SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN.
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
MARCELO B. FERNAN
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11th Congress. On the
agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were
nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the
Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while
those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that
the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7 members of the LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then
recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that
Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not been observed
in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President recognized Senator Guingona
as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore,
such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to
use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has
not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Without
any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption
and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been
shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized
as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be accused of “capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.” Where no provision of
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.
Endencia vs. David, G.R. No. L-6355, August 31, 1953
FACTS: Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590, which contained a provision that removed all income tax exemptions of
public officers, including that of judges.
Justices Endencia and Jugo of the Court of Appeals filed a case to declare it unconstitutional before the CFI of Manila.
The CFI of Manila ruled in their favor and declared the said provision unconstitutional. It also ordered the Collector of
Internal Revenue, Saturno David, to refund the income tax collected from the magistrates.
Citing Perfecto v. Meer, the trial court declared that the collection of income taxes was a diminution of magistrates’
compensation. This allegedly violated Sec. 9, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which states that “members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive compensation will not be diminished during their
continuance in the office.”
The Solicitor General argued that the Republic Act was promulgated precisely because of the unfavorable reception of
the ruling in Perfecto v. Meer.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether Sec. 13 of RA no. 590 is constitutional – YES
RATIO: Congress enacted Sec. 13 of RA No. 590 immediately after the Supreme Court interpreted Sec. 9, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution in Perfecto V. Meer, where the High Court held that the collection of income tax from judges and
justices was a diminution of their compensation. The congressional act explicitly counters the heart of the ruling.
Because the constitution is above every enactment of Congress, it follows that Sec. 13 of RA No. 590 should also be
considered null and void.
Moreover, Congress’ enactment of the RA 590 clearly manifests that it has a different interpretation of of the
constitutional provision. This act, however, violates the doctrine of the separation of powers among the branches of the
government is and invades the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the judiciary, which is that of
interpreting and applying the laws and the Constitution.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997 (En Banc)
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It
invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
“in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.”
ISSUES:
1. Whether Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over
Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
RULING: [The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply
for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to
the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of
the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If
the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy
and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy
provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a “state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered
“state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action;
and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state action.” Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of
the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding
rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the
bidders and other interested parties.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is
reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a
higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction
itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there
is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches
the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the
Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a
perilous skirting of the basic law.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR, G.R. NO. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, July 30, 1993
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for
the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners
request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable
of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
violates the requirements of due process.
Rulings: In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the
requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the
complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy.
He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well
as future generations.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness
a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.
The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice
Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the
said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read
Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein .
All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Valenzuela, G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Facts: Private respondent San Diego thrice flunked the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Upon application
again, herein petitioner rejected the application due to MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 which contains the rule: “A
student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not
be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.” Private respondent went to the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to
compel his admission to the test. Respondent Judge granted the petition, and held that the petitioner had been
deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
Issue: Whether there was improper exercise of police power
Held: No.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education.
The court found no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in
both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and,
indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the
regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the
State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from
the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

The petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is reversed.