REGISTRATION OF VOTERS does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the

Yra vs Abano right." The distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is
such, and a registered qualified elector and the respondent is such although
PETITIONER Marcos Yra: the vice-president elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan, not in his home municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the right
who challenges the right of the respondent, RESPONDENT Maximo Abano: of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.It should not be forgotten
the municipal president elect of Meycauayan Facts: Respondent Maximo that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to be their
Abano is a native of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he transferred local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be
to Manila to study. While temporarily residing in Manila, Abano registered as respected.
a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a member of the bar and after the
death of his father, Abano returned to Meycauayan to live there. From May
10, 1927, up to present, Abano has considered himself a resident of
Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching, he made an
application for cancellation of registration in Manila dated April 3, 1928, but
this application was rejected by the city officials for the reason that it was not
deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano
presented himself as a candidate for municipal president of Meycauayan in
the 1928 elections and was elected by popular vote to that office. Petitioner
Marcos Yra assails the eligibility of Abano on the ground that he had not
been a resident of Meycauayan for at least one year previous to the election.

Issue: Is the non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the
reason that he was not a “qualified voter in his municipality”, connoting that
he was not a “qualified elector therein”, sufficient to nullify his election?

Held: No. Ratio Decidendi: One of the qualifications required by law of a

person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified
elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term "qualified" when
applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a
registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to
register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications
prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in
section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the
municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be
voted for. Furthermore, the law of Kentucky provides that "No person shall
be eligible to any office who is not at time of his election a qualified voter of
the city and who has not resided therein three years preceding his election."
It was said that "The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it
is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One
may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering
Akbayan-Youth, et. al. vs. Comelec
Facts:
Akbayan-Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC)
to conduct a special registration before the 14 May 2001 General Elections,
of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million
youth failed to register on or before the 27 December 2000 deadline set by
the COMELEC under RA 8189. Acting on the clamor of the students and
civic
leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral
Reforms, Suffrage, and People’s Participation, through a Letter dated 25
January 2001, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of
discussing the extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those
who were not able to register before the COMELEC deadline. Subsequent to
a RA 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the
public hearing and on 29 January 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and
Lantion submitted Memorandum 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for
a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only. On 8 February 2001,
the COMELEC issued Resolution 3584, which denied the request to conduct
a weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their
two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17-18, 2001.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus, which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent
COMELEC’s Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of RA 8189
unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise,
petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing COMELEC
to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration
petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to
vote in the 14 May 2001 General Elections.
No. In a representative democracy, the right of suffrage, although
accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the
fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws
skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents and
purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished right from
ravishment and preserve the democratic institutions our people have, for so
long, guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
The
right of suffrage is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage,
as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and
procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and
other repositories of law. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen
to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he
must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Since Section 8 of
period starting 120 days before a regular election, the assailed COMELEC
Resolution should be upheld. Truly, it is an accepted doctrine in
administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the
operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great
nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possibly do
or not do, under prevailing circumstances.

Issue:
Whether the COMELEC may be directed, through mandamus, to hold a
registration of new voters for the 14 May 2001 General Elections on 17-18
February 2001

Held:
KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe
TOPIC: Biometrics validation
FACTS:
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory
biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean,
complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of
biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics
have not been captured shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who
fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for
registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated x x
x.”
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by
Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others, the said Resolution
provides that: “the registration records of voters without biometrics data who
failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications
for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections shall be deactivated.
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an
unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property.
Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation
on October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to
the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration
procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such
right. The process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to
vote.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must
nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the
level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated
by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which propagates a socio-
economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person’s ability THIRD ISSUE: No.
to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good -the same cannot
be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case. Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

SECOND ISSUE: Yes. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall,

however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)
In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the burden The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein
befalls upon the State to prove the same. refer to the prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer
be conducted. The subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to
Presence of compelling state interest conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period
which may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the
Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation administrative necessities and other exigencies.
requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was
precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible
elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having
flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. The foregoing
consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-
said interest

Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics

validation, whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally
appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent
evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints
recorded.

Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate

registered voters to submit themselves to validation every time there is an
election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the validation process
one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided
that he remains an active voter.

Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters

from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such
status, they could still apply for reactivation.
CANDIDATES
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649, 2013-04-16
Facts:
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.[4
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship
To further bolster his claim of Arnado's US citizenship, Balua presented in
his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record[11] dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April
2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco"
appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing
on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent... travel records:
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010
elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division
disagreed with Arnado's claim that he is a Filipino citizen.[18]
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with
the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado's act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
Arnado's continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado
had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office.
Issues:
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others,
Ruling:
Principles:
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open
to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.[3
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to
travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply
be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted... by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated
in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,[35] it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required... for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
Arnado vs COMELEC In the meantime, Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate who garnered the
second highest number of
Topic: Citizenship Requirement votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the COMELEC First Division
erred in applying the rule on
Facts: succession.
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine The COMELEC En Banc reversed the ruling of the COMELEC First Division.
citizenship after he was It held that Arnado's use
naturalized as citizen of the USA. of his US passport did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship;
Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the that he continued to use his US
Philippines, Arnado applied passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine
for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul General of the Philippines passport at the time of the
in San Franciso, USA. relevant foreign trips; and that, after receiving his Philippine passport,
He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, Arnado used the same for his
2008 and, on even date, an subsequent trips.
Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in Maquiling then appealed to the SC. While Maquiling’s petition was pending,
his favor. On April 3, 2009, the period for the filing of
Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. CoCs for local elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections officially
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for began. On October 1, 2012,
the mayoralty post of Petitioner Arnado filed his CoC for the same position. Respondent Capitan
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local also filed his CoC for the
elections. mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a petition to disqualify Petitioner Before the May 2013 elections, the SC ruled on the Maquiling petition. It set
Arnado and/or to cancel his aside the COMELEC en
CoC on the ground that Arnado remained a US citizen because he banc’s resolution and disqualified Petitioner Arnado from running for elective
continued to use his US passport for position, and declared
entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the
Renunciation. May 2010 elections and that
While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections the subsequent use of his US passport, Petitioner Arnado effectively
proceeded where Arnado garnered disavowed or recalled his April 3,
the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate. 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. The issuance of the Maquiling Decision sets
On October 5, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued held that Arnado's the stage for the present
continued use of his US controversy.
passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Shortly after the Maquiling Decision, Petitioner Arnado executed an Affidavit
Thus, he was disqualified to run Affirming Rommel C.
for public office for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009.”
COMELEC First Division Private Respondent Capitpan, Petitioner Arnado’s lone rival in the May 2013
accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession elections, filed a Petition
should be followed. seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan
and/or to cancel his CoC
based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. RA 9225 allowed natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Arguments: Philippine citizenship by
Petitioner: That the Maquiling case is not on all fours with the present reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and
controversy; that Capitan's Petition to enjoy full civil and political
was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the filing of rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run
the CoC sought to be for public office in the
cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the Philippines provided that they:
people of Kauswagan who (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming support for him as their Constitution and existing
mayor. Arnado prayed that the laws; and,
Comelec Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
that he be declared as eligible citizenships before any public officer
to run for mayor of Kauswagan. Petitioner Arnado avers that his former authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
counsel, revealed that he In this case, Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite because, as
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on November held in Maquiling v.
30, 2009. Hence, at the time Commission on Elections, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was
he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of the Philippines who deemed withdrawn when he
does not owe allegiance to any used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the
other country and, therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in time he filed his CoC on October
the May 13, 2013 elections. 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to
Respondent COMELEC: It disqualified Petitioner Arnado from running in the comply with said second
May 2013 elections. That requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an
at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply affidavit dated May 9, 2013,
with the requirement of RA affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not
9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign suffice for having been
citizenship. While he executed belatedly executed.
the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for public
or recalled when he office during the 2010
subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held in Maquiling elections — being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the
case. Republic of the Philippines -
still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1,
Issue: Whether Petitioner Arnado is qualified to run 2012. The Comelec En Banc
merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it would be
Held: No. The Petition is devoid of merit. COMELEC’s decision is affirmed. committing grave abuse of
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual discretion had it departed therefrom.
citizenship" is disqualified from The use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the
running for any elective local position. The phrase "dual citizenship" in said oath of renunciation. Arnado's
Section 4(d) must be use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting
understood as referring to "dual allegiance.'' in his disqualification to run
for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time
he filed his CoC for the
2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification.
Maquiling, therefore, is binding on
and applicable to this case.
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMELEC, GR No. 209835, 2015-09-22
Facts:
Petitioner... and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.
were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of
Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Private respondent filed a
Petition... cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the
latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was
eligible to run for Mayor... despite being a Canadian... citizen and a
non-resident thereof.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC... he took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul
General in Toronto, Canada on... and became a dual Filipino and Canadian
citizen pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225
Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on 2012.On 2013
COMELEC... issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material
misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of
Barangay Imnajbu... within one year prior to the election.
It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225
since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly
renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other
requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those... seeking elective
office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply
with the one year residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the
Local Government Code.
Elections were subsequently held... and... petitioner won over private
respondent... was proclaimed Mayor... petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the COMELEC... canceling his COC.
private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation
COMELEC En Banc... denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.
COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution.
Private respondent took his Oath of Office... claims that he did not abandon
his Philippine domicile.
he was born and baptized in Uyugan,... he was a registered voter and had...
exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein.
also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan
Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
canceling his COC.
Issues:
whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1)
year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his
CO... what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
Ruling:
We are not persuaded.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country, can re-acquire or... retain his Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of the law.
The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He
must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13,
2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his... new domicile of
choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.

Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born petitioner failed... to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in
Filipino. Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections... the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. less than the one year residency required by law.

Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign... citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or
in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an
elective public office, residency in the Philippines... becomes material.
al Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the
place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding
the election day.
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian
citizen.
We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78
refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency,
age, citizenship or any... other legal qualification necessary to run for a local
elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the
misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,...
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.
We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.
Principles:

naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile

in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident
status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.

Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines

and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to
Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be
considered as waiver of such abandonment.

[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act

No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.
CASE DIGEST : FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the
province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time.
On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter
(hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was
also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized
in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself
against President Marcos
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of
January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He
then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that
the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a
temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the
COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of
his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the
other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic
question.
HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of
the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section
42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office
must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting
mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows,
however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez
of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the
Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section
42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office
must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting
mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows,
however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez
of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire
Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with
the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and
PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He
contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without
more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly
the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship
previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee
had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner
had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen
is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why
it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered
and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country
of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its
prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an
express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should
be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents
are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of
governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female
legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or
omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office
simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten
days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied,
that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight
months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country.
The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for
Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number
of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a
US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate
for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on
August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in
the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and
thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point
of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that
he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines,

when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part
in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained
the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after
taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Disqualification (Sec 40, LGC; “Moral Turpitude”)
FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival
candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur
during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy
for Congressman on February 19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February
28, 2001.
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor of COMELEC Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify
Villaber and to cancel the latter’s certificate of candidacy due to the fact that
Villaber was convicted by the RTC for violation of BP22 and was sentenced
to suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of
P100,000.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude;
hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to
run for any public office. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the CA’s Decision. However, in its Resolution of October 26, 1992,
this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our
Resolution became final and executory. Cagas also asserted that Villaber
made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is
“Eligible for the office I seek to be elected” – which false statement is a
ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his
conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed
Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his
presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final
and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the
case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in Cagas’ petition, issued the
challenged Resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as “a candidate for and
from holding any elective public office” and canceling his certificate of
candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the
administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
HELD: The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from
being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
“Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which
he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
“The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed
removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified.”
As to the meaning of “moral turpitude,” we have consistently adopted the
definition in Black’s Law Dictionary as “an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.”
In In re Vinzon,the term “moral turpitude” is considered as encompassing
“everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.”
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that “not
every criminal act involves moral turpitude,” and that “as to what crime
involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.”We further
pronounced therein that:
“…in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the Court admitted that
it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not
exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum.
In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is
ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on the circumstances
surrounding the case.
 relates to and affects the good moral character of a person….”Thus,
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check
surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society
elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by justice, honesty or good morals.
analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
crime of fencing punishable by a special law. COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
Information: SO ORDERED.
“That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or
draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of
Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated
February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00,
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check, when presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said
check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.” (Emphasis ours)

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for
value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for

insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment.[19]

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. We held that
a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 “imports deceit” and “certainly
Lonzanida vs. Comelec
Facts:
Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and
was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void
on the ground of failure of elections.
On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998
elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC
order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanida’s opponent
assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy.
His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground
that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same
post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution
maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms
and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a
term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government
officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the
May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have
jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed
winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy is a petition for
quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of office
in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he
discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or
barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issues:
1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales
from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government
officials.
2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed winner.
Held:
1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.”
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First,
the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post
in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC
itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May
1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was
declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed
candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the
Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve
a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998
because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as
presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the
COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995
mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration
of the term. The respondents’ contention that the petitioner should be
deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he
served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it
disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e.,
that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of
the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. “The clear
intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a
term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the
legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not
hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to
March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the
three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on
this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set
aside.
2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation
or the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for
disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the
COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on
the merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
“Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial
and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment
is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed
before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of
the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate
and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution
of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a
candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his
disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation.” (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28,
1999)
Marquez vs Comelec
Facts:
Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor
of the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted
Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being
disqualified as a candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is
against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad
Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained
unserved because he already went to the Philippines then.
Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from
justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.
Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee
who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it
could be seen that there was confusion as to the implications of defining
what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a pronouncement from the
Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment,
and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR.
Issue:
What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed?
Held:
"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may
be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the
term.
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to
refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final
judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the
officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable
weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no
obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply
as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor
constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.
There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec
never made a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case
was remanded to Comelec. (G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995)
DELA CRUZ vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012 DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S.
Issue:
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the 6389
emerging concerns is the
application of the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system 2
wherein voters indicate their
choice of candidates by shading the oval corresponding to the name of their PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M.
chosen candidate printed on
the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the appropriate space 6428
provided in the ballots as in
previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose 1
certificate of candidacy had
been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of
included or printed in the Bugasong by the MBOC of
official ballots on election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance Bugasong.
candidate be considered Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes,
stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? Casimira contends that
Facts: she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC the MBOC properly tallied or
Resolution No. added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes.
8844 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who Ruling:
were either disqualified or The petition is meritorious.
whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names still It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification
appeared in the official ballots cases and not to
or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections. petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers Sections 69 (nuisance
(MBOC) of Bugasong candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false). Notably,
on May 13, 2010, Casimira insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be such facts indicating that a
counted in her favor. certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in
However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of mockery or disrepute, or to cause
Votes by Precinct for ViceMayor of Antique-Bugasong showed the following confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
results of the voting: candidates, or other
TOTAL RANK circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. bona fide intention to run for
the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
532 prevent a faithful determination of
the true will of the electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in
3 Section 68 (giving money or
material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials
performing electoral functions,
election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making
prohibited contributions) of the OEC
or Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for
disqualification under Section 68
and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy
(COC) under Section 78. Said
proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be
interchanged or confused
with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different
grounds, and resulting in
different eventualities. x xx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be
premised on Section 12 or
68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a
CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the
said certificate that is false.
The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified
under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is
cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she
never filed a CoC .
Thus, in Miranda vs. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate
who is disqualified under
Page 1 of 3
Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because
he/she remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due
course or cancelled
under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered
a intention of the
candidate. (Additional emphasis supplied)
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to
valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose
COC was cancelled as he/she
is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But
should these votes cast for the
candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered
stray?
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate
declared as such under a
final judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where
the name of the nuisance
candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the bona fide
candidate) still appeared on the
ballots on election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision
to cancel Edwin Bautista’s
COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on May
13, 1998 or three days after
the election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately
tallied on orders of the
COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and
hence are not really
stray votes. These separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate
determinable despite
the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate was not yet
final on electionday, this Court also considered those factual circumstances
showing that the votes
mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate candidate
(petitioner Efren Bautista) and
could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the
voters had constructive as
well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin
Bautista as a candidate for
mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real
voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of
has also been established that petitioner to private respondent
by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:
were informed of the Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is
COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate. to give effect
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance
Tribunal, this Court likewise candidates turns the
applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate
cast for a nuisance is faced with the
candidate stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as
notwithstanding that the decision to stray votes by the
declare him as such was issued only after the elections. mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance the part of the COMELEC
candidate on election increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political
day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the campaigners try to minimize stray
similarity of names that affects votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on
the voter’s will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in the ballot, still, election woes
Bautista is not exactly the brought by nuisance candidates persist.
same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to
Edwin Bautista a nuisance be
candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of
having been informed thereof confusion over the names of
through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of
election. Undeniably, however, the HRET to give weight to
the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly present in this case, if not relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable,
worse, considering the following the precedent in
substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or"C. MARTINEZ" Bautista. x xx
written on the line for
Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray Page 2 of 3
votes, the invalidated ballots
being more than sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of only 453 COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the
votes after the recount. former rule in Resolution
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new
2010 elections. On the automated election system to the form
basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been of official ballots, manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the
considered stray but substantial distinctions between
counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC’s changing of the rule on votes manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering the
cast for nuisance candidates votes cast for the disqualified
or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III,
COMELEC opines that these find no
application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of
ballotsapply only to elections where the
names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local
elections, political
rivals or operators benefited from the usually belated decisions by
COMELEC on petitions to
cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential nuisance candidates. In
such instances, political
campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write
the full name of their
candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance
candidates persist.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of
surnames of candidates
for the same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or
disrepute, had already been rectified
by the new voting system where the voter simply shades the oval
corresponding to the name of their
chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8844 on May 1,
2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names
of disqualified candidates
not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot.
Indeed, what use will it serve
if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from
list of official candidates if
the official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a
nuisance
candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such
nuisance candidate has
the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but counted
in favor of the latter,
remains a good law.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed
of the cancellation of
COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day.
As we pronounced in
Bautista, the voters’ constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy
made their will more
determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for
Aurelio could have been
intended only for the legitimate candidate. The possibility of confusion in
names of candidates if the
names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day,
cannot be discounted or
eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering
that voters who mistakenly
shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the
bona fide candidate they
intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct
the same.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent
with the rule wellensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes
governing election contests especially appreciation
of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate
in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral
experience had
demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance
candidates from both the Certified
List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil
sought to be prevented by the
exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.
Page 3 of 3
Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during
the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October
25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada,
explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President.
None of the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed
second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada
before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office
because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied
on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that
President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored
by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who
garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify
Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying
that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public office?
Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation
of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and
accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify which
political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did
not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of
suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary,
the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of
Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the
power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1)
impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way
of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states
that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of
the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is
worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape
from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or
amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the
pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to
no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President
Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been
restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and
political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is
not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause
that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word
"whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly
speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this
case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the
pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights
and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail
over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought
to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since
former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular
clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former
President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21,
2015)
EFREN RACEL ARATEA, Petitioner, reasoned that since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during
vs. election day, the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents. votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent
G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012 disqualification
CARPIO, J. resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the
FACTS: duly-elected
Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Vice-Mayor was mandated to succeed as Mayor.
Rodolfo ISSUE:
filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made
disqualify a false material
Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of representation under Section 78 of the OEC that resulted in his certificate of
candidacy on the candidacy being void ab initio.
ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as
Antonio, Zambales for Mayor in this case.
four (4) consecutive terms.
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of RULING:
candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It
remained also
pending during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest held that Antipolo, the "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor
number of votes because Lonzanida’s
and were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively. certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a
Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor. candidate at all.
Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified Lonzanida from running All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered
for the highest
Mayor based on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more number of votes for the position.
than three Qualifications and Disqualifications
consecutive terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the
convicted by final Local
judgment of ten counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Government Code. Section 40 expressly provides, among others:
Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
Mayor running for
because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Division any elective local position:
ordered the (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
from the list of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
official candidates. xxx
Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
candidate. He
Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by
competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or
for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon
or
granted amnesty.
xxx
False Material Representation
Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied
or
cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the
certificate of
candidacy.
Section 74 of the OEC details the contents of the certificate of candidacy.
This
included among others a statement that the person filing it is eligible for said
office.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from
being elected to
any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality
of the
judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of
law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute
disqualification
produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any
popular
elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of temporary
absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión mayor.
On the other
hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual special disqualification means
that "the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
his
disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute
disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective
public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his
certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective
public
office from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final.
The judgment of
conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23
October 2009, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 .
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78
of
the OEC because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that
the convict is
not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74
requires him
to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in
Fermin v.
Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to
"qualifications or
eligibility.” One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is
ineligible to run for
public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files
a certificate
of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office,"
as expressly
required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
representation that
is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a
disqualification under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, CoC. It is an appropriate ground for disqualification; thus, Dr. Rodolfo should
circumstance or be deemed to
condition which bars him from running for public office despite the have filed a petition for disqualification, not a petition for the cancellation of
possession of all the Lonzanida’s
qualifications under Section 39 of the LGC." In so holding the dissenting CoC.
opinions write in A resulting disqualification based on a violation of the three-term limit rule
the law what is not found in the law. cannot
Legal Duty of COMELEC begin to operate until after the elections, where the three-term official
to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification emerged as
Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the victorious. The prohibition against Lonzanida only took place after his
certificate election for his
of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to fourth consecutive term. With Lonzanida ineligible to assume office, the
run for public Vice-Mayor takes
office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of over by succession.
conviction is judicial
notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for DISSENTING OPINION
public office. REYES, J.:
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy The violation of the three-term limit cannot be a ground for cancellation of
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid COC. To
candidacy, and much less to valid votes. emphasize, this remedy can only be pursued in cases of material
Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the misrepresentation in the
constitutional fiat CoC, which are limited to the details that must be stated therein. Antipolo’s
on the three-term limit; and second, he is known to have been convicted by contention that
final judgment Lonzanida should be deemed to have made a misrepresentation in his COC
for ten (10) counts of Falsification. In other words, on election day, when he stated
respondent Lonzanida’s that he was eligible to run when in fact he was not is inconsistent with the
disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since basic rule in
respondent Lonzanida statutory construction that provisions of a law should be construed as a
was never a candidate for the position, the votes cast for him should be whole and not as a
considered stray series of disconnected articles and phrases.
Considering that the number of terms for which a local candidate had served
votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo should now be proclaimed as the is not
duly elected required to be stated in the CoC, it cannot be a ground for a petition to
Mayor. cancel a CoC.
The petition filed by Dra. Rodolfo against Lonzanida should be considered a
DISSENTING OPINION petition
BRION, J.: for disqualification and not a petition to cancel a CoC.
The violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for the In the event that a vacancy is created in the office of the mayor, it is the duly-
cancellation of a elected
vice-mayor, petitioner Aratea in this case, who shall succeed as mayor.

SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG and RODOLFO Y. ESTRELLADA, Respondents.
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for
mayor of Baliangao, MisamisOccidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She
indicated therein her place of birth and residence as BarangayTugas,
Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they
argued t hat she had falsely represented her place of birth and residence,
because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally
abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.
On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her residence
in the said barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels
of land there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs.
Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the former was overseeing the construction of her
house. Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the error in her place of birth
was committed by her secretary. Nevertheless, in aCoC, an error in the
declaration of the place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that
would lead to disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications
provided by law.
The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered
the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly
elected municipal mayor.
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent
was DISQUALIFIED for the position of mayor.
The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August 2010
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and
affirming the Resolution of the Second Division denying due course to or
cancelling her CoC.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials.
HELD: Petitioner failed to comply with theone-year residency requirement
forlocal elective officials.
Petitioner uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question is
whether she was able to establish, through clear and positive proof, that she
had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to
the May 2010 elections.
When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office, residence is
synonymous with domicile. Accordingly, Nuval v. Gurayheld as follows:
The term esidenceas so used, is synonymous with omicilewhich imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice.
First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an intention
to remain there. Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.
These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as
held in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELECand subsequently in Dumpit-
Michelena v. Boado:
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive true in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in
proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, the locality and her intent to stay there at least a year before the elections.
must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections
using the same standard of evidence. Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a voter
only shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency requirement
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and as a voter. This minimum requirement is different from that for acquiring a
positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one new domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public office.
year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
The Petition is DENIED.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III, Villanueva,
Duhaylungsod, Estrellada,Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol, Colaljo, Tenorio,
Analasan, Bation, Maghilum and Javier.

First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual and
physical resident of Brgy. Tugassince 2008. However, they declared in the
same Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray while her house was
being constructed in Brgy. Tugas.

Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and

Estrellada asserted that in December 2009, construction was still ongoing.
By their assertion, they were implying that six months before the 10 May
2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her house at Brgy. Tugas.

Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only visited
Baliangao occasionally when they stated that "at times when she (petitioner)
was in Baliangao, she used to stay at the house of Lourdes Yap while her
residential house was being constructed."

These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that
petitioner was not and never had been a resident of their barangay. At most,
the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that petitioner was building and
developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only
stayed in Brgy. PuntaMiray whenever she wanted to oversee the
construction of the resort and the house.

Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true,

Fernandez v. COMELEChas established that the ownership of a house or
some other property does not establish domicile. This principle is especially
Case Digest #2-2 | GR No. 189698 | Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC
FACTS:
The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
BACKGROUND:
Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph
of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of
the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.
Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679:
“Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA
9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the constitution.
HELD:
The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio
in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
RULING:
These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits civil service officers and employees from
engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service
officers and employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but
is subject to reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual
or class privelege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions
both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and
appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation by an appointing authority.
 has amassed „the scattered powers of government workers‟ so as to give
Quinto V. COMELEC 2010 itself
and its incumbent workers an „unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.”
The
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed Court added that “in the case at bar, the probable harm to society in
their permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as
certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. they
actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of
FACTS: having
arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a potentially overly broad
petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution
declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as
ipso Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution saying that it
facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal
it protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that
only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369. all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is
ISSUE: reasonableness which requires that:
1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid. 2. It is germane to the purposes of the law;
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
HELD: 4. It applies equally to all members of the same class.

In a 10-5 vote, the Supreme Court reversed its Decision rendered in the In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between
case public and elective officials which has been rendered moot and academic by
of Quinto vs. Comelec last December 2009 and declared that appointed the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al.
officials, including members of the judiciary and the Comelec itself, who Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.
have
filed their certificate of candidacy for the May 10 elections are already
deemed resigned. In the Resolution dated 22 February 2010, the
Court said
that its December 2009 Decision failed to consider the threat to government
“posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy:
the
danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a „powerful political machine‟
that
CASE DIGEST: JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, Respondents. G.R. No.
191084; March 25, 2010.
FACTS: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the
2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan, besting respondent
Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin of 15,732 votes. Respondent filed the
Election Protest which, anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly
perpetrated by petitioner.
Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently filed by the
parties, the COMELEC Second Division went on to render the 1 December
2009 Resolution, which annulled and set aside petitioners proclamation as
governor of Bulacan and proclaimed respondent duly elected to said
position. Coupled with a directive to the DILG to implement the same, the
resolution ordered petitioner to immediately vacate said office, to cease and
desist from discharging the functions pertaining thereto and to cause a
peaceful turn-over thereof to respondent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
resolution with the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that lack of
concurrence of the majority of the members of the Commission pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. However, the
motion was dismissed in a Resolution dated 8 Feb 2010. Petitioner filed
before the COMELEC an Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution
Promulgated on February 8, 2010. Anchored on the same ground, petitioner
filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
In their respective Comments thereto, both respondent and the Office of the
Solicitor General argue that, in addition to its premature filing, the petition at
bench violated the rule against forum shopping.
ISSUE: Is the assailed COMELEC Resolution valid?
HELD: No, the assailed resolution is not valid. The failure of the COMELEC
En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the 15 February
2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondent's Election
Protest.
Even before petitioners filing of his Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution
Promulgated on 8 February 2010 and the instant Petition for Certiorari with
an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the record shows that
the COMELEC En Banc issued the 10 February 2010 Resolution, ordering
the re-hearing of the case on the ground that "there was no majority vote of
the members obtained in the Resolution of the Commission En Banc
promulgated on February 8, 2010." Having conceded one of the grounds
subsequently raised in petitioners Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution
Promulgated on February 8, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc significantly
failed to obtain the votes required under Section 5(a), Rule 3 of its own
Rules of Procedure for a second time.
The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote
even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the
dismissal of respondents Election Protest. Promulgated on 15 February
1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter.
Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically
provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the Commission en
banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had,
the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the
action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall
stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied.
The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its literal tenor
cannot be gainsaid. As one pertaining to the election of the provincial
governor of Bulacan, respondents Election Protest was originally
commenced in the COMELEC, pursuant to its exclusive original jurisdiction
over the case. Although initially raffled to the COMELEC Second Division,
the elevation of said election protest on motion for reconsideration before the
Commission En Banc cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered an appeal.

Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly

observed in the lone dissent penned by COMELEC Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento, respondents Election Protest was filed with the Commission "at
the first instance" and should be, accordingly, considered an action or
proceeding "originally commenced in the Commission."

There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the

COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of
jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case brought before
the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is brought before the
COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the
appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to
the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends
without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands
affirmed.

Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what
is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original
jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first
decided by the division, which process is continued in the banc if there is a
motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is
reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be
dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.

In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed process

comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the process. If, at that
completion, no conclusive result in the form of a majority vote is reached, the
COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the protest. In a protest
placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed
proceeding that has resulted in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as
an appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed, reaches an
inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly, the
decision appealed from is affirmed. GRANTED.
Socrates vs Comelec like a recall election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the three
Post under Local Government , Political Law Case Digests , Term of Office , consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period constitutes an involuntary
Three-term limit interruption in the continuity of service.

FACTS:
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for
three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001.
Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie
for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran
and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s
unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under
the three-term limit rule.
After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private
citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018
votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the
mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn
was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. (Socrates vs. Comelec, G.R.
No. 154512. November 12, 2002)

ISSUE:

WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule

HELD:

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three--term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity
of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before
and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-

election for a fourth term, The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the same office following the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election
Case Digest: Pamatong vs. Comelec
Prefatory Statement:
Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies
(COCs) for the 2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for
President. Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called
"Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star
general, and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be
having automated elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be
written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles
corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No.
Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec
can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the
qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have
the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.
Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's
act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this
constitutional provision?
CASE DIGEST
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political
party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who
can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the
most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all
the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is
capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an
international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he
has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely
a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is
nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard
of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public
office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to
be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that
can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words
and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on
the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to
seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to
everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered
by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an
international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap,
who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII,
Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of
the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least
forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to
run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure
that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this
end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation
of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into
the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention
the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note
joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every
step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these
nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the
State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both

legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this
Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is
in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further
evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao
JOSEPH B. TIMBOL v. COMELEC, GR No. 206004, 2015-02-24
Facts:
his is a Peti
This is a Petition... for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of preliminary
mandatory injunction against... issuance... of the COMELEC... declaring
petitioner Joseph B.
Timbol (Timbol) a nuisance candidate and ordering the removal of his name
from the certified list of candidates
Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy... for the position of Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Caloocan City... he received a Subpoena... from COMELEC
E... lection
Officer Dinah A. Valencia
Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared
During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance
candidate.
Election Officer Valencia recommended that Timbol's Certificate of
Candidacy be given due course.
Despite... favorable recommendation, Timbol's name was not removed from
the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC's website.
With the printing of ballots for the automated elections
Timbol filed... a
Petition... praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates
COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot, considering that the printing
of ballots had already begun.[15]
COMELEC maintained that
Co... ntrary to Timbol's argument, he was given an opportunity to be heard
when Election Officer Valencia heard him during the clarificatory hearing.
Issues:
whether respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner Timbol's Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates.
Ruling:
Respondent's power to motu proprio deny... due course to a certificate of
candidacy is... subject to the candidate's opportunity to... be heard.
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their
certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by
respondent. This denial or cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party,"
"subject to an opportunity to be heard."
The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."
In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied "when the parties
are afforded fair and... reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand."
Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a
chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had
already issued Resolution
No. 9610... when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a...
clarificatory hearing
This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.

That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of
candidates did not cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610.

First, he would not have to file the Petition had been given an opportunity to
be heard in the first place. Second,... in the Minute Resolution

, respondent denied petitioner's Petition on the sole ground that the printing
of ballots had already begun

Respondent should... also balance its duty "to ensure that the electoral
process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful"... with the right of a...
candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office
before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate.

Principles:

The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to restrict a citizen's

right of suffrage should not be arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC cannot
motu proprio deny due course to or cancel an alleged nuisance candidate's
certificate of candidacy... without providing the candidate his opportunity to
be heard.
CASE DIGEST: RULLODA VS. COMELEC
7:44 AM

G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003

PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO

Facts:
Comelec denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in
the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently
garnered the highest votes when constituents wrote her name in the ballots.
Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election
Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido
contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was
the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only
candidate running.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied
petitioner’s request that she be allowed to run for elections.

Ruling:

There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in

barangay elections, a prohibition against said substitution cannot be said to
exist.

Petitioner’s letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when

COMELEC issued its resolution denying the same. In the contested election,
it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities and
procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way
of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
FEDERICO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 199612, JANUARY 22, 2013
DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 15 of RA 9369 which governs the conduct of
automated elections, the Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such
rules so as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of the first
national automated election: “the Comelec, which has the constitutional
mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election,”
In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before
Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not
abuse its discretion.
FACTS: Edna Sanchez and private respondent Maligaya were candidates
for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Maligaya was the Liberal
Party’s official mayoralty candidate.
On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the
gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas, died. On April 29,
2010, Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
mayor. She then filed a new COC and the corresponding Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as
substitute candidate for her deceased husband.
Subsequently, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed his COC and
CONA as official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute
candidate for mayor, in lieu of Edna.
Private Respondent sought to declare petitioner ineligible because his COC
was allegedly filed after the deadline had lapsed pursuant to Comelec
Resolution No. 8678.
However, the COMELEC en banc resolved to give due course to the
candidacy of Edna and Petitioner.
However, by the time of the elections, because the ballots had already been
printed, the name of Edna was still on the ballots for the position of Mayor of
Sto. Tomas against Private Respondent. In fact, Edna garnered the most
votes for that election, beating Private Respodent for the position of mayor.
Eventually the board ofcanvassers credited the votes of Edna to Petitioner
(who was the replacement of Edna).
Private Respondent filed this petition to annul the proclamation of Petitioner
Federico.
The COMELEC en banc eventually annulled the proclamation of Petitioner
and proclaimed Private Respondent Maligaya as mayor (Maligaya na sya).
The COMELEC declared that Petitioner's substitution of Edna was void
because if was filed after the period for filing of COCs had lapsed.
Petitioner filed a petitin for certiorari with the Supreme Court. He claimed
that Comelec Resolution No. 8678, which fixed a period for the filing of
COCs and CONAs cannot prevail over the Omnibus Election code,
specifically Sec. 77 which provides that a party's replacement candidate of
one who withdraws, dies or is disqualified may be filed no later than mid-day
of the elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it
annulled Federico’s proclamation as the winning candidate on the ground
that his substitution as mayoralty candidate was void.
HELD: No, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Comelec
is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and
successful the conduct of the first national automated election. RA 9369
which governs the conduct of automated elections specifically allows
COMELEC to set deadlines for the filing of certificates of candidacy etc.
Under Sec. 15, “the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election,”
In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before
Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not
abuse its discretion.
Thus, the substitution of Petitioner was made out of time and was thus void.
VICE-MAYOR MARCELINA S. ENGLE v. COMELEC EN BANC, GR No.
215995, 2016-01-19
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Babatngon, Province of Leyte
Petitioner's late husband James L. Engle,... was originally a candidate;
however, he died of cardiogenic shock... petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy... as a... substitute candidate for her deceased spouse. Private
respondent filed Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner arguing in the main that the latter
misrepresented that she is qualified to substitute her husband. He argued
that... petitioner's declaration that she was a member of the political party,
Lakas-CMD, was intended to deceive the electorate that she was qualified to
substitute her husband. Elections were held. James L. Engle's name
remained on the ballot. petitioner was declared as the duly-elected Vice-
Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte. COMELEC... denied due course to and
cancelled petitioner's COC resulting in the annulment of petitioner's previous
proclamation as duly-elected Vice-Mayor
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Engle can validly substitute for her late husband
James Engle who was an independent candidate for Vice- Mayor of
Babatngon, Leyte
petitioner's deceased husband's name remained on the ballot
notwithstanding his death even before the campaign period for the local
elections began
Yet, he received almost twice the... number of votes as the second placer,
private respondent, in a decisive victory.
Since the people of Babatngon, Leyte could not have possibly meant to
waste their votes on a deceased candidate, we conclude that petitioner was
the undisputed choice of the electorate as Vice-Mayor... on the apparent
belief that she may validly substitute her husband.
an election in which the voters have fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their
will is not invalid even though an improper method is followed in the
nomination of candidates.
e find that the late submission of Romualdez's authority to sign the CONA of
James L. Engle to the COMELEC was a mere technicality that cannot be
used to defeat the will of the electorate in a fair and honest election.
From the evidence it can be concluded that James L. Engle was not an
independent candidate but indeed a nominee of Lakas-CMD and he may be
validly substituted... by his wife, who was nominated by the same political
party, in light of his unexpected demise prior to the elections.
Principles:

Ruling:

ules and regulations for the conduct of... elections are mandatory before the
election, but when they are sought to be enforced after the election they are
held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held
to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any
fault... on their part.

Over time, we have qualified this doctrine to refer only to matters of form and
cannot be applied to the substantial qualifications of candidates.