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Anti-Theory
Roberto Andorno

INTRODUCTION

Anti-theory is a broad name for a contemporary movement that is critical of theory as the
proper approach to ethics, or at least of certain aspects or forms of ethical theorizing. It is
however not a unified camp, as it includes, among others, advocates of neo-Aristotelian
virtue ethics, casuistry and pragmatism. Among the claims that have been made by anti-
theorists are the following: that our moral lives cannot be reduced to a legalistic application
of a set of norms; that the emphasis on theoretical principles to solve concrete practical
moral problems is misguided; that some forms of ethical theorizing have a corrupting
effect on how to live our moral lives; that ethical theories are inevitably embodied in a
particular historical and sociocultural context and therefore it is an illusion to think that
there is some neutral standpoint for practical rationality; that some accounts of morality
ignore the plurality of goods and the possibility of conflict between them; and that there
are no ‘moral experts’. These criticisms to ethical theorizing will be briefly discussed, and
then some responses to them will be summarized.

THE CRITIQUES OF ETHICAL THEORIES

An excessive emphasis on norms rather than on persons

Among the charges made by anti-theorists is that some moral theories concentrate, in a
legalistic fashion, upon obligations to perform or to abstain from certain actions, instead
of focusing on moral agents and virtues. The British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe was
a pioneer in pointing out this flaw of what she called a ‘law conception of ethics’ (1958).
Among the theories she criticized for their reliance on obligations were Mill’s utilitarian-
ism and Kant’s deontology. Taking her inspiration from Aristotle, she called for a return to

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concepts such as character, virtue and flourishing; that is, for relying on persons rather
than on norms.
Accordingly, modern virtue ethicists insist that moral life does not consist in learning some
rules and then making sure that each of our actions lives up to those rules. Instead, they stress
the paramount importance of developing good habits of character or virtues. The key idea in
this view is that ethics cannot be captured in one rule or principle, because ethics is too diverse
and imprecise to be codified; moral life is a matter of experience and ability to perceive and
to reason practically, not of learning a code of moral norms. The key moral question is not
‘what I should do’, as Kant puts it, but rather ‘how can I make myself a better person?’
In this same line of thinking, MacIntyre (1984) has advocated a radical change in the
way we think about morality and for a return to a virtue-centred ethics. He claims that in
the world in which we live the language of morality still persists, but it is in a state of
‘grave disorder’, because we possess just ‘the fragments of a conceptual scheme,’ parts of
which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived; we continue to use
many key moral concepts, ‘but we have – very largely, if not entirely – lost our comprehen-
sion, both theoretical and practical, of morality’ (1984: 2). MacIntyre’s hypothesis is that
the moral schemes that emerged from the Enlightenment philosophers were condemned to
fail from the outset because they had rejected Aristotle’s idea that human life has a proper
end (telos), and ignored the fact that human beings cannot reach this natural end without
proper preparation, which consists of an adequate education and of the personal effort in
the practice of virtues (MacIntyre, 1984: 51–5).
Similarly, but relying on Plato, Iris Murdoch has challenged moral philosophy to attend
more long-term tasks in moral vision and self-cultivation, that is, to focus on lifelong
efforts to cultivate patterns of character rather than simply on isolated moments of willing.
In her view, moral inquiry in the modern period has been impoverished precisely by its
failure to articulate a substantive account of the good as fundamental to human life.
Indeed, ‘the idea of goodness (and of virtue) has been largely superseded in Western moral
philosophy by the idea of rightness’ (Murdoch, 2001: 52).

A misguided appeal to theoretical principles

Closely related to the previous criticism is the charge that ethical theories are misguided in
their view of morality as a highly abstract set of principles that all agents are expected to
use to guide their moral behaviour as well as to evaluate the moral behaviour of others. This
is not only because, as stated in the previous paragraph, the central role in morality is
played by personal virtues, not by norms; but also because principles are necessarily too
vague and general to guide action. Furthermore, it is argued that moral theories do not usu-
ally provide any guidance on how to resolve conflicts that may arise between principles.
These criticisms have often been levelled against the so-called ‘principlism’, as devel-
oped in the field of biomedical ethics by Beauchamp and Childress (1989) in the first three
editions of their Principles of Biomedical Ethics. The proponents of casuistry, for instance
claim that absolute moral principles are ‘tyrannical’, that moral knowledge is fundamen-
tally particular (or case-based) rather than general, and that practical reasoning proceeds
by analogy from settled cases to unsettled ones (Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988). Similarly, it

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has been advanced that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way
depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles (Dancy, 2004: 7). Rather,
what is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, because whether a feature
is relevant or not in a particular case, and if so what exact role it is playing there, will
depend on the other features of the case. This means that moral reasons are necessarily
holistic, or context-specific: a feature that makes one action better can make another one
worse, and make no difference at all to a third (Dancy, 2004: 7).
Also, ethical pragmatism rejects the idea that there are any universal ethical principles.
Although it does not preclude ethical theorizing as such, or the appeal to principles in
ethics, it insists that moral theories are just social constructs that are to be evaluated in
terms of their usefulness. This is why even their most fundamental features must be subject
to modification when novel problems encountered in practice demand it. In other words,
principles are not seen as absolute fixed moral laws, but rather as provisional tools for
guiding action, that is, as mere hypothetical guides. In the specific field of health care
ethics, it has been advanced that pragmatism aims ‘to reach consensus on good outcomes
in cases that pose moral problems by a thorough process of inquiry, discussion, negotia-
tion, and reflective evaluation’, in an inductive, rather than a deductive way (Fins et al.
2003: 29, 41).

A dichotomy between moral theory and moral motives

Some accounts of morality are also criticized on the ground that they create a serious
dichotomy between their principles and the motives that inspire moral agents. This leads
practitioners of such theories to suffer from a ‘moral schizophrenia’ because they will
necessarily have a gap between their values and their motives (Stocker, 1976). Among the
ethical systems to which this critique is directed are utilitarianism, hedonism and deontology.
In order to illustrate this point, some examples are given: A man committed to utilitarian-
ism believes that an act is moral insofar as it tends to maximize utility. But if he wants to
enter into a love relationship, he will find himself in a difficult position, as he will have
a tendency not to act for the sake of the beloved, but rather for the sake of the utility
or pleasure that such relationship may provide. Therefore, if he would like to enjoy the
happiness intrinsic to love, he must willingly submit to the schizophrenic malady and hide
from himself the fact that he is a utilitarian.
A similar flaw affects Kantian deontology. A person wanting to act according to the
Categorical Imperative who is visiting a sick friend in hospital cannot admit to himself that
he is doing so because he enjoys his friend’s company, or wants to cheer him up, but is
obliged to think that he is acting in this way just because it is his duty (since, for Kant, duty
is the only valuable moral motive for action). But the truth is that he is not solely acting for
the sake of duty, but mainly for the sake of his friend. Therefore, he will experience an inter-
nal conflict between his principles and his motives, and make his moral life schizophrenic.
Both examples show, according to Stocker, that what is lacking in these theories is simply
love for the other person, which is an essential feature of the most significant human relation-
ships and constitutive of a human life worth living (1976: 456–60). Indeed love, not auton-
omy, is ‘the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent’ (Murdoch, 2001: 33).

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Bernard Williams (1985: 54–70) has made a similar critique by appealing to the notion of
‘internal reasons’: we cannot have genuine reasons to act that have no connection whatever
with anything that we really care about. Thus, mere ‘external’ arguments that, for example
something is unjust would not suffice to that purpose. We will have a reason to act only if
there is something contingently about us (our personal education, our psychological states,
etc.) such that we are previously motivated to be just. Therefore, there are no independent,
universal moral truths which can automatically provide enough reasons for action.

The historical context of practical rationality

An additional criticism to ethical theories is directed to their ambition to develop a moral
system which is detached from any particular sociocultural context. According to
MacIntyre, every rational justification of moral judgments presupposes some particular
conception of rationality. In other words, there is no rationality that is not the rationality
of some tradition. Thus, in his view, the Enlightenment’s attempt to provide an ahistorical,
rationally-grounded justification for universal moral principles was utopian. He illustrates
his thesis by examining four philosophers (Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and Hume) to
show how their different views about practical rationality derive from different sources and
the historical contexts in which they lived. He concludes that, since rational justification
must be historical, the bearers of justifications are not ‘theories’ in the abstract, but embod-
ied traditions (1988: 349–54). Nevertheless, his emphasis on culture-specific rationalities
does not lead MacIntyre to adhere to moral relativism. On the contrary, he claims that the
relativist position is wrong because it fails to admit the timeless character of the truth.
In order to solve the problem of how to reach absolute truths from a historically limited
position, MacIntyre introduces the concept of ‘epistemological crisis’, that is, situations in
which a tradition finds itself unable to evolve by using its own standards and needs to
appeal to the standards provided by another tradition. In doing so, it may find a way to
survive such a crisis, but it may also fail. And precisely because the possibility of failure
is there, relativism is false (1988: 362–9).
From a different perspective, Williams also has stressed the crucial importance of the
historical context for any account of morality. On the grounds that it is impossible to
provide ‘a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles’ (1985: 72),
he rejects both Rawls’s contractualism and Hare’s utilitarianism as they erroneously
assume a reflective agent capable of distancing himself from the life and character he is
examining (78-92). In contrast to both philosophers, Williams envisions a non-theoretical
process beginning and ending with socially and historically conditioned ethical intuitions.

Plurality of goods and moral dilemmas

A common criticism of moral theories is that they present the moral field as unitary, as if
all values were commensurable with respect to a single standard. In this respect, Williams
(1985: 16–17) asserts that ‘the desire to reduce all ethical considerations to one pattern’
is characteristic of various moral theories, which ‘try to show that one or another type
of ethical consideration is basic’: the notion of duty in deontological ethics, the best

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consequences of our acts in utilitarianism, etc. But this is ‘a reductive enterprise’ which
‘has no justification and should disappear’, because in real life we weigh different kinds
of considerations without reducing them to a single currency of comparison. This is why,
he concludes, ‘philosophy should not try to produce ethical theory’ (Williams, 1985: 17).
A related objection is that moral theorists deny the possibility of irresolvable moral
dilemmas. As they claim that all moral values are commensurable with respect to a single
standard, they tend to suggest that all moral conflicts are resolvable. But this seems to be
false: we constantly experience in our ordinary life various conflicts between different goods
that cannot simply, or not always, be resolved by appealing to an overarching value. In this
regard, Charles Larmore (1987: 10–11) argues against ‘the monistic assumption’ of moral
theory and claims that sometimes ‘we know that … conflict is irresolvable’. In his view, only
when we suspend such assumptions and acknowledge that not everything is good or right
to the extent that it is commensurable with respect to any single standard, will we be able to
recognize how much we need prudential judgment for dealing with particular situations.
But in many cases, ‘judgment will be powerless to settle the conflict’ (Larmore, 1987: 11).

There are no ‘moral experts’

Another charge against moral theories is that, since they conceive morality as an axiomatic
system of norms that should guide our behavior, then it logically follows that there are, or
can be, moral experts; that is, people who have an academic training in ethics and know
what rules to apply to the case at hand. On the contrary, anti-theorists claim that moral
problems are not necessarily best solved by the alleged ‘moral experts’, because the rule
model of decision making they employ does not always, or even usually, illuminate what
is at stake in most moral situations (Louden, 1992: 96).
Moreover, moral knowledge (if knowledge is the right word), unlike, for instance,
knowledge of physics, is simply not – or not only – theoretical knowledge. As a matter of
fact, somebody can be morally wise without having been exposed to any moral theory.
There is no reason indeed why a person who has spent time to learn moral philosophy
should be more sensitive to moral truths than any other person, and in fact may be worse
(McNaughton, 1988: 204). The true training in moral philosophy is not the acquisition of
scientific knowledge of what is right and wrong, but the development of the ability to
reflect on the nature of our judgements of right and wrong, and to explain how we should
account for that wrongness or goodness. In other words, the attainment of moral sensibility
does not necessarily result from an academic training. Rather, it can be obscured by such
training, especially when it merely consists of the encounter with a multiplicity of opposed
and irreconcilable moral theories.

SOME RESPONSES TO ANTI-THEORISTS

In light of the criticisms that have been made against moral theorizing, some authors, while
recognizing that some part of truth is contained in such objections, have strongly argued
in favour of the possibility and, moreover, of the need for moral theory.

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Robert Louden claims that anti-theorists often criticize a caricature of moral theories,
which does not correspond to the accounts of morality that some moral philosophers, such
as Kant – one of the preferred targets of anti-theorists –, have really proposed. Louden
agrees with virtue-centred ethicists to say that ‘a moral conception that gives priority to
being over doing is superior’ (Louden, 1992: 28–30). Moreover, he acknowledges
that there are indeed bad moral theories, which are too abstract, obfuscatory, contrary to
our common moral intuitions, or simply useless. This is why he is sympathetic with the
complaint that ‘moral theorists tend to be constitutionally disposed toward overly
schematic and highly general accounts whose usefulness is a very open question’ (Louden,
1992: 126).
But he claims that we do not need to abandon altogether moral theorizing for developing
a plausible understanding of morality. We need better theories, not the abolition of
theories; we need more, not less, reflection in ethics. He points out that, contrary to what
is usually assumed, Aristotle also, no less than Kant, developed a moral theory (Louden,
1992: 99–116). Louden proposes an alternative model of moral theory which is ‘empiri-
cally informed and less reductionistic than current conceptions’ (1992: 139). He notes,
however, that such a theory will inevitably need the construction of some principles ‘to
help people decide what to do and how to live’, because morality is not a merely descriptive
undertaking, but has a normative dimension (Louden, 1992: 141).
Martha Nussbaum observes that today ‘ethical theory is under attack’, not from outside
as in past centuries, but ‘from within’ (2000: 227–30). She attempts to respond to such
attacks, first of all, by stressing the crucial importance of distinguishing between theories
and rules. The criticism of systems of rules does not need to entail a criticism of ethical
theory, as anti-theorists assume; rather, on the contrary, it can give us reasons for turning
to an ethical theory. It is precisely theory that ‘enables us to understand the limitations of
general rules in ways we could not do otherwise, therefore to correct the deficiencies
inherent in any system or rules’ (Nussbaum, 2000: 231). Nussbaum defines moral theory
as ‘a set of reasons and interconnected arguments, explicitly and systematically articu-
lated, with some degree of abstractness and generality, which gives direction for ethical
practice’ (2000: 233–4).
On these grounds, she claims that no ethical theory is a system of rules. Theories, unlike
systems of rules, offer arguments, reasons, explanations; they address their recipients as
reasoning beings (Nussbaum, 2000: 236–40). This distinction does not mean however that
ethical theories should dismiss rules as pointless. Most ethical theories, from Socrates
onward, draw heavily on the wisdom embodied in rules and conventions. This is under-
standable, since rules enable us to preserve those general judgments that we regard as
especially sound; they summarize the decisions of wise judges, refresh our memory, shape
and inform our vision, and focus our attention on aspects that we might otherwise have
missed (Nussbaum, 2000: 240–1).
But the appeal to some rules is just one element among others of a theoretical account
of morality, not the whole morality. At a second stage, Nussbaum responds point by point
to the criticisms made by anti-theorists. She argues, for instance that it is simply mistaken
to believe that moral theories ignore moral psychology and the importance of emotions.
All major theories have a deep interest in the passions, and all have accounts of how insti-
tutions and education can contribute to shape the passion so that they are more likely to

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support good action. This is as true for Kant as it is for Aristotle (Nussbaum, 2000: 243).
It is also false to affirm that moral theories ignore moral dilemmas and neglect the plural-
ity of goods. Although Kant and Aristotle do not give prominent recognition to moral
dilemmas, their theories are compatible with such recognition as well as with leaving
space for local or personal specifications of ends, without renouncing their claim to uni-
versality (2000: 244). Anti-theorists are naïve in thinking that the exchange of ethical
criticism in everyday life is sufficient to guide our practices. They ignore the brute fact that
theory can help our good judgment to prevail by giving us additional opposition to the bad
influence of corrupt desires, judgments, and passions. This is why we need theory in ethics
(Nussbaum, 2000: 252–4).
Similarly, Margaret Little argues that the critiques made by anti-theorists are often
‘objections to impoverished moral theory, not to moral theory per se’ (2001: 32–3).
Moreover, such critiques are in fact not inconsistent with the idea that we can and should
build a moral theory. Even Aristotle, who is often claimed as an ally of anti-theorists, ‘did
not confine himself to commenting on individual cases’, but ‘insisted that the person of
moral wisdom must know the “why”, not just the “that”; something that sounds, one might
have thought, like a call to theoretical abstraction’ (Little, 2001: 32). She makes the case
that theory is ‘essential to moral life’, as we need moral generalizations for guiding and
illuminating what our life experience reveals (Little, 2001: 39).

CONCLUSION

The anti-theory movement developed from dissatisfaction with the heavy role that the
notions of duty and obligation play in some modern accounts of morality. It also grew out
of an objection to the reduction of morality to the mere formal compliance with a set of
abstract rules. In this regard, anti-theory represents a refreshing approach to ethics and a
call for a more realistic and comprehensive vision of morality. It suggests the need to focus
on persons rather on acts, on being good persons rather than on complying with rules.
Nevertheless, some of the criticisms made by anti-theorists go too far when they attack
ethical theorizing as such, because philosophy is by its very nature a theoretical enterprise.
Ethics, which is a part of philosophy, cannot be explained and justified without the appeal
to some concepts and rules, which necessarily involve some degree of abstraction. Practical
rationality is after all a form of rationality: the use of reason in the service of action. The
challenge consists therefore in developing an account of morality which is not made up of
pale abstractions divorced from practice, but rather takes into account how we actually
deliberate in our daily lives and tries to identify the rational judgements that are implicit
in our search for goodness.

REFERENCES

Anscombe, Elizabeth (1958) ‘Modern moral philosophy’, Philosophy, 33: 1–19. [Reprinted in R. Crisp and M. Slote
(eds) (1997) Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 26–44.

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Beauchamp, Tom L. and Childress, James (1989) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Dancy, Jonathan (2004) Ethics without Principles. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fins, Joseph, Bacchetta, Matthew and Miller, Franklin (2003) ‘Clinical pragmatism: A method of moral problem
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Jonsen, Albert and Toulmin, Stephen (1988) The Abuse of Casuistry. A History of Moral Reasoning. Berkeley,
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Larmore, Charles (1987) Patterns of Moral Complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Louden, Robert B. (1992) Morality and Moral Theory: A Reappraisal and Reaffirmation. New York: Oxford
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McNaughton, David (1988) Moral Vision. An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Murdoch, Iris (2001) The Sovereignty of Good. London: Routledge.
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