Sanidad v.

COMELEC questions are issues of the day and the people have been
living with them since the proclamation of martial law.
73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J

FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad
petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners
contend that the president has no power to propose
amendments to the new constitution, as such, the referendum-
plebiscite has no legal basis.

ISSUE:
1. Is the case at bar justiciable?
2. Does the president have the authority to propose
amendments to the Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed
amendments within the time frame allowed sufficient and
proper submission?

HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a
constituent assembly is a justiciable question since it is not the
wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to
perform such act is in question. The president has the
authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers
are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis.
The time for deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite
questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the
UNITED KINGDOM v. ALBANIA
Brief Fact Summary. The fact that the Albanian (P) authorities
did not make the presence of mines in its waters was the basis
of the United Kingdom (D) claim against them.
Discussion. In this case, the Court found that the Hague
Convention of 1907 could not be applied but the Convention
was applicable only in time of war. It was on the basis of the
principle of freedom of maritime communication that this case
was decided.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. International obligations in peace

time are created through elementary consideration.

Facts. The explosion of mines in the Albanian (P) waters

resulted in the death of a British naval personnel. It was on this
basis that the United Kingdom (D) claimed that Albania (P)
was internationally responsible for damages.

Issue. Are international obligations in time of peace created

through elementary consideration?

Held. Yes. International obligations in peace time are created

through elementary consideration. Every state has an
obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of other states.

Marbury v. Madison
Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-
term appointee of President John Adams (President Adams) to
a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia,
brought suit against President Thomas Jefferson’s (President
Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison, seeking
delivery of his commission.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United
States (Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review
executive actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has
limited jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United
States Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged
by the Congress.
Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing
President Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the
judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with
Federalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the
nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of the
District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the
peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the
day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the
commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when
President Jefferson took office. The new president instructed
Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the
commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme
Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.
Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme
Court?
Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his
confirmation, the appointment has been made, and Marbury
has a right to the commission
Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the
president to deliver Marbury’s commission, that the Supreme
Court has the power to review executive actions when the
executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the
writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government “to do
a particular thing therein specified,”� mandamus is the
appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to
sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside the
constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme
Court.
Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both
political and legal. Although the case establishes the traditions
of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the
remainder of constitutional law rests, it also transformed the
Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an
equipotent head of a branch of the federal government.
People Vs. Pomar Case Digest
People Vs. Pomar

Facts: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la
Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granted a vacation leave,
by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of
July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not
given the salary due her in violation of the provisions of Act
No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section
13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the tobacco
Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the
other hand, claims that the facts in the complaint did not
constitute an offense and further alleges that the
aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was
unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No. 3071 provides that,
“Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a
factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be
obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who
may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and
another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the
employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause,
under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages
equivalent to the total of two months counting from the day of
her discharge.” Section 15 of the same Act provides for the
penalty of any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted
by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police Power
with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant
women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any
description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,
reasonable support for one month before and one month after
their delivery. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos
and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment.
Hence, the case was raised to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the former decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision
was a valid exercise of Police Power.
Held: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071
to be unconstitutional for being violative or restrictive of the
right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs.
It has been decided several times, that the right to contract
about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual,
protected by the "due process of law" clause of the
constitution. The contracting parties may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy
The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding
power. The police power may encompass every law for the
restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the
public peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot grow
faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or
violate the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police
Power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount
authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be
permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by the latter.
DEL MONTE CORPORATION V. CA 181 SCRA 410-
TRADEMARK
Category: Property, Ownership and Its Modifications
DEL MONTE CORPORATION V. CA
181 SCRA 410
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a case for trademark infringement and unfair
competition against Sunshine Sauce. The latter for a time
used the bottles of Del Monte in packaging their own catsup
sauce. It also used bottles which were similar to those of
petitioner.

HELD:
There is a distinction between infringment of trademark and
unfair competition:
1. Infringement is the unauthorized use of a trademark while
unfair competition is the passing off of one’s goods as that of
another
2. In infringement, fraudulent intent is unnecessary while it is
otherwise for unfair competition
3. In infringement, prior registration of the trademark is needed
whereas in unfair competition, registration is not necessary.

In assessing the two trademarks, side-by-side comparison is

not the final test of similarity because average buyers don’t
make minute scrutiny of
label details.

Also, in testing if there has been prior registration, registration

in the supplemental register isn’t what the law contemplates.
ASIA BREWERY VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SAN
MIGUEL CORP.- UNFAIR COMPETITION
Category: Property, Ownership and Its Modifications
ASIA BREWERY VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SAN
MIGUEL CORP.- Unfair Competition
Nobody can acquire any exclusive right to market articles
supplying the simple human needs in containers or wrappers
of the general form, size and character commonly and
immediately used in marketing such articles.
FACTS:
San Miguel Corp. (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia
Brewery Inc. (ABI) for infringement of trademark and unfair
competition. RTC dismissed the complaint finding that ABI has
not committed trademark infringement or unfair competition.
The CA reversed the decision finding that ABI is guilty of
trademark infringement and unfair competition thus the case at
bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not ABI infringes SMC’s trademark and as
such constitutes unfair competition
HELD: NO
Infringement is determined by a test of dominancy. If the
competing trademark contains the main or essential or
dominant features of another and confusion and deception is
likely to result, infringement takes place. A closer look at the
trademark of both companies will show that the dominant
features of each absolutely bear no similarity to each other.
SMC’s dominant trademark is the name of the product, “San
Miguel Pale Pilsen” written in white Gothic letters with
elaborate serifs at the beginning and end of the letters “S” and
“M” on an amber background while ABI’s is the name “Beer
Pale Pilsen” with the word Beer written in large amber letters,
larger than any of the letter found in SMC label.
The word “pale pilsen” on ABI’s trademark does not constitute
trademark infringement for it is a generic word descriptive of
the color of a type of beer. No one may appropriate generic or
descriptive words for they belong to the public domain.
ABI is likewise not guilty of unfair competition for unfair
competition is the employment of deception or any other
means contrary to good faith by which a person shall pass off
the goods manufactured by him for those of another who has
already established goodwill for his similar goods. The
universal test for this is whether the public is likely to be
deceived. Actual or probable deception and confusion on the
part of the customers by reason of defendant’s practices must
appear. However, this is unlikely to happen in the case at bar
for consumers generally order beer by brand. Also, the fact
that ABI also uses amber-colored steinie bottles cannot
constitute unfair competition for ABI did not copy SMC’s bottle.
SMC did not invent but merely borrowed the steinie bottle from
abroad. Likewise, amber is the most effective color in
preventing transmission of light thus providing maximum
protection to beer. 320 ml is likewise the standard prescribed
under Metrication Circular No. 778. The fact that it is the first to
use the steinie bottle does not give SMC a vested right to use
it to the exclusion of everyone else. Nobody can acquire any
exclusive right to market articles supplying the simple human
needs in containers or wrappers of the general form, size and
character commonly and immediately used in marketing such
articles.

There is no confusing similarity between the competing beers

therefore ABI neither infringed SMC’s trademark nor did it
commit unfair competition.

Dissenting Opinion of J. Cruz:

Side-by-side comparison is not the final test of similarity
because average buyers do not make minute scrutiny of label
details. The average shopper is usually in a hurry and does
not inspect every product on the shelf is if he were browsing in
a library.
Republic v. MERALCO (G.R. No. 141314) use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same
is subject to public regulation.

Facts: In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State

MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the
revision of its rate schedules to reflect an average increase in
its distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase
subject to the condition that should the COA thru its audit
report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, all
excess amounts collected from the latter’s customers shall
either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their
favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a
lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting of
the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB
decision. MRs were denied.
protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while
maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered.
However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State
the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the
public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the
rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair
return on the public utility upon the value of the property
performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public
for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable
rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer
interests.

Issue:

Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of

rates of MERALCO is valid.

Ruling: YES.

The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is

founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes
prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities
are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for
a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases
to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The
regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to
regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing
ADONG VS CHEONG SENG GEE (43 PHIL 43)
Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee
43 Phil 43 [GR No. 18081 March 3, 1922]
Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in
Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left
property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased
was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who
alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted
by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was
claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged
that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in
Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang,
married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo,
unmarried. The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo
were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga.
The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the
evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion,
with reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the
proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but
that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the
Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share
in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the
allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and
Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the
marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had
been adequately proved but that under the laws of the
Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage;
accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit
as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these
conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the
property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural
children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
Issues: Whether or not the chinese marriage is valid and
recognizable in the Philippines.
Whether or not the mohammedan marriage is valid.
Held: No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No.
68) provides that “All marriages contracted without these
Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in
which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands.”
To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity
provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the
Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact,
and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage
by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what
the laws of China in the Province of Amoy concerning
marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is
lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a
moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese
marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the
two cases are the same.
Yes. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world
is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is “that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.”
or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to
sanction morality; either to block or to advance settled
governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the
existence of the Mohammedan marriage. We regard the
provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating
marriages performed according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion.

Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative

provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior
marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to
the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an
effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare what
shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which,
when they took place, were against the law. Public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should
retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.

The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in

favors of that solution which will mot effectively promote the
public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry
legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences,
entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and
the deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the
Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void, would be
far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that
there are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have
been married according to local custom. We then have it within
our power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages;
either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards
PIO DURAN, petitioner,
vs.
SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS, Judge of People's Court,
respondent.
Marciano Almario for petitioner.
Judge Salvador Abad Santos of People's Court in his own
behalf.
JARANILLA, J.:
That the petitioner is a Filipino political prisoner under the
custody of the Director of Prisons in the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinglupa, Rizal, for not less than three months without any
information having filed against him: That the petitioner filed a
petition in the People's Court for his release on bail and that
the Solicitor General recommended that the petitioner be
provisionally released on P35,000 bail; That after hearing the
statements of Special Prosecutor V. D. Carpio, in
representation of the Solicitor General, and Atty. Marciano
Almario, counsel for the petitioner, which statements are
contained in Appendix E of the petition, the said respondent
judge denied the petition for bail on October 121, 1945, and
refused to reconsider it by his order issued on October 15,
1945; and.
That the denial of said petition is a flagrant violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines and of section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, and that the respondent has
committed a great abuse of discretion for which petitioner has
no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
The respondent judge, in answer to the petition, denies abuse
of discretion and alleges that the reason for the denial of the
petition for the release of the petitioner on bail was set forth in
his order of October 15, 1945, which reads as follows:
The detainee's adherence to the enemy as manifested by his
utterances and activities during the Japanese domination
especially as Executive General of the Makapili; as Director of
General of the Kalibapi; as Vice-Minister of State for Home
Affairs; member of the Council of State; as member of the
National Assembly under the Japanese-sponsored Philippine
Republic and as President of the New Leaders Association —
historical facts of contemporary history and of public
knowledge which the petitioner cannot deny — makes the
case against him quite serious and may the necessitate the
imposition of the capital punishment.
It appears that the petitioner was originally detained by the
United States Army, which had investigated the acts of said
petitioner and gathered the corresponding evidence; and that
after the hostilities were ended, with the formal acceptance by
Japan of the terms of the Allies, the said petitioner and the
evidence gathered against him were turned over to the
Commonwealth Government and the Office of Special
Prosecutors for such action as may be warranted. The said
petitioner was detained by the military authorities from July 4
to September 26, 1945, when he was turned over to the
Commonwealth Government, as may be gleaned from
Appendix A filed by him in this case. As a military political
prisoner, he could not be bailed out. Now he invokes the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the
People's Court and the Office of Special Prosecutor and
specifically section 19 of said Act, said section reads partly as
follows:
. . . Provided, however, That existing provisions of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the aforesaid political prisoners may,
in the discretion of the People's Court, after due notice to the
Office of Special Prosecutors and hearing, be released on bail,
even prior to the presentation of the corresponding
information, unless the Court, finds that there is strong
evidence of the commission of a capital offense . . .
As may be seen the above express provision of law, the
release of a detainee on bail, "even prior to the presentation of
the corresponding information," is purely discretionary on the
People's Court find that there is strong evidence of the
commission of a capital offense," in which case no bail
whatever can be granted, as the provision appears mandatory.
In other words, aside from that, the People's Court has the
absolute discretion to grant bail or not. Having invoked the
clear provision of said section 19 of Act No. 682 for his
temporary release on bail, the petitioner cannot attack it as
being illegal or unconstitutional. And it appearing that his case
is covered by said exception of the law, it must be held that he
cannot be admitted to bail.
Counsel's contention that there was strong have presented
evidence to prove that there was strong evidence of the
commission of a capital offense before People's Court could
deny bail in this case was substantially complied with,
although the information charging the commission of the crime
of treason had not as yet been filed. We are of the opinion and
so hold that hearing set and held for the purpose (see
Appendix E) was amply sufficient for the People's Court to be
informed and to determine whether there was strong evidence
of the commission of a capital offense.
.The case of the petitioner herein by reason of his prominence
in social political and court circles is such that this case has
assumed pre-eminence and interest of tremendous proportion
not only in this country but perhaps even in the United States
— all by reason known associations, connections and
statements made by the detained petitioner publicly and
privately in his advocacy of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere and his advocacy of Japan as the leading
nation in the Orient in the proposed Asiatic Monroeism on
which he had been working for so many years before and
during the war, and I take it for granted even now. And no one
can dispute the facts that in his advocacy of this program
aforesaid the petitioner has made statements, as follows: "The
flight, of MacArthur once again shows that the White men's in
East Asia is mercenary and imperialistic. He comes to exploit
the people and the natural resources, fill his pockets with as
much wealth as can be obtained irrespective of the means,
and later return to his own native land to spend the declining
years of his life in comfortable indolence. He cares not for the
defense of any of the colonies he may have acquired. At first
sign of danger he pacts his bag and baggage and runs away,
leaving the native inhabitants to whatever fate awaits them."
This appears in an article written by the detained petitioner in
the Tribune of March 22, 1942.

Further, the detained petitioner has said: "We, who have
always doubted the sincerity of occidental disinterestedness in
Asia, adhere to the theory that it is only through the unified
efforts of all of all Asiatics that the complete emancipation not
only of the Philippines but of all Asia may be achieved, that is
why we are co-operating solely and wholeheartedly with the
Japanese military administration and urge our countrymen to
do same." That come from a radio speech, reported in the
Tribune of May 6, 1942.
Again, the detained petitioner has stated: "With the Japanese
spirit moving the one hundred million people of Japan, who are
solidly behind the prosecution of the Greater East Asia War to
a successful end, the Great Empire of Japan cannot be beaten
in the current war." That also came from an article reported in
the newspaper, Tribune, July 7, 1942.
And on January 30, 1945, there appeared an article in the
Tribune an item, as follows: "Lingayen front, Jan. 27. —
Makapili members thrust into American lines following the
landing of the invaders in the Lingayen, gulf shores, it was
revealed here. Forming death defying squads, these youthful
Filipinos stormed into enemy lines with fixed bayonets causing
heavy casualties among the Americans."
Up to the present time, the Office of Special Prosecutors has
not the material time to check up all the evidence submitted to
us by the military authorities. There are more than 4,000 such
cases in our hands aid unless we are given enough time it will
be very hard for us to go over this particular case. Right now, it
our conviction that the evidence against the petitioner is rather
convincing. Neither have we formulated the necessary
information; but I venture to say that when we file the
necessary information to the Court it would not be for a simple
crime but for treason. I submit, however, the foregoing facts as
above stated to give the Court an idea of the nature of the
evidence that will in due time be adduced in support of the
information that we will file. (See Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil.,
210.)
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be stated that the petitioner
has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law,
because his petition for bail had been set for hearing and he
was given an opportunity to be heard when the above
circumstances were submitted to the People's Court, where it
was made to appear satisfactorily that he was being detained
due to highly treasonable activities against the Commonwealth
of the Philippines and the United States, which activities would
be charged in the information for a capital offense and
punishable by death, and that the evidence in the case strong.
Wherefore, we find and so hold that the petition is without
merit and therefore the same is hereby ordered dismissed with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.