HYPOTHESIS:

A person cannot be tried for different offences based on the same facts.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1) INTRODUCTION
2) HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THIS PRINCIPLE
3) SECTION 300 OF Cr.P.C
4) CASE ANALYSIS
5) CONCLUSION
6) BIBLIOGRAPHY
1) INTRODUCTION
Double jeopardy means that no person shall be prosecuted for the same offense
twice. Black’s law dictionary defines Double Jeopardy as “A second prosecution
after a first trial for the same offense”. In India the protection against double
jeopardy is given under section 300 of Cr.P.C and also under Article 20(2) of the
Indian constitution. Article 20(2) provides protection against the prosecution and
punishment of a person more than once. The same is available under common law
as autrefois acquit and autrefois convict which means that the person was already
convicted or acquitted for the same.
This principle is there in India even prior to the commencement of the constitution
under section 26 of General clause Act 1897 according to this when a person has
done some offense and it is covered under two or more enactments then he can be
tried and punished for either of those offences but he shall not be punished twice
for the same offense.
The constitution does not talk about protection against the person who is acquitted
of an offense. The criminal procedure code provides for it stating that when a
person is either acquitted or convicted after fair trail by a competent court ha
cannot be again subjected to prosecution for the same offense.
This guarantee lays down the basic principle under the constitution that a innocent
person should not be punished and an individual should be treated with dignity
and respect. It protects the rights of the accused person.
2) HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THIS PRINCIPLE
This principle was known from the period of Greeks and Romans. It was found in
the digest of Justinian that the governor should not permit the same person to be
again accused of a crime of which he was already acquitted.
In eighteenth century, Blackstone stated that no man can be brought into jeopardy
for his life for the same offence more than once. Thus a person who was found not
guilty after a fair trail by a court having competent jurisdiction he may plead such
acquittal as a bar for subsequent accusation for the same offence.
Doctrine of double jeopardy was drawn by the continental and English systems
from the canon law. The origin is from the maxim that “Not even god judges
twice for the same act” which was present in church canons in 847A.D
In Green v. United States the court observed that state should not allow the
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offence. If allowed this
makes the individual to feel embarrassed and compels him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity and it also increases the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.
The difference between the historical doctrine and modern double jeopardy
provisions is that the old one applies only to the crimes regarding life or limb. But
the modern one now applies to all criminal prosecutions and punishments.
This protection given under this rule has international recognition also through
various international documents like Article 14(7) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Article 4(1), Protocol 7 of the European Convention
of Human rights and Article 50 of the charter of Fundamental rights of the
European Union. The states which are parties to the conventions are bound to
follow them.
3) SECTION 300 OF CR.P.C

Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence:

(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an
offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or
acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor
on the same facts for any other offence for which different charge from the one
made against him might have been made under Sub-section (1) of Section 221, or
for which he might have been convicted under Sub-section (2) thereof.

(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with
the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate
charge might have been made against him at the former trial under Sub-section (1)
of Section 220.

(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing

consequences, which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from
that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last-mentioned
offence if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court to
have happened, at the time when he was convicted.

(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may,
notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and
tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have
committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the
offence with which he is subsequently charged.

(5) A person discharged under Section 258 shall not be tried again for the same
offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any
other Court to which the first-mentioned Court is subordinate.

(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of Section 26 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) or of Section 188 of this Code.
4) CASE ANALYSIS
a) Ravinder Kaur v. Anil Kumar (AIR 2015 SC 359)
Identification:
Case Name: Ravinder Kaur v. Anil Kumar
Appellant: Ravinder Kaur
Respondent: Anil Kumar
Bench: Jagdish Singh Khehar, S.A. Bobde
Decided on: 9th April 2015
Facts:
The Ravinder Kaur and Anil Kumar got married on 14-08-1991. Anil Kumar filed a
petition asking for divorce from Ravinder Kaur before Additional District Judge,
Ropar. The court issued summons to Ravinder Kaur and she appeared before the court
on 8-10-1992, the next day Anil Kumar had withdrawn his petition.
Anil Kumar on 30-04-1993 filed a second petition asking for divorce on the same
grounds as earlier in earlier petition before Additional District Judge, Chandigarh. The
proceedings were conducted in the absence of Ravinder Kaur and an exparte decree
was granted on 8-01-1994. Anil Kumar did not inform Ravinder Kaur about the
decree given by the court and continued conjugal relations with Ravinder Kaur by
deception.
Anil Kumar on 23-06-1994 married another person only then Ravinder Kaur came to
know about the decree given by the court and within six days of being aware of the
decree she filed an application for setting aside the decree. The court allowed the
decree and restored matrimonial ties.
Ravinder Kaur filed a complaint under section 376 of Indian Penal Code the court
held that is not a matter of dispute and respondent was discharged from
Ravinder Kaur filed a second complaint under sections 493, 494, 495, 496, 420, 526
read with 120B of IPC before Judicial magistrate 1st class, Kharar.
Procedural History:
The second complaint was dismissed by the judicial magistrate 1 st class, Kharar and a
revision petition was filed before Sessions court of Roopnanagr and it was also
dismissed. The criminal miscellaneous application made before High Court was also
dismissed.
Issues and Holdings:
Issues:
Is the present case maintainable under section300 of Cr.P.C?
Holdings:
The court held that the second petition can be allowed against Anil Kumar and it is
not against section 300 of Cr.P.C.
Reasoning:
The court held that the discharge of a person does not amount to acquittal of the
person under section 300. The explanation under this section clearly states the same.
So there is no trail held in the first complaint. So the trail can be conducted against
him.
Evaluation:
The court has not referred any cases.
Synthesis:
In this case the court has given that the dismissal in a previous complaint without any
trail being conducted does not amount to acquittal under section 300 of Cr.P.C and
exemption cannot be pleaded under this section and the trail can be conducted.
Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit kaur (AIR 2001 SC 784)
Identification of the case:
Case Name: Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit kaur
Appellant:
Respondent:
Bench: R.P. Sethi and K.T. Thomas
Decided on: 30th January, 2001
Facts:
In this case Jatinder Singh is lawful husband of Ranjit Kaur. He married the younger
sister of Ranjit Kaur secretly without her knowledge. After she came to know about
the marriage she filed complaint against her husband for bigamy and four other
people including her sister for abetting the said offence. The complaint filed by her
was in incubation stage nearly for one year and the case was dismissed by the
magistrate as she was not present inside the court when the case was called. She filed
a second complaint on the same grounds of the first complaint.
Procedural History:
The magistrate has taken cognizance of the second complaint. But Jatinder Singh filed
a revision petition before Sessions court and judge has raised objections that the
present complaint should be dismissed as the similar petition was dismissed earlier.
Magistrate has overruled those objections and wanted to proceed with the trail.
Jatinder Singh made a revision petition to stop the proceedings and the Sessions judge
granted stay on proceedings against Jatinder Singh. Ranjit Kaur filed a revision
petition before High Court and a learned single judge restored the order of magistrate,
but Jatinder Singh through special leave petition approached Supreme Court
Issues and Holdings:
Issues:
Whether a complaint dismissed first time either by default or on merits will have the
same effect or not?
Holdings:
The court held that when a case is dismissed on the basis of default and not on basis, a
second complaint on the same facts cannot be stopped under section 300 of Cr.P.C.
Reasoning:
There is no provision under the code which stops filing of a second complaint on
same allegation if the first complaint did not result in a conviction or acquittal or even
discharge. If a magistrate after conducting inquiry dismisses the case based on the
merits of the case, then no second complaint can be filed.
Evaluation:
Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar (AIR 1962 SC 876)
In this case the court held that the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of
Cr.P.C places no bar on the filing of second complaint on the same facts but will be
entertained only in exceptional circumstances. For example when the previous order
was passed on an incomplete record or a misunderstanding of the nature of the
complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which
could not with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous
proceedings have been presented.
Synthesis:
Basing on only fact that the first complaint was dismissed, a person cannot be stopped
from filing the second complaint. It has to be seen that whether the case was
dismissed based on the facts or not.
Lusmikant v. Bureau of Indian Standard Act
Identification:
Case Name: Lusmikant v. Bureau of Indian Standard Act
Appellant: Lusmikant
Respondent: Bureau of Indian Standard Act
Bench: Justice Sujoy Paul
Decided on: 2nd September, 2015
Facts:
In this case Lusmikant and Vishwanath Sonthaliya were partners of M/s Shree Tin
Manufacturing Company and Ashok Goyal is the manager of the company. They were
accused in a special case. Ashok Goyal has expired. The allegation against them was
that they supplied knowingly non ISI tins by projecting them to be ISI mark tins. This
offence was proved before the special court and they were convicted under section
120-B and 420 of IPC read with section 13(1)(d)/13(2) of Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 and they were given three years rigorous imprisonment and 2,000/- fine.
Based on the same facts Bureau of Indian Standards filed a complaint in the court of
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Morena that this company is running a business of
bottling of milk and they executed a contract with another person to supply tins to
another company. On the said tins ISI mark was printed by them without having any
authorisation to do so. Hence the partners have committed offence under sections 33
and 35 of Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 1986.
Procedural History:
Vishwanath Sonthaliya filed an application under section 300 of Cr.P.C before the trail
court that they were already convicted under the same facts and second trail cannot be
conducted. The trail court dismissed his appeal and he filed a revision application
before the Sessions court and the court dismissed it. Under section 482 of Cr.P.C he
appealed an appeal against the order and during proceedings he died and his petition
was withdrawn as it rendered infructuous.
Lusmikant now filed the present petition with the same contention as filed by the
other partner.
Issues and Holdings:
Issues:
The main issue in this case is that a person who was already convicted in a special
trail under Prevention of Corruption Act whether he can be again tried under Bureau
of Indian Standards Act, 1986 or not.
Holdings:
The court held that the principal of double jeopardy is not attracted in the present case
and Lusmikant can be tried under the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 1986.
Reasoning:
The court said that double jeopardy is not attracted merely on the fact that factual
foundation for both the cases is same. The offences in both the cases are different and
the ingredients are also different and the judgment given by the special court was still
in challenge and the present trail does not amount to double jeopardy.
Evaluation:
 Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat and another ((2012) 7
SCC 621)- In this case it was held that for the application of the doctrine of
double jeopardy the facts of both the cases must be same. Whether the offence
is same or not depends on the identity of ingredients of the offences. Here a
person who is tried for the offence of dishonour of cheques, can be tried again
for offences of cheating, criminal breach of trust and abetment as the
ingredients of the offence are not same and double jeopardy principle is not
applied here.
 /Kolla Veera Raghav Reddy v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao(2011) 2 SCC 703)
- in this case court made it clear that when the facts of the cases are same and
the offences are different, section 300 of Cr.P.C is applicable and the second
trail cannot be conducted.
 State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan ((1988) 4 SCC 655) -in this case it was held
that when a charge of killing of the elephant under section 420 of I.P.C has
failed against the accused, his trail under section 9(1) read with 2(16) of 51 of
wild life protection act will be no bar on the ground of issue of estoppel,
 V.K. Agarwal v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia ((1988) 3 SCC 467)- in this case
it was held that appeal can be placed before Supreme Court under section
134(1)(c) of the constitution when High Court quashes a subsequent
proceedings on the ground that it was barred under section 300 on the ground
of acquittal in a previous proceeding,
 Collector of Customs v. L.R. Melwani (AIR 1970 SC 962) - in this case it was
held that the accused has to prove that he was convicted or acquitted in the
previous trail.
 State of A.P. v. Kokkiliagada Meerayya ((1969) 1 SCC 161)- in this case it
was laid down that the rule of estoppel would apply only if there was no trail
in the former proceedings or it did not end in acquittal or conviction,
 Kharkan v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 578) - in this case the court held that
when two offences are distinct and required different charges the bar under
section 300(1) would not arise even if the might arise out of the same
transaction.
 Leo Roy Frey v. Supt., District Jail (AIR 1957 SC 747) - in this case court
held that section 167(8) of sea customs act and section 120B of I.P.C are
distinct offences which are based on same facts and the trail was not barred
under section 300
 State of M.P. v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri (AIR 1957 SC 458) - in this court
held that when the accused was acquitted of the offence under section 5(2) of
the prevention of corruption act, 1947, his subsequent trail under section 409
and conviction is not barred as they are distinct offences.
 State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte (AIR 1958 SC 119) - in this case court made it
clear that it is necessary to analyse the ingredients of two offences and not the
allegations made in the two complaints to see that they are distinct offences or
not.
 G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P ((2000) 2 SCC 636) - in this case the court held
that filing of another prosecution for the same offence on the same facts is
abuse of power and is laible to be quashed.
 P.V. Mohammad Barmay Sons v. Director of Enforcement (AIR 1993 SC
1188)- In this case it was held that the FERA and Sea Customs Act operate in
different fields one for contravention of FERA and other for evasion of excise
duty. So the doctrine of double jeopardy is not applicable in this case.
 A.A. Mulla v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1999 SC 1441)- in this case the
person was first acquitted of the offence under prevention of corruption act
and was again tried under FERA and Customs Act. The court held that it was
not barred because the ingredients of the offences and the factual foundation in
the new trail were different.
 Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P. (AIR 1957 SC 458)- in this court held that
the prosecution of accused under section 5(2) of the prevention of corruption
act, 1947 and his subsequent trail under section 409 and conviction is not
barred as they are not identical and they are distinct offences.
  Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Bombay (AIR 1957 SC 592) - in this case
the two conspiracies are distinct offences. As the ingredients of both the
offences are totally different and they do not form the same offence within the
meaning of Article 20(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, that article has no
relevance to the present case
Synthesis:
From this case it is clear that double jeopardy will not be attracted simply on the basis
that the factual foundation of both the cases is same. To amount for double jeopardy
the offence and the ingredients should also be same.
Jitendra Panchal v. Intelligence Officer, Ncb & Anr (2008 CriLJ 974)
Identification:
Case Name: Jitendra Panchal v. Intelligence Officer, Ncb & Anr
Appellant: Jitendra Panchal
Respondent: Intelligence Officer, Ncb & Anr
Bench: Altamas Kabir, Markandey Katju
Decided on: 3rd February, 2009
Facts:
US Drug enforcement agency officers on 17th October along with officers of the
Narcotics Bureau, India seized consignment containing about 562.2 Kgs of Hashish in
Newark, USA. During investigation it was found that Jitendra Panchal along with
Niranjan Shah and Kishore engaged in trafficking hashish out of India into USA and
Europe. Jitendra Panchal was arrested in Vienna on 5 th December by officers of drug
enforcement agency, USA and was extradited to USA. On 25 th March, 2003 deputy
director general of the narcotics control bureau visited USA and recorded the
statement of Jitendra Panchal. He then arrested Niranjan Shah, Kishore Joshi and
Irfan Gazali in India and filed a complaint before learned special judge, Mumbai
under NDPS Act, 1985. When the proceedings were in progress Jitendra Panchal was
tried before district court of Michigan. He was convicted there for conspiracy to
possess with intention to distribute controlled substances with a term of 54 months.
After the sentence was completed he was extradited to India, he was arrested and was
produced before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and was kept in judicial
custody. The charges under which he was punished in USA were dropped and he was
not prosecuted for them.
Procedural History:
He filed an application before learned special judge of Mumbai that he was already
prosecuted for the offences and it would amount to double jeopardy. The court
dismissed his application stating that those provisions under which he was already
convicted were removed and extended his judicial custody. He approached High court
of Bombay to release him on interim bail and quash the proceedings on the ground of
double jeopardy. The court dismissed his writ petition stating that the offences for
which he was charged in India were different from those of which he was convicted in
USA.
Issues and Holdings:
Issues:
Will the judge be barred from taking an action when different offences are made on
same set of facts, when the circumstances differ?
Holdings:
The court held that a person can be tried for distinct offences based on same facts, if
the circumstances differ.
Reasoning:
In this case Jitendra Panchal was convicted in USA for conspiring to possess a
controlled substance with intention to distribute the same and in India he was charged
for importing contraband article from Nepal into India and exporting t to USA for
sale. He was charged under provisions of controlled substance act and NDPS Act,
1985. These are distinct from those offences for which he was tried in USA. So it
does not amount double jeopardy. Here the circumstances differ.
Evaluation:
Assistant Collector of Customs & Anr v. L.R. Malwani & Anr
In this case it was observed that the doctrine of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit
embodied Section 300 of the Code along with the benefit of Article 20(2) of the
Constitution would be available to an accused person to establish that he had been
tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and that he was convicted or
acquitted of that offence and the said conviction or acquittal was in force. The court
observed that if that much was established it could be contended that he was not liable
to be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts for any other offence for
which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made.
Synthesis:
So in this case court made it clear that a person can be punished for distinct offences
on the same facts, when the circumstances differ. There is no bar on it under the rule
of double jeopardy.
Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao and Anr (2011) 2 SCC
703)
Identification of the case:
Case name: Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao and Anr
Appellant: Kolla Veera Raghav Rao
Respondent: Gorantla Venkateswara Rao and Anr
Bench: Markandey Katju, Gyan Sudha Misra
Decided on: 1st February, 2011
Facts:
In this case Kolla Veera Raghav Rao borrowed 60,000 amount from Gorantla
Venkateswara Rao for the purpose of purchasing a house and he executed a
promissory note in favour of Gorantla Venkateswara Rao to repay the money with an
interest rate of 24% per annum. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao demanded for the money
times but he failed to return the same. Later he gave a crossed cheque of 90,000/- for
part payment of the money in favour of Gorantla Venkateswara Rao. The cheque was
dishonoured by the bank stating that the account was closed. Gorantla Venkateswara
Rao issued a notice regarding the same to Kolla Veera Raghav Rao and asked him to
repay the money.
Procedural History:
The learned magistrate held that Kolla Veera Raghav Rao is guilty of offense under
section 138 of the negotiable instruments Act, 1881 and gave him one year rigorous
imprisonment.
On appeal sessions judge acquitted Kolla Veera Raghav Rao.
Gorantla Venkateswara Rao appealed to High court restored the punishment given by
the magistrate
Meanwhile he filed a complaint against Kolla Veera Raghav Rao under section 420 of
IPC and during the trail the magistrate acquitted Kolla Veera Raghav Rao as he was
already convicted for offence under section 138 of negotiable instruments act,1881.
And the second trail will amount to double jeopardy.
Gorantla Venkateswara Rao against this decision appealed to high court and the court
held that this does not amount to double jeopardy and setaside the judgment of the
magistrate.
Against this High court judgment Kolla Veera Raghav Rao appealed to supreme court.
Issues and Holdings:
Issues:
When the facts of the two cases are similar and the offences differ can the person
claim protection under double jeopardy?
Holdings:
The court held that when the facts are same and the person is tried under different
offences based on the same facts, then the person can claim protection under double
jeopardy.
Reasoning:
The court held that in the present case the facts are same in both the cases even the
offences are different and he cannot be punished under section 420 of IPC under
section 300 of Cr.P.C

Evaluation:
The court has not referred any cases.
Synthesis:
From this judgment the court made it clear that when the facts of the cases are same
and the offences are different, section 300 of Cr.P.C is applicable and the second trail
cannot be conducted.
5) CONCLUSION
Double jeopardy is the rule which bars the second trail From the above analysed five
cases it is clear that the when a case was dismissed on the merits of the case a second
complaint cannot be again entertained but when it is dismissed by default it can be
take. When a person is acquitted without any trail being conducted will not amount to
acquittal and second trail can be conducted. When a person is stopped from filing the
second complaint it has to be seen that whether the first case was dismissed based on
facts or not.
When the facts of both cases are same but when the circumstances differ a second
complaint can be filed and it will not be barred under double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy will not be attracted simply on the basis that the factual foundation
of both the cases is same, for it to amount double jeopardy the offence and the
ingredients should also be same.