. Debris booms are often used to
restrain the floating debris from reaching discharge facilities. In areas where beavers or
other animals are active, appropriate measures have to be taken.
2010 32
CHAPTER 6.0: STRUCTURAL DESIGN AND FACTORS

OF SAFETY FOR CONCRETE GRAVITY DAMS
This section applies to gravity-type concrete structures that resist a head of water on the
upstream side. A gravity spillway incorporates wing walls and aprons and may
include a downstream stilling basin.
6.1 Loading Combinations

The loading conditions that a structure may encounter during its service life are grouped
into the load condition categories of usual, unusual, or earthquake. Usual loads refer to
loads and load combinations that can be expected to occur frequently during the service
life of the structure (i.e. annual probability greater than or equal to 0.10). Unusual loads
refer to loads and load combinations that are of infrequent occurrence (i.e. annual
probability less than 0.10). Table 3-5 outlines the minimum sliding safety factors
(MSSFs) for concrete dams.
The stability of gravity concrete dams shall be assessed under the following loading
combinations:
1. Usual Load (Summer) includes the following loads acting in combination: Dead
load; Hydrostatic Load (maximum normal operating level); Soil Load; and Uplift
2. Usual Load (Winter) includes the following loads acting in combination: Dead load;
Hydrostatic Load (winter operating level); Ice Load; Soil Load; and Uplift (see note
4)
3. Unusual Load (Flood) includes the following loads acting in combination: Dead
Load; Hydrostatic Load (IDF flood level); Soil Load; and Uplift Load
4. Unusual Load (Winter) includes the following loads acting in combination: Dead
load; Hydrostatic Load (winter operating level); Ice Load; Soil Load ; and Uplift (see
note 5)
5. Earthquake loading includes the following loads acting in combination; Maximum
Design Earthquake, Dead loads, Hydrostatic Load (maximum normal operating
level); Soil Load; and Uplift
6. Post-earthquake Load includes the following loads acting in combination: Dead
load; Hydrostatic Load (maximum normal operating level); Soil Load ; and Uplift
Table 3-5 Minimum Sliding Safety Factors for Concrete Dams (MSSF)
Loading Unbonded Bonded
Combination
Usual 1.5 2.0
Unusual 1.3 1.5
Earthquake 1.1 1.3
Post-Earthquake 1.1 NA
2010 33
Notes:
1. The same MSSFs apply to all dam hazard classifications
2. The use of an assumption of a bonded or partially bonded foundation may be
used with conservative estimates of the available shearing resistance based
on geotechnical testing at the site or extrapolated from testing at nearby sites
using the same methods of construction.
3. The Unusual Load (Flood) MSSFs are the same regardless of the frequency
of the IDF
4. For Usual Load (Winter), use a 75 kN/m (5 kips/ft) ice load, applied 0.3m
below the normal winter water level.
5. For Unusual Load (Winter), the ice load is to be based on the Canadian
Electrical Association (CEA) Technologies – Static Ice Loads on Hydro-electric
Structures Report T002700-0206 (August 2003) or equivalent research that
provides a site specific ice load or based on ice loads measured at other
similar sites (i.e. published data).
6. Ice loadings may be reduced by 50% in the evaluation of steel gates and steel
stoplogs. An ice loading of 29.0 kN/m (2.0 Kips/ft.) may be used for the
evaluation of timber stoplogs.
7. For flood conditions, the flood discharge capacity available and the calculated
inflow design flood level shall be based on a reasonable assessment of dam
operations considering the operating plan and shall take into consideration
factors such as: accessibility during high flows, the potential for failure of
electrical and mechanical systems, and inspection and maintenance
programs.
8. Unusual Load (Winter) does not apply to existing low and moderate hazard
concrete gravity dams that have been operating with no signs of distress and
where operating conditions have not, and are not anticipated to change.
Documentation of satisfactory historical performance is required, e.g.
inspections by a professional engineer.
9. An earthquake or post-earthquake stability assessment need not be
undertaken for existing dams that have a low and moderate hazard
classification under a sunny day failure.
10. In the earthquake stability assessment of concrete gravity dams, methods of
analysis can range from pseudo-static, pseudo-dynamic, response spectra
and time history methods. In general, the pseudo-static method can be used
as a basic screening approach to assess the dam stability against the MFFSs
as shown in the above Table 3-5.
6.2 Sliding Stability Analysis for Gravity Concrete Dams

Step 1:
Assess safety factors under Usual, Unusual, and Earthquake loading using unbonded
shear resistance. The basic friction angle [˚] may be selected from literature based on
2010 34
the typical basic shear strength values for the contact rock type. Roughness estimates
will typically require an evaluation and/or a review of construction photographs. If the
safety factors for the various loading combinations are adequate, proceed to Step 5.
Otherwise proceed to Step 2.
Step 2:
For dams with bonded foundations assess safety factors under Usual, Unusual, and
Earthquake loading using bonded shear resistance values (friction angle [˚] & cohesion
[MPa]) selected from literature based on the contact rock type. If the safety factors are
adequate proceed to Step 3. Otherwise proceed to Step 4.
Step 3:
Confirm the degree of bonding and the existence of a cohesive bond by testing and
assess safety factor using conservative estimates of friction angle and cohesion strength
based on test results. The results of the analysis must demonstrate that the structure
has a safety factor in excess of 1.0 in the absence of a cohesive bond. If safety factors
are adequate, proceed to Step 5. Otherwise proceed to Step 4.
Step 4:
If safety factors for Usual and Unusual loadings are inadequate, repeat analysis with
proposed remedial action alternatives (e.g. lowered reservoir level, anchors) until safety
factors are adequate. If safety factor for Earthquake loading is inadequate, assess post-
earthquake safety factor using unbonded shear resistance. If post-earthquake safety
factor is adequate, evaluate damages to dam structure (deformation and stresses).
If post-earthquake factor of safety is inadequate, repeat analysis with proposed remedial
action alternatives until the safety factor is adequate.
Step 5:
Analysis complete; Dam structures meet stability criteria.
6.3 Position of the Resultant

For the Usual Load Cases, the Resultant should be in the middle third of the surface
being analyzed. For new dams this is achieved by design. For existing dams this
requirement may be waived if sliding factors of safety are met, and provided that the
resultant is within the base of the dam and limits on allowable bearing stresses are not
exceeded.
For the Unusual Loading case, the Resultant may be outside the middle third provided
that the sliding factors of safety are met, and provided that the resultant is within the
base of the dam, and the limits on allowable bearing stresses are not exceeded.
For the Earthquake Loading case, the Resultant may be located outside the base.
Uplift pressures vary linearly from full headwater to tailwater level. Uplift pressures may
be reduced if the dam has adequate pressure relief (either natural or installed/ and
monitoring (instrumentation) systems and the results of the monitoring systems show
that the pressure relief systems are functioning adequately.
Specific density for silt behind a dam should be taken as 1.4 for horizontal loading, 1.9
for vertical loading.
2010 35

1. For projects in which post-tensioned rock anchorages are used to increase
resistance to sliding and/or overturning resistance of the dam, the design must
account for the characteristics of the foundation material established by field
investigation, which may include in-situ testing and sampling or visual
inspections. A minimum factor of safety against sliding of at least 1.0 must be
achieved without considering the anchors. Anchors may only be used to increase
the factor of safety for sliding stability above this minimum value to the required
acceptable values. For new and existing dams in which anchors are used to
enhance stability, the specifications for anchoring must include on-site lift-off
testing and all relevant installation and material specification details.
2. Expansion joints must be watertight and are normally provided in concrete gravity
dams every 6.0 metres.
2010 36
CHAPTER 7.0: GEOTECHNICAL DESIGN AND FACTORS

OF SAFETY
This section applies to earthen embankment type structures, structures on overburden

foundations and tailings dams.
7.1 Geotechnical Aspects
Geotechnical design considerations should be assessed for the dam system that
includes the dams (embankment, concrete and other) and appurtenant structures, as
well as their foundations, abutments and the reservoir.
The nature and variability of potential dam and foundation conditions should be defined
by site investigations. These investigations commonly consist of test pitting, borehole
drilling and sampling, in-situ testing, laboratory testing and groundwater monitoring to
identify the geological and hydrogeotechnical conditions and to define engineering
properties of materials used to establish appropriate design parameters. Site
investigations should also pay particular attention to the identification of discontinuities
and anomalies such as jointing, fissures and weak seams that, if present, will generally
control foundation behaviour.
Engineering analyses should be performed to demonstrate that the dam, foundation and
abutments will remain stable under all hazards and loading conditions. Geotechnical
hazards for earth dams may include: seepage (internal erosion, piping and hydraulic
fracturing), deformation (consolidation, slope instability, static and dynamic liquefaction)
and surface erosion. Loading conditions include: end of construction, steady state
conditions (operations), rapid drawdown, reservoir surcharge, wind and wave action and
earthquake. Where significant changes in reservoir operations occur on a routine basis
(peaking and storage operations) the impact of these operations (such as rapid
drawdown) should be assessed and included in the analysis as normal operation loading
conditions.
7.2 Embankment Dams
Analyses should be performed or design checks made to demonstrate that the dam,
foundation and abutments will remain stable under all applicable design hazards and
loading conditions. For existing Low and Moderate hazard dams that show no signs of
distress and that have a history of good performance based on inspection by an
engineer, and loading conditions are not anticipated to change, detailed analyses may
not be required. The decision to perform detailed analyses should also consider
whether hazards to transient Persons at Risk downstream of the dam can be shown to
be minimal.
Overtopping as a result of flooding exceeding the reservoir capacity is the most common
mode of failure for embankment dams. Although this is generally considered to be a
hydrotechnical storage/discharge capacity issue, settlement of the dam crest can be one
of the contributing factors and freeboard of embankment dams should be considered
during assessment. Settlement may occur due to consolidation of the dam or foundation
2010 37
materials under static loading or may be induced by seismic activity, such as

liquefaction. Some of the practices within industry to address settlement include
foundation improvements, proper compaction of dam materials and cambering of dam
structures. The impacts of dam and foundation settlement should be reviewed during the
assessment of existing or new dams.
The susceptibility of the dam to piping development and a review of controls to mitigate
piping should be considered in the design and assessment of embankments dams.
Seepage induced piping is the second most common cause of embankment dam failure.
Piping occurs as a result of concentrated seepage and high hydraulic gradients that can
lead to fine particle migration and loss of materials, eventually resulting in formation of a
“pipe”. Particle migration typically occurs when seepage passes from a fine-grained
material into a coarser grained material or when material is carried into or through cracks
or discontinuities in the dam, foundation or abutment materials. Cracking in embankment
dams may occur as a result of differential settlement and hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic
fracturing occurs when internal hydraulic pressures exceed stresses within the
embankment material. Typical controls for seepage-related issues with embankment
dams include foundation grouting and cut-offs, upstream clay or low permeability
blanketing and granular filter transition materials conforming to accepted filter criteria
strategically placed within critical transition zones within the embankment and between
the embankment and the foundation.
Foundation “smoothing” to avoid differential settlement and stress changes and the use
of appropriately flexible core materials are some of the common industry practices to
reduce the potential for deformation induced cracking and the potential for the
development of piping failure development.
The stability of the upstream and downstream slopes of the embankment and the
potential for instabilities through the dam foundation needs to be assessed in
establishing the integrity of embankment dams. The methods of analysis used may
depend upon the characteristics of the dam and foundation, the material properties and
the type and severity of the loads that the dam may be subjected to. In general, stability
analyses can be performed using the limit equilibrium method of stability analysis.
Acceptance criteria are usually described in terms of factor of safety defined as the ratio
of available shear resistance along a potential plane of failure compared to the activating
shear forces along the same plane. The acceptance criteria for stability analyses are
aimed at preventing deep-seated failures that could lead to a reduction in crest height or
expose critical dam components and lead to dam breach.
Some analysis methods may indicate the potential for shallow surface failures to
develop, however, if these shallow failures do not lead to a reduction in crest height or
expose critical dam components they may be considered to be acceptable based on
engineering judgement. Where shallow failures are observed on an existing dam, this
too may be acceptable provided that the dam owner has an acceptable inspection and
maintenance program to identify and repair any such failure before they propagate into
and possibly expose critical components of the dam structure.
2010 38
7.2.1 Loading Combinations for Embankment Dam Stability Assessment

The stability of embankment dams shall be assessed under the following loading
combinations:
1. End of Construction includes the following loads acting in combination: Dead load;
pore pressures and uplift.
2. Long-term stead seepage includes the following loads acting in combination: Dead
load; Hydrostatic Load (normal maximum operating level); Steady State Phreatic
Conditions through the body of the dam, long term steady state pore pressures and
Uplift
3. IDF Loading Condition includes the following loads acting in combination: Dead
load; Hydrostatic Load (IDF level); Steady State Phreatic Conditions in the body of
the dam, long term steady state pore pressures and Uplift
4. Earthquake loading includes the following loads acting in combination; Dead load;
Maximum Design Earthquake (MDE), Hydrostatic Load (maximum normal
operating level); Steady State Phreatic Conditions in the body of the dam, long
term steady state pore pressures and Uplift
5. Full or partial drawdown includes the following loads acting in combination: Dead
load; Hydrostatic Load (maximum normal operating level); Steady State Phreatic
Conditions in the body of the dam with the upstream level suddenly dropped, long
term steady state pore pressures and Uplift
7.2.2 Embankment Dam Stability - Levels of Safety

The industry accepted factors of safety in Table 3-6 take into account the reliability of
inputs to the stability analysis, the probability of the loading condition, and the losses of
the potential failure.
Table 3-6: Factors of Safety for Embankment Dam Slope Stability - Static
Assessment and Seismic Assessment
Minimum Factor
Loading Conditions Slope
of Safety [Note 1]
End of construction before
1.3 Upstream and Downstream
reservoir filling
Long-term (steady state
seepage, normal reservoir 1.5 Upstream and Downstream
level)
IDF loading condition 1.3 Upstream and Downstream
Full or partial rapid drawdown 1.1 to 1.3 [Note 2] Upstream
Pseudo-static Greater than 1.0
Post earthquake 1.1
Notes:
1. Factor of safety is the factor required to reduce operational shear strength
parameters in order to bring a potential sliding mass into a state of limiting
equilibrium, using generally accepted methods of analysis.
2. Higher factors of safety may be required if drawdown occurs relatively frequently
during normal operation.
2010 39
3. For flood conditions, the flood discharge capacity available and the calculated
inflow design level shall be based on a reasonable assessment of dam operations
considering the operating plan and shall take into consideration factors such as;
accessibility during high flows, the potential for failure of electrical and mechanical
systems, and inspection and maintenance programs.
For High or Very High hazard dams it may be appropriate to apply more sophisticated
methods of analysis in addition to pseudo-static approaches. In these cases, other
accepted criteria based on the state of stress and strain, and displacements, should be
set for elastic response under usual loads, quasi-inelastic under unusual loads, and
inelastic response under extreme loads. The stress-strain field, state of deformation, and
distribution of pore water pressures in the entire continuum of the dam system should be
evaluated for different loading cases and time stages. For example, during construction
and immediately after construction; during impoundment and transient seepage; after full
reservoir level has been reached and steady-state seepage has been developed; long
term consolidation and creep; and transient loading conditions such as rapid or sudden
reservoir drawdown, floods and earthquakes.
Acceptance criteria with respect to allowable maximum levels of stress, strain and
displacement conditions are dependent on material properties including resistance.
Where appropriate, these criteria must be established for each project on a case-by-
case basis. It is possible, for example, to set criteria based on the maximum elemental
or local factor of safety (i.e. ratio of maximum shear stress, failure or yielding strength).
For slope stability concerns, such criteria could be established in order to provide a
safety margin that is equivalent to the factors of safety shown in Table 3-6.
7.2.3 Additional Considerations for Embankment Dams

Additional considerations that should be taken into account during embankment dam
design or assessment include:
1. Properly graded filters should be placed internally within the embankment and
between the embankment, abutments and foundation, if migration of particles by
seepage forces would otherwise be possible.
2. The impact of any seepage along the axis of or leakage from conduits passing
through the dam should be assessed, as necessary. Consideration shall be
given to filter zones and cut-off measures.
3. Seepage exit gradients should be within acceptable limits for the embankment
and foundation materials. The usual techniques used to reduce seepage through
the pervious units are impermeable upstream blankets, cut-off trenches, grout
curtains, sheet pile walls, slurry trench cut-off walls and other thin cut-offs.
Where such measures are not possible, filter materials can be used to provide an
acceptable exit condition.
4. The upstream slopes of the dam and its abutments should have adequate
protection against erosion and possible breaching due to wave and ice action.
Rip rap or other erosion protection should be based on site-specific criteria based
on expected water level, wind and wave action. The downstream slopes should
be protected where necessary against the erosive action of runoff, seepage
flows, traffic, frost and burrowing animals. Materials used for erosion protection
should be hard and durable and not susceptible to breakdown.
2010 40
5. Trees and shrubs should not be permitted to grow on any part of the dam
embankment.
6. The dam should be protected from burrowing animals.
The following failure mechanisms should be assessed for seismic loading:

1. Slope instability leading to overtopping
2. Permanent deformation leading to overtopping
3. Fissuration/ cracking leading to internal erosion failures
4. Liquefaction (both triggering and post-liquefaction stability conditions).
7.3 Dam Foundations
Dams may be founded on rock, overburden of a combination of the two. Dam foundation
treatment requires experienced engineering judgment. Specific issues to consider vary
depending on the nature of the foundation.
7.3.1 Rock Foundations
In general, competent rock foundations will provide adequate bearing capacity for both
embankment dams and concrete dams. However, the designer needs to consider the
implications associated with soft rock foundations such as mudstones and siltstones with
respect to both bearing capacity (in the case of concrete dams) and the potential for
internal erosion along open discontinuities (in the case of concrete dams and
embankment dams). A number of available laboratory tests exist to evaluate this
potential when it is deemed to be a possible issue.
In particular, placement of fine grained materials overtop of bedrock foundations requires

specific foundation preparation procedures to minimize the possibility of migration of the
fine grained materials through the discontinuities in the rock mass. In-situ permeability
testing and geological mapping can be used to assess the potential for this problem to
occur. Foundation preparation measures often include washing and hand cleaning to
expose adverse features such as vertical or near vertical bedrock ridges that could result
in high stresses or differential settlements. Treatment of the features using such
techniques as dental concrete, slush grouting and curtain grouting are commonly used.
Particular attention should be paid to in-filled discontinuities or weathered discontinuities
that may progressively open under the effects of the post impoundment hydraulic
gradient.
Limestone can, in some instances, create special problems associated with karsticity.
Karsticity occurs as a result of a progressive dissolutioning of carbonate rocks exposed
to water and carbon dioxide. In the presence of dissolved carbon dioxide, maximum
solubility increases dramatically. Therefore, a karstic formation implies the presence of a
network of solutioned, often highly permeable, discontinuities which are, by definition,
connected to the surface so that the free carbon dioxide necessary to allow the
solutioning process to continue is available. This fact means that Karst foundations are
usually associated with highly deformed, complex, rock masses that have pervious
windows extending directly to the foundation surface. Treatment of such foundations
often requires an extensive grouting programme to reduce post impoundment seepage
to manageable levels. In many karst foundations, highly soluble gypsum and anhydrite
2010 41
can be present along discontinuities or as interbeds within the rock mass. Treatment of
such features is generally very difficult and it would be typical to provide provisions in the
design to allow for future remedial foundation grouting as these features dissolve.
7.3.2 Overburden Foundations
For dams constructed on overburden foundations it is necessary to consider the bearing

capacity of the foundation materials and the possibility of long term settlement that could
affect freeboard or cause cracking of the impervious core. Special care is necessary
when embankment dams are situated on a variable foundation consisting of different
overburden types or partially on overburden and partially on bedrock. For these
situations, special care is required in the design of the dam to account for the possibility
of differential settlement at the boundaries between the different material types that
could lead to cracking or hydraulic fracturing. Measures might include flattening the dam
section to reduce the stresses at the foundation level, provision of a wider core or filters,
design of the core materials to provide an enhanced degree of flexibility or the use of
alternative materials, etc.
Stability analyses of embankment dams constructed on an overburden foundation must

consider the potential for failure through the dam fills and through the overburden
foundation itself. Depending on the nature of the foundation analyses may need to
consider the potential for liquefaction, the potential for a sudden loss of strength due to
collapse of the soil structure, as can occur in Champlain Sea clays in and around the
Ottawa area and the permeability of the soil.
Treatment of permeable overburden foundations beneath embankment dams may

require the use of a core trench or, for deeper foundations, the use of specialized
grouting techniques, the installation of an impervious cut-off wall (cement-bentonite,
plastic concrete, sheet pile, timber, geosynthetic or other depending on the nature of the
foundation and the hydraulic head) or the provision of an upstream impervious blanket
specifically designed to reduce seepage levels and hydraulic gradients to acceptable
levels. In the assessment of seepage control measures, designs should ensure that the
post construction hydraulic gradient at all unfiltered exits is such that the potential for
internal erosion (piping) is minimized.
Permafrost foundation subsidence occurs as reservoir impoundment raises the mean

annual ground temperature, which can cause an unusual degree of movement on a
dam. Foundations in intermittent permafrost zones are particularly susceptible to mean
ground temperature changes and can result in higher differential settlements throughout
the structure. Dams constructed on permafrost affected foundations must be capable of
deforming in response to potentially large differential settlements which are experienced
as a result of thawing of variable ice content in permafrost foundations. For new dams,
foundation exploration and treatment must be sufficient to limit thaw settlement and pore
pressures to acceptable amounts. Special attention to the foundation may be required
where ice lensing in the shallow foundation soils could potentially establish piping failure
through those soils under thawing conditions.
2010 42
If foundation settlement has steepened embankment slopes above the original design,
slope stability analysis should be performed. Likewise, the effect of observed cracking
and/or redistributed pore water pressures on stability should be analyzed. A distinction
should be made between the stability of frozen and thawed dams.
The settled crest of the dam should be verified to have sufficient freeboard based on
conventional wind and wave analysis plus an additional safety margin equal to the
expected ultimate settlement of the dam crest. Crest surveys and settlement pin
monitoring provide an ongoing record of settlement.
Current design practice requires dams on permafrost to be constructed of self-healing

granular materials. Embankment zones are typically designed to permit anticipated
future upgrading while preserving continuity of fill zones.
7.3.3 Reservoir Rim
The stability of reservoir slopes should be evaluated under seismic loads, heavy rainfall,
rapid drawdown, operational regimes, and any other loading conditions, if slope failure
could induce waves that pose an unacceptable risk to public safety, the dam or its
appurtenant structures.
7.3.4 Timber Crib Dams
A timber crib dam relies on the integrity of the timber frame and the materials used to fill
the crib for stability. Therefore, in assessing the suitability of an existing timber crib dam,
signs of deterioration of the crib and loss of materials within the crib need to be
evaluated. Assessment of the stability of a timber crib dam requires an evaluation of the
sliding stability of the structure at the foundation contact, and an evaluation of the
potential for circular failure thought the overburden foundation. In addition, the potential
for overturning requires evaluation. Table 3-7 presents the minimum factors of safety for
timber crib dams.
Table 3-7: Factors of Safety for Timber Crib Dams
Loading condition Minimum Factor of Safety

Usual – Sliding 1.5
Usual – Overturning 2.0
Unusual – Sliding 1.3
Unusual – Overturning 1.5
Other considerations for timber crib dams include; toe stress, foundation erosion, timber
material condition, sheathing, and cut-off walls.
7.4 Tailings Dams
2010 43
Tailings are the waste material transported by water and generated from the mining and
processing cycle of metal recovery from naturally occurring economic ore deposits.
Tailings Dams are embankment dams with the unique characterization which can be
constructed from tailings waste material.
Tailings dams share with conventional embankment dams, all design and safety
evaluation principles but have a number of unique considerations that must be
recognized and addressed during the design and construction phases of the dam life
cycle.
Tailings dams, for example, can be constructed from tailings materials and are generally
constructed in phases, often over a long period of time. In addition, tailings dams must
also be maintained for an indefinite period, following completion of the associated mining
activities. Some of the unique characteristics associated with tailings dams include the
management of contaminated water management in tailings ponds, specific dam design
criteria such as the width of the tailings beach, location of reclaim pond, method of
construction (e.g. upstream, downstream, centreline), maintenance of drainage systems,
material used for construction i.e., tailings; and the practicalities associated with the
operation of the dam, including periodic raising of tailings dams and the ongoing rise of
the impounded solids and fluids during the mine production phase.
Permafrost can cause special problems in tailings facilities as the condition of the frozen
ground can change. Further, the depositional pattern of tailings in the reservoir/basin
should be monitored because of the extremely low temperatures in permafrost areas.
Long term changes in the permafrost and active zone should be considered, particularly
for periods of temporary suspension of mining activities, or closure.
Given these considerations, the requirements for tailings dams may be substantially
different from those applicable to conventional embankment structures and careful
consideration of these issues forms part of the design of any tailings dam.
7.5 Flow Through Rockfill Dams
‘Flow-through’ rockfill dams are designed to withstand the combined effects of the action
of (i) the flow-through seepage emerging from and accumulating on the downstream
face, and (ii) any overflow. The latter is that part of the Inflow Design Flood (IDF) which
cannot pass through the rockfill. The dam is designed to withstand the combined effects
of these seepage forces without the migration of rock particles, whether singly or en-
masse.
Flow through rockfill dams, or ‘leaky’ dams, are designed to prevent flow over the crest,
unless the downstream slope and abutments are specifically designed to limit erosion.
Erosion protection from overtopping can consist of armour stone or may make use of
artificial means to limit erosion involving the use of metal or wire. In such cases, the
effects of the corrosion of the metal or wire on the life-span of such reinforcement must
be considered. Allowance must also be made for the possible accumulation, over time,
of debris on the upstream face of the dam. If this debris is not removed, it will reduce
the quantity of flow that can pass through the embankment and correspondingly
2010 44
increase the flow within the impoundment and potentially over it. Frazil ice can have the
same effect.
2010 45
CHAPTER 8.0: SEISMIC HAZARD STANDARDS AND

ASSESSMENT
8.1 General
The seismic design criteria for assessing the seismic safety of a given dam structure or
facility are to be based on a site-specific seismic hazard evaluation earthquake ground
motion parameters and are typically ascertained by conducting a probabilistic seismic
hazard evaluation with or without consideration of scenario events where known active
faults are identified.
The selected seismic loading criteria follow a traditional standards-based approach to

dam safety assessment. Based on this approach, the extent, level of detail, contents and
follow-up for a seismic evaluation depend on the hazard potential of dam failure or mis-
operation.
8.2 Scope and General Outline
To estimate earthquake ground motion parameters at a particular site, it is necessary to

incorporate the appropriate geologic and seismologic input and to utilize the most
relevant available procedures for estimating these parameters.
Seismic hazard evaluation is a developing science and is, to a large extent, based upon
experience and judgment of qualified specialists.
This guideline outlines the general approach for developing site-specific response
spectra of ground motions. The methodology primarily involves the probabilistic
evaluation (supplemented by a deterministic “scenario test” under limited cases)
performed by appropriate specialists.
The basic procedures used to conduct a site specific seismic assessment involve an
appropriate seismic hazard model which is able to incorporate both seismicity and
geological information, coupled with an analytical method.
Figure 3-A illustrates a typical overall process to assess the seismic safety of a dam.
2010 46
Figure 3-A Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment
2010 47
2010 48
8.3 Determination of Seismic Evaluation Requirements
8.3.1 Earthquake Hazard and Losses
Earthquake hazard assessment is an integral part of dam safety assessment, especially

for dams located in seismic zones. Extreme and rare earthquakes may occur randomly
in time and space. These events could cause partial damage or collapse of dams. The
losses associated with the partial damage and collapse may be small or large depending
on the geographic condition, environment, infrastructure, and number of people exposed
to the damage or collapse of the dam. The losses may increase as the earthquake
intensity increases. The seismic evaluation requirements should consider both the
expected losses of given earthquake intensities and the probabilities of those intensities
occurring or being exceeded during specified time intervals.
The determination of seismic loading or seismic event for designing new or evaluating
existing dams should be carried out based on sound engineering and scientific principles
and judgment of qualified specialists. The seismic hazard assessment should be based
on both geotechnical information and a statistical analysis of earthquakes experienced
near the site, taking into account all potential seismic sources capable of contributing
significantly to the seismic hazard at that site. It should consider the geological zone
where seismic occurrence is possible, the observed or potential seismic occurrence rate,
the magnitude of seismic events, the transmission of the seismic waves, and the
impact of the waves on structures of interest. The application of probabilistic analysis is
an integral part of seismic hazard assessment (Cornell 1968). For example, a current
seismic hazard model and set of hazard maps of Canada was developed by the
Geological Survey of Canada (Adams and Halchuk, 2003) for the 2005 edition of the
National Building Code of Canada (NBCC 2005). The detailed information provided in
NBCC 2005 consists of peak ground acceleration (PGA) and pseudo-spectra
acceleration (PSA) for various Canadian sites for a median probability of exceedance of
2% in 50 years (i.e. median annual probability of exceedance of about 4x10-4). However,
it must be noted that the national hazard results generated for the NBCC 2005 were
based on Canada-wide reference ground condition and are specifically provided for
seismic design of common buildings only. The probability level (2% in 50 years) was
selected to achieve uniform reliability across the country for building design given the
range of resistance factors embedded in limit design approach (e.g. the inclusion of R0
factors to reflect actual building performance). On the other hand, the probability levels
appropriate for dam design are to be established taking into account the expected losses
of failure in case it occurs. Furthermore, the ground motions for the NBCC 2005
represent only the median (i.e. 50th percentile) hazard value, as compared with the mean
hazard value recommended for typical seismic hazard computations for dam design. In
view of the above reasons, NBCC 2005 hazard values may not be appropriate for dam
projects. As a result, it is essential to conduct a site specific seismic hazard evaluation
especially for low probability design.
8.3.2 Terminology
Dams shall meet, at least, a specified seismic ground motion level (design earthquake).
However, there is no consistency in terminology for designating the various earthquake
scenarios that are used in defining the levels of earthquake excitations for which dams
2010 49
and their appurtenant structures should be designed or evaluated. Terms such as MDE
(Maximum Design Earthquake), MCE (Maximum Credible Earthquake), SSE (Safety
Evaluation Earthquake), and “Maximum Potential Earthquake” are used in various
jurisdictions.
Damage to dams and their appurtenant facilities is often the result from ground motion
induced at the dam site by an earthquake located at some distance from the dam.
Therefore, in addition to earthquake magnitude, the ground motion characteristics are
necessary to fully characterize the design earthquake scenarios for engineering
evaluation of a dam.
Consequently, it is essential to prescribe specific guidelines defining ground motions for

assessing dam structures. To reflect this concept, a definition of a “new” term, by the
Canadian Dam Safety Association, EDGM (Earthquake Design Ground Motion) is
introduced as follows:
Earthquake Design Ground Motion (EDGM)

EDGM is the level of earthquake ground motions1 at the location of the dam for
which a dam structure is designed and evaluated.
For the design and management of dams under seismic excitations, the performance
requirement is that the dam structures subjected to the EDGM should perform without
catastrophic failure, such as uncontrolled release of a reservoir, although severe
damage to the dam or economic loss may occur. For the standards based approach,
dam safety assessment normally takes into consideration of appropriate load and
resistance factors.
8.3.3 Design Earthquake Criteria
The seismic hazard analysis at the site determines the intensity of the seismic loads that
might affect the dam. In general, most other international standards use dam hazard
classification to determine the seismic load levels to be used for safety evaluation of the
dam. The parameter(s) defining the seismic loading for checking dam safety depends on
the selected analysis method such as the time history, response spectrum, pseudo-
static, etc, and on the required performance levels. Further, because upgrading existing
dams to a revised performance standard could be more costly than construction of new
dams, the seismic loadings for checking designs and for rehabilitating existing dams
deserve extra careful considerations.
The hazard potential classification is to be used together with the prescribed

performance levels in selecting the required seismic loading criteria. Design earthquakes
for various hazard potential classifications are presented in Table 3-8 below.
2010 50
Table 3-8: Design Earthquake Criteria
Hazard EDGM
Potential (annual exceedance probability)
Classification
Life Safety Property and Cultural – Built
Environment Heritage
More than 10,000 year
Very High 100
2,500 to 10,000 year
11 to 100 5,000 year
High
10 or fewer 2,500 year 1,000 to 2,500 year 1,000
Moderate 500 to 1:1000
Low 25 to 500 year
Notes
1. The AEP levels are to be used for the “mean” rather than the “median”
estimates.(The mean is the expected value given the epistemic uncertainties and,
for typical seismic hazard computations in Canada, the mean hazard value
typically lies between the 65th and 75th percentiles of the hazard distribution. The
median is at the 50th percentile.)
2. For existing dams having a hazard potential classification of Low or Moderate,
there is no requirement to undertake a seismic hazard evaluation unless requested
by the Minister.
8.3.4 Factors Influencing the Selection of Seismic Evaluation Requirements
The basic seismic loads for the design of new dams or for the safety evaluation of
existing structures are derived from the EDGM (Earthquake Design Ground Motion)
parameters.
The primary requirement for the earthquake-resistant design of dams is to protect public
safety, environment, life and property. Hence most dams must be capable of resisting
the strong ground motions considered appropriate to achieve this performance at the
dam site without uncontrolled release of the water impounded in the reservoir.
2010 51
Factors governing the level of effort required for a seismic safety evaluation include:
1. Severity of seismic hazard at the dam site

2. Type of dam
3. Functional requirements
4. Failure modes
5. Potential hazard for the dam and reservoir
6. HPC of the dam
The design and evaluation of hydraulic structures for earthquake loading must be based
on appropriate criteria that reflect both the desired level of safety and the nature of the
design and evaluation procedures.
8.4 Seismic Hazard Evaluations
8.4.1 General Approach
The purpose of a seismic hazard evaluation is to arrive at the Earthquake Design

Ground Motions (EDGM) at the site for use in assessing its facilities under seismic
loading conditions. Selection of the EDGM should be based on the hazard potential of
dam failure according to Table 3-8 above. The seismic parameters used to define the
EDGM should be derived by a site-specific probabilistic seismic hazard assessment
conducted by qualified specialists at regular time intervals for dams and associated
facilities. It often requires close collaboration of an interdisciplinary team that includes
technical experts in seismology, geology, material and geotechnical, and structural
engineering. The team is responsible for establishing the seismic design requirements,
planning and executing the seismological investigations and evaluating the analytical
results.
The EDGM are to be described in terms of amplitude levels, frequency content and
duration of ground motion, including time histories that characterize the EDGM. The
EDGM should be selected to be representative of mean or best estimate ground motions
for the target probability level. Investigations to determine the EDGM should include all
of the following aspects.
8.4.2 Identification of Earthquake Sources
Earthquake sources in the region and in the vicinity of the site that can produce seismic
ground motion at levels significant to the design of the dam structures should be
identified. This identification of earthquake sources should be based on the earthquake
history of the region, including the lowest magnitude earthquakes detected by modern
seismograph networks, in addition to all known historical and paleoseismic events, and
on tectonic and geologic interpretation of the sources and causes of the earthquake
activity. Where applicable, the potential or significant earthquake activity along local or
regional faults, during the life of the dam facilities, should be considered.
8.4.3 Earthquake Occurrence Rates
2010 52
Each potential earthquake source should be characterized in terms of the occurrence

rates of earthquakes, as a function of magnitude, and constraints on the upper
magnitude bound. Note that historical seismicity does not generally provide constraints
on the upper magnitude bound due to the relatively short historical record relative to fault
behaviour, which may be measured in thousands of years. Paleoseismic information or
other geologic data, or information from equivalent regions elsewhere in the world, may
provide constraints on long-term fault behaviour and maximum magnitudes.
8.4.4 Regional Ground Motion Relations
Appropriate regional relations, that specify the earthquake ground motion parameters,
their attenuation with distance, their scaling with magnitude, and random variability,
should be defined at all frequencies relevant to the design of the dam facilities. If no
relations are available for the region of interest, the choice of relations from other similar
regions, and their modification if necessary for the site area, should be justified using
available regional seismological data. The site condition to which the regional ground
motion relations apply should be clearly documented, as it will be required in the
evaluation of site effects.
8.4.5 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment Methodology
A probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (PSHA) quantifies numerically, at the dam

site, the contributions to the seismic motion of all sources and magnitudes within the
affected region. The basic procedures are described by McGuire (2004), EERI
Committee on Seismic Risk (1989), the U.S. National Research Council Panel on
Seismic Hazard Analysis (1988), Reiter (1990), and SSHAC (1997). Seismic hazard
analysis procedures should incorporate both seismicity and geologic information. The
probability of exceeding specified ground motion amplitude at a site can be computed by
integration of hazard contributions over all magnitudes and distances, for all source
zones, according to total probability theorem. To obtain ground motion levels or
earthquake response spectra for a desired probability, calculations are performed for a
number of ground motion amplitudes, and interpolation is used to find the ground
motions associated with the chosen probability level.
8.5 Selection of Seismic Evaluation Parameters
The parameters required to characterize the seismic loads for engineering evaluation of
a dam will depend on the type of dam, the possible failure modes or performance
requirements of the dam, and the methods used to analyze the dam. In particular,
different performance based design considerations and analysis methods are required
for either concrete or embankment dams. For concrete dams where the primary
concerns are sliding and overturning stability, uplift or cracking under seismic loads,
peak or peak effective ground motion parameters, response spectra or acceleration time
histories are typically used as ground motion parameters for the assessment. However,
for embankment dams where the primary concerns are slope stability or excessive
deformations, leading to slumping, loss of freeboard or cracking of embankment, not
only the intensity of the ground motions but also the duration of the shaking are
important to the evaluation of seismic performance (Tang et al. 2004).
2010 53
Thus, for most types of analyses the key ground motion parameters are: earthquake
magnitude and distance, peak ground motion parameters, acceleration response
spectra, and foundation fault displacement (if applicable). These parameters represent
the Earthquake Design Ground Motions (EDGM) for a structure under consideration, and
can be determined using Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA).
In general, given the difficulty of reliably correlating seismicity with specific geologic
features across most of Canada, a deterministic seismic hazard assessment (DSHA) is
only used in limited cases where active faults are well defined, such as in the case of
assessing potential Cascadia subduction earthquake scenarios. Guidelines for selection
of seismic evaluation parameters based on DSHA approach can be found in ICOLD
Bulletin No. 72 (1989), FERC (2005), and USCOLD (1999).
2010 54
CHAPTER 9.0: PREPARATION OF OPERATION,

MAINTENANCE, AND SURVEILLANCE PLANS
Dam operation, maintenance, and surveillance encompasses a number of required

activities and constraints defined to ensure that the dam is managed in a safe manner to
provide for the protection of person(s), property, and the environment. Documentation of
operating procedures and practices is necessary to ensure the safe operation of the dam
under various conditions. Maintenance activities, their types (routine and emergency)
and frequencies shall be listed and prioritized, carried out, and documented.
Surveillance, including routine visual and scheduled inspections and instrument
monitoring, is a cornerstone of any dam safety management system, since it is the
means for checking whether the dam is performing satisfactorily against required criteria
and standards. Surveillance activities, types and frequencies shall be listed, carried out
and documented.
9.1 Content of an Operations, Maintenance, and Surveillance Plan
An Operations, Maintenance, and Surveillance Plan (OMS Plan) is required for all dams
as a means to provide both experienced and new staff with the information they need to
carry out safe operation, maintenance and surveillance of the dam. The level of detail in
the Plan will depend on the complexity of the dam, including factors such as the legal
flooding rights, structural integrity, biophysical, ecological, social constraints, safety
requirements that are present upstream and downstream of the site. For many dams, a
single, short document may contain all the necessary elements. However, for some
large dams or complex sites, the information may exist in a number of specialized,
stand-alone operating, maintenance, and surveillance documents, and an OMS Plan
may simply identify the overall organization and provide a listing of the documents or
links to the appropriate information. Notwithstanding the previous statements regarding
the need for an OMS, some dams such as a weir (i.e., not an operable structure) would
not need an operations section in the OMS.
Although the format may vary the content must be specific to the site, a typical table of
contents for an OMS Plan is shown in Table 3.9.
OMS documentation must be prepared during the design phase/ and then revised and
updated as changes are proposed to the structures, equipment, or operating conditions
and after commissioning. The practices and documentation should be reviewed regularly
(as a minimum, during the periodic Dam Safety Review) to ensure information is current
and not outdated. Some old dams may not have had an OMS Plan prepared during their
construction, and the relevant and required information may be located in several
documents or may not be available. In these situations, the dam owner must develop an
OMS Plan by integrating the available information and data.
Tailings dams frequently have unique operation and maintenance issues related to
phased construction over a number of years of mining operations. The operation of the
tailings dams and associated water management facilities includes the transport and
containment of tailings, process water, effluents and residues and the recycle of process
2010 55
water. Closure requirements also influence the operating design of a tailings and water
management facilities. Therefore, the design basis and criteria for closure including
decommissioning and reclamation must be included in the OMS Plan. The Mining
Association of Canada’s Guide to the Management of Tailings Facilities (1998) and
Guide to Developing an Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance. Manual for Tailings
and Water Management (2003) outline important considerations for the mining industry.

Table 3-9: Typical Contents of OMS Plan
1 Project Description 3 Maintenance section
 Infrastructure  Maintenance Programs
o Communications  Concrete Structures
o Access Routes  Embankment Structures
o Public Safety  Steel Structure
o Site Security  Spillway Structures
 Penstocks, Tunnels, and

Pressure conduits
2 Dam Operations Section
 Infrastructure
 Roles and Responsibilities
o Access
 Operating Criteria
o Utilities
o Water Management
Objectives  Other Dam Structures
 Seasonal Reservoir Operating

Procedures
4 Surveillance section
 Data Requirements
 Effectiveness Monitoring and
 Operating Procedures Adaptive Management
o Normal Operations  Visual Inspections
o Unusual Operations  Routine Inspections
 Low water or  Scheduled Engineering Inspections

drought conditions
 Special Inspections
 Flow control
2010 56
equipment failure  Dam Instrumentation
 Ice or debris  Documentation and Follow-up

blockage Inspection, Maintenance and
Testing of Flow Control Equipment
 Solid ice shut
conditions  Response to unusual conditions
 Seismic events  Compliance Monitoring
 Flood events
 Energy emergency 5 Revisions Log

operations
o Emergency Operations
 Documentation
 Flow Control
 Equipment and Facilities
 Water Level Gauge Systems
 Supervisory Control Systems
 Emergency Systems
9.1.1 Project Description
The OMS Plan should include a brief summary of key project information, such as the
purpose and history of the project development, the ownership, any significant site
modifications, and the hazards that the dam presents. The components of the dam
system should be defined and documented to the extent that it would enable staff to
understand their characteristics and interactions. Hard copies of all operation plans must
be made available in case of a power outage.
Infrastructure, Communications and Access Routes

Infrastructure associated with the dam should be adequately documented. This would
include an inventory of communications systems (land line, cellular, satellite, radio, etc.)
and a focus on primary and secondary routes, including roads, rail, bridges and means
for reaching the site under various conditions (e.g. foot, boat, helicopter, snowmobile) If
access by land or water requires passage through locked gates, these must be identified
along with the location of the keys. Legal agreements on ownership and usage by
others should also be identified.
2010 57
Site Security
Public safety systems and maintenance requirements should be documented, including
procedures for seasonal installation and removal, if required, as well as the timing.
Security aspects and their maintenance requirements (including those for physical site,
equipment, and cyber security) should be documented, but it may be advisable, in some
situations, to keep such documentation separate and with restricted access.
9.2 Dam Operations Section
Dam owners should ensure identification of individual roles and responsibilities for
operations at the dam. This includes managers, employees or any individuals with
specific roles relating to a managed systems approach.
9.2.2 Operating Criteria

Most dams are constructed and operated to meet more than one objective, and
sometimes an array of objectives: flood management; recreation; power generation;
navigation; domestic, municipal and industrial water supply, etc. Seeking to provide an
array of benefits, while at the same time, avoiding doing harm, requires that sound
criteria be developed and used to operate dams. These criteria will typically be dictated
by the site characteristics (geophysical and ecological), the losses should a failure occur,
the presence of other dams in the watershed, upstream and downstream water uses
(ecosystem and socio-economic requirements and values), a dam’s design criteria, and
equipment limitations. These operating criteria are best expressed as objectives
(actions taken to create new benefits) and constraints (actions taken to prevent doing
harm).
In Ontario, rivers systems with waterpower facilities on them that were constructed prior
to the commercialization of the electricity sector (2002) have Water Management Plans
for Waterpower (WMPs). These plans seek to strike an appropriate balance in how flows
and levels are managed so that a variety of environmental, social and economic benefits
can be achieved. As such, the numerical flow and level values contained in these plans
have been adopted to achieve objectives and avoid constraints. Other watershed-based
plans seek to ensuring equity among stakeholders and various interests on the same
watershed (riparian rights, fisheries, erosion protection, etc.). These plans may contain
objectives or constraints which can affect whether or how a new structure or a
modification to an existing structure, is constructed and operated.
As such, the scope, number, level of detail, precision, sophistication, and data,
information and technical requirements associated the criteria (objectives and
constraints) used to operate the structure should reflect the array of considerations
identified above. Some criteria, such as constraints to preclude a dam failure, are
required in all instances; aquatic ecosystem objectives and constraints will be needed in
most instances; and, depending upon the upstream and downstream interests, some
objectives and constraints may be socio-economic in nature and relate to others’ use of
the water.
Operators are obliged to adopt criteria that clearly define operating limits and sufficient,
extensive, reliable, and timely data and information so as to ensure safe operations
2010 58
within those limits. The purpose of defining operating constraints is to ensure the
operation of the dam provides for the purposes of the Act.
Constraints on dam operations intended to maintain the integrity of the structures should
be defined during dam design and reviewed periodically, for example during the Dam
Safety Reviews. These constraints must be considered in the development of operating
procedures and could include but are not limited to:
1. Maximum safe discharge rates for all flow control equipment
2. Highest safe reservoir level beyond which dam components or reservoir rim may
start overtopping and become unstable or cause flow control equipment to be
inoperable
3. Reservoir levels at which overflow discharge structures, fuse gates, or fuse plugs
are intended to operate, expected outflows, and post-activation follow-up
requirements
4. Physical restrictions on operations that may impact dam or reservoir rim stability;
this should include precautions to be taken during drawdown events, first filling of
the reservoir, or refilling of a reservoir after a period of low water level
Operating objectives and constraints may be related to:
1. Avoiding statutory and regulatory prohibitions

2. Minimum freeboard at the dam should never be exceeded during the passage of
the incoming flood. It should only be reached if the incoming flood is the IDF;
and
3. Actual capacity of the flow control structures is calibrated and validated to handle
the incoming flow; and,
4. If the incoming flood is smaller than expected, the reservoir level after the
passage of the flood must be in the range of levels normally observed for that
time of the year. The reservoir should not be emptied because it was feared that
the IDF was coming, and the actual flood turned out to be much smaller.
5. Seasonal considerations with respect to the provision of aquatic ecosystem or
socio-economic benefits
6. All other self-imposed or negotiated objectives or constraints required to satisfy
other stakeholders interests, such as the objectives or constraints set out in an
approved Water Management Plan for Waterpower.
7. Reservoir water level constraints to minimize/control ice loading during solid ice
shut conditions.
9.2.3 Seasonal Reservoir Operating Rules
Reservoir operating rules are usually different for the spring floods and for
summer/autumn floods.
Spring Floods
For spring floods, the reservoir is typically drawn down as a result of fall and winter
operations, taking into consideration aquatic ecosystem and other objectives. The
reservoir level assumed at the beginning of the spring flood should be the highest level
observed for spring or from approved dam operation plans.
2010 59
Summer/Autumn Floods
For summer/autumn floods the reservoir is normally assumed to be at the normal
maximum level at the beginning of the flood as defined in the approved dam operating
plan.
Expected Large Flood

When a very large flood is expected, either when snow accumulation of the watershed is
abnormally high or when an exceptional storm has occurred somewhere on the
watershed, it is good practice to have as part of the dam operating plan, a reservoir
operating plan, that maximizes the reservoir volume. However, the following precautions
must be taken:
1. It should be ensured that the reservoir will be refilled to normal reservoir

operating levels after the passage of the flood peak flow; and
2. The reservoir outflow during the pre-spill operation should not create downstream
damages.
9.2.4 Data Requirements

Dam operators require systems and data to support and confirm their operating
decisions. The following data must be considered during the development of
documentation if applicable:
1. Timely headwater and tailwater elevations, needed for making operating
decisions
2. Ways to gauge flow volumes through generating units or flow control equipment
operation; this could include rating curves showing the relationship between
discharge and reservoir water level from the minimum to the highest safe
reservoir elevation
3. Reliable and accurate weather data and access to watershed flow data (river
gauges, rain gauges, flood warning systems, etc.) to allow reservoir inflow
forecasting
4. Information on uncontrolled upstream inflows or flow data and travel times
between dams on the same or interconnected watercourses
5. Reservoir storage tables that go to the highest reservoir level the dam system is
expected to be able to withstand without failure; this elevation may be above
maximum operating or regulatory levels but can be critical for emergency
operations
6. Records of normal inflows, water levels, and outflows, such as plots of minimum,
maximum, and average inflows versus time, throughout a typical year, so that
seasonal impacts can be identified and operators will know if inflows are within
normal statistical ranges. Frequency of recorded water levels and flows must be
determined on a site specific basis to capture the minimum low and high per day.
This will either require hourly, daily or weekly data.
7. Expected inflow design flood (IDF) inflow values as well as the expected
reservoir elevation to be reached during the IDF event
2010 60
9.2.5 Operating Procedures

Operating procedures must be defined for all expected conditions. Typically, procedures
and reservoir operating rule curves should be in place for normal operating conditions,
unusual or flood conditions, and emergency operating conditions.
Normal conditions
Those normal conditions that can be expected throughout much of the life of the facility
and might also be defined as routine or typical conditions. These incorporate seasonal
variability, but exclude unusual and emergency conditions defined below.
Unusual conditions
Unusual conditions not likely to lead to dam failure include operations required because
of flow control equipment failure, ice or debris blockages, seismic events, low water or
high water events, and energy emergencies.
Emergency Conditions
Those emergency conditions or events that might lead to dam failure if action is not
taken and could include extreme hydrologic events, seismic events, failure of a dam
component, or equipment failure.
It is important for operators to realize that even normal flood conditions could lead to
emergency conditions if poorly managed. Procedures must be specific enough to define
what actions are to be taken, by whom, and when.
This section must contain the triggers and/or conditions as to when the EPP must be
activated.
9.2.6 Normal Operations

Normal operating procedures must be well defined and documented and must include
safeguards and redundancies where necessary. Separate procedures may be
developed for spring (freshet), summer, fall, and winter conditions.
Normal operating procedures must outline as necessary:
1. Operating duties and authorities of staff involved in reservoir operations
2. Procedures for flow control equipment operations outlining local flow control
equipment operation versus remote or automatic operation, the use of alarms,
staged gate opening or notifications or warnings for downstream stakeholders,
remote cameras, and any other physical or procedural safeguards
3. Identification of areas impacted by operations, including downstream
communities, other dam owners, and industries, as well as any sensitive
downstream areas that may be flooded for spillway discharge less than full
capacity
4. Staffing requirements and time required to complete system operations
5. Communication protocols with other stakeholders
6. Procedures to ensure that enough gates are operational during flood and winter
conditions; this may include bubbler or heater system operations
2010 61
7. Procedures for ice or debris handling; this might include boom installation and
routine debris removal, as well as contingency plans for alternate equipment for
debris and ice handling
9.2.7 Unusual Operations

Flood operating rules must be predefined and specific enough that operating staff can
follow them without seeking approval. This guidance is critical to ensure required
operations are properly executed even if communications are lost under flood conditions.
Dam operators need to be aware of situations where, when or how operations could go
from normal to unusual or emergency conditions. Procedures should include internal
notifications, interim contingency plans for alternate discharge or reservoir manipulation,
dispatch of maintenance staff, and criteria for return to service. In general, contingency
plans must be in place for deviations from normal operating conditions, such as but not
limited to:
1. Shutdown of flow control equipment for maintenance or other planned activity
2. Flow control equipment inoperability due to power loss, failure to operate
(opening or closing), unplanned event, or blockage due to ice or debris.
3. Failure of an upstream dam or other water-retaining structure
4. Rapid drawdown events that could threaten dam or reservoir rim stability
5. Development of sinkholes, slumping, or sudden increase in seepage or turbid
flow through embankment dam structures
6. Loss of control of operating or flow control equipment or loss of communication
with data systems
7. Inability of staff to access site for normal operations or during flood conditions
Early identification and mitigative actions are critical to prevent unusual conditions from
becoming emergency conditions. Where possible, systems should be in place to identify
and warn operators (through notification and or systems) of the development of unusual
conditions. This will then allow operators to take action to mitigate unusual conditions or
to decide if the situation warrants implementation of the Emergency Preparedness Plan.
9.2.8 Emergency Operations

Emergency operation procedures are defined in this section and include mitigating
measures that operations staff can implement to avoid or minimize emergency
situations. These measures must be outlined in the OMS Plan, and include:
1. Reservoir inflows that exceed those defined as inflow design flood values.
2. Infrequent extreme floods below the IDF including passage of the floods through
the dam or over its emergency spillways.
3. Loss of flow control equipment during flood events due to debris, ice, power
failure, or loss of control system and rising reservoir levels projected to exceed
maximum safe reservoir levels
4. Seismic events that damage dam structures and require reservoir drawdown to
prevent failure and (or) carry out emergency repairs
It is required to include a table or description of scenarios that identify events that could
lead to activation of the Emergency Preparedness Plan. The authority of operating staff
2010 62
to initiate emergency procedures, along with possible triggers, must be defined in the
section titled “activation guidelines”.
Activation Guidelines
This section must contain clear procedures to identify an emergency, assess its type,
impact and level of urgency, and for taking appropriate action. To the extent possible,
clear guidance should be provided on the site-specific conditions that could lead to
activation of the EPP. Procedures addressing the transition from “normal” to
“emergency” situations must be covered and briefly described in the EPP. Documents
should be clearly cross-referenced, and the instructions must be consistent. Typically,
three levels of response are defined, with increasing levels of urgency:
1. Non Failure Emergency—the hazard or incident does not pose an immediate
danger but could develop into one.
2. Potential Failure Developing—downstream agencies or communities need to
take steps to mitigate damage or prepare for evacuation.
3. Failure Imminent or has Occurred—widespread evacuation of the downstream
population in the inundation zone is necessary.
An example Activation Guidelines is presented in Appendix 9A.
Preventive and Remedial Actions

Any preventive or remedial actions that have been identified must be clearly described.
Preventive and remedial actions may involve the installation of equipment or the
establishment of procedures for one or more of the following purposes:
Preventing emergency conditions from developing, if possible
Warning of the development of an emergency
Facilitating the operation of the dam in an emergency
Internal Notifications Plans

The owner’s Emergency Operations section should contain the internal notifications that
must be made within the owner’s organization, and a flow chart clearly demonstrating
the order and sequence of these notifications. The plans should identify the individual’s
home, office and cellular phone numbers and the alternate’s name and numbers (subject
to Information Related to Personnel below).
Owner’s Personnel Responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities of personnel accountable for initiating the emergency
plans must be clearly defined, as well as the roles and responsibilities of other personnel
involved in a dam safety emergency.
Information Related to Personnel
2010 63
In addition to the above requirements, the owner’s EPP should contain personnel and
other personal or business information specific to the owner’s organization and
management procedures. This information will be critical to the dam owner’s response to
an emergency but since it will contain personal information, then it should be placed in
an annex that is only in the owner’s copy of the document and not shared outside the
owner’s emergency personnel.
9.2.9 Compliance Monitoring Documentation

Operating procedures should include the requirement to document operating conditions
and activities, such as reservoir water levels, inflows, discharge flows, equipment
operations, unusual events, alarms and resulting actions, public activity, or any other
incidents that were related to operations or could have affected operations. An
operations log or record of actions should be maintained so that a periodic check of
compliance with procedures and operating constraints can be made to help define
potential omissions, procedural improvements, training requirements, or other overall
operating enhancements. Operating logs are also useful in follow-up or event
investigations to determine how to make improvements to the systems or procedures to
prevent recurrences.
Operations logs should be suitable to each specific dam. An example of an operation log
is provided in Appendix 10A.
9.2.10 Flow Control

Flow control equipment regulates the flow of water through a dam. It must be able to
retain or release water upon demand, whether to perform the normal intended function
of the dam or to protect the structures during unusual conditions. The equipment ranges
from manually operated flashboards to large sluice gate systems, depending on the size
and function of the dam.
Flow control equipment includes some or all of the following components:
Barrier to the water flow
Sluice gate, spillway gate, headgate, butterfly valve, jet valve, stoplogs, flash boards,
inflatable dam or siphon.
Components that ensure the desired movement of the barrier occurs
Gate hoist, valve actuator, stop log handling machine, rubber dam inflating system,
siphon priming system.
Auxiliary equipment
Gate and gain heaters, de‐icing systems such as gate bubbler systems and submerged
agitators, penstock air admission.
Power supply
Distribution grid, station service electric supply, portable main generator, backup or
emergency power supply, or manual operation.
Controls
2010 64
Usually a combination of automatic and manual operation.

Communications
Radio, telephone, bench board or SCADA monitoring.
Security systems
Locked control boxes, anchored stop log machines cameras and fencing protecting flow
control equipment.
Information related to flow control system operations should be identified and
documented. This may include manufacturer’s information, design reports, and other
relevant information.
For large dams, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), benchboard, or other
control systems are important operational tools. Procedures should be in place to ensure
these systems are adequately designed, sufficiently robust, and periodically checked to
provide remote dam operators with suitable and timely data for dam operation. Where
practical, alarms should be in place to warn operators of situations that could lead to
problems.
In addition, some critical dam surveillance instrumentation may be linked into the control
system to provide real-time indication of potential dam safety issues.
All emergency systems should be identified and documented. This could include dam-
breach early warning systems, emergency power supplies, and other related equipment
and systems. These systems should be included within the maintenance and
surveillance program to ensure they are functional when needed. Staff familiarity with
these systems will also be beneficial for response in emergency situations.
9.3 Maintenance Plan
9.3.1 Maintenance Programs

Maintenance of equipment and systems is important to ensure operational availability,
safe operations, and integrity of the dam. This is particularly true of mechanical and
electrical systems related to flow control equipment where failure due to lack of
maintenance can be sudden and dramatic. Civil structures may also develop more
maintenance issues as they age. Some dams may have maintenance needs that vary
seasonally as well as throughout different stages in their life cycle.
Maintenance programs must be described in the OMS Plan. These will identify the
components of the dam requiring maintenance and define the schedule of maintenance
activities.
Maintenance Documentation
Maintenance documentation must track which systems were maintained, what type of
maintenance was performed, when it was done, and by whom. Development of
maintenance checklists for each component of the dam system should be considered to
ensure the adequacy of the maintenance procedure followed and the consistency of its
documentation. This type of information is valuable for identifying chronic problematic
equipment issues or components of the system that might require replacement or major
maintenance to ensure reliability.
2010 65
Type of Maintenance
“Routine” maintenance is that which can typically be scheduled or defined on the basis
of time (weekly, monthly, etc.), usage (number of cycles, hours of operation, etc.), or
observed condition from periodic visual inspection (excessive wear, corrosion, etc.).
Routine maintenance may range from a simple change of lubricating fluids to a complete
overhaul with replacement of major parts.
Even with an effective preventive maintenance program, dam owners need to be

prepared for “emergency maintenance”. This might include having critical spare parts,
tools, equipment or suppliers names and contact, and trained, competent staff ready in
the event of an emergency.
“Major Maintenance” may refer to reconstruction or partial reconstruction of the dam,

spillway or other component and could be subject to MNR approval under section 16 of
the LRIA.
9.3.2 Concrete Structures

Maintenance needs for concrete dams, concrete-faced dams, and appurtenant
structures should be identified and might include items such as
1. Regular cleaning of foundation and internal drainage systems
2. Maintenance of surface and joint sealing systems
3. Sealing of cracks
Some concrete materials are subject to alkali aggregate reaction (AAR), which causes
expansion of concrete, pattern cracking, and ultimately loss of structural integrity. AAR
can affect operations by causing closure of sluiceway openings, leading to binding and
inoperability of logs or gates. AAR can also cause deck beams or slabs to shear at
bearing points, and loss of strength can lead to load de-rating of sluiceway structures,
causing the inability to move lifting equipment to pull logs. In some cases, special
maintenance procedures may be needed to reduce the effects of AAR.
Sluiceway gains need periodic maintenance, since deteriorated gains or roller paths for
gated sluiceways could lead to binding of gates. Deterioration of gains in stoplogs
sluiceways can lead to logs jamming or turning over thus impeding their removal.
9.3.3 Embankment Structures

Embankment dams and appurtenant structures and their required maintenance must be
identified and might include items such as:
1. Vegetation removal and cutting or establishment of desirable vegetation cover
2. Control of burrowing animals
3. Riprap repair or replenishment or replacement of deteriorated riprap
4. Crest settlement repair and establishment of required freeboard
5. Seepage-induced slumping repair
6. Drainage system cleaning
7. Surface erosion repair
2010 66
9.3.4 Steel Structures

Maintenance requirements for steel structures must be identified and may include
1. Corrosion protection (cleaning, priming, painting, anode or cathode replacement)
2. Connector maintenance (torquing bolts, checking rivets and welds)
9.3.5 Spillway Structures

Some types of spillway structures and approach channels may require periodic routine
maintenance to ensure their operability or integrity to safely discharge required flow.
Maintenance requirements for these structures must be identified and may include
1. Clearing of debris; removal of vegetation from spillway approach and outlet
channels and from the reservoir (where it may migrate and block discharge)
2. Repair of cavitation damage or eroded aprons or unlined spillway channels after
spill events
3. Routine cleaning of debris from energy dissipaters, from joint repairs in concrete
linings, and under drainage systems
4. Removal of vegetation and repair of fuse plug initiation channels to ensure they
will trigger as planned and not trigger prematurely
9.3.6 Penstocks, Tunnels, and Pressure Conduits

Well-designed penstocks, tunnels, and pressure conduits typically provide many years of
service if appropriate inspection and maintenance programs are followed. Tunnels,
pressure conduits, and penstocks may fail to perform as a result of design, operator
error, poor maintenance, unusual loading, and ageing. The losses associated with the
failure of a tunnel, penstock, or pressure conduit through an embankment dam can be
severe, including uncontrolled release of reservoir, dam breach, loss of life,
environmental damage, structural damage, and loss of generation.
Effective maintenance includes:
1. Applying suitable internal or external coatings to extend the life of existing
pipelines or penstocks
2. Repairing concrete tunnels and conduit linings or removing rock falls in unlined
tunnels
9.3.7 Other Dam Structures

Other types of materials have been used to construct dam structures, and the owners
need to ensure proper maintenance of these structures. Timber cribs, gabions, rubber,
geosynthetics, and other materials have been used for dam construction or
rehabilitation. Maintenance requirements for these structures should be identified and
may include, for the case of timber dams:
1. Application of wood preservative
2. Replacement of missing connectors (nails, bolts)
3. Replacement of deteriorated members or sheathing
4. Re-filling the crib to replace eroded material
9.3.8 Infrastructure
Necessary maintenance of infrastructure, including site access, may include
2010 67
1. Grading and replenishment of granular surface roads

2. Removal of snow on access road
3. Maintenance of bridge structures and decks
4. Cleaning of access road culverts and ditches and removal of beaver dams
5. Maintenance of signage to ensure emergency responders can locate remote
sites
6. Clearing of roadside or access path from vegetation
Maintenance requirements for public safety measures include issues such as:
1. Regular inspections and maintenance to ensure integrity of all system
components (signs, fences, etc.)
2. Replacement of missing and (or) damaged components, depending on criticality
of the item and redundancy
3. Installation and removal of any seasonal structures, such as booms or buoys
9.4 Surveillance Plans
9.4.1 General
In this section, the term surveillance is used to encompass both inspection activities as
well as instrumentation monitoring and data assessment. Dam failures are often
preceded by development of warning signs that may range from the appearance of
cracks in earth or concrete dams to the discharge of turbid, sediment-laden water
downstream of the dam. The warning time can range from days to months or even to
years; however, in some cases warning time may be as little as hours or minutes. The
goal of surveillance is to identify deviations in performance conditions so corrective or
risk mitigation measures can be implemented before adverse losses result.
In order to establish an effective dam safety surveillance program, surveillance
engineers must understand the hazards that are present, how the dam might fail (failure
modes), what early signs of failure to look for, and what inspection or monitoring
measures could be used to detect an emerging condition that could lead to failure. This
approach may be described as performance-based surveillance.
Staff performing surveillance activities must be trained to understand the types of failure
modes that apply to the dam structures under their care and to recognize signs of
emerging problems. Training should define surveillance methodologies and procedures
to be followed to document and report surveillance findings. Staff involved in surveillance
activities and working at or near a dam must be trained in the proper protocol for
reporting a potential dam deficiency and responding to an emergency. The qualification
and training of surveillance personnel must be commensurate with the complexity of the
facilities and the assigned level of responsibilities.
All inspections should be documented, including whenever possible annotated
photographs referenced in the inspection report. This will provide a continuous record of
conditions so that comparisons can be made to identify changes and trends.
The following table summarized the various types of inspections.
Table: 3-10 Minimum Frequency of Inspection
2010 68
Item Very High High Moderate and Very

Hazard Potential Hazard Potential Low Hazard
Potential
Routine Inspection Monthly Semi Annually Annually

Scheduled Inspection (1) Annually Every 5 years Every 10 years
(2)
Special Inspection As required As required As required
Full Load and Full Flood Every 7 years Every 7 years As required
Test
Test Operation of Outlet Annually Annually Annually

Gates and Mechanical
Components
1. Scheduled Inspections are intended as more thorough inspections performed by a qualified

engineer representing the owner.
2. Special Inspections should be conducted after floods, earthquakes or other unusual events.
9.4.2 Visual Inspections

The observational approach has long been recognized as a key component of the
performance monitoring process for earthworks and foundations. Therefore, routine
inspections by trained on-site staff and visual inspections are integral to an effective dam
safety program.
The level of detail of an inspection and the frequency of inspection depends upon the
type of inspection being performed, complexity of the site, of the losses associated with
a dam failure, past performance, seasonal or other access constraints, and other
relevant factors.
The OMS Plan must describe the type and frequency of inspections for the specific dam,
and any specific issue or known weakness that require special considerations.
9.4.3 Routine Inspections

Routine inspections are generally completed on a monthly, semi annual or annual
frequency based on the hazard potential classification of the dam to identify any
conditions that might indicate changes in dam performance and therefore require follow-
up. These inspections may be carried out by engineers or more commonly by other staff
routinely engaged in other tasks at the site. Such staff needs to be trained in dam
surveillance. Of particular significance in a routine inspection are new occurrences or
noted changes in leakage, erosion, sinkholes, boils, seepage, slope slumping or sliding,
settlement, displacements or cracking of structural components, clogging of drains and
relief wells, etc. Documentation of routine inspections should be a simple check sheet
with special focus on areas of concern or special consideration for the specific facility.
Changes identified during routine inspections must be brought to the attention of the
dam owner.
2010 69
9.4.4 Scheduled Engineering Inspections

Engineering inspections are typically performed annually for high hazard potential
classified dams and every 5 years for lesser classified dams. These inspections include
a detailed visual examination of the dam and appurtenances and the instrumentation
used to monitor their performance. This inspection report should document observations
regarding the condition of the dam, with any significant changes from previous
inspections being highlighted. Some assessment of the severity of observed anomalies
as well as recommendations for maintenance, repairs, investigation, or further
monitoring should be completed. Because of this additional level of assessment, these
inspections are generally performed by professional engineers.
Ideally, inspection checklists or reports should be designed to suit the specifics of each
dam.
9.4.5 Special Inspections

In addition to planned inspections, dams should be inspected during, if possible, and
after unusual or extreme events, such as heavy rainfall, flooding, windstorms, severe
icing, rapid snow melt, earthquakes, and exceedance of the absolute maximum
operating water level (which could occur during an extreme flood or as the result of
blocked discharge facilities or improper operation of the structure). Significant changes
to normal operations, nearby construction activity, or other unusual events might also
trigger special inspections.
9.4.6 Dam Instrumentation

Dam instrumentation should not be used as a replacement for regular visual inspections,
but as an aid to augment ongoing assessment of dam performance. The need for
instrumentation must be defined systematically on the basis of expected dam
performance, the performance aspects that require monitoring, and identification of
parameters that need to be measured quantitatively.
Existing dams may have a variety of instruments installed at different times and for
different purposes based on the approved design of the dam or identified as necessary
in a Dam Safety Review.. In establishing an instrumentation program, the design
engineer or dam safety review engineer needs to review all existing instruments at the
site, identify those that are no longer necessary, and those instruments necessary for
safe management of the dam (identify purpose and use).. Any new instrumentation
should be considered based on data need and purpose as follows:
a) Analytical assessment – Verification of design parameters related to dam behaviour,

Dam Safety Review calculations, assumptions and adequacy of construction
techniques, verification of satisfactory performance with respect to potential failure
modes, determining effectiveness of dam modifications to mitigate observed distress.
b) Observing the performance of known geologic and structural anomalies.
2010 70
c) Predicting future performance (long term monitoring) ‐ to indicate deteriorating

performance along with possible need for future intervention.
d) Establishment of baseline data for determination of causes and effects which can be
used in defense of liability/construction claims from neighboring interests.
Considerations for planning and executing a successful instrumentation program can be

obtained from references such as Dunnicliff (1988), ASCE (2000) and USACE (1995).
Introducing an instrument into a dam can alter the local area surrounding the instrument,
creating non‐conformity. These non‐conformity effects can be introduced through the
process of drilling a borehole into an existing dam or from the altered compaction
methods during construction in the immediate area around the instrument and along the
path of the instrument cables or physical conduits leading to the reading location at the
surface. Adding instrumentation to existing dams, if deemed necessary, requires careful
installation procedures to avoid damaging the dam.
The surveillance section must document the specifics of the instruments installed at the
site, the assumptions, failure modes identification, analysis, and other related
information used to define the instrumentation program, the parameters to be measured,
how often and by whom, expected threshold values, and what readings may trigger
follow-up actions, and who has the authority to initiate follow-up. The surveillance
section should also include procedures and frequency for required instrument
maintenance and calibration.
Whether the instruments are manually read or automated, it is important that the
readings be plotted regularly so that as a minimum a visual assessment of trends,
anomalies, comparison to thresholds can be made routinely. For Very High and High
Hazard dams, a thorough assessment of the data and evaluation of dam performance
based on inspection and monitoring data, must be done by a qualified engineer, as a
minimum on an annual basis, in conjunction with the Scheduled Engineering
Inspections.
Instrumentation may be installed in dam appurtenances or associated infrastructures for

a variety of purposes. Procedures for monitoring, assessment, documentation and data
management should also be specified. Procedures and supporting documentation
should be in place for water level gauge installation, calibration, maintenance, and
repair.
The effectiveness of instrumentation should be reviewed periodically, ideally during the

Dam Safety Review process, and updated as necessary to achieve the desired level of
dam performance monitoring.
9.4.7 Effectiveness Monitoring and Adaptive Management

Effectiveness monitoring and adaptive management is a process for continually
improving management decisions by learning from the outcomes associated with these
decisions. Sound operating criteria provide an important foundation for monitoring how
well objectives are being achieved, and constraints avoided.
2010 71
Where there are changes to the water level and flow regime that are anticipated to have
ecological or socio-economic impacts, OMS plans will contain provisions for monitoring
the effectiveness of operating requirements. Key operating criteria and other
performance indicators are to be selected as a basis for evaluating plan performance
over time. A combination of monetary, numerical indices, ecological metrics and
descriptive assessments may be used to monitor plan effectiveness. While dam owners
have the primary responsibility for monitoring, they may partner with MNR or others in
monitoring activities. Effectiveness monitoring and adaptive management is site-specific
and scale dependent, with the scope and need being driven by the socio-economic
values and their significance; impacts to ecological sustainability and biodiversity; the
expected frequency, severity and duration of a dam’s operations on these values; and
the practicable options for mitigating any adverse effects.
Dam owners undertaking current studies or submitted applications for location approval
must consider new data and information as it becomes available to potentially adjust
operations as a basis for improving the ability to achieve objectives and mitigate
constraints. Cause and effect relationships between dams and other upstream and
downstream values may take some time to discern. Dam owners may be required to
adjust their operating criteria at or prior to the time of a Dam Safety Review, to mitigate
adverse effects that may be deemed significant.
9.4.8 Documentation and Follow-Up

Data obtained from inspections and instrumentation must be documented, compiled,
plotted and analyzed in a timely manner for any indications of unusual dam
performance. The surveillance section should contain blank check sheets or inspection
report forms that can be copied and used. These forms must identify the circulation
protocol or who should receive copies, as well as the filing and retention requirements.
With respect to monitoring data, the surveillance section must specify where the raw
data and plots will be stored. Retention for instrumentation readings is usually indefinite,
i.e. they should be considered as permanent records. For manually read instruments,
blank data records sheets must be provided to be used for each instrument or group of
instruments.
The surveillance section must also contain procedures for follow-up actions on problems
identified during inspections and /or monitoring and the staff responsible for such follow-
up. Follow up action and problems must be brought to the attention of the engineer
carrying out the scheduled inspections. In some instances findings may require
immediate remedial actions, such as reservoir lowering or repair, to manage the risks.
Some training and judgment are required on the part of the inspector to help define the
urgency of follow-up actions. Observation of a hazardous condition at a dam may, in
some cases, lead to activation of the emergency response plan.
9.4.9 Inspection Maintenance and Testing of Flow Control Equipment
Mechanical and electrical equipment associated with dams consists mainly of flow
control equipment as described earlier.
Inspection, maintenance, and performance testing of this equipment are often carried
out as integrated activities and often in conjunction with operation.
2010 72
Mechanical and electrical inspection and maintenance of flow control equipment is a

critical component of the overall surveillance program for the dam system. The
procedures can be included in the surveillance and maintenance sections. Check sheets
should be provided to ensure the procedures are carried out systematically, in a
consistent manner, and well documented. Critical components should be identified so
they can receive priority in the maintenance program. Where appropriate, risk
assessment techniques such as failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) can help to
identify these components.
Operation and maintenance procedures will depend on the losses that could occur in the
event that the equipment failed to operate, and on the complexity and criticality of
equipment at the site. Maintenance procedures should include inspection, reporting,
repair, and follow-up. Spare parts should be available for critical components or at a
minimum where replacement parts can be quickly acquired. The appropriate inspection
and maintenance intervals will vary depending on its condition, frequency of use,
maintenance history, and criticality to dam safety, as well as the site climatic conditions.
All mechanical and electrical equipment that is required for the dam to pass the inflow
design flood must be tested to demonstrate that the equipment is in good working order
and the dam can pass the required flows. Most flow control equipment is in heavy use
only at certain periods of the year so it may be convenient to carry out inspection and
maintenance outside these periods. Testing is often done during at high flow times
because the excess water means there is little or no generation loss. Alternatively,
testing is done just before the high flow period to make sure the equipment is in good
condition before it has heavy use.
However, at some sites, the equipment is rarely used but is required to be available
under extreme conditions. Its only operation might be for testing purposes. As part of its
routine maintenance, the equipment would be inspected and undergo a limited test.
Annual Functional Test
Annual functional test must be conducted to verify that flow control equipment will
operate under normal flows. The testing can be carried out at less than the full open
flow, and for regularly used equipment, it could be a part of normal operation.
Full Flow Test
A full flow test or as close a surrogate test to it without creating measurable increased
flood damages must be carried out periodically (for example, as part of a Dam Safety
Review) to verify the design capability of the equipment. In a full flow test a gate, log
sluice, or valve is fully opened so that the device and its auxiliary equipment operate
close to their design loads. Contingency planning is needed to identify potential
problems that could occur during these tests and to develop procedures to deal with
these risks. In some situations, a full flow test may cause extensive flooding or
excessive loss of reservoir storage. In such situations, the owner may consider options
such as:
2010 73
1. Schedule the test to coincide with scheduled spills;
2. Schedule the test during the normal water levels;
3. If sectional gates are available, conduct the test in the “dry”;
4. If the full open test cannot be completed, a thorough visual inspection and
assessment of the equipment will be required including the embedded parts,
clearances, hoist structure, limit switches, etc. to ensure the equipment will
operate under design flow conditions.
Movement of silt, boulders and debris that have accumulated above the dam may occur
during the testing resulting in siltation downstream, or jamming of the sluiceway. The
operator needs to be cognizant of these concerns.
The OMS Plan must contain a listing and description of flow control equipment,
frequency of their testing, inspection and maintenance, check sheets or report forms to
be used for these activities, and the required routing, filing and retention. Procedures for
follow up actions must be documented and responsibility for follow up indicated.
The results of the inspection and maintenance must be reviewed and signed off by the
designated person. Copies of the maintenance reports and other documentation must be
kept in a central file location. Drawings and schematic diagrams must be readily
available and be kept up to date to reflect any modifications. Any new maintenance
issues arising from the work should be documented and included in the planning cycle
for the equipment.
Checklists
A checklist for inspection and maintenance of flow control equipment should be tailored
to the kind of equipment and its complexity at the dam. Very comprehensive examples
are provided in Appendix 10A – 10C.
9.5 OMS Plan Administration and Control
The OMS Plan must be a controlled document and contain procedures and designate
responsibilities for the formal issue of, distribution and periodic revisions to the Plan.
Reviews and revisions must be made to reflect all appropriate updates such as changes
to personnel or organization, as well as any changes in procedures not less than once a
year.
The responsibilities for the control and distribution of the OMS Plans must also be clearly
defined. This includes a description of who receives copies and where these copies are
located, and provisions for removing and archiving out of date material.
2010 74
CHAPTER 10.0: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

PLANS
10.1 Introduction
An Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) is the dam owner’s plan for notifying response
agencies in the event of an eminent dam failure, dam failure and/or mis-operation. This
does not include emergency operations for the dam by the dam owner, which is dealt
with in the emergency operations section of the OMS manual.
Response agencies directed under the Emergency Management Act have the
responsibility to carry out emergency functions such as the evacuation of persons in the
inundation zone and closing of roadways.
An EPP is required for dams having a HPC of High or Very High. Dams having a HPC of
Moderate may be required by the Minister to have an EPP depending upon the potential
losses in the inundation zone. Dams having a Low HPC are not required to have an
EPP.
The emergency management process must be annually updated over the full life cycle of
the dam, including the construction phase and whenever significant cofferdams are
required. For new dams, EPP’s must be submitted for Plans & Specifications approval
and tested prior to first filling of the reservoir. The level of detail in the plans and
procedures must be commensurate with the hazard associated with failure of the dam,
as reflected in its HPC.
While the owner’s responsibilities during an emergency are laid out within the OMS, it
must be included within the EPP as a very brief generic summary of the actions the
owner will be taking. These include procedures that specifically address the owner’s on-
site response and mitigation and water management during the emergency. The value
of including this will be that the emergency responders will have an understanding of
emergency operations being carried out by the dam owner.
10.2 Process to Develop an EPP
The initial development and regular reviews required to maintain an EPP must consider
the following activities:
1. Identify those situations or events that would require initiation of emergency
actions; identify the actions that are to be taken and by whom.
2. Carefully review the inundation maps and drawdown areas which delineate the
effects of a dam failure in order to identify critical infrastructures such as
institutions, bridges, roads, railways, electrical or gas distribution sub-stations, as
well as water treatment, water intakes and wastewater treatment facilities both
upstream and downstream, that may be inundated or otherwise rendered
unserviceable by the dam failure or mis-operation. This information is then used
to insure representative organizations responsible for the infrastructures are
2010 75
included in listing of key stakeholders and agencies as well as for the purpose of
preparing the owner’s emergency preparedness plan. Location and access to
residences and industrial and commercial buildings which may be affected must
also be identified on the maps.
3. Identify other dams on the river system or tributaries, both upstream and
downstream of the dam, that may be impacted by an emergency at the dam, or
whose operation can affect an emergency at the dam. If these dams are owned
by other organizations they should be invited to the stakeholders meeting and be
included in the stakeholders list.
4. Identify primary and auxiliary communication systems, both internal (between
owner’s personnel) and external (between owner and outside agencies,
especially emergency responders).
5. Identify all jurisdictions, agencies, and their contacts that will be involved in
implementing their own Emergency Response Plans in the event of a dam failure
or mis-operation emergency in order that interdependencies between Plans can
be coordinated.
6. Identify key stakeholders and agencies involved in the notification processes,
and include notification flowcharts (internal and external) that show who will be
notified and in what order.
7. Develop a draft EPP for the dam.
8. Hold co-ordination meeting(s) with parties/stakeholders included in the
notification list for input, review and comment on the draft EPP.
9. Make revisions, obtain necessary approvals where required, finalize and
distribute to the appropriate emergency responders.
10. Develop training programs for the dam owner’s personnel involved in the EPP.
11. Develop a review process for the plan and maintain an up-to-date EPP
document.
12. Prepare a list of “Mutual Aid Agreements” where applicable.
10.3 Content of the EPP
A complete EPP should contain the following items. The first five are mandatory and the
minimum that the owner must provide to emergency responders and stakeholders with
an active response role in a dam emergency:
10.3.1 Description and Location

A brief description of the dam, including photos or drawings, or dams covered by the
EPP and their location including geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude
coordinates)
10.3.2 External Notification Contact Lists
2010 76
Identifying the individuals from each agency that the dam owner will notify and a flow
chart showing the order in which these notifications will be made. The plans should
identify the individuals home, office and cellular phone numbers as well as alternate
names and numbers.
10.3.3 Inundation maps

Inundation maps must be at a scale of 1:20,000 or smaller.
Maps that delineate the flood limits for the following events
1. The water level (or water depth) under normal conditions.
2. The water level (or water depth) under IDF conditions.
3. The water level (or water depth) due to a dam failure under IDF conditions.
4. The water level (or water depth) due to a sunny day dam failure.
For the situation where the highest HPC of the dam is under normal conditions (i.e.
sunny day failure) the maps must delineate only the normal water level and the water
level due to dam failure under normal conditions.
In addition, the maps must identify locations of critical infrastructure including bridges,
roads, railways, houses, hospitals, water treatment, water intakes and wastewater
treatment) downstream of the dam breach. The following should be identified at these
key locations:
1. The maximum water elevation reached under the dam break scenario.
2. The approximate water depth above the normal summer water elevation.
3. The estimated distance from the dam failure.
4. The estimated arrival time and velocity of the flood wave.
5. The estimated time and velocity for the flood wave to peak or to reach the
highest level.
It should be understood that the dam break analysis requires many assumptions, so the
resulting maps should not be viewed in absolute terms. Data on maps will give the
estimated maximum extent of flooding, flood depths, and time to peak flow values for
planning and evacuation purposes.
Reservoir water levels post failure must also be estimated and the upstream effects
evaluated. Where critical infrastructure upstream of the dam could be affected, (e.g.
exposure of water intakes or sewage outflows), these facilities should be identified on
the maps.
10.3.4 Expected Roles During an Emergency

In an emergency, the first responder has legislated responsibility under the Emergency
Management and Civil Protection Act for planning and delivery during a response effort.
2010 77
For incorporated communities in Ontario, the first responder will be the municipality and
for unincorporated communities the first responder is the MNR. Emergency response
personnel (e.g., police, ambulance, fire, etc.) will work under the direction of the
municipality and the MNR, as appropriate. It is the responsibility of the dam owner to
confirm with the first responder who their appropriate 24/7 contact and response
personnel will be in case of an emergency. .
For First Nations communities, the first responder will be the Band. This is not a
legislated responsibility of the Band Chief, but dam owners are still required to attempt to
confirm with the Band Chief who their 24/7 contact and response personnel (if any) will
be in case of an emergency.
The warnings that the first responders and emergency personnel issue would normally
be based on the information provided by the dam owner or operator. Provincial or local
governments have their own emergency response plans including procedures that would
incorporate or include information provided by the dam owner.
10.3.5 Termination of an Emergency

The responsibility for terminating an emergency should be identified in the Plan. In
general, the owner has the responsibility for making the determination and advising the
first responder and emergency personnel that the situation at the dam is under control
and stable and no longer presents a hazardous condition to downstream population. The
first responders and emergency response personnel have the responsibility for the
termination of evacuation and other response activities. The owner must collaborate
with the authorities to ensure termination and public communication are done in a
manner that is clear and not lead to confusion.
For an emergency within a municipality, the head of council may rescind the emergency
declaration. If the situation has escalated to a provincial emergency, the Premier has the
responsibility for termination.
10.3.6 Communication Systems, Equipment, and Materials

Full details of internal and external communications systems as they apply to an
emergency response should be included in the EPP. Location and availability of
equipment, emergency power sources, on site and off-site, contractors, and stockpiled
materials that are critical to the emergency response should be identified.
10.3.7 Site Information and Access Routes

Information on personnel access to the site should be provided. The EPP should cover
personnel’s response during periods of darkness, including those caused by power
failure; and in adverse weather conditions, including extremes of cold, snow, or storms.
Time estimates for personnel to reach the site under normal and adverse conditions
should be included.
10.3.8 Debriefing/Follow-up Procedure
2010 78
The dam owner/operator should have in place a procedure to follow-up on any incident
or emergency that triggered all or part of the emergency response process. This
procedure may be included as an appendix to the EPP or the annex as a reminder to
staff following an emergency or separately within the owner’s documentation system.
The debriefing is a critical step in an effective emergency management process and
provides for continuous improvement. Its objective is not to lay blame but to identify any
issues in the EPP or associated processes, equipment, facilities, roles and
responsibilities, etc. The process should include an investigation of the event (data
gathering and analysis), recommendations, and plans for improvement implementation.
10.4 EPP Maintenance and Administration

By their very nature, EPPs contain items specific to the dam site safety and security, as
well as personnel’s private information (e.g. home telephone numbers). Therefore EPPs
should be controlled documents so that all copies are accounted for and designated
individuals in the owner’s organization are responsible for keeping the copies up to date.
Due diligence must be used to ensure that all stakeholders have received their copies of
the document and that their copies are updated. This may consist of a sign back sheet
or the like. The documents must contain a list of all document holders as well as a log
identifying the revisions and dates of updated versions.
The EPP must be reviewed annually by the owner, and updated if required. It is a good
practice to hold an annual stakeholders meeting to review the document and identify the
required changes or updates. To cover the eventuality of staff change, location or
telephone numbers change, as a minimum, both internal and external notification plans
must be checked and updated on an annual basis.
10.5 Training
Training should be provided to ensure that the owner’s personnel are thoroughly familiar
with all elements of the EPP. Training is essential for problem detection, proper
evaluation of developing situations, and appropriate follow-up actions. Refresher training
should also be provided routinely to ensure personnel maintain their readiness.
The dam owner is responsible for ensuring that his staff is adequately trained according
to their levels of responsibilities and their role in an emergency situation. Municipalities
and other responders are responsible for their own staff training and readiness.
10.6 Testing
Testing is an integral part of emergency preparedness, to ensure that both the document
and the training of involved parties are adequate. Tests can range from a simple call test
to a full-scale simulation of an emergency and can include multiple failures. Dam
operations staff should coordinate and participate in joint periodic testing of the
emergency procedures, preferably with affected agencies and stakeholders and
emergency responders.
2010 79
Warning time must be considered during the preparation of an Emergency

Preparedness Plan. This information will be used in the development of Emergency
Response Plans by response agencies and their subsequent testing during simulated
implementation. To be effective, this testing should be done in conjunction with the dam
owner’s EPP wherever possible.
The types of tests and frequency of testing should be commensurate with the hazard
presented by the dam. The requirements for table top or functional drills must be
identified as part of the dam safety review. It is important that actions resulting from any
tests be recorded and follow-up carried out promptly. The types of tests frequently used
are described in the following:
10.6.1 Call Tests

Call tests are the simplest types of tests. Their purpose is:
1. to test the communication systems (primary and secondary),
2. to verify the internal and external notification call chains.
3. to test the respondents’ knowledge of their expected actions and the availability
of the latest updated EPP document to these respondents.
Call tests are relatively fast to perform and must be run annually. At the same time, they
can be used as a means to update the notification list (individual contacts and alternates,
telephone numbers, etc.).
10.6.2 Table Top Drills

A tabletop drill is a simulated emergency scenario that is run in a conference room
environment, where all participants are gathered and carry out their roles based on a
described emergency situation. A facilitator runs the drill and announces events or
situations developing in the scenario. There may be other role players. Participants
perform their functions and react to developing events and messages conveyed to them,
as they would in a real emergency. The process allows opportunities to practice
problem solving and decision making for a coordinated and effective emergency
response. It also helps identify any gaps in the process or communication that ought to
be covered in the document. The drill should be followed by debriefing and discussion of
how to improve the EPP document and the processes involved. The document is revised
and issued after incorporating these improvements.
10.6.3 Functional Drills

Functional drills usually involve a dam safety failure scenario and therefore will involve
activation of the response organizations. They may include equipment mobilization and
perhaps even partial evacuation. The scenario is such that it requires activation and
testing of the full Emergency Preparedness Plans. Organizing a functional drill requires
the involvement of emergency response organizations, and extensive upfront planning
and coordination and a carefully developed communication protocol. Functional drills
require significant effort, time and resources to develop a realistic scenario, execute the
2010 80
drill, carry out an evaluation and report on the findings. They are generally carried out
only for Very High HPC dams.
2010 81
CHAPTER 11.0: DAM SAFETY REVIEW
11.1 Dam Safety Reviews
The Dam Safety Review (DRS) is a systematic review and evaluation of all aspects of
design, construction, maintenance, operation, and surveillance, and other factors,
processes and systems affecting a dam’s safety, including the dam safety management
system. The Review defines and encompasses all components of the “dam system”
under evaluation (including dam, spillway, foundation, abutments, reservoir, tailraces,
etc.) The evaluation should be based on current knowledge and standards, which may
be different from the acceptable standards at the time of original construction or a prior
Dam Safety Review. These inspections are documented in a report that will be
appended to or forms part of the Dam Safety Review and assessment. This report also
outlines the frequency, scope and content for a Dam Safety Review, and addresses the
need for independence in the reviewer, and follow-up on the findings.
11.1.1 Review Team
The review is to be carried out by a registered professional engineer (Review Engineer)

or multidisciplinary team reporting to the Review Engineer, who are qualified by their
background in design, construction, performance analysis and operation of dams. The
Terms of Reference of the Dam Safety Review should clearly identify the accountability
for the final review report.
The term “Reviewer” is used in this document to mean Review Engineer or members of
the review team reporting to the Review Engineer.
11.1.2 Independent Review
The Dam Owner is responsible to ensure that the Review Engineer is able to complete
the Dam Safety Review in an impartial and objective manner..
In general the review findings should be free of any conflict of interest that could be
caused by prior participation of the reviewer in the design, construction, operation,
maintenance or inspection of the dam under review. It is also advisable that the same
Review Engineer not carry out two consecutive Dam Safety Reviews of the same dam.
The intent is to encourage dam owners to benefit from a range of perspectives which
can lead to previously undetected performance issues being identified; as well as to be
consistent with the notion of having the review findings independent of any conflict of
interest.
11.1.3 Frequency of Review
The frequency of Dam Safety Review depends on the hazard that the dam presents, the
presence of or changes to external hazards, the results of surveillance and the
demonstrated performance. For new dams, it is important that all design and
construction records be preserved and catalogued for easy retrieval when a Dam Safety
Review is to be undertaken. It is suggested that documentation be compiled as the
2010 82
design proceeds, to ensure that all dam safety aspects have been addressed and to
reference all relevant design documents. This process could be considered a “Design
Phase Dam Safety Review”, and the documentation would also serve as a starting point
for the first post‐commissioning Dam Safety Review. It is important that as‐built drawings
be produced to show any changes made from the original design drawings, the reasons
for the change and any unusual site conditions observed during constructions. The first
post commissioning Dam Safety Review of a new dam should be completed within three
years of initial filling of the reservoir.
During its operational life, any significant change affecting a dam should trigger a Dam
Safety Review or appropriate investigations. Significant changes include, but are not
limited to, changes in stage of construction of tailings dams, construction modifications
to the original dam design, discovery of unusual conditions, new dams on the river
system, new developments downstream of the dam, new knowledge of safety analysis,
new standards of safety and extreme hydrologic or seismic events. Should these
significant changes result in a recommendation for dam decommissioning, a study and
assessment of all hydrologic, environmental and physical impacts should be undertaken.
A post decommissioning Dam Safety Review should be undertaken within three years of
closure or decommissioning of a dam.
Tailings dams and their facilities can be evolving structures, the construction of which
may continue over the entire active life of the facility. During the life of the structure(s),
the requirements for safety, maintenance, operation and surveillance may change, as
may the appropriate frequency of Dam Safety Reviews, if the incremental losses
associated with a potential dam failure change. The Dam Safety Review of a tailings
dam should take into account the dam safety requirements applicable to all future
operating phases.
For tailing dams, often an inspection and monitoring program is undertaken for many
years after closure, with periodic reviews and assessment of the post closure
performance. For all dams, at the completion of one review, the date for the next review
should be set. Suggested review periods based on consequence classification are
shown in Table 3-11. If surveillance or other observations indicate abnormal
performance, a review should be initiated sooner than indicated in Table 3-11. Closure
of a mines tailings dam does not imply that a dam has been decommissioned.
For owners with a portfolio of many dams, if it is necessary to prioritize Dam Safety
Reviews among dams with similar classifications, consideration should be given to the
performance of the dams and to any known problems or issues that have emerged since
the prior Dam Safety Review.
Table 3-11: Maximum Period Between Dam Safety Reviews

HPC CATEGORY PERIOD BETWEEN REVIEWS
Very High 5 years
High 7 years
2010 83
Low and Moderate No Dam Safety Review

required (10 year HPC review
still required)
i. A Dam Safety Review is not required for Low and Moderate hazard potential dams
but a periodic review of the hazard potential classification is required every ten years
to determine whether a change in the HPC is warranted due to upstream or
downstream changes in the watershed. If the hazard potential classification
increases, a Dam Safety Review may be required.
ii. Dams having a HPC of Moderate may be required by the Minister to have an DSR
depending upon the potential losses in the inundation zone.
iii. Dam Safety Review includes the following: collection of all available dam records,
field inspection, detailed investigations and possibly laboratory testing. It then
proceeds with a check of structural stability and operational safety of the dam,
beginning with a reappraisal of basic features and assumptions. The level of detail
required in a Dam Safety Review must commensurate with the importance and
complexity of the dam, as well as the consequence of failure.
iv. Dam Safety Review should be conducted within 3 years after initial filling. This
Review will also establish the frequency of subsequent Dam Safety Reviews.
11.1.4 Level of Detail
The level of detail in the Dam Safety Review should be sufficient to demonstrate that the
dam structure and its operation, maintenance and surveillance meet the principles of
these guidelines. The level of detail may be modified on the basis of previous
assessments, complexity of the dam, continuity of surveillance and records, external and
internal hazards, operating history, dam performance and age, and the need for public
protection during operation. If the information since the last review is complete and
continuous, the current review may be simplified.
11.2 Scope of a Dam Safety Review
The scope of a Dam Safety Review may vary from dam to dam according to the HPC
and other circumstances.
A DSR is required to demonstrate that the dam is safe, operated safely and maintained
in a safe condition, and that surveillance is adequate to detect any developing safety
problem. The review generally includes site inspection, review of all relevant
documentation, and interviews with operating and maintenance staff. If safety cannot be
demonstrated, the deficiency should be identified.
Records of any dam safety incidents since the previous review and follow‐up actions
must be reviewed. Testing of flow discharge equipment must be carried out. If the
equipment has been operated within a reasonable time frame, it need not be tested, but
records of the last operation and the performance records of the equipment must be
reviewed.
The DSR must consider and report on the following:
11.3 Dam Safety Analysis

2010 84
Safety analysis of the dam system should include the internal and external hazards,
failure modes and effects, operating reliability, dam response, and emergency scenarios.
The interaction of human factors, organization and equipment and the potential for
errors, misunderstandings or mis‐interpretations shall be examined. The design of the
dam should be reviewed to determine whether the dam, discharge facilities and reservoir
slopes meet applicable safety requirements. Although various features are reviewed
individually, the way they interact and function as a system should also be considered.
The construction and operation should be reviewed to ensure that the design intent has
been achieved. The review of the design as it relates to the present condition of the
“as‐constructed”, “as‐operated” dam should include but not be limited to the
consideration of the following, as applicable:
1. Construction records to determine how closely the as‐constructed dam conforms

to design assumptions and to establish the adequacy of dam and foundation
materials.
2. Adequacy of the derivation of extreme events, floods and earthquakes for which
the dam is designed, taking into account any extreme events that may have
occurred since the commissioning of the dam.
3. Structural stability, seepage and erosion resistance of all portions of the

constructed water barriers including their foundation, as well as any natural water
barriers under normal and extreme loading conditions, including the effects of
permafrost.
4. Spillways must be capable of discharging the design flows safely, be able to

adequately pass the inflow design flood and to draw down the reservoir if
required in an emergency.
5. Design of all gates, valves, intake flow control equipment and hoists, including
controls, power supply and winter heating criteria, to ensure timely, safe and
reliable operation. The level of reliability needed for the flood discharge facilities
depends on the repair time available between the start of an extreme flood and
overtopping of the dam should the gates not be opened. These discharge
facilities must function after an earthquake to the extent necessary to maintain
safe reservoir levels.
6. Operating rules under various conditions, and their conformance with the design
intent and criteria.
7. Adequacy of the as‐constructed facilities to deal with special phenomena

affecting safety (for example, debris, ice conditions and erosion) that may have
been insufficiently considered at the time of design and construction as well as
verification that they will function as and when required.
2010 85
8. Potential failure modes and criticality, and adequacy of design, construction and
operation features addressing these failure modes.
9. For tailings dams, design parameters such as tailings and water chemistry,
tailings characteristics, tailings beach development, discharge points, pond level
and location, and water balance.
Co‐operative agreements and agreed operational restrictions in place should be

reviewed and assessed. Owners of dams in cascade, or on parallel systems with
common areas of impact should coordinate with respect to operations, spill capacities,
emergency response and any other issue of mutual concern. In practice, this may be
difficult to achieve, particularly if there is no management plan to ensure that these dams
are managed and operated safely with consideration of the entire river regime, the
limitation and characteristics of each dam, and the areas of impacts.
11.4 Site Inspection
All Dam Safety Reviews must include a site visit so that the Review Engineer or review
team observes actual conditions of the entire dam system. The dam, dam
instrumentation, discharge facilities, outlet works, downstream areas that could be
inundated by a hypothetical dam breach, reservoir, reservoir slopes, and water
instrumentation (i.e. water level gauges upstream and downstream) should be included
in the site inspection. The inspection should note any debris accumulation upstream of
the dam and potential for debris accumulation under high inflow conditions. The general
stability of the reservoir slopes and evidence of slides or instabilities should be assessed
and noted. Depending on the area’s geology and topography, study of recent air photos
and comparison with historic photography, as well as a fly‐over inspection, may be
necessary.
If the dam is exposed to conditions other than those occurring during the site inspection,
efforts should be made to investigate the effects of these conditions by other means. For
example, in regions of extreme winters, the Review Engineer should examine records
and/or photographs of the dam’s winterized conditions and assess the winter ice
formation and loading and any associated problems. Similarly the effects of other
extreme climatic conditions should be assessed as appropriate. Reservoirs subject to
significant operational draw‐downs should be inspected with the reservoir full as well as
under drawdown conditions.
The extent of the area that should be inspected downstream of a tailings dam will
depend upon the nature of the tailings, basin characteristics and foundation conditions.
The inspection should include sampling of water quality, environmental conditions,
noting any stressed vegetation, discoloration of the ground and unnatural deposits at
regular or intermittent water courses.
Where the dam has deteriorated with age, field investigations should be carried out to
determine critical characteristics existing at the time of the review.
2010 86
11.5 Staff Responsibilities
A meeting or interview with staff responsible for the operation, maintenance and
surveillance of the dam can be beneficial in providing the Review Engineer with further
information and insight into operating and maintenance issues or incidents, on the
equipment or system issues, on the dam performance, and generally on the level of
training and knowledge of the staff. The Review Engineer should also assess the staff
familiarity with the river system, the presence of other dams on the system, their
operations and any coordination or integration issues, any public safety issues and other
stakeholder’s interests. These interviews are best done informally during the course of
the site visits and inspections. The review should address the capability and availability
of the operators assigned to the dam, to ensure that discharge facilities can be operated
in a timely manner. This review should also consider their normal hours of operation,
reaction time to the site relative to potential rate of reservoir rise under large floods,
availability of emergency power supplies, and access under all weather conditions. Any
deficiencies in training should be noted and recommendations made. If deficiencies in
operator availability are noted, consideration should be given to recommending
additional staff or to remote operation of the facilities. The reviewer should also ensure
that there is proper delegation of authority to operate the discharge facilities. The
operating authority should be reviewed, including the communication to higher
authorities. Regardless of the local lines of authority and communication facilities, the
local operators should be empowered with the authority to operate the discharge
facilities if water levels endanger the dam.
11.6 Documentation and Items to be Reviewed
11.6.1 Hazard Potential Classification
During the Dam Safety Review, the hazard potential classification of the dam failure are
to be reviewed. The primary reason that the classification could change is new
development in the flood plain downstream of the dam which would increase the
damages from dam failure or the identification of environmental or socio‐economic
losses that were previously unaccounted for. If the classification has not previously been
determined, it should be established during the Dam Safety Review.
11.6.2 Records and Data Collection and Effectiveness Monitoring
A Dam Safety Review requires an understanding of the construction methodology,

conditions and practices used for the construction of that dam. Ideally, a complete set of
records should be available for every existing dam. Record keeping should start at the
early planning stage and continue throughout all phases of the dam’s service life,
recording any relevant information on planning, field investigations, laboratory testing,
design decisions, construction and quality control, first reservoir filling, operation,
maintenance, repair, and any modernization or enlargement. The records should
include: design calculations; equipment specifications; as‐built documents; registered
data from hydrological, structural (including seismic) and operational monitoring; and all
safety inspection reports. If such records are generally available, the periodic Dam
Safety Review is facilitated. In the case of unacceptable performance, recommendations
2010 87
can be based on updated knowledge of the dam’s actual state of structural integrity,
compared to its past operational behaviour. A continuous set of design and service
records provides a reliable basis to support decisions on dam safety improvements.
Generally, the older the dam, the lower is the likelihood of finding usable documentation
on its design, construction and operation. Interviews with staff, usually retired, who have
contributed to the design and construction of the dam can be a very important source of
information. Often photos and videos either in archives, or personal files kept by retired
or current staff, can shed light and provide missing information and details on the site
construction and repairs or upgrades during its life stages.
Since the acquisition of the missing data can be expensive and time‐consuming, it
should be preceded by a careful determination of the type, amount and detail of data
actually needed to assess the structure’s safety and reach sufficiently reliable
conclusions. The first step will be a critical evaluation of the records of peak floods
available from third parties, repair accounts, old reports of dam tenders and
maintenance personnel, and other indirect information which may be obtained. A field
visit will reveal areas and items of major concern such as material deterioration,
excessive deformation, high seepage, equipment deficiencies, and others. The field visit
will also help to determine the scope and extent of specific investigation programs.
Following the site visit and review of records, a list of information gaps should be
prepared and the dam owner advised of the assumptions that must be made to fill the
gaps or the additional data that is required in order to proceed. A topographic survey can
be used as the basis for new drawings of the existing structures or to complement
available drawings. If the original design computations and material specifications are
unavailable, contemporary standards and text books may furnish some information on
design criteria and methods which most probably were used, safety factors and the
properties of then‐available materials.
Hydrological records are generally available for some periods of the dam’s operation. If
the available data are insufficient for hydrologic reassessment, correlation with records
from neighbouring drainage areas may be acceptable. Another source of information
could be precipitation records which can be used to determine runoff and flow data.
These data may serve as direct input to flow computations, or as a means to check and
calibrate correlations. Above all, careful judgment based on sound theoretical knowledge
and broad experience must be used for the analysis and correct interpretation of both
primary and secondary (indirectly obtained) data. In all cases the report must clearly
state the origin of data used in the analysis and the assumptions that have been made.
11.6.3 Previous Dam Safety Reviews
During the first dam safety review all existing data has been assembled and
supplemented with field investigation and data gathering. Design analysis has been
carried out, deficiencies identified and recommendations made for improvements. For
this reason, subsequent periodic Dam Safety Reviews can be structured more as an
audit of the previous information, ensuring that it is complete, up to-date with current
standards, that the conclusions reached and recommendations made were appropriate
and remain valid.
2010 88
Therefore, if one or more Dam Safety Reviews have been carried out in the past, the
Review Engineer should start with a review of the previous dam safety reports. Changes
in status or condition between those described in previous reports and those found by
the current review should be noted, and trends should be determined. The extent of
implementation of recommendations from previous reports should also be determined.
The Review should utilize information developed in any previous review, to the extent
that its reliability and validity can be verified.
11.7 Operation, Maintenance & Surveillance
The Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance plan(s) should be reviewed to confirm

effectiveness to meet its objectives as required by the regulation, and to confirm the
owner’s compliance with that plan.
The Dam Safety Review should determine:
1. If safe operating procedures have been developed, documented and followed,

and if contingency plans are in place which contain sections on describing
operations for low flow conditions, normal flow conditions, emergency conditions,
and unusual conditions. The adequacy of the documentation is to be reviewed.
2. If all facilities required for safety of the dam, including precipitation and water
level gauges, snow survey stations and dam monitoring instrumentation, are
maintained in satisfactory condition in accordance with the OMS Plan and any
detailed instrument manuals.
3. If the surveillance and monitoring methods and frequency are adequate to detect
any unsafe condition in a timely manner and if monitoring data has been
regularly analyzed and used to ensure prompt detection of any potentially unsafe
conditions in the dam, associated water containment and reservoir slopes.
4. If there are adequate debris management procedures to ensure that spillways

are not blocked or their discharge capacity reduced by debris.
5. Similarly, for dams in cold regions, if there are adequate ice management
procedures to ensure the spillways are not blocked by ice when they are needed
to operate (for example in early spring).
6. If the maintenance procedures and frequency of maintenance are adequate for

the dam and its components, including gates and other discharge facilities,
power supply, cranes, motors and hoists and foundation drains.
7. If there are adequate vegetation control procedures for the dams. Compliance
with the documented procedures can be assessed by audit of operation,
maintenance and surveillance records, discussions with site personnel, and by
judging the state of maintenance and site conditions during the site visit.
2010 89
8. Any instances of non-compliance with conditions of approval or plans
11.8 Flow Control Equipment Testing
The Dam Safety Review should address the testing of equipment required to operate
discharge facilities (including backup equipment and emergency power supply) that are
required for the safe passage of the inflow design flood, and any other flood that could
endanger the dam. If the discharge gates and equipment have been tested or operated
within the year, and adequate documentation is available, a review of such testing or
operation records may be adequate for the Review. Otherwise the testing can be carried
out during the Dam Safety Review. The Review should also determine:
1. If the flow control equipment is maintained in good working order and tested
regularly to ensure it would function reliably when called upon to operate.
2. If incidences of malfunction are promptly reported, investigated and addressed to

prevent recurrence.
3. If back up equipment required in the contingency plans (such as alternate power

supplies) are available and accessible within an adequate time frame.
11.9 Emergency Preparedness
Emergency Preparedness Plans and response procedures are to be reviewed. The

Review should determine if the appropriate level of emergency preparedness exists and
is adequately documented. The adequacy of warning systems, training and emergency
response plans should be reviewed, as well as the frequency of testing and the
processes in place for document control. The Review should ensure that the notification
lists are maintained and that a robust process is in place to keep it updated and
communicated to external contacts. The Review should also determine if findings and
lessons learned from incidents or from emergency drills are properly documented and
followed up within a reasonable time.
11.10 Security Requirements
Some dams, in view of their size, location, purpose and potential losses associated with
a dam failure, can be considered critical infrastructure that merit special security
measures. In carrying out the Dam Safety Review, the Review Engineer should verify
that such measures are in place and are in conformance with the requirement of the
appropriate Provincial or Federal Department or Agency responsible for infrastructure
security. The Reviewer should verify that operating equipment is secured against
vandalism or inadvertent operation by unauthorized individuals, and that the dam
management process ensures that any incident of security breach or vandalism is
reported and addressed in a timely manner.
2010 90
11.11 Public Safety Around Dams
The public safety measures at the site should be reviewed to ensure conformance with
the public safety measures plan.
11.12 Dam Safety Report
The Dam Safety Review should be documented by the Review Engineer in a formal
report with conclusions and recommendations to permit the Dam Owner to fulfill the
responsibility for dam safety and to comply with regulations. This report is to cover all
aspects of the dam’s safety and to document the review. The report should clearly detail
and quantify deficiencies in the structures, non-compliance with policies, guidelines or
standards, and any other issues requiring follow‐up, such that priorities for safety
improvement, remedial measures or additional investigations can readily be established
in the Dam Safety and Management Plan. It should also identify any additional steps
required for operation, maintenance and surveillance according to regulatory
requirements. Where past documentation was inadequate or absent, the reviewer
should report this information gap and identify where potential deficiencies may exist and
what further actions may be needed to comply with regulatory requirements.
The initial methods of analysis used in the Review, or the data available, may be
insufficient to clearly demonstrate an acceptable level of safety for the dam, discharge
facilities or reservoir slopes. If additional work is needed to evaluate and document dam
safety, the Dam Safety Review report should include recommendations for more
extensive analysis or investigations to provide adequate data for analysis.
Therefore, the essential output of the safety review is one or more of the following
conclusions that:
1. The dam clearly meets all regulatory requirements.

2. The dam clearly does not meet some regulatory requirements (list the
deficiencies or non conformances) and recommend a Dam Safety Management
Plan be prepared.
Upon completion, the DSR review engineer shall date, sign and certify this DSR Report.
It is the responsibility of the dam owner to retain a copy of the DSR report. Once
completed, the dam owner is responsible for entering the required information into the
Dam Registry indicating that the DSR has been completed.
2010 91
CHAPTER 12.0: DAM SAFETY MANAGEMENT PLANS
This chapter provides a very high level discussion of Risk Assessment. The MNR
is working with stakeholders to investigate a risk assessment process that can be
used by all dam owners to bring their dams in compliance with polices and
procedures regarding acceptable levels of risk and dam safety. The principles,
figures and graphs included within this section are for illustrational purposes only
to demonstrate the concepts being investigated. The MNR is seeking your
comments and opinions regarding the use of risk based assessment within a
provincial dam safety program.
12.1 Introduction
This Chapter is intended to give Dam Owners a basic understanding of their
responsibilities with respect to developing Dam Safety Management Plans (DSMP). The
information contained in Volume 3 (Chapter 5. Safe Management of Dams) provides
guidance on meeting regulatory requirements under the Regulation.
This Chapter has been prepared to provide a general framework of risk-informed

approach to dam safety decision making and to assist Dam Owners to better identify,
assess, and understand safety risks posed by dams, as well as the measures that can
be designed and implemented to demonstrate that these risks are not intolerable and
are as low as reasonably practicable. The normal requirements of MNR are set out in
this guide. The policy of MNR is to determine its requirements in any particular case on
the merits of that case.
This Chapter contains information pertaining to the objectives of the Dam Safety
program under the Lakes & Rivers Improvement Act, the operating principles under
which the Guidelines have been developed and the pertinent safety criteria regarding
potential loss of life, damage to property, and impact on the environment and cultural
heritage. The Guideline also addresses analytical approaches that dam owners can use
to appraise the risks posed by a particular structure.
This Chapter will assist the Dam Owner in determining how to develop a DSMP,
beginning with performing a comprehensive dam safety risk assessment and ending with
the development of a dam safety management system. The safety risk assessment
must be prepared by competent engineers and scientists and approved by the
management of the dam owning organization. This Guideline provides dam owners with
basic information about the importance of assessing risk and the types of information
that must be included in a dam safety risk assessment.
It is imperative that the DSMP have a clear objective relating to the safety of dams in
Ontario, and that this objective be supported by a similarly clear and explicit set of both
fundamental and operating principles under which the plan will work.
There is no such thing as absolute safety in any aspect of everyday life. All daily
activities, whether related to work or not, whether voluntary or not, always involve an
exposure to hazards. Since no human activity is completely free of risk, absolute
2010 92
guarantees of safety are not possible, and some risk must always be tolerated.
Furthermore, measures of reducing risk beyond a certain threshold may not be
reasonably practicable or even the desired outcome may not be in the public interest.
12.2 Terminology
Terms related to risk sometimes mean different things to different people. The concept
of risk is used in many areas of engineering, health and safety, finance, business, and
government. The literature on the subject is abundant and more comprehensive reviews
of the subject can be found in HSE (2001a), ANCOLD (2003), AS/NZ 4360 (2004),
Hartford and Baecher (2004), or ICOLD (2005).
Interpretation of the term risk differs among the different areas of application. In some
applications, risk is understood as the probability of a casualty. In business and financial
applications, risk usually means the magnitude of financial loss at a predefined level of
probability. In engineering in general, and dam safety in particular, risk refers to both
probability and consequences.
Another area of potential misunderstanding comes from terms describing various phases
of the risk management process. The terms risk analysis, risk estimation, risk
evaluation, and so forth, are sometimes used to characterize activities in the process of
managing risk, and sometimes these are used in different ways or overlap in their
meanings. Therefore, a short definition of the terms used in this Guideline is provided
below.
ALARP (As Low As A principle stating that any level of risk below the tolerability limit is
Reasonably Practicable) tolerable only if its further reduction is either impracticable or
requires grossly disproportionate sacrifice.
Acceptable Risk In general, the notion that there is some level of risk that everyone
will find acceptable is an idea not always possible to reconcile. In
real life, there are many different ways to define broadly
acceptable risk depending on different weights applied to the
views of different stakeholders. It is possible that no definition of
‘broadly acceptable’ will be suitable to all stakeholders. Successful
resolution of such issues can be achieved only through the political
process.
In this guideline broadly acceptable risk is understood as a risk
judged to be outweighed by corresponding benefits or one that is
of such a degree that it is considered to pose negligible potential
for adverse effects.
2010 93
Failure Mode A failure mode is a characterization of the way a system, a sub-

system, a component or a process fails causing a loss of function.
Hazard Threat. Condition, which may result from either an external cause
(e.g. flood) or an internal vulnerability, with the potential to initiate
a failure mode.
A source of potential harm or a situation with a potential to causing
loss or harm, in terms of human death or injury, damage to health,
property, the environment, and other things of value, or some
combination of these.
Risk to the individual Individual (fatality) risk plays a major role in the current system of
health and safety regulations. Different agencies use variations on
the ‘risk to the individual’ construct (risk to the maximally exposed
individual, to a highly exposed individual, to the median or average
individual, or to some other person). Often, risk to the individual is
understood as the probability of a specified individual dying
prematurely as a result of exposure to the hazard.
In this guideline risk to the individual is the incremental probability
of death that the hazard imposes on some particular person. This
increment of risk is in reference to the background risk to life,
which the person would live with on a daily basis if the dam did not
fail.
Intolerable Risk Risk that is so large that nobody should be exposed to this risk
and thus risk reduction should be undertaken without regard to
cost.
Likelihood Qualitative description of probability or frequency.
Probability A measure of the degree of confidence in a prediction, as dictated
by the evidence, concerning the nature of an uncertain quantity or
the occurrence of an uncertain future event. It is a numerical
estimate of the likelihood of the magnitude of the uncertain
quantity, or the likelihood of the occurrence of the uncertain future
event. This measure has a value between 0 (impossibility) and 1
(certainty).
From the practical view of assigning probability values, two major
interpretations of probability are used in engineering applications –
statistical and epistemic.
Statistical approach interprets probability as frequency or fraction
obtained from the outcome of a repetitive experiment (e.g. flipping
coins). Such a number is called an “objective” probability because
it exists in the real world and is in principle measurable by
conducting the experiment.
Epistemic—sometimes called, “subjective”—probability deals with
incomplete knowledge, and is a quantified measure of belief,
judgment or confidence in the likelihood of an outcome, obtained
by considering all available information honestly, fairly and without
bias. Such interpreted probability is affected by the state of
understanding, judgment regarding an evaluation, or the quality
and quantity of information. It may change with time as the state of
2010 94
knowledge changes.
Qualitative Risk An analysis that uses words, descriptive, or numeric rating scales
Analysis to describe the magnitude of potential consequences and the
likelihood that these consequences will occur.
Quantitative Risk An analysis that uses numerical values of the potential
Assessment consequences and likelihoods with the understanding that these
values constitute a valid representation of the actual magnitude of
consequences and probabilities.
Residual Risk The remaining level of risk at any time before, during, and
after a program of risk mitigation measures has been
taken.
Risk Measure of the probability and severity of an adverse effect to life,
property and the environment. Kaplan (1997) relates risk to the
combination of scenario, probability, and consequence.
The chance of injury or loss defined as a measure of probability
and severity of an adverse effect to life, health, property, the
environment, or other things of value.
Risk Analysis A structured process utilizing all available information to estimate
the risk to individuals, populations, property, and environment from
hazards. Risk analysis can comprise (but not be restricted to)
scope definition, hazard identification, and risk estimation.
Risk Assessment Risk assessment combines risk analysis and risk evaluation into
an overall process of identifying, measuring, and evaluating risks.
The outcome of the risk assessment is a decision recommendation
on whether existing risk is tolerable, and whether present risk
control measures are adequate, and if not, whether additional risk
control and mitigation measures are justified.
Risk Control The implementation and enforcement of actions to keep risk at a
desired level including periodic re-evaluation of the effectiveness
of these actions.
Risk Estimation Process used to assign a numerical value to a risk and its
components.
Risk Evaluation Process of judging the significance of the risk.
Risk Management Overall application of management policies, processes and
practices to the tasks of identifying, analyzing, assessing,
controlling, and monitoring risk.
Risk Mitigation A selective application of appropriate techniques and management
principles to reduce either the likelihood of occurrence of an
adverse impact, or its consequences, or both. In industries other
than hydropower, the term risk mitigation is sometimes used in the
narrower sense of reducing just consequences.
Societal Risk A measure representing the probability that an incident resulting in
multiple fatalities will occur.
Tolerable Risk A risk within a range that society can live with so as to secure
certain net benefits. It is a range of risk that we do not regard as
negligible or as something we might ignore, but rather as
2010 95
something we need to keep under review and reduce it still further

if and as we can.
12.3 The Overall Dam Safety Objective

This Guideline formulates commonly shared safety concepts with the understanding that
their implementation improves both safety and benefits to society as a whole. The
Guideline draws on the overarching objective of the dam safety legislation that can be
stated as:
The overarching objective of the dam safety legislation is to ensure

adequate safety of people, property, environment and cultural heritage.
Traditionally, dam safety practice has been standards-based, although there are aspects
of dam safety not covered by any standard. Technical guidelines and design criteria are
prescribed in codes, guidelines, and manuals of good practice, and these must be met
by the facility. In this respect, dam safety has been no different than other technological
health and safety activities, which call for the safe construction, operation, and
maintenance of hazardous installations by adhering to prescribed regulations, or in the
absence of such, by adhering to recognized practices.
This standards-based approach is vague on establishing safety goals and defining the
meaning of, adequate safety. Thus, specific methods, models, procedures, and
standards are developed and imposed in an attempt to achieve safety. A fundamental
assumption behind this approach is that following prescribed requirements will achieve
the desired result. However, the desired result itself is not explicitly defined, which
means that the level of protection provided is unknown. Also, the provided level of
protection may be inconsistent among different dams even when using the same
standards, and there are no recognized standards for some aspects of safety, such as
protection against piping in embankments lacking filters, and regarding the reliability of
spillway gates.
Risk assessment is a systematic method of characterizing fundamental aspects of dam
safety; specifically:
1. What can go wrong?
2. What is the likelihood (probability) of this occurring?
3. What are the consequences if it occurs
The goal of risk assessment is to ensure that analysis and assessment efforts are
focused on those aspects of a structure and its operation that are the most risk
significant, and that a consistent and coherent decision-making framework is in place.
The key element in formulating a performance-based approach is to identify how a
quantifiable outcome can be defined in order to demonstrate that required levels of
safety are met. Risk, understood as a metric characterizing the likelihood of an
undesired event and its potential consequence, is a suitable candidate for the
2010 96
performance goal, because dam safety management, like virtually all safety
management, is ultimately concerned with the management of risk.
12.4 Objective of the Dam Safety Management Plan

For the purpose of developing specific Dam Safety Management Plans, these
Guidelines translate the overarching objective into the following DSMP objective:
The objective of the Dam Safety Management Plan is to ensure that

dams in Ontario meet an acceptable level of safety. The compliance
with this goal is achieved when it can be demonstrated that the dam
pose a tolerable risk to public safety, property, the environment, or
cultural heritage with the intent to move the level of risk toward
acceptable levels in a process of continuous safety improvement.
The concepts of intolerable, tolerable and acceptable risk are defined within the context
of risk criteria, below, in Section 12.5.
12.4.1 What Must Dam Owners Do To Meet The DSMP Objective?

The dam owner needs to demonstrate to the Ministry of Natural Resources that both the
volume of water stored behind the dam and the flows through and around the dam
remain under control and within specified limits at all times. It is imperative that this be
achieved without imposing unreasonable restrictions on the operations of the dam that
themselves create the benefit of taking the dam safety risks.
To meet the objective the following aspects must be in place:
1. Control of releases resulting from misoperation that could otherwise cause
damages downstream.
2. Restraint on the probability of events that may lead to the loss of control over
stored volumes or discharges.
3. Readiness of mitigative measures to reduce or eliminate adverse consequences
of loss of control.
12.4.2 Types of Dams Requiring a Dam Safety Management Plan

The Ministry of Natural Resources requires that, for an existing dam, if the dam owner
cannot demonstrate compliance with the current dam safety criteria, as defined in
Volume 3, the dam owner must either:
1. Design and implement measures to ensure that the dam does meet those
criteria; or
2. Provide a Dam Safety Management Plan (DSMP) as a means of demonstrating
that the dam, as far as is reasonably practicable, is safe and poses tolerable risk
to people, property, environment, or cultural heritage.
Therefore, the DSMP constitutes an alternative for these dam owners whose dams do
not meet current standards but who are capable of conducting an assessment of dam
2010 97
safety risks and of implementing risk reduction measures to ensure that a dam does
meet risk tolerability criteria.
12.4.3 What Impacts of Dam Safety Must be Included?

The Ministry of Natural Resources has interpreted the Lakes & Rivers Improvement Act
as including four categories of impact that must be considered in analyzing dam safety
and the potential consequences of adverse performance of a dam.
1. Potential loss of life of people residing downstream of a dam, transiently
occupying the flood plain, or in the employ of the dam owner.
2. Destruction of or damage to physical and real property other than the dam itself.
3. Adverse impacts upon the natural environment.
4. Adverse impacts upon cultural and historical resources.
12.4.4 Roles & Responsibilities

The dam owner as an entity responsible for the safety of a dam must ensure that the
safety analysis conducted for the Dam Safety Management Plan is reliable. The owner
should maintain adequate capability to perform or procure safety analysis. The owner
should establish a formal process to periodically assess and update safety analysis in
order to account for emerging operational and new identified safety issues. The owner
should develop and implement a formal quality assurance process for conducting safety
analysis.
Although the regulatory interest in dam safety issues is restricted to risks to life, third
party property, the environment and cultural heritage, the owner is encouraged to
consider the overall safety level relevant to its business and asset risk management
(business responsibility to stakeholders, consumers, and to the community).
The owner may either conduct safety analysis using in-house resources or retain a
qualified consultant. Safety analysis as an essential element of safety assessment is an
engineering and analytical study intended to demonstrate how safety requirements are
met for the entire extent of operating conditions and all possible dam failure initiating
events. The analyst has to have a specialized knowledge which encompasses both risk
analysis methodology and dam engineering.
The regulator sets the requirements for protection of the public, property, and the
environment. These requirements are expressed through a set of tolerable risk criteria.
The regulator has to review the Dam Safety Management Plan and be satisfied that:
1. The dam owner has performed adequate safety assessment of the dam and
identified appropriate measures to control risks, and
2. The dam owner has developed adequate management systems ensuring that
these measures will be implemented and maintained.
2010 98
12.4.5 Benefits and Challenges of Risk Analysis for Dam Safety

Although formal risk assessment and management has a relatively short history of
successful applications (as compared to the field of dam engineering more generally), it
is gradually becoming accepted as the state-of-the-art approach to analyzing the safety
of engineering systems in hazardous industries. It has also become an important new
science for various fields of technology, economics, and politics. The general
methodology of the risk-informed approach has sound foundations but successful
applications are hampered by the difficulties of characterizing, measuring and assessing
uncertainty in performing the analysis of risk. Risk analysis for dams is challenging
because of the uncertainty in estimating the probabilities of various events contributing
to the dam failure and the estimation of consequences to life safety, property damage,
and the environment and cultural heritage, providing the failure occurs. Loss of life
estimation poses a difficult problem and adds another probabilistic dimension to the
estimation process.
Cost of studies necessary to conduct the risk assessment and availability of qualified
analysts and experts pose another challenge. However, this will become less significant
with time.
Potential benefits from applying the risk-informed approach can be substantial. The most
important benefit is linked to the major challenge—uncertainty in estimation of
consequences and failure probabilities. The risk-informed approach allows for explicit
and transparent identification of uncertainty at all stages of analysis. The traditional
approach has always been conscious of uncertainty but lacked the means to address
the problem directly and usually resorted to intuitive and informal accounting. This is
significantly different from a risk-informed approach which seeks the sources of
uncertainty at all stages of analysis and decision-making, seeks to characterize and
quantify them to the extent possible, and seeks to quantify the degree of confidence in
the results.
Another benefit arises from the comprehensiveness of the risk-informed approach. Risk
analysis requires identification of all hazards and potential failure modes under all
possible loading conditions. Such an approach provides an improved understanding of
the dam and its performance, and identifies important risk contributors and the dam
vulnerabilities. Importantly, risk analysis provides a means of assessing aspects not
covered by the traditional standards, such as the vulnerability to piping (internal erosion)
of embankment dams, the reliability of spillway gates, the influence of human factors,
and the role of interventions aimed at preventing failure.
Lastly, the risk-informed approach provides a consistent and transparent basis for
setting public safety policy goals. Traditional engineering design standards have never
established consistent and transparent margins on safety. The risk-informed approach
provides a common metric for these margins and moves the task of establishing safety
goals to the public safety policy arena where it properly belongs.
12.5 Fundamental and Operating Principles

The fundamental principles, from which the Dam Safety Management Plan is defined,
include the following:
2010 99
1. The dam owner is responsible for the safety of a dam, and for taking the steps
necessary to comply with safety requirements.
The dam owner is in full charge of the structure and has both responsibility and
authority for approved operation in order to conduct business activity. Since the
operation also affects the safety of the dam, the owner has to establish a policy
of following safety requirements, establishing procedures for safe control and
operation of the dam in all circumstances and under all conditions, and ensuring
that it has fully trained and competent staff. All responsibilities at all
organizational levels have to be defined and documented.
2. Effective leadership and management of safety must be established and
sustained in the dam owner’s organization responsible for risk management.
The dam owner has to ensure that there is an established safety culture that
governs the actions and interactions throughout the entire organizational
structure. Safety culture should be established by formulating requirements at
policy levels, all levels of management, and for individuals. Safety has to be
achieved and maintained through implementation of an effective management
system, capable of integrating all elements of management, and ensuring that
safety is not compromised by other demands or requirements.
3. Safety measures have to provide the highest level of safety that is reasonably
practicable.
Safety measures required to be provided by the dam owner have to provide the
highest level of protection that can be reasonably achieved throughout the life
cycle of the dam, without placing an unreasonable burden on society or the dam
owner. Risks should be periodically reassessed throughout the lifetime of the
structure.
4. Risk to individuals and societal risk must be tolerable.
5. All reasonably practicable steps must be taken to prevent dam failure and
misoperation incidents.
Likelihood of the events leading to adverse consequences can be controlled and

lowered by implementing measures (1) preventing the occurrence of failures or
misoperation, and (2) preventing the escalation of undesired events when they
occur. This principle can be implemented through a combination of multiple
levels of protection ensuring that no single human, technical, or organizational
failure that could lead to harmful effects remains at a relatively high level of
probability.
6. Adequate arrangements must be made for emergency preparedness and

response in the case of dam failure or misoperation.
Adverse effects of a dam failure or misoperation can be reduced or avoided if

adequate arrangements are in place ensuring effective response. These
arrangements should ensure that for reasonably foreseeable incidents the
consequences are minor and that for any other incidents or failures, there are
practicable measures available to reduce consequences.
2010 100
A Dam Safety Management Plan based on these fundamental principles can be further
developed by inclusion of the following more detailed operating principles:
1. A dam owner may demonstrate compliance with safety requirements either by
conformance to MNR prescribed safety standards, or by establishing that the
risks posed by a dam conforms to Ministry of Natural Resources quantitative risk
guidelines, and are thus consistent with the above objective of the DSMP. Risk
analysis must include all hazards and modes of failure of the dam as identified in
a failures modes and effects analysis, because risk to the individual and societal
risk are defined with respect to all hazards and failure modes.
2. If the risk posed by a dam is intolerable as per the MNR risk criteria, the
immediate task of the dam owner is to reduce the level of risk to one that is
below the intolerable zone.
3. In managing risks, the ALARP principle is the fundamental concept within the
tolerable zone, to determine the level of risk reduction that is needed.
4. Within the tolerable zone, the onus will be on the dam owner to demonstrate to
the regulator that risks are ALARP.
5. Within the acceptable zone, ALARP risk reduction decisions rest solely with the
dam owner.
Other considerations that need to inform the fundamental principles may include the
observation that, the overarching goal of the DSMP is to have safe dams, but there is no
such thing as absolute safety. The prime responsibility for dam safety resides with the
dam owner, and as a result effective leadership and dam safety management must be
both established and then sustained in the owner’s organization.
If the set of operating principles is well defined, the general regulatory approach can be
restricted to setting the objective to be achieved. Dam owners then have considerable
margin in choosing options resulting in the regulatory objectives being met in an efficient
and effective manner.
12.6 Risk Assessment

A risk assessment combines the identification of potential risks, estimation of the
likelihood that the public is exposed to adverse consequences of these hazards, and
prediction of the consequences should the hazard be realized. The process provides a
systematic means of documenting the rationale for instituting operating procedures,
installing physical improvement measures, and other components of the Dam Safety
Management Plan.
The general framework of risk assessment process carried out for the purpose of the
DSMP development is illustrated on the diagram below (Figure 3-B).
2010 101
Figure 3-B Risk Management Overview
2010 102
12.7 Risk Criteria

Dam safety management is the management of risks associated with dams. The goal of
dam safety management is to ensure that all dams present a consistent level of risk to
the population, and that such risk is as low as reasonably practicable. The following four
criteria areas must be included in a dam safety risk assessment:
1. Loss of life
2. Economic consequences to the public and other stakeholders (but not the dam
owner)
3. Environmental impacts
4. Social and cultural impacts
Review of international practices in risk criteria for dams and other critical civil works,
including current and proposed practices in Europe, Australia, and the US, leads to the
following criteria. A summary of these reviews and justification of the criteria is presented
in bulletins associated with these guidelines.
12.7.1 Potential loss of life

Societal risk criteria with respect to life safety are most commonly expressed as either
single or multiple anchor points or as lines on a diagram of numbers of fatalities (N) vs.
annual exceedance probability (F), commonly referred to as F-N diagrams.
Typically, if criteria are defined on F-N diagrams, they form three separate areas of risk:
an upper area where risks are deemed to be intolerable or unacceptable, a lower area
where the risks are deemed to be broadly acceptable (negligible), and the area in
between where risks are deemed to be tolerable given the benefits accruing from the
dam, but providing that the risks have been reduced to a level as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP).
Recommended criteria for loss of life risks for existing dams are given in Figure 3-C.
These criteria are “broadly” consistent with published societal risk criteria of jurisdictions
that have adopted FN-curve criteria for hazardous facilities. “Where safety is judged by
reference to the […] public safety risk guidelines, the […] requirement for the long-term
is that societal risk be below the limit of tolerability shown at the above quoted figure to
the extent dictated by the ALARP principle. For societal risk, […] a negligible level [is
adopted], which is two orders lower than (one hundredth of) the limit of tolerability [,,,]”
(NSW, 2006). The Dam Safety Risk Analysis must include consideration of the potential
for loss of life both downstream of the dam and at the site of the dam.
12.7.2 Damage to physical and real property

The risk criteria for direct economic losses to downstream riparians and stakeholders
(but excluding economic costs to the dam owner) are structured as for societal loss-of-
life risk. That is, they are established on an F-N diagram (Figure 12-3) in which direct
economic loss is graphed along the horizontal axis and annual exceedance probability is
graphed along the vertical axis.
2010 103
Probability of dam failure per year with anticipated N or more 1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
fatalities
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
N, Number of fatalities
Figure 3C Societal Risk Requirements for Existing Dams
2010 104
1.E-01
Probability of Economic Loss equal to or higher than [per year]
1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
1 10 100 1000 10000
Economic Loss [Million $}
Figure 3-D Economic Risk Requirements for Existing Dams
2010 105
1.E+00
Probability of Impact equal to or higher than [per year]
1.E-01
1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
Low Significant High
Environmental and Cultural Impact
Figure 3-E Environmental and Cultural Heritage Risk Requirements for Existing
Dams
The boundaries separating intolerable, tolerable, and acceptable economic risks have a
slope of -1 on the log-log graph. The rationale for scaling these boundaries on the F-N
Diagram is to pin the lines to an anchor point, shown as the small square at a cost of
one billion dollars and a probability of 1:100,000 per year for the tolerability limit. This
represents the approximate largest potential consequence posed by any dam currently
in operation in the Province of Ontario, plotted against the average rate of failure for all
well-engineered dams worldwide. The boundary for acceptable risk is taken, as for
potential loss of life, to be 100-times lower.
12.7.3 Impact on the natural environment, and on cultural and historical resources
The risk criteria for environmental and cultural heritages losses are again structured as
for societal loss-of-life risk and direct economic loss. That is, they are established on an
F-N diagram in which direct environmental or cultural loss is graphed along the
horizontal axis and annual exceedance probability is graphed along the vertical axis.
The rationale for scaling these boundaries on the F-N Diagram is to pin the boundaries
to anchor point values for loss of life and direct economic loss. The principle distinction
between environmental and cultural heritages losses compared to loss of life and direct
2010 106
economic loss is that the impacts are usually expressed qualitatively as scenarios, and
evaluated by judgment.
12.4.4 As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)

The concept of ALARP was explicitly formulated for the first time as a result of a court
case (Edwards vs. The National Coal Board) in United Kingdom, in 1949. The court
“established that a computation must be made in which the quantum of risk is placed in
one scale and the sacrifice, whether in money, time or trouble, involved in the
measures necessary to avert the risk is placed in the other; and that, if it be shown that
there is a gross disproportion between them, the risk being insignificant in relation to the
sacrifice, the person on whom the duty is laid discharges the burden of proving that
compliance was not reasonably practicable,”
What is expected of a dam owner in reducing risks to a level as-low-as-reasonably-

practicable? Risk must be weighed against the measures necessary to reduce it. The
notion of reasonably practicable implies a calculation in which the reduction of risk is
balanced against the cost of the measures necessary for reducing that risk, whether in
money, time, or difficulty. If it is shown that there is a gross disproportion between the
cost of risk reduction on the one side and the magnitude of reduction of risk on the other,
then the risk is deemed to be as-low-as-reasonably-practicable.
Determining that risks have been reduced ALARP involves an assessment of the risk to
be avoided, of the sacrifice involved in taking measures to avoid that risk, and a
comparison of the two. This process can involve varying degrees of detail depending on
the nature of the hazard, the extent of the risk and the control measures to be adopted.
The more systematic the approach, the more rigorous and transparent it is to both the
regulator and to other stakeholders. The greater the initial level of risk under
consideration, the greater the degree of analysis required of the arguments purporting to
show that risks have been reduced to as-low-as-reasonably-practicable.
12.8 Risk Analysis Approach

Best practices from international sources should be brought together to develop the
analytical architecture for analyzing risk and uncertainty in evaluating dam safety. The
guidance here provides an overview of the risk analysis approach but does not attempt
to summarize mathematical models and methods. These models and methods are
available in a number of textbooks, guidance documents, and reports (e.g., ANCOLD
2003, Bedford and Cooke 2001, Hartford and Baecher 2004, USBR 2003).
What is Risk Analysis for Dam Safety?

A risk-based dam safety management process is an alternative approach to the
traditional dam safety management process of applying prescribed standards in that the
fundamental components of surveillance, periodic safety reviews, and operation and
maintenance procedures, are central to the procedure. Dam safety is achieved through
an integrated process that provides explicit recognition and analysis of risk, formal
treatment of uncertainties, and a defined risk evaluation leading to risk assessment
processes, which together permit informed decision-making to manage risk.
2010 107
Products and Outcomes of a Risk Analysis

The goal of the proposed effort is to build upon the existing background to develop a
safety case approach. A safety case is “a documented body of evidence that provides a
convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given application in
a given environment” (Bishop and Bloomfield 2007). The safety case for a particular
dam is created by establishing an explicit set of claims about the dam, producing
evidence to support those claims, developing a set of safety arguments that tie the
claims to the evidence, making assumptions and judgments transparent to reviewers,
and allowing different viewpoints and levels of detail to inform the analysis. The safety
case approach is the obvious outgrowth of the current state of practice in dam safety risk
assessment, and is consistent with regulatory directions for hazardous facilities in a
variety of jurisdictions.
The risk analysis process upon which a safety case is based involves the following
activities:
1. Scope definition and selection of analysis methods
2. Hazard identification and definition
3. Assignment of probability of dam failure.
4. Estimation of consequences of dam failure
5. Risk estimation
6. Risk evaluation
7. Risk assessment
8. Documentation, verification, and review and revision
These activities can be carried out using an iterative approach with increasingly detailed
levels of analysis.
Scope definition and selection of analysis methods

The scope of the risk analysis should be defined and documented in the safety case
plan at the start of a project. This will include a thorough familiarization with the dam and
the various sub-systems that make up the dam system under consideration.
Once the scope of the risk analysis has been defined, the initial level of effort should be
selected based on the role of the analysis in the decision-making process, objectives of
the study, type of dam system and hazards being analyzed, level of risk involved,
personnel, level of expertise and resource availability, and information and data
requirements and availability.
Hazard identification and definition

The hazards and loading conditions that generate risk require identification. Risk
analyses for dams can be categorized by the nature of the hazard leading to the
consequences of concern. Known hazards such as floods, earthquakes, and
vulnerability to piping (internal erosion) should be identified. To identify unknown
2010 108
hazards, formal methods provide a structure for asking questions requiring foresight so
that a system is fully analyzed.
Failure mode identification is an essential step in the risk estimation process as it lays
the foundation on which the remainder of the study is built. The extent to which failure
modes are defined may depend on the level of the analysis. Failure mode identification
can be performed as part of, or as a precursor to, a failure modes and effects analysis.
Assigned probability of dam failure

Depending on the decision needs, the dam response analysis can take various forms
including qualitative failure modes and effects analysis, various levels of event tree and
fault tree analyses, or detailed quantitative analyses with formal treatment of uncertainty.
These methods are presented in detail in the scientific and technical literature (see, e.g.,
Bedford and Cooke 2001, USBR 2003, Hartford and Baecher 2004, ICOLD 2005).
Dam response analysis involves modeling the response of the dam to the full ranges of
loads due to hazards and operating conditions. The first stage of this process involves
selection or development of a suitable model and identification of data requirements.
The second stage involves providing input data and running the model for the various
conditions under consideration.
The assigned annual exceedance probabilities based on the Hazard Potential

Classification (HPC) of the dam and the corresponding maximum Inflow Design Flood
(IDF) for each of the classifications are provided in Table 3-12. These annual
exceedance probabilities are to be used for the purposes risk assessment.
Hazard Potential Inflow Design Floods Annual Exceedence

Classification (maximum in each classification) Probability (AEP)
AEP is 10-6
Very High PMF
Table 3-12: Annual Exceedance Probabilities For Risk Assessment
2010 109
AEP is 10-4
High 50% between the 100 year flood and PMF
AEP is 10-3
Moderate 1 in 1000 year flood of RF, whichever is greater
AEP is 10-2
Low 1 in 100 Year Flood
Estimation of consequences of dam failure

Consequence analysis involves estimating the impacts of the failure or incident. The
consequence analysis should provide a clear picture of what emergency response
personnel would be faced with, should the failure occur, as well as a picture of the long
term effects of the failure. Consequence analysis consists of identification of potential
losses and loss magnitude estimation. In some cases it may be necessary to describe
the estimate of consequences probabilistically and account for temporal variation in the
characteristics of the inundated area.
Risk Estimation
Depending on the scope of the analysis, the output from a risk analysis for a dam will
provide descriptions of the risk in one, some, or all of the following: risk to the individual
to life, societal risk to life, property risk, occupational risk to workers, environmental risk,
and social heritage risk.
In quantitative analyses, risk and how it accumulates can be represented in a

summarized event tree based on condensed versions of the dam failure and failure
consequences event trees. Risk is estimated by combining the (usually annualized)
probabilities of failure-initiating events obtained from the hazard analyses with the
probabilities (usually conditional) of dam failure obtained from the dam response
analyses, and the magnitudes of consequences and their associated probability
distributions from the consequence analysis phase.
Risk Evaluation
Risk evaluation compares the risks estimated for a particular dam with risk acceptance
criteria. These acceptance criteria are a political and regulatory decision, and are
discussed in more specific detail in Criteria for loss-of-life, economic, and environmental
and cultural heritage impacts, Bulletin 1 of this DSMP Guideline.
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment addresses the question, is the dam safe enough for the time being?
This question is discussed in more specific detail in Criteria for loss-of-life, economic,
and environmental and cultural heritage impacts, Bulletin 1 of this DSMP Guideline; and
in ALARP principles and demonstration, Bulletin 3 of this DSMP Guideline.
2010 110
Documentation, Verification, and Review and Revision

At each level, a risk analysis should be documented and verified to an appropriate level
of detail to facilitate subsequent review and revisions.
12.9 Demonstration of Safety Through Integrated Risk Management

System
In order to provide sufficient assurance that a dam meets all necessary safety
requirements, the dam owner has to demonstrate that:
1. Adequate risk assessment has been performed (all hazards with the potential to
cause dam failure have been identified, relevant risks analyzed and evaluated)
and measures to reduce these risks to the level as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP) identified.
2. Adequate and effective safety management system is in place ensuring
compliance with all relevant safety requirements and ensuring that all identified
risk reduction measures have been implemented and maintained.
3. Adequate arrangements have been made for audit of the safety management
system and for audit reporting.
Demonstration of adequacy can be provided by the submission of a Safety Management

System describing a systematic and structured process by the dam owner that provides
assurance, through comprehensive evidence and argument, that the dam can be
operated and maintained in a safe manner.
A key condition in developing a Safety Management System is the requirement that the
owner has in place or is planning to implement a corporate plan for safety. The corporate
safety management system is a systematic and explicit approach to managing all
corporate risks. It also defines how the corporation intends to manage safety within its
overall business goals.
Detailed description of principles and fundamentals of safety management systems can

be found in Cole et al. (2004), HSE (2003), HSE (2005), HSE (2006), Railways (Safety
Case) Regulations (2000), National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (2004).
Safety Demonstration for a Dam

The Safety Demonstration for a dam is subordinate to the corporate Safety Management
System that addresses all aspects of corporate safety and provides foundation for
ensuring all aspects of safety of the dam system. A Safety Demonstration is essentially
a detailed document prepared by the dam owner that outlines the types of studies
undertaken, the results obtained, the measures taken or planned, to eliminate or reduce
the identified risks, and all relevant management arrangements. The purpose of the
Safety Demonstration is to explain:
1. What are the risks posed by the dam and how they were assessed?
2. What the dam owner does to manage these risks.
3. Who manages the risks, how are they managed and when.
2010 111
4. How the dam owner knows that they are managed and how corrective actions
are taken if they are not managed.
5. Why this arrangement is adequate and sufficient.
It is evident that this description is in fact a sophisticated and comprehensive integrated

risk management system and can be perceived as a management approach based on a
rigorous framework provided by the Safety Management System.
A Safety Demonstration must provide a true reflection of the state of all safety
arrangements. It must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the regulatory body that the
owner is aware what hazards and threats may or will occur, how they can be managed,
and how safety will be assured in the event of the hazards and threats materializing. It
must also identify methods and means of monitoring and reviewing all activities related
to the dam safety.
At a detailed level, the Safety Demonstration consists of a number of statements

claiming that specific safety requirements are met. These claims have to be supported
by arguments and evidence demonstrating compliance with safety requirements.
Evidence can be factual or be based on scientifically valid methodologies which reflect
current technical knowledge and is supported by experience.
The common features of Safety Demonstration regimes, as applied in other industries

operating hazardous installations are:
1. The Safety Demonstration must be developed and submitted by the dam owner.
The underlying principle here is that those who create the risk must manage it.
The dam owner has to identify hazards, assess the risks and develop the
strategy how to deal with them. The owner has the knowledge and the means to
manage the dam, analyze what can go wrong and identify and implement
appropriate controls. The role of the regulator is to challenge both the analysis
and the proposed solutions.
2. The Safety Demonstration must identify technical and managerial safety aspects
of the dam. The importance here is in the necessity of identifying the critical
technical and managerial aspects of safety. A safety case which disregards this
requirement is almost always flawed.
3. Appropriate performance standards must be defined for the operation of critical
safety aspects. A performance standard can be either prescriptive or goal
setting: It is a statement, either qualitative or quantitative, defining the
performance required from a system, sub-system, or component; or a person or
a procedure. The performance standard underpins the Safety Case and the
entire risk management system by providing a means to assess and measure the
performance of both technical and managerial components of the safety system.
The number and level of detail of performance standards should be
commensurate with the magnitude of the risks being managed.
4. All levels of managements and the workforce must be involved.
5. The Safety Demonstration is developed with the underlying assumption that it will
be examined by a competent and independent regulator who may prohibit
continuing operation of the dam if there are significant deficiencies in the case.
2010 112
The dam owner is responsible for the safety of the dam; the role of the regulator
is to see that the owner discharges that responsibility.
Safety Management System

The Safety Management System (SMS) is the method by which safety of the dam is
managed. This statement may imply that the SMS is simply a comprehensive set of
policies and procedures. What transforms a set into a system in this case is the way the
procedures are interlinked and linked with the risks that it is supposed to manage. Thus,
the SMS can be perceived as a tool applied to reduction of identified risks and at the
same time a tool ensuring that these risks remain ALARP at all times.
The starting point for the development of an SMS is the definition of policy and
objectives of the system. The policies should set a clear direction to follow in achieving
the safety goals.
The next step involves planning. In this step the objectives and targets are set, plans for
implementation are developed and performance standards are defined. Comprehensive
risk assessment of the dam system is the element of the planning step that would
precede the implementation planning. This step also includes determination of resources
required to achieve the objectives.
Implementation step is designed to put in place an effective management structure and

system of procedures that ensure that the policy is realized.
Monitoring and evaluation provides the information of how effective is the management
system in managing the risks. As performance of the system can be measured against
the performance standards established in the planning step, any deficiencies can be
identified and the required improvements can be designed and implemented.
Audit and review step provides a systematic review of performance based on information
collected in the previous step with additional data provided by independent audits.
Performance can then be assessed not only against the standards set in the planning
step, but can also be compared with external practice.
Results of audit and review are used to improve the management system by adjusting
the policies and processes. The diagram illustrating a generic SMS is provided on Figure
3-F.
2010 113
Figure 3-F Steps of a Safety Management System
12.10 Reporting and Documentation

The Safety Management System report should include at least the following parts:
1. A description of the dam system under consideration in the DSMP.

2. A detailed description of the risk assessment for the dam system.
3. A detailed description of the safety management system.
The description of the facility must give details of:

1. The layout of the dam site.
2. The technical and other control measures identified as a result of the dam safety
assessment.
3. Activities that will, or are likely to, take place at, or in connection with, the dam
system.
4. Any other matters that may be relevant to dam safety.
The risk assessment is an assessment or series of assessments, conducted by the dam

owner that:
1. Identifies all hazards having the potential to cause the failure of the dam.
2. Constitutes a detailed and systematic assessment of the risk associated with
each of those hazards.
3. Identifies the technical and other control measures that are necessary to reduce
that risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
2010 114
ALARP demonstration should address full range of considerations (e.g. engineering

design, competency of personnel, integration of management system, etc.). The
identification of technical and other control measures that are necessary to reduce the
risk to a level that is ALARP should include discussion of the control measures selected
(including how they contribute to reducing the risk) and those considered and rejected,
and the reasons for not adopting these controls. This aspect is best covered early in the
process so that reasons for acceptance and rejection are explicit and documented—for
example, as part of the hazard identification process. In relation to technical control
measures, the safety case should include sufficient detail to describe the circumstances
in which these will be effective, including any associated limitations.
The Safety Management System report should include sufficient detail to be considered
a stand-alone document. The summary of a risk study within the formal safety case
should include:
1. Details of personnel involved in the risk study, clearly demonstrating competence

of the risk analysts, involvement by members of the workforce (where
appropriate) and involvement of personnel with experience and knowledge
relevant to the issues analyzed.
2. A description of the major outcomes of the risk studies, including identification of

hazards with the potential to lead to dam failure, control measures considered
and rejected or adopted, and major recommendations and outstanding action
items associated with safety critical issues (risk controls) with responsibilities and
timeframes for completion clearly assigned.
The Safety Management System report for a facility must contain the following
components:
1. Comprehensive and integrated framework.
2. Provision for all activities that will, or are likely to, take place at, or in connection
with, the dam system.
3. Provision for the continuing and systematic identification of hazards that can lead
to the dam failure.
4. Provision for the continuing and systematic assessment of the likelihood of the
occurrence of adverse consequences with those hazards.
5. Provision for the reduction to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable of
risks to health and safety of persons, property and environment that can
potentially be affected in case of the dam failure.
6. Provision for adequate inspection, testing and maintenance of the equipment and
hardware that are the physical control measures for those risks.
7. Provision for adequate surveillance and monitoring.
8. Provision for any other matter that is necessary to ensure that the safety
management system meets the requirements and objective of the DSMP.
9. Specification of the performance standards that apply.
10. Means of ensuring that the safety management system is or will be implemented.
2010 115
11. Means of ensuring continuing and systematic identification of deficiencies in the

safety management system.
12. Means of ensuring continuing and systematic improvement of the safety
management system.
2010 116
CHAPTER 13.0: DAM REGISTRY

13.1 Purpose of the Dam Registry System (DRS)
The Dam Registry System (DRS) will be used as a tool to help MNR assess the
implementation of provincial dam safety requirements and to provide the data for
continuous improvements. Dam owners subject to provincial requirements must provide
owner and dam related information to the DRS. The DRS will also retain information
regarding safe dam management and emergency preparedness of dams in Ontario.
13.1.1 Emergency Management
MNR requires a comprehensive inventory and status of dams to assist in regulated

dams being maintained to acceptable standards and to provide information to assist in
responding when confronted with an emergency at or in the vicinity of a dam.
Emergency response teams also require dam owner/operator information to enable
timely response to a rescue of a public safety around dams incident or dam failure.
13.1.2 Government Transparency
The DRS provides dam owners with a secure process to register their dams and with
pertinent information on their regulatory compliance. The DRS provides information
regarding regulatory compliance to provide for the safe management and status of
dams.
13.1.3 Dam Safety Regulation Enforcement
The DRS enables MNR to;
1. create an inventory of regulated dams in the province

2. establish a record for dam safety planning and monitoring by compiling
information as defined in the regulation
3. report on the status and pursue enforcement of issues related to non-
compliance
13.2 Dam Safety Program Measures
The DRS will enable the MNR to report on the effectiveness of the Dam Safety Program
by providing a means for dam owners to record incidents related to any dam failure,
incorrect operation, death or serious injury requiring medical assistance occurring at the
dam site or area identified as hazardous in the Public Safety Measures Plan.
Statistical information on incidents will be used to track trends in consequences

as an indicator to successful implementation.
13.3 Access to the DRS
2010 117
Access to the Dam Registry System is password protected. The site is maintained by
MNR and the database rests on a secure MNR website. Dam owners will be provided
with a password to allow them to access the Registry and input data for their dams only.
Only the MNR will have the ability to alter the database. Unauthorized access will not be
permitted. In addition, dam owners will have access only to their database.
13.4 Dam Owner
The dam owner is considered to be the corporate body that owns the dam. Where a
private individual owns a dam, the owner is the individual
The dam owner may have representatives called “responsible parities” or those
agents/individuals acting on behalf of the dam owner to register the dam and to provide
the necessary dam registry information. Only the dam owner and responsible parties will
be allowed direct access to the DRS via a username and password.
13.5 Others
It is the intent of the MNR to provide public information regarding the status of Ontario’s
dams. This would be done in the form of a routine report provided to the public or others
by the regulator. Information provided in such reports must conform to legislation and
polices such as FIPPA.
13.6 Request an Account
All regulated dam owners and those who are required to provide incident records must
request a user name and password from the DRS administrator who resides within the
xxxxx Section of the MNR.
This process is established to ensure a secure system that only allows dam owners and
MNR as the regulator to obtain an account to access the DRS.
13.6.1 Account Request Form
A form is available from the DRS Administrator to request an account. The form may be
obtained form the website: www.xxx.xx . If internet access is not available, contact the
DRS administrator and the form can be mailed or sent to you. The form must be
completed in its entirety and returned to the DRS administrator. The DRS Administrator
may contact the dam owner to verify the provided information.
13.6.2 Account
Once the DRS Administrator has verified your request, your account that includes your
user name and password will be issued to you. Your user name will be issued to you
2010 118
according to the preference indicated on your request form (e-mail, mail, or fax). For
security reasons your password will be issued by phone to the name and telephone
number within the application.
13.6.3 User Name and Password
Your password may be changed after you have logged in to the DRS. Changing your
password is highly recommended. If you have forgotten your user name and password
you will need to contact the DSR Administrator.
2010 119
CHAPTER 14.0: LOCATION APPROVAL

14.1 General
As part of satisfying the purposes of the LRIA, and consistent with the principles guiding
the location, design, and review of dams and reservoirs, applicants must gather and
consider representative baseline data and information on pre-project conditions which
relates to the interests and values identified in this chapter, as a basis for formulating
operating criteria (see Chapter 9), and formulating and evaluating options for mitigating
adverse effects associated with the location, construction and operation of a dam and
reservoir. In some instances, the development of a new facility will be subject to the
requirements of the Environmental Assessment Act (e.g. MNR’s Resource Stewardship
and Facility Development Class EA, Electricity Projects Regulation). Where an EA
process is required to be followed, the appropriate requirements of the Lakes and Rivers
Improvement Act must be incorporated into the EA process. A coordinated approach
involving all key interests will best serve the needs of regulatory authorities, the applicant
and the public. Refer back to Volume 1 for more information on the Location Approval
process.
Representative baseline data and information is needed to identify and inform applicants
and MNR of the expected effects (impacts and benefits associated with the purposes of
the Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act) of a dam and reservoir on the various interests
and values. Applicants must use this data and information to design and formulate
operating criteria for the dam, including objectives and constraints. Objectives relate to
the new benefits that an applicant is seeking to obtain or provide by constructing a
project, such as flood control, water supply and electricity generation. Objectives may
also relate to other upstream and downstream interests. Alternatively, constraints are
necessary to address related adverse effects and should be avoided, is possible, or no
violated if approved. For example, not exceeding the Full Supply Operating Level of a
dam when possible and/or not increasing erosion to riparian land owners may be two
constraints. The effects of constraints may be at the dam or upstream and downstream
in order to mitigate the effect of the Applicant’s objectives.
The location design, construction, operation, maintenance or alteration of dams and

reservoirs have the potential to create an array of impacts on people, the built
environment and natural resources (IEA, 2000; WCD, 2000). Consistent with the
purposes of the LRIA, and the principles guiding the formulation and review of works,
proponents and MNR staff must consider options for the location and design of dams
and reservoirs that avoid, reduce or otherwise mitigate the potential adverse social
effects.
The applicant shall develop practicable operating criteria options for avoiding, reducing
or mitigating adverse effects on the interests and values. Depending upon the nature of
the affected interest or value, and the expected magnitude, frequency, severity and
duration of the effect, no mitigation to several mitigation alternatives may be conceived.
An applicant’s analysis should reveal and inform their understanding of the balance
and/or trade-offs associated with alternative ways of constructing and operating the dam
and reservoir. Applicants should seek to adopt trade-offs which would result in their
project creating the greatest socio-economic and environmental benefits, net of costs.
2010 120
Analytical tools should be used which are commensurate with the scale of the dam and
reservoir, and the magnitude of the expected effects on the affected interests and
values. Such tools may range from descriptive evaluations of options against operating
criteria and performance indicators, to formal, multi-criteria analyses (US Water
Resources Council, 1983; USACE, 1996; USACE, 2002).
Table 3-13 Summary Checklist of Information Required for Vol. 3 Location

Approval
Types of Information Requirements Types of Work

1 Application form information (already provided) all
Additional Information
2 Legal Instruments – right to flood all
3 Statements of authorization from affected riparian owners all
4 Watershed maps, Official Plans – existing and future (20 yr) land use all
5 Ecological information (aquatic and terrestrial) all
8 Natural amenities present at the site all
9 HPC Classification dams
10 Plans and specifications application date all
14.2 Assessment of Upstream Impacts Within the Zone of Influence

14.2.1 General
The review for Location Approval must consider the upstream effects of the proposed
works within the zone of influence on Aboriginal and treaty rights, public rights, the rights
of riparian land owners, the management and perpetuation of fish, wildlife and other
natural resources. Traditional Aboriginal and treaty practices for harvesting food, and
the exercise of various customs or traditions on land and water, are among the more
obvious potential impacts associated with dam siting, construction, and operation.
Further guidance is provided under Section 14.4 (Consultation and Environmental
Assessment).
The potential for adverse socio-cultural effects and adverse socio-economic effects on
natural resources, and the persons and business establishments which rely upon them
require consideration. The review must also consider the potential for effects of the dam
and the upstream zone of influence on historical, architectural and archaeological
heritage resources.
MNR will on a case-by-case basis determine the ecosystem-based water level and flow
objectives that will support the ecological sustainability of aquatic ecosystems for the
perpetuation of fish and wildlife.
14.2.2 Work Site and Area to be Flooded
Private Land Ownership or Rights
2010 121
If a proposed dam site and reservoir area is to be permanently flooded to the regulated
water level, including periodic flooding up to the IDF then it must be located:
i. entirely on lands owned by the applicant, and/or
ii. on lands which the applicant has obtained legal authority from the owner to
construct the dam and cause flooding.
For determination of required flooding rights refer to Volume 1, Chapter 1.
Public Land Ownership or Rights
If a dam site and/or flooded area are to be located on or near public land, authorization
must be obtained from the MNR under the Public Lands Act. Authorization for
occupation and for both permanent and periodic flooding of Crown Land is required.
Where the dam site or area to be flooded is proposed on public lands that are subject to
an existing approval issued to someone else (i.e., public land presently reserved for or
occupied by other uses, such as, a park, road reserve or waterpower lease agreement,
license of occupation, mining lease, or land use permit issued under the PLA, CSFA,
and the Mining Act), MNR must advise the appropriate government authority and the
applicant of the conflict and hold the granting of Location Approval for the proposed
works in abeyance until the matter is resolved as outlined in Volume 1, Chapter 1.
14.2.3 Water Levels and Flows
Regulated Water Level (Range) for a Reservoir
The maximum regulated water level or Full Supply Operating Level (FSOL) proposed for
the area to be permanently flooded by a dam shall not exceed the existing summer
water surface elevation of the river at the applicant's property boundary without legal
authorization. This is required to prevent flooding and erosion on upstream property
owned by others and detrimental effects of altering upstream flow characteristics, e.g.,
on tile drainage outlets. The normal regulated water level should be at least 0.3 metres
below this elevation.
Flood Level
As a result of the location, design, construction, operation, and/or maintenance, a dam,

shall not cause flooding on land located upstream owned by others and upon which the
applicant does not have the legal right to flood, both permanently and periodically up to
the Inflow Design Flood (IDF) level, above that which would occur under existing
conditions.
A general rule is to base upstream flooding limits on the top-of-dam elevation. However,
a backwater analysis is usually necessary as part of the Plans and Specifications
submission (particularly for flat gradient streams or large reservoirs). Flooding of
developed areas (existing or future) is not permitted. Flood flows and water surface
2010 122
profiles must be determined and assessed using the Natural Hazards Technical Guide
(2001).
Where during the review of an application complaints of flooding (permanent or periodic)

are received from property owner(s) upstream of an existing dam, there will need to be
an assessment made of the amount and extent of flooding caused by the dam and of the
modifications that may be required in the construction and/or operation of the dam to
eliminate the flooding.
Policy 3.1.5 of the Provincial Policy Statement (PPS), 2005 states that where the two
zone concept for flood plains is applied, development and site alteration may be
permitted in the flood fringe area, subject to appropriate floodproofing.
Further to policy 3.1.5 and subject to areas prohibited in policies 3.1.2 and 3.1.4, policy
3.1.6 provides that development and site alteration may be permitted in parts of
hazardous lands and sites where the effects and risk to public safety are minor so as to
be managed or mitigated in accordance with provincial standards and where the
following is achieved:
1. Development and site alteration meets floodproofing, protection works and

access standards;
2. Vehicles and people have a way of safely entering and exiting the area during
times of flooding, erosion and other emergencies;
3. New hazards are not created and existing hazards are not aggravated; and
4. No adverse environmental impacts will result.
The backwater effects of structures on upstream flooding hazard limits are to be

accounted for in the hydraulic calculations. Flood levels and flood line maps shall be
adjusted as dams are added or altered. This may mean amending existing approved
water management plans and/or OMS plans to accommodate the new construction.
The backwater effect of upstream reservoir flood levels, and operating flows and levels,
on commercial, and recreational interests and aquatic ecosystem values must be
considered.
Proposed Dam Operations
The review for approval of a dam location must take into account the operation of the
dam and potential impacts on riparian interests. Where the operation of a dam involves
flow and water level manipulation, the operating procedures must be later described in
the Dam Operations Plan.
Clearing Areas to be Flooded
Crown timber located on areas to be permanently flooded by construction of a dam shall

be cleared from that area under supervision of and to the satisfaction of the District Area
Supervisor. Where applicable, the clearing will be done in compliance with the CFSA
requirements including considering the holder of the Forest Resource License.
2010 123
Similarly, privately owned timber on areas to be permanently flooded, that is, below the
regulated water level, should be cleared to the satisfaction of the District Area
Supervisor.
A vegetated buffer zone (i.e. trees, shrubs, and grasses) should be retained around the
perimeter of a reservoir down to the regulated water level to provide shade over the
reservoir to help minimize summer water temperature increases in the reservoir, reduce
erosion, and subsequent transportation of nutrients into the water and increased
subsurface nutrient uptake.
Erosion and Sediment
During construction and operation of a dam, erosion and turbidity must be controlled
around the shores of the reservoir to minimize possible sedimentation downstream.
The owner of the dam should be advised that they will be responsible for any increased
erosion and sediment damage which may occur on upstream or downstream property as
a result of construction and/or operation of a dam.
14.2.4 Natural Amenities
One purpose of the LRIA is to protect the natural amenities of the lakes and rivers and
their shores and banks. Refer to section 2(e) of the LRIA.
Natural amenities are areas of streams, rivers, and lakes that can be used and enjoyed
by the public and riparian owners and include beaches, vegetation, trees, unique
physical features, scenic areas, areas for swimming, areas for canoeing and boating,
and areas for fishing. The natural amenities may be a feature of the water, the bed, or
the shores and the banks.
Natural amenities on shores of lakes and rivers should not be destroyed or altered
without a full evaluation of the trade-offs involved and options for mitigation evaluated.
14.2.5 Permit to Take Water (PTTW)
The construction alteration, repair, maintenance, and operation of a dam may require
MOE approval for a PTTW under the Ontario Water Resources Act and thus the MOE
should be invited to the scoping meeting to harmonize the approvals.
14.2.6 Navigable Waters
Dams (including a safety boom) are named works under the Navigable Water
Protection Act. In accordance with the MOU between MNR and Transport Canada, the
Area Supervisor will forward the application on behalf of the applicant or request the
applicant to apply to Transport Canada. Determinations of navigability for the purposes
of the NWPA are made by Transport Canada. MNR will not issue location approval until
Transport Canada has provided NWPA approval – see Volume 1.
2010 124
Section 1 of the Beds of Navigable Waters Act provides that the beds of all navigable
waters belong to the Crown unless expressly granted in the patent. In those instances,
the Public Lands Act applies.
14.2.7 Historical, Architectural, and Archeological Resources
Dams and reservoirs have the potential to impact on historical, architectural and
archaeological sites. The ministry plays a key and on-going role in development
planning processes, by assisting and guiding municipalities, approval authorities and
public and private sector developers in meeting the Act’s requirements. It sets standards
and guidelines for heritage conservation in Ontario, reviews investigations by licensed
archaeologists, develops operational policies, and works closely with the heritage
community, First Nations, and other groups and individuals who have an interest in
conserving the province's heritage. A licensed archaeologist may be required to carry
out an assessment of a site, and permits may be needed prior to excavation of
designated sites.
The proposed location for a dam and flooded area should be checked by the proponent
to determine if historical, architectural, or archaeological sites might be destroyed or
flooded. As part of MNR’s review, the Ministry of Culture should be advised of the
proposal and comments requested. Projects subject to the Environmental Assessment
Act must have incorporated cultural heritage in their respective planning processes.
14.2.7 Fill, Construction and Alteration to Water Crossings and Channelizations
Many Ontario Conservation Authorities (CAs) have made regulations under The
Conservation Authorities Act (CAA) which require persons proposing to place fill in a
regulated area, construct a structure (including a dam) in a flood plain, or alter a
watercourse, to first obtain a permit under that regulation.
1) When an application for a dam which is to be located in area under a CA’s

jurisdiction is received, the CA shall be advised of the proposal and given 30 days to
comment on whether the proposal would conflict with the policies, criteria, or
programs of the authority.
2) If a CA submits comments within 30 days that the proposal conflicts with its policies,
criteria, or programs, but does not conflict with MNR policies, etc., and would
otherwise be granted approval under the LRIA, the application should be held in
abeyance pending resolution.
14.3 Assessment of Downstream Impacts within Zone of Influence
14.3.1 General
Riparian owners are usually thought of as those affected directly by the works and
having property near the site. However, riparian concerns can extend throughout the
watershed. Additionally, the impact should not be judged solely on the works being
proposed but should also consider the potential impact of a number of similar works.
2010 125
The cumulative impacts of a number of works can cause serious damage to riparian
owners.
The overriding two concerns in downstream parts of the watershed are:
1) decreased low flows during dry periods due, in some cases, to increases in
evaporation or the taking of water into storage and
2) increased flows from increased conveyance capacity or the taking of water from
storage during heavy snowmelt and rainfall events leading to flooding and erosion
damages.
Any changes to the current flow and storage characteristics of the stream can cause
increased downstream flows. Not only reductions in storage but changes to the timing of
flood peaks (delayed or advanced) can cause increased downstream flows. There is a
need to understand the impacts in downstream areas of the zone of influence for all
works that modify the natural storage and flow characteristics. This may require detailed
analysis or modifications to the works to eliminate flow and storage changes. If it can be
readily seen that releases from storage will not aggravate downstream flooding, a
detailed analysis is not required. An example of this is a large receiving body of water
immediately below the works where the impacts of increased flow would be insignificant.
14.3.2 Flooding and Erosion
1) A dam shall not cause permanent or periodic flooding or erosion on land located
downstream owned by others on which the applicant does not have the legal
authority to flood or erode above that which would occur under existing conditions as
a result of the location, design, construction, state of repair, and/or operation of the
works.
2) The hazard potential from flooding and erosion damage to downstream property or
loss of life due to failure of a dam at the proposed location must be minimized. The
larger the downstream property damage and/or hazard potential for loss of life that
would be caused by failure of a dam, the higher the design requirements must be for
the dam.
3) Downstream flooding hazard limit and flood lines should not be altered because of
new structures.
14.3.3 Total Diversions
A river shall not be totally diverted unless the loss of water to provide for the protection
of downstream riparian interests, natural amenities and aquatic ecosystem is adequately
addressed.
14.3.4 Partial Diversions
2010 126
Where there is a partial diversion associated with a dam, flow requirements in the main
channel reach affected by the diversion (i.e. the bypassed reach) will be determined
using a species-specific, habitat-based approach. Where fish habitat is likely to be
altered in this bypassed main channel reach, applications must be referred to DFO for
review under the Fisheries Act and the results of this review will be used to determine
appropriate flow requirements in the main channel reach affected by the diversion. It is
recommended that DFO/CA and MNR staff work together to ensure that any fish habitat
concerns that may affect fisheries management objectives are identified during review
under the Fisheries Act.
Riparian interests and natural amenities in the affected main channel reach must also be
identified and dealt with on a project specific basis and any concerns addressed.
14.3.5 Temporary Works
Temporary works should be designed to provide for their intended purpose taking into
account the risks of failure involved. Delays in the construction schedule must be taken
into consideration in the design requirements. They must be installed and removed
promptly as intended.
Temporary works (such as cofferdams):
1. may be designed using lower design floods than those identified in Table 3.2, Inflow
Design Floods.
2. required for one season can be designed based on an appropriate seasonal design
storm.
3. should be located taking into consideration the impact on aquatic resources and
riparian rights.
4. should have an outlet capable of passing the base flows in the watercourse during
the construction period.
5. should contain a description of the installation and removal sequence.
Conditions regarding the time of the year for installation and removal of temporary works
must be included in the approval. Sedimentation prevention is an important concern
with any temporary works.
14.3.6 Low Flows
Adequate downstream flow shall be maintained during both construction and operation
of a dam to protect the interests of riparian owners and to ensure the continued
sustainability of natural resources dependent on the stream. Provisions shall be made in
the design and operation of a dam and any associated partial diversion to maintain
adequate downstream flow when there is flow in the stream (e.g. low flow opening in the
dam period).
2010 127
14.3.7 Turbidity and Sediment
Turbidity and sediment must be minimized downstream during construction of the works.
The owner of the dam should be advised that they would be responsible for any erosion
and sedimentation damage which may occur on downstream property as a result of
construction and/or operation of a dam.
14.4 Consultation and Environmental Assessment
14.4.1 General
One of the purposes of the LRIA is to protect the interests of riparian land owners.
Applicants should make every effort to maintain the interests of riparian owners, using
the criteria set out in Volume 3, Section 14.2.2. If these interests cannot be protected,
applicants must obtain landowner’s consent through, for example, an agreement, lease,
sale, or purchase of the affected lands.
Applications which involve Crown resources (i.e., the beds of lakes or rivers which are
navigable) are subject to MNR’s Class EA for Resource Stewardship and Facility
Development (RSFD), and proponents should consult with MNR about how best to
coordinate these requirements. Municipalities which are proponents are obliged to fulfill
their obligations under the Municipal Class EA. Proponents of most waterpower projects
are obliged to follow the Class Environmental Assessment for Waterpower Projects
(Ontario Waterpower Association, 2008), which is discussed in further detail in Section
14.9 (Waterpower).
Applications may have the potential to adversely affect Aboriginal and treaty rights. The
Crown has a duty to consult with and to accommodate Aboriginal peoples when it has
knowledge, real or constructive, of the existence or potential existence of an Aboriginal
or treaty right and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it. Proponents may
wish to confirm the requirements with MNR on such consultation. Refer to Volume 1 for
additional information.
Applicants will be required to provide documentation of the public and Aboriginal

consultation carried out as part of the Location Approval process. As described below,
consultation and planning requirements of the LRIA must be integrated into a project’s
EA requirements, as appropriate. To the extent possible, a “one project, one process”
approach should be taken to coordinate legislative and regulatory requirements including
public, agency, and Aboriginal community engagement.
14.4.2 Environmental Assessment
In Ontario, title to the beds of navigable lakes and rivers are held by the provincial
Crown, unless a grant has expressly been made or is otherwise under the jurisdiction of
the Crown in right of Canada. Approvals to locate works on these beds involves a
disposition of rights to Crown resources, and are subject to the EAA. The Class EA for
2010 128
Resource Stewardship and Facility Development sets out the EA obligations MNR is
required to meet prior to issuing authorizations.
The Area Supervisor will coordinate the screening and evaluation of the application
under MNR’s Class EA for RSFD, and will specify what the consultation requirements
will be.
Where a municipality is the applicant, it is obliged to meet its obligations under the
Municipal Class EA. The municipality shall provide evidence to the District Area
Supervisor of it having fulfilled its obligations under the Class EA.
Alternatively, waterpower projects up to 200 MW are subject to the Class Environmental

Assessment for Waterpower Projects. This is discussed further in Section 14.9.3.
Canada and Ontario have entered into a harmonization agreement. This provides for a
coordinated EA process should projects also trigger the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act.
Applications which involve private land (e.g., non-navigable streams and ponds, beds
that were otherwise disposed of by the Crown) and otherwise do not involve other Crown
resources do not trigger obligations under the EAA.
14.5 Consideration of Aquatic Ecosystems
14.5.1 MNR Review of Applications
Consistent with the Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act purpose to provide for the
management, perpetuation and use of fish, wildlife and other natural resources
dependent on the lakes and rivers, and MNR’s vision and mission, the Ministry’s review
of applications for dams will consider the needs of aquatic ecosystems.
Data and information that is needed to assess a project’s potential effects on

ecosystems shall be provided to MNR as early as reasonably possible, so as to facilitate
timely consideration.
Ecosystem complexity is best managed and protected through strategies that move
beyond a single species focus to address all components relating to the structure and
function of an ecosystem. Complementary to this holistic approach may be a finer scale
identification of valued ecosystem components, such as species at risk, to ensure that
water flow and level needs of sensitive and indicator species and features are
considered.
14.5.2 Fish Passage
Fish passage includes all types of migration, including the localized movement of fish
within a given type of habitat. Altering fish passage can result in habitat fragmentation,
loss of genetic diversity, population declines, species replacement or even extirpation.
2010 129
Safe passage of fish species at dams is specific in all cases, and usually includes a
combination of physical, chemical or biological conditions to be met.
The federal Fisheries Act contains several sections which are relevant to fish passage
and review under the FA will be used to provide for fish passage at dams. Fish passage
at dams can influence the achievement of fish population, use, and management
objectives and are taken into account by DFO when establishing fish passage
requirements, and thus MNR staff must identify any concerns related to fish passage
and fisheries management objectives to Conservation Authority/DFO staff during the
referral process.
For any new dam, the need for fish passage should be determined as part of the design
process, with consideration for the migration needs of all species found within the local
fish population.
For existing dams and applications for new works on existing dams, consideration
should be given to the need for improving fish passage, keeping in mind the overall plan
in place for the fish community in the affected river reach.
14.5.3 Timing Windows for Work In-Water
MNR is the lead agency for setting timing windows for work in water. Timing windows
are applied to protect fish migration and survival within or adjacent to a proposed work in
water. Timing windows vary geographically across the province and depend on the
species of fish present. MNR will set timing windows for work in water which protect fish
spawning and egg incubation periods and other sensitive stages. Application of timing
windows is consistent with MNR’s responsibility to manage fish populations.
14.5.4 Referral of LRIA Applications to DFO
In order to meet the purposes of the LRIA related to the perpetuation of fish, MNR will
rely on and refer all LRIA applications for works in or around water where fish habitat is
likely to be altered including dams, water crossings and channelizations, to DFO for
review under the federal Fisheries Act. DFO will provide advice and consider all habitat
provisions of the Fisheries Act in their review of LRIA applications.
To further improve client services in Ontario, DFO has signed agreements with many
Conservation Authorities to undertake review of project proposals under Section 35 of
the Fisheries Act. A similar agreement also exists with Parks Canada for National
Parks, National Marine Conservation Areas, National Historic Canals, and National
Historic Sites. The referral process is described in greater detail in the publication “A
Protocol Detailing the Fish Habitat Referral Process in Ontario”, dated August 2000,
which outlines roles and responsibilities of DFO, Parks Canada, MNR, and Conservation
Ontario.
It is recommended that DFO/CA and MNR staff work together to ensure that any fish
habitat concerns that may affect fisheries management objectives are identified during
review under the Fisheries Act.
2010 130
14.6 Assessment of Wildlife
Applications submitted under LRIA will consider the impact of proposed work on wildlife
and wildlife habitat. Lakes, rivers and wetland areas (including marshes, bogs, swamps
and fens) often provide ecological habitat features that are important to wildlife.
Significant wildlife habitat should be protected. Significant wildlife habitat can be divided
into four broad categories:
1. Seasonal concentration areas,

2. Rare vegetation communities or specialize habitat for wildlife,
3. Habitats of species of conservation concern,
4. Animal movement corridors
Valuable riparian wildlife habitat should also be protected, and when appropriate, wildlife
species considerations should be made for:
1. Semi-aquatic furbearers (e.g., beaver, otter, mink, muskrat, etc.)

2. Waterfowl (e.g., ducks, geese)
3. Waterbirds (e.g., great blue heron, black-crowned night-herons, great egrets, etc.)
4. Other wildlife species that frequent wetlands (e.g., moose)
Existing wildlife movement corridors (both along and across the waterbody) should be
maintained to ensure that sufficient wildlife passage can still occur.
A water crossing, or channelization should not be located on a lake or river on which a

marsh, swamp, or bog exists in which significant wildlife habitat will be flooded, drained,
or otherwise destroyed by construction and/or operation of the works unless impacts can
be mitigated to the satisfaction of MNR. Significant unnatural fluctuations in water levels
may negatively impact wetland obligate bird species, particularly species that nest on
floating vegetation mats (e.g., loons, grebes, etc.).
14.7 Assessment of Species at Risk
In 2007, the government of Ontario introduced an Endangered Species Act. This Act
provides broader protection provisions for species at risk and their habits, greater
support for volunteer stewardship from private landowners and partners, a stronger
commitment to recovery of species and more effective enforcement provisions.
The Endangered Species Act, 2007 makes it an offense to kill or harm, or to damage or
destroy the habitat of, an Endangered or Threatened species unless authorized under
the ESA.
Habitat is broadly defined to include:
(a) with respect to a species of animal, plant or other organism for which a
regulation is in force, the area prescribed by that regulation as the habitat of
the species, or
(b) with respect to any other species of animal, plant or other organism, an area
on which the species depends, directly or indirectly, to carry on its life
2010 131
The Act also includes a suite of “tools” (permits, agreements, regulation) that provide for
the integration of human activities with the objectives under that legislation.
The proposed location for a works and any area to be flooded should be checked to
determine if habitat for Endangered or Threatened species may be damaged or
destroyed by the construction or flooding and, if so, brought to the attention of the
appropriate authority for assessment.
The Federal Species at Risk Act (SARA) contains a List of Wildlife Species at Risk. The
habitat of these species must also be included in the above assessment.
14.8 Assessment of Wetlands
Applications submitted under LRIA will consider the impact of proposed work on
provincially significant wetlands (PSW). Wetlands on lakes, rivers and in riparian areas
provide important ecological, hydrological and socio-economic values. PSW’s should be
protected. Please refer to the “Wildlife and Wildlife Habitat” and “Species-at-Risk”
sections for additional information on these values.
A water crossing, dam or channelization should not be located on a lake or river on

which a PSW will be flooded, drained, or otherwise destroyed by construction and/or
operation of the works unless it has been demonstrated that there are no negative
impacts on the natural features or ecological functions which make the wetland
provincially significant. In particular work is to be timed and carried out such that there
are no negative impacts on wetland hydroperiod.
In a wetlands context, the PPS defines negative impacts in two ways. Wetlands as:
1. natural heritage areas: “degradation that threatens the health and integrity of the
natural features or ecological functions for which an area is identified due to single,
multiple or successive development or site alteration activities”; and
2. hydrological features: “degradation to the quality or quantity of water, sensitive

surface water features and sensitive ground water features, and their related
hydrologic functions, due to single, multiple or successive development or site
alteration activities.”
14.9 Waterpower
14.9.1 General
2010 132
Waterpower facilities involve structures that range from the most complex to most simple
water control structures and reservoirs that are constructed or created in Ontario.
How waterpower facilities, water control structures and reservoirs are designed and
operated is a function of, among other things, biophysical site conditions (e.g., geology,
head, and dependable flow) and how electricity is valued, produced, transmitted,
marketed and regulated. Where conditions permit, facilities or control structures are
frequently designed to store water and, to the extent possible, schedule operations in a
manner that follows seasonal and daily changes in the demand for electricity.
As such, Location Approval review for waterpower facilities, along with other associated
large non-waterpower facilities, is to be commensurate with the scale of the expected
effects of the construction and operation of these dams and reservoirs on the interests
and values requiring consideration. What constitutes reasonable, representative
baseline data and information for large facilities and reservoirs may be greater than for
small facilities.
For waterpower facilities, close attention should be paid to the formulation of operating
criteria, and the development of practicable options for avoiding, reducing or mitigating
adverse effects. The magnitude, frequency, severity and duration of the effects may be
greater for large facilities than for other dams and reservoirs; as such, the sophistication
of the analyses for evaluating the performance of the options should accordingly be
greater.
14.9.2 Applicability of Waterpower Site Release Policy
Prior to submitting a LRIA application to the local District Office, persons proposing to
construct new waterpower facilities on Crown land (e.g., Crown lake and river beds) are
obliged to follow MNR’s Waterpower Site Release Policy (PL 4.10.05 POL) and
Procedure (PL 4.10.05 PRO). This policy and procedure governs how opportunities to
develop waterpower facilities on Crown land are made available, and “Applicants of
Record” are selected. Once a person has been awarded “Applicant of Record” status,
they submit a LRIA application to commence the location approval process.
14.9.3 Water Management Planning for Waterpower
The Minister of Natural Resources has legislative responsibility for the development and
the operation of waterpower facilities pursuant to the provisions of the LRIA. The LRIA
provides the Minister with the authority, where it is considered necessary for the
purposes of the Act, to order owners of dams, structures or other works to maintain the
water level of a lake or river.
Owners of existing waterpower facilities may be required to prepare and comply with an
order to prepare a Water Management Plan (WMP) issued by the MNR under section
23.1 of the LRIA. Additional guidance on water management planning is provided in
Water Management Planning Guidelines for Waterpower (MNR, 2002).
14.10 Social Considerations

2010 133
14.10.1 Aboriginal and Treaty Rights
Dams and reservoirs have the potential to affect proven and/or asserted Aboriginal and
treaty rights. These rights stem from practices, customs or traditions which are integral
to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal community with the proven or asserted right
and from the language of the treaties.
Where a dam or reservoir could affect the exercise of Aboriginal or treaty rights, the
Crown has a legal duty to consult with the affected Aboriginal people. Constitutional law
requires that the Crown be honourable in its dealing with Aboriginal communities (See
Volume 1).
14.10.2 Riparian and Other Land Owners

The footprint of a dam, its holding back of water, and the storage of water in reservoirs
have the potential to impact the rights of riparian land owners upstream and downstream
of the dam.
The reservoir behind a dam should be designed, constructed and operated so as to not
interfere with wells, septic sites or waste disposal areas. Seepage water from the
reservoir should not cause wetting of land owned by riparians and other land owners.
Where the riparian land owner holds a shoreline road allowance, MNR policy requires
that the backshore land owner be consulted.
2010 134
CHAPTER 15: PLANS & SPECIFICATIONS APPROVAL

15.1 General
Once all required information has been submitted and deemed complete by the MNR
District Area Supervisor a plans and specifications Letter of Approval is issued and the
proponent can begin construction. Should the application be considered as incomplete,
the proponent must resubmit for review.
The proponent should refer to Table 3-14 to ensure that all required information is
submitted with the application.
TransBoundary Dams (e.g. Ontario, Quebec and New York)

Where there are dams that cross jurisdictional boundaries, Ontario’s criteria and
standards apply only to that portion of the dam that is located on the Ontario side of the
border. The dam owner might wish to apply standards to the entire dam where they
meet or exceed Ontario standards.
Note to MNR Staff: Where there are transboundary dams that may result in the
application of different standards, MNR staff are encouraged to enter into discussion
with the dam owner and their jurisdictional counterpart to discuss a uniform approach
that would meet or exceed the intent of Ontario’s regulatory requirements for the entire
dam and appurtenances.
Table 3-14: Summary Check List of Information Requirements for Volume 3 Plans
and Specifications
Types of Information Requirements Types of Work
1 Application form information all
2 Location approval information all
Hydrologic and Hydraulic Analyses
3 Inflow design flood all
4 Stage-storage-discharge calculations all
5 Floodplain mapping all
6 Hydraulic capacity calculations all
8 Channel velocity calculations all
9 Channel and bank protection all
10 Fluvial Geomorphological Assessment all
11 Flood routing computations/modeling dams
12 Dam break analysis and inundation mapping dams
13 Water balance calculations; evaporation, withdrawals dams, ponds
Stilling basin design calculations dams
14 Geotechnical field and office Investigations and Calculations
15 Structure all
16 Embankment, reservoir and borrow areas dams
17 Stability calculations dams, retaining walls
Soils Analysis
18 Classification (United Soils Classification System) all
19 Soil strength all
20 Bearing capacities All except channelizations
21 Erosion and Sediment Control Plan All
22 Standard Proctor Test dams, embankments
23 Permeability Dams
Additional Information
2010 135
24 Construction Drawings and Specifications All

25 Construction Timing Windows All
26 Report(s) documenting that criteria and standards have been met All
27 Location approval expiration date and work permit form All
Environmental Analyses
28 Habitat assessment All
29 Ecological information
30 Water Quality Information dams, ponds
Detailed (stamped) plans and specifications;
31 Construction Drawings and Specifications All
32 Operation Maintenance and Surveillance Plans (OMS Plan) Dams
33 Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) Dams
34 Public Safety Measures Plan (PSMP) Dams
35 Sediment and erosion control (CO)
The above table documents a checklist of standard requirements. It should be noted

however, that the extent of the documentation required will largely be determined by the
Project Engineer affiliated with MNR’s Regional Engineering Services Unit (RESU). This
determination will be made on a case-by-case basis and in response to the proposal
under review.
Note to Applicants:
While the above summarizes the documentation required for applications to be
considered for approval, Dam Owners and/or their Agents are directed to contact the
District Area Supervisor of the local MNR District Office with any questions concerning
the Ministry’s documentation requirements.
15.2 Information Requirements
Physically Attached Defined:
Components of a dam that are structurally connected to the proposed improvement and
work to resist loads and forces to safely forward, hold back or divert water.
Logically Connected Defined:
Components of a dam that are not physically attached to the proposed improvement but
are required to resist loads and forces in order to safely forward, hold back or divert
water (e.g. control dams and block dams, fishways, water power generating facilities on
the same reservoir, mechanical gates and remotely operated control systems).
Dam owners must submit information to support the application for approval of the
proposed improvements. Additional information requirements are related to those
components of a dam that are “physically attached” or “logically connected” to the
improvements.
Detailed information, including plans, drawings, specifications, schedules and supporting

information must be provided to the MNR such that the application for approval of the
improvements can be reviewed in detail. The schedule will identify all works and dates
2010 136
of completion. The information provided must address all upstream and downstream
impacts within the zone of influence of the proposed works.
The supporting information required for approval must be clearly presented, typically in
the format of a design report, containing the following:
1. All supporting information, analyses, calculations, and assumptions made in

determining the design of the improvement works;
2. All information required in support of the design of the components of the dam that
are physically attached or logically connected to the improvement works,
demonstrating that the requirements and standards have been met. Any
departures from Provincial standards must be documented and justified including
an analysis of risks, interim and permanent.
Dam owners are encouraged to apply for approval or arrange for a pre-consultation
meeting with MNR well in advance (months) of any planned construction period to allow
sufficient time for the initial determination of the requirements for approval or to conduct
the approval under the LRIA. The local MNR District and Regional Office personnel will
need to attend the pre-consultation meeting to assist with the determination of the
requirements of LRIA approval. MNR may ask for additional information to clarify the
understanding of proposed works.
Proposed improvements that are submitted for Plans and Specifications Approval are
required to provide specific information in connection with:
1. The Design Report

2. Hydrological Information
3. Reservoir Information
4. Hydraulic Information
5. Foundation Information
6. Design, Drawings and Details, Specifications and Construction Schedule
Information
7. Operational Information
8. Ecological Information
The information requirements and considerations associated with dams are discussed
more fully under each heading below:
15.2.1 Final Design Report
1. Watershed Description
2. Location and Description of the Proposed Work
3. Hazard Potential Classification (HPC)
4. Hydrologic and Hydraulic Analyses
5. Inflow Design Flood (IDF)
6. Geotechnical Field Investigations and Structural Analyses
7. Final Design
2010 137
8. Where required, electronic and hard copy of hydrotechnical computer

simulations, including input and output.
15.2.2 Hydrological Information
For most dams, deterministic hydrologic methods and procedures are required.
Hydrologic calculations/simulations are required for:
1) the inflow design flood flow and resulting flood hydrograph;
2) any reservoir flood routing; and
3) calibration and/or verification of the hydrologic input parameters.
15.2.3 Reservoir Information
The reservoir information should include for all the areas within and adjacent to the new
or change in the existing reservoir.
1. A drawing(s) showing the area to be flooded and resulting shoreline by providing the:
a) topographic and bathymetric (natural) contours;

b) existing water level and high water mark (see Glossary);
c) lowest, normal, highest operating and regulated water levels during each month
of the year which address the upstream and downstream environmental and
riparian water level and flow constraints identified;
d) maximum design flood level resulting from the IDF; and
e) freeboard
2. A reservoir stage-storage curve showing the various regulated and maximum water
levels;
3. A reservoir features map(s) indicating location, elevation, and information on:
a) terrain, vegetation, soils, groundwater, geological features (faults, shear zone)

and anomalies;
b) aquatic ecology;
c) historical, cultural, or archeological sites;
d) flood-susceptible buildings, access roads, and docks around the reservoir
e) wells, septic tile beds; and
f) mineral and forest resources located adjacent to the reservoir
15.2.4 Hydraulic Information
2010 138
The discharge facilities must be capable of passing the IDF, taking into account the
routing effect of the reservoir, without the resultant reservoir flood level infringing on the
freeboard.
Where the works are associated with a waterpower facility, the facility should be
considered to be out of operation during passage of short period IDF’s (less than two
weeks). If the tailwater level exceeds the elevation of the powerhouse floor, the turbine
discharge capacity should be reduced to zero.
The dam, waterpower facility, and all discharge facilities (including emergency spillways
and downstream energy dissipation channel) must be designed to handle ice and debris,
protect the dam, and resist anticipated high water velocities.
Hydraulic analyses/simulations must include identification of all input parameters and

assumptions in the determination of the:
a) maximum and minimum discharge capabilities;

b) water loss assessment; evaporation, and seepage;
c) stage-discharge curve and maximum discharge capacity for each discharge
facility for the dam;
d) stage-discharge curve for the immediate downstream channel;
e) downstream energy dissipation details;
f) downstream channel and reservoir shore protection details; and
g) dam break analysis, where required, including an inundation map showing land
use, the regulatory flood plain hazard limit, and the inundation resulting from the
dam failure for a distance downstream sufficient for effects of the dam break
flood wave to be dissipated.
15.2.5 Foundation Information
The nature and variability of potential dam and foundation conditions should be defined
by site investigations.
Both the dam and foundation conditions will determine the need for and extent of
information gathered. The foundation includes the area beneath the dam and adjacent to
the dam. The extent of investigation beyond the dam into the reservoir or downstream
will be site specific. Because of the complex nature of foundations, any work to
investigate and report on foundations must be performed by a professional engineer
The field work will include setting out locations to probe, expose, and sample the dam
foundation and reservoir areas to document and retrieve materials for laboratory
analysis. These investigations commonly consist of:
1. excavating multiple test pits to sample soils and locate the ground water table;
2. borehole drilling and coring, and recovering soils, rock, and concrete;
3. in-situ testing to record and monitor subsurface conditions;
2010 139
4. laboratory testing and groundwater monitoring to identify the geological and

hydrogeotechnical conditions;
5. to define engineering properties of materials used to establish appropriate design

parameters; and
Site investigations should also pay particular attention to the identification of

discontinuities and anomalies such as jointing, fissures and weak seams that, if present,
will generally control foundation behaviour.
The geotechnical report will be used to assess the need for additional field work,
additional laboratory work, and to establish design parameters.
For most earthfill dams, consideration must be given to seepage paths, bearing capacity,
sliding potential, materials (filters) compactability, erosion susceptibility and protection,
and emergency spillways set on natural conditions.
15.2.6 Design Drawings and Details, Specifications and Construction Schedule

Information
Design calculations should include:
1. identification of all input parameters, assumptions, and criteria;
2. stability calculations for overturning, sliding, and overstressing;
3. seepage analysis; and
4. structural testing, analysis, and recommendations.
Design drawings and details should include:
1. General arrangement in plan view of the reservoir, dam, all appurtenant facilities
and downstream- receiving channel shown in relationship to any acquired
easements or property boundary constraints;
2. Plans, profiles, and detailed cross-sections clearly illustrating:
a) the surface and subsurface conditions;

b) all natural and proposed water levels, to geodetic datum;
c) all associated infrastructure, such as, discharge facilities, waterpower,
saddle/block dams
d) temporary facilities, e.g., cofferdam, staging areas .
3. A sediment and erosion control plan and any required dewatering system; and
Specifications:
2010 140
Materials and equipment for the works and related infrastructure must also be submitted
on the drawings or as a separate document as part of the final design.
Construction Schedule:
Proposed improvements can be phased over more than one year where it is
demonstrated that phasing is necessary given the scope and scale of the proposed
work. There must be a firm written commitment by the dam owner on the timing to
complete all work and the interim risks must be documented. Approval may be granted
if, in the opinion of the Ministry, the timelines and phasing of work are reasonable in light
of the interim risk. Detailed schedules showing work to be completed in each phase
must be provided, and will form part of the approval.
Where plans and specifications have been approved for a multi-year plan of works, no
additional approval is required for those works unless there are proposed changes in the
phasing, schedule or proposed work. Changes to phasing, schedule or proposed work
will require a separate written approval. Such requests must document the reasons for
the delay, the current condition, details or works completed, and the interim risks.
Where construction completion dates are exceeded, the approval is automatically
cancelled unless an extension is applied for and granted.
15.2.7 Operational Information
The extent of operational information required for submission will vary with the HPC of
the dam and the degree of operational control necessary to manage the water levels and
flows.
Dams classified as High and Very High require the following information to be submitted
for review.
1. Upstream sediment loading, reservoir sediment accumulation and storage loss,

and downstream sediment mass balance;
2. A listing and location plan of other in-line and by-pass reservoirs on the river
system upstream and downstream to ensure integrated operation and account
for the cascade failure of dams;
3. A dam operations plan, maintenance plan, and surveillance (inspection and

monitoring) plan or OMS Plan;
4. Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP); and
5. Public Safety Measures Plan (PSMP).
15.2.8 Ecological Information
Ecological information requirements will include, but not be limited to, existing and
anticipated changes to:
2010 141
1. Water flows and levels
2. Water quality
3. Water temperature
4. Sediment regime
5. Fisheries and wildlife
6. Endangered species
For existing dams and applications for new works on existing dams, consideration
should be given to the need for improving fish passage, keeping in mind the overall plan
in place for the fish community in the affected river reach.
This information should be provided in an ecological report that identifies methods,

assumptions, information and monitoring requirements and other supporting
documentation.
2010 142
VOLUME 3 APPENDICES
Appendix 9A: Activation Guidelines-Example
Response Condition
Action
Level Hydrologic Event Other Events
 Receive Flood Alert/Warning  Abnormal features  Initiate the internal notification
1 from MNR about an unusually observed (leakage, plan
large flood (unusual in settlement, deflection)  Determine need to activate
magnitude or timing e.g.  Condition of abnormal external notification plan based
freshet size flood occurring in features deteriorating on likelihood of the situation
Non-
summer); threatening public (e.g. leakage flow progressing to Response Level 2
Failure safety but not immediately becoming turbid) and time required by external
Emergency threatening dam integrity  Act of sabotage agencies to activate their plans
 Forecast Response Water threatened (e.g. bomb including evacuations.
Level 1 (RWL1) will be threat)  Evaluate need for external
exceeded and higher water  Loss of Telemetry or notification at this stage
levels forecast inability to operate flow  Carry out actions to mitigate
 Flooding of upstream or control equipment and it emergency
downstream developments has is predicted that  Onsite monitoring of dam and
not occurred but is imminent Response Water Level 1 flows may be required
 Downstream safe channel (RWL1) may be  In the event of an Earthquake
capacity is reached exceeded. the Operator shall follow the
 Earthquake damage relevant seismic procedure. An
earthquake does not
automatically constitute an
EPRP event.
 All discharge facilities open  Abnormal water level  Owner activate its emergency
2  Forecast RWL2 will be readings indicative of operating centre
exceeded potential dam failure  Activate external notification plan
 Failure not imminent but  Condition of abnormal  Provide external agencies with
Potential possible features deteriorating updates as required.
 Downstream safe channel rapidly (e.g. leakage flow  Discuss time required for
Failure increasing and becoming
capacity exceeded evacuation with appropriate
Developing more turbid, liquefaction external agencies
of dam materials,  Consult with technical staff or
continuous settlement or consultants regarding response
deflection of dam) strategy
 Failure not imminent but  Continue mitigation actions
possible  Continuous onsite monitoring
 Dam overtopping is imminent  Water level increasing or  Notifications completed to all
3  Forecast RWL3 will be decreasing rapidly Internal and External
exceeded indicative of dam failure. stakeholders, ensuring that all
 Failure of dam probably not  Abnormal features pose parties understand the current
avoidable or has already a serious danger to the status of the situation.
Failure
occurred dam (e.g. sinkhole on  Obtain regular updates from
Imminent upstream slope, large external stakeholders as to the
 Rapidly decreasing water
Or Has levels, independent of ongoing settlement or status of their evacuation efforts
Occurred operations, may also indicate deflection, collapse of and response so that this can be
failure is occurring or that dam crest, sabotage) integrated with internal
equipment is malfunctioning  Failure of dam is not responses.
and requires verification. avoidable or has  Evacuate staff to safety.
occurred
2010 143
Notes:
 Response Level triggers should be developed on a Site-Specific basis. In

flood situations, where reservoir storage is small and inflows large there may be
very little time to react between various Response Levels and this should be
addressed in discussions with external agencies to ensure suitable time is available
for evacuation or emergency actions.
 Any condition mentioned above or that requires activation of the EPP is considered a
significant dam incident. The reporting of dam incidents should be carried out as per
owner’s procedures.
 Response Water Levels (RWL) 1, 2, and 3 should be established for each dam. If
forecast RWL will be exceeded, Response Level Actions should be promptly initiated to
maximize warning time
2010 144
Appendix 10A: Example Dam Operation Log
Time U/S D/S Flow Operations Activities/Comments

Date Water Water (m3/s) Stoplogs Gate Operator
Level Level (Before/ Installed/ raised
(m) (m) After) Removed /lowered
(Before/ (Before/
After) After)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2010 145
APPENDIX 10B: Example Dam Inspection Checklist
Date Weather
Owner
Dam Name
Hazard Potential
Classification
Location
Inspector
Date construction
Engineered by
Last inspection
Next inspection
Head Water Level
Tail Water Level
1. Earth Dam
Dam Reservoir
height
Top Width Crest Length
Material
A) Upstream Slope Action Needed
Monitor Investigate Repair
Vegetation
Comments
B) Upstream Protection Action Needed
Size
Comments
C) Crest Action Needed
Settlement
Cracks
Crest surface
protection
Comments
D) Downstream Slope Action Needed
Vegetation
Surface
protection
Seepage
Comments
2010 146
2) Concrete Dam Action Needed

Concrete condition
Cracks
Leakage
AAR
Joint
Seal
Comments
3) Outlets
A) Pipe Action Needed
Location
Condition
Type
Inlet
Outlet
Barrel
Valve/Gate
Downstream
Comments:
B) Spillway Action Needed

Location
Condition
Type
Inlet channel
Bed Width
Head walls
Floor Slab
Chute walls
Wing walls
Outlet
Drains
Downstream
Debris
Comments
2010 147
C) Emergency Spillway Action Needed

Location
Condition
Type
Debris
Comments
4) Abutments Action Needed

Erosion
Seepage
Condition
Comments
5) Reservoir Action Needed

Use
Full Supply Level
Slope
Storage
Drainage
Log-boom
Condition
Comments
6) Downstream of Dam Action Needed

Channel
Vegetation
Slope
Habitation
Structure
Tributary to
Stilling basin
Energy dissipater
Water depth
Channel bank
Comments
7) Hoist, Equipment, Tools Action Needed

Electrical system
2010 148
Cables
Fall restraints
Safety supplies
Control house
Moving parts
Lighting
Communication system
Water measurement
Computer
Comments:
2010 149
APPENDIX 10C: Example Checklists for Inspection, Maintenance and

Testing of Flow Control Equipment
Sample Checklist for Sluice Gate Inspection and Maintenance

Item  Notes
Hoist gear box
Inspect the oil level
Inspect for water in oil and any oil leakage
Inspect the gears
Check drive coupling for wear
Hoist (wire rope or chain)
Inspect components for wear or damage
Inspect brakes and verify correct alignment and operation
Lubricate the bearings
Inspect the gate position telemetry
Inspect the wire rope or chain
Grease the wire rope/chain according to the schedule
Inspect the sheaves
Inspect and verify the operation of the limit switches
Hoist (vertical screw type)
Lubricate the horizontal drive shaft pillow blocks
Check the gate gear box housings for oil leaks and cracks
Check for water inside the gear boxes
Lubricate any greased gears
Check the condition of the accordion cover over the screws
Re‐lubricate hoist screws as recommended by manufacturer
Hoist (hydraulic)
Inspect the system for oil leaks
Check oil levels
Inspect filters and strainers
Inspect the heater or desiccant
Check the accumulator charge
Every two years take an oil sample for analysis
Check system performance‐jerkiness, noise, vibration
Hoist structure
Check main hoist structure condition for deformation or corrosion
Vertical leaf gate
Inspect the wheels for signs of non rotation
Lubricate parts as required
Inspect side rollers
Verify operation of the gate heater
Inspect gate seals for leaks and damage
Inspect rear cladding on a vertical gate
Check proper operation of ice prevention bubbler system/agitator
Inspect inside gate for leakage, skin plate deformation or
corrosion. Confirm that drain holes in horizontal beams are open
Radial/Sector/Taintor gate
Inspect and grease trunnions
2010 150
Item  Notes
Grease wheel guides
Inspect trunnion supports and gate arms for deformation
Check heater operation
Inspect seals
Inspect connection of hoist to gate
Make sure gate slot and gate are free of debris and obstructions
Inspect skin plate for leakage, damage or corrosion
Inspect for cavitation damage on gates used for flow regulation
Caterpillar or Stony Roller gate
Follow vertical leaf gate procedures
Inspect rollers, roller tracks or cages
Butterfly valves
Lubricate gate bearings
Inspect valve seals for leakage
Inspect valve body and disk for wear or damage
Inspect and lubricate valve operator
Remove any debris
Hollow cone valves
Inspect and lubricate operating mechanism
Inspect closed valve for leakage
Inspect seals
Check general condition of cone and sliding surfaces
Inspect for cavitation of seats and vanes
Five year interval work
Dewater gate using sectional service ( maintenance) gates
Inspect side seals, bottom lip, and sill plate
Inspect trunnions, wheels and side rollers and ensure they rotate
Inspect and pressure lubricate the wire rope.
Inspect gate skin plate for deformation, corrosion, rivet damage,
paint loss. If needed perform ultrasonic thickness check of plate.
Drive motor AC or DC
Test operate motor
Lubricate motor bearings
Measure resistance of windings
Record current readings with motor under load
Inspect contactor and control wiring
Inspect brake solenoid and measure its resistance
Confirm manual operation of the brake (if installed)
Back up power supply
Test operate back up power supply.
Control work
Verify limit switch operation
Verify hoist motor operation
Verify gate operation on automatic level control
Verify local/remote gate operation
Inspected by (Sign) (Print) (Date)
Approved by (Sign) (Print) (Date)
2010 151
Sample Checklist for Stop Log Machine Inspection and Maintenance

Item  Notes
Gasoline engine
Test operate engine
Change oil and fuel filters
Inspect throttle linkage, spark plugs, ignition system, battery
Check engine coolant level
Inspect exhaust pipe and muffler
Fill gas tank and add conditioner
Check battery electrolyte level, specific gravity, condition of leads
Electric drive motor
Test operate motor
Lubricate bearings
Measure resistance of windings and controls
Check brake solenoid and measure its resistance
Check contactor assembly, control wiring and heaters
Gearbox
Check oil level and for water in the oil
Inspect gearbox heaters
Inspect condition of gears
Inspect and lubricate gear change mechanism and couplings
Inspect and adjust brake
Hydraulic System
Check hydraulic oil level in tank
Inspect system for leaks, damage and deterioration
Replace hydraulic oil filter
Vertical columns and drive train
Lubricate column drive train and column guides
Check if guards on rotating equipment are in place and good condition
Inspect log hooks on column ends
Inspect spreader beam between columns for cracks or deformation
Carriage travel and traversing drive trains
Inspect and lubricate the drive train
Inspect the log carriage for damage.
General
Check machine structure for damage and corrosion
Inspect rails on dam for straightness, also hold‐downs and end‐stops
Check fire extinguisher; record date of last inspection
Check oil spill kit contents
Inspect personnel fall arrest system tie off points
Inspect condition of dam deck gratings and hand rails
Check general condition of stop logs
Check lighting on machine and dam
Check general condition of conduit boxes and receptacles
Test operate back up power supply
Check gear box heaters
Check all limit switches
2010 152
2010 153
Sample Checklist for Sluice Gate Test

Site name: Date of test:
Sluice gate # 1 2 3 4 Log Sluice # 1 2 3 4
Number of logs
Gate to be opened to be pulled
Gate successfully opened Number of logs
and closed (Y/N) successfully pulled

Item  Notes
Pre‐test actions
Conduct downstream safety inspection before test as per test plan.
Check for upstream or downstream debris or obstructions
Is environmental screening required?
Reservoir conditions
Reservoir level
Downstream level
Weather conditions
Record any reservoir test requirements or limits
Equipment operation tests:
Normal power
Was opening and closing travel completed?
Opening and closing time Open time:
Close time:
Back up power
Use back‐up power system to raise and lower one gate
Do electrical transfer switches and disconnects operate?
Opening and closing time with back up power Open time:
Close time:
Hoist
Is there excessive noise or vibration during operation?
Is emergency or gravity closure system operational?
Is fan brake or magnetic load brake operating correctly so gate
drops smoothly?
Does hoist brake maintain gate at all positions and fully disengage
when actuated?
Record motor inrush, maximum & normal current reading
Do wire rope drums and sheaves operate smoothly?
Is wire rope in good condition and properly spooled without gaps
or overlaps?
Hydraulic cylinder operators.
Record cracking and opening pressure
Record closing pressure
Record if operator travels the full stroke
Controls
Are local controls operational?
Are remote controls operational?
Are automatic controls operational?
Do limit switches operate correctly?
2010 154
Item  Notes
Are over travel devices functioning?
Is backup power supply transfer logic operating correctly?
Instrumentation
Is local, remote opening indication properly calibrated and
accurate?
Do indicator and position lights operate?
Gate structure
Check if gate movement is smooth without wobble or jamming
Observe gate alignment and operating clearances during operation
Check that rollers, guides, bumpers are properly aligned
Check that rollers are free to rotate either manually for accessible
ones or by observing them during the test
Verify operation of auxiliary equipment such as seals, bypass
valves, heaters, bubblers, agitators and guides
Check for seal leakage after gate is closed
Check sliding surfaces for indications of wear

2010 155
Appendix 12A: Bulletin on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FEMA)
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a form of reliability analysis that is used to
map out the consequences of specific events that can occur during the operation of dam
and to use this information to identify and prioritize necessary actions. FMEA is an
inductive method of analysis where particular faults or initiating conditions are postulated
and the analysis reveals the full range of effects of the fault or the initiating condition on
the system.
Concepts
FMEA techniques are structured, logical frameworks that allow engineers to use
available knowledge and information in a systematic way to lead to an understanding of
the sources of risk in a system. The key benefits of the technique are transparency and
amenability to audit.
Use of the technique follows a basic structure:
1. Define the system

2. Separate the system into its functional subsystems
3. Systematically separate the subsystems into key functions
4. Analyze element failure modes
5. Assess direct failure effects and operational consequences
6. Assimilate findings
7. Respond
The primary skill required is to understand the functional nature of the system being
analyzed.
Failure modes and effects

The definition of failure modes, failure causes and failure effects depends on the level
within the system at which the analysis is carried out. Therefore, as the analysis
progresses upward through the system, the failure effects identified at a lower level
become the failure modes at the next highest level and so on. A failure mode is a
descriptor of how component failures must occur to cause loss of the sub-system or
system function. For example, the entire spillway gate control subsystem would be
considered to be a component if the FMEA was carried out at that level in the system.
Failure Mode Frequency and Probability

In reliability engineering, probabilities of occurrences of failure modes are derived from
existing data or synthesized using analytical techniques. In this regard, the frequency
interpretation of probability provides the basis for assigning criticality values. In the
context of the frequency interpretation of probability, estimates of probability of a
particular failure mode in a particular operating environment require a statistically
significant reliability database. In the context of dams, it may be necessary to derive the
probability distributions through the use of alternative methods including the elicitation of
expert opinions of frequency characteristics.
If event/failure frequency is available for mechanical and electrical equipment under the
operational and environmental conditions that are envisaged, these data can be used
directly. However, in reality, failure rates are usually available for system elements rather
2010 156
than for failure modes and the operating and environmental conditions under
consideration.
Failure Effects
A failure effect is a consequence of a failure mode in terms of the operation or
performance of the dam system. A failure effect can result from one or more failure
modes of one or more components or subsystem. The effects of each failure mode need
to be identified and recorded. Since the system is analyzed in a hierarchical manner,
provision should be made to be able to track failure effects at consecutively higher levels
in the system.
Severity
Extending the failure modes and effects analysis to consider criticality requires the
introduction of probability of occurrence. Criticality analysis can be either qualitative or
quantitative. The qualitative approach is appropriate when detailed failure rate data are
not available. The quantitative approach may be appropriate when detailed failure data
is available.
Prior to carrying out a criticality analysis, it is useful to establish a set of ‘Severity
Classes’ ranging from catastrophic to inconsequential, with particular reference to the
range of possible damage and loss. The FMEA provide a basis for allocating each failure
effect to a severity class.
FEMA Process
The end result that is being sought from FMEA is a structured understanding of the
effects on the dam-system resulting from any failure of any element of the system for the
pre-determined level of detail considered appropriate to the particular study. The FMEA
process is a structured systematic means to that end.
FMEA is carried out in an iterative manner in a limited way during the early planning and
scoping stages of the analysis. More detailed analysis is done at a later stage if
necessary.
There are two primary approaches to conducting a FMEA, the “component” or
“hardware” approach and the “functional” approach. The “component” approach involves
the listing of individual components and the analysis of their possible failure modes to
identify the effects on the system. The “functional” approach is based on the premise
that every element of the system is designed to perform one or more functions that can
be considered as outputs. The functional FMEA is performed by listing and analyzing
these outputs to determine their effects on the system.
Criticality analysis
The effect of a failure event, allocated to a class of severity in the FMEA is combined
with an assessment of frequency of occurrence to give the criticality of the effect. The
steps in qualitative criticality analysis are:
1. Extend the FMEA worksheet to include a qualitative description of probability

such as frequent, reasonably probable, remote, extremely unlikely etc.
2. Combine the severity classes and the qualitative probability descriptions possibly
in matrix form.
2010 157
3. Develop a method of ranking the severity-probability pairs.
The semi-quantitative alternative is to rank severity and probability descriptors on

numerical scales of say 1 to 5 and combine them by multiplication. It is recognized that
this approach may be overly simplistic and overlook many complex issues of system
behavior and the combinatorial mathematics of the associated physical behavior. In
some instances it may be appropriate to include a rating for compensation or
mitigation.
Quantitative analysis requires additional treatment of the probability component and,

depending on the nature of the problem may also require consideration of exposure
time. The Canadian Standard Q636-93 describes an eight step process. The British
Standard describes a similar process. The appropriateness of these approaches for use
in dam systems should be assessed on a case by case basis. They may find application
in spillway gate reliability analysis, but for the most part adequate failure rate data are
not be available for dam safety applications.
2010 158
Appendix 12B: Bulletin on Loss of life estimation
INTRODUCTION
Predictions of the potential loss of life resulting from dam safety incidents is made
difficult by the absence of extensive statistical histories of deaths resulting from dam
failures or related events such as flash floods, and by the inherent difficulty of modeling
loss of life from first principles and demographics.
Three approaches to the estimation of loss of life from dam incidents have been
proposed:
1. Statistical,
2. Simulation, and
3. Geo-spatial database models.
4. These are reviewed and evaluated.
STATISTICAL APPROACHES
The best known statistical approach, based on historic dam failures and flash floods,
was undertaken by the US Bureau of Reclamation in the 1980 and 1990’s. These
studies attempted to relate characteristics of a failure and subsequent flooding to the
fraction of the population at risk (PAR) becoming fatalities.
This resulted in two “statistical” models of loss of life, due respectively to DeKay and
McClelland (1993) and to Graham and associates (1988, 1999). Some work on
statistical models was undertaken by Utah State University under funding by the USBR,
but this has not led to an additional approach.
DeKay and McClelland

DeKay and McClelland applied a logistic regression model to the limited number of dam
failures and flash floods that have resulted in loss of life. They developed a set of
equations using flood severity and warning time as independent variables, and
predicting loss of life as the dependent variable. Given the limited number of data sets
available, the statistical uncertainty in this approach is thought to be high.
Reference: Michael L. DeKay and Gary H. McClelland. (1993) Predicting Loss of Life
in Cases of Dam Failure and Flash Flood. Risk Analysis 13:2, 193–205
Graham
Wayne Graham and colleagues at the USBR developed LOL predictive models based
on the same data bases used by DeKay and McClelland, but employed an intuitive or
qualitative approach to categorizing failure cases. They developed a matrix of conditions
based on flood severity, warning time, and other variables to predict best estimates of
LOL. This approach leads only to best estimates without statistical measures of
uncertainty; but is now the approach used by the USBR.
2010 159
Reference: Curtis A. Brown, Wayne J. Graham (1988). “Assessing the threat to life
from dam failure,” Journal of the American Water Resources Association,
24(6):1303–1309.
Reference: Wayne J. Graham (1999). “A procedure for estimating loss of life caused
by dam failure,” DSO-99-06, Sedimentation and River Hydraulics, US Bureau of
Reclamation, Denver.
Reference: Lester B. Lave and Tunde Balvanyos. (1998) “Risk Analysis and
Management of Dam Safety,” Risk Analysis 18:4, 455–462
Models developed in the Netherlands

Over the last two decades a number of loss of life models have been developed in the
Netherlands for the estimation of loss of life for sea and river floods. These models
relate the fatalities to water depth in the inundated area and account for warning and
evacuation.
Reference: Jonkman, S.N. (2007). “Loss of life estimation in flood risk assessment –
theory and application,” PhD Thesis,
SIMULATION APPROACH
BC Hydro has pioneered an approach to loss of life estimation using agent-based
simulation of the behavior of individuals residing in the flood plain. This approach has
been captured in software systems for simulating dam break floodways and the resulting
behaviors and potential loss of life of persons in the flood way. BC Hydro’s physically-
based approach to modeling life safety considerations in dam safety decision-making
uses concepts that have application in emergency planning and in risk assessment for
dam safety decision-making. When applied in the risk assessment framework, the
procedure simulates the range of potential life safety outcomes and how they might
materialize. The proposed procedure has advantages over empirically based methods of
estimating loss of life from dam failures and flash floods.
Reference: Niels Lind, Desmond Hartford and Hamed Assaf. (2004) “Hydrodynamic
models of human stability in a flood,” Journal of the American Water Resources
Association 40:1, 89–96
GIS-DEMOGRAPHIC APPROACH
Under funding by the US Army Corps of Engineers, a demographic GIS approach to
estimating loss of life has been developed which uses spatial databases of land use and
population to estimate loss of life.
Reference: Maged Aboelata, David S. Bowles, and Duane M. McClelland (2003).
“GIS Model for Estimating Dam Failure Life Loss,” Risk-Based Decision making in
Water Resources X, ASCE, pp. 126-145.
Reference: Jonkman, S.N. et al. (2002). “Loss of life models for sea and river floods,”
in We et al (Eds.), Flood Defence, Science Press, NY.
2010 160
Volume 3: References and Bibliography
Abrahamson, N.A. 1992. Generation of Spatially Incoherent Strong Motion Time

Histories. Proceedings of the Tenth World Conference on Earthquake Engineering,
Madrid, Span, July 19-24, pp. 845-850.
Abrahamson, N.A. and Silva, W.J. 1997. Empirical response spectral attenuation
relations for shallow crustal earthquakes. Seismological Research Letters, 68, 94-127.
Adams, J. and Atkinson, G. 2003. Development of seismic hazard maps for the 2003
National Building Code of Canada. Can. J. Civ. Eng., 30, 255-271.
Adams, J. and Halchuk, S. 2003. Fourth generation seismic hazard maps of Canada:
Values for over 650 Canadian localities intended for the 2005 National Building Code of
Canada. Geological Survey of Canada, Open-File 4459.
Atkinson, G. and Boore, D. 1990. Recent trends in ground motion and spectral response
relations for North America, Earthquake Spectra, 6, 15-36.
Atkinson, G. and Boore, D. 1997. Some comparisons of recent ground motion relations.
Seism. Res. L., 68, 24-40.
Atkinson, G. and Beresnev, I. 1998. Compatible ground-motion time histories for new
national seismic hazard maps. Can. J. Civ. Eng., 25, 305-318.
Atkinson, G. and Boore, D. 2003. Empirical ground motion relations for subduction zone
earthquakes and their application to Cascadia and other regions. Bull. Seism. Soc. Am.,
93, 1703-1729.
Atkinson, G. 2004. An overview of developments in seismic hazard analysis. Keynote

paper (5001), Proc. 13th World Conf. Earthq. Eng., Vancouver, B.C., Aug. 2-6.
Atkinson, G. and Pierre, J. 2004. Ground-motion response spectra in eastern North

America for different critical damping values. Seism. Res. L., 75, 541 545.
Atkinson, G. 2005. Ground Motions for Earthquakes in southwestern British Columbia

and northwestern Washington: Crustal, In-Slab and Offshore Events. Bull. Seism. Soc.
Am., 95, in press.
Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD). 1998. Guidelines for design
of dams for earthquakes. August.Bolt, B.A. 1973. Duration of Strong Ground Motion. 5th
World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Rome, Italy, Proc., Vol. I, 6-D, Paper
292, July.
Bolt, B.A. 1996. Seismic Design Evaluation and Retrofit of Steel Bridges – Seismic
Issues. Second US Seminar on the Seismic Design, Evaluation, and Retrofit of Steel
Bridges, San Francisco,November.
2010 161
Bozorgnia, Y. and Campbell, K.W. 2004. The vertical to horizontal response spectral
ratio and tentative procedures for developing simplified V/H and vertical design spectra.
Journal of Earthquake Engineering, 8, 175-207.
Bozorgnia, Y. and Bertero, V.V. 2004. Earthquake Engineering from Engineering

Seismology to Performance-based Engineering. CRC Press.
Campbell, K.W. and Bozorgnia, Y. 2003. Updated near source ground motion
(attenuation) relations for the horizontal and vertical components of peak ground
acceleration and acceleration response spectra. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of
America, 93, 314-331.
Canadian Dam Association, 2007 Dam Safety Guidelines
Canadian Dam Association, Draft 2007 Technical Bulletin, Flow Control Equipment
Chang, F.K. and Krinitzsky, E.L. 1977. State-of-the-Art for Assessing Earthquake
Hazards in the United States. Miscellaneous Paper 5 73 1, U.S. Army Engineers
Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Miss., Report 8, December, 58 pp.
Cornell, C.A. 1968. Engineering seismic risk analysis. Bulletin of the Seismological
Society of America, 58(5), 1583-1606.
EERI Committee on Seismic Risk. 1989. The basics of seismic risk analysis. Earthquake
Spectra,5, 675-702. EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute). 1993.
Guidelines for determining design ground motions, Report TR-102293, Vol. 1-4, Palo
Alto, CA.
FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). 1985. Federal guidelines for

earthquake analyses and design of dams, Interagency Committee on Dam Safety,
FEMA65, March.
FEMA 93, 1979 Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety
FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). 2005. Engineering guidelines for the
evaluation of hydropower projects, Chapter 13, Evaluation of Earthquake Ground
Motions, (Draft Version), Division of Dam Safety and Inspections, Office of Energy
Projects, September.
FERC, EPRP Guidelines
Harmsen, S., Perkins, D., and Frankel, A. 1999. Deaggregation of probabilistic ground
motions in the central and eastern United States. Bull. Seism. Soc. Am., 89, 1-13.
Husid, R. 1973. Terremotos Earthquakes. Editorial Endres Bello, Santiago, Chile.

ICOLD International Commission on Large Dams). 1989. Selecting seismic parameters
for large dams, Bulletin 72.
2010 162
Idriss, I.M. 1985. Evaluating Seismic Risk in Engineering Practice. 11th International
Conf. on Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering, San Francisco, CA, Proc., Vol. 1,
pp. 255-320.
McGuire, R. 1995. Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and design earthquakes:

Closing the loop. Bull. Seism. Soc. Am., 85, 1275-1284.
McGuire, R. 2004. Seismic hazard and risk analysis. Engineering Monograph MNO-10,
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute.
McGuire, R., W. Silva and C. Costantino. 2001. Technical basis for revision of regulatory
guidance on design ground motions: Hazard and risk consistent ground motion spectra
guidelines. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm., Rpt. NUREG/CR 6728.
McGuire, R., W. Silva and C. Costantino. 2002. Technical basis for revision of regulatory
guidance on design ground motions: Development of Hazard and risk consistent
seismic spectra for two sites. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm., Rpt. NUREG/CR-6769.
NZSOLD (New Zealand Society on Large Dams). 2000. Dam safety guidelines,
November. Newmark, N.M. and Hall, W.J. 1982. Earthquake Spectra and Design.
Monograph, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Berkeley, California.
NRC Committee on Seismology. 1988. Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis. 97 pp.

National academy Press, Washington, D.C.
OMNR, Dam Operations, Maintenance, Surveillance and Safety Guidelines For Water
Control Structures, Draft, 2004, Prepared by Hatch Acres
Ontario. Environmental Assessment Act. R.S.O. 1990. Chapter E. 18
Ontario. Regulation 116/01 (Electricity Projects).
Ontario Waterpower Association. 2008. Class Environmental Assessment for

Waterpower Projects. 106 pp. OWA: Peterborough, ON:
OPG Standards for Dam Safety EPRP
Reiter, L. 1990. Earthquake Hazard Analysis: Issues and Insights. Columbia University
Press, New York, NY.
SSHAC (Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee. 1997. Recommendations for

probabilistic seismic hazard analysis: Guidance on uncertainty and use of experts. U.S.
Nuclear Reg. Comm., report NUREG/CR-6372, 256p.
Shome, N., Cornell, C.A., Bazzuro, P., and Carballo, E.J. 1998. Earthquakes, records,
and nonlinear responses. Earthquake Spectra, 14, 469-500.
2010 163
Siddiqqi, J. and G. Atkinson. 2002. Ground motion amplification at rock sites across
Canada, as determined from the horizontal-to-vertical component ratio. Bull. Seism. Soc.
Am., 92, 877-884.
Silva, W.J. 1997. Characteristics of Vertical Strong Ground Motions for Applications to
engineering Design. Proceedings of the FHWA/NCEER Workshop on the National
Representation of Seismic Ground Motion for New and Existing Highway Facilities,
Burlingham, CA, September 22, 1997. Edited by Ian Fredland, Maurice S. Power, and
Ronald L. Mayes, National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, State
University of New York at Buffalo, pp 205-252.
Silva, W.J. and Lee, K. 1987. WES RASCAL code for synthesizing earthquake ground
motions, in State of the Art for Assessing Earthquake Hazards in the United States.
Report 24, U.S. Army Engineers Waterway Experiment Station, Misc. Paper S-73-1.
Stewart, J.P., Chiou, S-J, Bray, J.D., Graves, R.W., Somerville, P.G., and Abrahamson,
N.A. 2001.
Ground Motion Evaluation Procedures for Performance Based Design. PEER Report
2001/09, Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Centre, UC Berkeley, September.
Tang, J.H.K., Chan, P.K., and Ko, P. 2004. Uncertainties in Seismic Evaluation of Dams
in EasternCanada. CDA 2004 Conference, Ottawa, September 2004
The Mining Association of Canada Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance Manual for
Tailings and water management facilities
Toro, G. and McGuire, R. 1987. Calculational procedures for seismic hazard analysis
and its uncertainty in the eastern United States. Proc. Third Intl. Conf. Soil Dynamics
and Earthquake Eng., Princeton, pp. 195-206.
USACE (US Army Corps of Engineers). 1995. Earthquake design and evaluation for civil
works projects, Regulation No. ER 1110-2-1806. Washington, D.C.
USACE, 1999. Response Spectra and Seismic Analysis for Concrete Hydraulic
Structures. Engineering Manual EM1110-2-6050, 30 June, 1999.
USACE 2003. Time-History Dynamic Analysis of Concrete Hydraulic Structures.

Engineering Manual EM1110-2-6051, 22 Dec. 2003.
USBR (US Bureau of Reclamation). 1989. Design Standards, Embankment dams.

Chapter 13 Seismic design and analysis. December.
USCOLD (US Committee on Large Dams). 1999. Updated guidelines for selecting
seismic parameters for dam projects, April.
USNRC (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1997. Identification and characterization

of seismic sources and determination of safe shutdown earthquake ground motion,
Regulatory Guide 1.165, March.
2010 164
Wen, Y. and Wu, C. 2001. Uniform hazard ground motions for mid America cities.
Earthquake Spectra, 17, 359-384.
Wind Set-Up and Wave Run-Up:
Ahrens, J.P. and Heimbaugh, M. 1988. Irregular Wave Runup on Riprap Revetments,
ASCE Journal of Waterway, Port, Coastal and Ocean Engineering, Vol. 14, No. 4, July,
pp. 524‐530.
Ahrens, J.P. and McCartney, B.L. 1975. Wave Period Effect on the Stability of Riprap,
Proceedings of Civil Engineering in the Oceans, Vol. 3, ASCE, pp. 1019‐1034.
Ahrens, J.P. and Titus, M.F. 1985. Wave Runup Formulas for Smooth Slopes, ASCE
Journal of Waterway, Port, Coastal and Ocean Engineering, Vol. 111, No. 1, July, pp.
128-133.
Atria Engineering Hydraulics Inc. 1991 November. Limit of Wave Runup – Great Lakes
& St. Lawrence River Shorelines. Prepared for Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources.
Batjjes, J.A. 1974. Surf Similarity. Proceedings of the 14th Coastal Engineering
Conference, ASCE, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Buggeln, B. and Judge, D. 2006. Determining Necessary Reservoir Freeboard

Two Methods Of Estimating Wave Runup And Wind Setup. Proceedings of the CDA
2007 Annual Conference, St. John’s, Canada.
Hunt Jr., I.A. 1959 September. Design of Seawalls and Breakwaters, ASCE Journal of
the Waterways and Harbours Division, Vol. 85, WW3.
SBJ (Societe d’energie de la Baie James). 1997 June. Riprap Sizing Practical Guide.
Engineering and Environment Department.
USACE. 1984a. Coastal Engineering Manual. EM1110‐2‐1100.
USACE. 1984b. Shore Protection Manual, Coastal Engineering Research Center.
USACE. 1990. Automated Coastal Engineering System, User’s Guide Technical

Reference, Coastal Engineering Research Center, Waterways Experiment Station,
Vicksburg, MS.
USACE. 1997. Hydrologic Engineering Requirements for Reservoirs. EM 1110, pp.2-

1420.
USACE. 2003 April. Coastal Engineering Manual. EM 1110, pp. 2-1100.
2010 165
USBR (US Bureau of Reclamation). 1992. Freeboard Criteria and Guidelines for
Computing Freeboard Allowances for Storage Dams, ACER Technical Memorandum
No. 2.
Spillways:
Annandale, G. W., “Erodibility”, IAHR Journal of Hydraulic Research, Vol. 33, No 4,

1995.
ASCE, “Hydraulic Design of Spillways”, Technical Engineering and Design Guides as

Adapted from the US Army Corps of Engineers, No 12, ASCE Press, 1995.
Ball, J. W., “Construction Finishes and High‐Velocity Flow,” ASCE Journal of the
Construction Division, pp. 91-110, CO2 September 1963.
Balloffet, A., “Pressures on Spillway Flip Buckets”, Journal of the Hydraulics Division,
ASCE, Sept. 1961.
Bakhmeteff, B.A. and Matzke, A.E., “The Hydraulic Jump in Terms of Dynamic
Similarity”, Transactions ASCE, 1936.
Bauer, W.J., “Development of the Turbulent Boundary Layer on Steep Slopes”,

Transactions ASCE, 1954.
Blaisdell, F.W., “Development and Hydraulic Design St. Anthony Falls Stilling Basin”,
Transactions ASCE, 1948.
Blaisdell, F.W. and Donnelly, C.A., “Hydraulic Design of the Box Inlet Drop Spillway”,
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, July 1951.
Blaisdell, F.W., “Hydraulics of Closed Conduit Spillways”, SAF Hydraulic Laboratory,

University of Minnesota, Paper 12, Series B, 1953.
Blaisdell, F. W., C. A. Donnelly, K. Yalamanshili, and G. G. Hebaus, “the Two-Way Drop

Inlet Self Regulating Siphon Spillway”, Proceedings of Symposium on Design and
Operation of Siphons and Siphon Spillways, Paper No C4, BHRA Fluid Engineering,
London, UK, 1975.
Bradley, J.N., “Morning-Glory Shaft Spillways: Prototype Behavior”, Proceedings of the

ASCE, Separate No. 431, April 1954.
Bribiesca, J. L Sanchez and O.A. Fuentes Mariles, “Experimental Analysis of

Macroturbulence Effects on the Lining of Stilling Basins,” International Commission on
Large Dams, 13 Congress New Delhi, Q50, R6, 1979.
Bureau of Reclamation, “Hydraulic Laboratory Techniques”, U.S. Department of the

Interior, Water Resources Technical Publication, Denver, 1986.
2010 166
Chamani, M. R. and N. Rajaratnam, “Characteristics of Skimming Flow Over Stepped

Spillways”, ASCE Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 125, No. 4, 1999
Chamani, M. R. and N. Rajaratnam, “Onset of Skimming Flow on Stepped Spillways”,

ASCE Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 125, No. 9 1999.
Chanson, H., “Comparison of Energy Dissipation Between Nappe and Skimming Flow
Regimes on Stepped Chutes”, IAHR Journal of Hydraulic Research, Vol. 32, No. 2,
1994.
Chaudry, M. H., “Open-Channel Flow”, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1993.
Chow, V. T., “Open Channel Hydraulics”, McGraw Hill, 1959.
Christodoulou, G. C., “Energy Dissipation on Stepped Spillways,” ASCE Journal of

Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 119, No. 5, 1993.
Engels, E.T. and A. Sheerman Chase, “Design and Operation of a Fuse Plug Spillway
in Swaziland”, Water Power and Dam Construction, June 1985.
Ervine, D. A., H. T. Falvey and W. Withers, “Pressure Fluctuations on Plunge Pool

Floors,” Journal of Hydraulic Research, IAHR, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1997.
Fahlbusch, F. E., “Scours in Rock River Beds Downstream of Large Dams,” Water
Power and Dam Construction, September 1992.
Falvey, H.T., “Cavitation in Chutes and Spillways”, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,

Department of the Interior, Water Resources Technical Publication, Engineering
Monograph No. 42, April 1990.
Fiorotto, V. and A. Rinaldo, “Fluctuating Uplift and Lining Design in Spillway Stilling
Basins”, ASCE Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 118, No 4, April 1992.
Foss, W.L., “Some Features of the Waterton Spillway”, The Engineering Journal, EIC,
March 1966.
Gray, E. W., “Fuse Plug Embankments in Auxiliary Spillways, Developing Design

Guidelines and Parameters”, Fourth Annual USCOLD Lecture, US Bureau of
Reclamation, January 24, 1984.
Gumensky, D.B., “Air Entrained in Fast Water Affects Design of Training Walls and
Stilling Basins”, Civil Engineering, 1949.
Hall, L.S., “Open Channel Flow at High Velocities”, Transactions ASCE, 1943.
Hartung, F. and E. Hausler, “Scours, Stilling Basins and Downstream Protection under
Free Overfall Jets at Dams”, 11th International Congress on Large Dams, Vol. II, Q 41,
Paper R3, Madrid 1973.
2010 167
Hickox, G.H., “Air Entrainment on Spillway Faces”, Civil Engineering, ASCE, Vol. 15,
1945.
Hinchliff, D.L., and Houston, K.L., “Hydraulic Design and Application of Labyrinth
Spillways”, USBR, 1984.
Huff, N., “The Hydraulic Design of Rectangular Spillways”, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
Nov. 1948.13. Ippen, A.T., “Channel Transitions and Controls”, Chapter 8, Engineering
Hydraulics, Rouse (Editor), J. Wiley and Sons, New York, 1950.
International Commission on Large Dams, ICOLD, “Spillways for Dams,” Bulletin No. 58,
1987.
Kawakami, K., “A Study on the Computation of Horizontal Distance of Jet Issued from
Ski Jump Spillway,” Transactions of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 5, 1973.
Kells, J.A. and Smith, C.D., Reduction of Cavitation on Spillways by Induced Air
Entrainment. Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, CSCE, Vol. 18, June, 1991.
Kessler, L.H., “Erosion Control Structures Drop Inlets and Spillways”, Bulletin 122,
Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Wisconsin, 1934.
Lindner, D. H., “Application and Design Practice of Gabion Drop Structures in Alberta” ,
CSCE 6th Canadian Hydrotechnical Conference, Ottawa, June 1983.
Mason, P. J. and K. Arumugam, Free Jet Scour below Dams and Flip Buckets , ASCE
Journal of Hydraulic Research, Vol. 111, No 2, 1985.
Michels, V. and Lovely, M., “Some Prototype Observations of Air Entrained Flow”,
Proceedings Minnesota International Hydraulics Convention, 1953.
Novak, P., “Developments in Hydraulic Engineering - 2 -, Elsevier Applied Science

Publishers, 1984.
Pegram, G. G. S., A. K. Officer, and S. R. Mottram, “Hydraulics of Skimming Flow on

Modeled Stepped Spillways”, ASCE Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 125, No. 5,
1999.
Peterka, A. J., “Hydraulic Design of Stilling Basins and Energy Dissipators”, Bureau of
Reclamation, U.S. Department of the Interior, Engineering Monograph No. 25, 1978.
Peterka, A J., “Morning Glory Shaft Spillways: Performance Tests on Prototype and
Model”, Proceedings of the ASCE, Separate No. 433, April 1954.
Peterka, A.J., “Hydraulic Design of Stilling Basins and Energy Dissipators”, Engineering
Monograph #25, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1963.
PFRA, “Hydraulic Design of Drop Inlet Pipe Spillways”, Prairie Farm Rehabilitation
2010 168
Administration Agriculture Canada, Design Bulletin No 5, Regina, Saskatchewan,

1955.
Phelps, H.O., “Model Study of Labyrinth Weir – Navet Pumped Storage Project”,
University of the West Indes, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering,
Series No. 6, 1974.
“Prototype Tests of Spillway Crest and Flip Bucket, Pine Flats Dam, California”, Report
No. 2 511, U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Miss., 1959.
Rae, P. J. and D. Hurdowar Castro, Modeling Effects in the Estimation of Spillway

Free Jet Trajectory Lengths , ASCE National Conference on Hydraulic Engineering,
Buffalo, NY, 1994.
Rae, P. J., “Hydraulic Design of Spillway Plunge Pool Linings”, ASCE, Hydraulic
Engineering ‘94, Buffalo, 1994.
Rae, P. J. and D. Hurdowar Castro, “Estimation of Spillway Free Jet Trajectory

Lengths” ASCE, Hydraulic Engineering ‘94, Buffalo, 1994.
Ralston, David C, “Design and Performance Evaluation of Earth Emergency Spillways”,

ASAE, SCS, USDA, Paper Number 80 2549, December 2 15, 1980, Winter Meetings.
Rajaratnam, N., Turbulent Jets: Developments in Water Science No. 5 , Elsevier

Applied Science Publishers, 1976.
“Report on Chute Spillways”, Corps of Engineer, U.S. Army, Dec. 1939.
Rice, C. E., and K. C. Kadavy, “Model Study of a Roller Compacted Concrete Stepped
Spillway”, ASCE Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 122, No. 6, 1996.
Rouse, H., Howe, J.W., and Metzler, D.E., “Experimental Investigations of Fire Monitors
and Nozzles”, Transactions ASCE, 1952.
Schoklitsch, A., “Hydraulic Structures”, Vol. 2, Translation Published by ASCE, 1937.
Slopek, R., Leseberg, G., and Jamal, A., “Snare Cascades Hydro Project, Northwest
Territories, Canada”, Proceedings of Small Hydro International Water Power & Dam
Construction Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1996.
Smith, C. D., “Hydraulic Structures”, University of Saskatchewan Printing Services,

Saskatchewan Canada, 1995.
Smith, C.D., “Hydraulic Model Tests of Spillway Crest and Gates”, South Saskatchewan
River Project, P.F.R.A. Design Memorandum 12, July 1960.
Smith, C.D., “Hydraulic Model Tests of Chute Divergence and Stilling Basin”, South
Saskatchewan River Project, P.F.RA. Design Memorandum 13, Aug. 1960.
2010 169
Smith, C.D., “Bontango Project Drop Inlet Spillway”, P.F.RA. Report, Feb. 1969.
Smith, C.D., Review of C.E. Bowers and J. Toso, Karnafuli Project – Model Studies of
Spillway Damage, Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, ASCE, Vol. 115, No. 6, October,
1989.
Smith, C. D., Slab and Drainage Details for Chute Spillways. Proceedings of the CSCE
Annual Conference, Vancouver, B.C., May, 1991.
Smith, C.D., “Selection of Design Flood Frequencies for Hydraulic Structures”, Canadian
Journal of Civil Engineering, CSCE, Vol. 19, August, 1993.
Soil Conservation Service (SCS) USDA, 1973, Technical Release 52, “A Guide for
Design and Layout of Earth Emergency Spillways as part of Emergency Spillway
Systems for Earth Dams.”
Stein, O. R., P. Y. Julien and C. V. Alonso, Mechanics of Scour Downstream of a

Headcut , IAHR Journal of Hydraulic Research, Vol. 31, No 6, 1993.
Straub, L.G. and Anderson, A G., “Experiments on Self Aerated Flows in Open
Channels”, Proceedings ASCE (HY7) Vol. 84, 1958.
“Studies of Crests for Overfall Dams”, Bulletin 3, Boulder Canyon Project Reports, Part.
6, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1948.
Tinney, E. Ray and H.T. Hsu, “Mechanics of Washout of an Erodible Fuse Plug”, ASCE
Journal of Hydraulics Division, Vol. 87, No HY3, May 1961.
Toso, Joel W. and C. Edward Bowers, “Extreme Pressures in Hydraulic Jump Stilling
Basins”, ASCE Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 114, No HY8, August 1988.
USBR, “Design of Small Dams”, US Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior,

Water Resources Technical Publication, Denver, Colorado, 1987.
Wagner, W.E., “Morning-Glory Shaft Spillways: Pressure Controlled Profiles”,

Proceedings of the ASCE, Vol. 80 Separate No. 432, April 1954.
Webster, M.J., “Spillway Design for Pacific Northwest Projects”, Journal of the
Hydraulics Division Aug. 1959.
Wood, I. R., “Air Entrainment in Free Surface Flow,” IANR Design Manual, Balkema
Publishers, 1991.Theory of Hydraulic Models”, MacMillan, 1971.
Yalin, M.S., “Theory of Hydraulic Models”, MacMillan, 1971
Outlets:
Bureau of Reclamation, “Criteria and Guidelines for Evacuating Storage Reservoirs and
Sizing Low Level Outlet Works”, U. S. Department of the Interior, ACER Technical
2010 170
Memorandum, No 3, Denver Colorado, 1982.
Houk, I.E., “Spillways and Outlet Works”, Irrigation Engineering, Volume 2, J. Wiley and
Sons, New York, 1956.
Kalinske, A. A. and J. M. Robertson, “Closed Conduit Flow”, ASCE Transactions, Vol.

108, Paper No 2205, 1943.
Klassen, M. ., “Design Criteria for a Two Stage Hydraulic Jump Stilling Basin”, M.Sc.
Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, 1977.
Koloseus, H.J., and Ahmed, D., “Circular Hydraulic Jump”, Journa1 of the Hydraulics
Division, ASCE, January, 1969.
Korolischuk, E.M., “Square Conduit Outlet Structures”, M.Sc. Thesis, University of

Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, 1970.
Ledingham, G.A., “Flow Through a Wet Well Control for an Outlet Works”, M.Sc. Thesis,
University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, 1962.
Miller, D.S., “Internal Flow Systems”, Fluid Engineering Series, Vol. 4, British
Hydrodynamic Research Association, Cranfield Bedford, 1978.
“Model Investigation of Garrison Dam Outlet Works and Spillway”, Design Analysis,
Corps of Engineers, Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Miss., 1951.
“Outlet Works, Oahe Dam, Missouri River, South Dakota, Report No. 2-557, Corps of
Engineers, Vicksburg, Miss., 1960.
Rouse, H., Bhoota, B.V. and Hsu, E.Y., “Design of Channel Expansions”, Transactions,
ASCE, Vol. 116, 1951.
Smith, C.D., “Hydraulic Design of an Outlet Basin for a Single Culvert”, The Engineering
Journal, EIC, August, 1955.
Smith, C.D., “Hydraulic Model Tests of Outlet Structure Diversion Tunnels South
Saskatchewan River Project”, P.F.R.A. Design Memorandum 106 50, Sept., 1959.
Smith, C.D., “Hydraulic Design for an Outlet Structure”, Proceedings, 3rd Annual
Symposium on Inland Waterways for Navigation, Flood Control and Water Diversions,
Fort Collins, Aug., 1976.
Smith, C.D., “Bend Losses in Drop Inlet Spillways”, Canadian Journal of Civil
Engineering, CSCE, Vol. 10, No. 1, March, 1983.
Smith, C. D. and B. H. Haid, “Location of the Hydraulic Jump in a Steeply Sloping

Circular Pipe”, Proceedings for the 8th Canadian Hydrotechnical Conference, CSCE,
Montreal, Canada, 1987.
2010 171
Smith, C.D., “Outlet Structure Design for Conduits and Tunnels”, Journal of Waterway.
Port Coastal and Ocean Division, ASCE, Vol. 114, No. 4, July, 1988.
Smith, C. D. and W. Chen, “The Hydraulic Jump in a Steeply Sloping Square Conduit”,
IAHR Journal of Hydraulic Research, Vol. 27, No 3, 1989.
“Spillway and Outlet Works, Fort Randall Dam, Missouri River, South Dakota”, Report
No. 25 28, Corps of Engineers, Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Miss., 1959.
Stevens, J.C., et al, “Hydraulic Models”, ASCE Manual 25, 1942.
“TVA Water Control Projects”, Technical Monograph No. 55, Vol. 1, Tennessee Valley
Authority, 1954.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Hydraulic Design of Reservoir Outlet Works”, Engineer
Manual EM 1110-2-1602, October 1980.
USBR, “Criteria and Guidelines for Evacuating Storage Reservoirs and Sizing Low-Level
Outlet Works”, U.S. Department of the Interior, Acer Technical Memorandum No. 3,
Denver, 1982.
Gates and Valves:
Campbell, F.B., and Guyton, B., “Air Demand in Gated Outlet Works,” Proceedings of
the Minnesota International Hydraulics Convention, Minneapolis, 1953.
Creager, W.P., and Justin, J.D., “Hydro Electric Handbook,” John Wiley and Sons, New
York, 1955.
Dickson, M.L., et al, “Outlet Structures for Fixed Dispersion Cone Valves,” Journal of
the Hydraulics Division, ASCE, Aug. 1958.
Grzywienski, A., “Hydraulic Forces on Vertical Lift Gates,” Proceedings of the 8th
Congress IAHR Montreal, 1959.
Hellstrom, B., “Hydraulics of a Submersible Tainter Gate,” Proceedings of the 8th

Congress IAHR, Montreal, 1959.
Houk, LE., “Irrigation Engineering,” Vol. 2, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1956.
Murray, R I., and Simmons, W.P., “Hydraulic Downpull Forces on Large Gates,” Water
Resources Technical Publication, Research Report No. 4, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
1966.
Naudascher, E. and D. Rockwell, “Flow Induced Vibrations: An Engineering Guide”,

IAHR Hydraulic Structures Design Manual No 7, Balkema Publishers, 1994.
Novak, P., “Developments in Hydraulic Engineering 1 , Elsevier Applied Science

Publishers, 1981.
2010 172
Rhone, T.J., “Problems Concerning the Use of Low Head Radial Gates,” Journal of the
Hydraulics Division, ASCE, Jan. 1959.
Simmons, W.P. (Jr.), “Air Model Studies of Hydraulic Downpull on Large Gates,” Journal
of the Hydraulics Division, ASCE, Feb. 1959.
“Spillway and Outlet Works, Fort Randall Darn,” Technical Report No. 2 528, Corps of
Engineers, Oct. 1959.
“Valves, Gates, and Steel Conduits,” Reclamation Manual, Vol. X, Design and
Construction, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1950.
DSMP:
ANCOLD (2003). Guidelines on Risk Assessment, Australian National Committee on

Large Dams), Sydney, New South Wales. Australia.
AS/NZ (2004). “Risk management ,” AS/NZ 4360 (2004), Standards Australia and
Standards New Zealand,.
Bedford, T. and R.M. Cooke (2001). Mathematical Tools for Probabilistic Risk Analysis,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and London.
Bishop, P., and Bloomfield, R. (2007). A Methodology for Safety Case Development,
Adelard, London, UK
CAN/CSA-850-97 (1997). Risk Management Guideline for Decision Makers.
Cole, K. M., Reid, P., and R. Rock (2004). Considerations in Developing Safety Case for
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Facilities and Associated Infrastructure in Canada. A
Report submitted to the Nuclear Waste Management Organization. File NWMO-SC-R-
00012-0.
Hartford, D.N.D, and G.B. Baecher (2004). Risk and Uncertainty in Dam Safety, Thomas
Telford, Ltd., London.
HSE (2001a). “Reducing risks, protecting people,” Health and Safety Executive, Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office, Norwich, UK.
HSE (2001b). “Assessing compliance with the law in individual cases and the use of
good practice,” (http://www.hse.gov.uk), Health and Safety Executive, Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office, Norwich, UK.
HSE (2003). “HM Railway Inspectorate. Railway Safety Case Assessment, Part 2
Assessment, Health and Safety Executive, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Norwich, UK.
HSE (2005). “HM Railway Inspectorate. Railway Safety Case Assessment, Part 1
Manual, Health and Safety Executive, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Norwich, UK.
2010 173
HSE (2006). “Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities,” Health and Safety
Executive, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Norwich, UK.
ICOLD (2005). “Risk assessment in dam safety management—A reconnaissance of

benefits, methods, and current applications,” Bulletin No. 130, Paris.
Kaplan, S. (1997). “The words of risk analysis,” Risk Analysis, 17 (4).
National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (2004). “Safety Case Guidelines,” Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office, Norwich, UK.
NSW (2006). Risk Management Policy Framework for Dam Safety. Government of New
South Wales, Dam Safety Committee.
Railways (Safety Case) Regulations 2000 (2000). Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 2688.
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Norwich, UK.
USBR (2003). “Dam safety risk analysis methodology,” Version 3.3.1, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, Denver
Location approval
“I. Social Impacts.” 2000. Thematic Review prepared for the World Commission on
Dams. London: Earthscan. http://www.dams.org/kbase/thematic/
Aylward, B., Berkhoff, J., Green, C., Gutman, P., Lagman, A., Manion, M., Markandya,
A., McKenney, B., Naudascher-Jankowski, K., Oud, B., Penman, A., Porter, S.,
Rajapakse, C., Southgate, D., and Unsworth. R. 2000. Financial, Economic and
Distributional Analysis, Thematic Review III.1, World Commission on Dams. London:
Earthscan. http://www.dams.org/kbase/thematic/
Asian Development Bank. 1997. Guidelines for Economic Analysis of Projects.

http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/Eco_Analysis/introduction.asp
International Energy Agency. Implementing Agreement for Hydropower Technology and

Programmes. 2000. “Annex III: Environment and Social Aspects of Hydropower.”
Technical report series. http://www.ieahydro.org/annex3.htm
Interorganizational Committee on Principles and Guidelines for Social Impact
Assessment. 2003. “Principles and guidelines for social impact assessment in the
USA.” Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 21(3): 231-250.
http://www.iaia.org/Non_Members/Pubs_Ref_Material/pubs_ref_material_index.htm
Lawrence, D. 2003. The Significance of Social and Economic Impacts in

Environmental Assessment. Prepared for the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Agency. http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/015/001/023/abstract_e.htm
Ontario. Ministry of Natural Resources. 2002. Water Management Planning Guidelines

for Waterpower. Peterborough, ON: OMNR.
http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/MNR/waterpower/
2010 174
Ontario. Ministry of the Environment. 2001. Guide to Environmental Assessment

Requirements for Electricity Projects. Toronto: MOE,
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2000/electricity.htm#RA00E00
05
“People and large dams: Social performance.” Chapter 4 in Dams and Development: A
New Framework for Decision-Making. 2000. Earthscan Publications: London.
http://www.dams.org/report/contents.htm
United States. Department of the Army. Corps of Engineers. 1996. Planning Manual.
IWR Report 96-R-21.
United States. Department of the Army. Corps of Engineers. Trade-off Analysis

Planning and Procedures Guidebook.
http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/inside/products/pub/publications.cfm
United. States. Water Resources Council. 1983. Economic and Environmental Principles
and Guidelines for Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies.
http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/inside/products/pub/publications.cfm
Whittaker, D., B. Shelby and J. Gangemi. 2005. Flows and Recreation: A guide to
studies for river professionals. Washington, D.C.: Hydropower Reform Coalition and
United States National Park Service. http://www.hydroreform.org
2010 175
2010 176

Stdprod 069405

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Descrizione originale:

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Stdprod 069405

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

DRAFT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY

Ministry of Natural Resources

Ministère des richesses naturelles

Technical Guidelines and Requirements for Approval

The Lakes & Rivers Improvement Act

VOLUME THREE – LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT OF

The purpose of these guidelines is to provide dam owners, members of the

Chapter 2: Classification of Dams

Chapter 3: Inflow Design Floods

Chapter 4: Incremental Hazard Evaluation

Chapter 6: Structural Design and Factors of Safety

Chapter 7: Geotechnical Design and Factors of Safety

Chapter 8: Seismic Hazard Criteria, Assessment and Considerations

Chapter 9: Preparation of Operations, Maintenance, & Surveillance Plans

Chapter 10: Emergency Preparedness Plans (EPP)

Chapter 11: Dam Safety Review

Chapter 12: Dam Safety Management Plans

Chapter 13: Dam Registry

Chapter 14: Location Approval

Chapter 15: Plans and Specifications Approval

Appendices for Volume Three

CHAPTER 1.0: GENERAL

1. criteria and standards;

CHAPTER 2.0: CLASSIFICATION OF DAMS

2.2 Ontario’s Dam Classification System

The hazard potential classification assigned to a dam is a measure of the greatest

Table 3-1 Hazard Potential Classification

2.2.1 Low Hazard Potential

2.2.2 Moderate Hazard Potential

Cultural - Built Heritage: irreversible damage to municipally designated cultural heritage

2.2.3 High Hazard Potential

Environmental Losses: appreciable loss of fish and/or wildlife habitat or significant

Cultural - Built Heritage Losses: reversible damage to nationally recognized heritage

2.2.4 Very High Hazard Potential

Environmental Losses: extensive loss of fish and/or wildlife habitat or significant

Cultural - Built Heritage Losses: irreversible damage to provincially designated cultural

2.2.5 Hazard Potential Classification (HPC) Determination

1. current structural integrity

Advanced Warning Time

Flood and Sunny Day Scenarios

Using the HPC to Determine MDE

Using the HPC to Determine IDF

Loss of Life and Permanent Dwellings

Assessing Property Damage

Losses must be based on a 20 year development horizon or as outlined in official

Cascade Dam Failure – Existing Dams

Cascade Dam Failure – New Dams

2.2.6 Preliminary Hazard Potential Determination

2.3 Other Considerations

2.3.1 Advanced Warning Time

2.3.2 HPC Changes Over Time

CHAPTER 3.0: INFLOW DESIGN FLOODS

Inflow Design Flood (IDF)

3.1.1 Future Development Potential

Evaluation of losses, as well as the selection of hydrologic and hydraulic parameters to

3.1.2 Determining the IDF

3.1.3 Statistically Determined or Event Based IDF

Inflow Design Floods will be determined by either statistical or event-based

3.2 Selecting the Inflow Design Flood

Table 3-2 – Range of Minimum Inflow Design Floods

Hazard Range of Minimum Inflow Design Floods

11-100 2/3 between 1/3 between the 1000 Year