Alson, Jericka Christine P. Prof. J.

Chan
MSIE Case Study 16: OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
By William D. Whisler

Questions with solutions:

1. General Walker wants to help in determining the quantities of transport aircraft and fast-logistics ships
that will be needed to satisfy the treaty commitments of the United States at minimum cost.

a. Formulate a linear programming model of this situation.

b. Use a spreadsheet to summarize the formulation from part (a) in a table.

The column headings should be the variables.

The first row of the table should have the coefficients of the variables in the objective function
and should indicate whether it is maximization or minimization.

Subsequent rows should have the exchange (or technological) coefficients of each constraint,
the sign of the constraint (≤, =, or ≥), and the right-hand side numbers.

Solution:

a. Let Xijk - number of transport from "I" base to theatre "j" during week "k"
Z - total cost of transporting work force units from base to theatres in dollars
Cij - cost of transport from "i: base to theatre "j" per week (52 weeks in one year)

Objective formulation: Minimize Z = � CijXijk

where i = C (CONUS), D (Diego Garcia), E (Europe)

j = M (Middle East), F (Far East), A (Africa)
k = week 1, 2, 3

Cost Per Week MIDDLE EAST FAR EAST AFRICA

CONUS $ 228,462.00 $ 228,462.00 $ 228,462.00
DI EGO GARCI A $ 192,308.00 $ 192,308.00 $ 192,308.00
EUROPE $ 211,538.00 $ 211,538.00 $ 211,538.00

Subject to:
CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST
Constraint 1: Holding Capacity of Fast-Deployment Ship Bases
XDM1 + XDM2 + XDM3 ≤60 (kilotons of force units in Diego Garcia)
XEM1 + XEM2 + XEM3 ≤40 (kilotons of force units in Europe)

Constraint 2: Aircraft Availability per Week (due to estimated losses)

XCM1 ≤ 225 (number of aircrafts available on week 1)
XCM2 ≤ 0.9 (225) (number of aircrafts available on week 2)
XCM3 ≤ 0.81 (225) (number of aircrafts available on week 3)

Constraints 3: Weekly Requirements per Theatre

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CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST
Constraint 1: Holding Capacity of Fast-Deployment Ship Bases
XDF1 + XDF2 + XDF3 ≤60 (kilotons of force units in Diego Garcia)
XEF1 + XEF2 + XEF3 ≤40 (kilotons of force units in Europe)

Constraint 2: Aircraft Availability per Week (due to estimated losses)

XCF1 ≤225 (number of aircrafts available on week 1)
XCF2 ≤0.9 (225) (number of aircrafts available on week 2)
XCF3 ≤0.81 (225) (number of aircrafts available on week 3)

Constraint 3: Weekly Requirements per Theatre

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA
Constraint 1: Holding Capacity of Fast-Deployment Ship Bases
XDA1 + XDA2 + XDA3 ≤60 (kilotons of force units in Diego Garcia)
XEA1 + XEA2 + XEA3 ≤40 (kilotons of force units in Europe)

Constraint 2: Aircraft Availability per Week (due to estimated losses)

XCA1 ≤ 225 (number of aircrafts available on week 1)
XCA2 ≤ 0.9 (225) (number of aircrafts available on week 2)
XCA3 ≤ 0.81 (225) (number of aircrafts available on week 3)

Constraints 3: Weekly Requirements per Theatre

b.

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

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CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA

2. Solve the linear programming model formulated in Question 1.

Solution:

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

An optimal solution was obtained in minimizing the cost of work force unit transports in Middle East. 45
aircrafts during week 1, 60 fast-logistic ships on week two from Diego Garcia, and 30 fast-logistic ships
from Europe will be needed for the three-week deployment with a minimum cost of $30,865,385.

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CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

An optimal solution was obtained in minimizing the cost of work force unit transports in Far East. 100
aircrafts during week 1, 140 on week 2, and 20 during week 3, 60 fast-logistic ships on week 3 from Diego
Garcia, and 40 fast-logistic ships from Europe on week 3 will be needed for the three-week deployment
with a minimum cost of $95,000,000.

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA

Slack variable in 3rd week indicates that total transports to Africa lacks 17 (180-163) kilotons of force
units.

The Africa Contingency was infeasible because of lack of transport resources as shown in the feasibility
report. 182 aircrafts available on week 3 (cell N11) and the limited pre-positioned ships at Diego Garcia
and Europe (cells N7 & N8) makes the solution infeasible which means the transports from these
resources cannot satisfy the requirements on week 3.

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The following questions should be attempted only after Questions 1 and 2 have been answered correctly.

3. New estimates made by MAC indicate that the loss rate of air transports will be much lower than was
previously estimated- only 1% rather than the previously estimated 10%. Discuss how the revised
estimate changes the strategic mobility deployment plan.

SOLUTION:

New Estimates Due to Losses goes down to 1.0% from 10%.

If losses go down to 1.0%, the only affected contingency is at Africa. The new situation will generate an
optimal solution due to availability of more aircrafts for weeks 2 and 3 while other contingencies will
remain the same. During the first week, 175 aircrafts will satisfy force unit requirements. On the second
week, 205 aircrafts must be used and 8 ships from Diego Garcia while on week three, 220 aircrafts are
needed, 52 ships from Diego Carlo, and 40 ships from Europe.

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA

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4. A routine safety investigation discovers cracks in the tail sections of 20% of the transport aircraft, so
they have to be grounded for a 6-month period while they are being repaired. Evaluate the effect of
this finding.

SOLUTION:

Routine safety investigation findings grounds 20% of aircrafts for transport. Find its effect to the plan. The
only affected plan is the contingency in Africa since from the start, the number of available aircraft is not
sufficient all slack variables of 2nd to 3rd week aircraft constraints are zero while slack variables on
Middle East and Far East contingencies has values. The aircraft availability on the third week and the
limited pre-positioned force units of Africa contingency makes the solution infeasible.

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA

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5. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is circulating a new study indicating that current military plans
seriously underestimate the magnitude of the possible contingencies. The study indicates that the
number of troops and associated equipment – the number of force units actually required – is about
1% higher than previously predicted. How would this affect the current strategic mobility deployment
plan? What about a 2% increase?

SOLUTION:

Current plans underestimated the magnitude of the association of force units.

a. The number of force units actually required 1.0% higher from previously estimation. How would this
affect the deployment plan?

A minimal effect of percent higher requirements will reflect on the deployment of force units on the two
feasible contingencies (Middle East and Far East). A 2% increase in cost on Middle East and Far East
contingency while Africa contingency will remain infeasible.

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA

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b. What about a 2.0% increase?

A minimal effect of percent higher requirements will reflect on the deployment of force units on the two
feasible contingencies (Middle East and Far East). A 3% increase in cost on Middle East and Far East
contingency while Africa contingency will remain infeasible.

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA

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6. Suppose that anti-American demonstrations in Europe regarding the American bases have become
widespread and are a political embarrassment to both the local and the U.S. governments.
Consequently, to decrease the visibility of the U.S. presence, the closing of bases is being
contemplated. Conservative senators and representatives say that the United States will be unable to
meet its treaty commitments without the European bases. However, liberals sat that, in addition to
improving relations with the European governments, the cost savings associated with closing the
bases will give an added boost to a weak U.S. economy and decrease the government's deficit. What
do you think? Analyze this change to see how it affects the current plans.

SOLUTION:

Close the European bases. What will be the effect to the plan?

Closing the Europe bases will increase the cost of Middle East and Far East Contingency while making
the Africa Contingency still infeasible because of lack in transport resources on the third week as shown
in the feasibility report for Africa Contingency. There will be a 21% increase in cost of Middle East
contingency while a 15% increase in cost of Far East contingency as transports for week 3 will be
allocated from CONUS (aircrafts) which are more costly than ships.

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA

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7. Lockheed Corporation, in an attempt to increase its market share and to become more competitive,
informs DOD that it would consider cutting the prices of its C-5A and C-141 aircraft by 20% if DOD
purchased more. Should DOD purchase more? If so, why and how many? If not, why not, and what
price cuts would be needed before DOD should reconsider and purchase more?

SOLUTION:

Prices of aircraft maintenance will decrease by 20% if DOD will purchase more units. Should DOD
purchase more? If so, why and how many?
The basis of decision for this will be the contingency of Africa since it is at Africa that available aircrafts
are insufficient. For it to be feasible, 175 aircrafts are needed for week 1, 225 is needed for week 2 and
200 is needed for week 3. Therefore, considering the estimated losses there must be 225 available
aircraft on week 2 to be able to satisfy transport requirements in Africa on week 3 by trial and error
making the solution feasible. If 25 (250-225) more aircrafts are purchased, the US Military will be able to
meet all treaty commitments at the same time, decreasing costs of Middle East contingency and Far East
contingency by 8% and 16%, respectively. Lastly, the optimal cost for Africa contingency is $158,461,538.

TRIAL AND ERROR COMPUTATION OF MINIMUM REQUIRED AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY FOR

AFRICA CONTINGENCY AND EXCEL SPREADSHEET SOLUTION OF AFRICA CONTINGENCY:

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

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8. Although political considerations originally dictated that the size of the forward base in Europe should
be limited to 40 kilotons, several senators are questioning this policy. They reason that Europe is so
centrally located that increasing the amount of pre-positioned material there would actually save U.S.
taxpayers money in the long run. analyze this situation and make a recommendation.

SOLUTION:

Since Europe is centrally located to theaters, increasing the amount of prepositioned materials from 40
kilotons would save U.S. taxpayers in the long run. Analyze this situation and make a recommendation.

SENSITIVITY REPORT (CONSTRAINTS)

The sensitivity report shows that force units pre-positioned in Europe base will provide an optimal feasible
report with allowable increase up to infinity (1E+30) units. If RHS of Europe pre-position constraint is
changed to i.e.1000, the maximum number of pre-positioned transports needed from Europe is 210
kilotons (from Africa Contingency). The cost of Middle East contingency remains the same while there is a
decrease of 31% in cost of Far East contingency. The Far East contingency cost were decreased since
transports previously allocated to aircrafts – which has higher transport cost, were replaced by transport
by ship from Europe base for the second or third weeks of the contingency. Moreover, Africa contingency
will become feasible with a minimum cost of $106,442,308. The U.S. military should have 210 available
ships (170 more) for a 210 kilotons pre-positioned force units in Europe to decrease taxes of U.S. tax
payers in the long run and to meet all contingency commitments.

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

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CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA

9. The navy has many old Victory-ships mothballed at various bases on both the east and west coasts.
They are old and go slow but are relatively cheap to operate – about $6 million per force unit
annually. Troops and supplies sent in these ships would not arrive at the various theaters of operation
until the third week. Analyze whether they should be used. If so, how many? If not, why not? Assume
that the capacity of Victory-ships is 1 kiloton.

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SOLUTION:

The navy can provide old ships which cost $6 million annually per force unit. Force units sent by these will
arrive until the third week. Should they be used? Assume capacity of ship is 1 kiloton. If so, why and how
many?

The 180 old ships (based from Africa contingency) should be used since it is the most costsaving
alternative which enables the U.S. Military to meet all treaty commitments. All costs from Middle East and
Far East were decreased by 21% and 55%, respectively because all week 3 transports will be allocated
from old navy ships due to its cheap maintenance cost.

CONTINGENCY IN MIDDLE EAST

CONTINGENCY IN FAR EAST

CONTINGENCY IN AFRICA

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