Organizational Dynamics (2019) 48, 8—15
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An inconvenient truth about leadership
development
Harlow B. Cohen
In a recent article by McKinsey, leadership development is
estimated to have become a $50 billion dollar enterprise.
Some estimate its value at three times that number. In the U.
S. alone the leadership machine allegedly doubled in the last
15 years. The proliferation of programs stem from many
sources that include universities, executive education, cor-
porate training centers, consulting firms, literature, and
independent practices. Despite the amazing growth of this
popular segment of training and development, there is little
evidence that we are actually getting better leaders, or that
leaders are more effective. Quite the opposite . . . Citing a
Harris Poll, Kaiser and Curphy, show that confidence in
leadership “has plummeted”. Numerous corporations and
executives likewise express concern that there is an inade-
quate reserve of future leaders from which to draw. Chris-
topher Hayes explains that “elites” who were at the helm of
financial, religious, educational, corporate, and government
institutions were responsible for monstrous failures that
eroded public trust and confidence, thus leading to devas-
tating economic, social, and political consequences. None-
theless, organizations pour massive amounts of money into
developing leaders with the belief that if an organization can
populate its managerial ranks with effective leaders, per-
formance will likewise follow a successful track. Unfortu-
nately, it’s just not working, and few want to admit that the
investment in leadership development is not generating a
return. In a phrase, “The emperor has no clothes”.
The reason why so many leadership programs fail to
produce the desired outcomes is that they are built on a
conventional school of thought that is facing in the wrong
direction. The prevailing logic of many conventional leader-
ship programs appears to be built on three questionable
assumptions. These are:
1. Leaders who possess the “right stuff” create successful
organizations. The premise is that if we can find or
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2017.10.002
0090-2616/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
develop leaders with the “right stuff”, populate the
organization with enough of these folks, and aggregate
the individual performances, we can ensure organiza-
tional success.
2. Leadership potential is best gauged by assessing individ-
ual attributes. This premise is wedded to the belief that
leadership is an individual sport. As such, our attention is
geared toward finding individual traits and characteris-
tics that when found will allegedly create a winning
formula.
3. Leader effectiveness can be objectively assessed and
developed independent of the social context in which a
leader works. This assumption places a great deal of faith
in the belief that individual capabilities are distinct from
and unaffected by the day-to-day interactions with
others; or by the cultural memes that inform people
what is considered preferred behaviors, ideas, and pri-
orities.
These three assumptions dominate the conventional
school of thought, and mold the practices of many leadership
development programs. Because many of these practices are
backed by research, few have been willing to question them,
or even check to see if they are working. However, as we will
show, there are compelling arguments to suggest that such
assumptions and practices are not well supported.
DOES HAVING THE RIGHT STUFF FOSTER
ORGANIZATIONAL SUCCESS?
Does a leader that has the right stuff foster organizational
success? Perhaps, but a closer look at the relationship
between leadership and organizational performance reveals
that leadership accounts for a smaller portion of organiza-
tional performance than suspected. For example, one study
separated the impact of the CEO immediately before and
Leadership development
after a change in leadership occurred. The study found that
fifteen percent of the variation in firm performance was due
to a change in the CEO. That means 85% was explained by
factors other than leadership.
Another study looked at whether a company’s perfor-
mance was impacted by a leader’s managerial style. Manage-
rial style, in this case, was defined as investment and
financial policies used by the same leaders over time and
at more than one firm. These styles were measurable and
objective –— not spongy and subjective. The study found a
statistical relationship between managerial style and com-
pany performance. However, it only explained four percent
of firm performance. That’s hardly a resounding endorse-
ment for the role that managerial style plays in affecting
organizational performance.
Yet another article cited in Forbes Magazine found that
the more CEO’s got paid, the worse their firms did in stock
and operating performance. The study compared CEO pay to
company performance for 1500 of the largest market cap
companies for a period of ten years from 1994 to 2013. The
findings showed that the more pay a CEO received, the worse
their companies did. This negative relationship was even
more pronounced for the 150 firms with the highest paid
CEO’s. Allegedly, CEO’s ascend to the top by virtue of their
performance, intellectual horsepower, strategic prowess,
and personal attributes. It is, therefore, fair to say that
CEO’s that have the right stuff and leadership ability rise to
the top. In fact, one gauge of leadership is getting promoted
which typically corresponds with higher pay. So in this case,
not only did leadership (and its rewards) not explain com-
pany performance, it was inversely related to it.
Still other studies of a different genre show that the rise
and fall of organizations is due more to the forces of com-
petition and innovation than the quality of leadership. In
fact, changes in performance (good or bad) often occur while
the same leaders are in place. We learn that organizational
high performance is unsustainable, because of a pernicious
regression toward the mean where less than five percent of
publicly traded companies can maintain a total return to
shareholders greater than industry peers for more than ten
years.
Leadership has its place, and unquestionably can be a
source of competitive advantage. The tendency, however, is
to overestimate leaders’ impact on performance. Leaders
get credit for success and blame for failure. The penchant is
to attribute more inordinate power to a leader than is
humanly possible, rather than assigning weight to other
factors like rivalry and innovation. Such factors have as
much if not more sway in affecting organization perfor-
mance. Having the right stuff may be necessary, but it is
clearly not sufficient when leadership is put into perspective
alongside other influential factors. Otherwise, we tend to
explain good or bad performance solely on the basis of a
leader having the right stuff, and that would be incorrect.
GAUGING LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL BY
ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL ATTRIBUTES
Managers and leaders ultimately are judged on the decisions
they make, and whether such decisions prove to be positive
9
or negative. Add to that assertion a temporal dimension, and
effective decisions must meet not only near term needs, but
ones that have staying power. In comparison, assessing
individual potential may shed light into a person’s behavior
or tendencies, but they tell us little about how leaders
practice the art of management, or whether the decisions
they make are of consequence. As Sull explains, “By focusing
on who executives are, the common explanations distract us
from how they manage”.
Nonetheless, over the years, achieving results and making
good decisions as a gauge of leadership potential have been
supplanted by a magnetic fascination with a leader’s perso-
nal qualities, traits, or psychological profile. The conven-
tional process for assessing leadership typically starts by
comparing a person to a research-based normative profile
deemed to be predictive of future potential. Potential is
often defined as the likelihood of being promoted, or as a
predictor of how one will perform. Think about that premise
for a moment. A universal, oftentimes generic profile pre-
dicts the chances that a manager will be promoted or per-
form better regardless of the type of organization she/he
works in. What situation are they being promoted into? Is it a
turnaround situation? Is it starting something from scratch in
a foreign country? Is it shutting down an operation that’s
been underperforming? Is it leading an acquisition/integra-
tion team? Is it moving from a line position to one that is staff
support in nature with little or no authority? Is it making the
transition from an individual contributor to a supervisory
role? Will the assessment of attributes be sufficiently robust
to account for all these scenarios? And even if the model is
robust, there is no guarantee that any given trait will
manifest itself at the right time in the right situation to
produce the right outcome. That’s why it is called potential.
Assessing potential is inherently constrained, simply because
the range of complex scenarios a manager confronts will
naturally stretch the flexibility of any predictive behavior or
capacity. And why would we want a prediction, when we can
observe decisions in action or actual outcomes? As such, we
must be wary of granting too much power to tools that assess
one’s so-called potential based solely on traits or character-
istics that are constrained by their very definition.
JUDGING LEADER EFFECTIVENESS
INDEPENDENT OF THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
As stated above, the third assumption believes that leader-
ship effectiveness can be objectively assessed and devel-
oped apart from the social context in which leaders work. If
that were the case, why is it that “stars” who change firms
rarely achieve the same performance in a new setting?
Groysberg and his colleagues studied storied investment
analysts that changed firms. These analysts were publicly
heralded figures hired away at huge salaries. The study
looked at their mobility and performance, and found that
after changing firms 46% of such analysts did poorly in the
first year . . . On average their performance dropped by 20%
and failed to improve to former levels even five years later.
Those analysts that maintained their performance and status
tended to change jobs again, and added little to help their
new firms.
10
Many years ago I conducted research that involved three
divisions of the same firm. All three business units performed
the same task, but in different venues. The aim of the
research was to understand the process by which managers
were identified as high performers, confirmed as such, and
groomed for future leadership roles. Although I started down
a path to surface individual dimensions, I soon found that the
process of becoming a high performer was more complex,
and anything but individual. I learned that although there
were actions a person could take to heighten their visibility
as a high performer, the process was largely out of his/her
control. Moreover, I found that the process was largely
informal and implied, rather than formal and explicit. The
process involved a great deal of inferred and intersubjective
attributions, as opposed to concrete or objective criteria.
For example, during the study, the general manager of one
division was fired despite the fact that his business perfor-
mance was quite good. When asked why, senior management
said they simply did not believe the improvements in per-
formance could be attributed to him. They saw him as too
much of a laissez-faire leader.
I also discovered that attributions and inferences varied
by division suggesting that each business unit had its own
unique social context; was situational; and often reflected
specific needs, hopes, or aspirations that were valued,
missing, or desired.
Once the label of high performer was affixed, the person
received added social, political, and/or economic advan-
tages. Such advantages took the form of broader involve-
ment, inclusion in new activities, insider information, and/
or exposure to a variety of new leadership challenges. These
increased opportunities further developed and added to the
favored person’s respective capabilities. This intricate, yet
subtle social system, acted like a self-reinforcing cycle –—
one that identified and confirmed the inferred attributions,
and then allocated more resources that provided marked
advantages which in turn reinforced the social identity of the
person as a high performer.
Whereas one cannot generalize the findings from just
three divisions of a single organization, it most certainly
may raise some eyebrows. The implications of this argument
suggest that not only might leadership effectiveness be
socially constructed, but that each organization or business
unit has its own social context that causes some leadership
factors to be valued, while others are not. If this premise
applies, it means that the identification, development, and
retention of future leaders are driven by a social system, and
operates on an informal and implied basis. It also means that
it is less likely that a universal or objective individual profile
of excellence exists. To the contrary, it suggests that leader-
ship profiles are subjective and shaped by a unique social
context.
USING A DIFFERENT SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
There is a different school of thought that may actually be
easier to use and implement, adds more value, and com-
pensates for the aforementioned arguments. This approach
asserts that: (1) Leaders with the right experience are more
likely to influence the success of an organization; (2) Leader-
ship potential is best gauged by demonstrating results; and,
H.B. Cohen
(3) Leader effectiveness and an organization’s social context
are woven tightly together such that developing leaders
must be aligned with that context, or the context must be
changed to support the development process.
Shifting from the Right Stuff to the Right
Experience
One of the first major studies that informs us of the impor-
tance that experience plays in developing leaders was con-
ducted by Bray, Campbell, & Grant as part of the famous
AT&T studies. AT&T used a sophisticated assessment center
that predicted which new hires would make it to middle
management or beyond. They tracked the new hires’ careers
to see how predictive the assessment was. An interesting
observation emerged that showed roughly one-third pre-
dicted to ascend to middle management or beyond did
not — termed false positives. In contrast, roughly one-third
of those predicted not to make it to middle management
actually did — termed false negatives. They compared the
false-positive group to the false-negative group. The major
difference between the two groups was that the false-nega-
tive group had the good fortune of working in a variety of
jobs and challenging assignments. In contrast, the false-
positive group was inherently limited in the variety of jobs
they performed, and confined to a narrower track within a
single discipline or silo. Variety of job experiences and
leadership challenges was the crucial difference. Years later
Kotter corroborated this finding based on his own research by
observing that “firms with superior leadership capacity
assigned challenging tasks that stretched people, and
allowed them the chance to exercise some leadership”.
Another study conducted by Gabarro compared successful
and unsuccessful managerial transitions that included divi-
sion presidents, general managers, and functional managers.
He found, “All things being equal, prior experience . . . was
the single most powerful factor associated with what the
new manager focused on; the changes he/she made, and the
competence of his/her early actions”. Gabarro also learned,
“The importance of prior experience is also . . . supported
by a comparison of failed successions and those that were
successfully completed. Lack of industry-specific experience
characterized three out of four failed successions . . . ”
Yet another study conducted by McCall, Lombardo, and
Morrison found that despite large sums of money spent on
management development and classroom training, most
development and learning take place on the job. This study’s
contribution stems from documented evidence of the skills
learned from performing different types of job assignments.
For example, they found that executives commonly cited
five types of developmental experiences and meaningful
assignments. These included starting something from
scratch; performing fix-it/turnarounds; making line-to-staff
switches; effecting changes in scope or scale; and serving on
high level task forces. Building on his prior work, McCall
subsequently explained that “management skills and intui-
tion that enable people to succeed in new assignments were
shaped through their experiences in previous assignments in
their careers”.
These studies clearly show that developing skills and
capabilities accrue from gaining experience by performing
Leadership development
a constellation of jobs and assignments –— not the reverse.
Armed with this basic understanding the way to “build a
perfect beast” is by mapping out the relevant types of
experiences that create leaders who make good decisions
that foster successful organizations. You start with a simple
algorithm –— not one that is a complex statistical formula.
Rather, the algorithm consists of equally weighted factors
rooted in practical experience and common sense. The
formula is deceptively simple:
 Exposure to a variety of organization specific leadership
challenges + tangible performance expectations + clear-
cut learning agenda + cross functional involvement and
collaboration = Leader Development
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the formula is through a
specific example.
Dana worked in the plastics industry and started his
career in sales. He quickly gained exposure to an array of
products, features, and applications. He rotated across
geographic regions and a variety of customer segments.
He was given a project to compare higher performing rep
organizations to lower performing ones to find out why the
high performers produced more sales at lower discounts.
Dana was also assigned to a standing committee that
reviewed incoming orders to decide if an order should move
forward into the design and engineering phase. Next, Dana’s
duties expanded to include foreign markets where he
learned to revise his tack based on cultural nuances. Over
the next few years senior management again enlarged his
duties to include production and plant operations. He slowly
came to grips with the fact that selling machinery was at best
break-even. Although this was a hard pill to swallow, Dana
reluctantly acknowledged that the parts, aftermarket, and
retrofit business was the real profit generator. Armed with
this new insight, he shaped an installed base strategy –— one
that stressed basic products that could be customized in the
field by retrofitting the machines. This strategy grew the
service side of the business, and launched the firm into a
promising arena that expanded into new market opportu-
nities at higher margins. Eventually, Dana became the Pre-
sident and CEO of the firm.
The story clearly shows that Dana was given a variety of
leadership challenges that consisted of different job experi-
ences, projects, and assignments. Each of these challenges
had a four-fold focus –— one which provided Dana with the
type of organization or industry specific experiences unique
to the injection molding and machinery business; one which
required Dana to achieve tangible performance outcomes;
and one which was to learn more in-depth skills, insights,
and capabilities. Last, many of the leadership challenges cut
across multiple functions. When more than one function is
involved, it teaches managers like Dana the importance of
making interdependent choices that promote connectedness
and reinforce a unified purpose. There’s no question that
Dana was an avid learner. There are lots of avid learners in
many organizations. However, unless a manger has the
chance to gain first-hand experience, the lessons don’t stick.
The story also shows that each organization has certain
experiences that are unique to that firm and industry. For
some companies future leaders might need exposure to more
11
than one revenue generating function such as retail and
corporate banking, or investment. In another organization
they might need to perform a role that has limited decision
making authority because the organization is highly decen-
tralized. In such instances, managers must learn how to
exercise indirect influence, or become more strategic in
garnering support. The configuration of jobs and assignments
must provide a mosaic of experiences that deepen a man-
ager’s understanding of the organization, and broaden their
network of relationships.
In Dana’s case each successive job experience acted like a
puzzle piece that in retrospect formed a portrait. He started
in sales and rotated through a range of geographic regions so
he gained an appreciation for the customer base. He experi-
enced international markets and customers so he could
enlarge his understanding of cultural differences. Note that
everything was not a promotion or job change. Instead, some
moves were lateral, interim assignments, or project-based
in nature. For example, being asked to conduct the rep study
sharpened Dana’s understanding of which rep organizations
had a robust value proposition. Being assigned to the order
entry committee positioned him to consider what was in the
best interest of the whole firm, rather than just the sales
function. Last, giving Dana responsibility for production &
plant operations along with sales & marketing, forced him to
reconcile differences between very diverse functions. He
achieved this by peeling back the layers of complexity that
were less than obvious. Only then was he able to craft a more
sophisticated game plan, and fit the pieces together. Such
examples show how a vivid learning agenda must parallel
performance expectations.
Last, development takes time and plays itself out over
years. The tendency is to treat leadership development as a
weekend excursion. It’s not. “Building the Perfect Beast” is
more than a Don Henley song. It requires committed senior
management willing to hand manage the careers of future
leaders. Moreover, it does not occur by happenstance. The
process is intentional, and requires thoughtful resolve, often
aided by HR professionals. Whereas individual potential and
learning ability might be assessed using instruments, devel-
oping skilled leaders comes from providing them with tar-
geted job and project experiences that build key
capabilities. There is no guarantee they will learn what they
should, but one thing is certain. If they are not given the right
experiences, it will not happen.
Gauging Leadership Potential by Demonstrating
Results
Ask a senior executive what he/she wants from a leadership
development program, and many will tell you they want to
see an improvement in organizational performance. To
quote one such executive, “I’m not interested in creating
a finishing school for executives. I need to see development
activities that produce results”. If you ask HR the same
question, they will talk more about the desired qualities a
manager needs to lead others. Both are valid expectations.
Unfortunately, gauging leadership, in large part, has
become a passive activity. Managers are assessed against a
profile. An assessment report is generated and shared with
an expert versed in that system or protocol who in turn
12
provides the feedback to the recipient. The two work
together to surface strengths, gaps, and common behavioral
themes. They then draft a written development plan that
the recipient is supposed to implement. Perhaps a coaching
relationship is even formed, but in the end it’s a lot of talk,
and far less action. A Vietnamese folk-ism captures the
essence of what is needed; that being, “A thousand hearings
aren’t worth one seeing, and a thousand seeing’s aren’t
worth one doing”. Managers need to practice behaviors that
demonstrate results, rather than merely be made aware of
them. As Pfeffer & Raynor assert, “Knowing isn’t doing”.
To move from knowing to doing, leadership development
activities can be paired with a result-driven strategy. This
means the leadership development process should be
anchored to the achievement of business-specific outcomes
that measurably improve performance. Moreover, this tack
must allow senior execs to observe how managers conduct
such assignments. It should put less emphasis on finding the
right profile, and place more emphasis on a manager showing
what she/he can actually do. Consider the following exam-
ple:
A financial services organization identified a list of high
potential managers, and assessed them using a 360 review
process. The 360 process revealed strengths and develop-
mental needs for each Hi-Po. The assessments were supple-
mented by salient anecdotal data and observations provided
by the senior management team. Instead of conducting
training workshops aimed at building targeted developmen-
tal needs, each SBU (strategic business unit) exec was asked
to identify one stretch assignment that could be matched to
a particular Hi-Po. The projects needed to be: (1) priorities
the senior manager wanted to address, but had not had the
time to do; (2) improvement opportunities that had poten-
tial for significant gains; or, (3) first-step, get-started pro-
jects that were part of a longer term strategic agenda. For
example, one project sought to increase a region’s cross-sell
ratio of products sold to high net worth customers. Another
effort pursued improvements in service quality by reducing
the backlog of late items in the Stock Transfer business. Yet
another project focused on decreasing the percentage of
unplanned and emergency installations for a software appli-
cations group in Operations. In all, eleven stretch projects
launched across eight strategic business units. Each project
considered not just the desired outcomes, but the type of
developmental experience that each high potential needed
to learn. For instance, one person was given a project that
was too large to do by herself so she could learn how to
achieve results through the efforts of others. Another person
had to perform a project in an area of IT he was completely
unfamiliar with, and staff that did not report to him. The
developmental challenge for him was to learn how to hold a
group of technical staff accountable that had expertise in
areas he did not. Still another had to work with a low
performing region to learn how to effect a turnaround. These
projects adhered to a short burst protocol which meant that
real progress and results had to be demonstrated in 100 days
or less. The group of high potentials, aided by an outside
consultant, learned how to design, launch, and implement
such projects. At fixed intervals all eleven Hi-Po’s met and
shared progress with one another. This added an element of
camaraderie where each person became part of a cohort. At
the end of 100 days, each Hi-Po presented their projects to
H.B. Cohen
all eight senior execs plus the president. They presented the
results they achieved, how they obtained such outcomes,
and what they learned from the experience. This interaction
fostered extraordinary learning, and triggered valuable
input from the senior leaders who shared their own gen-
erative stories.
A design of this sort provides a front row seat to view a
high potential from multiple perspectives. It became a
powerful vehicle for testing real-time a manger’s ability
to achieve results, learn from doing, and getting the type
of experience that builds new skills. Those that put points on
the scoreboard, and learned from doing, remained on the
radar screen, while accumulating valuable experience that
groomed them as the next generation of leaders. Even during
economic downturns, the practice continued, since the
leadership development process was linked directly to a
performance agenda, rather than run as a stand-alone or
disconnected training program.
Using Social Context to Inform Leadership
Development
Many of us express concern for cultivating a positive orga-
nizational culture one that promotes high employee
engagement. When it comes to culture we implicitly under-
stand and accept that much of our experience in organiza-
tions is socially constructed. This means we hear similar
messages, and assign shared meaning to our interactions
because we have a common frame of reference that tells us
what is valued and not valued. However, when it comes to
framing leadership, we don’t interpret it the same way. The
lexicon of leadership places more weight on the individual,
and less on the influence that the social system has in shaping
managerial behavior. In part, this jaded view of leadership is
ironically very much a function of Western culture that
places a premium on rugged individualism. The point, here,
is not to dismiss individual behavior, but to show how impor-
tant social context is to the leadership and performance
agenda. If you want to develop an effective leadership
program, the social context of an organization must inform
the development process –— not cloud it. There are two basic
strategies for using social context to inform leadership
development: (1) focus at the level of the whole; and (2)
connect the dots between what is happening in the organi-
zation and its social practices. Consider the following illus-
tration:
The program started as a traditional leadership develop-
ment process for managers. The hope was that the process
might spark a much needed improvement in performance.
All twenty-eight managers were assessed using the same
tool. Managers received individual reports and personal
profiles. They also received one-on-one feedback and coach-
ing, and a tailored development plan. However, on the
advice of a consultant the CEO asked for a composite profile
for the whole management team. That’s where it got inter-
esting. Quite apart from any single manager’s profile, it
became clear that the management team as a whole scored
higher on dimensions involving interpersonal skills such as
compassion and sensitivity, building and mending relation-
ships, collaboration and teamwork, and putting people at
ease. In contrast, the team as a whole scored lower on
Leadership development
achievement dimensions such as decisiveness, results orien-
tation, being a change catalyst, demonstrating initiative,
and exercising influence. Was this happenstance, or did the
findings stem from something more systemic in nature? To
explain, the business resided in a rural area where many
managers were not just co-workers, but residents of the
community. Some managers knew each other for years.
Others owned farms in the community, yet worked a second
job in the business to boost their income. As such, many
shared a common life style. In the not so distant past, the
business went through bankruptcy, and some managers lost
their jobs. After the firm filed for bankruptcy, the major
shareholder — an investment firm — assigned a CEO to turn
the business around. Unfortunately, this CEO turned out to
be an aberrant personality. Many managers found themselves
banding together and protecting one another just to survive,
while hoping that a new CEO would replace the existing one
soon.
Focus at the Level of the Whole
Had a composite management profile not surfaced aggregate
themes, the focus would have been locked at the individual
level of assessment. The default option almost always
focuses at the individual level of analysis. This basic “attri-
bution error” puts more emphasis on individual personal-
ities, and far less on the social context, culture, or setting.
This tendency often leads to solutions such as one-on-one
coaching, conducting workshops, or delivering training ses-
sions. Such choices ignore crucial constraints; namely, the
social practices that evolve in response to economic reali-
ties, industry trends, and history. The result of this error
often leads to injecting new talent into the equation only to
see the person get assimilated into the very same cultural
pattern, and to compromise whatever new skills or acumen
they came with . . . I’ve seen this happen to many managers
and educators that come into an organization only to be
constrained by a limited system, and handcuffed by pre-
existing practices. What is really needed is to change the
system or social practices that circumscribe managerial
behavior. And for that to happen we need to shift the focus
up a level to the whole. I’m not advocating that organiza-
tions throw away their 360’s or assessment tools. Instead,
use such tools or simply astute observations to find common
behavioral patterns that are both functional and dysfunc-
tional. In the above example, the new CEO realized that the
social context that grew from the team’s prior experience
fostered too strong of an affiliative context. Although an
affiliative social context may foster collaboration, one that
is too dominant unwittingly suppresses a more robust
achievement orientation that can be traced to performance
shortfalls and challenges.
Connect the Dots
Once the focus shifts from the individual level to the whole,
and insights emerge, the immediate next step is to connect
the dots between what is happening in the organization (i.e.,
required changes) to the social behaviors and practices. As
explained above, a protective pattern of behavior charac-
terized the existing social system. This implicitly urged staff
13
to compensate for others mistakes and to accommodate
errors. One manifestation of this pattern was that accounts
payable processed 65% of all payable requests three times.
Nonetheless, the Accounts Payable department chose to
accommodate the rework, rather than correct the problem
at the source. The same social injunction prevented produc-
tion from achieving a first pass yield of no more than 15%
because no one was willing to shut the line down despite
huge amounts of rework. Likewise, the social context per-
mitted the sales function to sell (unchecked) low or no
margin products. These are real performance issues that
inextricably tie a leadership agenda to social context. Unless
such practices get resolved performance remains uncor-
rected, and staff assume that mediocrity or even low per-
formance is okay to tolerate.
Leadership development is an organizational process no
different than other types of processes. The only difference
is the purpose it is designed to achieve, and whether it is
formal or informal. Informal processes are harder to
observe, and to gauge whether they are working. Although
the purpose of leadership development is relatively easy to
explain, the presence of an informal social context makes
the task more difficult. Therefore, before installing a formal
leadership development program, it is worth clarifying the
social context so that senior management can decide if such
patterns are supportive, or are constraints that need to be
changed.
MAKING A REAL DIFFERENCE
Almost thirty years ago, John Kotter in his famous study
titled, The Leadership Factor asserted, “It is not entirely
clear there are many firms today that do a truly exceptional
job of attracting, developing, retaining, and/or motivating
leadership talent”. The questionnaire data that Kotter col-
lected showed that although some firms did a better than
average job of developing leaders, there was still room for
much improvement. It’s now clear that the status and find-
ings have not changed all that much. Although there are
reasons for doubt and skepticism, there are also alternatives
that are more promising.
To start, there continues to be a preoccupation with hiring
leaders and identifying high performers based on who they
are, rather than what they can do. It does not matter much if
your organization needs to launch an entrepreneurial venture,
and the person you tag to lead the effort has no start-up
experience, even though she/he has a favorable individual
profile. Having potential is not the same as demonstrating it
any more than telling is the same as showing. Phil Jackson, one
of the greatest basketball coaches in the history of the game,
did very well in Chicago and Los Angeles because he knew how
to work with superstars like Michael Jordon. However, he did
not come close as the general manager of the New York Knicks
in turning that franchise into a perennial winner. Jackson did
not suddenly lose all his basketball know-how or acumen. The
more likely explanation is that he had little or no turnaround
experience.
Look at the world of retail. Did all the CEO’s heading retail
firms abruptly become incompetent? Not likely . . . Instead,
the advent of firms like Amazon changed the game, and were
better equipped to compete on-line, whereas retail stores
14
work under very different business models. Simply stated,
the context and business design of retail changed. Innova-
tions and competitive business practices cause firms to rise
and fall irrespective of the leaders that are in place. Yes, it’s
true that changes in competitive practice give rise to new
business models, and place emphasis on new and different
leadership skill sets. Nonetheless, such compelling changes
are the reason why high performing businesses (even the
best-of-the-best) are so difficult to sustain over time.
Last, leadership as an individual construct is a conve-
nient and short-hand way to explain success or failure.
Unfortunately, studies show that although leadership
accounts for some portion of organizational performance,
it is less than what we think, or more to the point, what
we’d like it to be. Saying that leadership only explains four,
ten, or at best fifteen percent of organizational perfor-
H.B. Cohen
mance subverts “our hunger for a clear message about the
determinants of success and failure in business, because we
need stories that offer a sense of understanding, no matter
how illusory”.
If we are really interested in bolstering leadership and
organizational performance, we need to let go of the great
man or woman theories. Even though many say they do not
believe in this theory, they still act (in practice) as if they do.
People grow and develop over time by gaining the right types
of relevant experience and assignments. People learn how to
achieve results by focusing on causal outcomes –— not tan-
gential or passive activities. Last, people develop the appro-
priate leadership skills, when we consciously design or
redesign the social context in ways that make it possible
for developmental processes to flourish, and for managers to
perform effectively and learn.
Leadership development 15

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
For gaining insight into how effective leadership development
has been in producing better leaders and bench strength
see R. Kaiser, G. Curphy, “Leadership Development: The Fail-
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Research 2013, Vol. 65, No. 4, 294—302; M. Beer, M. Finnstrom,
D. Schrader, “Why Leadership Training Fails –— and What to Do
About It”, Harvard Business Review, 2016, October Issue, pp.
50—57;
C. Feser, N. Nielsen, M. Rennie, “What’s Missing in Leadership
Development”, McKinsey Quarterly, 2017, August Issue.
For understanding the impact and what relationship
exists between leadership and organizational performance
see W. Joyce, N. Nohria, B. Roberson, What Really Works:
The 4 + 2 Formula for Sustained Business Success, New York:
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“Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Poli-
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2003: pp. 1169—1208; M. Cooper, H. Gulen, P. Rau, “Perfor-
mance for Pay: The Relationship Between CEO Incentive
Compensation and Stock Price Performance”, revised ver-
sion, Elsevier, November 2016; P. Rosenwieg, The Halo
Effect: And Eight Other Delusions that Deceive Managers,
New York, Free Press, 2007, pp. 79—82 and pp. 88—98; D.
Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, New York, Farrar, Straus,
Giroux, 2011, pp. 204—208; D. Goleman, R. Boyatzis, A.
McKee, Primal Leadership, Boston, Harvard business School
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Dangerous Half-Truths, & Total Nonsense: Profiting from
Evidence Based Management, Boston, Harvard Business
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For reading that informs the importance that experience
plays in developing leaders see D. Bray, R. Campbell, D.
Grant, Formative Years in Business: A Long Term Study of
Managerial Lives, New York, Wiley, 1974; J. Gabarro, The
Dynamics of Taking Charge, Boston, Harvard Business School
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son, Lessons of Experience: How Successful Executives
Develop on the Job, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books,
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Next Generation of Leaders, Boston, Harvard Business School
Press, 1998; J. Kotter, The Leadership Factor, New York, The
Free Press, 1988, pp. 79—94.
To learn more about results-driven approaches see
H. Cohen, “The Performance Paradox”, Academy of Manage-
ment Executive, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1998; H. Cohen, “Results:
The Forgotten Element of Quality Programs” Advanced Man-
agement Journal; Vol. 59, No. 3; Summer 1994; R. Schaffer,
H. Cohen, “Today’s Business Problems Require New HR
Strategies”, The Human Resources Professional, Summer
1991; R. Schaffer, H. Thompson, “Successful Change
Programs Begin with Results”, Harvard Business Review,
January—February 1992; K. Weick, “Small Wins: Redefining
the Scale of Social Problems”, American Psychologist Vol. 39,
No. 1, 1984, pp. 40—49; J. Pfeffer, R. Raynor, The Knowing-
Doing Gap: How Smart Companies Turn Knowledge into
Action, Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 2000;
R. Schaffer, High Impact Consulting: How Clients and
Consultants Can Leverage Rapid Results into Long term
Gains, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997, pp.
27—44.
For articles and books that discuss the effect that social
context has on developing leaders and fostering supportive
cultures see H. Cohen, E. Neilsen, Finding and Developing
Tomorrow’s Top Managers, Cornell Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1,
May 1988, pp. 34—41; J. Pfeffer, R. Raynor, Hard Facts
Dangerous Half Truths & Total Nonsense: Profiting from
Evidence-Based Management, Boston, Harvard Business
School Press, 2006, pp. 85—108; G. Morgan, Images of
Organization: The Executive Edition, San Francisco,
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 1998, pp. 111—146;
D. Cooperrider, D. Whitney, J. Stavros, Essentials of
Appreciative Inquiry, Brunswick, Ohio, Crown Custom
Publishing, Inc., 2008, pp. 14—15; K. Gergen, M. Gergen,
Social Construction: Entering the Dialogue, Taos Institute
Publications, 2004; B. Groysberg, A. Nanda, N. Nohria, The
Risky Business of Hiring Stars, Harvard business review, 2004,
May Issue: 94.

Harlow B. Cohen is a professor of Organizational Behavior, and the Faculty Director of the Master’s programs in
Positive Organization Development & Change at the Weatherhead School of Management, Department of
Organizational Behavior, Case Western Reserve University (Case Western Reserve University, Weatherhead School
of Management, Department of Organizational Behavior, 10900 Euclid Avenue, Peter B. Lewis Bldg #439,
Cleveland, OH 44106-7235, United States; 17370 Owls Hollow Lane, Chagrin Falls, OH 44023, United States.
E-mail: hbc@case.edu).