Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
PERFECTION;
Aquilino Nietes v. Court of Appeals and Dr. ISSUE:Whether the petitioner has can buy
Pablo Garcia the property.
FACTS: Yes. The contract does not say that Nietes had
to pay the stipulated price of P100,000 before
On October 19, 1959, said petitioner and exercising his option to buy the property in
respondent Dr. Pablo C. Garcia entered into a question.In the case of an option to buy, the
"Contract of Lease with Option to Buy." creditor may validly and effectively exercise
Instead of paying the lessor in the manner set his right by merely advising the debtor of the
forth in the contract, Nietes paid in various former's decision to buy and expressing his
amounts. readiness to pay the stipulated price, provided
On or about July 31, 1964, Dr. Garcia's that the same is available and actually
counsel wrote to Nietes the letterrescinding delivered to the debtor upon execution and
the contract. Nietes, thru his counsel, sent his delivery by him of the corresponding deed of
reply stating that he did not violate any terms sale. Unless and until the debtor shall have
of the contract and will exercise his option to done this the creditor is not and cannot be in
purchase the land and building. default in the discharge of his obligation to
pay.
On July 26, 1965, Nietes deposited with the
branch office of the Agro-Industrial Bank in Nietes had validly and effectively exercised
Angeles City checks amounting to his option to buy the property of Dr. Garcia,
P84,860.50, as balance of the purchase price at least, on December 13, 1962, when he
acknowledged receipt from Mrs. Nietes of On January 15, 1975, the spouses
the sum of P2,200 then delivered by her "in Vallejeraplaintiffs-spouses (respondents
partial payment on the purchase of the herein) filed this action against the Spouses
property" described in the "Contract of Lease Vasquez defendants-spouses (petitioners
with Option to Buy"; that from the aggregate herein) seeking to redeem Lot No. 1860 of the
sum of P29,957.00 paid to him up to that HimamaylanCadastre which was previously
time, the sum of P12,708.33 should be sold by respondents to petitioners on
deducted as rental for the period from June September 21, 1964.
1960 to December 13, 1962, or roughly thirty
The said lot was registered in the name of the
(30) months and a half, thereby leaving a
respondents. On October 1959, the same was
balance of P17,248.67, consisting of
leased by respondents to the petitioners up to
P12,291.67, representing the rentals for the
crop year 1966-67, which was extended to
unused period of the lease, plus P4,957.00
crop year 1968-69. After the execution of the
paid in excess of said rental and advanced
lease, repondents took possession of the lot,
solely on account of the purchase price; that
up to now and devoted the same to the
deducting said sum of P17,248.67 from the
cultivation of sugar.
agreed price of P100,000.00, there results a
balance of P82,751.33 which should be paid On September 21, 1964, the respondents sold
by Nietes to Dr. Garcia, upon execution by the lot to the petitioners under a Deed of Sale
the latter of the corresponding deed of for the amount of P9,000.00. The Deed of
absolute sale of the property in question, free Sale was duly ratified and notarized. On the
from any lien or encumbrance whatsoever, in same day and along with the execution of the
favor of Nietes, and the delivery to him of Deed of Sale, a separate instrument,
said deed of sale, as well as of the owner's denominated as Right to Repurchase was
duplicate of the certificate of title to said executed by the parties granting respondents
property; and that Dr. Garcia should the right to repurchase the lot for P12,000.00,
indemnify Nietes in the sum of P2,500 as and likewise duly ratified and notarized. By
for attorney's fees. virtue of the sale, petitioners secured TCT
No. T-58898 in their name.
Thus modified, the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga is hereby On January 2, 1969, respondents sold the
affirmed in all other respects, and that of the same lot to Benito Derrama, Jr., after
Court of Appeals reversed. securing the petitioners' title, for the sum of
P12,000.00. Upon the protestations of
petitioners, assisted by counsel, the said
second sale was cancelled after the payment
of P12,000.00 by the petitioners to Derrama.
Spouses Cipriano Vasquez and
ValerianaGayanelo v. Court of Appeals and petitioners resisted this action for redemption
Spouses Martin Vallejera and Apolonia Olea on the premise that the Right to Repurchase
is just an option to buy since it is not
G.R. No. 83759 July 12, 1991 embodied in the same document of sale but in
FACTS: a separate document, and since such option is
not supported by a consideration distinct
from the price, said deed for right to In the instant case, since the transaction
repurchase is not binding upon them. between the petitioners and private
respondents was not a sale with right to
After trial, the court rendered judgment
repurchase, the private respondents cannot
against the petitioners, ordering them to resell
avail of Article 1601 of the Civil Code which
the lot of the HimamaylanCadastre to the
provides for conventional redemption.
respondents for the repurchase price of
P24,000.00, which amount combines the
price paid for the first sale and the price paid
by defendants to Benito Derrama, Jr.
Petitioners moved for, but were denied Ang Yu Asuncion, Arthur Go and Keh Tiong
reconsideration. v. Court of Appeals and Buen Realty
Development Corporation
ISSUE: Whether there is a sale with right to
repurchase between the parties. G.R. No. 109125 December 2, 1994
HELD: FACTS:
No. The nature of the transaction between the On July 29, 1987, an amended Complaint for
parties is not a sale with right to repurchase. Specific Performance was filed by petitioners
Conventional redemption takes place "when Ang Yu Asuncion and others against Bobby
the vendor reserves the right to repurchase Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan
the thing sold, with the obligation to comply before RTC.Petitioners (Ang Yu) alleged
with the provisions of Article 1616 and other that:
stipulations which may have been agreed 1. they are the tenants or lessees of
upon. (Article 1601, Civil Code). residential and commercial spaces
In this case, there was no reservation made by owned by Bobby Unijeng and others
the vendor. Thus, it was more of an option to located in Binondo, Manila, since
buy or a mere promise on the part of the 1935;
vendee to resell the property to the vendor. 2. that on several occasions before
October 9, 1986, the lessors informed
The right of repurchase is not a right granted the lessees (petitioners) that they are
the vendor by the vendee in a subsequent offering to sell the premises and are
instrument, but is a right reserved by the giving them priority to acquire the
vendor in the same instrument of sale as one same;
of the stipulations of the contract. Once the 3. that during the negotiations, Bobby
instrument of absolute sale is executed, the Cu Unjieng offered a price of six
vendor can no longer reserve the right to million while they made a counter
repurchase, and any right thereafter granted offer of P5-million; and
the vendor by the vendee in a separate 4. that they wrote them on October 24,
instrument cannot be a right of repurchase but 1986 asking that they specify the
some other right like the option to buy in the terms and conditions of the offer to
instant case. sell; that when plaintiffs did not
receive any reply, they sent another
letter dated January 28, 1987 with the HELD:
same request;
No. In the law on sales, the so-called "right of
The RTC found that Cu Unjiengs’ offer to first refusal" is an innovative juridical
sell was never accepted by the petitioners for relation. Needless to point out, it cannot be
the reason that they did not agree upon the deemed a perfected contract of sale under
terms and conditions of the proposed sale, Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Neither can
hence, there was no contract of sale at all. The the right of first refusal, understood in its
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the normal concept, per se be brought within the
lower court. This decision was brought to the purview of an option under the second
Supreme Court by petition for review on paragraph of Article 1479, aforequoted, or
certiorari which subsequently denied the possibly of an offer under Article 13199 of
appealfor insufficiency in form and the same Code.An option or an offer would
substance. require, among other things, a clear certainty
on both the object and the cause or
On November 15, 1990,while the case was
consideration of the envisioned contract.
pending consideration by the Supreme Court,
the Cu Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of In a right of first refusal, while the object
Sale transferring the subject property to might be made determinate, the exercise of
petitioner Buen Realty and Development the right, however, would be dependent not
Corporation. only on the grantor's eventual intention to
enter into a binding juridical relation with
Petitioner Buen Realty and Development
another but also on terms, including the price,
Corporation, as the new owner of the subject
that obviously are yet to be later firmed up.
property, wrote a letter to the lessees
Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as
demanding that the latter vacate the premises.
merely belonging to a class of preparatory
On August 30, 1991, the RTC ordered the Cu juridical relations governed not by contracts
Unjiengs to execute the necessary Deed of (since the essential elements to establish the
Sale of the property in litigation in favor of vinculum juris would still be indefinite and
Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur Go inconclusive) but by, among other laws of
for the consideration of P15 Million pesos in general application, the pertinent scattered
recognition of petitioners’ right of first provisions of the Civil Code on human
refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of conduct.
Title be issued in favor of the buyer. The
Even on the premise that such right of first
court also set aside the title issued to Buen
refusal has been decreed under a final
Realty Corporation for having been executed
judgment, like here, its breach cannot justify
in bad faith. On September 22, 1991, the
correspondingly an issuance of a writ of
Judge issued a writ of execution.
execution under a judgment that merely
The CA reversed the RTC ruling. recognizes its existence, nor would it
sanction an action for specific performance
ISSUE: Whether the right of first refusal is without thereby negating the indispensable
deemed as a perfected contract of sale and element of consensuality in the perfection of
whether the filing of the writ of execution is contracts.
a proper remedy.
The final judgment in the case has merely Theater. The Contract of Lease was likewise
accorded a "right of first refusal" in favor of for a period of 20 years.
petitioners. The consequence of such a
Both leases contained a clause giving
declaration entails no more than what has
Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the
been said. In fine, if, as it is here so conveyed
subject properties. Sadly, on July 30, 1978 -
to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the failure
within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject
of private respondents to honor the right of
properties were sold by Carmelo to
first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. for
execution on the judgment, since there is
eleven million smackers, without their first
none to execute, but an action for damages in
being offered to Mayfair.
a proper forum for the purpose.
As a result of the sale of the subject properties
to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale
Equitorial Realty Development v. Mayfair between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific
Theater performance, and damages. RTC decided for
G.R. No. 106063 November 21, 1996 Carmelo and Equatorial. Tsk tsk.
Petitioners own a property in Tacloban City G.R. No. 115849. January 24, 1996
which they intend to sell for 6.5M. They gave
FACTS:
the respondents the right to purchase the
property. Respondents replied that they agree Producers Bank (now called First Philippine
to buy the property and they will negotiate for International Bank), which has been under
details. Petitioner sent another telegram conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6
informing respondents that their proposal is parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement
accepted and a contract will be prepared. with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for
the two to purchase the parcels of land for a
Atty. Pedro Gamboa arrived bringing a
purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The
contact with an altered mode of payment
said agreement was made by Demetria and
which says that the balance payment should
Janolo with the Bank’s manager, Mercurio
be paid within 30 days instead of the former
Rivera. Later however, the Bank, through its
90 days. (Original terms: P2M payment upon
conservator, Leonida Encarnacion, sought
execution and P4.5M after 90 days)
the repudiation of the agreement as it alleged
ISSUE: Whether there is a valid contract of that Rivera was not authorized to enter into
sale between the parties. such an agreement, hence there was no valid
contract of sale. Subsequently, Demetria and
HELD: Janolo sued Producers Bank. The regional
trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al.
The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of forum and the parties are not precluded from
Appeals. seeking remedies elsewhere.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares
of stocks with the said Bank, filed a motion
for intervention with the trial court. The trial Maria P. Vda. De Jomoc, Et al. V. The Court
court denied the motion since the trial has of Appeals, Regional Trial Court of Misamis
been concluded already and the case is now Oriental
pending appeal. Subsequently, Co, assisted G.R. No. 92860 August 2, 1991
by ACCRA law office, filed a separate civil
case against Carlos Ejercito as successor-in- FACTS:
interest (assignee) of Demetria and Janolo A parcel of land in CDO owned by late
seeking to have the purported contract of sale Pantaleon Jomoc was fictitiously sold to third
be declared unenforceable against the Bank. persons in which the last transferee are the
Ejercito et al argued that the second case spouses Mariano and Maria So. Maria Vda de
constitutes forum shopping. Jomoc filed suit to recover the property and
ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum won.
shopping. While pending appeal, Vda de Jomoc
HELD: executed executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale of Land with private
Yes. There is forum shopping because there respondent for P300,000.00. The document
is identity of interest and parties between the was not yet signed by all the parties nor
first case and the second case. There is notarized but in the meantime, Maura So had
identity of interest because both cases sought made partial payments amounting to
to have the agreement, which involves the P49,000.00.
same property, be declared unenforceable as
against the Bank. There is identity of parties So demanded from the heirs of Jomoc for the
even though the first case is in the name of execution of final deed of conveyance but the
the bank as defendant, and the second case is latter did no comply. As such, So filed a civil
in the name of Henry Co as plaintiff. There is case and a notice of lis pendens were placed
still forum shopping here because Henry Co in the title of the land.
essentially represents the bank. Both cases On the same date, the heirs of Jomoc
aim to have the bank escape liability from the executed another extra-judicial settlement
agreement it entered into with Demetria et al. with absolute sale in favor of intervenors Lim
The Supreme Court also discussed that to Leong Kang and Lim Pue claiming that they
combat forum shopping, which originated as believe that So already backed-out from the
a concept in international law, the principle agreement.
of forum non conveniens was developed. The ISSUE: Whether the sale is enforceable.
doctrine of forum non conveniens provides
that a court, in conflicts of law cases, may HELD:
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it Since petitioners admit the existence of the
is not the most “convenient” or available extra-judicial settlement, the court finds that
there was meeting of the minds between the which then reduced the amount of the annual
parties and hence, there is a valid contract that rental from 400 to 320 php. When Guillerma
has been partly executed. died, Santos sent Cuyugan a notice to comply
with the 420 php rental, which was agreed
The contract of sale of real property even if
upon prior to the payment of 1000php or he
not complete in form, so long as the essential
will eject Cuyugan from the land. Cuyugan
requisites of consent of the contracting
then offered to pay the balance that his
parties, object, and cause of the obligation
mother owes Santos by virtue of the right to
concur and they were clearly established to
repurchase agreed upon on the deed of sale,
be present, is valid and effective as between
but Santos refused to do so.
the parties. Public document is only needed
to bind third persons. ISSUE: Whether there is a valid sale.
The payment made by So is a clear proof of HELD:
her intention to acquire the property and the
No. The Supreme Court held that what should
petitioners cannot claim about the respondent
be given force is the intention of the parties,
backing out. The sale to the intervenors Lim
and not the provisions of the instrument on its
cannot be recognized because when they
face. Under the provisions of contracts, for a
bought the property, there was already a
valid contract to exist, there should be:
notice of lis pendens and the sale cannot be
said to be in good faith. 1) consent
2) cause
G.R. No. 10265 March 3, 1916 Thus, in the present case, what is consented
by both parties is that this deed of sale is only
FACTS: in consideration for a loan, or by a nature of
Eutiquiyano Cuyugan filed an action to a contract of mortgage. Moreover, by way of
compel Santos to enforce his right to evidence it was established by the court that
repurchase in the deed of sale entered into by the parties indeed treat such as a contract of
his late mother, Guillerma, with the loan rather than a deed of sale when Santos,
defendant. Allegedly, a deed of sale of the when given by Guillerma 1000 php in favor
subject land was entered into by Guillerma, of such contract, lowered the payment of the
and Santos with a right to repurchase the land rental from 400-320 php. Since the
in a stipulated period of time, although this agreement was the 400 be equal to the interest
deed of sale is executed as a security for a per annum, when the loan was reduced, the
loan that Guillerma have with Santos. In the interest as well reduced. This transaction
deed of sale, it further stated that Guillerma proved that the treatment and the intention of
shall continue to have possession of the land, the parties was indeed as a security for the
and pay an annual rental of Php 420 per loan, and not as a deed of sale appearing
annum which is the amount equal to the before the face of the contract.
loan’s interest. That after sometime,
Guillerma paid 1,000 pesos on the loan,
A. A. Addison, v. Marciana Felix and delivered and that 2/3 of the other half were
Balbino Tioco in the possession of a third person. She then
filed for a declaration of the rescission of the
G.R. No. L-12342 August 3, 1918
contract, whereby she prayed that petitioner
FACTS: return her P3000 plus interest and indemnity.
Four (4) parcels of land as describe in a public ISSUE: Whether delivery of the public
instrument was subject of a contract of sale instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the
between the petitioner and the defendant. subject matter of the sale.
Defendant paid 3000 upon the execution of
HELD:
deeds and promised to pay 2000 on July 15,
1914 and another 5000 (30) days after the No. The Code imposes upon the vendor the
issuance of her certificate of title obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing
is considered to be delivered when it is placed
The contract was stipulated as follows:
"in the hands and possession of the vendee."
That the defendant is to pay P10 within ten (Civ. Code, art. 1462.) It is true that the same
years for trees in bearing and P5 for trees not article declares that the execution of a public
in bearing with the condition that it will not instruments is equivalent to the delivery of
exceed the amount of P85,000. the thing which is the object of the contract,
but, in order that this symbolic delivery may
That the purchaser shall deliver 25% of the produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary
value of the products "from the moment she that the vendor shall have had such control
takes possession of them until the Torrens over the thing sold that, at the moment of the
certificate of title be issued in her favor." sale, its material delivery could have been
Further stipulated was that "within one year made. It is not enough to confer upon the
from the date of the certificate of title in favor purchaser the ownership and the right of
of Marciana Felix, this latter may rescind the possession. The thing sold must be placed in
present contract of purchase and sale, in his control. When there is no impediment
which case Marciana Felix shall be obliged to whatever to prevent the thing sold passing
return to me, A. A. Addison, the net value of into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole
all the products of the four parcels sold, and I will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through
shall obliged to return to her, Marciana Felix, the execution of a public instrument is
all the sums that she may have paid me, sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the
together with interest at the rate of 10 per cent execution of the instrument, the purchaser
per annum." cannot have the enjoyment and material
tenancy of the thing and make use of it
In 1915, Addison filed a suit to compel the himself or through another in his name,
defendant to pay him the P2000 with interest because such tenancy and enjoyment are
as in the accordance of the terms of the opposed by the interposition of another will,
contract. However, in a form of special then fiction yields to reality — the delivery
defense, Felix alleges that the petitioner has not been effected.
failed to do his obligation of the contract by
failing to deliver the parcels of land. That out The execution of a public instrument is
of the 4 parcels of land only 2 of it where sufficient for the purposes of the
abandonment made by the vendor; but it is conveyed the said properties to her for the
not always sufficient to permit of the sum of P80.00. She said the amount was
apprehension of the thing by the purchaser. earned by her mother as a worker at the
Tabacalera factory. She claimed to be the
It is evident, then, in the case at bar, that the
illegitimate daughter of Domingo Melad,
mere execution of the instrument was not a
with whom she and her mother were living
fulfillment of the vendors' obligation to
when he died in 1945. She moved out of the
deliver the thing sold, and that from such non-
farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan
fulfillment arises the purchaser's right to
approached her and asked permission to
demand, as she has demanded, the rescission
cultivate the land and to stay therein. She had
of the sale and the return of the price. (Civ.
agreed on condition that he would deliver
Code, arts. 1506 and 1124.)
part of the harvest from the farm to her, which
Inasmuch as the rescission is made by virtue he did from that year to 1958. The deliveries
of the provisions of law and not by having stopped, she then consulted the
contractual agreement, it is not the municipal judge who advised her to file the
conventional but the legal interest that is complaint against Danguilan. Melad’s
demandable. mother, her only other witness, corroborated
this testimony. Daguilan testified that he was
the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo’s
Felix Danguilan v. Intermediate Appellate niece, whom Domingo Melad and his wife
Court, Apolonia Melad, assisted by her Juana Malupang had taken into their home as
husband, Jose Tagacay their ward as they had no children of their
own. He and his wife lived with the couple in
G.R. No. L-69970 November 28, 1988 their house on the residential lot and helped
Two lots were owned by Domingo Melad. Domingo with the cultivation of the farm.
The lots are claimed by both Felix Daguilan Domingo Melad signed in 1941 a private
and Apolonia Melad (and her husband Jose instrument in which he gave Daguilan the
Tagacay). On 29 January 1962, Apolonia farm and in 1943 another private instrument
Melad filed a complaint against Daguilan in in which he also gave him the residential lot,
the then CFI Cagayan for recovery of a farm on the understanding that the latter would
lot and a residential lot which she claimed she take care of the grantor and would bury him
had purchased from Domingo Melad in 1943 upon his death. Danguilan presented three
and were now being unlawfully withheld by other witnesses to corroborate his statements
Daguilan. In his answer, Daguilan denied the and to prove that he had been living in the
allegation and averred that he was the owner land since his marriage to Isidra and had
of the said lots of which he had been in open, remained in possession thereof after
continuous and adverse possession, having Domingo Melad’s death in 1945. Two of said
acquired them from Domingo Melad in 1941 witnesses declared that neither the plaintiff
and 1943. The case was dismissed for failure nor her mother lived in the land with
to prosecute but was refiled in 1967. At the Domingo Melad. The trial court believed
trial, Melad presented a deed of sale dated 4 Daguilan and rendered a decision based
December 1943, purportedly signed by mainly on the issue of possession.
Domingo Melad and duly notarized, which
ISSUE: Whether there was delivery in favor Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar v. Ester T.
of respondent in alleged sale. Villablanca, Zosimo Villablanca, Eustaquia
Bocar and Catalina Bocar
HELD:
G.R. No. L-21998 November 10, 1975
No. No constructive delivery allowed if
property is in actual and adverse possession FACTS:
of a third person. In our jurisdiction, it is a
On 4 February 1963, Calixto Pasagui and
fundamental and elementary principle that
Fausta Mosar filed a complaint with the CFI
ownership does not pass be mere stipulation
Tacloban City, alleging that on 15 November
but only by delivery and the execution of a
1962, for and in consideration of P2,800, they
public document does not constitute
bought from Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina
sufficient delivery where the property
Bocar a parcel of agricultural land with an
involved is in the actual and adverse
area of 2.6814 hectares, situated in
possession of third persons.
Hamindangon, Pastrana, Leyte; that the
Therefore, in our Civil Code it is a corresponding document of sale was
fundamental principle in all matters of executed, notarized on the same date, and
contracts and a well- known doctrine of law recorded in the Registry of Deeds of
that "non mudis pactis sed traditione dominia Tacloban, Leyte on 16 November 1962; that
rerum transferuntur". In conformity with said during the first week of February 1963,
doctrine as established in paragraph 2 of spouses Ester T. Villablanca and Zosimo
article 609 of said code, that "the ownership Villablanca, “illegally and without any right,
and other property rights are acquired and whatsoever, took possession of the property
transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or harvesting coconuts from the coconut
intestate succession, and, in consequence of plantation thereon, thus depriving Pasaqui
certain contracts, by tradition". and Mosar of its possession; that despite
demands made by Pasagui and Mosar upon
In accordance with such disposition and
the Villablancas “to surrender to them the
provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes
property and its possession” the latter failed
a necessary and indispensable requisite for
or refused to return said parcel of land to the
the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the
former, causing them damage; and that
same by virtue of a contract.
Eustaquia and Catalina Bocar, vendors of the
One who is in possession is presumed to be property, are included defendants in the
the owner. In this case, there no dispute that complaint by virtue of the warranty clause
it is Danguilan and not Melad who is in actual contained in the document of sale.
possession of the litigated properties. And
even if the claim of petitioner and respondent
ISSUE: Whether public instrument amounts
are weak, judgment must be in favor of the
to delivery.
Danguilan for one who is in possession is
presumed to be the owner, and cannot be HELD:
obliged to show or prove a better right.
The execution of the deed of absolute sale in
a public instrument is equivalent to delivery
of the land subject of the sale. This
presumptive delivery only holds true when cleared before it delivers the truck and
there is no impediment that may prevent the tractor.
passing of the property from the hands of the
Meanwhile, another case penned “GELAC
vendor into those of the vendee. It can be
Trading Inc vs. Wilfredo Dy” was pending in
negated by the reality that the vendees
Cebu as a case to recover for a sum of money
actually failed to obtain material possession
(P12,269.80). By a writ of execution the court
of the land subject of the sale. In the present
in Cebu ordered to seize and levy the tractor
case, Pasagui and Mosar had not acquired
which was in the premise of LIBRA, it was
physical possession of the land since its
sold in a public auction to which it was
purchase on 12 November 1962. As a matter
purchased by GELAC. The latter then sold
of fact, their purpose in filing the complaint
the tractor to Antonio Gonzales.
in Civil Case 3285 is precisely to “get the
possession of the property.” ISSUE: Whether the ownership of the farm
tractor had already passed to petitioner when
said tractor was levied on by the sheriff
pursuant to an alias writ of execution issued
in another case in favor of GELAC.
Perfecto Dy, Jr. v. Court Of Appeals, Gelac
Trading Inc., and Antonio V. Gonzales HELD:
G.R. No. 92989 July 8, 1991 Yes. The mortgagor who gave the property as
security under a chattel mortgage did not part
FACTS: with the ownership over the same. He had the
Wilfredo Dy purchased a truck and a farm right to sell it although he was under the
tractor through LIBRA which was also obligation to secure the written consent of the
mortgaged with the latter, as a security to the mortgagee or he lays himself open to criminal
loan. prosecution under the provision of Article
319 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. And
Petitioner, expresses his desire to purchase even if no consent was obtained from the
his brother’s tractor in a letter to LIBRA mortgagee, the validity of the sale would still
which also includes his intention to shoulder not be affected.
its mortgage. LIBRA approved the request.
At the time that Wilfredo Dy executed a deed There is no reason why Wifredo Dy, as the
of absolute sale in favor of petitioner, the chattel mortgagor cannot sell the subject
tractor and truck were in the possession of tractor. There is no dispute that the consent of
LIBRA for his failure to pay the amortization. Libra Finance was obtained in the instant
case. Libra allowed the petitioner to purchase
When petitioner finally fulfilled its obligation the tractor and assume the mortgage debt of
to pay the tractor, LIBRA would only release his brother. The sale between the brothers
the same only if he would also pay for the was therefore valid and binding as between
truck. In order to fulfil LIBRA’s condition, them and to the mortgagee, as well.
petitioner convinced his sister to pay for the
remaining truck, to which she released a Article 1496 of the Civil Code states that the
check amounting to P22,000. LIBRA ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the
however, insisted that the check must be first vendee from the moment it is delivered to
him in any of the ways specified in Articles
1497 to 1501 or in any other manner
signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
We agree with the petitioner that Articles
1498 and 1499 are applicable in the case at
bar.
In the instant case, actual delivery of the
subject tractor could not be made. However,
there was constructive delivery already upon
the execution of the public instrument
pursuant to Article 1498 and upon the
consent or agreement of the parties when the
thing sold cannot be immediately transferred
to the possession of the vendee (Article
1499).