J.L.T. AGRO, INC.
vs BALANSAG At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of
Facts: Don Julian contracted 2 marriages with Antonia Baena and
Milagros Donio. He had 2 children with Antonia (Josefa and
Emilio). He had 4 children with Milagros (Evelyn, Catalino,
Milagros and Pedro).
A parcel of land with 954 sqm was originally registered in the
name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia
under. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties
involved in an action for partition and damages entitled "Josefa
Teves Escaño v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al."4 Milagros
Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an
intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into
a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all
the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement, the CFU declared
the tract land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property
owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the
first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during the
lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were given
other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the "movie
property," the commercial areas, and the house where Don
Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained
by Don Julian.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of
the present dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual death
of Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties
hereinafter adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaňo and Emilio B.
Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall
be understood as including not only their one-half share which
they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and
other successional rights which would correspond to them of the
other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other
words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L.
Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in
second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children,
namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural
children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his
two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose
Catalino Donio Teves.
Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of
Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
(petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio
also executed an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed
of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities
(Supplemental Deed) which constitutes a supplement to the
earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No.
63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner. Later, Don
Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner
sought the registration of the subject lot in its name. A court, so
it appeared, issued an order cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the
name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia and TCT No. T-375 was
issued in the name of petitioner. Since then, petitioner has been
paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately
taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of
the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly
lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria
Cadayday, respondents herein. On Lot No. 63, respondents
temporarily established their home and constructed a lumber
yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate. In the deed of
partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two
(2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the
subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner in
1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate.
absolute sale, respondents discovered that the lot was already
titled in the name of petitioner. Thus, they failed to register the
deed.
Respondents, as vendees, filed a complaint before the RTC
Branch 45 of Bais City, seeking the declaration of nullity and
cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the
transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus damages.
TRIAL COURT: dismissed the complaint. Asked the plaintiffs to
vacate the subject land.
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor
of Josefa and Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of their
deceased mother Antonia, as well as their potential share in the
estate of Don Julian upon the latter’s death. Thus, upon Don
Julian’s death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his
estate, except their proper share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in
the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties adjudicated
in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were
free from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and
Don Julian was under no impediment to allocate the subject lot,
among his other properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4)
children.
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words
"shall be," the adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her
four (4) children was not final and operative,
With Lot No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian and
Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros Donio and
her children had no hereditary rights thereto except as to the
conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon
the death of the latter.
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julian’s death, Lot
No. 63 was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier
assigned it to petitioner. Consequently, the lot could not be a
proper subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and
her children, and not being the owners, they could not have sold
it.
CA: Reversed the decision.
Per the appellate court, the Compromise
Agreement incorporated in CFI decision, particularly paragraph
13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don
Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate
except as regards his (Don Julian’s) share in Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and
possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in
the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose
of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI
decision constitutes res judicata. Don Julian could have disposed
of only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.
ISSUES:
1. WON a future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and
reserved prior to the death of Don Julian;
2. WN Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63
to petitioner because he reserved the same for his heirs from
the second marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement;
3. WN the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition
of his heirs from the second marriage;
HELD: Confirmed the ruling of CA in favor of respondents.
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the
second marriage became automatically operative upon the
approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on
them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of
respondents.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that
future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved
prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our
declaration in Blas v. Santos is relevant, where we defined future
inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable
of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may
in the future acquire by succession. Article 1347 of the New Civil
Code explicitly provides:
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of
men, including future things, may be the object of a contract. All
rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of
contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones,
which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object
of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered
into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the
exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession
must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A
contract may be classified as a contract upon future
inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article
1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance;
and
(3) That the promisor has, with respect to the object, an
expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception
to the exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on
future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.
....
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced
the opinion that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no
formalities are prescribed by the Article.38 The partition will of
course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily
require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition
that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the
formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be
the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no
will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession
(intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the
physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.39
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code
is Article 105640 of the old Civil Code. The only change in the
provision is that Article 1080 now permits any person (not a
testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter
vivos. This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine
that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he
must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law.41
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a
testator to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them
among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a
testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui
generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during
his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until
his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the
respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only
by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced
heirs.42
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is
undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However,
considering that it would become legally operative only upon the
death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second
marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the
compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a
bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the
prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was
inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to
which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never
exist.43
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment
covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained
the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot
would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the
time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don
Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his
lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and
her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated
to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don
Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during
his lifetime. The lower court ruled that he had done so through
the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court disagreed, holding
that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a
prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second
marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of
Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well-founded.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the
heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while
mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some
part of the properties.44 It is the total omission of a compulsory
heir in the direct line from inheritance.45 It consists in the silence
of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in
the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not
giving him anything in the hereditary property but without
expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in
the latter case.46 But there is no preterition where the testator
allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since
there was no total omission of a forced heir.47
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he
resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as
evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus,
it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to
the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal
heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the
heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian
upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise
Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this
line.48 Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s
heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to
exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on preterition,
still the petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there
was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably,
Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner, and
his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer
thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a
transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order,
especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No.
63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children could
inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which
necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to
incisive and detailed examination.
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves
as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein.49 A certificate of title
accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement
of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate,
in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly
the real interest of its owner.50
To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title
establishes, a sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on
the defect of the title must be adduced to overcome the
predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens title. Thus,
contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, the appearance of a
 mere thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his signature in
the Supplemental Deed would not affect the validity of
petitioner’s title for this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a
recognized mode of signature.51
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in
the name of Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave
irregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes the
orthodox, conventional and normal process established by law.
And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both
titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee relies on a voluntary
instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his name such
instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is
evident from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The sections read,
thus:
SEC. 53. Presentation of owner’s duplicate upon entry of new
certificate. – No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the
Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate certificate
is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly
provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause
shown. (Emphasis supplied)
....
SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. – An owner
desiring to convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute
and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in
law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter make out in the
registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee and
shall prepare and deliver to him an owner’s duplicate certificate.
The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate
certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the
registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a
reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The
original and the owner’s duplicate of the grantor’s certificate
shall be stamped "cancelled." The deed of conveyance shall be
filed and endorsed with the number and the place of
registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed.
(Emphasis supplied)
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on
the Supplemental Deed, it should have presented it to the
Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name.
Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No. 5203
or on the succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it
had presented the Supplemental Deed. In fact, there is
absolutely no mention of a reference to said document in the
original and transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard that
the finding of the Court of Appeals concerning the absence of
entries on the blanks intended for the Book No. and Page No.
gains significant relevance. Indeed, this aspect fortifies the
conclusion that the cancellation of OCT No. 5203 and the
consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are not
predicated on a valid transaction.
What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent
entry:
Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO,
INC.
CONDITIONS: Lost owner’s duplicate is hereby cancelled, and
null and void and a new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per
Order of the Court of First Instance on file in this office.
Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.
(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)52
What the entry indicates is that the owner’s duplicate of OCT No.
5203 was lost, a petition for the reconstitution of the said
owner’s duplicate was filed in court, and the court issued an
order for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate and its
replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to be believed,
the court concerned (CFI, according to the entry) issued an order
for the issuance of a new title which is TCT No. T-375 although
the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the Registry of Deeds
had not been lost.
Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the
reconstitution court may order the reconstitution and
replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. Since what was
lost is the owner’s copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owner’s copy
could be ordered replaced. Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded
his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted owner’s copy of
the original certificate of title but a new transfer certificate of
title in place of the original certificate of title. But if the court
order, as the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new
transfer certificate of title—even designating the very number of
the new transfer certificate of title itself—the order would be
patently unlawful. A court cannot legally order the cancellation
and replacement of the original of the O.C.T. which has not been
lost,53 as the petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss
merely of the owner’s duplicate of the OCT
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a
convenient contrivance to effect the transfer of title to the
subject lot in its name, instead of the Supplemental Deed which
should be its proper course of action. It was so constrained to do
because the Supplemental Deed does not constitute a deed of
conveyance of the "registered land in fee simple" "in a form
sufficient in law," as required by Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.
A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental
Deed discloses that the assignment is not supported by any
consideration. The provision reads:
....
WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the
Assumption of Liabilities executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B.
Teves and Josefa T. Escaño at Dumaguete City on 16th day of
November 1972 and ratified in the City of Dumaguete before
Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and entered in the latter’s
notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page No. 17; Book No. V; series
of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño,
transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its
assets and liabilities as reflected in the Balance Sheet of the
former as of December 31, 1971.
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the
Decision made in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,
12th Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil
Case No. 3443 the following properties were adjudicated to Don
Julian L. Teves. We quote.
From the properties at Bais
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves
....
Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203,
together with all improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00
....
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties
herein in order to effect the registration of the transfer of the
above corporation.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above
premises the ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and assigns
unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above described parcel of
land[s] with a fair market value of EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND
PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine Currency, and which transfer,
conveyance and assignment shall become absolute upon
signing.54 (Emphasis supplied)
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion
of the instrument does not represent the consideration for the
assignment made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement
of the fair market value of all the nineteen (19) properties
enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one,
that were transferred by Don Julian in favor of petitioner.
Consequently, the testimony55 of petitioner’s accountant that
the assignment is supported by consideration cannot prevail
over the clear provision to the contrary in the Supplemental
Deed.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered
the 1948 mortgage which is annotated on the back of the TCT
No. T-375 as the consideration for the assignment.56 However,
the said annotation57 shows that the mortgage was actually
executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, not of
petitioner.58 Clearly, said mortgage, executed as it was in favor
of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being no
showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation,
could not have been the consideration for the assignment to
petitioner.
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of
a valid contract, namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties;
(2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with
unlawful cause produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts
lack an essential element and they are not only voidable but void
or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph (2).59 The
absence of the usual recital of consideration in a transaction
which normally should be supported by a consideration such as
the assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he
still had at the time, coupled with the fact that the assignee is a
corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the President
and Director, forecloses the application of the presumption of
existence of consideration established by law.60
Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a
donation. Article 749 of the New Civil Code is clear on the point,
thus:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be
valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein
the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or
in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless
it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments.
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,61 this Court declared that title
to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the
donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been
accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same
instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the
same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of
donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal
notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is
either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of
donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null
and void.
In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a
public document,62 the absence of acceptance by the donee in
the same deed or even in a separate document is a glaring
violation of the requirement.
One final note. From the substantive and procedural
standpoints, the cardinal objectives to write finis to a protracted
litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing at all
times.63 Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts have
ample authority to rule on specific matters not assigned as errors
or otherwise not raised in an appeal, if these are indispensable
or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded
issues.64 Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but consideration of which are necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case, or to serve the
interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.65
In the instant case, the correct characterization of
the Supplemental Deed, i.e., whether it is valid or void, is
unmistakably determinative of the underlying controversy. In
other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument
which is at the core of the controversy is interwoven with the
issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the trial court
and the appellate court.66 Thus, this Court is also resolute in
striking down the alleged deed in this case, especially as it
appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.
LOLITA BAS CAPABLANCA, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS,
REPRESENTED BY JOSEFINA BAS ESPINOSA AND REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Petition for Review1 assailing the Decision2 dated
March 12, 2014 and Resolution3 dated March 15, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals, Nineteenth Division, Cebu City. The Court of
Appeals reversed the Decision4 dated December 26, 2007 of
Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and dismissed the
petitioner's complaint.
The subject matter of this case is Lot 2535 of the Talisay-
Minglanilla Friar Land's Estate located in "Biasong, Dumlog,
Talisay, Cebu"5 with an area of 6,120 square meters.6
Andres Bas (Andres) and Pedro Bas (Pedro) acquired Lot 2535,
"and Patent No. 1724 was issued in their names on May 12,
1937."7
On November 28, 1939, Pedro sold to Faustina Manreal
(Faustina), married to Juan Balorio, his portion of Lot 2535 "with
a seeding capacity of four (4) chupas of com."8 The sale was
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale dated November 28,
1939.9
After the death of Faustina and her husband, their heirs
executed a notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and
Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 13, 1963. Lot 2535 consisting
of "1,000 square meters, more or less," was conveyed to one (1)
of their heirs, Alejandra Balorio (Alejandra).10 Alejandra sold the
land through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 13, 1967 to
Edith N. Deen, who in turn sold it to Atty. Eddy A. Deen (Atty.
Deen) on March 21, 1968.11
Upon Atty. Deen's death on December 18, 1978, an extra-judicial
settlement of estate, which did not include Lot 2535, was
executed by his heirs. Later, or on March 30, 1988, they executed
an Additional ExtraJudicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of
Sale, which sold the land for P10,000.00 to Norberto B. Bas
(Norberto), who took possession of and built a house on it.12
On December 15, 1995, Norberto died without a will and was
succeeded by his niece and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca
(Lolita).13
Subsequently, Lolita learned that a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-96676 dated June 6, 1996 was issued in the names
of Andres and Pedro on the basis of a reconstituted Deed of
Conveyance No. 96-00004.14
In October 1996, Josefina Bas Espinosa (Josefina) represented
the Heirs of Pedro Bas to file a complaint for Clarification of
Ownership of Lot 2535 against Lolita before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Biasong, Talisay, Cebu.15 The conflict
between the parties was not resolved and resulted to the
issuance of a Certification to file Action.16
On December 16, 1996, a notarized Partition Agreement of Real
Property, Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights was executed between
the heirs of Andres and Lolita, representing Norberto, whereby
they partitioned Lot 2535 among themselves.17
Lolita sought to register her portion in Lot 2535 but was denied
by the Register of Deeds of Cebu, citing the need for a court
order.18 Lolita then learned that TCT No. T-96676 had been
partially cancelled and TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183,
and T-100185 had been issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro
Bas, represented by Josefina, on May 29, 1997.19
On December 16, 1997, Lolita filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for the cancellation of the titles
with prayer for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
and litigation expenses.20
In their Answer, the Heirs of Pedro Bas claimed that "the sale
between Pedro Bas and Faustina Manreal [was] fake, spurious
and invalid because [Pedro] who [was] an illiterate never learned
how to write his name so that the signature appearing thereon
could not have been made by Pedro Bas."21 They further claimed
that the cancellation of TCT No. T-96676 was made pursuant to
a final judgment in Civil Case No. 84022 for Partition, Damages,
and Attorney's Fees.23
After trial, Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City rendered a
Decision24 on December 26, 2007, in favor of Lolita. The trial
court held that there was substantial evidence to prove that
Lolita had been in long possession of the lot under a claim of
ownership as the heir of Norberto and that it was not necessary
for her to be first declared as his heir before filing the
complaint.25 It further ruled that to dismiss the case on the
ground that Lolita should first be declared an heir would be too
late as the Heirs of Pedro Bas did not raise the issue in a motion
to dismiss or as an affirmative defense in their complaint.26
On the substantive issues, the trial court upheld the validity of
the 1939 Deed of Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Faustina. It
found Josefina's uncorroborated testimony of Pedro's illiteracy
as self-serving and unconvincing to contradict the regularity of
the notarized deed. Moreover, her testimony was controverted
by the notarized Assignment of Sale Certificate 195, which bore
the same signature of Pedro, and by the Heirs of Pedro Bas'
answers in Civil Case No. R-10602, another case which contained
allegations that Pedro sold his share in the lot to Faustina.27
The trial court further held that the object of the sale was
determinate, i.e., Pedro's share in Lot 2535 was specified by the
boundaries indicated in the Deed of Sale.28 It concluded that
Norberto acquired the entire share of Pedro in Lot 2535, which
was found only after survey in 1996,29 to actually consist of 3,060
square meters and not 1,000 square meters as insisted by the
Heirs of Pedro Bas. The trial court gave credence to Lolita's
testimony that before the survey, Pedro's portion was estimated
to be 1,000 square meters; hence, the area indicated in the
successive transfers of the lot from the heirs of Faustina down
to Norberto was "1,000 square meters, more or less."30
Consequently, with Pedro's sale of his share in Lot 2535, his heirs
acquired no portion by inheritance and their titles were null and
void and should be cancelled.31
Finally, the trial court affirmed that the Judgement of the
Municipal Trial Court of Talisay in Civil Case No. 840 for Partition,
Damages and Attorney's fees was not binding on Lolita, who was
not a party to the case.32
The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
declaring as null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Cebu to cancel the following transfer certificates
of title:
1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-100181, of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, in the name
of Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina Bas,
covering Lot 2535-J, Psd-07-037377, being a portion of
Lot 2535, Flr-133, situated in the Barrio of Dumlog,
Mun. of Talisay, Prov. of Cebu, Island of Cebu,
containing an area of 304 square meters;
2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-100182, of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, in the name
of Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina Bas,
covering Lot 2535-B, Psd-07-037377, being a portion
of Lot 2535, Flr-133, situated in the Barrio of Dumlog,
Mun. of Talisay, Prov. of Cebu, Island of Cebu,
containing an area of 1,554 square meters;
3) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-100183, of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, in the name
of Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina Bas,
covering Lot 2535-A, Psd-07-037377, being a portion
of Lot 2535, Flr-133, situated in the Barrio of Dumlog,
Mun. of Talisay, Prov. of Cebu, Island of Cebu,
containing an area of 965 square meters; and
4) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-100185, of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, in the name
of Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina Bas,
covering Lot 2535-A Psd-07-037377, being a portion of
Lot 2535, Flr-133, situated in the Barrio of Dumlog,
Mun. of Talisay, Prov. of Cebu, Island of Cebu,
containing an area of 187 square meters.
Costs against the defendants.33
The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied the Heirs of Pedro
Bas' motion for reconsideration.34
Hence, the Heirs of Pedro Bas appealed to the Court of Appeals,
making the following lone assignment of
error:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The trial court seriously erred in not dismissing the case for
plaintiffs lack of cause of action pursuant to (the) doctrinal
jurisprudential case of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay vs. Del
Rosario (304 SCRA 18) considering that plaintiff in her complaint
alleged, she is the sole heir of Norberto Bas.35
The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court Decision
and dismissed the complaint.36 According to the Court of
Appeals, Lolita must first be declared as the sole heir to the
estate ofNorberto in a proper special proceeding.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
December 26, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial
Region, Branch 8, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-21348 for
Ownership, Nullity of Deeds, Cancellation of TCT Nos. T-100181,
T-100182, TM100183[,] and T-100185, covering portions of Lot
No. 2535, damages, etc., ordering the cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183[,] and T-
100185 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint of plaintiff-appellee is hereby DISMISSED, without
prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful
heirs of the late Norberto Bas and the rights concomitant
therewith.37
Lolita sought reconsideration but was denied in the Court of
Appeals Resolution dated March 15, 2016.
Hence, Lolita filed this Petition principally contending that the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in reversing the
Regional Trial Court Decision and dismissing the complaint.
Petitioner argues that the 1999 case of the Heirs of Yaptinchay
v. Del Rosario38 cited in the Court of Appeals Decision does not
apply to this case because the factual circumstances are
different.39 In that case, the claims of the opposing parties were
anchored on their alleged status as heirs of the original
owner.40 "Hence there may have been the need for a previous
judicial declaration of heirship in a special proceeding."41 Here,
petitioner does not claim to be an heir of Pedro, the original
owner. Rather, her interest over the property is derived from a
series of transactions starting from the sale executed by Pedro.42
Petitioner further contends that respondents neither raised the
ground "lack of cause of action" as an affirmative defense nor
filed a motion to dismiss before the court a quo. Instead, they
allowed the trial to proceed with their full participation all
throughout. Petitioner asserts that respondents' action or
inaction should be constituted a waiver.43 Otherwise,
respondents' "failure to properly act on its perceived defect" in
the complaint hampers the speedy disposition of the action "and
would only promote multiplicity of suits."44
In their two (2)-page Comment,45 respondents contend that the
findings of the Court of Appeals were duly supported by
evidence and jurisprudence.
This Court grants the petition.
Contrary to the erroneous conclusion of the Court of Appeals,
this Court finds no need for a separate proceeding for a
declaration of heirship in order to resolve petitioner's action for
cancellation of titles of the property.
The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to
Norberto but the validity of the sale of the property in 1939 from
Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer
transactions that culminated in the sale of the property to
Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the property in 1939, it follows
that there would be no more ownership or right to property that
would have been transmitted to his heirs.
Petitioner's claim is anchored on a sale of the property to her
predecessor-in-interest and not on any filiation with the original
owner. What petitioner is pursuing is Norberta's right of
ownership over the property which was passed to her upon the
latter's death.46
This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is
necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the
property of the deceased.47 In Marabilles v. Quito:48
The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has
not been judicially declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled
in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property of a
deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property
of the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest,
and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which
the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations
which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the deceased
himself. Thus, it has been held that "[t]here is no legal precept
or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous
legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate
on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider
themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that they may
maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their
ancestor" ... A recent case wherein this principle was maintained
is Cabuyao vs. [C]aagbay.49 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals' reliance on the ruling in Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario50 was misplaced. In that case, the
motion to dismiss was filed immediately after the second
Amended Complaint was filed.51 The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss, holding that the Heirs of Yaptinchay "have not
shown any proof or even a semblance of it-except the allegations
that they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays-
that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple."52
Here, respondents never raised their objection to petitioner's
capacity to sue either as an affirmative defense or in a motion to
dismiss.53 Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states,
"[d]efenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." Thus, it was
erroneous for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that there was no prior judicial declaration of
petitioner's heirship to Norberto.54
Moreover, the pronouncement in the Heirs of Yaptinchay that a
declaration of heirship must be made only in a special
proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance
of property was based on Litam, etc., et al. v. Rivera55 and Solivio
v. Court of Appeals,56 which involved different factual milieus.
The facts of the case in Litam, etc., et al. v. Rivera57 show that
during the pendency of the special proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam,
the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action. They claimed that as
the children of the deceased by a previous marriage to a Chinese
woman, they were entitled to inherit his one-half (1/2) share of
the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa
Rivera (Marcosa).58 The trial court in the civil case declared,
among others, that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of
the deceased and that Marcosa was his only heir.59 On appeal,
this Court ruled that such declaration-that Marcosa was the only
heir of the decedent-was improper because the determination
of the issue was within the exclusive competence of the court in
the special proceedings.60
In Solivio v. Court of Appeals,61 the deceased Esteban Javellana,
Jr. was survived by Celedonia Solivio (Celedonia), his maternal
aunt, and Concordia Javellana-Villanueva (Concordia), his
paternal aunt.62 Celedonia filed the intestate proceedings and
had herself declared as sole heir and administratrix of the estate
of the decedent to facilitate the implementation of the latter's
wish to place his estate in a foundation named after his
mother.63 While the probate proceeding was pending, Concordia
filed a separate civil action where she sought to be declared as
co-heir and for partition of the estate.64 This Court held that the
"separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court
that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate."65 This Court further held that "in the
interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and
conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not
interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal
court."66
In Litam and Solivio, the adverse parties were putative heirs to a
decedent's estate or parties to the special proceedings for an
estate's settlement. Hence, this Court ruled that questions on
the status and right of the contending parties must be properly
ventilated in the appropriate special proceeding, not in an
ordinary civil action.
Here, as stated, the main issue is the annulment of title to
property, which ultimately hinges on the validity of the sale from
Pedro to Faustina. Petitioner does not claim any filiation with
Pedro or seek to establish her right as his heir as against the
respondents. Rather, petitioner seeks to enforce her right over
the property which has been allegedly violated by the fraudulent
acts of respondents.
Furthermore, as found by the Regional Trial
Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The plaintiff [Lolita] has sufficient interest to protect in the
subject portion of Lot 2535. She had been there for around thirty
(30) years, and had been in possession thereof under a claim of
ownership as an alleged heir of Norberto Bas after the latter's
death on December 15, 1993, that is: long before the issuance of
TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183[,] and T-100185 in 1997,
and even TCT No. T-96676 in 1996. Moreover, it is annotated on
TCT No. T-96676 (Exhibit "G") that she, together with the heirs
of Osmundo Bas, executed a declaration of heirs with partition,
quitclaim, etc., dated December 16, 1996, registered on March
3, 1997 ... wherein they adjudicated unto themselves and
partitioned Lot No. 2535 ... She also executed on June 14, 1997
an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir, declaring herself as the
sole heir of Norberta Bas and adjudicated unto herselfthe
subject portion pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
The existence of the questioned certificates of title, and other
related documents, constitute clouds on said interest. There
seems, therefore, to be no necessity that the plaintiff should
have been declared first as an heir of Norberta Bas as a
prerequisite to this action. Her possession of the subject lot
under a claim of ownership is a sufficient interest to entitle her
to bring this suit.67 (Citation omitted)
This case has gone a long way since the complaint was filed in
1997. A full-blown trial had taken place and judgment was
rendered by the Regional Trial Court where it thoroughly
discussed, evaluated, and weighed all the pieces of documentary
evidence and testimonies of the witnesses of both parties. At
this point, to dismiss the case and require petitioner to institute
a special proceeding to determine her status as heir of the late
Norberta would hamper, instead of serve, justice.
In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,68 where the contending parties
insisted to be the legal heirs of the decedent, this Court
dispensed with the need to institute a separate special
proceeding to determine their heirship since the parties had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence. It held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property
of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,
to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a
special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious,
just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous
in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case - subject of
the present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over
the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being
no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners'
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon[.]69 (Citation omitted)
In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special
proceeding and to require it would be superfluous considering
that petitioner had already presented evidence to establish her
filiation and heirship to Norberto, which respondents never
disputed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated March 12, 2014 and Resolution dated March 15,
2016 are VACATED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
December 26, 2007 of Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS, ANSELMA B. ENDRINAL,
GERTRUDES BASBAS, RUFINA BASBAS, CEFERINA B.
CARTECIANO, ANACLETO BASBAS, ARSENIA BASBAS,
ANASTACIO BASBAS, BEDACIO BASBAS, TEODOCIA B.
OCAMPO, SEGUNDO C. BASBAS, MARIA B. RAMOS AND
EUGENIO BASBAS IN REPRESENTATION OF PEDRO BASBAS;
HERINO T. BASBAS AND NESTOR T. BASBAS IN
REPRESENTATION OF LUCAS BASBAS; ADELAIDA B.
FLORENTINO, RODRIGO BASBAS, FELIX BASBAS, JR., TEODULO
BASBAS, ANDRESITO BASBAS, LARRY BASBAS AND JOEY
BASBAS IN REPRESENTATION OF FELIX BASBAS, SR., VICTOR
BEATO, ALIPIO BEATO, EUTIQUIO BEATO, JULIANA B. DIAZ,
PABLO BEATO AND ALEJANDRO BEATO IN REPRESENTATION
OF REMIGIA B. BEATO, AS REPRESENTED BY RODRIGO
BASBAS, Petitioners, v. RICARDO BASBAS AS REPRESENTED BY
EUGENIO BASBAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
A claim of status as heir of a decedent must always be
substantially supported by evidence as required under our law.
The resolution of a case, in this instance, an action for annulment
of title and reconveyance of real property, cannot be further
stalled and waylaid by a mere assertion of a party of an
ostensible conflicting claims of heirship of the common
decedent. Not all rights to property and incidents thereof, such
as titling, ought to be preceded by a declaration of heirship,
albeit supposedly traced to a single decedent and original
titleholder.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 998531 which reversed and set aside the
rulings, after trial and then on appeal, of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC), Sta. Rosa, Laguna in
Civil Case No. 19132 and Civil Case No. B-6334,3 respectively. The
trial courts annulled TCT No. 294295 issued in the name of
Crispiniano Talampas Basbas (Crispiniano) and herein
respondent Ricardo Talampas Basbas (Ricardo), covering Lot No.
39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, the subject property, and
originally titled to the decedent, Severo Basbas (Severo) under
Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.). Crispiniano and Ricardo
and all their successors-in-interest were ordered to reconvey the
subject property to petitioners.
Both parties, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas (Valentin), and
respondent Ricardo trace their claim of ownership over herein
subject property to Severo.
Petitioners filed an Action for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance
with Damages against Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo
seeking to: (1) annul Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295
issued in the names of Crispiniano and Ricardo covering the
contested lot, and (2) recover possession of the subject property
before the Municipal Trial Court, Santa Rosa, Laguna, docketed
as Civil Case No. 1913.
Countering petitioners’ allegations, Crispiniano and Ricardo
denied petitioners’ ownership over Lot No. 39 and contended
that upon Severo’s death, he was survived by two heirs, Valentin
(grandfather of petitioners) and Nicolas Basbas (Nicolas)
(paternal grandfather of Crispiniano and Ricardo) who evenly
divided Severo’s estate, comprising of two lots, herein subject
property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, and Lot
No. 40, adjacent thereto, among them. Lot No. 40 was inherited
by Valentin, while Lot No. 39 went to Nicolas.
The pertinent documents presented in evidence by both parties
include:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) in the name of Severo;
(2) Order of the Land Registration Court, Regional Trial Court,
Biñan, Laguna dated 1 June 1989, granting the Petition for
Reconstitution of Title covering Lot No. 39 filed by Crispiniano
and Ricardo;
(3) TCT No. T-294295 covering Lot No. 39 issued in the names of
Crispiniano and Ricardo; and
(4) Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of decedent Severo.
The undisputed facts uniformly found by all three lower courts,
at the first instance, the MTC, the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna,
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and the Court of
Appeals are:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo x x x died
on July 14, 1911. They had a child named Valentin (Basbas).
During Severo’s lifetime, he acquired a parcel of land in Santa
Rosa, Laguna otherwise known as Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate. Lot No. 39 is adjacent to Lot No. 40 of the Santa
Rosa Detached Estate which lot was acquired, by purchase, by
Valentin Basbas. Sometime in 1995, [herein petitioners Heirs of
Valentin Basbas] discovered that [respondents] Crispiniano and
Ricardo Basbas were able to secure for themselves Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-294295 over Lot No. 39 of the Santa
Rosa Detached Estate. Sometime in 1987, [respondents],
through Crispiniano Basbas, filed a Petition for Reconstitution of
Title before the Regional Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna, docketed as
LRC Case No. B-758, covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate. Subsequently thereafter, or on June 1, 1989,
an Order was issued by the RTC granting the aforesaid petition.
On the basis of said Order, the title covering Lot No. 39 was
ordered reconstituted in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) was issued.
On November 13, 1993, [therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas
y Talampas and [respondent] Ricardo Basbas y Talampas
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of deceased
Severo Basbas x x x stating among others that the only heirs of
Severo Basbas are Felomino Basbas and Melencio Casubha. On
the basis of said Extra-Judicial Settlement x x x, the Registry of
Deeds of Calamba, Laguna cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-1684 and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-294295 was issued in the names of [therein] defendants
Crispiniano Basbas and [respondent] Ricardo Basbas x x x.
[Petitioners] then brought the matter to the Barangay but no
settlement was reached. Hence, this instant action.4
Significantly, the Pre-Trial Order of the MTC, dated 2 September
1998, contained the following Stipulation of
Facts:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
STIPULATION OF FACTS
1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.
2. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the
middle name Talampas.
3. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin
Basbas, who is a son of [Severo] Basbas.
4. The property at dispute was originally registered in
[Severo’s] name.5
After trial, where both parties presented evidence, the MTC
ruled, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
[petitioners] and against defendants [including herein
respondent Ricardo] as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1) declaring TCT No. T-294295 in the name of the defendants
[including herein respondent Ricardo] as NULL and VOID;
2) ordering the defendants [including herein respondent
Ricardo] to reconvey to [petitioners] Lot No. 39 of the Santa
Rosa Detached Estate, and to surrender possession thereof in
favor of the [petitioners];
3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna to issue a
new certificate of title covering said Lot No. 39 in favor of the
heirs of Severo Basbas; and
4) ordering the defendants [including herein respondent
Ricardo] and their successors-in-interest to pay [petitioners]
the sum of Php 50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.6
On appeal to the RTC by Crispiniano and Ricardo docketed as
Civil Case No. B-6334, judgment of the MTC was affirmed in toto.
Insistent on their stance, Crispiniano and Ricardo appealed to
the Court of Appeals.
In a subsequent turn of events, the appellate court reversed,
applying our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del
Rosario,7 and set aside the uniform rulings of the trial
courts:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The court a quo erred in affirming the decision of the MTC, as
the MTC had ruled on filiation and heirship, matters which fall
within the jurisdiction of a probate court, which the MTC or RTC
of Sta. Rosa, Laguna were not designated to be. It is also proper
that these particular matters be threshed out in a special
proceeding.
In Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, it was
ruled that it is decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can
be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as it involves the
establishment of a status or right.
The case at bar is an action for annulment of title, reconveyance
with damages, a civil action, whereas matters which involve the
settlement and distribution of the estate of a deceased person
as well as filiation and heirship partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court. With both parties claiming to
be the heirs of Severo Basbas, it is but proper to thresh out this
issue in a special proceeding, since [Crispiniano and respondent
Ricardo] seeks to establish his status as one of the heirs entitled
to the property in dispute. Before the action for annulment of
title, reconveyance with damages can be resolved, this Court
opines that the matter of heirship should be adjudicated upon
first. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the
civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding.
x x x x
The MTC and the RTC, both acting in their general jurisdiction,
are devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of annulment of title and reconveyance of the real property
in favor of the respondents. We reiterate that the question of
who are the heirs of Severo Basbas should be adjudged first in a
probate court prior to the resolution of the action for annulment
of title and reconveyance.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.8
Hence, this appeal by certiorari of petitioners — Heirs of
Valentin, raising the following
issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 24 OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA
AFFIRMING THAT OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTA
ROSA, LAGUNA’S DECISION FINDING FOR THE PETITIONERS.
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
APPLYING THE RULING IN HEIRS OF GUIDO AND ISABEL
YAPTINCHAY VERSUS HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, THAT PRIOR TO
THE RESOLUTION OF THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE
AND RECONVEYANCE, THE DETERMINATION OF WHO THE HEIRS
ARE SHOULD FIRST BE ADJUDGED IN A PROBATE COURT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FAILING TO RENDER JUDGMENT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED RELATIVE TO THE ISSUES RAISED AND RULED UPON
BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTA ROSA, LAGUNA AND
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA.9
In ruling in favor of petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, the trial courts
found that petitioners fully established their filiation with the
decedent Severo, the original titleholder of Lot No. 39 and from
whom all parties trace their claim of ownership over the subject
property. Oppositely, the trial courts found wanting, lacking
documentary evidence, the different claims of heirship of
Crispiniano and herein respondent Ricardo, through Severo’s
purported other son or nephew, Nicolas. The MTC, affirmed in
toto by the RTC, declared, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[Petitioners] have fully established their true filiation with the
late Severo Basbas from whom the subject property came from.
Through their own evidence, testimonial and documentary, it
was established that Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera.
They had one (1) child named Valentin Basbas x x x. Valentin
Basbas had no other brother nor sister. He (Valentin) was
married to Irene Beato. Valentin bore four (4) children, namely:
(1) Pedro Basbas; (2) Lucas Basbas; (3) Feliz Basbas, Sr.; and
(4) Remigia Basbas. x x x.
x x x x
As shown, [petitioners] are now the great grandchildren of the
late Severo Basbas who died in Santa Rosa, Laguna on July 5,
1911.
The defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] on the
other hand claim that they are also the legal heirs of the late
Severo Basbas. Such a claim, however, was not supported by any
document. x x x.
x x x x
As correctly pointed out by [petitioners] that assuming, for the
sake of argument, that Nicolas Basbas, predecessor of these
defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo], was the son
of Severo Basbas, then Nicolas Basbas must have been an
illegitimate child of Severo Basbas, in which case his filiation
should be first established before he can claim to be an heir. But
this cannot be done anymore, simply because an action for
recognition should have been made or brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parents x x x. It could not even be
applied under the exception of said law x x x, as no evidence was
ever adduced to that effect. The only conclusion, therefore, is
that Nicolas Basbas was neither a legitimate nor an illegitimate
son of Severo Basbas, so that defendants [including herein
respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late Severo
Basbas.
x x x [T]he defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are
not the legal heirs of the late Severo Basbas. They (defendants)
[including herein respondent Ricardo] claimed that they derived
their title and ownership over Lot No. 39 in representation of
Felomino Basbas, an alleged son of the late Severo Basbas; that
Severo Basbas gave Lot No. 39 to Nicolas Basbas; and that Lot
No. 40 was also given by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas. Such
a claim has no basis at all. The [petitioners’] evidence, specifically
the Friar Lands Certificate x x x and the Certification from the
DENR x x x show that Valentin Basbas acquired Lot No. 40 of the
Santa Rosa Detached Estate by purchase from the government
way back on April 1, 1913, contrary to the allegations of the
defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] that the same
was given by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas as the latter’s
share in the inheritance.10
In marked contrast, the Court of Appeals zeroed in on the claim
of Crispiniano and Ricardo that they are descendants, likewise
great grandchildren, of Severo and inherited Lot No. 39 from
their father Felomino Basbas, Severo’s grandson from the
latter’s son, Nicolas, who received the subject property as his
share in Severo’s estate. On the whole, the appellate court ruled
that the MTC and the RTC, acting in their general jurisdiction, did
not have authority to rule on issues of filiation and heirship of
the parties to the decedent Severo, such matters to be sorted
and established in a special proceeding and falling within the
jurisdiction of a probate court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on the applicability of our
ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court's ruling unqualifiedly
applying Heirs of Yaptinchay. Mistakenly, the Court of Appeals
glosses over facts, not controverted by Crispiniano and
respondent Ricardo:
(1) Valentin was a legitimate child of Severo and Ana Rivera; and
(2) Petitioners are themselves legitimate descendants of
Valentin.
Not only is the petitioners’ heirship to Severo uncontroverted.
The status of Valentin as a compulsory heir of Severo and of
petitioners’ statuses as heirs of Valentin and Severo are
stipulated facts agreed to by Crispiniano and respondent
Ricardo:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.
2. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the
middle name Talampas.
3. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin
Basbas, who is a son of [Severo] Basbas.
4. The property at dispute was originally registered in
[Severo’s] name.11
On the other hand, Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo
miserably fail to establish the status of their ascendant and
purported predecessor-in-interest, Nicolas. In fact, the
testimony of respondent Ricardo tells about the status of
Valentin, not about Nicolas’ status, as a compulsory heir of
Severo:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q Now, do you know also [petitioners] in this case the heirs
of Valentin Basbas, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know them Mr. Witness?
A They are my relatives, sir.
Q Will you tell us specifically what is your relationship with
[petitioners] in this case, Mr. Witness?
A They are my cousins, I used to call them “Kuya.”
Q How come you became the relatives of [petitioners,] (sic)
Mr. Witness?
A My father and the father of [petitioners] are relatives.
Q Specifically, what is the name of the father of
[petitioners], Mr. Witness?
A Valentin Basbas.
Q What is the name of your father?
A Felomino Basbas.
Q How is Felomino and Valentin related?
A They are cousins.
Court
How come they became [your] cousins?
A Their family names are both Basbas.
Q And that is your only basis in saying that they are
relatives?
A No.
Q So, what other basis?
A Severo Basbas is the eldest and he bore a child name[d]
Nicolas Basbas and Nicolas Basbas bore a child name[d]
Felomino Basbas who [had] two sons named Crispiniano
and Ricardo Basbas.
xxxx
Q Who was the father of Valentin Basbas then?
A Severo Basbas.
Q You said a while ago that Nicolas Basbas is the son of
Severo Basbas and now you are saying that Valentin
Basbas is the son of Severo Basbas, you mean to say that
Valentin Basbas and Nicolas Basbas are brothers?
A Yes, Nicolas is the eldest[older] th[a]n Valentin Basbas.
Q So, it is clear now that Nicolas and Valentin Basbas are
brothers?
A That is what I know. That is what my brother told me.12
Mauro Basbas (Mauro), one of the defendants before the trial
court, while testifying, also failed to shed light on the status of
Nicolas as an heir of Severo, insisting only that Nicolas is Severo’s
son as told to him by his grandfather, Felomino Basbas. Mauro
even categorically answered that the wife of Severo is Ana
Rivera, further establishing the legitimacy of Valentin as the son
of Severo and Ana Rivera:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q Who is the father of Felomino Basbas?
A Nicolas Basbas.
Q You mean to tell us that Nicolas is the son of Severo
Basbas?
A Yes.
Q Do you happen to know the mother of Felomino Basbas?
A Yes.
Q Would you tell us?
A Catalina Mane.
Q Since you seem to be so well informed about the family of
Severo Basbas, can you tell us who was the wife of Severo
Basbas?
A Ana Rivera.
Q How can you say now unless you are implying that Severo
Basbas had an illegitimate son, how can you explain now
why the surname… the middle name of your grandfather
is [not] Rivera?
Court
xxxx
What is the middlename (sic) of Severo Basbas?
A I don’t know.
Court
Who is the son of Severo Basbas?
A Nicolas Basbas.
Q What is the maiden name (sic) of Nicolas Basbas?
A I don’t know.13
In all, Valentin’s long-possessed status as a legitimate child and
thus, heir of Severo, need no longer be the subject of a special
proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the Court
of Appeals. There is no need to re-declare his status as an heir of
Severo.
And, contraposed to the fact that Valentin’s status as a
legitimate child of Severo is already established, Nicolas’ status
as a purported heir of Severo can no longer be established,
Nicolas’ right thereto expiring upon his death.
Glaringly, there is no pretension from respondent’s end that
Nicolas was born of a valid marriage, only that he is Severo’s son.
Nonetheless, even if respondents were minded to establish the
status of Nicolas, whether he is a legitimate or an illegitimate
child of Severo, such can no longer be done.
Article 165, in relation to Articles 173 and 175, of the Family
Code and Article 285 of the Civil Code
state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
CHAPTER 4
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
SECTION 1. - Recognition of Natural Children
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration
of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which
either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years
from the finding of the document.
Our ruling in Raymundo v. Vda. de Suarez14 is
instructive:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, herein respondents must first be
declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to
annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property
of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.
We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.
Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr.
and Teofista — and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs — has been firmly
established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of
Appeals. True, this Court is not a trier of facts, but as the final
arbiter of disputes, we found and so ruled that herein
respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father,
Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have
been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower
court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and
Maria Concepcion's representation in the RTC that our ruling
in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of
their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.
As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case
No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which
belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with
regard to said portion." There is clearly no intimation in our
decision for the RTC to have to determine an already settled
issue i.e., herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr.
Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly,
the status of herein respondents as legitimate children of
Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein
respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The
following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity
of herein respondents, and the latter's status as legitimate
children:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to 10649 where
Teofista, along with herein respondents, questioned the RTC,
Branch 151's Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14,
1986. Although the CA ruled against Teofista and herein
respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as
legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and
2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly
ruled that herein respondents were, as children of Teofista,
merely successors-in-interest of the latter to the property and
by virtue thereof, bound by the judgment in Civil Case Nos.
21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine of res judicata. We
subsequently reversed this ruling on the wrong application of res
judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and
affirmed, however, the CA's factual finding of herein
respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held
therein that "the proprietary interest of [herein respondents] in
the levied and auctioned [properties] is different from and
adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-
owners of the property not because of [Teofista] but through
their own right as children of their deceased father [, Marcelo
Sr.]." Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status of
legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be
indirectly or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action
to annul a judicial sale.
Articles 262, 263, 265 and 266 of the Civil Code, the applicable
law at the time of Marcelo's death, support the foregoing
conclusion, to wit:
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of
the child only in the following cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period
fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint,
without having desisted from the same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall
be brought within one year from the recording of birth in the
Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a
proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months
if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad.
If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be
counted from the discovery of the fraud.
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the
record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding
article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession
of status of a legitimate child.
In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of
the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance
of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of
this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein
respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The
same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr.
specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates the
properties she owns in common with her children, herein
respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein
respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case
interminably.15
Thus, we find no need for a separate proceeding for a
declaration of the heirs of Severo in order to resolve petitioners’
Action for Annulment of Title and Reconveyance of the subject
property.
Prescinding from the foregoing, a closer scrutiny of the
documents presented in evidence by Crispiniano and Ricardo
before the trial court, betray the fraudulence of their claim.
1. Order of the RTC, Branch 25, Biñan, Laguna in LRC B-758, a
Petition for Reconstitution of Title filed by Crispiniano and
respondent Ricardo:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner alleges that a certain parcel of residential land,
situated in the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Province of Laguna is
registered in the name of the legal heirs of Severo Basbas as
evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna (Exhibit “E”); that the
aforementioned duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. (N.A.) was lost during the latter part of the Japanese
Occupation when the petitioner and his family evacuated from
their residence to evade the atrocities being committed by the
Japanese soldiers; that after peace and order was restored,
diligent efforts were exerted in trying to find the said certificate
of title, but the same proved futile; and that pursuant to the
provisions of R.A. No. 26, petitioner desires that the original copy
of said title be reconstituted and thereafter have the full
technical description of Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached
Estate be inscribed therein.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26 copies of the
petition, notice of hearing, plan and technical description of Lot
No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate were forwarded to the
Office of the Land Registration Commission for appropriate
action. On January 18, 1989, this Court received the Report
(Exhibit “C”) of the Acting Administrator of the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA).
x x x x
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.
During the hearing of the petition, Atty. Agapito G. Carait,
counsel for the petitioner, presented Crispiniano Basbas.
Together with his testimony, the following documentary
evidence were presented, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Exhibits “A” - the publication in the
Official Gazette;
“B” - Certificate of Posting;
“C” - Report;
“D” - Certification form from
the Register of Deeds;
and
“E” - Friar Lands Sale
Certificate.
CRISPINIANO BASBAS, 70 years old, widower and a resident of
Santa Rosa, Laguna, stated that he is the petitioner in this case;
that the parcel of land involved in this case is situated at Aplaya,
Santa Rosa, Laguna and is identified as Lot No. 39 of the Santa
Rosa Detached Estate with an area of 330 sq. m.; that he was
born in that property; that this parcel of land was covered by a
title in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas; that the title was
lost during the Japanese Occupation when his father Felomino
Basbas who was then in possession of the duplicate title,
evacuated to the Province of Rizal particularly in Tanay; that
later on his father moved to Sta. Maria, Laguna; that he was with
his father when they evacuated to a place called Laranga; that
while there, he saw the title in the possession of his father in the
“maleta” where he kept it; that when they returned to Santa
Rosa, Laguna, he asked his father regarding the Transfer
Certificate of Title and his father told him that the title was lost
in the mountains of Rizal; the petitioner verified from the Office
of the Register of Deeds if said title is still intact with their office;
that the Register of Deeds issued a certification (Exhibit “D”) to
the effect that Lot 39 of Santa Rosa Detached Estate has no
record on file with the office; that petitioner went to the Bureau
of Lands to verify the title and found out that the said patent was
issued in the name of the legal heirs of Severo Basbas (Exhibit
“E”); that the children of the petitioner are now in possession of
Lot 39; that the petitioner’s father had paid the realty taxes and
after his death, he (petitioner) continued paying the taxes; that
his father exerted all efforts to recover or find the said title but
the same proved futile; and that to his own knowledge, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot No. 39 has never been
encumbered, sold or given as security for the performance of
any obligation.
x x x x
Thus, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, in his
REPORT dated January 18, 1989
recommends:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the foregoing information relative to Lot No. 39,
Santa Rosa Detached Estate, is respectfully submitted for
consideration in the resolution of the instant petition, and if the
Honorable Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification
pursuant to Section 15 Republic Act No. 26 to grant the same,
the owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.)
may be used as a source of the desired reconstitution pursuant
to Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 26, Provided, however, that
in case the petition is granted, the reconstituted title should be
made subject to such encumbrances as may be subsisting, and
provided, further that no certificate of title covering the same
parcel of land exists in the Office of the Register of Deeds
concerned.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be in order and meritorious
and there being no objection on the part of the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) as to the technical description of Lot
No. 39, the same is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby orders
the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch to reconstitute
the original copy of TCT No. (N.A.) in the name of the heirs of
Severo Basbas who appear in the aforesaid Transfer Certificate
of Title at the time the original was lost and/or destroyed as the
registered owners, using as basis the technical description of Lot
39, certified by the Bureau of Lands, and thereafter to annotate
on the corresponding title the full technical description of Lot
No. 39 of the Sta. Rosa Detached Estate.
For this purpose, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward to the
Registry of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, a certified copy of
the Report of the Acting Administrator, Land Registration
Authority dated January 18, 1989, the copy of the technical
description, which documents shall be used by the Register of
Deeds as bases for reconstitution and inscription.16
2. Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Severo executed by
Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF
DECEASED SEVERO BASBAS
x x x x
That FELOMINO BASBAS is our father and likewise died intestate
last October 30, 1976 leaving no will or debts and the share of
MELENCIO CASUBHA was sold and bought by us last 5 December
1977, xerox copy of such Deed is hereto attached as Annex “A”
and made an integral part of this Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate of Deceased SEVERO BASBAS;
That there is no pending testate or intestate proceedings against
said estate;
That in view thereof the aforenamed CRISPINIANO and RICARDO
both surnamed BASBAS do hereby adjudicate unto themselves
the aforedescribed parcel of land subject to the provisions of
Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CRISPINIANO BASBAS – undivided share and
RICARDO BASBAS – undivided share;17
Ultimately, we agree with the disquisition of the trial courts in
annulling TCT No. 294295 and ordering the reconveyance of Lot
No. 39 to petitioners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [We proceed to] the next issue as to “whether or not the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severo Basbas
executed by Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas is valid.” The Court
believes otherwise. Simply because the defendants [including
herein respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late
Severo Basbas. They (defendants) [including herein respondent
Ricardo] claimed that they derived their title and ownership over
Lot No. 39 in representation of Felomino Basbas, an alleged
[grand]son of the late Severo Basbas; that Severo Basbas gave
Lot No. 39 to Nicolas Basbas; and that Lot No. 40 was also given
by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas. Such a claim has no basis
at all. The [petitioners’] evidence, specifically the Friar Lands
Certificate x x x and the Certification from the DENR x x x show
that Valentin Basbas acquired Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate by purchase from the government way back on
April 1, 1913, contrary to the allegations of the defendants
[including herein respondent Ricardo] that the same was given
by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basba as the latter’s share in the
inheritance.
Claiming to be the only heirs of Felomino Basbas (their father),
and that Felomino Basbas and Melencio Casubha are the only
heirs of the late Severo Basbas, Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo
Basbas executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Severo Basbas on November 12, 1993, whereby they
adjudicated to themselves Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate x x x. On the basis of the said Extra-Judicial
Settlement, Crispiniano Basbas filed a Petition For The
Reconstitution of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa
Rosa Detached Estate x x x before the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna, and after hearing, an Order was issued granting
the aforesaid petition. Subsequently thereafter, TCT No. RT-
1684 (N.A.) in the names of the Heirs of Severo Basbas was
cancelled and a new title (TCT No. 294295) was issued in the
names of Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas, defendants
[therein.]
Based on the evidence on hand, defendants [including herein
respondent Ricardo] acquired the property in question through
fraud and, therefore, an implied trust was created in favor of
[petitioners] under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which
provides, thus:
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
What right or rights, therefore, do they have under these
circumstances? Since a constructive trust was created,
[petitioners] have the right to recover the property subject of
this action. The fact that the decision of the RTC, Biñan, Laguna
approving/granting the petition for the reconstitution of the title
covering Lot No. 39 and said decision has obtained its finality, is
of no moment. It has been held: “the rule that registration of real
property under the Torrens System has the effect of constructive
notice to the whole world cannot be availed of when the
purpose of the action is to compel a trustee to convey the
property registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que
trust. In other words, the defense of prescription cannot be set
up in an action to enforce a trust x x x.
The fact that the subject lot was already registered in the
defendants’ [including herein respondent Ricardo] name and
indeed a Tax Declaration was issued in their favor for taxation
purposes, and they have paid the taxes due thereon, are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. Hence, it has been held:
When a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging
to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of a true
owner, he is considered guilty of fraud, and he may be compelled
to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the
property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value x x x. Also it has been held “that an original owner of
registered land may seek annulment of the transfer thereof on
the ground of fraud and the proper remedy is reconveyance x x
x.18
We add that Valentin’s rights to the succession vested from the
moment of death of the decedent Severo.19 In turn, petitioners’,
as Heirs of Valentin, who is an uncontested heir of decedent
Severo, rights to the succession vested from the moment of
Valentin’s death. As such, they own Lot No. 39, undisputedly
titled in Severo’s name and forming part of Severo’s estate, and
are entitled to the titling thereof in their names.
In this regard, we note that the Court of Appeals did not reverse
the trials courts’ factual finding on Cripiniano’s and Ricardo’s
fraudulent titling of Lot No. 39 in their names. The evidence
presented by Crispiniano and Ricardo highlight the fraudulence
of their claim:
1. Title to Lot No. 39 is not in their names, neither is it titled in
the name of their predecessors-in-interest, Nicolas and
Felomino Basbas;
2. Crispiniano and Ricardo are not the only heirs of Severo, if they
are even heirs to begin with.
One final note. Severo, as well as Valentin, have been long dead.
It is well-nigh that title to the subject property, Lot No. 39 of the
Santa Rosa Detached Estate, appear in the names of the
petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, herein declared heirs of Severo, or
their successors-in-interest, to finally settle title thereto and
prevent occurrences of fraudulent titling thereof. Hence,
petitioners, Heirs of Valentin and their successors-in-interest,
are directed to take the appropriate action for titling of the
subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99853 is REVERSED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court and the Municipal Trial Court
are AFFIRMED. Petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas and their
successors-in-interest, are likewise DIRECTED to take the
appropriate action for titling of Lot No. 39 of Santa Rosa
Detached Estate with dispatch, and NOTIFY this Court within ten
(10) days of such action.
4. LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it
rests the burden of showing why it should not be allowed. In
the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden
satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any
reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that
allowed the probate of the will.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the December
12, 2002 Decision2 and the March 7, 2003 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision
appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place
judgment is rendered approving and allowing probate to the
said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering
the issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner Josefina
Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the court a quo for
further and concomitant proceedings."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA,
as follows:
"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived
for a long time in the United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the
Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200
Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in
common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their
names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the
United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was
then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto
Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two
years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a
cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in
English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15,
1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the
attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that
page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three
instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the
continuation of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end
of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. It
provides in the body that:
‘LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE
NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:
‘I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina
Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of 9200 Catmon Street,
Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and
disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my
last will and testament:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under
the auspices of the Catholic Church in accordance with the rites
and said Church and that a suitable monument to be erected
and provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory
in the minds of my family and friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C.
VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the follow-described
properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO),
situated in Makati, Metro Manila, described and covered by
TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila
registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca
Valmonte), having share and share alike;
b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property,
made of strong and mixed materials used as my residence and
my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro
Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482,
Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased
sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and
share alike or equal co-owners thereof;
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal
properties, including my savings account bank book in USA
which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others
whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath
to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole
executrix of my last will and testament, and it is my will that
said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th
day of June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines.’
"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia
on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially
those found in the USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of
the heirs of the testator; or to give them proper notice
pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and
legal solemnities and formalities were not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time
of the alleged execution he being in an advance sate of senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or
threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and
pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her agents and/or
assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he
did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time
of affixing his signature thereto;’
and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina
alleging her want of understanding and integrity.
"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as
witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who
prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental
witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and
Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.
"According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they
lived in her parents house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but
they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly
pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were
times though when to shave off on expenses, the testator
would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his
lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will was
witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were
their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she
had no knowledge of the existence of the last will and
testament of her husband, but just serendipitously found it in
his attache case after his death. It was only then that she
learned that the testator bequeathed to her his properties and
she was named the executrix in the said will. To her estimate,
the value of property both real and personal left by the testator
is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that
the testator never suffered mental infirmity because despite
his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three
kilometers from their home cooked and cleaned the kitchen
and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled
to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also
asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was
hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually
resulted in his death.
"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who
notarized the testator’s will, testified that it was in the first
week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three
witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and
requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the
testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he
wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back
on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had
prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and
locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned
on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town
so they were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9,
1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses
signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them
each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the
testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that
though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and
his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have
been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal
execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he
no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983
because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The
notary public also testified that to his observation the testator
was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his
signature on the will.
"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the
testimony of the notary public, and testified that the testator
went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez
at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany
him to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his
intended will; that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro
Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983; that they
returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were
asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983 because of the
absence of the notary public; that the testator executed the
will in question in their presence while he was of sound and
disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that
the contents of the will was explained by the notary public in
the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as
witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other. And that during the execution, the
testator’s wife, Josefina was not with them.
"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit
alone because aside from her there are other children from the
siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him.
She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that
at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was
already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She
knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the
Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him and
they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical
and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and
senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane
Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
"Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he
evidence adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds,
namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in
the execution and attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution
of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility
"It then found these grounds extant and proven, and
accordingly disallowed probate."5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will
of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility
of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had
acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held
that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism
and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways"6 did not make him a
person of unsound mind.
Hence, this Petition.7
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"I.
Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled
to great respect.
"II.
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the
subject will was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido
Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last
will and testament.
"III.
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at
the time he allegedly executed the subject will."8
In short, petitioner assails the CA’s allowance of the probate of
the will of Placido Valmonte.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Probate of a Will
At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be
raised in a Petition for Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence
presented during the trial may be examined and the factual
matters resolved by this Court when, as in the instant case, the
findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the
trial court.9
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not
necessarily mean that every will presented for probate should
be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites
that must be satisfied for the probate of a will.10 Verily, Article
839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be
disallowed, as follows:
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied
with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable
of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the
influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other
person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto."
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido
Valmonte’s will by imputing fraud in its execution and
challenging the testator’s state of mind at the time.
Existence of Fraud in the
Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the
formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains that the
circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of
fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the
testator’s wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary
public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to
sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of
the execution and the attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at
the prime of her young life [to] almost immediately plunge into
marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who
happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado,"11 thus casting
doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of
the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic
and common experience"12 for an old man with a severe
psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and
testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false
statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It
may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived
as to the nature or contents of the document which he
executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is
led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would
not have made."13
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden
of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution.14 The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence
of fraud.15 Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-
serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever
presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does
not affect the due execution of a will.16 That the testator was
tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the
fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty
years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded
petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken
"the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight
years."17
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict
between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate
the document, "because the law does not even require that a
[notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion."18 More important, the will must be subscribed by
the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses
who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and
of one another.19 Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses
must acknowledge the will before a notary public.20 In any
event, we agree with the CA that "the variance in the dates of
the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public
and the instrumental witnesses."21
The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June
11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October 13, 1986, and October
21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively
as follows:
"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:
Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June
15 when the testator and his witnesses were supposed to be in
your office?
A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to
your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of
town.
xxxxxxxxx
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as
per acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this the actual
date when the document was acknowledged?
A Yes sir.
Q What about the date when the testator and the three
witnesses affixed their respective signature on the first and
second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9,
1983.
Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date
appearing on the body of the document as well as the
attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I
put it in my own handwriting August 9, 1983 on the
acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)
Eugenio Gomez:
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June
15, 1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is dated August
9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this
discrepancy in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte
and the two witnesses; that was first week of June and Atty.
Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we
returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did
you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you
signed, who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn,
November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento,
three times?
xxxxxxxxx
A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first
week of June was out first time. We went there to talk to Atty.
Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and
testament. After that what they have talked what will be
placed in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he
will go back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15,
Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign it,
the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on
August 9 and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn,
October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June
15, 1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on
August 9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty.
Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)"22
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand
conspiracy" in the commission of a fraud. There was no
showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive
any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of
the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible
evidence of its due execution.23 Their testimony favoring it and
the finding that it was executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any
showing of ill motives.24
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the
Civil Code gives the following guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the
testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.
"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by
disease, injury or other cause.
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of
making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed
of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.
"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind
at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who
opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month,
or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane,
the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove
that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must
have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as
follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the
proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character
of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case,
we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that
Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution
of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able
to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the
extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that
he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated
earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not
affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-
Betts v. CA,25 which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and
memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary
capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally
known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of
mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has
been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility
from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person
incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may
make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and
how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute
a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does
not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or
of unsound mind."26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
5. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA
CAPONONG-NOBLE, Petitioner, v. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL
ABELLAR, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 assailing the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 47644. The Court of Appeals sustained the Resolution3 of
the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental,
Branch 61 ("RTC-Kabankalan"), admitting to probate the last will
and testament of Alipio Abada ("Abada").
The Antecedent Facts
Abada died sometime in May 1940.4 His widow Paula Toray
("Toray") died sometime in September 1943. Both died without
legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (now RTC-
Kabankalan) a petition,5 docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for
the probate of the last will and testament ("will") of Abada.
Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural
children Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is
the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the
ground that Abada left no will when he died in 1940. Caponong
further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should
be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed
and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the
last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries.
Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged
intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline,
Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada ("Joel Abada, et
al."), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela
Tronco ("Levi Tronco, et al."), also opposed the petition. The
oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada
and Toray.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition6 before the
RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 071 (312-8669), for the
probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel
Abada, et al., and Levi Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the
same grounds they cited in SP No. 070 (313-8668).
On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition7 before the
RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 069 (309), praying for the
issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Abada and Toray.
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted
to probate the will of Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any
motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of
Toray's will became final and executory.8
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan
designated Belinda Caponong-Noble ("Caponong-Noble")
Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and
Toray.9 Caponong-Noble moved for the dismissal of the petition
for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-Kabankalan denied the
motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.10
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge
Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered that in an Order dated 16 March
1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already
submitted the case for decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan
rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as follows:
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by
law; that there is substantial compliance with the formalities of
a Will as the law directs and that the petitioner through his
testimony and the deposition of Felix Gallinero was able to
establish the regularity of the execution of the said Will and
further, there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or
substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of
Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed
probate.
As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar11 is appointed
administrator of the estate of Paula Toray who shall discharge
his duties as such after letters of administration shall have been
issued in his favor and after taking his oath and filing a bond in
the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of
Alipio Abada shall continue discharging her duties as such until
further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the
oppositors in their motions to dismiss the petition for probate,
that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as
required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the
failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all
other issues.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice
of appeal.
In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the RTC-Kabankalan. The
appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly
admitted to probate the will of Abada.
Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;
2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a
notary public;13
3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a
language or dialect known to the testator;
4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so,
whether the attestation clause complies with the requirements
of the applicable laws;
5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue
of whether the will of Abada is written in a language known to
Abada;
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate
of the will of Abada.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-
Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of Abada.
The Applicable Law
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that
time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No.
190 or the Code of Civil Procedure14 which governed the
execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation
clause in the will of Abada. Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,15 governs the form of
the attestation clause of Abada's will.16 Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. - No will, except as provided in the
preceding section,17 shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in
the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him,
or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person
requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his express direction, in
the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites
of a will are the following:
(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by
the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other;
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will must sign each
and every page of the will on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages
used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the witnesses
witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate
that it is written in a language or dialect known to the testator.
Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before
a notary public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the
Old Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a]
language or dialect known to the testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses. xxx18
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of
the New Civil Code.19 Article 804 of the Old Civil Code is about
the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an
absentee, while Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a
legitime.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions.
Article 804 of the New Civil Code is taken from Section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.20 Article 806 of the New Civil Code is
taken from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code21 which provides:
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate
the will must be acquainted with the testator, or, should they
not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are
acquainted with him and are known to the notary and to the
attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also
endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has, in their
judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a
notary, in cases falling under Articles 700 and 701, are also
required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure22 repealed Article 685 of
the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the
intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution
of any will.23 Therefore, Abada's will does not require
acknowledgment before a notary
public.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one
discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that
such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the
will. On this issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was
not raised in the motion to dismiss, and that it is now too late to
raise the issue on appeal. We agree with Caponong-Noble that
the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in probate
proceedings.24 In addition, the language used in the will is part
of the requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and the Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Noble's contention must still fail. There
is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the
testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.25 This is a
matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.26 Caponong-
Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed,
among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the
contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will.
However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-
speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and
his companions would talk in the Spanish language.27 This
sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
The Attestation Clause of Abada's Will
A scrutiny of Abada's will shows that it has an attestation clause.
The attestation clause of Abada's will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima
voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo
tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen
izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo. Y en
testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en
presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y
en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de
que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales estan paginadas
correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS' en la parte
superior de la carrilla.28
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the
attestation clause. Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation
clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is
written.
The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo
de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el
mismo" which means "in the left margin of each and every one
of the two pages consisting of the same" shows that the will
consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively
with the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the
phrase "las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las
letras "UNO" y "DOS."
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails
to state expressly that the testator signed the will and its every
page in the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the
Court of Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on
substantial compliance found in Article 809 of the New Civil
Code.29
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y
declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad
y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el
testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de
todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo." The English translation
is: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his
last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also
signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every
one of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly
states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the
presence of the witnesses.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the
attestation clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. On
this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying
the rule on substantial compliance in determining the number of
witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the
number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that
three witnesses signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even
before the effectivity of the New Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson
v. De Gorostiza,30 the Court recognized that there are two
divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on
strict construction and the other on liberal construction.
In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan,31 the
basic case on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in
later decisions of the Court.
In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,32 the petitioner, arguing for
liberal construction of applicable laws, enumerated a long line of
cases to support her argument while the respondent,
contending that the rule on strict construction should apply, also
cited a long series of cases to support his view. The Court, after
examining the cases invoked by the parties, held:
x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid
and inflexible, which would be applicable to all cases. More than
anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the
surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the
will, and the instrument appears to have been executed
substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law,
the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad
faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate,
although the document may suffer from some imperfection of
language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in
permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution
of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be
proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore,
should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the
purpose of the law. x x
x 33 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of
Abada's will. Abada's will clearly shows four signatures: that of
Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude
that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the
number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the
will itself and without the need for presentation of
evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of
the rule on liberal construction, thus:
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty,
nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The later
decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the
dividing line with precision. They do not allow
evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or
supply missing details that should appear in the will
itself.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its
confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence
or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp
limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of
dire results.34 (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence"
coupled with the signatures appearing on the will itself and after
the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada
subscribed to and professed before the three witnesses that the
document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed the will and the
left margin of each page of the will in the presence of these three
witnesses.
Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does
not expressly state the circumstances that the
witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa
presence of the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled: Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero
desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation.
the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay
language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc,
attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.35 Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang
The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de pasubali’t at kondiciones;
ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang
y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness, every one nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na
of us also signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.
shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing of the Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10
will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in the ng Hunyo, 1981.
presence of one another and of the testator. PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling
12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo,
SO ORDERED. tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng
Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng
6.FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner, kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t
vs. dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap
ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents. ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at
DECISION sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito.
TINGA, J.: EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, address: 500 San Diego St.
purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is QUIRINO AGRAVA
provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code. Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of LAMBERTO C. LEAÑO
pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a JUANITO ESTRERA
mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is address: City Court Compound,
sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
is just aching for judicial rejection. Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito
provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all (Sgd.)
the detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
the validity of notarial wills — that they be acknowledged before Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
executed with indifference to these two codal provisions opens The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on
itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy. the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 bottom of the attestation clause.
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and
by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one
will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad.
Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.
Pilipino, read in full: The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN: 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its
Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several
pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for
aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on
naunang ginawang habilin o testamento: petitioner’s right to occupy the properties of the decedent.3 It
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, also asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner,
La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs,
katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per
magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the
pamilya at kaibigan; widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and the mother of
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her
karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag- mother by three (3) months.5
alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed
out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page
of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These
twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order
dated 10 August 1992.6 The RTC favorably took into account the
testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava,
Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore
"the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator
more freedom in expressing his last wishes;"7 and from this
perspective, rebutted oppositor’s arguments that the will was
not properly executed and attested to in accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the
testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses, and
having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities
in the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the
interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will
with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that
the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the
testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted
that at the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix, the
following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng
Mga Saksi":
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling
dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo,
tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng
Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng
kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t
dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga
saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap
ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at
sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause
and the acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as a
substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
On the oppositor’s contention that the attestation clause was
not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof,
this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing
witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will
containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead
of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of
identification and attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not
numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each
page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages
thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two
pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary
dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of
the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the
defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For
the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature
on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the
last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not
a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositor’s assertion that the signature of the
testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to
establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and
the due execution of the will.8
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto
Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law,
Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of
the petition for probate.9 The Court of Appeals noted that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the
will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the
Civil Code that "the number of pages used in a notarial will be
stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the
substantial compliance rule."11
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805
and 806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the
left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which
the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the
office of the Clerk of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect,
the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages
of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several
more deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to
state the number of pages of the will.12 There was an incomplete
attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been
allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the
attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the
requisite was left uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial
court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca13 and In
re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among
the defects of the will in question was the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the
will.15 In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate,
the Court made the following consideration which remains
highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number
of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the
document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a
sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions
of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total
number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out
the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following
sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of
sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the
document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging
of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a
matter attended with much greater difficulty."16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation
clause of which failed to state the number of sheets or pages
used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to
declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out
in the attesting clause is fatal."17 It was further observed that "it
cannot be denied that the x x x requirement affords additional
security against the danger that the will may be tampered with;
and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement,
it must be considered material."18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v.
Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein the Court
allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact
that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of
the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of
these two cases, and made the following distinction which
petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily
show that the attestation does not state the number of pages
used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and
undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in
"Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and
Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA
195," to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the
attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon
which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme
Court are not applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench.
This is so because, in the case of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia
Florentino, et al., supra," although the attestation in the subject
Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however,
the same was found in the last part of the body of the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation
clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the
will is written, which requirement has been held to be
mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of
interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the
prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be
bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs.
Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30;
Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66
Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that
the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number
of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing
or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the
deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the
situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state
the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is
written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a
statement that it is composed of eight pages, which
circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule
of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases
where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to
prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely
technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring
supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra,
the notarial acknowledgement in the Will states the number of
pages used in the:
"x x x
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in
writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not
for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will
that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier
stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the
testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or
at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left
margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos"
comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament
consists of two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra)
(Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in
the will is not stated in any part of the Will. The will does not
even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number
of pages of the will should be stated.21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the
enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the statutory
provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 22 Reliance on these cases
remains apropos, considering that the requirement that the
attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from
Section 618.23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950
did put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of
wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that
may vary from the philosophy that governed these two cases.
Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad faith,
forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code
Commission, which stated that "the underlying and fundamental
objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this
project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the testator more
[freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in
accord with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities
in the execution of wills."24 However, petitioner conveniently
omits the qualification offered by the Code Commission in the
very same paragraph he cites from their report, that such
liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions
to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the testator."25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion
made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court on the
conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal
formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause in
wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with
several other cases, as examples of the application of the rule of
strict construction.28 However, the Code Commission opted to
recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial
compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck
though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be
applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that
can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all
the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures
appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing
witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts
that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely
disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all
persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other
must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the
only check against perjury in the probate
proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in its assailed decision, considering that the failure to state
the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one
of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded.
In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will
whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other,30 the other omission cited by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly
disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it
now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would
not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the
attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."31 Thus, a
failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed
every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be
checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one
another’s presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the
attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages
on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article
809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the
number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its
pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages.33 The failure to state the number of pages equates with
the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental
witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the
execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and
subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance
with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many
pages it is comprised of, as was the situation
in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have
been no substantial compliance with the requirements under
Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause
or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which
comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need
to comply with the formal requirements as enumerated under
Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the
Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains
that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal
requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards
against the forgery or intercalation of notarial
wills.34 Compliance with these requirements, however picayune
in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that
the testator himself or herself had decided to convey
property post mortem in the manner established in the
will.35 The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in
the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition
of the testator’s incontestable desires, and not for the
indulgent admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals.
However, an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of
even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its
rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the
instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the
will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause
which after all consists of their averments before the notary
public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing
the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand
margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered the signature
requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of
six (6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the
attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will
fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses
to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause,
although the page containing the same is signed by the
witnesses on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is
correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts
attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made
by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered
as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures
at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the
three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially
to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the
attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are
in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on
the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not
signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be
admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a
will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator
and any or all of the witnesses.39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro.
Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the
requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the
instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these
two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among
others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are
signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures
to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are
referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause
itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from
the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results
in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed
the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned
attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that
do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different
avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in
this case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-
hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without
diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses’ signatures
on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the
attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into
writing of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the
witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article
805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every
page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated
these elemental facts would be their signatures on the
attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly
attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign
the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial
of this petition should also hinge. The requirement under Article
806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been
complied with. The importance of this requirement is
highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the
other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a
separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article
806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in
compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of
equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y.
Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng
Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no
manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed.41 It involves an extra
step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the
notary that the executor of a document has attested to the
notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even
though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is
that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before
him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the
executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow
that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary
public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he
himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though,
the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of
and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this
case would involve the decedent and the instrumental
witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as
a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express
requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged",
and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not
present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the
decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the
will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in
a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against
spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the
testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless
act.43 The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the
instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law
that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own
free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain
of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons
who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also
provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of
certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to
those persons he/she had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-
evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn
to before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were
not fully satisfied by the will in question. We need not discuss
them at length, as they are no longer material to the
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator
and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the
will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the
witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin,
her only signature appearing at the so-called "logical end"44 of
the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered
correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with
Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused
the notion that these two requirements be construed as
mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves,
may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these
omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they
need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a
general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article
805 by whoever executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question
suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.