DDR v2 Ed1 EN

Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration (DDR):

A Practical Overview
Course Author
Mr. Cornelis Steenken
DDR/SALW/SSR/Post-conflict consultant
Series Editor
Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
Peace Operations Training Institute

®
Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

Cover Photo: UN Photo #535676 by Basile Zoma.

An officer of the Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration programme (DDR) of the UN
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) supervises the
collection of weapons by UN peacekeepers and
the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI). 1
February 2012.
Course Author
Mr. Cornelis Steenken
DDR/SALW/SSR/Post-conflict consultant
Series Editor
Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.

®
Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

© 2017 Peace Operations Training Institute. All rights reserved.

1309 Jamestown Road, Suite 202
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First edition: 2008 by Yvan Conoir
The material contained herein does not necessarily reflect the views of the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI),
the Course Author(s), or any United Nations organs or affiliated organizations. The Peace Operations Training Institute
is an international not-for-profit NGO registered as a 501(c)(3) with the Internal Revenue Service of the United States
of America. The Peace Operations Training Institute is a separate legal entity from the United Nations. Although every
effort has been made to verify the contents of this course, the Peace Operations Training Institute and the Course
Author(s) disclaim any and all responsibility for facts and opinions contained in the text, which have been assimilated
largely from open media and other independent sources. This course was written to be a pedagogical and teaching
document, consistent with existing UN policy and doctrine, but this course does not establish or promulgate doctrine.
Only officially vetted and approved UN documents may establish or promulgate UN policy or doctrine. Information with
diametrically opposing views is sometimes provided on given topics, in order to stimulate scholarly interest, and is in
keeping with the norms of pure and free academic pursuit.
Versions of this course offered in other languages may differ slightly from the primary English master copy. Translators
make every effort to retain the integrity of the material.
Table of Contents
Foreword x
Method of Study xiii
Lesson 1 Outline and Context of DDR 14
Section 1.1 Introduction 16
Section 1.2 Context of DDR 17
Section 1.3 DDR Terminology 17
Section 1.4 Objectives of DDR 21
Section 1.5 Post-Conflict Environment 21
Section 1.6 Post-Conflict Security Situation 23
Section 1.7 Security Concerns of Demobilized Combatants 24
Section 1.8 What is a DDRP? 24
Section 1.9 Security Threat Posed by XCs 30
Section 1.10 Impact of Past Programmes 30
Section 1.11 Conclusion 31
Lesson 2 Participants, Beneficiaries,

and Actors in DDRPs 34
Section 2.1 Participants and Beneficiaries 36
PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE
v
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): A Practical Overview
Section 2.2 Communities 37
Section 2.3 XCs as a Specific Needs Group 37
Section 2.4 Targeted Assistance 39
Section 2.5 Eligibility and Screening Mechanisms 41
Section 2.6 Specific Needs of Female XCs, Veterans’ Wives, and

War Widows 44
Section 2.7 Youth 52
Section 2.8 Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed

Groups 54
Section 2.9 Disabled XCs 64
Lesson 3 Disarmament and Small Arms Control 74
Section 3.1 Basic Principles of Disarmament 77
Section 3.2 The Four Main Phases of Disarmament 79
Section 3.3 SALW – Weapon Control and Disarmament 85
Lesson 4 Demobilization 90
Section 4.1 Approaches to Demobilization 92
Section 4.2 Planning and Preparation 93
Section 4.3 Conduct of Demobilization 96
Section 4.4 Camp Support and Internal Programming 100
Section 4.5 Information Campaigns to Help Expectations

Management and Support to Demobilization 103
Section 4.6 The Moment of Demobilization (Discharge) 104
Section 4.7 Reinsertion 105
Section 4.8 Conclusions 107
vi
Lesson 5 Reintegration 110
Section 5.1 Introduction 111
Section 5.2 Security Needs for Reintegration 113
Section 5.3 Economic Reintegration 115
Section 5.4 Social Reintegration 121
Section 5.5 Political Reintegration 127
Section 5.6 Reintegration Planning and Design 131
Section 5.7 Reintegration – Needs Assessment 136
Section 5.8 Reintegration Programme Funding Issues 139
Section 5.9 Conclusion 142
Lesson 6 Post-Conflict Issues and Linkages to DDR 146
Section 6.1 The Post-Conflict Security Situation 149
Section 6.2 DDR and SSR 151
Section 6.3 UN Military Roles and Responsibilities in DDR 155
Section 6.4 UN Police Roles and Responsibilities in DDR 157
Section 6.5 DDR and TJ 159
Section 6.6 Natural Resources and DDR 165
Section 6.7 Summary of DDR Linkages to other Humanitarian and

Peacebuilding Programmes 166
Lesson 7 DDR Challenges and Current Issues 170
Section 7.1 DDR History and Policy 172
Section 7.2 DDR Programming Challenges 174
Section 7.3 Community Violence Reduction and Haiti 177
Section 7.4 DDR and Countering Violent Extremism or

Demobilization and Disengagement of Violent Extremists 179
vii
Section 7.5 DDR Measures of Success – the Quantification of DDR

182
Section 7.6 DDR and Corruption 184
Section 7.7 Private Military and Security Companies versus

Mercenaries and DDR 186
viii
Appendices
Appendix A: List of Acronyms 192
Appendix B: Glossary of DDR Terms and Principles 196
Appendix C: IDDRS Glossary of Terms and Definitions 231
Appendix D: Current Peacekeeping Missions 235
About the Author: Mr. Cornelis Steenken 236
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination 237
ix
Foreword
The end of the Cold War was a contributing factor to the end of many intra-State conflicts in Latin
American and African countries. These countries used the fledgling concept of disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) to disband former warring factions, downsize their national armed forces, and provide
both sides with short- to medium-term alternate civilian employment. Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War
also contributed greatly to the supply of cheap, easy-to-use weapons and ammunition, which encouraged or
facilitated other conflicts. Some of these conflicts have continued for multiple years — even decades — and
are now seeking resolution of a broad range of contextually different civil conflicts by further application of
the concept of DDR to disband and disarm guerrillas, irregular armies, and armed groups, and to sustainably
reintegrate former combatants.
In the transition period following a civil conflict, there are a host of actors involved in the overall transition
from war to peace in a country. These include the former warring factions, different local and national
government actors and ministries, and regional power players as well as a host of external actors; factions
(such as former colonial powers); regional power blocs; and international actors like the United Nations,
donors, and non-governmental organizations.
A DDR programme is but one of the many programmes that run concurrently at the outset of a peace
process. All of them need to be resourced; proper phasing and prioritization is key. DDR programmes are
multidimensional and include a host of social, economic, political, military, and/or fiscal objectives that are
part of the overall peace and recovery strategy. Social and economic objectives may include early recovery
initiatives and equitable and sustainable development. Political objectives include democratization and stability.
Military objectives might include a smaller and more affordable armed force that meets the new security needs
of the country. Fiscal objectives include debt and deficit reduction and improving the balance of payments.
DDR is most often seen as a process in which the technical steps of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion,
and reintegration are not distinct phases but rather a continuum of transition from military to productive civilian
life. During each of these phases, the needs of ex-combatants (XC) are different, and different support measures
are required. Experience demonstrates that demobilization and reintegration must be thought of as a single,
continuous process. Planning for both sets of activities must be connected and coordinated to avoid fragmented,
uncoordinated efforts. In early DDR programmes, reintegration activities were often carried out in isolation from
other stages of peacebuilding efforts. While it was mostly well-intentioned in the short term, it resulted in weak,
unsustainable programmes that frustrated those they intended to serve.
The stages leading from war to peace (peace negotiations, demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration)
are interdependent. The objectives of each stage can be achieved only if/when the objectives of the other
stages are also achieved. This applies in particular to the cases of reintegration and demobilization. The
development of forward and backward linkages between each stage, therefore, strengthens the peacebuilding
process and ensures a smoother transition to peace. As all peacebuilding stages are linked to one another,
the negotiation stage is critical. Ideally, demobilization and reintegration would be planned as part of this
peace process and should be planned well in advance and made part of the negotiation package. Donor
support should be sought as early as possible after the accord is signed (or even when it appears imminent)
to obtain funds needed for the reintegration of XCs. In designing reintegration programmes, it is necessary
to keep in mind the dual nature of reintegration — of urgency and development — to develop efforts closely
coordinated with the rest of the peacebuilding and peacemaking processes. Dividing the war-to-peace period
into successive stages does not reflect the actual interrelations existing between the different stages, yet there
x
are significant challenges and difficulties. Most reintegration options can be identified only after information on
disarmed soldiers has been gathered through the demobilization process. Demobilization, on the other hand,
may be dependent upon the further incentives offered by reintegration programmes.
Each actor has a different timeline or programme phase with which they are most concerned. Some
groups are primarily concerned with the immediate security objectives of a programme. These entail the
immediate pacification of combatants so an election and political transition can occur in a fixed period.
Typically, peacekeeping contingents, some donors, and some incumbent leaders fall into this category. Other
groups have a longer-term perspective and view the economic, political, and social reintegration of XCs as a
key to future stability. These groups argue that reintegration is a prerequisite for implementing the terms of
the peace accords, consolidating the peace process, and preventing a recurrence of the conflict.
The organizations, communities, and individuals supporting DDR have different perceptions of the
priorities, goals, and scope of the reintegration process. It is therefore not surprising that the programme
components they recommend and the resources they offer often differ — and sometimes clash. Groups are
likely to disagree on when reintegration programmes should begin and when they need to be prepared and
ready to implement. They will differ on the extent of programmes and the needs of demobilized soldiers. They
will have different views about the end point of reintegration and about indicators of success. The impacts
sought by reintegration programmes need to be defined in advance so programming can be specifically
designed to fulfil those goals. How success is defined will vary according to the needs of the affected country.
Defining success and agreeing on the indicators that will be used are important steps in coordinating the
activities of those supporting the process.
Designing DDR programmes, obtaining funding, and preparing to implement them can be a lengthy
process. Even after reintegration programmes are implemented, it takes time before they begin to sustain
XCs. This suggests that DDR should be a phased process extending over many months. Those managing the
process may be concerned mainly with security. If soldiers can be moved through camps or discharge centres
quickly, demobilized, and dispersed, then the peacekeeping missions are less costly and security problems
can be managed more easily (for the short term). Some planners involved in early missions believed that
reintegration programmes had to be ready by the time XCs left the camps. This left little time to prepare
sophisticated reintegration programmes. In some cases, the different time horizons and priorities of the many
groups involved in planning clashed so much that the extended debate paralyzed action, threatened donor
commitments, and greatly delayed programming and implementation. Realizing the difficulty in this transition,
others encouraged a holding pattern once the forces were disengaged, reducing the pressure and allowing for
planning to take place after properly surveying the actual forces on the ground.
The differing perspectives of the urgency versus development dilemma are not necessarily incompatible.
Both views can be accommodated if planners coordinate their activities. The period immediately following
demobilization should be seen as a transition or reinsertion stage that precedes reintegration. Alternatives
to holding patterns can be some form of immediate assistance package provided to soldiers leaving initial
disarmament and demobilization camps. At the same time, demobilizing soldiers can be informed about
reintegration programmes that will follow. XCs need to know about interim steps, when the programmes will
be available, and how they can access them. This will help to sustain XCs until reintegration programmes take
effect, while providing the time needed to prepare adequate programming. The knowledge of programmes
still to come may help pacify XCs who might otherwise give up on the peace process and turn to banditry
xi
or extremism. There is also a risk of frustrating expectations if programmes are repeatedly delayed or fail to
materialize.
DDR is an inherently political process. It is most common in the aftermath of wars or protracted civil
conflicts. These conflicts often weaken political institutions and disrupt political processes. Returning a large
number of young men and women to civilian life can further destabilize politics. The XCs may be drawn into
political extremism if their expectations are frustrated. The way in which soldiers are reintegrated, the areas
in which they settle, the benefits to which they are entitled, and the way they form associations will affect the
political process for years after demobilization. The success or failure of DDR programmes is intertwined with
the progress of political reconciliation. Strong commitment and cooperation from the leadership of armies and
their political leaders are necessary for a successful implementation of DDR programmes.
There is no single model or blueprint for DDR programmes. Case studies can only offer lessons and
recommendations that might increase the chance of success. Each DDR programme must be tailored to the
actual political, security, economic, fiscal, and social context of the country. The objectives of the many actors
involved in supporting programmes must be reconciled to these realities.
Just as there are no programme blueprints, there are also no universal institutional arrangements for
designing and implementing programmes. Past programmes have arisen from many different organizational
arrangements. They have involved many combinations and levels of participation and decision-making by
the host State and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. The burden of planning,
coordinating, and obtaining funding for implementing and monitoring DDR programmes is a challenge,
especially for countries emerging from protracted conflict. It is further complicated if political authority is in
doubt pending a later election. Partisan quarrelling and the need to clear decisions with both the government
and non-government parties may delay programmes and planning. Governments may lack the necessary
administrative capacity, financial resources, and technical capacity to design and implement programmes.
The establishment of one civilian agency or national commission with overall design and implementation
responsibility serves this purpose best. The managing organization must have a combination of centralization
and decentralization — centralized control and decentralized implementation. Field offices provide easier
access to beneficiaries and contribute to making the programme more responsive to local needs.
Conclusion
The transition from civil war to sustainable peace is a difficult one. Successful DDR of XCs is essential for
this transition. While the objectives of DDR are broad, it must be carefully planned and executed to enhance
security, support development, reduce government expenditures, and remove impediments to democracy.
DDR should be viewed as a holistic process, not discreet steps. The success of any programme to support DDR
is closely linked to the political, economic, and security situation of the country where it occurs.
–Mr. Cornelis Steenken, 2017.
xii
Method of Study
This self-paced course aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The
following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies
and minimum expectations for completing this course successfully:
• Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire course. Notice the lesson and
section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.
• The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details,
strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.
• Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.
• Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson,
orient yourself to the main points. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum
understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.
• At the end of each lesson, take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. Clarify any missed questions by
rereading the appropriate sections, and focus on retaining the correct information.
• After you complete all of the lessons, prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking
time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, when ready, log into your online student
classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.
»» Access your online classroom at

<www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login>
from virtually anywhere in the world.
• Your exam will be scored electronically. If you achieve a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher
on the exam, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent,
you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.
• A note about language: This course uses English spelling according to the standards of the
Oxford English Dictionary (United Kingdom) and the United Nations Editorial Manual.
Key Features of Your Online Classroom »

• Access to all of your courses;
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• Access to additional training resources, including multimedia course

supplements;
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course; and
• Forums where you can discuss relevant topics with the POTI community.
xiii
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION (DDR): A PRACTICAL OVERVIEW
LESSON
1 Outline and Context of DDR
This chapter provides an

introduction to some of
the key issues involved in
the concept and context of
disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) of ex-
combatants (XCs).
UN Photo #132361 by Martine Perret.
In this lesson » Lesson Objectives »
Section 1.1 Introduction • Explain the purpose and context of DDR.
Section 1.2 Context of DDR • Identify the main components and characteristics
of DDR.
Section 1.3 DDR Terminology
Section 1.4 Objectives of DDR

• Understand the post-conflict environment as it
pertains to XCs and DDR.
Section 1.5 Post-Conflict Environment
Section 1.6 Post-Conflict Security Situation
Section 1.7 Security Concerns of

Demobilized Combatants
Section 1.8 What is a DDRP?
Section 1.9 Security Threat Posed by XCs
Section 1.10 Impact of Past Programmes
Section 1.11 Conclusion
14
LESSON 1 | Outline and Context of DDR
The Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (ADDR) begins demobilization processing on a site at Anyama,
outside Abidjan, rehabilitated by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and its partners. XCs line up to turn in their weapons,
receive demobilization cards, and begin reintegration. 25 October 2012. UN Photo #535682 by Basile Zoma.
“In many respects, the range of

activities that fall under the heading
of ‘disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR)’ is as wide as the
global scope of the United Nations
system itself. In the early days after
a cessation of hostilities, DDR can
serve as a vital confidence-building
measure. DDR features prominently
in the mandates of United Nations
peacekeeping operations. In the
last few years, we have also seen
that DDR is just as crucial for
peacebuilding, as reflected by the
increasing references to DDR tasks in
integrated peacebuilding missions.
15
Not to mention the reintegration of ex-combatants, which

is closely related to wider early recovery and development
processes. In the twenty years since the first peacekeeping
operation with a DDR mandate was established in Central
America, we have seen that DDR is an important tool
for countries emerging from conflict to pave the way for
sustainable peace, recovery and development. I am proud of
my colleagues in the entire United Nations family engaged
in DDR activities — from peacekeeping operations to special
political missions to United Nations agencies, funds and
programmes who are playing crucial supporting roles in
advancing the ultimate objectives of the United Nations.”1
–United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
Section 1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an introduction to some of
the key issues involved in the concept and context of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)
of ex-combatants (XCs).
Disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, and

reintegration activities play an important role in
modern peacebuilding operations. Most comprehensive
peace agreements (CPA) incorporate DDR activities,
which provide a flexible framework for initiating the
Officers of the United Nations Operation in Côte
separation and concentration of forces, commencing d’Ivoire (UNOCI) conduct a DDR operation with XCs in
the delicate job of disarming and demobilizing armed the Abobo area of Abidjan. 1 February 2012. UN Photo
#504399 by Hien Macline.
factions, and returning or reintegrating XCs back into
society.
The conditions around DDR operations have increased in complexity as new threats and circumstances
emerge. While DDR Programmes (DDRPs) vary according to the context, it is important to note that
DDR does not function in a vacuum — it functions as part of a larger peace operation that includes
other socioeconomic, political, and security reforms. Thus, a DDRP must take into account these other
issues, and DDR practitioners must plan, design, and implement programmes within a wider recovery
and development framework.
1) United Nations, “A Word From: Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General ”, in DDR in peace operations: a retrospective.
16
XCs being airlifted by helicopters

from Kibuye to Muyinga in Burundi,
where the United Nations Operation
in Burundi (ONUB) started an
operation consisting of deploying XCs
to provinces to start their new police
training. 11 May 2005. UN Photo
#74846 by Martine Perret.
Section 1.2 Context of DDR

A DDR process is part of the larger framework of the transition from war to peace. A DDRP is a
time-bound, finite series of actions that focuses on disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating back into
society an armed group or groups of armed individuals, their supporters, and their family members with
the overall objective of reinstating the State monopoly of violence. A successful DDRP appears to be a
key component of an effective transition from civil war to sustained peace.
DDR has always been in a state of flux depending on the context of the conflict and the nature of
the peace. While no two DDR processes are the same, DDR practitioners can learn and adapt some
lessons for use in subsequent DDR operations. The United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS),
developed from 2003–2006, did just that. The IDDRS collected lessons learned from the 1990s through
the mid-2000s to provide guidelines for future DDR operations. While the IDDRS provides a helpful tool
and reference for DDR, gathering a consensus on updates to meet the changing dynamics of DDR has
proven difficult.
Different “Generations of DDR” that take into account the growing scope and mandate of DDR offer
some updated guidance for DDR practitioners and planners. Academics and practitioners are reviewing
many aspects of DDR, including the effectiveness and impact of programmes, with an aim to measure
success. This is a challenging endeavour, as DDR is only a portion of the overall peace process, and it
is often difficult to credit DDR activities with a successful outcome when they are interlinked with other
peacebuilding initiatives. The lack of a clear definition of success presents another challenge: Is success
the absence of war, or is it a reintegrated combatant? What is a successful reintegration? Regardless of
the definition, accurately measuring how DDR contributed to the outcome is challenging.
Section 1.3 DDR Terminology
Disarmament
“Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and

disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and
heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian
population. Disarmament also includes the development of
responsible arms management programmes.”2
2) Secretary-General Note to the General Assembly, May 2005 (A/C.5/59/31).
17
Disarmament is taking weapons away from soldiers. Individual soldiers give up their personal
weapons, ammunition, and associated equipment before demobilizing. Similarly, demobilizing units
surrender their heavy weapons, vehicles, and other equipment. Weapons and equipment may be
destroyed or reallocated according to the terms of a peace agreement. “Micro-disarmament” refers
to the collection, control, and disposal of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the development
of responsible arms management programmes. Responsible arms management includes reducing the
production, procurement, and transfer of arms and enacting regional measures to restrict the flow of
weapons across boundaries.
Disarmament may be the first step of the DDR process and occur in the same place as demobilization,
but this is not always the case. In some cases, weapons are put beyond use, stored, or even destroyed
as armed individuals or groups turn them in. Some groups may see disarmament as the equivalent of
surrendering, and thus find alternate solutions and language to mitigate this phase. In the immediate
post-conflict phase, disarmament is a vital confidence-building measure toward continuing the peace
process. Over the long term, it will help consolidate peace.
Demobilization
“Demobilization is the formal and

controlled discharge of active combatants
from armed forces or other armed
groups. The first stage of demobilization
may extend from the processing of
individual combatants in temporary
centers to the massing of troops in
camps designated for this purpose
(cantonment sites, encampments,
assembly areas or barracks). The second A helmet of the Armed Forces of the Democratic
stage of demobilization encompasses Republic of the Congo (FARDC) in a demobilization
transit camp. 20 May 2014. UN Photo #589540 by
the support package provided to the
Sylvain Liechti.
demobilized, which is called reinsertion.”3
Demobilization is the process of turning combatants into civilians. It involves the assembly,
disarmament, administration, and discharge of former combatants, and it can apply to irregular
combatants, guerrilla or freedom fighters, and even regular soldiers. The latter group demobilizes
because armed forces often reduce their numbers after a conflict. The process begins with identifying
criteria for selection followed by the actual selection and processing of those to be demobilized.
Demobilization ends with some formal acknowledgement of discharge from the military or armed group
service that individuals belonged to. The demobilization process may be a short, one- to five-day process
or an extended stay in an assembly or cantonment area. It also may be preceded by a holding period or
interim stabilization procedure if the parties so choose.
18
A demobilization programme may include many steps during which a combatant relinquishes
weapons and equipment, leaves a unit, exchanges a uniform for civilian clothes, undergoes medical
screening and administrative processing, indicates their desire for future education and training, and
receives information and new identification documents or discharge papers. The demobilization process
may include compensation or assistance in the form of reinsertion.
Reinsertion
“Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants

during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of
reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance
to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their
families and can include transitional safety allowances, food,
clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education,
training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-
term, continuous social and economic process of development,
reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to
meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.”4
Reinsertion is the transition of ex-soldiers into the communities in which they will become civilians.
The exact point where demobilization ends and reintegration begins is hard to describe. Reinsertion
is an intermediate, transitional phase. Transport, reception, and personal security are some of the
key issues in this phase of the process. A demobilization benefits package may include short-term
reintegration assistance.
Reintegration
“Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire

civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.
Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with
an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities
at the local level. It is part of the general development of a
country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates
long-term external assistance.”5
In the context of DDR, reintegration refers to the process by which former combatants and their
families assimilate into social, economic, and political life in civilian communities. The objective of
reintegration is to permit XCs and their families to become productive, self-sustaining citizens who
contribute to the community. Reintegration is a complex psychological, social, political, and economic
process that begins prior to demobilization and continues for an extended period following the XC’s
reinsertion into civilian life. Successful reintegration helps demobilized soldiers become ordinary, active
members of their communities, unidentifiable as a separate interest group and without special status
or needs.

19
Mathieu Ngudjolo (second from right),

leader of the Congolese Revolutionary
Movement (MRC), receives a uniform
from a member of the FARDC. Mr.
Ngudjolo and 300 other members of
MRC received FARDC uniforms. 28
December 2006. UN Photo #136649
by Martine Perret.
More broadly, reintegration refers to the process by which groups displaced by war (including
refugees and internally displaced persons [IDPs]) re-enter and transition to productive lives and
participate in the community’s political, social, and economic life. Hostilities remaining between groups
following a violent civil war may complicate reintegration.
• DDR processes are the previously mentioned disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
processes included in the greater peace process. In most cases, they go on for a longer
period than the DDRP mentioned below. For example, the disarmament process includes the
disarmament programme for XCs plus a larger SALW civilian collection programme. The same
concept applies to the finite timeframe of the reintegration programme, while fully reintegrating
an individual back into society can take much longer.
• DDRPs are time-limited programmes intended to assist the above processes. They are
grounded in the belief that demobilization and reintegration will not occur spontaneously for
the majority of fighters, and that delays may derail the peace process. Many believe that the
benefits of such programmes to the country, region, and international community outweigh
the costs — although that is subject to debate. Longer-term social and economic reintegration
programmes for former combatants are intended to help XCs become part of the productive life
of their civilian communities, such as through training, employment, and credit schemes. Other
programmes focus on political reintegration and reconciliation.
• Community-based Reintegration Projects are activities designed to benefit a target area or

community and its residents in general instead of targeting a particular group or groups within
the community.
• XCs are persons who previously engaged in hostilities. This may include men, women, and
children who were involved in fighting and supporting combatants, in addition to uniformed
soldiers. Programmes that provide benefits to XCs may set conditions based on eligibility
criteria. For example, in some conflicts, only XCs registered by their factions may be eligible.
This often excludes women, children, and other supporters (e.g. cooks, spies, munitions-
bearers, porters, etc.), as well as family members who depend on those fighters. More recent
conflicts have used a broader definition of XC highlighting differential benefits for fighters and
their support elements. These criteria require careful definition and should be included in the
CPA. XCs normally receive a discharge certificate or identity card, which may be a requirement
for access to some benefits or programmes.
20
Section 1.4 Objectives of DDR

As stated in the IDDRS:
“The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security

and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery
and development can begin. The disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of combatants together make up a complex
process with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-
economic dimensions.
This process aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem

that arises when combatants are left without livelihoods and
support networks during the vital period stretching from conflict
to peace, recovery and development. DDR also helps build
national capacity to assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants
and to support communities receiving ex-combatants and
working for their peaceful and sustainable reintegration.”6
Section 1.5 Post-Conflict Environment

To properly understand DDR, practitioners must understand the post-conflict context and
environment. A post-conflict country suffered from protracted militarized violence that likely contributed
to the fragmentation of the socioeconomic, security, and political structures of the society. Different
factions may control different parts of the country, and government representation and legitimacy may
be limited at best. Frequently, the State lacks the ability to undertake basic government functions, and
the State and civil society lack experience in forming democratic structures and processes.
Formerly opposed communities may maintain their

tensions and distrust in the aftermath of civil conflicts.
In light of this, the overriding goal of the peace process
is to encourage formerly hostile communities to
communicate and bargain with each other within the
framework of agreed-upon procedures of a CPA. The CPA
outlines procedures that can help channel competing
interests and policy differences into peaceful forms of
competition and collaboration. DDR practitioners must
make these peaceful channels more attractive as the
means for achieving group and individual interests than
Liberians celebrate the tenth anniversary of the CPA,
the alternative of taking up arms. Some recent conflicts
signed in Accra on 18 August 2003, which ended their
have lacked peace agreements. In those cases, country’s 14-year civil war. 19 August 2013. UN Photo
the DDR process aims to provide an alternative to #558965 by Staton Winter.
continued conflict and violence while working towards

an eventual peace agreement.
6) United Nations, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), 2014. Available at: <http://
www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>.
21
Relinquished firearms are laid on the ground as officers of UNOCI conduct a DDR operation with XCs in
the Abobo area of Abidjan. 1 February 2012. UN Photo #504393 by Hien Macilne.
In the transition period following a civil conflict, various actors place differing priorities on programme
objectives. Actors include governments, former warring factions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
international organizations such as United Nations agencies, and donors. DDRP objectives may be social,
economic, political, military, and/or fiscal. Social and economic objectives might include equitable and
sustainable development. Political objectives include democratization and stability. Military objectives may
include a smaller and more affordable armed force that meets the new security needs of the country.
Fiscal objectives include debt and deficit reduction and improving the balance of payments.
Each actor has a different timeline or programme phase with which they are most concerned. Some
groups are primarily concerned with the immediate security objectives of a programme. These entail
the immediate pacification of combatants to initiate an election and/or political transition. Peacekeeping
contingents, some donors, and some incumbent leaders typically fall into this category. Other groups
have a longer-term perspective and view the economic, political, and social reintegration of XCs as a
key to future stability. These groups view reintegration as a prerequisite for implementing the terms of
the peace accords, consolidating the peace process, and preventing the conflict from recurring. This is
one aspect of the issue of urgency versus development in DDR.
The organizations, communities, and individuals supporting DDR have different perceptions of
the priorities, goals, and scope of the reintegration process. It is not surprising that the programme
components they recommend and the resources they offer often differ and sometimes clash. Groups
are likely to disagree on when reintegration programmes should begin. They may differ on the extent of
programmes and the needs of demobilized soldiers and could have different views on the end point of
reintegration and indicators of success. DDR practitioners should define in advance the impacts sought
22
by reintegration programmes in order to design programming that can fulfil those goals. How success
is defined will vary according to the needs and context of the affected country. Defining success and
agreeing on its indicators are important steps in coordinating the activities of those supporting the
process.
The post-conflict environment also offers opportunities. One of these opportunities is to reform
the political system and change features that potentially contributed to the outbreak of violent
conflict in the first place. Political reintegration efforts must be sensitive to the danger of reinforcing
unequal geopolitical structures and encourage greater regional political representation and economic
development. Lesson 5, which focuses on reintegration, will discuss further details.
Water is distributed in El Srief (North

Darfur) where the nearest water point is
15 kilometres away. The activity fosters
DDR. The outreach activity is organized
by the African Union-United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
and supported by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), the
United Nations Children’s Emergency
Fund (UNICEF), the North Sudan DDR
Commission, and the local NGO Friends
of Peace and Development Organization
(FPDO). 25 July 2011. UN Photo #480960
by Albert González Farran.
Section 1.6 Post-Conflict Security Situation

Uncertainty and challenges for national security, public security, and personal security typically
characterize the post-conflict environment. These problems often include continued human rights abuses
(sporadic and systematic), lack of accountability by security forces, lack of civilian control over the
military, resistance to change by military factions, the existence of rogue military units, low competence
of police forces to perform domestic security functions, and increased crime. In addition, the proliferation
of small arms, a lack of employment opportunities, weakened social institutions, and a war-induced
black market in illicit goods and services may all contribute to the creation of an environment conducive
to criminality. In some countries, criminality may even replace militarized violence as the principal
source of personal insecurity in the post-conflict political, legal, and social vacuum. These security
shortfalls at all three levels have a strong impact on the DDRP’s prospects for success.
23
Arms are destroyed by fire during

the “Flame of Peace” ceremony to
signify the beginning of the country’s
disarmament and reconciliation process
in Bouake, Côte d’Ivoire. 30 July 2007.
UN Photo #149796 by Basile Zoma.
Section 1.7 Security Concerns of Demobilized Combatants

XCs require material and personal security in order to successfully reintegrate. They need to see a
safe, viable alternative to fighting. Their leaders must also feel sufficiently confident that their legitimate
interests will be respected. Without this confidence, there is no political will for peace. Some of the issues
that affect material security include ownership of land, protection of movement and trade, available
work, and benefits packages. Police or paramilitary activity, respect for human rights, protection of
political rights and civil society, and free and fair electoral and judicial systems affect personal security.
Personal security includes freedom from slavery, torture, inhumane treatment or punishment, and
freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile.
Former combatants who give up their guns and their identities as part of an armed group often
have concerns for the physical safety of themselves and their family members. They may fear that
any political or territorial gains made through the conflict may be lost (or any losses made worse). The
losing side will require reassurances backed by guarantees they will be protected and will not suffer
reprisals after they demobilize and disarm, especially in the case of the termination of hostilities due to
a military victory by one side. In the case of an internal conflict ended through a negotiated settlement,
the non-government side will have the same security concerns. Former combatants from both sides
may settle in the same regions. Combatants who formerly fought for the irregular army are likely to
feel threatened by the government’s military and political control both at the national level and in the
regions where they settle.
Section 1.8 What is a DDRP?

A DDRP is a vehicle through which DDR occurs. Designing DDRPs, obtaining funding, and preparing
to implement them can be a lengthy process. Even after reintegration programmes begin, it takes time
before they start to sustain XCs. This suggests that DDR is most effective as a phased process extending
over many months and even years. Those managing the process, however, may be concerned with
security. If disarming and moving soldiers through camps or discharge centres happens quickly, they can
be demobilized and dispersed faster. Doing so can make peacekeeping missions less costly and security
24
problems more easily manageable (for the short term).

Some planners involved in early missions believed
that reintegration programmes had to be ready by the
time XCs left the camps. This left little time to prepare
sophisticated reintegration programmes. In some
cases, the different timelines and priorities of the
many groups involved in planning clashed, paralyzing
action, threatening donor commitments, and greatly
delaying programming and implementation.
The issues of urgency versus development in

DDR are not necessarily incompatible — both can be
accommodated if planners coordinate their activities.
Planners should view the period immediately
following demobilization as a transition or reinsertion
stage that precedes reintegration. Programmes can
provide immediate assistance packages (reinsertion
benefits) to XCs leaving camps. At the same time,
DDR practitioners can inform XCs about subsequent
reintegration programmes. Soldiers need to know
about eligibility, when the programmes will be
available, and how they can access them. This will help
sustain XCs until reintegration programmes take effect
A man in El Srief (North Darfur) stands holding a
while providing the necessary time for preparation.
spear. To foster disarmament and security arm control
Knowing that additional programmes are planned may among the peoples, a DDR outreach activity was
help pacify demobilized soldiers who might otherwise organized by UNAMID with the assistance of UNDP,
UNICEF, the North Sudan DDR Commission, and the
give up on the peace process and turn to banditry or
local NGO FPDO. 25 July 2011. UN Photo #480964 by
extremism. There is also a risk, however, of frustrating Albert González Farran.
expectations with delayed or abandoned programmes.
Demobilization may not always result in a reduction in defence expenditures — that is context-
dependent. DDR practitioners should ask: Is there an ongoing conflict? Are there other armed groups
or potential clashes with neighbouring countries? These factors affect the security sector and its future
reformation (if needed). Reforming, training, and equipping the (new) police and army and paying
the remaining, more professional force may offset the savings gained from reducing the number of
personnel under arms. Any peace dividend should be understood in terms of the social, economic, and
political effects and benefit as well as the fiscal gains of reforming the security sector. For more details,
see Lesson 6.
In some respects, DDR is a political process that takes place in the aftermath of wars or protracted
civil conflicts. These conflicts often weaken political institutions and disrupt political processes. Returning
large numbers of XC to civilian life can further destabilize local and even national politics by increasing
the number of eligible voters in an area. The XCs may turn to political extremism if their expectations are
not met. The manner of reintegrating ex-soldiers, their areas of resettlement, their available benefits,
25
and the way they form associations will affect the political process for years after the DDRP concludes.
The success or failure of DDRPs is intertwined with the progress of political reconciliation. Because of
this, strong commitment and cooperation from the leadership of armies and their political leaders are
necessary for DDRPs to succeed.
The aftermath of war complicates reintegration. National and local governments may be weak.
Communities face many competing demands. Fighting may have destroyed resources and infrastructure,
and people with basic knowledge and skills may have fled or been killed. Economic and social institutions
are often shattered and civil society is generally weak.
There is no single model or blueprint for DDRPs. A DDRP is context-dependent, and while case
studies and existing programmes can offer lessons and recommendations that might increase the
chance of success, planners must tailor each DDRP to the political, security, economic, fiscal, and
social situation of the country. They must also reconcile the objectives of the many actors involved in
supporting programmes with these realities.
DDR as a continuum
The negotiation stage is critical and should consider all elements, as all peacebuilding stages are
linked one to the other. This could take time. In fact, ensuring proper consideration and planning of all
aspects of a Peace Accord may require months or years of negotiation. The development of forward and
backward linkages between each stage, therefore, strengthens the peacebuilding process and ensures
a smoother transition to a sustainable peace.
Demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration

are not distinct phases, but rather a continuum
of transition from military to productive civilian
life. Most often, programmes implement them by
considering time and space to accommodate the size
of the groups, as a single massive demobilization
effort could destabilize the country. During each of
these processes, the XCs have different needs and
require different support measures. Experience
demonstrates that DDR practitioners should think
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
of it as a single, continuous process. Planners must
combatants with UN cartoon flyers on disarmament,
connect and coordinate all sets of activities to increase demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration
the chance of a successful outcome. Not everything (DDRR) in Bopolu, Gbarpolu County, where UNMIL’s
DDRR programme team visited to inform XCs about its
will happen at once. DDR operations have too often
programme. 7 February 2004. UN Photo #30524 by
begun as fragmented, uncoordinated efforts with good M Novicki.
intentions, and perhaps even short-term successes,

before ultimately ending in failure.
This is not to say that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration must be done sequentially.
There may be times — especially in armed societies — where disarming the combatants may in fact put
them in harm’s way. In these circumstances, allowing some of the combatants to remain armed while
demobilizing and reintegrating has been beneficial in achieving the peace. In other peace processes,
26
A United Nations peacekeeper from

the Indian battalion of the United
Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) takes stock of weapons
and ammunition collected during the
demobilization process in Matembo,
North Kivu, in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. 8 November
2006. UN Photo #132362 by Martine
Perret.
the factions viewed the concept of disarmament the same as surrendering and could accept it. Those
situations required a new language of putting weapons beyond use in order for disarmament to proceed.
The fact remains that over time, disarmament must occur, be it through a DDRP or a subsequent SALW
programme. The same is true for demobilization, which can be done in a mobile or in situ manner. In
a mobile demobilization process, the programme goes to the people. In the in situ manner, the XCs
go to an assembly area, concentration area, or holding area for processing. In other circumstances,
combatants may already be in their chosen communities and DDR (especially reintegration) can take
place there along with the other returning refugees, IDPs, and stayees. This all depends on the context
of the conflict.
Reintegration needs both urgency and development components to be effective. The urgency
component calls for short-term support to XCs — both directly as individuals and indirectly as groups
resettled in specific areas. Policies for this component must be hands-on, targeted, and interventionist.
The development component calls for medium- to long-term government interventions only indirectly
targeted at XCs and harmonized with longer-term national development initiatives focused on the needs
of all members of society, including refugees, IDPs, and stayees, to help rebuild or reform a community.
Community reintegration, sometimes referred to as area reintegration, may be more effective in the
long term, but it often faces a funding dilemma with donors who have funds for specific purposes that
cannot always be mixed or used for other purposes.
Forward linkage
Demobilization must link to reintegration. If reintegration options already exist at the demobilization
stage, DDR practitioners can use them as incentives tied to reinsertion programmes to convince
individual combatants to give up their old lives. However, this linkage has not been fully developed in
many recent cases, meaning they depend on reinsertion programmes to help cover the gap.
27
More than 400 XCs from both sides of the long-running Darfur conflict arrived on 4 July 2011 to take part in the
disarmament and reintegration exercise run by UNAMID and the North Sudan DDR Commission. 4 July 2011. UN
Photo #478444 by Olivier Chassot.
Generally, past reintegration programmes have had little in common with development policies
despite the fact that reintegration should eventually convert to development efforts. Reintegration
strategies occurring in the immediate post-conflict environment must take into account many constraints
foreign to development and achieve objectives of little developmental value. However, interdependence
is needed to ensure stability of the process. Reintegration programmes will remain unstable unless the
subsequent development stage strengthens them. Planners usually develop autonomous reintegration
programmes and wait to incorporate development features later on. The best option, however, is to
start integrating the most fundamental aspects of development policies into DDRPs from the beginning.
This forward linkage helps avoid the urgency trap and aids a smooth transition to development.
DDRP funding
Assisting the demobilization and reintegration processes requires a well-structured, well-planned,

and integrated programme. DDRPs tend to be costly, especially for a government in a war-torn country
beset with many competing demands. Few countries can afford the complete costs of a DDRP, and
DDR planners often face the challenge of devising programmes without knowing what resources will
be available. International donor aid and other assistance are essential to formulate such a plan. Many
donors are reluctant to commit resources until presented with such a plan. Worse, they may wait until
demobilization is actually underway to accept that there is sufficient political will to invest in peace. Many
countries like Angola and Liberia saw several peace processes and DDRPs come and go. Political will,
careful planning, and inclusion into the peace accord process can help improve the deployment of the
DDRP as soon as there is a ceasefire and thus help prevent the parties from slipping back to violence.
In their absence, idle soldiers may turn to banditry, officers may interfere with the political process,
and resources needed for reconstruction continue to be tied up in continued conflict. Demobilization
28
benefits and reintegration programmes may be

necessary to help persuade combatants — especially
military leadership — that complying with peace
arrangements is in their interest. However, donors
often have difficulty responding quickly to the need
for funds. There are both bureaucratic and political
impediments. Donor governments must follow
budget cycles, and pledges of aid take time to
convert to available cash. Donors may be cautious
about committing funds to an uncertain peace
process, although the lack of funds may make the
peace even more tenuous. For all these reasons,
funded programme segments sometimes lack
coordination with each other, and vital components
may be neglected. Lack of donor support may make
it impossible for governments to keep promises (i.e.
providing land to XCs in Nicaragua and El Salvador). General Samuel Bower, former force commander of
ex-rebels, with UNMIL’s peace message and Secretary-
Failure to keep these promises may lay the foundation
General Kofi Annan’s photo in hand while at an UNMIL
for future violence. DDR sensitization event. 20 November 2003. UN Photo
#29551 by Shima Roy.
Institutional arrangements for DDRPs
In some cases, an ad hoc government-established national institution led the demobilization

process and worked with the assistance of international institutions. Since the early 1990s, DDR experts
recommend having some sort of central coordinating body, such as a National Commission for DDR
(NCDDR), to help plan, implement, monitor, and follow up on DDRPs.
“Coordination within government and between government and

other relevant actors is important in maximizing the effectiveness
of programme interventions. The establishment of one civilian
agency with overall design and implementation responsibility
serves this purpose best. Central coordination balanced by
decentralized implementation authority to the districts constitutes
an effective institutional structure.”7
The managing organization must combine centralized control and decentralized implementation. Field
offices provide beneficiaries with easier access to staff and programme benefits and contribute to making
the programme more responsive to local needs.
7) Nat Colletta et. al., Case Studies in War to Peace Transition: Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and
Uganda. Executive Summary, World Bank Discussion Paper no. 331, 1996, 23. Available from: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/385411468757824135/Case-studies-in-war-to-peace-transition-the-demobilization-and-reintegration-of-ex-combatants-in-Ethiopia-Namibia-
and-Uganda>.
29
Section 1.9 Security Threat Posed by XCs

XCs often have expectations of upward social and
economic mobility following the peace settlement. Such
expectations are likely to go unmet for the majority.
They may have received promises of compensation for
sacrifices or foregone opportunities during their time
in armed service. Neglecting demobilized soldiers has
consequences for both the soldiers and the society to
which they belong. Unmet needs can result in social
unrest in communities and political instability at
the national level. High unemployment, crime, and
resentment can impede reconstruction and development
efforts. Reconciliation of former adversaries is more
difficult under such circumstances. If their needs are not
met, XCs can pose a special risk due to their experience
with organized violence.
XCs have been schooled in and practiced violence for

a living. Membership in an armed force — whether regular
or irregular — can provide individuals with a livelihood,
social status, identity, support network, and security. After
demobilizing, XCs lose the things that membership in the
force represented to them. They also have experience
participating in a cooperative organizational structure to
carry out violent activities. Easy access to weapons is
the norm in countries recently engaged in a civil conflict.
If they are unable to meet their basic needs, they may
engage in criminal or political violence. They may re-arm
themselves in small groups to participate in actions such A stockpile of AK-47 rifles of the members of the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army burns at the launch
as roadblocks or kidnapping to reinforce their demands.
of the DDRP in southern Sudan by the United
They may become involved in armed disputes with their Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). 10 June 2009.
former rivals or get involved with other armed groups or UN Photo #399169 by Tim McKulka.
organized crime, destabilizing the peace process.
Section 1.10 Impact of Past Programmes

DDR does not take place in a vacuum, and the success of any programme to support DDR is closely
linked to the political, economic, and security situation of the country in which it occurred. In some
countries, there have been multiple iterations of DDRPs due to earlier failed processes. The immediate
effect is that people see the benefits XCs have received previously and may join one faction or another
in order to receive some form of benefit in the post-war setting. Expectation management is key in
these situations, especially during the negotiation process when the definition and eligibility criteria of a
combatant are finalized to help retain control of budgets and expenses for the DDRP.
30
In Tora village, North Darfur,

water is used to make bricks
for the construction of a school
which will house 30 former child
soldiers. The water was delivered
by the DDR Section of UNAMID.
19 April 2010. UN Photo
#434500 by Albert González
Farran.

The transition from civil war to sustainable peace is a difficult one. Successful DDR of XCs is one of
the essential steps or enablers of this transition. DDR practitioners must view it as a holistic process,
not discreet steps. Most countries in need of DDR require outside assistance and funding to support
programmes. Similarly, early planning and detailed negotiations — including donor involvement and
effective coordination — can prevent many problems, but planners need to be aware of impediments
to the DDR process. Recent mandates expanded the role of DDR, using it to enhance security, support
development, help reduce government expenditures, and remove obstacles to democracy. In some
cases, previously voluntary DDR processes became involuntary, and participants were detained while
undergoing the process. Where possible, planners should specify DDR objectives early and preferably
include them as part of the overall peace negotiations so that all parties subscribe to them. A case
can be made for targeting ex-soldiers as a specific needs group, but it is usually better to consider the
needs of the community as a whole when designing suitable inclusive or holistic programmes. The way
in which DDRPs are implemented has far-reaching implications for security, society, politics, and the
economy in a post-conflict society.
Suggested readings:
• Robert Muggah and Chris O’Donnell, Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 30, 2015, 1–12.
Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.fs>.
• UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) <www.unddr.org>.
31
End-of-Lesson Quiz »
1. The UN Secretary-General defines 4. All UN DDRPs should be _____.

reintegration as _____.
A. internationally owned and self-centred
A. the process by which XCs acquire civilian B. inflexible and accountable to the XCs
status and gain sustainable employment and C. separated from other peacekeeping and
income peacebuilding operations, and secretive
B. the assistance offered to XCs during D. integrated and flexible
demobilization
C. the assistance offered by local institutions 5. Which of the following is NOT considered
and populations following disbanding of a combatant?
illegal combatants A. A person arriving in a host country as a
D. a life-long process of transitional assistance refugee
supported by international donors B. A person involved in recruiting or training
military personnel
2. The UN Secretary-General defines
C. A member of a national army or an irregular
disarmament as _____.
military
A. surrendering of all troops before they
D. A person arriving in a host country carrying
become prisoners of war
arms or in military uniform
B. retrocession of all arms and weapons to the
ICRC at the end of a conflict 6. Which example best defines
C. collection, documentation, control, and reintegration?
disposal of ammunition, explosives, and light A. Ensuring that XCs have housing and jobs for
and heavy weapons of combatants and often the long term
also of the civilian population B. Encouraging former combatants to cease
D. collection of heavy weapons as a first step perceiving themselves as a special class,
towards a comprehensive ceasefire and to become accepted and identified as
members of the community
3. Complete this sentence by choosing
C. A life-long process of transitional assistance
the correct pair of words: The objective
supported by international donors
of the DDR process is to contribute
to security and stability in _____ D. Short-term assistance provided to XCs after
environments so that recovery and the demobilization process
development can begin. The _____,
demobilization, and reintegration of
combatants together make up a complex
process with political, military, security,
humanitarian, and socioeconomic
dimensions.
A. conflict, reinsertion
B. conflict, disarmament
C. post-conflict, reinsertion
D. post-conflict, disarmament
Answer Key provided on the next page.
32
7. The UN Secretary-General defines 10. Which of the following are common

reinsertion as _____. difficulties which may confront
demobilized soldiers as they finish a
A. the assistance offered to XCs during
DDRP?
demobilization and prior to reintegration
A. Lack of civic awareness and self-reliance
B. the assistance offered to XCs following the
B. Lack of financial resources and inadequate
reintegration process
shelter
C. the assistance offered by local institutions
C. Lack of education and marketable skills
and populations following disbanding of
illegal combatants D. All of the above
D. a life-long process of transitional assistance

supported by international donors
8. Which of the following is not a situation

in which DDR could be used?
A. Disbanding of armed groups and militias
B. Protection of cultural sites in a conflict
environment
C. Downsizing of armies or armed forces
D. Disbanding of gangs and other armed groups
9. DDR needs to be viewed as _____.

A. a holistic process
B. a series of discreet steps to achieve a goal
C. one of the essential steps or enablers from
civil war to sustainable peace
D. Both A and C
Answer Key »
1. A
2. C
3. D
4. D
5. A
6. B
7. A
8. B
9. D
10. D
33
LESSON
Participants, Beneficiaries,
2 and Actors in DDRPs
DDR is a complex,
multidimensional, and
multi-stakeholder process.
It is essential to be aware
of the various local,
national, and international
partners that may be
involved, as well as their
capacities and limitations.
UN Photo #434498 by Albert González Farran.
Section 2.1 Participants and Beneficiaries • Identify the participants and beneficiaries of
DDRPs.
Section 2.2 Communities
• Describe the specific needs of XCs.
Section 2.3 XCs as a Specific Needs Group
• Understand what “targeted assistance” means.
Section 2.4 Targeted Assistance
• Describe eligibility and screening mechanisms for
Section 2.5 Eligibility and Screening
DDRPs.
Mechanisms
• Describe the key issues concerning female XCs.
Section 2.6 Specific Needs of Female XCs,
Veterans’ Wives, and War

• Describe the key issues concerning youth and
Widows
DDR.
Section 2.7 Youth

• Describe the key issues concerning children
associated with armed forces and groups.
Section 2.8 Children Associated with Armed
• Describe the key issues concerning disabled XCs.
Forces and Groups
Section 2.9 Disabled XCs
34
LESSON 2 | Participants, Beneficiaries, and Actors in DDRPs
Officers of UNICEF and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) set
apart demobilized child soldiers as the Mai-Mai militia surrenders itself to Congolese Government forces. 25 November 2013. UN Photo
#571930 by Sylvain Liechti.
Introduction
It is important for DDR practitioners to be familiar

with the participants and beneficiaries in DDR. It is
difficult to serve the needs of the target groups without
a clear understanding of them and the roles they play,
as well as the eligibility criteria used to determine the
participants in DDRPs.
An agreement between warring factions may include

lists of combatants. In many cases, DDR staff must
verify this information. They will need to determine if
the lists are correct and generate gender- and age-
disaggregated data in order to start the planning process
in accordance with the CPA. If this information is missing
or only partially available, the first efforts of staff will
be to obtain valid estimates and information about the
35
combatants. Without it, planning a DDRP is impossible. The transparency of the process requires a clear
list of participants, and DDR planners must verify this list to avoid the perception that any particular
group is being favoured or victimized.
DDR is a complex, multidimensional, and multi-stakeholder process. It is essential to be aware of

the various local, national, and international partners that may be involved, as well as their capacities
and limitations.
This lesson focuses on issues of community; the specific needs groups of XCs; and men, women,
youth, and the disabled. The information provided in this lesson will always be context-specific and
must be carefully tailored to the situation.
Section 2.1 Participants and Beneficiaries

As stated previously, modern peace operations are complex and varied and require integration
with and cooperation from the many actors who are present on the ground. Some of the various actors
present in or influencing a country coming out of crisis — ranging from local to international — can
affect the peace process in a country.
There is a difference between participants and beneficiaries of a DDRP:
• Participants are persons who receive direct assistance through activities from the DDRP/
project.
• Beneficiaries are individuals and groups who receive indirect benefits, such as the wider
receiving community, civil society, and businesses that have the capacity to work with XCs.
The following list includes some of the actors that may affect combatants and the conflict outcome.
These actors can either help or hinder a society in its return to a peaceful and secure State. The list is
not exhaustive and will require close analysis before initiating action in any country. For example, civil
society exists at multiple levels and is by nature an inclusive and dynamic group that could include trade
unions, professional organizations, private entrepreneurs, educational institutions, religious bodies,
NGOs, youth organizations, advocacy organizations, lawyers, and many more.
Local Level » National Level » International Level »

• Members of Armed • Political parties • The UN System
Forces or Armed Groups • Governments • Regional organizations
• XCs • NCDDR • Member States and
• Women • The military bilateral partners
• Youth • Non-signatory Armed • Development banks
• Children Forces and Groups • International NGOs
• Disabled persons • Civil society • International
• Abductees • Media outlets corporations
• Civilian returnees • NGOs
• Communities
36
Section 2.2 Communities

XCs, refugees, displaced persons, victims, and “stayees”1 all interact and establish a new or
modified social compact for the post-conflict society in their communities. Communities can be large
or small, rural or urban, and ethnically homogenous or diverse. As with most DDR issues, the process
of reintegration is not the same for each community, as successes can depend on the size of each
group and the values they share. Some DDR practitioners argue that community-based reintegration
is a new concept. After a conflict, though, all persons live in some version of a community. Some
DDRPs have shifted from individual- or military-focused efforts to more community-based approaches,
such as community violence reduction, community security, economic recovery, and other community
development models.2
Section 2.3 XCs as a Specific Needs Group

Combatants often expect to be rewarded for their sacrifices. Factional leaders, the peace process,
or political promises may raise and fuel these expectations. Surveys conducted by donors and members
of peacekeeping missions may also fuel expectations. Expectation management must be a key
consideration during the post-conflict process. XCs often have hopes of upward social and economic
mobility following a peace settlement. They may have received promises of compensation for sacrifices
or foregone opportunities during their time in armed service.
Whatever the cause, expectation

management is a key component of any
DDRP — for the XCs, as well as the receiving
communities. Neglecting demobilized soldiers
has consequences for both the soldiers and the
society to which they belong. Unmet needs can
result in social unrest in communities and lead
to political instability at the national level. High
unemployment, crime, and resentment can
impede reconstruction and development efforts.
Reconciliation of former adversaries is much
more difficult under such circumstances. Some The Security Institution Unit (SIU) of the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
particular issues include:
African Republic (MINUSCA) coordinated weekly food distribution
• Awareness and self-reliance. by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to over
2,000 ex-Séléka combatants at three camp sites in Bangui in
Most former combatants require an
2014. The support was the first phase of a joint mission by the
adjustment to civilian life in order African-led International Support Mission to the Central African
to understand expectations for their Republic (MISCA), Operation SANGARIS, IOM, and MINUSCA
to facilitate the disarmament and relocation of the ex-Séléka
behaviour. These individuals may have a
combatants to their community of origin. A soldier helps unload
limited understanding of human rights, rice at one of the camps for XCs. 15 July 2014. UN Photo
civil rights and responsibilities, and the #595076 by Catianne Tijerina
1) Stayees are those who stay in place during a conflict and do not leave for a variety of reasons.
2) United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in
Peace Operations (New York: United Nations 2010), 11.
37
workings of democratic government. Additionally, XCs may have limited knowledge of the
workings of the civilian market economy (i.e. cash, credit, and employment). Furthermore, they
often lack familiarity with financial self-reliance.
• Education and Skills. In many countries emerging from a protracted civil conflict, few regular
soldiers or irregular combatants have readily marketable skills. During their time in armed
groups, combatants frequently forego the opportunity for formal education and experience in
marketable skills, or may never have such opportunities due to conflict. Illiteracy tends to be
high among former combatants.
• Employability. Even those XCs who have

employable skills or acquire them through
reintegration programmes may experience
discrimination by potential employers. Social
stigma depends on the outcome of the
conflict: some may view XCs as victors and
embrace them, while others may view them
as problematic, deficient, violent, and/or
likely to cause trouble. Employers may feel
embittered by oppressive actions committed
by combatants in the past. Employers may
fear hiring former combatants out of concern
their businesses will be targeted or boycotted.
Combatants are unlikely to belong to the
informal networks of friends and relatives
through which people are commonly hired.
Restrictions may exist on government hiring
of former soldiers due to legal concerns or
to avoid a massive increase in civil service
hiring and government spending. Employment
opportunities may be rare, as many people XCs participate in skills training at the Booker
Washington Institute as part of the rehabilitation and
seek employment in a war-damaged economy.
re-integration process in Kakata. 10 January 2005. UN
Destruction of infrastructure may also limit Photo #85565 by Eric Kanalstein.
opportunities, but reconstruction can provide
employment if there are funds to support it
and if job seekers have appropriate skills.
• Health. Many demobilized soldiers have special health problems — both physical and mental.
Amputations and war wounds are the most visible. Chronic conditions like tuberculosis, malaria,
malnutrition, HIV/AIDS, and intestinal parasites may be widespread as a result of years of camp
living and combat. The demobilization process can disrupt camp routines and increase the risk
of infectious diseases. Mental health is another serious problem area. XCs may be more prone
to domestic and social violence, or they may become withdrawn and anti-social. There may be
38
The SIU of MINUSCA coordinated weekly food

distribution by the IOM to over 2,000 ex-Séléka
combatants at three camp sites in Bangui in 2014.
The support was the first phase of a joint mission
by the African-led MISCA, Operation SANGARIS,
IOM, and MINUSCA to facilitate the disarmament
and relocation of the ex-Séléka combatants to their
community of origin. A team of partners gather to
coordinate food distribution. 15 July 2014. UN Photo
#595075 by Catianne Tijerina.
few resources to help families and communities cope with large numbers of returning XCs who
have physical and/or mental health problems.
• Financial resources. Soldiers in a civil war may serve for years with meagre or no wages
and no opportunity for saving. Service in the conflict may sever any connection they had with
sources of credit or economic assets like land or capital. Family members who may vouch for
them or employ them may have disappeared, died, or may have fled during the conflict. These
circumstances could make XCs particularly vulnerable through a lack of credit, capital, and
assets.
• Shelter and land. During the conflict, the government may have provided regular soldiers with
government housing. Upon demobilization, this may then be unavailable. Furthermore, guerrilla
or irregular combatants rarely own land or property. Combatants may have lost land or housing
to destruction or confiscation during the conflict, or it may be subject to disputed claims. Land
may be unworkable due to landmines, difficult to use due to long periods of abandonment, or
be inaccessible because of disruption to the transport networks. As part of a settlement, XCs or
veterans may receive land to farm. However, they may not be able to use it due to unfamiliarity
with agriculture, lack of seeds or animals, lack of capital, or lack of motivation to be farmers.
Section 2.4 Targeted Assistance

Targeted assistance focuses on a particular group of people. In the case of DDR, it means focusing
the programme on the former or XCs. It may be prudent for DDRPs to cater to XCs, as they can pose
a threat to order if their needs go unaddressed. They are also a large and potentially vulnerable group.
Sub-groups (like child soldiers and handicapped veterans) also merit special attention. The composition
and delivery of benefits may be politically motivated rather than calculated to contribute to the group’s
reintegration. Sometimes targeted assistance does not correspond to the needs and demands of
recipients, let alone to the society where they will call home. Additional problems may come from the
donors. Some can only give certain things or contribute towards specific projects, all of which could
greatly impact or influence the benefits offered to demobilized soldiers.
39
The problem with targeting assistance at XCs is that it excludes the members of the receiving
community. After a conflict, many needs groups are competing for limited resources, and they will
likely resent any special treatment and benefits offered to XCs. While this is context-dependent, other
community members may resent demobilized combatants for the suffering they experienced during the
conflict. Benefits and programmes that strongly favour former soldiers but do not support the receiving
communities may exacerbate existing tensions. This could hamper or delay the reintegration of the
XCs with an end result of displacing the XCs to another community or even into criminality. However,
if the community reveres the XCs as heroes who successfully defended and made sacrifices for the
community, it will be more accepting of benefits targeted at them. Additionally, XCs from opposing
sides may settle in the same region with possible negative consequences. Political rivalry, bitterness,
prejudice, and sometimes hatred between members of formerly opposing armies and their supporters
may continue. Therefore, DDR practitioners should reduce any actions that intensifies these tensions.
Reintegration requires measures that diminish the perception of former combatants as a special
class, and help communities accept them as members. Assistance targeted exclusively to XC may
counter this goal and actually postpone reintegration by enhancing XCs’ feelings of entitlement and
increase their demands and aggressive behaviour.
Budgets and how to maximize the impact of

reintegration are other concerns. For many years,
donor funds typically targeted specific groups —
XCs, women, children, or refugees and IDPs. That
meant funds could not legally go to other groups,
which increased animosity between the groups. This
has begun to change. Although many disarmament
and demobilization/reinsertion activities continue to
focus on XCs and many reintegration programmes
still have a greater focus/emphasis on the combatant
due to budgetary constraints, these activities are also
broadening their scopes. For example, Community
An upsurge in violence beginning 10 April 2017
Violence Reduction Programmes in Haiti (see CBRS displaced thousands of people in South Sudan’s Wau
and CVR in lessons 5 and 6) incorporate various town. Between 10 and 12 April, approximately 4,000
people arrived at the protection of civilians (POC) site
community elements into the demobilization and
adjacent to the United Nations Mission in the Republic
reinsertion processes. From a primarily economic of South Sudan (UNMISS) base, joining more than
point of view, it may be more cost-effective for XC 25,200 IDPs already seeking refuge in the site. New
arrivals at the POC site had access to water and put up
groups to benefit from general development strategies
basic structures for shelter. 20 April 2017. UN Photo
that create an enabling environment, a sense of #720374 by Nektarios Markogiannis.
community, promote private sector development, and
create employment opportunities.
There are also slow changes to the UNDP “early recovery strategy”, which pairs DDRPs with other
donor funds or national development programmes. This allows DDRPs to incorporate an increasing
number of community members in similar economic conditions. This paired assistance has also been
called a “target area strategy” or a “community-based programme” and involves financing activities
deemed indirectly useful to XCs in areas where they concentrate. These programmes may incorporate
40
direct issues for the XCs such as land, housing, training, health care, funds for agriculture and fishing, as
well as funds for infrastructure, including roads, demining, and health centres. This type of programming
encourages XCs to stop identifying as a separate or special class and to identify as members of the
community instead.
“This new wave of DDR represents a move away from narrowly

conceived stand-alone interventions toward activities that are
purposefully connected to national development plans. The
aim is to avoid unintentionally stigmatizing combatants and
dependents. Indeed, there is a sociological dimension to next
generation DDR that encourages former combatants to embrace
more positive and forward-looking identities, whether as a
community leader, a social worker, an electrician or a father
(rather than privileging their military status).”3
Targeting is an issue that will confound governments in all reintegration projects. As mentioned
previously, targeting XCs alone can increase social tensions and polarization between the targeted and
non-targeted groups. On the other hand, targeting might be justifiable — especially early on — for various
non-economic reasons (for example, providing homes to XCs, addressing the disabled, reintegrating
child combatants, etc.). Targeted programmes should be short-term, lasting only as long as necessary
to eliminate the specific disadvantages of the ex-soldier. Once these specific disadvantages have been
addressed, the targeted programme should draw to a close in favour of more holistic programmes that
include the general population.
Section 2.5 Eligibility and Screening Mechanisms

Sometimes, the CPA is clear with respect to the numbers of XCs and which armed forces and armed
groups will be downsized or dismantled. However, DDRPs may have to develop the criteria to identify
those who are eligible for DDR within these armed forces and groups and/or are otherwise associated
with those groups.4
Commanders and leaders of armed forces and/or armed groups that are about to undergo DDR
might want to include as many people as possible who contributed to the armed force or group during
the conflict. This could inflate the numbers and end up targeting the wrong group. Inflated figures
could also complicate the logistics and financing of the programme, which could result in many of the
actual XCs not receiving benefits. Additionally, entry into a DDRP under false pretences may discredit
the whole DDR process. Thus, having a clear idea of who the participants and beneficiaries are in each
case will help DDR practitioners create realistic and implementable DDRPs. It is important for planners
to get an independent estimate of the number of members of armed forces and armed groups being
downsized and/or disbanded. Key definitions to keep in mind include:
• Armed forces: The military organization of a State with a legal basis and the supporting
institutional infrastructure (e.g. salaries, benefits, basic services, etc.).
3) Robert Muggah and Chris O’Donnell. “Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”. Stability: International Journal of Security
and Development, (2015), 4(1), pp. 30.
4) As part of organizational restructuring beginning 1 January 2019, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) became the Department of
Peace Operations (DPO), and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) became the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). DPO no
longer supports DDR of armed forces. This may, however, still occur bilaterally and under separate supervision.
41
• Armed groups: Groups that have the potential to use arms to achieve political, ideological,
or economic objectives. They are not within the formal military structures of a State, State-
alliance, or intergovernmental organization; nor are they under the control of the State(s) in
which they operate.
• Combatant:
»» Hague Regulations (1899) - “Article 1 of the 1899 Hague

Regulations” and
»» Hague Regulations (1907) - “Article 1 of the 1907 Hague

Regulations provides: The laws, rights, and duties of
war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1) To be commanded by a person responsible

for his subordinates;
2) To have a fixed distinctive emblem

recognizable at a distance;
3) To carry arms openly; and
4) To conduct their operations in accordance

with the laws and customs of war.
In countries where militia or volunteer corps

constitute the army, or form part of it,
they are included under the denomination
‘army’.”5
Establishing eligibility criteria requires striking a balance between security and equity. Although the
primary focus should be on targeting those who pose the greatest threat to peace, DDRPs should also
try to provide non-discriminatory and fair treatment to all eligible members of armed forces and groups,
including women, children, and the disabled.
• Unarmed members of armed groups are not eligible for disarmament but should be eligible for
demobilization and reintegration benefits.
• Dependents are not eligible for disarmament and demobilization benefits but are normally
included in reintegration activities,
• Children and abductees may need to be disarmed but should not be formally demobilized and
should qualify to receive adequate assistance corresponding to their specified needs. Since children
are not formally mobilized, this is normally done separately through Interim Care Centres (ICC).6
• When possible, the definition of a combatant should not be weaponized (linking it to a weapon),
as doing so could reduce the opportunity for women to be included in the peace process.
5) Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule4>.
6) See Section 2.8.
42
Registration and Screening
Once eligibility criteria is determined, the registration and screening can take place. Screening of
DDR candidates is the single most significant activity in the process. The registration programme should
be carried out individually with separate lines or areas for men, women, and children separated into
the ICC. This can help reduce false information and help identify those who are forced or coerced into
the programme in a safe setting. All data should be sex- and age-disaggregated to allow for better
understanding of caseload and future needs.
The registration of each person and their personal data is a key component of any DDRP and
normally takes place in an assembly area or demobilization camp. This can be a sensitive process. Many
XCs do not have any identification, and the new XC identity card becomes their first step towards re-
entering society.
Steps in this process are as follows:
• Each combatant needs to fill out a registration form and personal data questionnaire. Because
these questionnaires include sensitive personal data, some XCs may suspect registration
information could be used against them for prosecution or discrimination. In many countries,
special laws are enacted to assist this transition as part of the transitional justice component of
the peace process.
• DDRPs should keep track of the numbers of participating XCs. Oftentimes, headcounts increase
months after the initial registration as confidence in the process and security increases.
The aim of screening can be varied and context-

appropriate but at a minimum will help to:
• Establish eligibility of the DDR candidate to

enter the process;
• Screen out non-combatants;
• Gather background information on the

candidate to customize reintegration;
• Identify DDR candidates with special needs;
• Screen out those who intend to cheat the A Popular Defence Force data collector interviews a
system; and prospective DDR candidate during the DDR pre-registration
exercise, in Khartoum, Sudan. 15 January 2007. UN Photo
• Gather military information on the armed #138790 by Fred Noy.
group/force.
A separate screening to gather information on military activities, which will enable DDR planners to
have a realistic view of the remaining caseload, should also take place. Specialists should carry out all
interviews and conduct them with the strictest discretion.
Family tracing may also take place at the demobilization site. This activity may be outsourced to
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has extensive experience in the matter.
In addition, DDR practitioners may arrange medical and psychosocial screening during which specific
43
information on sexual exploitation and abuse, health matters, and HIV/AIDS should be distributed and
psychological trauma may be identified.
Screening should be gender-sensitive and may include differing questions for male and female
combatants. Normally, men will screen men and women will screen women. One option from the IDDRS
is included below:
Section 2.6 Specific Needs of Female XCs, Veterans’ Wives, and War
Widows
Q1: Does she possess any type of

weapon? Yes Eligible for disarmament
No
Q2: Was the use of weapons an

Yes
important part of her function during
the conflict?
No
Q3: Does she have any experience of

using weapons? Did she undergo Yes
training in the use of weapons?
No
Q4: Did she perform essential support

functions during the conflict (e.g. Yes Eligible for demobilization
cook, porter, spy, messenger, etc.)?
No
Q5: Is she socially and economically

Yes Eligible for reintegration
dependent on a male ex-combatant?
Gender sensitive screening example1
1) United Nations, “OG 5.20: Youth and DDR” in The Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
(IDDRS) (2014). Available at: <http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>.
44
Zainab Hawa Bangura (centre), Special

Representative of the Secretary-General on
Sexual Violence in Conflict, walks with UN officials
after meeting with Syrian refugee women at a
settlement in Lebanon near the Syrian border. 21
April 2015. UN Photo #629496 by Pasqual Gorriz.
During conflict, women come to occupy different roles and perform new duties. They are often subject
to violence and suffer economic deprivation — especially in internal conflicts. As the infrastructure of
an area declines and men participate in armed conflict, women must support immediate and extended
families alone as well as perform all of the duties of the house. DDRPs should make special efforts
to integrate women into all phases of post-conflict emergency, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and
development efforts — from planning to implementation. Local and international assistance organizations
should reflect this in their policies, strategies, and programmes. Helping women effectively participate
at all stages requires innovative approaches. This section addresses the specific needs of women after
conflict, including female demobilized combatants, wives of demobilized soldiers, and war widows.
These women share many needs in common, but they also deal with distinct issues.
Specific Considerations for Women After Conflict
Women and children make up the largest group among refugees, IDPs, and the general population
after war. There are many children, orphans, and disabled persons and few income earners after a
war. This creates a high dependency ratio — especially on women — and thus increases women’s
responsibilities after war. As the number of households headed by women (widows, single mothers,
and wives of absentee or disabled men) soars, so does the poverty associated with these households.
Often the husband is absent, has been killed, or has been disabled physically and/or psychologically.
In addition to childcare and household duties, the wife must take on additional burdens such as being
the sole economic provider for the family or caring for the disabled husband. Family members are often
separated or relocated during conflict, which reduces family networks and stretches the social fabric
traditionally used for support.
Three groups of women — female XCs, veterans’ wives, and war widows — share many of the same
reintegration problems characteristic of post-conflict societies. They also have distinct problems and
needs that should be taken into account in planning and implementing demobilization and reintegration
programmes.
• Physical/Sexual Abuse/Psychological Trauma: Without the protection of men and with

the breakdown of traditional and social mores, rates of sexual abuse of women increases during
45
and after conflict. Rape, sexual torture, humiliation, and mutilation may be used as weapons
of war, and women may return home with unwanted children. Sexual abuse increases the risk
of contracting sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. It may affect the ability of
women to reintegrate back into their communities, especially if their families are unable to
accept or acknowledge their use as combatants or worse — as forced “wives or comforters” of
the male combatants. Cultural beliefs and attitudes may affect girls’ opportunities for marriage,
resulting in girls moving away and some possibly turning to prostitution.
• Multiple Wives: In some societies,

polygamy is tolerated for men. Married
men in combat or finding refuge
away from home may establish new
relationships or marriages with other
women. Once they return to their first
wife, they may force her to accept a new
woman in the household. This presents
economic and social difficulties for the
woman. The new wife may not speak
the same dialect or language, creating
communication difficulties. Additionally,
Participants at a mediation workshop develop a collective action
the new situation may confuse the plan on strategies for effective engagement of women in the
children, who may find it hard to accept prevention and management of conflicts. The workshop, which
took place on 16-17 May 2016, was led by the Civil Affairs
or recognize the authority of one or the
Division of UNMISS for women residing at POC Site 1 in Juba,
other woman. Alternatively, the new South Sudan. 17 May 2016. UN Photo #677872 by JC McIlwaine.
and old wife may establish friendly
relations.
• Discrimination: Women may acquire new roles during conflict, which may liberate them from
traditional constraints. After the conflict, however, they are often pressured to revert back to
traditional roles.
• Low Education/Few Job Skills: Women’s traditional roles as mothers and agricultural workers
limit their opportunities for education and literacy. Many of these women cannot read or write,
yet they often find themselves as the heads of households and economic providers.
• Abandonment: Abandonment is a common phenomenon for female combatants, especially

given the stress caused by the return of a demobilized veteran. Some women may be abandoned
or rejected by their husbands or prospective companions out of fear and out of assumptions
regarding the nature of their role as combatants. The divorce rate is likely to be high, thereby
increasing stress on the women.
• Poverty and Legal Rights: Economic deprivation and extreme poverty characterize post-
conflict environments. Given their nature, civil wars and protracted civil conflicts often lay waste
to agricultural areas. Most women live in rural areas, and their means of subsistence is typically
agriculture. Unfortunately, some traditional norms and rules dictate that land passes on through
the patriarchal line. If women lose their spouses, they often lose their livelihoods and sink to
46
the lowest economic levels of society. Women may have fewer legal rights than men and may
be unaware of the rights they do have, limiting their access to land rights, economic rights, and
upward mobility.
Specific Needs of Female Combatants
• Roles: Women may be active combatants, perform support or care roles, or be informants
or spies. Women combatants tend to be recruited at young ages and are mainly found in the
opposition forces where some are forced to serve and others serve voluntarily.
Some women join because they see no other prospects for livelihood, subsistence, and
safety. The majority of women only participate in combat when their families and homes are
threatened or when they are personally attacked or forced into fighting. In many contexts,
social responsibilities and expectations exclude women from a more active combat role.
• Percentages of Forces: Women make

up less than 5 per cent of the total
number of regular military personnel
worldwide. Girls and women have
been identified in the ranks of both
government armies and opposition
groups. However, women serve in higher
proportions among insurgent forces.
The proportion varies from country to
country and often is not recorded in the
official list of combatants. For example,
women comprised nearly 30 per cent The UN Integrated DDR Unit launches its programme in Ed
of the XCs in the Eritrean People’s Damazin, Sudan. Fifteen combatants from the Sudanese north-
south war, which ended with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
Liberation Front. In El Salvador, women
Agreement, were demobilized during an official ceremony
held some 40 per cent of leadership attended by senior governmental officials, donor countries, and
roles and 30 per cent of the combat UN representatives. During the process, the soldiers symbolically
handed over their weapons, registered, and received a DDR ID
roles during the conflict.7 Other
card, cash, non-food items, and a coupon for food rations. 5 May
countries may have lower proportions 2009. UN Photo #395258 by Johann Hattingh.
of women combatants.
• Additional Problems Typical of Other War-Affected Women: Women XCs face all of the
problems of their male counterparts, but also share problems typical of women in that culture
who did not fight. Needs vary by culture and by conflict, but frequently, women who fought as
combatants likely have higher employment expectations than other groups of conflict-affected
women.
• Pressure to Revert to Traditional Norms: Female XCs may no longer fit their societies’
image of women. Female XCs may face negative stereotypes, such as lacking decency and
propriety. Communities may find it difficult to accept that young girls were also combatants.
Young women may have to conceal the role they played in conflict. Civilian men are often
7) United Nations, Facts and figures on Women, Peace and Security (2005). Available from: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/
WPS_Facts.pdf>.
47
reluctant to marry female XCs, so women soldiers

may find it easier to marry male XCs with whom
they have a common understanding. As combatants,
women might have enjoyed a variety of new social
freedoms. On returning to civilian life, however, they
may confront the social mores of the conservative
and rural societies from which they came, and men
and other community members may expect them to
return to their traditional roles.
• More Adversely Affected by Poor Economy:

Demobilized women are more likely to be adversely
affected by a weak post-war economy than their male A female medical personnel (left) from the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) signs the
counterparts. Upon demobilization, they often have
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
no previous work experience and lack marketable (DDR) pre-registration forms, at the Al-
skills. Traditional social, cultural, and legal factors Askaryia military hospital site, the only SAF site
registering female candidates. 13 December
also limit opportunities for women. For example, they
2006. UN Photo #135242 by Fred Noy.
may not be permitted to own businesses or land.
• Sex-Role Stereotyping in Reintegration Programmes: Reintegration programmes that

practice sex-role stereotyping may encourage women to take up professions that do not pay
very well. For example, the mid-level commanders’ programme in El Salvador trained men in
animal husbandry and trained women as bakers, which was a generally less lucrative form of
employment. Depending on societal constraints, some programmes should offer to train women
in fields that would assist their entry into non-traditional areas.8
Special Demobilization Concerns for Female XCs
• Separate Encampment Facilities or Transit Centres: Having separate demobilization

facilities can help reduce women’s exposure to the physical and psychological violence they
may otherwise suffer at the hands of their male counterparts while awaiting demobilization.
It may also concentrate women and increase accessibility for NGOs or other agencies offering
specialized services. Such services may include gender-specific clothing or tailored benefits
that include vocational training, housing assistance, and gender-appropriate household items in
support of the family unit, health care, etc. Family tracing can be initiated to help in reunification.
Special Demobilization Concerns for Veterans’ Wives
During the conflict, members of a soldier’s family may be displaced internally become refugees.
They may also face the hardship of relocation and starting anew after the war. After demobilization,
wives of former combatants often face resettlement in a new area. They may face beatings from spouses
frustrated while attempting to adjust to their new status. Women may also experience discrimination
due to their association with XCs or membership in a different ethnic group. They will often lack support
from family members and the community. Wives of demobilized soldiers are often uninformed of their
civil, legal, and political rights — especially of the rights of women — and often face the additional post-
8) Cornelis Steenken personal observations throughout various DDR missions.
48
conflict burdens of taking care of severely disabled XCs, caring for children, and supporting the family
economically. Statistics from several countries show a high rate of divorce and abandonment of former
wives and children following demobilization.
• Families and Demobilized soldiers sustained during encampment: In most cases, wives
and families of regular soldiers do not accompany them during the conflict. Some have homes in
the areas of the soldier’s home base, while others may become refugees or internally displaced.
During assembly and encampment, wives and families of irregular army combatants often
encamp in the same or nearby areas. While encamped, they may receive subsistence-level
assistance. Several DDRPs have taken an approach that regards the family as a demobilization
unit based on the view that an XC’s family is a vulnerable social unit.
• Family Member Location and Reunification: Family reunification is essential to the successful
reintegration of XCs into society. Unified efforts can revitalize stability, trust, and traditional
customs within a family unit and community. For this reason, it is essential that family tracing
follows demobilization in order to reunite XCs with their communities. To facilitate the process of
family reunification, involved agencies and designated programmes should focus on preparing
identification documents that may be missing or incomplete.
• Household Items in Demobilization

Packages to Distribute to Wives:
Demobilization packages should include
subsistence and household items in
support of the family if individuals
do not receive such items through
other programmes, e.g. repatriation
as refugees. Male combatants often
do not perceive the value of such
items and may sell, trade, or discard
The organization Nonviolent Peaceforce facilitated reunification of
them before reaching their settlement
families separated by conflict in South Sudan through a process
destination. Some programmes have of registration in various regions of the country. Michael and Anna
found that distributing household items (father and mother) were separated from their children Ezekiel
(17) and Nyakueny (6), at the beginning of the most recent civil
to women is more effective, as there is
conflict in South Sudan. The children went with their relatives
more assurance that women will use into the Bentiu POC site, while the parents made their way to
such items for intended reinsertion/ Juba. Here the family is reunited in a POC in Juba after over two
years apart. 12 May 2016. UN Photo #677209 by JC McIlwaine.
reintegration purposes.
• Language and Ethnicity Barriers: Upon return, men may ask their spouses to move to
another community or village or to reside with him in the demobilization camp. This may prove
difficult if the women face an ethnic division or language barrier. Women who do not speak
the local language of their destination may find themselves feeling isolated. Locals may view
the women as different and deny them support in their new residence. Such problems are
magnified if the woman’s husband dies. The community may ostracize the widow, take her
belongings away, and treat her with disrespect — even if she has clearly defined property rights.
49
Ivorian widows run a small

restaurant in Yopougon, Côte
d’Ivoire, with the help of the NGO
Les Compagnes de Ruth. 1 March
2005. UN Photo #68438 by Ky
Chung.
• Commitment/Dowry: Another factor contributing to rejection of an XC’s wife is failure of

the veteran to sanction the union, which is traditionally done through paying a “bride price” or
dowry. In such an arrangement, wives and children lack identifiable family rights. If their spouse
pursues a divorce, dies, or engages in a custody dispute, the women may be vulnerable and in
a weak legal and social position.
• Which Wives and Families to Transport to Settlement Destinations: Programme

administrators face the difficult decision of choosing which family members will accompany the
XCs if they have more than one wife and/or have children with multiple partners. DDRPs must
establish consistent, transparent policies about this issue.
Special Demobilization Concerns of War Widows
War widows are a frequently neglected group. These women are often left behind or forgotten as the
conflict rages. They may become dependent on their extended families for support. They often become
heads of their households and bear the burden of responsibility for their families. They feel compelled to
take on new roles and responsibilities often in the face of cultural, religious, ethnic, and governmental
opposition. Even so, few groups actively incorporate a support system for these disadvantaged widows.
Some common concerns of this group include:
• Land Ownership: Men often control women’s employment opportunities and their access to
land. Furthermore, these rights are often culturally based. Patrilineal heritage laws frequently
disadvantage widows, leaving them with no ownership rights and only indirect access to land.
Land reform policies can help address these issues. If land is redistributed, it would be prudent
and logical to ensure that male and female companion XCs receive adjacent plots.
• Effects on General Status and Community Acceptance: While stigmatization of XCs is a

frequent occurrence in most post-conflict settings, it can be even more difficult for women. The
roles of women in combat frequently differ from their pre-conflict roles. Many women opt to blend
back into society without undergoing the DDR process in order to avoid this stigmatization. In the
case of war widows, the community or culture of their dead spouses may not accept them, making
it hard for them to reintegrate or remarry. This creates new challenges and leaves many women
open to abuse and problems that reduce their ability to reintegrate into society.
50
• Assistance in Developing Sustainable Economic Activities: While women constitute the

majority of the world’s agricultural workers, programmes should focus on assisting women
with a broader perspective, allowing them to pursue more economically viable and sustainable
options — especially in urban settings.
Reintegration Programme Options for Women
• Target Family Unit: Women are a vulnerable group, but they are also part of family units.
Benefits that target families can also assist women and vice versa.
• Education on Rights, Economics, and

Preventive Health Care: When targeting
women in post-conflict societies, DDRPs must
recognize their possibly low educational levels,
limited access to economic opportunities, and
potential ignorance of their rights. Deprivation
in every aspect of life, including health care,
characterizes post-conflict societies. Programmes
for women should take these factors into account
and should ensure the education of women in
these different fields.
• Psychosocial Counselling: Women may

have been the targets of sexual/physical and
psychological abuse. Some of these women
may suffer grave depression in the form
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
nightmares, anti-social behaviour, etc. DDRPs
should offer psychosocial facilities, train social
workers in identifying these problems, and
help make families and communities aware of
psychological issues. DDR practitioners should
XCs participate in skills training at the Booker
educate communities and societies to use their Washington Institute, as part of the rehabilitation and
own resources and healing mechanisms to reintegration process in Kakata. 24 January 2005. UN
Photo #85566 by Eric Kanalstein.
alleviate women’s psychological problems and
accept their participation in society.
• Encourage Cooperative Efforts among Women: In some situations, women have reorganized
their social lives around participation in women’s cooperatives and associations. These support
systems can be formal or informal and may provide options and ideas beyond the normal circle
of family and community. They can also help focus the autonomy women gained during the war
and encourage them to expand beyond the traditionally defined roles and identities families and
society impose on them. This can provide space for increased participation in civil society and
give women the ability to develop means to participate in the country’s reconstruction. Such
involvement can also contribute to their well-being and healing. For further information on
these issues, please refer to UN IDDRS 5.10 and the UN Women website.
51
Section 2.7 Youth
Definition of Youth
Youth are typically defined as young people between the ages of 15 and 24. As such, they usually
cross over the internationally accepted definitions of children and adults. This group represents the
future of a country emerging from a conflict, but is still vulnerable to exploitation by the various forces
that were fighting. Some youth might have experienced combat and may not have a well-developed
sense of what a regular society expects of them. Unfortunately, many DDRPs neglect youth in the
planning process and instead cater to children and older adults. Youth may need specially tailored
programmes that will need to be context-specific depending on the circumstances of the environment.
Legal Implications of the Definitions of Youth
The IDDRS Chapter 5.20 deals specifically with this group and states:9
There is no legal framework specifically dealing with youth (15–24 years). Legally, children up to the
age of 18 years are covered under the Paris Principles and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
and other protective frameworks, such as International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 182 and
the Optional Protocol of 2002 (also see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).
With regard to admission to youth employment, of particular relevance is the ILO Minimum Age
Convention of 1973 (No. 138), which contains provisions aimed at the effective abolition of child labour
and the progressive raising of the minimum working age. It requires that a general minimum age for
admission to work be set that is: (1) not lower than the end of compulsory schooling; and (2) cannot
be below age 15, although developing countries could initially set a minimum age of 14. Exception
is granted for work done in an appropriate vocational training framework, including apprenticeship
from the age of 14, but a higher minimum age of 18 must be set for hazardous work that is likely to
endanger the health, safety or morals of young persons. Each country determines its list of hazardous
work and must take time-bound measures for the rehabilitation and social integration of children
released from armed groups and forces, ensuring their access to health care, and to free basic
education or vocational training, as appropriate.
Forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict, slavery and child prostitution is
among the worst forms of child labour. DDRPs should be based on the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention of 1999 (No. 182), which aims to put an end to the involvement of all girls and boys under
18 in the intolerable activities it defines. Accordingly, reintegration programmes for youth should avoid
leading young people into jobs or activities that might not be permissible, taking into account the
difference between those above and those under 18 (and also the difference between those above and
those under the minimum working age).
9) United Nations, “OG 5.20: Youth and DDR” in The Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
(IDDRS) (2014). Available at: <http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>.
52
The Rwandan battalion of UNMISS handed over newly constructed buildings for Kapuri Primary
School in Central Equatoria State to the South Sudanese government on 9 February 2015.
The contingent built eight classrooms, two staff offices, and washrooms for the school after
Rwandan soldiers, during a routine patrol in May 2014, observed pupils studying under trees
and in make-shift classrooms with no sanitation facilities. The battalion began construction in
September 2014, in partnership with UNICEF, members of the Rwandan community in South
Sudan and local Kapuri communities. The project was completed under the theme “Umuganda”
or “Shared Work”. A view of Kapuri Primary School pupils and members of the UNMISS
Rwandan contingent participating in the handover ceremony. 9 February 2015. UN Photo
#622427 by JC McIlwaine.
Special DDR Concerns of Youth
DDRPs should meet the needs of this group, as they often constitute the largest group within a
DDRP. From a programming perspective, those who are under the age of 18 are normally dealt with
as children, while males and females over the age of 18 are treated as adults. Yet youth have distinct
needs. One key component is expectation management of youth, which requires a good understanding
of why they joined, their capabilities and limitations, and their hopes and aspirations for the future.
They will often need “catch-up” educational programmes separate and distinct from children while
undergoing skills or vocational training as part of adult programmes.
• Employment: Youth employment is critical for post-conflict stability and lasting peace. However,
their unemployment is often seen as one of the contributors to instability and may even be
a direct threat to peace in post-conflict settings. This is because their exposure to violence
and combat may make them susceptible to criminal elements and re-recruitment into nascent
armed groups. As indicated by writer Irma Specht in her studies of youth, the “challenge for
governments, NGOs, and international organizations seeking to foster youth unemployment
is to tap the dynamism of young people and build on their strong spirit of risk-taking. The
strategy for socioeconomic reintegration of armed youth must be multifaceted: it must improve
the employability of these ex-combatants and, at the same time, promote local economic
development and job creation in the war-torn economy.”10
10) Irma Specht, “Juventud y reinserción”. Serie Working papers FIP No. 1 (Agosto de 2006) (Colombia: Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, Colombia,
2006), 17.
53
• Youth as agents of change: While there is a UN definition of youth, in most countries youth
is a context-driven group shaped by many societal and cultural indicators. In conflict settings,
they often assume adult roles that they may have to surrender in the aftermath of war. They are
not a homogenous group and include positive elements who need to be encouraged to support
peace as well as potential spoilers who may need supervision. Education and opportunity are
key components of any DDRP to enable the potential and capacity development of youth and to
avoid the dangers of criminality and re-recruitment.11
Section 2.8 Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups
Defining Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (CAAFAG)
The term “soldier” or “combatant” is used for a member of a regular or irregular armed force or
armed group in any capacity and those accompanying such groups; it includes those serving in support
capacities, i.e. cooks, porters, messengers, etc.
Paragraph 2.1 of the Paris Principles states:
“A child associated with an armed

force or armed group (CAAFAG)
refers to any person below 18
years of age who is or who has
been recruited or used by an
armed force or armed group in
any capacity, including but not
limited to children, boys, and girls
used as fighters, cooks, porters,
messengers, spies, or for sexual
The South Sudanese army (SPLA) handed over two former child
purposes. It does not only refer to soldiers to the South Sudan DDRP, in Juba, on 27 March 2015.
a child who is taking or has taken The two children were captured by the SPLA in Raja County on 16
March from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
a direct part in hostilities.” 12
(SPLM-IO). 27 March 2015. UN Photo #627271 by Isaac Billy.
Conflicts Involving CAAFAG
CAAFAG mostly appear in protracted conflicts where they become a valuable resource and are
easy to enlist. Some may be orphans, homeless, or refugees who are bored, frustrated, or convinced
of nationalistic sentiments. As such, many armies and/or guerrilla groups recruit them. It is difficult
to verify precise numbers of CAAFAG. They are often “invisible” since those who use them deny their
existence. The armed groups with which they associate keep no record of their numbers and ages, or
they falsify their ages. In some cases, they are not part of the formal strength of the forces or groups
to which they are attached, but are unacknowledged servants. Many are enrolled in a variety of militias
and citizens defence groups, the very existence of which may be undocumented.
11) For further information refer to UN IDDRS 5.20 and FOI — Lecture Series on African Security 2008:7 — “DDR of Youth in Africa; Theory, Standards,
and Practice” by Irma Specht.
12) UNICEF, The Paris Principles. Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007. Available from:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/465198442.html>.
54
• Gender Issues: Girls can join armed

opposition groups and may even have
combat duties. They may suffer sexual
abuse, trauma, and even torture,
which may have led them to join
armed groups in the first place. These
experiences have a serious impact on
girls’ ability to reintegrate back into
their families and communities. Cultural
beliefs and attitudes may affect their
opportunities for marriage and normal
socialization. Consequently, they may Children perform during the official launch of the “Children, Not
refuse to participate in DDRPs or Soldiers” campaign in South Sudan, a collaboration between the
United Nations and the Government of South Sudan. 29 October
return to their families and may have
2014. UN Photo #610288 by JC McIlwaine.
reduced economic opportunities.
Recruited CAAFAG
Given all of the established international conventions and principles, why do children still appear within
the ranks of national and regular armies and guerrilla/militia movements? Various reasons explain this:
• Conscription: During protracted wars, social infrastructure breaks down. Family bonds can
no longer serve as binding frameworks for a child’s upbringing. Schools close down and entire
societies fall into chaos. Fighting displaces people and separates children from their families.
Family members may die in the conflict, potentially leaving children with no alternative but to
seek refuge in an armed group. Add these factors to poverty, economic and social injustice,
and family problems at home, and it is easy to see why many children volunteer or fall prey
to recruitment into conflict. Some armed groups terrorize children, subject them to physical
abuse, use various methods of coercion, and/or make false promises in order to recruit them.
• Voluntary Recruitment: Many children make a choice to join armed groups in the absence
of better prospects. With the breakdown of social networks, the prevalent state of poverty,
and the number of displaced persons and refugees, children may choose to leave their homes.
Children can feel frustrated and/or abandoned and know that a life within the ranks of an armed
force will provide them with food, clothing, and shelter. Children that voluntarily join usually do
so to survive. Pressure and prospects of adventure may also factor in their decision. Another
factor that can lead children to become soldiers at young age is the legacy of violence within
their environment, as seen in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Colombia, and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory. Children may also join in light of promises of prestige, as a result of family pressure,
or with the idea of avenging loved ones killed in the fighting.
55
Roles and Duties of CAAFAG
In times of conflict, armed groups often see children as useful because of their size, vulnerability,
and bravery. They can perform many duties, including manning checkpoints, providing security along
supply routes, working as bodyguards, carrying ammunition, working as spies or informants, or serving
on the front lines of battle.
Treatment of CAAFAG
Many CAAFAG receive severe punishment in the form of physical abuse for failing at military training,
falling asleep on sentry duty, or disobedience. In government armed forces, military law applies to all
soldiers including CAAFAG. Many are mistreated, beaten, or killed for disobedience or attempting to
escape. Some are forced or required to commit atrocities to ensure they cannot return to their villages,
and others are given a mixture of alcohol and drugs to control them or make them more aggressive. In
some units, superiors force children to engage in sexual activity, while others (both boys and girls) are
raped or forced to have sex in exchange for food and shelter.
Typical Problems of CAAFAG
The behaviour of former CAAFAG can be inconsistent, going from docile to erratic. DDR practitioners
should note that the participation of CAAFAG in conflict governed their norms of behaviour up until their
release. The norms of behaviour in conflict differ from those in everyday life.
• Familiarity with Violence: In their lives

as combatants, children are frequently
separated from the supportive and
nurturing environment of the family, and
authoritarian military structures control
their behaviour. As such, they face harsh
punishments. They may model their
behaviour on these structures, which
causes the children to develop a continued
dependence them. Without such a support
Former child soldiers enlisted by Al-Shabaab are handed over
structure in place, children may resort to to UNICEF after their capture by forces of the African Union
aggressive techniques to get what they Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 1 November 2012. UN Photo
#533678 by Tobin Jones.
want.
• Educational level: Children in armed groups usually have a level of education inconsistent
with their age due to missing months or years of schooling. CAAFAG experience high rates of
illiteracy. When children seek education after conflict, they can feel embarrassed or frustrated
about attending school with younger children. They may drop out of school. It is important for
DDR practitioners to recognize this dimension of the reintegration process and consider the
development of special classes and/or schools for CAAFAG.
• Feeling different: Demobilized children may feel shame, fear, rejection, and lack of trust in
society and people. They may also feel aggressive, threatened, stigmatized, and helpless. In
programmes designed specifically in the interest of CAAFAG risk singling them out as “special”,
which the children might resist.
56
• Trauma: The effects of conflict on

children who witnessed atrocities
during their time as part of an army
or militia are many and grave. Some
have seen the torture and/or killing
of their parents, communities, and
friends. Some have killed, and some
were captured, imprisoned, or even
tortured. Although some children do
not recognize their trauma, experts
have identified symptoms such as
nightmares, difficulty concentrating, Former child soldiers enlisted by Al-Shabaab are handed over to
UNICEF after their capture by forces of AMISOM. 1 November
and a sense of hopelessness about the
2012. UN Photo #533679 by Tobin Jones.
future.
DDR practitioners must understand and recognize the effects that war can have on these CAAFAG
and include special psychosocial trauma counselling sessions to deal with their aggression, fear,
uncontrolled emotions, and/or alcoholism and narcotic drug abuse during their post-conflict
reintegration efforts. Instructors and teachers must understand the effect of participation in
conflict on children’s behaviour and provide them with the necessary skills to deal with the
various problems that arise. UNICEF, Save the Children, and other actors have specialized
counsellors who are trained to deal with these issues in separate ICCs. Others recommend not
treating children as a distinct group in these programmes, but rather integrating them into skill
courses with other trainees in order to promote assimilation.
• Separation from families or lack of families: War can cause the complete breakdown of
social structure and bonds. Prior to participating in conflict or upon demobilization, it is common
that many CAAFAG are separated from their families or lose their families to the conflict. Many
people die, become homeless, or are displaced, thus severing community ties and relationships.
Upon demobilization, CAAFAG may have no means of locating their families.
• Limited knowledge of the national language: In some conflicts, CAAFAG may not speak
the national language. This further complicates the challenges of education, vocational training,
and employment for these children. It is necessary for DDRPs to educate teachers in the local
language and to provide courses for children to learn the national language.
• Lacking Job Skills: As an immediate result of their time in combat, children and youth do
not possess any marketable employment abilities depending on their age at the time of their
recruitment. The skills they do have may not transfer to daily community lives. In general, time
spent in the military is a time of lost opportunity.
• Health Problems: In addition to the psychological problems CAAFAG may have, many also
exhibit physical problems. These range from physical disability as a direct result of their
engagement/exposure to armed conflict to symptoms of torture or sexual abuse. Sexual abuse
may result in sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Health-related problems may
arise from a lack of adequate nutrition, clean water, or sufficient rest and shelter. As such,
CAAFAG may contract other infectious diseases like tuberculosis or malaria.
57
• Little Comprehension of Civilian Community Life: Given that most CAAFAG likely spent a
crucial amount of time within the ranks of armed forces or militia groups, they may not have
a basic understanding of civilian community life or communal morals. CAAFAG may not have
subsistence skills and may have little to no understanding of the value of money and saving.
• Lack of Documentation: Another problem for children upon demobilization is their frequent
lack of identification papers (e.g. birth certificates, service registration cards, etc.). This may
be a result of their leaders’ attempts to hide their existence within their ranks, or it may be a
direct consequence of conflict and its uprooting effect on society. Proof that CAAFAG are indeed
children complicates the process of designing specific programmes for them.
• Little understanding of government functions: CAAFAG do not usually understand their

rights and the responsibilities of governments and citizens. This includes the functions of federal
and State governments and their institutions.
• Political indoctrination: Armed groups use political indoctrination or brainwashing (in both
verbal and physical forms) to recruit and train children. Upon demobilization, many children
believe in the war they were waging.
Special Considerations in Release of CAAFAG
• Location, identification, and documentation: In considering the demobilization of CAAFAG,

it is important that involved agencies have trained personnel to identify CAAFAG and provide
those children with adequate documentation for their future lives.
• Immediate and continuous release from military units: Before, during, and after a peace
process begins, armed groups should release children in accord with the Paris Principles, which
state:
“‘Release’ Includes the process of

formal and controlled disarmament
and demobilization of children from
an armed force or armed group as
well as the informal ways in which
children leave by escaping, being
captured or by any other means.
It implies a disassociation from the
armed force or armed group and
the beginning of the transition from
military to civilian life. Release can
take place during a situation of Former child soldiers enlisted by Al-Shabaab are handed over to
armed conflict; it is not dependent UNICEF after their capture by forces of AMISOM. 1 November
2012. UN Photo #533678 by Tobin Jones.
on the temporary or permanent
cessation of hostilities. Release is not
dependent on children having weapons
to forfeit.”13
13) UNICEF, The Paris Principles. Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007. Available from:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/465198442.html>.
58
• Interim Care Centres: ICCs provide

for the safety and security of CAAFAG
while performing important logistical
and administrative functions. They can
act as a focal point where children in
need of reunification can cluster and to
which foster and biological families can
turn for assistance. They often serve
as an initial stable environment for
gathering additional information on the
child’s family, their education, primary Radhika Coomaraswamy (front, centre), Special
health care services, and psychosocial Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict, poses for a group photo at the signing
screening and information for follow-
ceremony in Juba, South Sudan, for an agreement by the
up activities. These centres serve only SPLA, the South Sudanese Ministry of Defence, UNMISS, and
as temporary arrangements and should UNICEF, to renew all parties’ commitment to the protection of
children. “This is an important day for South Sudan,” said Ms.
avoid becoming long-term holding centres
Coomaraswamy at the ceremony. “Not only does this Action
for unaccompanied children. Having Plan ensure the government’s commitment that the SPLA will
identified and screened these children, have no children within its ranks, but that all armed groups
who have accepted amnesty with the Government must
it will be the responsibility of UNICEF in
release their children.” 12 March 2012. UN Photo #507821
conjunction with NGOs and humanitarian by Isaac Billy.
aid programmes to initiate the process of

family reunification or a substitute thereof (i.e. foster families or orphanages). In this process,
programmes should quarter children in areas separate from demobilization centres for adults.
These interim care centres should be located in major concentration areas of CAAFAG to ensure
maximum assistance to the child while maintaining and/or establishing contact with the family
where appropriate. The transit areas should be accessible, free of mines, and have access to
potable water.
• Family Tracing and Reunification: The process of family tracing and reunification is an
essential component of the successful reintegration of CAAFAG. Families and community
environments provide the stability, which is most needed at the time of release. Furthermore,
family reunification can enable bonds of trust and honesty between war-affected children.
UNICEF has many specialized tools and techniques used for the identification and registration of
the children, including how to collect personal details, names, places of origin, photos, and even
voice recordings. These are collated into a centralized data base used by several coordinating
agencies to help the reunification process. The tracing agencies often go to the areas known to
the child. The process entails extensive research. “Verification” may commence once the agency
locates family members. They carry personal information back to the child to reconfirm that
those located are actually family members, that conditions are adequate, and that the child
wishes to join his or her relatives. The latter is particularly sensitive and especially important in
the cases where a child may have left because of difficult situations at home, such as physical,
mental, and even sexual abuse.
59
A child holds up bullets collected from

the ground in Rounyn, a village about
15 kilometres from Shangil Tobaya,
North Darfur. Most of the village’s
population fled to camps for IDPs
because of heavy fighting between
the Government of Sudan and rebel
forces. 27 March 2011. UN Photo
#468142 by Albert González Farran.
Reunification “transport and delivery” occurs with the child accompanied by social service personnel
and the NGO partner. Where possible and if deemed appropriate, they take the child directly to the home of
the located family members. In cases where this location is extremely remote, the support actors select a
suitable intermediary point. Air transport may be used if resources are available. Families and communities
should receive assistance and counselling to facilitate their abilities to adequately re-accept a child soldier.
Special benefits should exist for those children in need of medical assistance as a result of injury or disease
during war.
Obstacles to Release and Reintegration of CAAFAG
• Lack of Recognition of Existence: Typically, there is no formal recognition of children

participating in a conflict — even when their involvement was prevalent. Although CAAFAG
commonly constitute part of different national armies and militia groups, it appears that
governments of many countries have difficulty admitting their existence and use different denial
tactics, including fudging data, not recognizing children as part of the peace agreement and
consequent demobilization initiatives, lying on interviews, physically hiding the children, etc.
• Whether and How to Hold Children Responsible for Acts Committed as Soldiers:
Young, underage suspects of violence rarely reach the courts. However, government treatment
of captured child soldiers varies enormously. Many are treated the same as captured adult
soldiers, which means that they will be treated as criminals or terrorists, or they may be held in
military prisons. Many captured CAAFAG undergo abusive interrogation, torture, isolation, and
rape practices.
• Glorification of Children in Military Service: In some situations, participation in the military

or warlike activities is glorified. Children learn to idolize historical military leaders and to view
the military as a sign of manhood. In addition, military life may appear glamorous to a child in
terms of the uniforms and the prestige that may come with participation. For other children,
military life comes with power and authority, more than what their peers may possess.
60
• Attitudes of Communities and Families: In many cases, complete reintegration of a child

soldier requires family reunification. However, some children may have fled their families due
to a family history of physical, mental, or even sexual abuse. This must be determined by the
workers in the ICC. If discovered, staff must make alternate arrangements with extended family
or friends. Simply placing a child with their family may not be sufficient. The impact of conflict
on the family may mean that on return, they view the child as an extra mouth to feed. The child
could face a family radically changed in structure and function. This may significantly weigh
upon the efforts the child and the family must make in order for them to return to civil society.
In recognition of this, DDR practitioners must make every effort to aid families in this process
of rebuilding family life. Mobilizing families and communities into action is key to creating a
conducive atmosphere within which the former child combatant can return, settle, and prosper.
Reintegration Programme Options for CAAFAG
• Western-Biased Healing Concepts:

Approaches to psychosocial care of former
CAAFAG and other war-affected children
vary widely. The more clinical approach
seeks to adapt Western expertise in
child psychology and psychiatry to the
local context, encouraging children
diagnosed as “traumatized” to talk about
their experiences. Emphasis on healing
through play is also characteristic of
Western approaches. This raises the
question: Should healing concepts come
directly from Western medicine, should
they lie within the indigenous community,
Grace Akallo, former child soldier of Uganda, participates
or should they involve a combination of in the Security Council open debate on children and armed
both? Previous cases suggest that the conflict. 29 April 2009. UN Photo #394136 by Mark Garten.
latter is the best way to ensure — at least

for some — successful reintegration into
social life and structures.
• Boost Ability of Communities and Families to Reintegrate CAAFAG: In the absence of

abuse, the crux of successful reintegration of CAAFAG is the involvement of the family and
community. A critical early step in this process is “sensitization”, which includes both education
and raising awareness in the community of the problems of CAAFAG until all concerned
understand the situation and recognize it as a problem in need of a solution. However, given
their own experience of war, the communities and families may require both moral and material
assistance. A second phase of community involvement calls on the community to mobilize
resources and promote long-term sustainability, food security, health services, educational
services, and psychosocial counselling.
61
• Family/Community Sensitization, Mobilization, and Advocacy: As previously noted,

community institutions (e.g. extended families, elders, women’s associations, etc.) are important
in assisting war-affected children. As a result of the breakdown of customs and family bonds,
some families and communities may be reluctant to take back lost children for fear of what they
might bring. At the same time, these communities are also recovering from war. As they begin
to heal the children, they may also heal themselves. Song, dance, drama, and art emphasize
social interaction at the community level. In addition, many traditional healing methods may
already be in place. Reliance on the community can also serve as a resource-saving mechanism
at the time of reintegration. As such, it is necessary not only to educate the community on
the problems of CAAFAG but to teach them to use their own, context-specific mechanisms
such as traditional healing, birth attendants, village health workers, religious organizations and
services, community networks, and extended families.
• Alternative Destinations: It is necessary to create alternative systems of care appropriate to

the cultural circumstances of children who cannot be reunited with their families. For children in
such situations, alternative arrangements should focus on care that meets their physical, social,
and emotional needs. This is of particular importance to the older child combatants who may
have spent considerable time with the military and as a result find it very difficult to reintegrate
into their families. As has been seen, this group in certain cases is in danger of resorting to
criminal activities, made easier by the availability of weapons. Alternatives should not focus on
institutionalization of the child. Institutions should provide temporary relief and stay for a child
and ultimately should last for a short period of time.
• Different Approaches According to the

Age of the Child: The age of children at
the time of their recruitment, the length of
time they associated with the military, and
the roles they carried out will be important
in assessing how the conflict affected them
and how best to reintegrate them into
civil society. Although age is important
when considering specific reintegration
programmes, it might not always be
possible to address their needs through
A Uruguayan soldier tries to secure the helipad as UN
activities implemented within the broader assistance and reinforcements land in South Kivu. The town
population of children affected by war. The was to be placed under safe haven status in order for the UN
to assist in getting the population to safety. 1 June 2004. UN
most important thing is for these CAAFAG to
Photo #65451 by Yasmina Bouziane.
develop a sense of identity not associated
with their previous military lives.
• Gender-Specific Healing: The situation of female former CAAFAG is especially difficult to

address because of the “conspiracy of silence” which frequently surrounds their participation in
conflict. This will ultimately affect the way in which they can effectively re-adapt and reintegrate
into normal society. It is difficult for most families and communities to accept that their daughters
and sisters were fighters. In addition to this, it is especially difficult for families to confront the
62
sexual nature of many girls’ experiences in war, as many were abused sexually in addition to
experiencing war-related violence. DDRPs should make it a priority for their reintegration to
monitor those girls who do not reunify with their families and help them to engage in positive
activities for their economic security. In many cases, it is culturally inappropriate and difficult
for them to establish themselves in the community without a family. DDRPs should also
focus attention on family planning education, household education, and basic survival skills.
Programmes could establish groups of girls in the same situation to provide an outlet for their
common experiences, concerns, and trauma.
A blind university student walks

with his white cane at the Sudanese
Association for Disabled People in El
Fasher, North Darfur. The association
assists people with disabilities across
the Darfur region. 1 December 2013.
UN Photo #572922 by Albert González
Farran.
• Education: Their unwillingness to return to school can affect the extent former CAAFAG
take advantage of educational opportunities. They may believe it takes too much effort to
catch up on lost time. Staff must make it clear to these children that education and economic
opportunities are inextricably linked. They must note the importance of re-establishing any form
of educational system, as it provides an environment where the child can gain cultural literacy,
which allows the child to develop a sense of social responsibility.
• Job Skills: This is part of the educational process where the CAAFAG are taught a specific
trade, along with management skills and a knowledge of human rights and relations. The debate
regarding the acquisition of job skills by former CAAFAG stems from the question of whether they
should join vocational training courses with adult demobilized soldiers or whether DDRPs should
establish special courses for children. Apprenticeships with existing businesses and combining
skills and education with guidance and supervision are a useful option but could lead to abuse
if not properly supervised and monitored. Another model is non-formal skill training that is
carried out within the community and by the family to teach the children skills traditionally
associated with providing for the family’s economic security. Evaluation may be difficult as there
is no specific entry requirement. However, most observers deem such programmes to be cost-
effective and activities learned relate to the local situation. Official vocational training may have
drawbacks. Their entry requirements may include basic literacy and an understanding of the
national language. In addition, they may cost money and children may be intimidated by elders.
For further information, see UN IDDRS chapter 5.30 and the webpages for UNICEF and Save
the Children.
63
Section 2.9 Disabled XCs

Combat injuries are a significant factor in any conflict. Modern weapons systems wound many more
combatants then they kill. These wounds range from minor flesh wounds that heal well to a broad range
of disabilities resulting from the loss or abnormality of physical, anatomical, or psychological structure
or function. The needs of disabled XCs at the time of demobilization and reintegration in post-conflict
societies are great. They face not only the difficult task of going back to a normal life with a significant
injury but also must do so in a society characterized by economic deprivation and infrastructural decline.
Unfortunately, the experience of the vast majority of disabled combatants in post-conflict countries
is remarkably similar. After fighting for a cause and suffering some form of disability, only a few
receive the requisite medical rehabilitation services, and even fewer receive any form of appropriate
training, employment, resettlement, or compensation. As such, they frequently end up destitute and/
or dependent. This has also occurred in modern “first-world” armies where change has been slow and
often insufficient. To avoid these issues, disabled combatant programmes should include a broad range
of training and employment schemes subject to the range of disabilities in counties emerging from
armed conflict.
According to the ILO:
“The needs of disabled ex-combatants

have usually been viewed as being
primarily medical, although the
provision of medical care and
rehabilitation services, by both
government and non-governmental
facilities and organizations, has often
been unsatisfactory. Problems with
medical care delivery have included
timeliness, access, as well as the
availability of technical aids and
devices. For example, disabled ex- Men at a housing site for XCs with disabilities in Kigali,
during a visit by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Jim
combatants often are confronted by
Yong Kim, President of the World Bank Group. The Rwanda
long delays in obtaining specialized Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC)
medical treatment and equipment, provided support for XCs, who formed cooperatives and
engaged in activities such as shoemaking and handcrafts, in
such as wheelchairs and artificial
efforts for social and economic reintegration. 23 May 2013. UN
limbs. Those suffering psychiatric Photo #551624 by Eskinder Debebe.
problems due to combat trauma have
rarely been able to obtain satisfactory
and long-term care.”14
14) ILO Geneva, “Expert Meeting on the design of Guidelines for Training and Employment of XCs, Harare”.
64
Background on Disabled XCs
A disabled person is defined as “an individual whose prospects of securing, retaining and advancing
in suitable employment are substantially reduced as a result of a duly recognized physical, sensory,
intellectual, or mental impairment.”15 In the case of XCs, they may suffer from a broad range of disabilities
ranging from mild to severe psychosocial and psychological disorders to a host of physical disabilities.
• Psychological disorders: These include those individuals suffering from depression up to

those suffering from PTSD. While some display few if any symptoms and suffer in silence
(often characterized by feelings of worthlessness, insecurity, and nightmares), others become
aggressive and impulsive. Both groups may suffer from alcoholism and drug abuse.
One of the key concerns is that these issues may not be evident in the short term as they may
take a period of time to manifest. The military leadership may be reluctant to submit their
troops to testing to identify psychological disorders. Furthermore, once identified, there may be
little treatment to offer or no means to require those affected to seek any available treatment
• Physical disabilities: These include a

broad range of visible to less tangible
injuries affecting normal activities,
mobility, and ability to work. They
normally include chronic pains and
stiffness up to more serious head/brain
injuries, blindness, and single or multiple
amputations.
Depending on the degree of disability,

disabled combatants may require special
demobilization and reintegration activities.
A disabled Popular Defence Force XC is pictured during the
While generally viewed as part of the
DDR pre-registration exercise in Khartoum, Sudan. 15
combatant population to be demobilized, January 2007. UN Photo #138791 by Fred Noy.
their distinct needs and the high level of
social and political sensitivity given their
situation tend to make them a special case.
This dynamic is heightened since programmes often separate severely disabled combatants from
the other combatants — either willingly or unwillingly — prior to demobilization. This usually results
in separate treatment for the disabled by involved agencies. An immediate effect is occasional
unequal treatment for these two groups.
The disabled combatants believe they deserve the same benefits as their fellow combatants in
addition to special support and compensation for having suffered the most. The disabled may
perceive medical facilities, prosthetic devices, rehabilitation, and pensions as an extra benefit
that should not exclude them from the same benefits received by other troops.
15) ILO Geneva, UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), “Managing disability in the workplace. ILO code of practice Geneva”, (Geneva:
International Labour Organization, 2002). Available from: <http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2002/102B09_340_engl.pdf>.
65
Typical Problems of War for Disabled XCs
• Feel Entitled to More: At the time of demobilization, disabled XCs tend to feel that they
deserve more benefits than other XCs. They perceive themselves as having suffered the most
from the conflict, which therefore entitles them to the most for their sacrifice. They do not wish
to be included with disabled persons and prefer treatment with their former colleagues and
combatants.
• Lack of Community/Family Acceptance: In many cases of successful XC reintegration,

programmes have recognized the central role of the community and family. Disabled XCs may
face situations where their families will not take them in or will accept them but do not have
the means to provide for their economic well-being and stable health. This places the XCs in a
difficult position since employment opportunities will be hard to come by.
• Need Prosthetic Device and Other Special Assistance ‒ Affordability and Local Access:
Some disabilities result from the loss of limbs. Disabled XCs may need prosthetic devices or
specialized medical assistance that they cannot afford. Oftentimes, they cannot access aid
locally because the government or NGOs have not ensured adequate distribution.
• Poverty/Economic Concerns: Given the destructive effects of war on a population at large, on

social bonds, and on infrastructure, it is not surprising that disabled XCs often find themselves
at the low end of the economic spectrum. Inflation often characterizes post-conflict economies.
The money XCs may receive through marginal jobs and/or pensions may have little value,
making maintaining a livelihood and subsistence more challenging. In addition to poverty,
disabled veterans face the daunting task of rebuilding their lives.
• Lack of Basic Educational Skills: Like other demobilized combatants, disabled XCs rarely
completed even the lower levels of education. Common problems for disabled XCs include
low literacy and the inability to speak the national language. This poses a problem for their
successful economic reintegration into society.
• Lack of Marketable/Vocational Skills:

In addition to being illiterate, many
disabled veterans do not possess any skills
that may be helpful to their successful
economic reintegration. This not only bars
them from immediate sources of income
but may also contribute to a feeling of
inferiority. Low self-esteem could couple
with anxiety over not having access to
economic self-betterment and/or worries
about providing for families and children. A woman, who was handicapped in the Darfur conflict,
Most cannot compete against able-bodied participates in a reintegration programme held at the National
Service Camp in Nyala (South Darfur). DDR constituted an
XCs for jobs and skilled work, causing
integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation in Sudan.
them to take marginalized jobs or lose out The work was undertaken by UNAMID. 1 June 2011. UN
on employment opportunities. Photo #474499 by Albert González Farran.
66
• Discrimination ‒ Social and in the Workplace: Disabled combatants may face the problem
of social and workplace discrimination as a result of their disability. This may lead to further
alienation from their communities and families and substantially decrease their chances of
finding economically viable employment. DDRPs should provide communities with instruction
on the reintegration of disabled XCs and also establish a quota system to ensure disabled XCs’
prospects for equal upward mobility.
Special Demobilization Concerns for Disabled XCs
• Special Transportation Needs to and from Assembly Areas or Transit Centres: Severely
disabled XCs may need special transportation to and from the assembly areas or discharge
centres. Before dropping them off, however, DDR staff should make special arrangements with
care givers and the transit centres.
• Health Screening ‒ Identification

of Disabilities, Categorize Type
and Severity, and Recommended
Treatment: Disabled XCs may need
specially trained physicians at assembly
areas or demobilization-discharge
centres to help screen, identify, and
categorize disabilities and to recommend
treatment and follow-up plans. When
setting up programmes that target
specific categories of disabled soldiers, More than 400 XCs from both sides of the long-running
staff should identify where they reside Darfur conflict register at the disarmament and reintegration
exercise run by UNAMID and the North Sudan DDR
and to what category they belong. Once
Commission. 4 July 2011. UN Photo #478447 by Olivier
screened and categorized, it is important Chassot.
for staff to try to return the disabled XC
to their place of residence.
• Eligibility Criteria: DDRPs also face the challenge of establishing criteria for eligibility and
determining which benefits disabled XCs will receive.
• Special Care for Seriously Disabled Prior to Demobilization: Upon encampment and
selection, staff should separate out seriously disabled XCs and provide them with special care
and assistance.
• Locating Family Members and Willing Care Givers: This is a special concern for disabled
XCs since family reunification has proven to speed up the process of reintegration and increase
the likelihood of success. As with other demobilized XCs, family reunification and acceptance
are crucial for their successful reintegration.
• Special Immediate Assistance Packages and Benefits: Normal demobilization programmes

should include disabled XCs as much as possible. They should receive the same benefits given
to all demobilized soldiers in addition to any benefits specific to their disabilities. The existence
of additional programmes for the more severely disabled creates the danger that these
67
programmes will be utilized inappropriately. This could prevent the majority of the disabled who
can and should participate in mainstream programmes and activities from doing so. Special
immediate assistance packages should include prostheses, crutches, and wheelchairs to achieve
the maximum possible mobility. In addition, disabled XCs should have full access to the disability
pension and transportation to selected residences.
Reintegration Programme Options for Disabled XCs
• Meet Needs in General Programmes as Much as Possible: Three practical options appear
possible in countries emerging from conflict: agricultural work, paid employment in infrastructure
construction and rehabilitation, and self-employment in micro and small enterprises. All three
are also options for XCs with disabilities. DDRPs often propose skills training programmes in
order to prepare XCs for civilian work. These include agricultural skills training; rural, non-
farm activities; vocational skills training; and skills training for urban, informal sector self-
employment. When planning such programmes, staff typically assume the target trainees are
not non-disabled, and course trainers rarely include disabled XCs. Planners may not recognize
that individuals with vision, hearing, and mobility impairments are able and want to learn a skill
and be productive.
• Vocational Training: Disabled XCs should

be eligible for vocational and technical
training to ensure the sustainability of their
income and their upward mobility. Many
disabled veterans lack basic educational
and interactive skills, which can hinder
this process. Wherever possible, training
courses need to take into account less
severely disabled XCs. Training and
resettlement activities should integrate
Participants attending an international seminar to share Côte
disabled XCs as much as possible, and
d’Ivoire’s experience in DDR went on a field trip to Bouaké
assistance typically planned for non- to see concrete evidence of the disarmament, resocialization,
disabled demobilized soldiers should training, and reinsertion of XCs. The seminar was organised
by the Ivorian ADDR, UNOCI, and UNDP. Aïchatou
also include them. Such programmes
Mindaoudou Souleymane (left), Special Representative and
could include a special counselling Head of UNOCI, watches a demonstration at a centre for the
activity to allow for the identification of conversion of plastic waste, one of the region’s reintegration
sites for XCs. 6 November 2014. UN Photo #612746 by Abdul
those activities most appropriate to the
Fatai.
physically disabled.
The inclusion of disabled XCs in mainstream vocational skill training programmes and courses
requires orienting vocational instructors on how to assess the vocational interests and capabilities
of prospective disabled trainees. In addition, including selected disabled trainees in mainstream
training course requires that the training facilities are wheelchair-accessible, and those with
vision or hearing impairments should be able to access the content of training.
68
• Education: Most XCs are concerned with economic survival and employment. The lack of access
to education early in life and economic deprivation during the duration of the conflict likely made
disabled XCs reluctant to pursue higher education. Some countries offer special schools for
all disabled persons including XCs. XCs benefit from literacy and basic education programmes
sponsored by national Ministries of Education and NGOs while developing sustainable skills for
their future.
• Meet Needs within Community and Families to the Extent Possible: It is important for
communities and families to meet the needs of their disabled members as much as possible.
Although some families and communities may be reluctant to accept a disabled family member
back into the household, they must learn ways to cope with the new member, the additional
economic consequences, and any adaptations that must to be made.
• Support Community Psychosocial and Health Services: Although post-conflict societies

must rebuild entire political, economic, and social systems, the adequate provision of health care
to disabled XCs is a vital need. Upon demobilization, disabled veterans are in desperate need of
immediate and continued medical attention before they can resume normal lives. Governments
and international agencies should focus on providing relevant aid and assistance to revitalize
the health system and to ensure the provision of doctors, nurses, medical treatments, and
orthopaedic devices.
• Facilitate Acceptance By Families: Personal relationships can be important for XCs facing
life with a disability. Facilitated group discussions can examine the common reactions to loss —
anger, denial, grief, and acceptance. Such discussions can help build self-esteem and help the
XC adapt to their disability with the goals of developing supportive family and social units,
actively participating in community reconstruction, and consciously minimizing dependency on
other family members.
• Family Tracing and Reunification:

Family support is a key factor in successful
reintegration. DDR staff should make
every effort to locate family members
of disabled soldiers. In contrast to non-
disabled soldiers, it may be harder to
successfully reunite disabled veterans with
their families given their greater need for
family support (economic, social, medical,
and emotional). Bearing this in mind,
Community members in Pariak, in Jonglei State of South
agencies and governments should focus
Sudan, engaged in brick-making as part of the pilot phase of
their efforts on establishing family tracing the DDRP. The programme’s pilot phase targeted community
support programmes and programmes for members until the first batch of the demobilized were
discharged from Training Centres. 21 March 2013. UN Photo
families of disabled soldiers. The latter
#545897 by Martine Perret.
could provide education and instruction to
69
families and communities on how to muster their own resources to help the disabled veterans
and themselves. As such, income-generating activities should target families and groups of
disabled XCs to heighten their chances of sustainability and social cohesion through the division
of labour.
• Housing Alternatives to Transit Centres: Housing is important for disabled XCs. One problem
with the provision of housing may be that a programme envisions it as being part of a general
pension. Pensions may not be sufficient to ensure adequate housing facilities that accommodate
different degrees of disability. Some disabled soldiers will not be able to reintegrate into their
family setting. They may have a high level of disability and dependency which necessitates
permanent care, their family may reject them, or they may be unable to locate family members.
Alternatives to transit centres should be created for these individuals. They should take into
consideration the degree of assistance and care required for them.
• Facilitate Access to Health Care: DDRPs usually view the needs of disabled XCs as primarily
medical. However, the provision of medical care and rehabilitation services by both government
and non-government facilities and organizations has often been unsatisfactory. Problems with
medical care delivery have included timeliness, access, and limited availability of technical aids
and devices. For example, disabled XCs often face long delays in obtaining specialized medical
treatment and equipment such as wheelchairs and artificial limbs. Those suffering psychiatric
problems due to combat trauma are rarely able to obtain satisfactory and long-term care.
• Facilitate Access to Prosthetics: It is important to ensure physical rehabilitation for those

disabled soldiers in need. DDRPs should set up orthopaedic centres. Soldiers leaving for areas
without such facilities should receive priority before their departure. The provision of prostheses
upon demobilization should not further delay the process of returning home and resettlement
under the demobilization timetable.
• Counselling for the Disabled Veteran and Family: Not only may disabled veterans suffer
from an obvious physical disability but they may also suffer from depression and lack of self-
esteem as a direct result of their disability and their experiences in conflict. DDRPs should make
adequate counselling available to them. Furthermore, the option of family counselling should
exist. Programmes should assure counselling for families who accept the return of disabled
XCs on how to assist their disabled family member(s) and how to cope with any problems or
complications (such as economic subsistence, adapting home facilities, etc.) that may arise
from their return.
• Pension: The involved governmental and non-governmental agencies should ensure the
provision of lost or missing identification papers (e.g. birth certificates, service cards, etc.)
necessary for the pension application process. They should provide aid and counselling on how
to fill out pension applications in order to increase efficiency and access to pensions. Pensions
should be sufficient to ensure the livelihood of a disabled veteran and his/her family. They
should also take into consideration his or her disability needs such as medical or social services.
DDRPs should consider pensions for disabled veterans as part of the entire benefits package
they receive upon demobilization in addition to the normal pension received by demobilized
soldiers. These programmes can be costly and are often underfunded. Accordingly, linking
70
them to existing programmes such as free or low-cost public transportation, medical care, and
existing educational services may be a useful alternative. DDR practitioners should note that,
despite their often low value, a disability pension can be an important source of income for a
family or household and an important symbolic acknowledgement for the disabled veteran.
Additional Reading on Disabled XCs
• Florence Baingana and Ian Bannon, Integrating Mental Health and Psychosocial Interventions
into World Bank Lending for Conflict Affected Populations; A Toolkit. The World Bank, Conflict
Prevention and Reconstruction, September 2004.
• ILO Geneva, “Expert Meeting on the design of Guidelines for Training and Employment of XCs”.
• UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Available from: <https://www.un.org/

development/desa/disabilities/>.
71
1. What is the difference between 3. What is the definition of a child

participants and beneficiaries to a according to CAAFAG?
DDRP?
A. Any person who joined the fighting under the
A. Participants participate in the programme age of 18 regardless of their current age
and the beneficiaries only get the benefits B. Any person who suffered as part of the
B. Participants get direct benefits from the hostilities under the age of 18
DDRP and beneficiaries get indirect benefits. C. Any person below 18 years of age who is or
C. Participants are those who fought in the who has been recruited or used by an armed
conflict and beneficiaries are those who did force or armed group in any capacity. It does
not fight but received some form of financial not only refer to a child who is taking or has
gain from the conflict taken a direct part in hostilities
D. Participants are entitled to more benefits D. Any person over the age of 18 years of age
than beneficiaries who is or who has been recruited or used
by an armed force or armed group in any
2. The main difference between armed
capacity. It does not only refer to a child
forces and armed groups is that _____.
who is taking or has taken a direct part in
A. armed groups allow dependants to follow
hostilities
them in their campaign while armed forces
are not allowed to live with their families 4. What is the definition of targeted
B. armed groups are mostly composed of assistance?
children and women while armed forces are A. Any assistance that is focused on people who
usually exclusively composed of males were targeted during the conflict
C. armed forces are obliged to respect the rules B. Any assistance that is focused on a specific
of the International Humanitarian Law while group or groups
armed groups are not C. Any assistance that is available for those
D. armed forces are the military organization of who were shot at during a conflict
a state with a legal basis while armed groups D. Any assistance that is focused on people who
are not under the control of the State in did the targeting during a conflict
which they operate
72
5. Which of the following is NOT an actor 8. When should children be released from
that may affect the peace process at the armed forces and armed groups?
international level?
A. Always
A. The UN System B. During a ceasefire or at the end of hostilities
B. Regional organizations C. Whenever they are captured
C. Member States and bilateral partners D. All of the above
D. Town councils
9. Choose the correct statement when it
6. DDR should develop the following comes to reintegrating woman in DDR.
transparent, easily understood, and
A. Women should be forced to return to their
unambiguous eligibility criteria except
previous lives and roles
_____.
B. Women should only be offered employment
A. exclusive selection of male combatants in
training in “typically female jobs”
cases of internal conflicts
C. Women should only be offered employment
B. independent estimates of the number of
training if they are singe and unmarried
members of the armed forces and groups
D. Programmes should be offered which train
C. balance between security and equity
women in fields that would assist their entry
D. weapons and/or ammunition possession
into non-traditional areas
7. Special groups of attention to DDR

10. Which one of the following is not a role
practitioners include all the following
for an ICC?
except _____.
A. They can act as a focal point where children
A. female members of armed forces and groups
in need of reunification can cluster and to
who participated in armed conflict
which foster and biological families can turn
B. boys and girls under the age of 18 recruited
for assistance
into armed forces and groups
B. Serve like a long-term holding centre for
C. refugees fearing persecution in case they do
unaccompanied children
not take the side of one party or the
C. Temporary care and safety of children
other
they perform important logistical and
D. young combatants who have been recruited
administrative functions
as children but who were not demobilized
D. Serve as an initial stable environment for
before they became young adults
gathering further information on the child’s
family, their education, and primary health
care services
Answer Key »
1. B
2. D
3. C
4. B
5. A
6. A
7. C
8. D
9. D
10. B
73
LESSON
Disarmament and Small Arms
3 Control
Disarmament activities
and procedures must be
planned and coordinated
as part of the overall DDR
process.
Section 3.1 Basic Principles of Disarmament • Understand challenges in the implementation of

the protection of civilians (POC) on the ground.
Section 3.2 The Four Main Phases of
Disarmament • Comprehend the process of translating a POC

mandate into a POC operational concept.
Section 3.3 SALW – Weapon Control and
Development • Describe the main elements and three tiers of

POC action.
• Know and explain the POC response phases.
• List peacekeeping activities for different POC

phases.
74
LESSON 3 | Disarmament and Small Arms Control
UNMISS and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) destroyed weapons and ammunition recovered from civilians seeking refuge in the
UNMISS base in Malakal, Upper Nile State. Some 134 weapons and 10,500 rounds of ammunition were disposed of in the exercise.
A majority (108) of the confiscated weapons were AK-47/56 rifles. A view from the exercise of destruction of weapons. 12 December
2014. UN Photo #617061 by JC McIlwaine.
Introduction
After a conflict, communities are often awash in

weapons of every kind and calibre. Additionally, the
armed conflict may have left many weapons in the
battlefield. Mines, explosives, and unexploded ordnance
(UXO) could make even passing through a field a life-
threatening hazard. Once a peace agreement takes
effect, one of the first actions is for fighting forces to
relocate to agreed-upon areas, restricting their mobility
and thus reducing their ability to return to conflict. Doing
so may help initiate some form of weapons control and
even disarmament.
Weapons control is often culturally based. In some

areas, disarmament flies in the face of “gun cultures”
such as in Afghanistan and Chad where having a weapon
is sometimes considered a part of manhood. It is not
the purpose of this lesson to review this important and
75
contextual issue, but rather to point out that it is a significant and context-sensitive issue that should
factor into the overall peace process in some settings.
For many armed groups, declaring their weapons and ammunition is one of the last steps of the
peace process and is normally included as an annex in a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This
should include all weapons. However, a separate section of the CPA normally covers larger weapons
systems, which are brought to cantonment areas under centralized control. Normally, DDR only deals
with small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the ammunition carried by these armed groups.
Like the rest of the DDR process, disarmament

relies on trust between the parties. This trust is
established gradually and phased in, starting with the
unilateral ceasefire followed by a mutual ceasefire
and the ultimate signing of the accord itself. The
initial phases of the peace process typically include
disarmament. However, it is context-specific. In
many cases, it is the first step towards practical
confidence-building between the parties to the
conflict. While it is officially designed to return the
control of weapons to the legitimate authorities,
The DDR Section of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
disarmament can also be a demonstration of intent
(UNOCI), along with its partners, conducted a weapons
towards a more secure society. Combatants require collection in the public square of the Williamsville
assurances of basic security before they will want to neighborhood, in the Adjamé district of Abidjan. 6 June
2012. UN Photo #535692 by Basile Zoma.
surrender their weapons. How security is provided
will vary considerably, but without it disarmament
will not succeed.
The process of planning and coordinating DDR must include disarmament activities and procedures.
It is a sensitive political and practical subject that requires a clear understanding of the local context as
well as strong practical planning and technical skills. Disarmament planning requires technical assistance
and advice from well-trained weapons and ammunition experts to ensure safe handling; collection;
registration; storage; and destruction of weapons, explosives, and ammunition, as appropriate. There
are national and international standards for these procedures (for example, <www.smallarmsstandards.
org/isacs> as well as UN IDDRS 4.10 and others), and they normally require specific safe and secure
areas and trained Explosive Ordnance and Disposal (EOD) teams.
Additionally, a small arms survey may be needed to properly indicate the scope and number of
weapons in the society for future civilian SALW collection programmes. SALW management usually
consists of a broader national disarmament and weapons control process, but acts at the local level
to ensure consistency. This process aims to raise awareness of the negative consequences of arms
possession and misuse and emphasizes the benefits of weapons control in reducing the number of
arms-related accidents. It also normally includes a strong technical component to manage and control
weapons as they are being securely stored or voluntarily surrendered as part of this process. It might
include a broad range of weapons accounting protocols, safe and secure storage (including dual-key
systems for local storage), building/upgrading storage facilities, registration and marking, tagging,
databases, and a common or centralized destruction procedure as appropriate.
76
Military personnel of UNOCI compile

the weapons collected during the
disarmament of the militia groups.
19 May 2007. UN Photo #325568 by
Basile Zoma.
Definitions
»» “The term ‘disarmament’ refers to the collection,

documentation, control, and disposal of small arms,
ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of
combatants, and often of the civilian population, as well.
Disarmament should also include the development of
responsible national arms management programmes.”1
»» “Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) refers to all

conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual
or light vehicle. These are weapons that do not require an
extensive logistical and maintenance capability. Small arms
include pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, machine guns, and
ammunition. Light weapons (in addition to small arms) include
small calibre cannons, grenades and mines, anti-tank weapons,
anti-tank mines, shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, and
ammunition and mortars up to 100mm.”2
Section 3.1 Basic Principles of Disarmament

A peace agreement is often the vehicle for initiating disarmament. The agreement will specify the timing
and scope of disarmament. Disarmament is normally undertaken quickly, as the agreement could unravel.
However, the process could occur though phasing or by locking up some or all of the weapons under neutral
supervision. Regardless of the circumstance, planning and executing the process requires sufficient time.
If planners allocate insufficient time to prepare adequately, it could result in a flawed disarmament process
and new violence. Enforcing compliance with arms agreements is a major issue of disarmament, and failure
to do so often hinders the peace process.
1) United Nations, “OG 4.10: Disarmament” in Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS),
124 (2014). Available from: <http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>.
2) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts, (New York and Geneva: United Nations 1995), 2.
Available from: <http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/small-arms-and-intra-state-conflicts-238.pdf>.
77
The parties must also reach an agreement on the procedures to follow. Procedural aspects of an
agreement might include:
• Declaring the number and type of weapons;
• The sequence of disarmament and extent

to which the other side can challenge
inspect it;
• The ratio or proportion of forces to be

disarmed at each stage in the process (this
is important to prevent unevenly matched
forces from taking advantage of a sudden
change in the balance of military power);
and Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(FARDC) personnel, and the Front for National Integration
• The technical issues, including risk
(FNI) militia commanders negotiate to reach an agreement
and hazards of transporting, handling, concerning the disarmament process in the Ituri region,
collection, storage, supervision, and the Doi, Democratic Republic of Congo. 27 November 2006. UN
Photo #133142 by Martine Perret.
final disposition of weapons.
All of these issues form the nucleus planners build on to initiate and finalize the key components of
a disarmament plan.
There is the additional concern as to what qualifies as a weapon. Rifles and pistols normally have
simple definitions, but how should DDRPs differentiate homemade or artisanal weapons or old and rusted
weapons? Normally, disarmament programmes collect all weapons regardless of age or functionality, as
different pieces of non-functioning or older weapons can be combined to create a serviceable or artisanal
weapon. DDR practitioners should discuss these issues, along with the sensitive issues of ammunition and
explosives, during the lead-up to the peace accord. If this is not done, they should convene a technical
committee. Some common sense must apply during these discussions: a rifle with no ammunition or
magazines is an item with little use. The same applies to a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher with
no rockets or bombs — it has little use. As such, disarmament programmes should consider the concept of
a “weapons system” or soldiers’ “combat load” (e.g. weapon multiplied by the numbers of full magazines
of ammunition, grenades, or mortar bombs) for collection as part of the weapons criteria and for eligibility
for disarmament benefits.
Disarmament measures in affected countries should also link to regional agreements about trade in
light weapons in order to prevent a sudden outpouring of cheap weapons from destabilized neighbouring
areas. Regional agreements are useful. Policing porous borders is a different issue. New sources of
supplies for guerrilla movements in Guatemala and Honduras were by-products of the agreements in
the neighbouring countries of Nicaragua and El Salvador. Similar issues have occurred in West Africa,
sometimes brought on by the very procedures designed to collect weapons. As Professor Alpaslan
Özerdem of the University of Coventry pointed out, those turning in weapons received some $300 worth
of benefits in Liberia, while weapons surrendered in Côte d’Ivoire garnered $900 worth of benefits —
due in large measure to the higher cost of living. Weapons can become a post-conflict commodity, and
staff must understand this to avoid any undue problems or hardships.3
3) Alpaslan Özerdem, Post War Recovery: Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris. 2009), 27.
78
Section 3.2 The Four Main Phases of Disarmament

Disarmament is a highly technical issue and programmes must plan it in a way that ensures safe
and secure procedures are established and followed. While these may vary according to the context,
there are well-established international guidelines as indicated in the UN IDDRS:
“The disarmament component of a DDR programme should usually consist of four main phases:
• Information collection and operational planning;
• Weapons collection or retrieval operations;
• Stockpile management;
• Destruction.”4
Each phase contains a number of recommended specific components, which the following matrix
summarizes:
Serial Phase Components

1. Information collection and • Team selection and structure
operational planning • Eligibility criteria
• Weapons survey
• Risk assessment
• DDR awareness (sensitization)

2. Weapons collection or retrieval • Pick-up points (PUPs)
• Weapons collection points (WCPs)
• Disarmament sites
• Weapons registration and accounting
• EOD support
3. Stockpile management • Security
• Weapons storage
• Ammunition storage
4. Destruction • Weapons destruction
• Ammunition destruction
Information Collection and Operational Planning
Once an agreement sets the scene at the international level, planning at the national level (or within
a UN mission headquarters) must reconcile the continuing conflict between the interests of the parties.
If not already included in the agreement, mission headquarters must resolve the creation of a timeline,
sequencing of events, weapons surveys, hand-in policies, location, funding, and safety and security
as part of the information collection process. This process takes time and relies on the cooperation of
the parties to the conflict. The peacekeepers handling the disarmament and the armed groups must
4) United Nations, “OG 4.10: Disarmament” in Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS),
124 (2014). Available from: <http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>.
79
A stockpile of disposed UXOs. The

United Nations Military Observers of
the Juba team site, from UNMIS, take
part in a bilateral exercise with the
Joint Integrated Units Sudanese Armed
Forces (JIU SAF) to assess the quantity
and eventual destruction of UXOs as the
disarmament process begins in Sudan.
10 November 2006. UN Photo #134572
by Tim McKulka.
establish confidence in each other; neutral observers must exchange and verify information; and
documents must be prepared for the safe collection, storage, and eventual disposal of the weapons.
The disarmament process needs to be transparent because parties may not be honest when yielding
their weapons. Planning at the mission level must concentrate on fostering conditions of security in
which weapons are no longer seen as the only guarantor of security. If an international force is to
provide security in disarmament sites, then the programme must establish clear procedures to guarantee
safety, control, sustainability, replicability, and legitimacy in the eyes of all parties. Public information
campaigns and amnesty provisions can also condition expectations and encourage individual soldiers
to report on arms caches and other attempts to violate agreements. Disarmament programmes require
solid mechanisms and strong support of all parties to deal with violations in order to prevent a return
to conflict.
Planning teams should be aware of the specifics of the conflict, understand its roots, and factor in
the issue of “gun culture” (if appropriate) to help initiate effective planning guidance. Concerted public
information campaigns to advocate the need for collection and safe storage of weapons can significantly
increase the numbers of weapons turned in during a disarmament process. Engaging with local and
national leaders will also be important in persuading people to give up weapons.
One factor to consider is the issue of proportional disarmament. If a DDRP disarms two or more
forces, then proportional disarmament is highly encouraged to avoid giving the military advantage to
one side or group. This is normally done during negotiations, and parties agree to established guidelines
at the strategic level. Planners must keep this in mind during the execution phase, as poor or delayed
disarmament can be disastrous. An example of this is when a small force surrenders a large proportion
of its units early on but retains its best units to the end. By doing so, it might gain an advantage over a
large force disarming units proportionally. Clear sequencing and good communication are critical to help
ensure that parties follow the guidelines, and a strong conflict resolution mechanism will help prevent
any conflict.
80
Weapons Survey
A weapons survey helps to answer vital planning questions early. How many weapons are there?
Who is expected to turn in weapons, and how do you know when you have them all? Who controls
weapons outside the army (for example, police and special police or gendarmes)? Where are there
pockets of heavily-armed people who might become bandits or security threats? Where are the heavy
weapon stocks and what is expected to happen to them? The parties to the conflict should declare their
weapons stocks as part of the peace process. However, UNMOs or reconnaissance units of a deployed
force may play a role in answering these questions. Since access is often difficult at the outset, the UN
Arms Registry might be a useful planning starting point to guide first-hand reconnaissance. However,
keep in mind that weapons smuggling typically ignores documentation. The turn-in policy must address
what constitutes a weapon (e.g. a functioning firearm manufactured in this century), what to do with
unserviceable weapons and components, and offer clear guidance on who is responsible for unit and
formation heavy weapons.
Public information and Weapon Collection
The importance of the public information dimension of the disarmament and weapons management
process cannot be overstated. It is essential that XCs know their rights and obligations if they are to act
in accordance with them. Similarly, experts must create understanding and support for the disarmament
and weapons management measures aimed at armed groups and individuals outside the formal DDR
process, as well as members of the public in general. Both the combatants as well as the general public
need to be aware of the particulars of the process in order to maintain transparency. With that said, the
process requires some degree of confidentiality, especially with respect to the movement of arms and
ammunition, in order to avoid problems from other armed groups or organized crime.
Public information can also help build

confidence in the overall process. Confidence in all Information programmes »
aspects of security is a key issue in disarmament. • For confidence-building and increased
People will turn in their weapons if they feel they no transparency;
longer need them. Incentives will also encourage
• To reduce misinformation and false
people to turn in their weapons, especially if what
expectations; and
programmes offer in return is worthwhile. Lastly,
• To improve attitudes and show progress
all forms of weapon collection and disarmament
in peace.
strategy require good security. All sides must see
the benefits of reduced weapons in society and feel Topics to include:
they are involved and informed for disarmament
• Disarmament steps as part of the overall
to be successful.
DDR process;
Confidence-Building Measures • Political and peace process progress;
The following measures can enhance the • Laws, regulations, sites, and schedules
confidence of individual soldiers in the DDR of the DDR process; and
process: buffer zones, secure corridors, mutual • Security situation.

observation, communications, and dual key
Methods: TV and Radio, Pamphlets, Briefings
procedures.
81
Impartial observers agreed to by both sides or UN Military Observers (UNMO) and/or UN forces
can oversee buffer zones separating the former warring factions. Liaison officers from the factions can
help ensure that the buffer zone is being respected. When possible, the separation of forces should be
adequate to provide realistic warning. Troops can move with the help of mobile escorts providing secure
corridors or by routes that representatives of the warring factions have reconnoitred and approved. For
the larger camps and weapons cantonment areas, it is useful to have liaison officers from the factions
each observing the other’s sites. Mutual observation enhances confidence in the weapons destruction
process.
Effective communication is essential to the success of observation and liaison measures. If the
factions lack adequate communications abilities, they may rely on UNMOs or UN force communications,
or the programme might provide them with radio or satellite telephone communications to coordinate
their compliance with the disarmament provisions. The programme should provide translation where
necessary so that all communications are transparent — both to international observers and the factions
involved.
Temporary storage in shipping containers under a dual key procedure (one key for observers and
the other for the faction) can be a step between giving up weapons and relinquishing control of all
access to the weapons. In remote camps, programmes may use sea containers or truck-trailers to
collect weapons; the containers are secure and easily locked and guarded. At an early stage, some
members of the disarming forces may be allowed to keep a few of their weapons for personal or VIP
security and to help guard the containers. Both UN observers and the on-site faction commander retain
a key to the container so that either can open it — for inspection only and in the presence of the other.
These procedures were used effectively in El Salvador and in Croatia (1993). Programmes normally
use concentric rings of security from both government and guerrilla forces around this area to ensure
mutual confidence and prevent any unauthorized access to the weapons and to help guarantee the
safety of disarmed troops.
Collection, Storage, and Disposition of Weapons
The collection of weapons may occur in several

forms including: weapons incentive programmes;
weapon surrender incentive programmes;
voluntary surrender; and forced collection by the
military, civilians, police, or other agencies. The
preferred method is voluntary surrender, but in
unstable or insecure situations, people are less
willing to surrender their weapons. They may be
scared and want their weapons in case a new
conflict erupts. Disarmament programmes can be
crucial first steps to help demonstrate that a conflict
Peter Karim, Commander of the FNI, participated in a
is over. They are a key public relations point and follow-up meeting, sponsored by MONUC, on the ongoing
programmes should conduct them ceremoniously negotiation to disarm FNI combatants and integrate them
into the FARDC. 17 November 2006. UN Photo #133058 by
depending on the context of the conflict. The CPA
Martine Perret.
will normally stipulate the timeline, location, and
82
the types and numbers of weapons to be surrendered as part of a collective disarmament. Individual
disarmament often begins with old or unserviceable weapons including shotguns and hunting rifles
depending on the confidence in the process. Once people feel more secure and that there will not be a
recurrence of conflict, better and newer military-style weapons may appear for collection. Staff should
collect every weapon upon surrendering, as many parts from modern weapons are interchangeable,
and an individual or group could make serviceable weapons from the parts of non-functioning weapons.
Disarmament programmes should not use weapon buy-backs. They create a market for weapons
and may actually cause an increase in weapons in the area, as some citizens may trade for arms to sell
them to buy-back programmes and make a profit. Incentive programmes are a possibility, especially in
poorer societies where food and jobs are in short supply. Exchanging weapons for development, where
communities receive funds and choose how to apply them (e.g. towards a clinic, school, or market)
have worked in some contexts. Innovative ideas such as lotteries for weapons, in which people receive
tickets towards non-monetary benefits, education, skills training, technology, or cars, have had some
limited success (Croatia 1992–2002 and Macedonia 2003).5 Weapons amnesties, which allow the public
to turn in weapons without fear of prosecution, can work but are more a post-conflict SALW collection
process than a DDR tool. In each case, proper understanding of the local dynamics is key. Lastly, forced
collection of weapons is difficult to enforce, dangerous to conduct, and should only be used as a last
resort. It is often difficult for programmes to decide who enforces the collection because no civilian
police, military, or international forces wish to be seen as the enemy.
Weapons are tools for life in conflict and post-conflict societies. Economically, weapons provide a
means to provide security, to exert pressure on people, and even to make a living by turning to crime.
On a social level, arms are often seen as a status symbol and a part of belonging within the community.
Security and cultural issues can also be at play here. All of these factors make it difficult to do away
with SALW. Programmes must establish significant incentives in the form of non-monetary benefits,
rebuilding programmes, and confidence-building measures to effectively substitute for weapons in
these various areas.
Connection with other programmes may aid in weapon collection. For example, programmes often
match demobilization with disarmament and conduct them back-to-back in the same location or en
route to a demobilization site by tying turning in a weapon to the reinsertion package of returning to
society. Part of XCs’ transition during the DDR process and reintegration into society is giving up their
tools of war. Other integrated programme possibilities may include land and/or small loan packages in
exchange for weapons. Programmes can also couple re-education classes with disarmament procedures.
In cases such as El Salvador, where many child soldiers who grew up during the conflict, providing a
new alternative way to live is one of the best routes to encourage disarmament. If people no longer feel
a need for the weapons, they will turn them in.6
Weapons Storage
DDRPs may store weapons after collection instead of destroying them for several reasons. The lack
of ability, proper equipment, or political will to destroy the weapons may necessitate at least temporary
storage. Sometimes the decision to destroy the weapons will depend on whether the weapons are
5) Nicholas Wood, “Swap Guns For Prizes? Few Comply In Macedonia”, The New York Times, December 14, 2003, accessed 15 Jan 2016. Available from:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/14/world/swap-guns-for-prizes-few-comply-in-macedonia.html>.
6) Cornelis Steenken, personal observation from ONUSAL.
83
allocated for conversion and/or redistribution to local military or civilian police forces. In the interim,
weapons storage may be necessary.
Considerations for storage include the duration and the security of the storage facility. As indicated
earlier, shipping containers are simple, secure, and easily obtained almost everywhere in the world.
Adding some form of perimeter security, a double lock system, and a good registry makes an easily
controlled system for the storage of weapons.
Ammunition and explosives are a more challenging issue, as safe and secure storage is critical.
In both cases, international guidelines for control, security, and handling of weapons, ammunition,
and explosives exist and are accessible through the UN International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
(IATG)7 or International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS)8. Ammunition is generally safe, but it
must not be stored with the weapons. On the other hand, explosives may be unstable and are normally
destroyed in place or in safe areas so as not to pose a further threat to people or the process.
In terms of security, there are several possibilities. First is security and storage provided by local
civilian police. This may seem logical, but it may not be ideal. The police may have been parties to
the conflict and could be corrupt or have an interest in one side of a conflict. Second is the idea of
commercial contracting of security. This raises the question of who gets hired, how they are screened,
and who pays for the programme. The final — and often best — possibility is the use of an external
independent military presence as security at all phases of disarmament.
Weapons Destruction
Programmes for the destruction of SALW must take into consideration many factors, including
safety, cost, effectiveness, and the verification of destruction. In most cases, it is harder to make the
decision to destroy the weapons than the actual destruction itself.
Weapons destruction is not only a practical

method of disarmament, but also a symbolic gesture.
In many conflicts, involving high level officials from
all sides in a public destruction of weapons can help
convince citizens that the transition from war to
peace has begun.
Methods used for the destruction of SALW cover

a range of possibilities, from simply making the
weapon non-functional to its complete destruction.
The easiest methods are cutting with trained teams On 10 February 2015, MINUSCA, with the support of
using oxy-acetylene torches and/or electric grinders Sangaris, carried out a military operation to ensure
freedom of movement in Bria. The operation against the
running off generators. Metal, wood, and plastic can
ex-Séléka and in support of State authority restoration
be recycled. There are other methods to consider resulted several weapons seized. Pictured: Seized
where technologically feasible, such as smelting, weapons of ex-Séléka rebels. 11 February 2015. UN Photo
#622479 by Nektarios Markogiannis.
crushing, shredding, and breaking.9
7) Available from: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard>.

8) Available from: <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs>.
9) For greater details, see <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0550-en.pdf>.
84
Section 3.3 SALW – Weapon Control and Disarmament
Weapons Registration
Civilian authorities normally conduct SALW after DDRPs when there is more security in the country.
Procedures should complement or build upon the former disarmament programmes. Weapon registration
is normally a first step in the process. Registration can help people feel secure knowing they can keep
some of their weapons and can help civilian police forces know relatively how many weapons are
in a given area. Comparing the number of weapons collected to the registry is a particularly useful
measurement of success for disarmament campaigns.
Registration is a simple process that requires accurate information collection and sufficient personnel.
It does not require a large amount of equipment or storage, but security is paramount. The problem
with weapons registration is similar to those of most weapons control techniques — people may not
want to come forward. Local authorities must put forth assurances that security is not a problem and
that registering implies amnesty — the weapons will not be seized and people turning them in will not
be prosecuted. Incentives are often used to encourage registration. They range from positive incentives
like food and non-monetary benefits to negative consequences like harsh laws and forced seizure of
weapons.
Registering weapons allows for the recording of weapons’ serial numbers into an inventory to track
their future usage and trade. This helps increase transparency and implement controls. Authorities
can track weapons to their place of origin through military and police databases to help limit future
unauthorized transfers.
Weapon Redistribution
Weapon redistribution is a tricky area in post-conflict peacebuilding. Irregular forces may resent
turning over their weapons to their former enemies. This is especially true where there was no clear
winner in the conflict. Not destroying weapons also leaves them available for use in possible future
conflicts. To avoid complications such as the disappearance and smuggling of returned weapons or
extended storage periods, a timetable for redistribution is necessary. Authorities must monitor the
concentration and distribution of SALW to ensure that the disarmament is a long-term process and XCs
are not inadvertently re-armed. Of primary concern here is the implementation and monitoring of the
process by a neutral party.
Practice of Disarmament: Supply and Demand
There are several factors responsible for the accumulation of SALW: earlier supply during the Cold
War; internal conflicts; competition for commercial markets; criminal activity; and the collapse of
governmental law and order, giving citizens an excuse to arm themselves.
85
Economic Considerations
The economics of supply and demand work from both sides — those producing the arms and those
buying them. Suppliers encourage the proliferation of weapons because it is their business. Buyers
are plentiful and need weapons to fight conflicts, maintain criminal networks, and “provide security” in
war-torn nations. It is this last consideration that often hinders the disarmament process the most, as
people feel they must provide for their own security and are unwilling to give up their weapons if they
feel threatened.
Many factors influence the supply of weapons to a region. The same countries and corporations
also sell off old stocks of weapons. The end of the Cold War resulted in massive arms and ammunition
stockpiles being plundered and sold to feed intra-State conflicts. Weak international control allowed
weapons smugglers to buy and sell large quantities of both arms and ammunition, which they easily
transported by air, land, and sea to a range of unscrupulous rebel groups, leaders, and dictators. While
these groups did not obtain all of these weapons illegally, the current influence of organized crime, black
markets, and corruption continues the proliferation of weapons, making the purchase of small arms and
light weapons all too easy.
Demand for weapons is often a necessity.

Most of the weapons trade happens in societies
already involved in conflict. In a state of conflict,
there is an obvious demand for weapons. Security
is a primary issue in a conflict society. This often
results in an arms race scenario with all involved
parties trying to ensure they have more than
their opponents. These societies often maintain
a culture of violence after a conflict, which also
influences the demand for weapons.
The balance of supply and demand

determines the price and availability of weapons.
Price and availability also influence disarmament UNMISS destroyed 25 firearms and hundreds of knives,
machetes, and similar weapons confiscated from IDPs
strategies. Providing security and programmes to
living in its POC sites in Juba at a 9 December 2014 public
stabilize the region decreases demand. As such, event held in its Tomping compound. Over 1,500 rounds of
lowering the need for weapons is essential. On ammunition recovered from IDPs were detonated near the
community of Nyolo, south of Juba, the following day. Similar
the level of supply, destroying weapons instead
weapons and ammunition destruction events were scheduled
of stockpiling them eliminates future threats. to be held later in the month at UNMISS bases in Malakal,
Certain weapons and weapon trades/transfers Nassir, Wau, Bentiu and Bor. A view of the confiscated
weapons. 9 December 2014. UN Photo #615719 by Isaac
may be banned (i.e. cluster bombs, mines,
Billy.
and blinding laser devices), while others are
monitored with a strict programme of controls.
86
Conclusion
In an uncertain and conflict-ridden post-Cold War world, small arms and light weapons proliferation
contributes to thousands of deaths and poses a significant problem within the peace process. Addressing
this problem requires disarmament programmes. Disarmament programmes provide incentives that
compensate for the things that people otherwise achieve by possessing weapons: security, economic
stability, and social status. To accomplish this, disarmament programmes often join with other
programmes, such as providing retraining, education, or even small loan packages for XCs to re-
establish themselves. Authorities can enact laws and enforce them in order to specify carry, use, or
even surrender of all weapons. Proper education and disarmament programmes are a simple way to
save lives.
87
1. The four phases of disarmament are 5. What are some of the confidence-
_____. building mechanisms for disarmament?
A. cantonment, weapons collection, stockpile A. Buffer zones, secure corridors, mutual
management, and destruction of landmines observation, communications, and dual key
B. information gathering, weapons collection, procedures
stockpile management, and weapons B. Open communications, mutual observation,
destruction single key security, and buffer zones
C. selection of safe equipment, stockpile C. Buffer zones, mutual observation, periodic
management, weapons collection, and verification, and no security
promotion of anti-SALW programmes D. Presence of a neutral third party, weak
D. cantonment, stockpile management, sale of political presence, and insecurity
unused weapons, and weapons destruction
of selected items 6. Weapon buy-backs should not normally
be used. Why not?
2. What are small arms and light weapons A. Organized crime may make too much money
(SALW)? B. Buy-back programmes may create a market
A. Weapons that are small and light enough to for weapons and may cause an actual
be carried by vehicles increase in weapons in the area
B. All conventional weapons that can be carried C. The government does not have the ability to
by an individual or light vehicle purchase all the weapons
C. All weapons up to calibre 120 mm D. It is illegal to buy weapons from former
D. All weapons with an explosive warhead less combatants
than 50kg
7. At the weapons collection point, what
3. Who normally provides security at a happens to unsafe ammunition?
disarmament site? A. It is immediately transported to the storage
A. Military and police area
B. Police and security guards B. It is given back to the XC for recycling
C. Armed groups themselves C. It is treated for future recycling and use
D. Depends on the context of the conflict and D. It is identified and selected for immediate
the role of the security forces in the conflict destruction
4. How are larger weapons systems 8. Which weapons are collected at the
covered in a peace process? weapons collection point?
A. They are turned over to the government and A. Only military-style weapons
sold B. Any and all weapons that are handed in
B. They are destroyed by both parties under C. Only serviceable weapons
mutual supervision D. Only hunting rifles and shotguns
C. They are put into a safe compound under
mutual supervision
D. They are normally included in the CPA and
will be context-specific
88
9. What are some of the conditions that 10. Why is a weapons registration
prevent the collection of weapons? programme important?
A. Insecurity, lack of confidence in the process, A. To know the exact number and status of
ability and presence of the security forces each weapon
B. Lack of confidence in the process, effective B. To provide control and accountability over
security forces the weapons
C. Monetary value of the weapon, good C. To be able to track a weapon from handover
transport options, and insecurity to eventual destruction
D. Bad weather, poor roads, and good security D. All of the above
at the weapons site
Answer Key »
1. B
2. B
3. D
4. D
5. A
6. B
7. D
8. B
9. A
10. D
89
LESSON
4 Demobilization
This overview describes

the process of
demobilization through
which soldiers become
civilians.
UN Photo #171898 by Steen Johansen.
Section 4.1 Approaches to Demobilization • Understand the demobilization process.
Section 4.2 Planning and Preparation • Describe the different steps of demobilization.
Section 4.3 Conduct of Demobilization • Understand the reinsertion process.
Section 4.4 Camp Support and Internal • Describe the different options available for
Programming remobilization.
Section 4.5 Information Campaigns to Help
Expectations Management and
Support to Demobilization
Section 4.6 The Moment of Demobilization
(Discharge)
Section 4.7 Reinsertion
90
LESSON 4 | Demobilization
People watch the Darfur Drama actors perform at El Srief (North Darfur). The DDR outreach activity was organized by UNAMID and
supported by UNDP, UNICEF, the North Sudan DDR Commission, and the local NGO FPDO. 25 July 2011. UN Photo #480961 by Albert
González Farran.
Introduction
This overview describes the process of

demobilization through which soldiers become civilians.
Demobilization is a highly technical and controlled
phase that programmes must implement in a consistent
manner throughout the DDR process in a country.
Simply stated, it is the reverse of mobilization, which
took civilians and civilian assets and converted them
to military employment. Demobilization returns the
combatants — men, women, and children — to civilian
life, and returns military assets to civilian use and/or
destroys them. Demobilization begins with a period
of preparation during which DDR staff concurrently
pursue negotiations, planning, assessment of needs,
and gathering of resources. Conducting demobilization
involves maintaining the confidence of soldiers,
security, and supply, whether it be in camps, assembly
91
or cantonment areas, or in their community holding locations while the DDR process is planned, initiated,
and conducted in accordance with the peace agreement. The moment when soldiers are “demobilized”
occurs at the time officers cease to control formed bodies of troops. This may coincide with their
discharge from the armed group and the issuing of discharge certificates. DDR practitioners should aim
to manage a smooth transition between demobilizing soldiers and subsequently reintegrating them into
a civilian society and economy.
Demobilization definition
According to the UN IDDRS:
“Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active

combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The
first stage of demobilization may comprise the processing of
individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of
troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites,
encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage
of demobilization encompasses the support assistance provided
to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.”1
Section 4.1 Approaches to Demobilization

While practitioners must adjust each demobilization process to the context of the conflict,
programmes normally choose between two distinct approaches to demobilization. The first approach
calls for encamping or cantoning the various groups into zones or areas where it is easier to control,
structure, and verify what is going on. It also allows for the use of economies of scale and simplifies
the logistical component, which can help reduce overall programme costs. The second approach leaves
the groups where they are and brings the process to them — either through mobile demobilization
teams or by conducting the demobilization in the communities where they already are. Each approach
has advantages and limitations, and both are context-specific. The first approach may be easier for
programmes to control, while the latter may allow for better community participation — but may face
difficulty in breaking the chain of command. The CPA and context of the country shape both approaches,
and they both depend on a host of other issues that DDR programmes (DDRPs) should consider during
the negotiations before the peace agreement is signed. Some factors that DDR practitioners should
consider include: the security concerns, history, nature, and length of the conflict; relative strengths
and weaknesses of the armed groups; geography; funding; gender concerns; and their capacity to
implement the process.
It must be pointed out that putting or confining troops in a set area or cantonment/assembly area
is not by itself demobilization. For demobilization to occur, programmes must follow and adhere to a set
process in a set time period with the intent to demilitarize the conflict.
1) Secretary-General’s Note, A/C.5/59/31, 24 May 2005.
92
Section 4.2 Planning and Preparation
Preconditions
A comprehensive peace agreement is often the vehicle for initiating the peace process, and it will
outline many of the details of the DDR component, such as timing and scope. DDR is often one of the
last items agreed to, but the first component conducted in order to stabilize an area. If the DDRP is not
implemented quickly, the agreement runs the risk of unravelling. A flawed demobilization process could
result in new violence if authorities do not allow sufficient time for adequate preparation. This problem
lends urgency to the DDR process. In some countries, authorities put the XC into a holding pattern,
also called Interim Stabilization Methods (ISM2), to give the process more time for planning before
implementation. While a peace agreement will not include all the details, it should include annexes
indicating in broad strokes who will develop the DDRP and how, and detailed procedures to follow,
including a timeline for the overall process. Some of the procedural aspects of an agreement might
include the following:
• Disarmament may precede demobilization,

but in the event of a weaponized culture, it
could be delayed or only partially completed.
• The type and sequencing of a demobilization

process and the extent to which the other
side can challenge or inspect it or a neutral
third party can supervise it.
• The ratio or proportion of forces to

demobilize at each stage in the process (this
is important to prevent unevenly matched
forces from taking advantage of a sudden
change in the balance of military power). A close-up of weapons retrieved from rebels by MONUSCO
in coordination with UNMAS shortly before they were
• The disposition of weapons and destroyed, in Goma, North Kivu. 26 October 2012. UN
arrangements for their supervision. Photo #533415 by Sylvain Liechti.
• Modalities for conflict resolution

(commissions, committees, etc.).
Planning at the National Level
Once the agreement sets the scene at the international level, planning at the national level (or
at mission headquarters) must reconcile the continuing conflict between the interests of the parties.
Sequencing, surveys, procedures, and dispute and conflict resolution methodology, as well as the
key issues of funding and implementation, are some of the issues that the government or mission
headquarters/other organization managing the overall DDR process must resolve.
Once the authorities agree to guidelines at the strategic level, planners must develop clear, easily
replicable guidance for the entire process. Joint development of a timeline is critical and should include
clear details concerning sequencing of disarmament and demobilization of both forces, as well as a
2) Nat Colletta, Jens Samuelson, Hannes Baerts, Interim Stabilization, Folke Bernadotte Academy Sweden 2008. Available from: <www.fba.se>.
93
People of Bopolu, Gbarpolu County, listen

to UNMIL’s disarmament, demobilization,
rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR)
programme team’s briefing. The team
visited the region to inform XCs about its
programme. 7 February 2004. UN Photo
#30528 by M Novicki.
mechanism for conflict resolution. This is crucial in order to avoid inadvertently changing the balance
of power; such could be the case if a small force retains its best units to the end — it might gain an
advantage over a large force disarming units proportionally. Equally critical is the problem or conflict
management system, which includes a good system of communications and helps speed the resolution
of any problem or possible delays in the process.
Other important factors are the issues of information sharing and data collection, as well as various
assessments that are helpful to answer vital planning questions early on: How many combatants are
there? Who is expected to turn in weapons, what type are they, and how many? What other formal and
informal armed groups are there (for example, paramilitary, police, militia, reserves, etc.)? Are there
pockets of heavily armed people who might become bandits or security threats and where? What are
the elite units? Who are the most notorious human rights abusers? Where are the units and heavy
weapon stocks, and what is expected to happen to them? Military Observers (UNMOs), reconnaissance
units of a deployed peacekeeping force, international and local NGOs, Member State governments,
and political and military representatives of the parties themselves may play a role in answering such
questions.
The demobilization process needs to be transparent. Parties will be least trusting during the initial
movements away from conflict positions and when disbanding their unit structure and removing their
ability to provide for their own security. Planning at the mission level must concentrate on fostering
trust and confidence. It must also build conditions of security in which demobilizing combatants no
longer see the current structure of the armed forces as the only guarantor of personal security for
themselves and their families. Planning for security concerns is also vital. One temporary option for
security is a series concentric rings provided by the national government, army, and police surrounding
an international force to provide security around the cantonment sites or quartering areas. These
concentric rings of security could also include neutral observers or UNMOs, but they must take care to
ensure their own security given the instability of a post-conflict setting. The parties will want to know
how long the UN or other force will stay. Irregular troops who have fought the government for decades
(as in Guatemala, Colombia, or South Africa) may not be comfortable with the government alone re-
assuming security functions within the first months of demobilization. Programmes can use information
campaigns and amnesty provisions to condition expectations and offer incentives (and protection) to
encourage individual soldiers to report attempts to violate agreements.
94
Technical Considerations
Politics, geography, and economics are the main sources of technical considerations for planning
demobilization. The politics of the peace accord and the outcome of subsequent negotiations will
determine the timing and sequence of demobilization. For example, programmes in El Salvador,
Mozambique, and Uganda pursued demobilization in multiple phases, each consisting of a complete
demobilization sequence. This allowed parties to build confidence and learn from the previous phase.
Geography can affect the timeline or feasibility of simultaneously conducting DDR in each area. Planners
should consider a trial or pilot phase for the DDR planners to practice with their own staff, followed by a
small or select number of XC to verify the process and allow for changes before proceeding to a larger
scale operation. Since there are usually many combatants awaiting processing, programmes normally
use a phased approach. This lowers costs by reducing the number of camps and allowing several groups
to use the same facilities over time, which can help identify necessary adjustments to the process.
Demobilization programmes must work to establish clear guidelines and procedures for those other
combatants who are waiting to enter the process.
Funding a Demobilization Programme
Major costs facing most demobilization programmes likely include:
• Establishing camps;
• Transitional resettlement support (food, shelter, other subsistence needs, etc.);
• Benefits, payments, and incentives;
• Procedures and arrangements for vulnerable groups;
• Pre-discharge orientation;
• Preparing reintegration programmes; and
• Transport.
Programme costs are likely to be high and planners must find funds within current programmes and
ministries (in the case of a nationally funded programme) or in the UN assessed budget (for disarmament
and demobilization activities and international donors for reintegration programmes). Donor conferences
or other bilateral assistance must plan and apply these funds. DDR practitioners must attempt to meet
donor funding cycles and timelines, otherwise funds may be insufficient or disburse late. It is important
for DDR practitioners not to make promises or over-commit before funding is clear, as this has a direct
impact on the credibility of the process. An important lesson from several DDR processes is the need
to manage expectations at all levels. Promises to soldiers must not exceed resources, and programmes
must take steps to provide accurate and current information to demobilizing soldiers to reduce rumours
and inflated expectations.
95
Section 4.3 Conduct of Demobilization

While the language used is specific to demobilization in camps, many of the principles apply to
demobilization in situ, in communities, or to mobile demobilization. As indicated previously, demobilization
is a technical exercise with a large logistical component. This requires careful planning and scheduling
to ensure that programmes initiate and execute all the components on time and that the facilities are
ready when the activities begin and the soldiers arrive. Even a well-planned campaign at the operational
level can fail due to inappropriate execution.
Maintaining the Confidence of Soldiers
DDRPs can enhance the confidence of participating soldiers through the following measures:
• Creating buffer zones and secure corridors;
• Mutual observation;
• Camp security; and
• Communications.
Independent observers such as UNMOs can

oversee buffer zones separating the former
warring factions. Independent bodies, such as the
Organization of American States, African Union, or
UN forces, can patrol these zones. Having individuals
from the factions act as liaison officers can convince
each side that the buffer zone is being respected.
When possible, DDRPs should adequately separate
the forces to provide realistic warning. Proper
management of public affairs, mobile escorts, and
General Prince Seo (left), Liberians United for
routes that representatives of the warring factions Reconciliation and Democracy, with Capt. Mussarat
have reconnoitred and approved can provide secure (centre) Pakistani peacekeeper, in Bopolu, Gbarpolu
County, where the UNMIL DDRR programme team visited
corridors for the movement of troops. It is also useful
to inform XCs about its programme. 7 February 2004. UN
for liaison officers from the factions to observe the Photo #30526 by M Novicki.
other faction’s sites.
It must be noted clearly that cantonment sites are not concentration sites. Armed guards normally
provide perimeter security to protect the camp from outside attack. Security guards wielding sticks or
batons normally provide internal security, breaking up normal arguments and maintaining control of the
XC. Depending on the peace agreement and the length of stay in the camp, it is normal for a percentage
of the XCs to come and go using a leave or pass system controlled by the camp.
As mentioned for disarmament, communication is essential to make observation and liaison

measures work. If the factions have inadequate means of communicating, they may rely on UNMO or
UN force communications, or they might be provided radio or satellite telephone communications to
coordinate their compliance with demobilization and disarmament provisions.
96
Siting Camps
Inappropriate siting can undermine many of the confidence measures detailed earlier. Although
high-level authorities often select broad site locations, on-site commanders must be free to make
local or on-scene adjustments with the consent of both parties. Normally, camps do not operate near
cities, strategic points, or busy roads, as large numbers of XCs concentrated in certain areas can cause
tension. However, they should also be close enough to take advantage of the services that XCs may
need. Factors that can only be assessed adequately on the ground include:
• Boundaries that can be secured;
• Availability of sufficient water, location-specific shelters and facilities, and shade;
• Hygiene and sanitation factors;
• Threats to strategic areas, routes, or choke-points;
• Interference with (or by) local populations; and
• Interaction with other sites.
Normally, each camp hosts only one faction, but this is context-specific. Availability of security,
water, proper housing, and sanitation are key factors for a well-run camp. If the XCs are comfortable
and cared for in the camps, they are less likely to cause problems. Camp authorities should prepare
or drill wells, as transporting water is a difficult and expensive proposition. All-weather access to good
roads will ease logistical requirements. Appropriate facilities for the XCs with gender-separated areas,
(including separate and sufficient washrooms, accommodations, and relaxation or common areas) will
help reduce the chances of sexual violence, improve control, and ease the stress of demobilization.
Proper reconnaissance, siting, contingency planning, trial or pilot camps, clear procedures, and
good public information can help avoid or reduce problems during this delicate timeframe.
Supplying Camps
Effective camp logistics are necessary to prevent reversals in the demobilization process
(remobilization by units), frustrations, or self-demobilization (departure by individuals). In general,
camp logistics should permit support at least as good as what the soldiers experienced during the
conflict — but not so good that they will be reluctant to leave when the time comes. Sufficient and
appropriate food and shelter along with a promulgated schedule can keep the XCs involved in the
process. Potentially thorny issues include whether and how to accommodate occupants’ family members
and whether to offer support services to nearby community residents. All of these are context-specific
and DDR practitioners must address them for each location — even within the same country. Camps
should be pre-stocked and should have a reserve of essential supplies. Practitioners should properly
secure the stocks and reserves and set up a varied supply routine.
Running Camps
The functions performed in camps can include:
• Assembling, screening, and identifying soldiers;
• Data collection and needs assessments;
97
• Health checks, including identifying and classifying vulnerable groups;
• Taking away weapons and uniforms;
• Providing for basic needs while encamped and during the post-discharge transition period;
• Beginning the rehabilitation process; and
• Family location and reunification.
Screening
Soldiers may arrive at camps or designated areas

on foot or via some other form of transportation.
As mentioned earlier, DDRPs should plan for their
arrival with routes cleared and approved by all
parties and local communities before movement
begins. Programmes must organize and conduct
movement in a safe and secure manner without
provocation or deviation from the plan to avoid
creating suspicion or problems. Good briefings and
clear control will help ensure that the arrival is well-
The DDRR of over 40,000 combatants in Liberia began 7
controlled, marshalled, and organized into an orderly
December 2003 with the opening of the first cantonment
process. This could consist of manageably sized site at Camp Schieffelin, 35 miles east of Monrovia. At
groups under the control of mid-level commanders. Camp Schieffelin, a former combatant (left) talks to
United Nations peacekeepers. 7 December 2003. UN
DDR practitioners should consider the need for food,
Photo#29936 by Shima Roy.
water, and shelter, as the process normally takes
more time than planned.
XCs often have difficulty producing proper identification after protracted conflicts because many of
them may not have identification papers, are illiterate, use “war names”, or conceal their real identities
as a security precaution. In conjunction with local authorities and commanders, administrators must
assure that those who present themselves actually are soldiers (e.g. some armies may send non-
combatant civilians to camps in place of soldiers). One of the worst examples of this occurred in May
1991 with the collapse of the Bicesse Peace Accords in Angola. The peace accords sought to bring an
end to the Angolan Civil War:
“...in which more than 300,000 people had died. The accords
committed [the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola] UNITA and the [People’s Movement for the Liberation
of Angola] MPLA to demobilization; UNITA was to convert into a
political party, presenting its candidates in national presidential
and legislative elections. The accords did not, however, foresee
that UNITA would lose the elections, accuse the government of
rigging them, and resume the war. Neither side complied with
demobilization.”3
3) Christine M. Knudsen and I. William Zartman, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 541, Small Wars (September
1995), 130-143.
98
It is important that various levels of commanders and unit rosters (if available) be present to help
screen the soldiers. A simple test of military proficiency, such as assembling a weapon or answering
a series of questions referencing key battles, events, or timelines, may also help weed out impostors.
Translators are key. Programmes should test and monitor translators during the process to ensure they
are doing their jobs and not falling under the influence of commanders. DDR practitioners should be
aware that industrious individuals can compromise protocols by setting up classes to teach locals or
others what is being asked of them in screening tests (e.g. assemble a weapon, key dates battles, etc.)
for a small fee.
Medical Screening
Camps conduct medical screenings of XCs upon entry or registration. Triage to determine degrees
of disability or illness can help direct those in need of greater assistance or evaluation to a separate
line or area of the camp. If time permits, camp staff can conduct a more thorough screening of every
XC while in the camp itself, registering details in their personal files on the monitoring and information
system (MIS).
Database (MIS)
Programmes should catalogue all information requirements at the beginning of the process and to
create a comprehensive database or MIS. Many models can accomplish this, and programme staff should
conduct a good review of existing monitoring and information systems before initializing a new one.
In-processing may include photographs, fingerprints, retinal or biometric scans (to create temporary
ID documents), and questionnaires that include family information. Programmes should also consider
educational levels, preferences for future training or education, and a good catalogue of existing skills.
As these systems may store a vast range of information, DDR practitioners must take proper care
regarding the confidentiality of data.
Weapons
While XCs typically turn in weapons under supervision before (but in conjunction with) the
demobilization process, programmes should conduct a weapons search of individuals and their
personal effects to ensure no weapons enter the camp. In some cases, the warring faction’s chain of
command helps supervise this process, and some commanders may temporarily retain their side-arms.
Programmes normally make some differentiation between officers, mid-level commanders, and soldiers,
although treatment is generally equal. Strict rules for the definition of a weapon and the carrying of
weapons are crucial to avoid problems.
Uniforms
Upon entry into the cantonment area, most XCs receive new, non-military clothing and dispose
of their military attire, frequently through burning. Is some cases, the new clothing resembles a new
uniform — jeans, boots, and white T-shirts and jackets. XCs often retain combat boots since they are
useful footwear in most places.
99
Soldiers of the Cambodia People’s

Armed Forces (CPAF) are cantoned
and demobilized as part of Phase
Two of the cease-fire. 13 June 1992.
UN Photo #137762 by Pernaca
Sudhakaran.
Section 4.4 Camp Support and Internal Programming

The demobilization likely involves many agencies. The division of responsibility among military
observers, UN or other international agencies, NGOs, the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), World Food Programme (WFP), and local civil and medical authorities must be clear. It must also
be flexible. The responsible agencies may not have people in the right place at critical stages in the
demobilization process, and other agencies may have to act on their behalf.
It is likely that the agencies responsible for receiving soldiers and accepting weapons (often military
observers with UN agency support) are not responsible for administering or transporting XCs. The
numbers of XCs in quartering areas or transit centres will fluctuate as demobilization proceeds. The
responsible agencies must communicate well to permit resource planning and allocation.
Many XCs may require more extensive health care than what is available in camp clinics. Planners
must decide the extent to which to centralize this. Greater centralization increases the need for transport
but decreases the number of specialist teams required.
Processing and planning
After units disassembling their units upon entry into the camp, camp staff may need to regroup
the XCs to facilitate their reinsertion and reintegration. For example, the programme might categorize
them according to the region to which they will return or by occupation. Although breaking the chain
of command is one of the goals of demobilization, programmes may in some cases select officers
for leadership positions to help move people through the demobilization process. Programme staff
categorize the soldiers and afford them assistance and benefits depending on their urban or rural
destinations, degree of disability, and sometimes length of service. During the process of categorizing
combatants, DDR practitioners should make attempts to identify special problem cases, often referred
to as “irreconcilables” — individuals who may be too violent or too traumatized to return to society and
will require additional care and attention.
100
Demobilization Process – Long vs Short
Since cantonment is expensive and mainly funded externally, most of the international community
members designing and managing demobilization programmes plan for a brief cantonment and
rapid demobilization. This is especially true in more recent DDR processes. Although this approach is
prevalent, some programmes have operated for months or even years (e.g. Mozambique, Nepal, etc.).
Additionally, many conflict-related demobilization programmes have experienced significant delays —
sometimes weeks or longer. The local situation may also require a longer period of cantonment as part
of ISMs. As proper use of this time is essential, these cases require contingency plans. The XCs must
stay active with practical work — not simply through “make-work” programmes.
In cases where the irregular army gathers in assembly areas, combatants could spend two to three
or more months (in some cases over a year) encamped while awaiting demobilization, and most of
the regular army might be confined to their bases. In Mozambique, El Salvador, Ethiopia, and Nepal,
prolonged inactivity during the extended encampment period contributed to escalating outbreaks of
unrest. DDR practitioners should use this period constructively, both to ready reinsertion or follow-on
reintegration programmes and to prepare combatants as much as possible to adapt to civilian life. Given
the high probability of delays and the severe consequences of inactivity during a prolonged assembly,
DDR practitioners should devise and budget for an activities contingency programme. This can range
from sports, recreation, and entertainment to pre-discharge orientation and other activities designed to
contribute to the reinsertion process prior to completion of the demobilization phase.
In longer encampment or ISM periods, programmes should consider providing an opportunity

for simple education or “catch-up” education and career counselling, as well as some psychosocial
screening/counselling. Other opportunities valuable for preparing combatants for their civilian transition
include civic education, preventive health education (including AIDS awareness), and voter education.
One such example is provided below:
“In El Salvador, government troops awaiting demobilization

were provided an orientation on various vocational tracks
(agriculture, micro-enterprise, education, employment) for
which they would be eligible. Members of the National Police
(PN) awaiting demobilization received vocational guidance and
counselling prior to demobilization, including aptitude testing
and informational sessions on vocational opportunities (and
their pros and cons). Some FMLN members in assembly areas
began training candidates to the new police force. Others
took the initiative of building small classrooms for teaching
carpentry, sewing, machine work, and welding.”4
Longer cantonment activities have many of the same considerations as community-based

demobilization and reintegration programmes. Since the XC are already in their communities, staff can
tailor the reinsertion programmes to specific needs and conduct them in situ to better. This approach more
fully places the XC into the non-fighting side of the community and benefits the community as a whole.
4) Cornelis Steenken, personal experiences from the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), 1992-93.
101
A pre-discharge orientation should also cover demobilization procedures including participants’

transportation home, their benefits, various programmes for which they qualify and how to access them,
and other needs and concerns of demobilizing combatants. Handouts or pictograms of their process
can be a useful tool at the individual level to help build understanding and confidence. Bringing in
village elders and encouraging them to participate may help initiate social reintegration for the receiving
communities.
“In Uganda, a booklet containing ‘Information for Veterans’ was

developed for demobilizing soldiers, which covered relevant
topics such as their benefits and support services, rights and
responsibilities as civilians, and community participation.
During later phases of Uganda’s demobilization programme,
demobilizing soldiers were required to receive a week-long
pre-discharge counselling and orientation, designed and
delivered by fellow soldiers, which provided details on their
demobilization packages, how to open a bank account, how to
start income-generating activities, environmental issues, legal
issues, family planning, and AIDS prevention.”5
Lessons learned from various country experiences in pre-discharge activities include the need for
considering target group characteristics when designing programme content and delivery. For example,
consider the target soldiers’ alienation from society, the literacy rate (if low, rely less on written
communication methods and more on spoken methods), and the diversity of languages spoken by
combatants (to decide in what languages to prepare and deliver materials).
All information, programmes, and materials should be politically impartial and identical for all forces
to avoid accusations of partiality and propaganda. The design and implementation of pre-mobilization
reintegration programmes can incorporate military counterparts of demobilizing combatants, i.e.
consulting with commanders on programme content and use of the chain of command for disseminating
information. Such a practice could bolster troops’ involvement, build their confidence and trust, and
improve the relevance of programme content. Programmes can use the chain of command to support
demobilization in the early stages, but interest and enthusiasm wane over time.
Civic education can be useful, but it sometimes degenerates into political indoctrination. In most
cases, pre-discharge orientation includes basic education about points of contact, creation of a CV,
banking skills, budgeting, health, hygiene, and essential civilian skills. Programmes sometimes use pre-
testing and interviews to establish how simple instruction should be.
Some may call to extend the encampment and postpone demobilization to incorporate vocational
training. However, experience suggests vocational training often is not germane or is delivered poorly in
camps, and it may be better left until the ex-soldiers return to civilian communities.
5) Cornelis Steenken, personal notes from Uganda, 1997.
102
In the province of El Paraiso, General Agustin

Quesada (Spain), Commander of the United
Nations Observer Group in Central America
(ONUCA) (second from left), watches a
United Nations soldier destroying a weapon
surrendered by the Nicaraguan resistance forces
as part of overall peace process in Central
America. 18 April 1990. UN Photo #1408 by
Steen Johansen.
Section 4.5 Information Campaigns to Help Expectations

Management and Support to Demobilization
Ex-soldiers likely have unrealistic expectations about life after the war and what they will receive for
demobilizing. Political leaders may encourage these beliefs, but they can also emerge spontaneously.
Information programmes can temper these expectations by explaining the obstacles XCs will face
and the resources available to assist them. Ex-soldiers must have confidence that they will be able
to meet their needs and support their families in the civilian economy. Experiences in various cases
of DDR show the importance of keeping combatants informed of outside events and preparations
throughout the demobilization process — and the serious consequences of neglecting this responsibility.
Representatives from destination communities are usually the best people to inform combatants of
training and employment options; areas where training programmes are available; and requirements,
eligibility, and prospects for employment in their desired destinations.
Public Information
Information campaigns can bolster the confidence of civilians who may worry about the return of
former enemies to their communities. The prospect of the return of XCs may be a signal for political
opportunists to stoke residents’ fears and memories of the war. The information campaign to counter
this might concentrate on steps taken by the international community to ensure effective supervision
and the rebuilding of institutions such as the police force, judicial branch, and the creation of human
rights monitoring mechanisms.
Demilitarization
DDR practitioners generally do not use the term “demilitarization”, but it is widely acknowledged that
ex-soldiers must stop thinking and acting like soldiers in order for reintegration to succeed. Screening
for special problems; providing education and information; turning in uniforms; reducing over time the
role, status, and participation of military commanders; reducing the military organization and climate
of the camp; and using symbolism effectively can contribute to this part of the demobilization process.
103
Demobilization into the New Armed Forces
In some post-conflict situations, one of the options may be to incorporate XC into a newly reconstituted
security sector. This may seem to increase the size of the security sector, but it may also serve as a
temporary stabilization method to help control the various different groups. Although this may appear
to be an attractive option, it is often fraught with difficulties. Creating a well-integrated security sector
is difficult in the first place, let alone right after conflict. DDR practitioners normally cite South Africa as
an example of this with the unification of former guerrillas into the new South African National Defence
Forces (SANDF). However, they must take care to understand the context of how this occurred. As former
African National Congress guerrilla wing commander Rocky Williams described in his insightful review
for the Institute for Security Studies, “the ‘defeated’ South African Defence Force in fact became the
administrative and bureaucratic backbone of the new SANDF due to its virtual monopoly of the formal staff
skills … and their familiarity with the strategic and doctrinal issues underpinning both the planning and
force design process.”6 In fact, the process in South Africa took many years and suffered from numerous
spoilers — both internal and external — before becoming the new and effective SANDF.
Section 4.6 The Moment of Demobilization (Discharge)

After soldiers assemble and replace their weapons and uniforms with civilian clothes, the units and
formations to which they belonged disband. The individual ex-soldiers should gather in the assembly
area and prepare to depart to their communities.
Pre-Discharge Orientation
One of the key activities in the camps is orientation for this resettlement. The re-education of ex-
soldiers should place their experiences in a credible vision of a better future — for themselves and their
children. This vision needs to be specific to the local culture of their area of resettlement. Reinsertion
and follow-on reintegration processes require adequately funded training and education programmes —
not publicity and quick abandonment.
Discharge Ceremonies
Discharging a soldier to XC is the technical point at which these individuals leave their former armed
group and rejoin society. Programmes should mark this moment in a significant and memorable way
to close this chapter in the lives of XCs, and it should include members of the receiving society such as
elders or chiefs. This may be the case for the first few demobilized groups, but interest can wane, and
later groups may not feel as welcome as those who preceded them. DDR practitioners should avoid this
whenever possible to ensure each XC is welcomed back and to help prevent re-recruitment.
Discharge Procedures
Generally, only one camp undergoes discharge procedures on a given day. Camps may also
discharge groups of combatants in stages for a variety of administrative, political, financial, and security
reasons. For discharge, programmes set up a series of “stations” (generally groups of tables and chairs)
6) Rocky Williams, South African guerrilla armies: the impact of guerrilla armies on the creation of South Africa’s Armed Forces, (Pretoria: Institute for
Security Studies, September 2006), 43.
104
for combatants to individually finalize their paperwork, receive benefits (including cash, clothing, and
other in-kind items or vouchers), and receive their demobilization card, which may also be known as a
veteran’s identification card. Once discharged, the programme generally transports the demobilized XCs
to their settlement destinations or provides them with vouchers or money to cover transportation costs.
Post-Discharge Monitoring and Follow-up
Some past DDRPs have not included a means to follow up on the status of the demobilized XCs
and monitor their progress in the reintegration process. Including such a follow-up function to monitor
as many as possible (or at least a representative sample) would help DDR practitioners assess their
contribution toward reintegration and adjust assistance and other programme elements.
Demobilization also marks the official end of military ties and the chain of command. However,
the reality is that XCs do not easily abandon military ties and often maintain them for life. Some join
veterans’ groups, which can be both positive and negative. Some blend back into society easily, while
others encounter difficulty obtaining employment. This necessitates a follow-up mechanism as part
of the MIS to track the XCs and help provide alternative assistance if and where required under other
present government programmes.
Section 4.7 Reinsertion

Once XCs leave the camp or finish the initial demobilization steps, they begin the transition back
into society. Since XCs do not usually have jobs at this stage, they will need some sort of transitional
or subsistence allowance to help them survive until they gain employment. This allows XCs to become
contributing members of society.
The concept of reinsertion is not new. In fact,

the Ugandan veterans’ assistance programme used
it in the early 1990s to help resettle some 40,000
soldiers. Conflicts in Central America also involved
transitional support packages that allowed people
to return to society. Reinsertion programmes or
transitional safety nets should normally be gender-
sensitive and cover such issues as transportation,
emergency assistance, clothing, tools, and some cash
to ease re-entry into society. The UN sees reinsertion
Members of the FARDC after being encouraged to disarm
as a key component of a successful demobilization
and repatriate to Rwanda board a UN helicopter of
programme, as outlined and incorporated into the MONUC headed to the DDRR base camp in Goma. 4 April
IDDRS.7 2008. UN Photo #185621 by Marie Frechon.
Procedures and Steps
Overall, the transition from military to civilian life can be a complex and difficult process. Procedures
for each reinsertion programme will vary, but planners must act carefully and in accordance with the
context of the area picked for reinsertion. Men and women have different needs and require different
7) For the IDDRS definition of reinsertion, see Lesson 1.
105
programmes; however, the overall value should be similar. Tailoring the reinsertion assistance for urban
and rural settings may also result in the perception of different treatment. If the overall value is similar,
however, planners can reduce potential sources of dissatisfaction.
A frequent complaint about transitional support or reinsertion programmes is that they appear to
reward those who contributed to the violence at the expense of victims. While this is a serious charge,
DDR practitioners must understand that a reinsertion programme is time-bound and only meets the
basic needs of the XC. As the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) clearly states:
“The very fact that the transitional safety net endorsed by the
SIDDR is a short term (up to one year) that seeks to meet only
the basic needs and that is clearly security related may actually
help to make it more acceptable to the population at large.
More importantly however is that one more example of how the
SIDDR promotes thinking about DDRPs in connection with other
interventions, the SIDDR considered it imperative to implement
programmes concurrently with DDR that serves the needs of
other war affected groups. Traditionally these programmes have
lagged far behind DDR.8
DDRPs can use cash dispersal as one of the activities included in reinsertion assistance, but only in
small amounts over a set period of time. Practitioners should avoid lump sum amounts because they can
be seen as “cash for weapons” or worse — wasted on the purchase of drugs, alcohol, or other weapons.
The key but often overlooked component of the reinsertion programme is the information and
referral system. This system allows XCs to receive help with any additional orientation or resettlement
concerns. Follow-up programmes normally must ensure that XCs indeed re-enter society and do not
become victims or perpetrators of further violence.
Reinsertion programmes/projects can serve as confidence-building measures between the XCs

and their community. Programmes and projects should normally operate in a reasonably secure
environment and include a range of labour-intensive projects referred to as quick impact projects
(QIPs). These must be viable or realistic projects that contribute to the economic development of the
community. Reintegration planning should account for these reinsertion programmes/projects to ensure
harmonization of efforts. While this is not always possible, it does help reduce XCs’ frustrations and
improve their opportunities for reintegration.
The UN context has set rules and guidelines for the planning, use, and implementation of reinsertion
programmes that practitioners must follow.9
8) Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, “Stockholm initiative on DDR final report”, ed. Lena Sundh, Jens Shorlien (Sweden: Swedish government
offices, 2006), 27.
9) See DPKO Guidelines and the IDDRS for additional information.
106
Section 4.8 Conclusions

In the wake of a protracted conflict, soldiers and weapons are the most visible aspects of a militarized
society. Dispersing disarmed and demobilized soldiers to their communities removes the most obvious
and potent remnant of the conflict. This process is context-dependent, and planners and practitioners
must act carefully to lay a sound foundation for the real work of building lasting peace; that is to say,
the medium- and long-term goals of reintegrating the XCs and reconciling formerly hostile communities.
DDR practitioners must keep this longer process in mind during the planning of demobilization.
107
1. What is the second part of 5. Constructing a demobilization site does

demobilization called? not necessitate _____.
A. Reintegration A. being close to highways and other means of
B. Reconciliation access
C. Reinsertion B. building disarmament sites suitable for the
D. Repatriation number of people and weapons to be housed

C. inspection and clearing of landmines
2. According to the Secretary-General, D. proximity to leisure facilities like beaches,
demobilization is _____.
sport stadiums, etc.
A. the informal and ad hoc discharge of illegal
armed groups after a ceasefire in the case of 6. What are some of the most important
an internal conflict concerns in siting a demobilization
camp?
B. a process by which the good XCs are
separated from the bad XCs in order to A. Access to roads, clean water, adequate
rebuild a national army after a conflict shelter, secure area, and good hygiene and
sanitation
C. a formal cantonment process by which active
XCs are separated from their wives and B. Access to firewood, transportation hubs, and
dependents before being reintegrated into a learning centres
new army C. Access to roads, clean water and sanitation,
D. a formal discharge of active combatants and close proximity to strategic areas
from armed forces or other armed groups D. Boundaries that can be secured, potable
water, and in rebel-held areas
3. Disarmament normally precedes
demobilization. When would this NOT be 7. What is NOT a tool used to screen out
the case? imposters or false combatants?
A. When demobilization will take a long time A. Commander’s lists
B. When DDR takes place in a weaponized B. Word of mouth
culture C. Military proficiency tests
C. When disarmament is too difficult D. Various levels of commanders present during
D. When the DDRP is run by the military the screening process
4. Who normally provides security inside 8. What are activities that are NOT
a demobilization camp or cantonment normally done inside a camp or
area? cantonment area?
A. Military personnel A. Training on how to write a CV
B. Local police forces B. Political indoctrination
C. Private security guards armed with batons C. Training on how to attend a job interview
D. All of the above D. Basic catch-up education (i.e. reading,
writing, and arithmetic)
108
9. What is an ISM? 10. Which of the following is NOT likely

to be a major cost of a demobilization
A. Interim Stand-by Module
programme?
B. Intellectual Siting Measure
A. Establishing camps
C. Interim Stabilization Methods
B. Transitional resettlement support (food,
D. Interim Status Military
shelter, other subsistence needs, etc.)
C. Benefits, payments, and incentives
D. National infrastructure reconstruction
Answer Key »
1. C
2. D
3. B
4. C
5. D
6. A
7. B
8. B
9. C
10. D
109
LESSON
5 Reintegration
Of the three main

components of DDR,
reintegration is the most
complex and the most
important.
UN Photo #568432 by Martine Perret.
Section 5.1 Introduction • Explain why reintegration is the most complex

component of the DDR process.
Section 5.2 Security Needs for Reintegration
• Explain why security is critical to the success of
Section 5.3 Economic Reintegration reintegration.
• Distinguish different approaches to

Section 5.4 Social Reintegration reintegration.
Section 5.5 Political Reintegration • Describe the key concerns of economic, social,
and political elements of reintegration.
Section 5.6 Reintegration Planning and
• Understand reintegration programming
Design concerns.
Section 5.7 Reintegration – Needs
Assessment
Section 5.8 Reintegration Programme
Funding Issues
110
LESSON 5 | Reintegration
UN peacekeepers oversee the collection of weapons under the mandate of the UNOC DDRP. 1 February 2012. UN Photo #535675 by
Basile Zoma.
Section 5.1 Introduction
IDDRS Definition of Reintegration:
“In the Note by the Secretary-General

dated 24 May 2005, reintegration is
defined as, ‘the process by which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status
and gain sustainable employment and
income. Reintegration is essentially a
social and economic process with an
open timeframe, primarily taking place
in communities at the local level. It is
part of the general development of a
country and a national responsibility, and
often necessitates long-term external
assistance.’”1
1) United Nations, IDDRS 4.30. Available from: <http://unddr.org/uploads/

documents/IDDRS_4.30%20Reintegration%20WEB.pdf>.
111
Of the three main components of DDR, reintegration is the most complex and the most important.
Disarmament and demobilization are relatively short-term and technical in nature. Reintegration
combines a complex mix of social and economic factors and the need to return to and adjust to a
community that is new or changed. The community may differ from the one left by the XCs. The ebb
and flow of conflict alters society and may result in a complex mix of refugees, IDPs, and “stayees” in
addition to the returning XCs. The XCs must find suitable sustainable employment and a social support
network to avoid the temptation of sliding back into illegal behaviour, crime, or conflict. Therefore,
successful reintegration is at the heart of a sustainable peace process.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach for reintegration. A sustainable reintegration and lasting peace
require a mixed approach that focuses first on XCs combined with a more people-centred approach that
incorporates XCs, members of receiving communities, and other stakeholders. The services required
to facilitate reintegration often do not exist and need to be built or at least strengthened. This type of
programme takes time to plan, develop, and put in place.
This is one of the reasons why funded reinsertion

assistance is necessary to bridge the gap between The 2006 Stockholm
Initiative on DDR »
demobilization and reintegration.2 Although the medium-
to long-term sustainability of reinsertion programmes is “…one should not underestimate
doubtful, it does provide a source of income and keeps the the necessity of state policies
XC out of trouble until the reintegration programme begins. regarding affirmative action for
those individuals and groups most
It is important for DDR practitioners not to focus too
marginalized by the conflict.”
much on the XC alone. Individual programmes may be useful
Therefore, in spite of showing a
initially, but in the medium to long term, efforts should
general reliance on market-driven
focus on the receiving communities to help incorporate the
solutions, the SIDDR seems relatively
XC with other groups returning, restarting, and rebuilding
open towards a more people-centred
their lives in the community. In fact, XCs often face the
or community approach.i
same economic and social problems or difficulties faced by
other groups in the post-conflict setting. Where possible,
i) Stefan Thorsell, “Towards People-Centred Economic
reintegration assistance should be inclusionary and Reintegration? An Analysis of the Economic
Reintegration Strategy of Demobilised Combatants
participatory and avoid the perception of favouring XCs with
in Colombia”, Colombia Internacional, no. 77 Jan./
special treatment. For example, XCs should receive slots in Apr. 2013. quoting Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Sweden, Final Report of the Stockholm Initiative
existing or refurbished training facilities in the community on DDR, ed. Lena Sundh, Jens Shorlien, (Sweden:
alongside other community members to foster inclusion. Swedish government offices, 2006), 29.
This can help form a stronger community in the long term.
At the individual level, all of the XCs — male, female, old, or young — are different. They have varying
backgrounds, needs, skills, and capacities that necessitate tailor-made or individualized assistance to
reintegrate into the community. Some will simply leave and reintegrate themselves, but many others
will need some form of help. The XCs reintegrating into a community might bring a range of skills
and social capital to the recovery and reconstruction process. In those cases and where appropriate,
they can act as agents of change bringing new opportunities, skill sets, and abilities to help revitalize
communities. In so doing, they can help prevent a return to conflict.
2) For more information on funded reinsertion assistance, see Lesson 4.
112
Reintegration normally consists of different

kinds of assistance. That assistance must be
context-specific, usable, and offer progress towards
a sustainable future. It should also help prevent a
slide towards criminality and violence. Employment
creation and income generation programmes include
vocational training, business training, job placement
schemes, business development services, micro-
and small business start-ups, and the provision of
micro-grants and should link with the private sector.
It is important for programmes to determine market Participants attending an international seminar to share
structure and community absorption capacities to Côte d’Ivoire’s experience in DDR went on a field trip to
Bouaké to see concrete evidence of the disarmament,
ensure the sustainability of reintegration schemes.
resocialization, training, and reinsertion of XCs. The
Other kinds of assistance include educational seminar was organized by the Ivorian ADDR, UNOCI, and
provision and scholarship programmes, health UNDP. 6 November 2014. UN Photo #612741 by Abdul
Fatai.
support, life skills development, legal assistance,
facilitated access to land and housing, etc.
It is important for programmes to include accountability and transparency, mainstreaming of gender

and rights-based approaches, realistic costing, and flexibility in funding structures and processes as
integral components of reintegration programme design. Programmes should be detailed and transparent
with clear eligibility criteria for accepting XCs and associated groups. Where possible, reintegration
programmes should correspond with national reconstruction programmes and become more holistic and
inclusive of all those displaced by conflict including IDPs, refugees, and stayees.
Section 5.2 Security Needs for Reintegration

The relationship between DDR and security is not new. As far back as 1987, the UN Office for
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) promulgated key stepping stones towards DDR, security, and development.
As stated in the Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between Disarmament and
Development, “Security is a fundamental prerequisite for both disarmament and development. Security
consists of not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian, and human rights and
ecological aspects.”3 As Irma Specht points out:
“The concept of security has changed, as well. The ‘Kampala

Document’, reflecting the views of a wide range of influential
African scholars and politicians, states: ‘The concept of security
goes beyond military considerations. It embraces all aspects of
the society including economic, political and social dimensions
of individual, family, community, local and national life. The
security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security
of the individual citizens to live in peace with access to basic
3) Department for Disarmament Affairs, Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, (n.p., 1987).
Available from: <https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/96d5a6bbca98158d85256c36007b1428/4b7bda4dbedd2690852578940066
d515/$FILE/A-CONF130-CW-2.pdf>.
113
necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/

her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human
rights’... Such a widened concept of security is close to the
concept of human security, according to which the focus of
security studies should shift from the state to the individual
and should encompass military as well as non-military threats.
In this chapter, it is argued that reintegration programmes for
ex-combatants should take into account these principles
of human security in order to become effective and
sustainable.”4
The DDR process cannot create or provide

a secure environment by itself. As part of
the overall peace process, however, it can
contribute to peace and security and help
create a secure environment.
Post-conflict societies face many threats

to security, reconciliation, and reintegration.
Surplus weapons, failure to secure weapon
stocks, and the incomplete disarmament of
combatants make the instruments of violence
widely available. Lack of support for XCs
and failure to include political and human
dimensions in post-conflict rebuilding plans
Mark Simmonds, United Kingdom Minister for Africa, visited a
affect XCs, their families, and society in transit camp for XCs in Bweremana, accompanied by Martin
general. Under extreme circumstances, XCs Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head
of MONUSCO. XCs at the transit camp during the visit. 6 February
may even use their former fighting skills for
2014. UN Photo #579212 by Sylvain Liechti.
criminal activity due to a lack of alternatives.
Measures to improve security that are also essential to reintegration include the following:
• National Security – a competent military ensuring external security, and a competent police
force and other security institutions ensuring domestic security;
• Public Security – an impartial, competent police force and respect for the rule of law;
• Personal Security – choice, religion, and movement for all, including XCs and their families;
• Political Security – free and fair electoral and judicial systems; accountability of all officials;
and strengthened rule of law including legal impartiality, protection of political rights, property
rights, and land tenure; and
• Economic and Social Security – jobs, investments, and business including protection of
ownership of land and protection of movement and trade.
4) Irma Specht, “Jobs for Rebels and Soldiers”, in Jobs after war: A critical challenge in the peace and reconstruction puzzle, Eugenia Date-Bah ed.,
(International Labour Office, Geneva, 2003), chapter 4, pp. 73-109 (Module 3 page 2). Emphasis added by Cornelis Steenken.
114
A street scene of Hamar Weyne Market in the Somali capital Mogadishu. The militant group Al-Shabaab withdrew
from Mogadishu 6 August 2011 following sustained operations to retake the city by the Somali National Army
(SNA) backed by AMISOM troops. Since the group’s departure, the country’s capital has re-established itself
and a sense of normality has returned. Buildings and infrastructure devastated and destroyed by two decades
of conflict have been repaired; thousands of Somalis have returned from abroad to invest and help rebuild their
nation; and foreign embassies and diplomatic missions have reopened. 5 August 2013. UN Photo #557912 by
Stuart Price.
To assist the DDR process — and the reintegration process in particular — the government must be
capable of enforcing laws and protecting all groups and individuals including minorities. This will likely
include elements of security sector reform (SSR) to ensure that the police, military, and judiciary system
can act impartially to defend the country, enforce laws, and adjudicate disputes. This includes courts,
prisons, and legal advice as well as other security elements of the State function as guarantors of public
safety for all citizens. It requires the military to come under the control of duly elected and appointed
civilian officials, and it normally includes the separation of functions of internal security and external
defence. If the situation on the ground is difficult, the country may request international assistance to
monitor basic human rights violations and the transition towards a new security sector.5
Section 5.3 Economic Reintegration

Economic reintegration is at the core of reintegration. It is usually one of the most difficult aspects
of reintegration, as conflicts normally disrupt local economies and may destroy economic infrastructure.
National and local governments may be weak or non-existent and receiving communities face many
competing demands. Furthermore, people with knowledge and skills may have fled or been killed.
Conflict may shatter economic and social institutions and weaken civil society and the local private
sector.
5) The linkages between DDR and SSR are discussed in Lesson 6.
115
Economic Challenges to Reintegration
The economic challenges facing a DDRP are significant. In addition to taking place in post-conflict
settings with widespread destruction, loss of life, shortage of skills, and poor education facilities,
programmes often operate in the world’s poorest and most marginalized countries. Even conflicts in
middle-income countries, such as the Philippines and Colombia, generate similar economic challenges
to the reintegration of XCs.
Physical destruction serves as one of the most visible legacies of a protracted armed conflict. The
strategic targeting of electrical systems, transportation routes, and industry combined with direct and
indirect attacks on farms and food producers may push the economy in some areas below subsistence
levels. Common post-conflict economic problems include:
• Extensive damage to the economic and • A focus by international organizations

social infrastructure; active in the country (including NGOs)
• Interruption of production and trade, on relief instead of development and
including abandonment of large tracts of reconstruction;
farmland and devastation of smallholder • A loss of key skills due to departure and
agriculture production and trade, which dislocation of population, as well as the
is normally responsible for sustaining a foregone opportunities for study and
large percentage of the population; training during the conflict;
• Disruption of the export sector upon which • A high level of government debt;
many small, war-affected economies • A devalued national currency and a
overwhelmingly depend; devastated banking system;
• Depleted investment and production • High inflation;
capital due to capital flight;
• Unsustainably high military budgets;
• Extremely high unemployment and
• Skewed distribution of wealth, income,
underemployment as entire sectors of
and assets;
the economy are non-operational;
• Population dislocation;
• Widespread poverty and dependence
on foreign aid by the government and • Environmental degradation; and
individuals, especially emergency relief • Abandonment of land and property rights,

like food aid; among others.
Protracted armed conflict distorts the economy. It subsidizes inequitable and inefficient socioeconomic
structures and creates “war economies”, which may stifle and alter production and waste scarce resources in
non-productive war-related expenditures. In addition to the generally high unemployment situation frequent
in developing economies, wars negatively affect the level and composition of production and expenditures.
Many post-conflict countries experience the additional challenge of transitioning from a centrally
controlled economy to a market-oriented economic system, including facing pressure from donors and
the international community to make economic reforms. Such reform programmes may exacerbate social
116
disruption and pressure on the government,

aggravating the unemployment situation in
the short term and limiting the capacity of
governments to create or expand employment
opportunities.
Privatization and tighter monetary policies

can cause initial increases in the prices of
consumer goods and further slow the recovery.
Recovery of production and building new
factories, businesses, and other economic
structures take time. That impacts employment
opportunities, which are frequently slow to
emerge, especially in the short term. The
Participants attending an international seminar to share Côte
return of demobilized combatants, IDPs, d’Ivoire’s experience in DDR went on a field trip to Bouaké to
refugees, and stayees, many of whom were see concrete evidence of the disarmament, resocialization,
training, and reinsertion of XCs. The seminar was organised by
victims of the conflict, can exacerbate the rate
the Ivorian ADDR, UNOCI, and UNDP. The field trip included a
of unemployment and underemployment in visit to the centre for the resocialization of XCs during which
post-conflict countries, which is already high. the visiting high-level delegation saw the different modules and
methods used to facilitate the reinsertion of XCs into society
Engaging in the agricultural or informal sectors
once they return to civilian life. 6 November 2014. UN Photo
may be promising for some XCs, but a lack of #612745 by Abdul Fatai.
skills, capital, land, licenses, or entrepreneurial
experience may make this difficult.
This is the economic situation into which XCs and other displaced groups are returning and into which
they must reintegrate. Yet it is within this tough economic setting that a well-designed reintegration
programme can improve the overall solution as part of the wider economic reconstruction and recovery
efforts.
An important factor for DDR practitioners to remember is the private sector and how it can aid the
reintegration process by providing support or helping implement parts of the reintegration programme.
The private sector often has the resources to initiate local and even regional development. The SIDDR
examined this opportunity, and the Cartagena DDR conference in June 2009 advanced it as a possibility.
Philanthropy may also possible in some contexts. Many programmes overlook it, but philanthropy can help
create opportunities in newly opened or delicate areas.
Economic Reintegration Activities: Tied to Reconstruction and Development
There are several early actions that could help jumpstart post-conflict economies and contribute to the
economic reintegration of XCs and other community groups. They include taking steps to restore freedom
of movement; re-establishing markets and small businesses; rehabilitating agricultural production; and
repairing infrastructure such as cell networks, power distribution, and the customary agricultural processing
centres and transit roads (“feeder roads”) used for internal trade. Early interventions for XCs and other
community members may include seeds and tools programmes, which hope to gradually replace food relief
with domestic agricultural production. As mentioned in Lesson 1, some programmes may choose a targeted
117
approach that focuses on the XC. Others may deem early targeting unfeasible, not cost-effective, or not
advisable due to the risk of aggravating an already politicized, polarized, and tense situation. The way
in which authorities undertake infrastructural redevelopment is also important, as opening up routes for
trade and quickly establishing a cellular network and local electrification projects (solar, wind, small scale
hydro, etc.) help create demand and generate supply in other products. Approaches that draw resources
and support from all social groups and sectors of society may serve an important reintegration function by
creating shared interests and stakes in a shared future.
In the past, DDRPs generally neglected finance (including small-scale credit and savings) as a
programme element. This is a national issue. Encouraging or requiring XCs to use and rely on a fledgling
financial system can help create a critical component of the post-war economy. Reactivating the financial
system and increasing the availability of credit often requires interventions. DDRPs require a sound
financial network if the distribute cash allowances to XCs settling in all parts of the country, especially
the rural areas. The reintegration stage uses savings and credit to help XCs develop productive activities.
Rwanda and Colombia serve as good examples. The Rwanda DDRP was the first to try and implement
telephone banking. The programme in Colombia further developed existing banks and modern telephone-
internet banking, including an alliance with some financial sector entities that linked financial education
programmes to the creation of incentives for savings within their products, thus helping to build a credit
history for the XC.6
Economic Reintegration Activities for XCs
At the individual level, economic reintegration requires taking steps toward building new human capacity
including increasing the financial independence and self-reliance of XCs. In the 1990s, DDRPs viewed labour-
intensive work such as infrastructure construction and rehabilitation as suitable reintegration activities to
create income for a large number of XC within a short period of time.7 In the present day, DDR practitioners
view large scale “make-work” programmes as better possible reinsertion activities while proper reintegration
programmes in development. Current reintegration programmes include a broad scope of employment and
income generating activities such as value chain development, business development services, and small and
micro-businesses. These programmes aim to improve employability using local resources coupled with a focus
on gender and age to foster social cohesion in an economic setting. 8
Employment and Income Generation – UN Policy on Post-Conflict Employment Creation,
Income Generation, and Reintegration
The creation of employment is one of the key issues in any society and is vital to ensure a functioning
economy. This is especially true in a post-conflict economy. Employment in all its phases — from short-
term, to emergency, to labour-intensive work, to sustainable medium- to long-term work — is the basic
requirement for a country as it transitions from conflict to a post-conflict situation. Recognizing this
6) Cornelis Steenken, personal observations.

7) International Labour Organization (ILO), “Reintegration of demobilized combatants through (self) employment and training”, prepared for the Expert
Meeting on the Design of Guidelines for Training and Employment of XCs, Harare, 11-14 July 1995, p. 8-9.
8) One such approach is highlighted in Annex A – “Community Based (Re-)Integration and Security” as developed by Transition International.
118
United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration, United Nations, Geneva,
2009, 12.
• Track A programming responds to the urgent needs of crisis-affected groups with

interventions to help stabilize livelihoods.
• Track B programming focuses on medium- to long-term local economic recovery, including

interventions to boost sustainable employment, income generation, and reintegration
(where required).
• Track C programming focuses on long-term employment creation and inclusive economic

growth. Interventions in Track C help to strengthen the national systems and policies
necessary to sustain the progress achieved in Tracks A and B.
• Interventions under the three tracks complement each other, and some of the activities in
Tracks A, B, and C — such as skills training — are crosscutting. The programming content
varies in different countries and contexts.
issue, the UN generated a holistic policy titled Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation
and Reintegration in May 2008. The introduction to the policy states:
“Employment and income generation are fundamental elements

of the post-conflict solution. For communities and individuals,
job creation and regular income can provide the means for
survival and recovery. They are also keys to reaching out to
young people and reintegrating ex-combatants and returnees.
In short, generating employment is crucial to building peace.
Promoting employment creation is challenging in the best of
119
circumstances, and far more so in post-conflict situations…

The policy put forth here proposes a practical ‘three track
approach’: stabilizing income generation and emergency
employment; promoting employment opportunities at the
local level, where reintegration ultimately takes place; and
supporting sustainable employment creation and decent work.”9
While most disarmament and demobilization staff will not be involved in creating these programmes,
it is important that they understand and recognize the different forms of reintegration interventions that
their colleagues develop in order to help build a sustainable economy.10
Training and Education
Vocational training is one tool to contribute to the socioeconomic integration of former combatants.
The possession of valuable skills and the capacity and willingness to work will the community accept
former combatants and foster their social integration into their families and communities. Training can
also facilitate social integration through common activities with community members — and even former
enemies — and help develop social norms and practices. DDR practitioners should not view vocational
training should as a result but rather as a tool for XCs to find a job or to start a business.
Providing equal access to education

through accelerated learning programmes for
adult learners or scholarships can contribute
toward achieving social objectives such
as reducing inequality and can improve
social integration and cohesion of groups
with different socioeconomic, religious, and
cultural backgrounds. Providing XCs with
effective and well-designed education and
training for rural employment as farmers,
farm workers, or rural micro-entrepreneurs,
XCs are profiled during a DDR operation conducted by UNOCI in
may help ease the rapid rural-to-urban
Attécoubé, Abidjan. 8 February 2012. UN Photo #504392 by
shift found often in many post-conflict Patricia Esteve.
communities.
DDRPs should make training and education for XCs available to the furthest extent possible within
the framework of existing national training systems and structures.
As discussed in Lesson 2, alternatives to targeting programmes exclusively at XCs include expanding

benefits to non-combatants or targeting the general social and economic needs of communities where
XCs and other returnees settle. Training schemes that avoid marginalization and isolation of former
combatants and promote joint settings with former foes tend to promote social integration most
effectively.
9) “UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration”. UNDP-ILO May 2008, 12. Available from: <http://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_117576.pdf>.
10) For more information, review the UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration or consult with ILO and
UNDP colleagues.
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The various countries that have recently undertaken DDRPs attempted several approaches to
promote the economic reintegration and self-sustainability of XCs. These include initiatives specially
targeted at XCs as well others that focused on communities where a concentration of XCs and other
returnees — known as “war-affected populations” — congregated. These interventions depended on the
context of the specific situation and may have featured credit programmes, co-op programmes specially
designed for reintegrating in rural or urban areas, vocational training programmes, programmes to
assist XCs and others in starting micro-enterprises, and other income generation and employment
generation programmes.
In reality, proper sustainable economic reintegration takes time to develop. It is laborious and time-
consuming and frequently made up of various short-term initiatives that lead to or link to medium-term
sustainable employment. Opportunities are often few and of short duration, which individuals may find
insufficient to get over the stigma attached to status as an XC. Employers are often suspicious and need
to develop confidence — not only in the overall peace process, but in the XCs in their midst. Providing
employers with a percentage of funds to offset and train XCs or tax breaks to encourage hiring more
XCs only works if the whole system works, which is often beyond the ability of the DDRP to guarantee
by itself.
A holistic approach is often preferable. Broadly defined, it includes demobilized soldiers and their
dependents, internally displaced persons, returning refugees, women heads of households, street children
and orphans, and the disabled (both civilian and military). Micro-projects are a useful option that can
include income-generating activities such as agricultural projects, handicrafts, and micro-enterprises and
businesses; social infrastructure projects involving the repair, rehabilitation, and construction of schools,
clinics and health centres, and water supply and sanitation facilities; and economic infrastructure (e.g.
markets, roads and bridges, workshops, and storage facilities). Programmes should consider labour-
intensive projects and techniques for larger area-based construction projects (e.g. roads, sewage,
water, etc.), but they may not be applicable to all XC ranks.
Section 5.4 Social Reintegration

DDR practitioners should note that conflicts separate members of armed forces and groups from
their families and communities. Communities turn against other communities and new boundaries
disrupt economic activity to the detriment of most people (some may in fact benefit from black markets
and smuggling). Incorporating them back into a normal market can prove challenging as a loss of social
cohesion may have contributed to — or resulted from — the conflict.
Post-Conflict Social Situation
Most previous DDRPs have initiated following the resolution of a protracted civil conflict. Such
conflicts had a variable impact on the social situation in each country depending on the context and
circumstances of each. Reintegration is a broad term that implies building up the sort of dense and
durable interactions between all members of society — from former members of armed forces and
groups to refugees, displaced persons, and stayees — all of whom were affected to varying degrees by
the conflict.
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Participants attending an international seminar to share Côte d’Ivoire’s experience in DDR went on a field trip
to Bouaké to see concrete evidence of the disarmament, resocialization, training, and reinsertion of XCs. The
seminar was organised by the Ivorian ADDR, UNOCI, and UNDP. The field trip ended with a visit to a centre for the
conversion of plastic waste, one of the region’s reintegration sites for XCs. 6 November 2014. UN Photo # 612747
by Abdul Fatai.
The social situation may deteriorate further with declines in economic and agricultural performance.
The production of only a subsistence level of agriculture can reduce social interaction and aggravate
chronic food insecurity at the household and community levels, which in turn may increase the number
of socially disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.
Massive population movement often affects social structures and decision-making systems at the
community level as well as weakening extended family and lineage-based social networks. As men and
women head off to war, the whole social and economic landscape changes. Conflict-affected societies
often experience a dramatic increase in the number of households headed by women — with resulting
strains on traditional roles. While some may view this negatively, it also creates positive opportunities
for women to take non-traditional roles in both social and economic settings. In some cases, whole
villages and regions are abandoned due to the conflict. The resulting displacement puts tremendous
pressure on society and families in particular. Frequently, distrust and apprehension about the future
prevail and normal patterns of daily life are disrupted.
In many cases, the conflict destroys or damages social services. This is especially true for education
and health facilities. Many health and education professionals may be dead, internally displaced, or
have left the country, and new professionals may not have been trained during the war period. Looting
and physical destruction of buildings may leave scarce usable equipment or structures.
Some of the social changes brought about by the conflict may be irreversible, and a return to old
systems and traditions may not be possible. This is not always a negative development, however. In
some cases, duplicating former social patterns may not be advisable as a return to previous social
relations could plant the seeds of future conflict.
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The extent to which conflict destroys a country’s social foundation has a significant impact both on the
appropriate prescribed reintegration policies and on the possible success of reintegration interventions.
Social Reintegration Challenges of XCs
Social problems common among demobilized combatants include low levels of education and a lack
of marketable skills; high levels of unemployment and underemployment; a lack of shelter and land
and the skills and resources needed for agricultural production; limited financial resources; physical
and mental health problems; and discrimination, stigmas, and ignorance of how to behave properly in
a community. Potential consequences of neglecting these issues include greatly increased social and
political unrest at the community and national levels, increased crime and unemployment, and greater
resentment between the former rivals, inhibiting reconciliation. These social characteristics also deprive
the community of what may otherwise be productive assets.
There may be a social stigma attached to

status as a former combatant in an armed group
such as guerrilla groups or even the national
army. In some cases, the community may view
XCs as heroes; elsewhere, they may be viewed as
potential troublemakers. Societies may stigmatize
female XC for not fitting back into traditional
roles. Some community members may remain
embittered by family losses or oppressive actions
taken by the armed group to which they belonged.
Employers may hesitate to hire former soldiers,
fearing that former foes of the XC themselves The Security Institution Unit (SIU) of the UN Multidimensional
may target or sabotage their businesses. Women Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
(MINUSCA) coordinated weekly food distribution by the IOM
sometimes avoid the DDR process altogether
to over 2,000 ex-Séléka combatants at three camp sites in
due to stigma, and they often suffer in silence. Bangui. The support is the first phase of a joint mission by
Lastly, former combatants’ governments may the African-led International Support Mission to the Central
African Republic (MISCA), Operation Sangaris, IOM, and
refrain from hiring XCs by choice or by law. The
MINUSCA to facilitate the disarmament and relocation of the
government commonly controls or funds most ex-Séléka combatants to their community of origin. Bags of
formal sector employment in many less developed rice being distributed at one of the camps for XCs. 15 July
2014. UN Photo #595077 by Catianne Tijerina.
economies.
Objectives of Social Reintegration
A primary objective of demobilization and reintegration is to facilitate the integration of XCs,

associated groups, and their families back into society. Reintegration programmes strive to help
demobilized soldiers become ordinary, active members of their former communities or the new locations
they choose. Social issues surrounding reintegration of demobilized combatants involve efforts to unify
them with family members, assist in their reinsertion to civilian communities, and to encourage their
active and productive participation in the community and their acceptance by community members.
123
Indicators of progress toward social reintegration may include the following:
• The level of social unrest or social peace both at the community and national levels;
• Unification of XCs — both male and female — with family members;
• Marrying or remaining married following demobilization;
• Increased family responsibilities;
• Access of XCs and their families to shelter and land;
• Return to and (re)connection of XCs with civilian communities;
• Increased participation in non-military, community activities (i.e. religion, sports, recreation,

associations, etc.);
• Attitudes of other (non-military) community members toward XCs and their perceptions of the
XCs’ contributions to the community;
• Self-identity as a community member first;
• Enhanced civic interest and participation, (i.e. voting, social awareness);
• The severing of links with military structures; and
• Attitudes of XCs to being part of the civilian society.
Other evidence of civilian social skills include a heightened role of individual XCs in decision-making;
friends outside of XC circles; improved self-perception; and XCs’ perception of diminished risk to
personal security and a better vision for the future. The reintegration process includes the involvement
of XCs in productive activities as both a social and an economic objective.
Activities towards Social Reintegration
• Focus on Families: For XCs to complete social reintegration successfully, reintegration

interventions must consider their families. Reinsertion assistance often provides XC with pre-
discharge orientations, food rations, and other immediate necessities that are most often
directed at the family unit instead of individual XCs. These should be in line with their follow-on
reintegration benefits to avoid creating any difficult precedents or a sudden disappearance of
assistance. In some countries, programmes can have a broader focus including social security
and family health, community welfare, and social interaction — along with different levels of
skills and technical training — in addition to primary, secondary, and post-secondary education.
• Quick Impact Projects: QIPs implemented during the reinsertion period when XC and others
return can jumpstart social reintegration by requiring cooperative efforts within the community
on projects that provide immediate, general economic benefits to community members, such as
agriculture, fishing, and income generation projects.
• Education: Educational support can have a quick impact in communities. It includes emergency
supply of educational materials, rehabilitation of schools, food aid, salary supplements to
teachers, assistance to reopen primary schools, and supplying basic office equipment, supplies,
vehicles, teacher training, and textbooks. Education provides a structured return to daily life.
Basic and accessible education services throughout the country can help break the cycle of
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Martin Kobler, Special Representative

of the Secretary-General and Head of
MONUSCO, met with XCs in Bweremana.
Two XCs pose in front of their living
quarters at a transit camp in Bweremana.
18 December 2013. UN Photo #575566
by Sylvain Liechti.
violence, provide an immediate structure for children, contribute to a return to normalcy, and
help set a post-war country on the road to peace and relative prosperity.
• Preparing Communities: Former soldiers will have greater difficulty finding employment if
their communities do not accept them. If ex-soldiers feel they have a stake in civil society, there
is less risk they will try to undermine it through violence. Preparing communities for the return
of XCs and other returnee groups and improving conditions in communities could contribute to
their social reintegration. Each community will differ in this process. Those who supported the
XCs during the conflict will more readily take them in and care for them, while communities who
opposed the XCs may resent their presence and further stigmatize the XCs.
• Public Information Campaigns: One of the first things DDRPs should undertake is a national
to local level information campaign aimed at both the XCs (while they are in their holding
areas) and the receiving communities. Doing so could help counter propaganda and rumours
as accurate information will be disseminated to both parties. XCs should receive information on
conditions, employment, and available services in the communities prior to their departure from
their holding areas, concentration zones, or assembly areas. Campaigns should also promote
visits by returnee representatives to home communities and by community leaders to these
holding areas, and allow time for planning and provision of safe corridors within the countries
for those returning home. Communities should receive accurate information on the number
of XCs who may arrive, the skills they have, and any services they might need. Providing
informational material and holding seminars for village elders, community leaders, and religious
leaders on the reintegration programme and the need for reconciliation can help the local
community’s involvement in all aspects of reintegration. The government also can help by
providing a minimum level of support for rebuilding economic and social services; preparing
settlement areas for returnees; and coordinating with local authorities and UN and local human
rights monitors to enhance the security of returnees. Supplies must be in place for returnees of
all kinds. Some form of interim shelter area, such as community centres, can act as distribution
points of in-kind assistance and temporarily accommodate returnees who lack a safe place to
stay.
125
Health Concerns
Combatants in the process of demobilizing, be they men, women, boys, or girls, commonly suffer
from various physical health problems. While more prevalent in irregular forces, poor health is common
and stems from a lack of preventive health care, neglect of proper sanitation, poor nutrition for an
extended period, lack of access to medicines, and improperly treated and poorly healed war wounds
such as broken bones and bullet wounds. XCs frequently have poor dental health and suffer from
infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, parasites, skin diseases, and sometimes a range of sexually
transmitted diseases, including HIV. Mental health problems, psychosocial trauma, and post-traumatic
stress are also common among XCs resulting from the trauma and guilt of their combat experiences.
Sickness pay prevent some from becoming economically or socially self-reliant, and they may depend
on their families or communities for care. Additionally, former members of government forces who
demobilize after a conflict and return to their local communities could place an even greater burden on
the health care network.
This additional burden must be offset by government programming and expenditures in the health
sector, or it runs the risk of over-taxing the very limited community health system already dealing
with stayees, returning refugees, and displaced people. While the health care network is not a DDR
issue, finding ways to offset or deal with these issues will be a DDRP concern. Retiring military medical
personnel and demobilized irregular medical personnel can help in the receiving communities, but these
are transitional measures. Proper investment in reconstructing clinics and training medical personnel
is required. A rotational presence of trained medical personnel from the capital or military can address
some of the urgent needs in outlying areas and local communities.
Community health interventions include (re)building institutional capacity in health through:
• Health education and information campaigns (i.e. women’s medical issues and awareness
training of malaria, dengue, and sexually transmitted diseases);
• Refurbishing clinics and hospitals;
• Rehabilitating water and sanitation

systems;
• Re-establishing vaccination programmes;
• Providing medicines and medical supplies;

and
• Supporting on-the-job training of

auxiliary health workers and assisting
in strengthening the health sector’s
management, coordination, and
information systems capacities as soon
as possible (i.e. help in designing national
A medical officer examines an XC of the long-running
health policies, guidelines, standards, Darfur conflict on the first day of the disarmament and
and training curriculum rather than reintegration exercise run jointly by UNAMID and the North
Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
superimposing independent administrative
Commission. 4 July 2011. UN Photo #478445 by Olivier Chassot.
structures on the health care system).
126
Section 5.5 Political Reintegration

As previously mentioned in Lesson 1, political reintegration allows for the transformation of an
armed group into a legitimate political party or similar entity that is able to participate in the new
political process under certain conditions. This is popularly referred to as a transition “from bullets to
ballots”, and it is important to help prevent future conflicts.
Effective governance includes four essential functions:
1) Executive decision-making;
2) Administration;
3) Legislation (law making); and
4) A judicial system.
Political violence is an indication that these functions have not succeeded in resolving disputes
peacefully. They must be restored or reformed in order to help regulate disputes without violence
occurring. In a post-conflict setting, this means that former enemies must cooperate within the same
political system rather than attempt to subordinate them through force, intimidation, or expulsion.
Beyond the four basic functions of government,

there are many questions that former adversaries
must resolve before government and political
institutions will be stable and durable. The parties
must agree to power sharing arrangements as
well as constitutional reform and institutional
arrangements for government. This may entail
agreements about the division of powers between
central and local governments and autonomy
for certain regions or self-government for some Participants attending an international seminar to share Côte
groups. After a conflict, states may need outside d’Ivoire’s experience in DDR went on a field trip to Bouaké
to see concrete evidence of the disarmament, resocialization,
help to reform civil and military services and
training, and reinsertion of XCs. The seminar was organised
build their capacity to administer effectively. The by the Ivorian ADDR, UNOCI, and UNDP. The field trip ended
parties will need to agree on reforms that address with a visit to a centre for the conversion of plastic waste,
one of the region’s reintegration sites for XCs. 6 November
the interests of minority, marginalized, and
2014. UN Photo #612748 by Abdul Fatai.
disadvantaged groups.
Efforts to encourage political reintegration and sustained peace include:
• Strengthening government capacity to carry out key tasks;
• Activities to strengthen democratic structures and processes;
• Assistance to reform and strengthen electoral institutions, including support for developing
political parties, reforming the civil service, and civic education;
• Support to develop a free, fair, and competent media; and
127
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited a

resettlement area in Palai Veemankamam South
Village, in Jaffna District, Sri Lanka, where he
toured a shelter run by the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and
latrines and well renovations administered by
UNICEF. He also held a discussion with community
representatives. The resettlement project was
funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund. The
Secretary-General (at right) during his visit to
Palai Veemankamam South Village. 2 September
2016. UN Photo #690057 by Eskinder Debebe.
• Support for popular culture programmes that encourage tolerance, democratic principles, and
unifying national goals.
International efforts to restructure political systems after a civil conflict should include bringing the
military under civilian control and support for civil society actors and initiatives that encourage public
participation, tolerance, and democratic processes. Post-conflict political development and reintegration
efforts must not neglect popular participation and representation.
Ideally, international interventions should concentrate on addressing grievances in a manner

supporting the development of legitimate political processes and transparent and accountable
systems. While some advice avoiding support for particular groups or leaders, others recommend that
the international community reward those leaders who display tolerance and accommodation. The
appropriate use of peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive analysis tools should always inform political
reintegration processes.
In the immediate aftermath of civil conflict, the task of improving governance involves establishing
temporary fixes such as an interim government and international peacebuilders (or in some cases
peacekeeping forces) to provide security. In the medium term, it is necessary to establish durable
institutions for making national policy decisions while balancing the interests of groups. This could include
improved laws governing elections and a more reformed, professional security sector. Programmes
need to require former enemies to talk and work together, potentially including hardliners who may be
“spoilers” to the peace process.
Medium-term post-conflict efforts to improve governance include civil service reforms, capacity-
building, and support for revising constitutional provisions on the division of central and local power and
other questions of governance. Such measures are important for helping government become a valued
mechanism to mediate the interests of competing groups and settle policy disputes.
Many post-conflict societies with scarce material resources have overly-centralized government
control of various functions and sectors. This extreme concentration of government functions and power
contributes to civil conflicts by raising the stakes of the contest over who controls the government
apparatus and how it allocates privileges and benefits. One way to reduce political conflict is to disperse
128
some of the functions of government to separate national institutions, i.e. separate executive, legislative,
and judicial institutions with distinct authority and responsibilities and divide them between national and
local government. Local governments must have sufficient authority to take on some of the burden of
public administration. They must have the ability to respond to local demands and needs and thereby
reduce the resistance to and conflict with the central government.
It is important to establish procedures and institutions that express the preferences of the general
population. This is essential for new governments to wield legitimate authority and to be held accountable.
These procedures and institutions create a basis for the electorate and competing political movements
whose most promising means of pursuing their aspirations is through public debate and electoral
competition — not armed opposition. Activities in support of this include creating political incentives
for transforming armed movements into peaceful political entities, developing and implementing rules
for party formation and election campaigns, helping to organize and monitor elections, discouraging
demagogic political campaigns, and empowering elected legislatures.
The rank-and-file of opposed communities and mid-level political leaders must endorse and feel
connected to the political arrangements negotiated by political elites and must believe they have a voice
and can engage meaningfully in the political system.
Legal Documentation
Many XCs (particularly from non-government groups) lack the legal documents necessary to live in
civilian society, participate in civilian politics, and obtain employment. These may include identification
cards; certificates of marriage and birth; proof of citizenship; education diplomas; and evidence of
any skills, military service, training, land ownership titles, voter registration cards, driving licence,
and others. Establishing proof of such credentials may require interviews, and authorities may provide
temporary documentation.
Frequently, providing XCs, refugees, and IDPs with these vital documents requires international
assistance. This is especially true in ethnic or particularly divisive conflicts where local and national
governments deliberately made obtaining such documents difficult for marginalized groups.
Housing, Land, and Property Rights
After an extended period of civil conflict,

problems with property rights and land tenure
are common due to absence, squatting or
abandonment of land, and population dislocation.
Disputes over property rights are politically
sensitive, contribute to continued tension and
uncertainty, and may contribute to extending
or re-igniting violent conflict. New legislation
that supports private property, an improved A view of refugee housing near Tripoli during the Secretary-
General’s visit to the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp
system of restorative justice, the presence of a
and other UN-assisted projects in Northern Lebanon. 25
central authority that supports property rights, a March 2016. UN Photo #668821 by Mark Garten.
129
functioning public security and law enforcement system to enforce property rights, and options for
compensation for lost lands can help improve prospects for sustained peace. However, they are normally
beyond the purview of the DDRP.
Generally, members of irregular armed groups have been away from their (former) homes while
fighting. The residence they occupied may have been destroyed, seized, or occupied by others during
their long absence. Due to their involvement in the conflict, their former co-habitants may no longer
wish to share space with them, or there may no longer be room for them and their expanded families.
Additionally, their former companions who previously shared a home with them may have been killed or
displaced. Land they owned or occupied may also be subject to an ownership dispute; be unworkable
due to the presence of landmines; be difficult to till productively because of a long period of disuse; or
be cut off from markets due to damaged transportation networks and/or the combatant’s unfamiliarity
with agriculture and lack of capital, implements, seeds, and farm animals.
Members of government forces generally receive housing while in the military. Demobilization of
government troops may put additional pressure on local economies as many of the former combatants
will now be unemployed and lack the means to afford housing.
When societies respect property rights, entrepreneurs feel more confident to open stores, farmers feel
more secure to work the soil and plant crops, and overseas investors are more confident to risk capital. A
1997 study found that respect for property rights and the presence of functioning economic reconstruction
programmes were two economic indicators that correlated highly with effective post-conflict transitions.11
However, this is a State responsibility and takes time — usually much longer than the DDRP itself.
With respect to the DDRP, reintegration can include options aimed at improving the housing
situation for XCs by including the distribution of construction materials and assistance for housing repair
and construction. Builders should use local materials and local construction techniques. It is critical to
exercise care not to favour the XCs, and it is crucial to make them part of a community reconstruction
project such as rebuilding clinics, schools, or public spaces.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Jim Yong Kim, President

of the World Bank Group, visited a housing site for XCs
with disabilities in Kigali. The Rwanda Demobilization and
Reintegration Commission (RDRC) provided support for XCs,
who formed cooperatives and engaged in activities such as
shoemaking and handcrafts, in efforts for social and economic
reintegration. 23 May 2013. UN Photo #551623 by Eskinder
Debebe.
11) B. Blechman, W. Durch, W. Eaton, and T. Stukey, “Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace, Final Report”, prepared for OSD/
OASD/S&R/PK&KA under contract, (Washington, D.C.: Prepared by DFI International, September 30, 1997, pg 31.
130
Section 5.6 Reintegration Planning and Design

This section provides general guidelines for designing and planning reintegration programmes in
post-conflict situations. Each post-conflict situation is context-specific and thus needs country-specific
solutions — not simply a transfer of programme details from another DDRP. There are many good or
useful examples to study and adapt to the local context. However, programme design and development
must be realistic to be effective, and it frequently involves imaginative application to resolve local and
national issues.
General Guidelines
• Involving XCs and Communities: Too often, DDR practitioners conduct programme design
away and apart from the conflict using tried and true procedures but not necessarily adapted
to the local context. One good practice to contextualize the design process is to include
participation by representatives of former warring factions and local communities. Selecting the
right individuals to assist this process is key. Programmes should consider their qualifications
and capacity to represent the whole group. They can be appointed or elected from within the
group. These representatives can help confirm local issues; identify gender balanced programme
alternatives; identify needs, opportunities, and assistance packages; and evaluate proposals
and suggest alternatives.
• Coordination: Reintegration efforts should obtain maximum input from existing national
ministries as well as resident bilateral and multilateral agency missions and NGOs in programme
design. Integrated planning of reintegration programmes early on is crucial to avoid unnecessary
delays in project implementation. Lack of coordination increases the disconnects between the
demobilization and reintegration programmes and makes assistance from both less effective. It
also causes redundancy and gaps in programme components and increases the fragmentation
of projects with each other and between the reintegration programme and other relief,
reconstruction, and development programmes. Coordination helps implementation as well as
the hand-off to follow-on programmes. Reintegration planners should take into account any
benefits already offered through the reinsertion programme and try to link to them and increase
their effectiveness. They should also establish links with any other programmes from which the
target recipients could possibly benefit.
• Flexibility: Reintegration programmes must be flexible in order to respond to rapidly changing

needs. Local circumstances should also influence flexibility, and programme design should
embrace it to meet changing local factors or issues.
• Capacity-building: As emergency relief assistance shifts into the redevelopment phase,

reintegration planners need to recognize the host government’s lack of institutional capacity and
formally engage government ministries in the reintegration programme’s assessment, design,
and approval process. This is a crucial component of the eventual exit strategy.
• Selection Criteria, Priorities, and Targeting: Selection criteria for target areas will vary
based on need and context but could include variables such as the extent of damage, importance
of access, concentration of the target population (demobilized combatants, returnees, IDPs,
etc.), availability of local government institutions, participatory potential of the local community,
131
availability of labour, and linkages with parallel economic and social activities. During project
formulation, DDR practitioners should examine possibilities for cooperation with other ongoing
and planned activities, i.e. with local investment activities, area or community development
programmes, special programmes of assistance to refugees and IDPs, infrastructure
rehabilitation and reconstruction schemes, and programmes implemented by bilateral donors
and NGOs. They should explore the possibility of a pilot programme to correct any unforeseen
issues and include networking with other programmes through sharing of information, facilities,
or services and avoiding disparities in benefits.
• Design for Accountability: Programmes will need procedures to verify the status and
identity of XCs — especially those in an irregular army. They will also need procedures to
avoid having individuals “double-dip” from a single programme and from benefiting from too
many programmes to the exclusion of other qualifying beneficiaries. A good monitoring and
information system with close ties to various government agencies can help reduce fraud.
Steps in Reintegration Planning
This section includes suggested steps for reintegration programme planning. DDR practitioners
should not necessarily follow them in sequential order as many of the steps overlap. Programmes will
need to undertake some of them on an ongoing basis throughout the planning and implementation
process. Planners must begin work on reintegration at the outset of — and frequently before — the
disarmament and demobilization components of a DDRP.
• Study the Peace Agreement and Existing National policies: The peace agreement should
act as the starting point for DDR planning. Examine accord commitments and existing national
policies that the peace process may involve. Sometimes, the accord provides a timetable for
demobilization and follow-on reintegration activities. In many cases, it more broadly states
various reintegration components over specific DDR items and refers to transitional activities
that lead to donor conferences, implementation deadlines, or election dates without specifying
existing policies or linkages to organizations assisting the reintegration process.
• Conflict Analysis: In developing the DDRP, planners must consider proper conflict analysis to
determine the reasons behind the war and any persistent conflict fault lines. Doing so helps to
avoid aggravating sensitive issues and to prepare initiatives to address the sources of conflict in
the country. Planners should consider how the conflict’s causes can be or are being addressed
at the national, regional, and local levels. They should identify the specific difficulties and
constraints to be faced.
• Develop Eligibility Criteria and Procedures: Decisions on eligibility for the overall programme
will depend in large measure on the terms of the peace agreement, the security situation,
priorities of the programme, and the funding available. DDR practitioners will need to address
eligibility for specific programmes. Eligibility for reintegration programmes could be broader
than for disarmament and/or demobilization and may take into account the supporters and
family structure of the combatants. A broader, collective or community-based approach helps
bring communities together and may seem easier to apply, but it nonetheless faces challenges
in financing, timeliness, and implementation. In contrast, an individualized approach can meet
132
particular wants and desires but can be more expensive to run, create increased dependency,
and seem to benefit the aggressors rather than the community.
• Select Reintegration Approach: As mentioned before, reintegration planners face the

dilemma of whether or not to treat ex-soldiers as a special target group. Programmes must
strike a balance between dealing with XCs’ specific needs and not creating discontent among
the rest of their communities, which would jeopardize reintegration. Depending on the context,
programmes may target XCs as a specific group. In other situations, it may be appropriate
to target communities where there is a concentration of demobilized combatants and other
returnees or war-affected populations.
The issue of targeted programmes versus broader reintegration programmes is ongoing and
context-specific. Generally, planners should limit the number of targeted programmes and shift
as early as possible to community-based programmes and/or programmes benefiting all of the
most severely war-affected populations. Special benefits for XCs should end when the transition
period ends. As reintegration requires the dissolution of the former group identity, any benefits
provided on the basis of previous armed group participation would reinforce self-identification
with that group and postpone reintegration to civilian life.
• Select a Mix of Reintegration Programme Components: Choosing the programme

components of a reintegration programme involves facing trade-offs such as urgency versus
development, short-term versus medium- and long-term, expediency versus sustainability, and
control versus initiative. Ideally, planners will recognize such trade-offs and make decisions using
the objectives and priorities of the reintegration strategy. These need to tie into government
development priorities, which may not yet exist or remain in the development stage. Due to the
scarcity of resources available for reintegration assistance, the projects chosen should be the
most effective in terms of programme objectives and the most efficient in terms of costs and
benefits.
• Conduct Needs Assessment: A key

preliminary step in the design of a
reintegration strategy and reintegration
programme is to conduct a reintegration-
specific needs assessment of XCs and
communities. DDR practitioners often
lack the socioeconomic data and other
information necessary for proper planning,
programming, budgeting, resource
allocation, and monitoring and evaluation,
but they should proceed on the basis of
Children visit the DDR stand of UNOCI during the
realistic assumptions. As soon as possible,
commemoration of United Nations Day (24 October) in
programmes must make an effort to Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire. 24 October 2014. UN Photo #612742
collect needed data, taking into account by Abdul Fatai.
the needs of specific groups (XCs, women
133
and children, the disabled, senior- and mid-level commanders, etc.) to help create gender-
disaggregated information and a clear socioeconomic profile of the target group. The programme
should also profile the civilian population (including returning refugees, IDPs, and stayees) to
provide a benchmark for comparing the reintegration performance of XCs.
At the beginning of the overall DDRP, staff should conduct a needs assessment and update it
on an ongoing basis during the demobilization and reintegration processes. Ongoing collection
of data and monitoring of needs will be essential to identify when and how programme design
requires adjustment.
DDRPs should incorporate this information into a management information system (MIS),
including a database. Planners will need to access the data important to design programmes as
well as to monitor progress as soon as possible.
• Design for Desired Impact: In the early stages, planners need to define and establish
objectives for the overall reintegration programme and benchmarks for achieving programme
objectives. They should define the specific impacts desired for reintegration programmes at the
beginning to design programming specifically to fulfil those goals. In choosing and prioritizing
the objectives of reintegration programmes, planners must choose between urgency and
development trade-offs. Resolving this dilemma in reintegration programming depends on
considering the local situation — political, economic, social, financial, and security aspects —
and the priorities of the key actors involved.
An essential step in specifying the desired impact and goals of reintegration is to identify any
differences between XCs and their civilian counterparts as well as any factors that may hinder
XCs from achieving a similar socioeconomic status. This must include the development of a
monitoring and evaluation programme and the selection of clear indicators that can show the
progress made toward achieving the identified reintegration goals. The goals and perceived
needs of XCs are likely to change over time. This moving target complicates the task of
designing programmes; planners must identify reintegration needs early on to design responsive
programmes, but they must also have sufficient flexibility to adapt to evolving objectives.
Develop Inclusive DDR Strategy
A comprehensive and strategic plan of the overall peacekeeping/peacebuilding process is critical.

The broad outlines of that overall strategic plan provide a framework for the development of the overall
DDR strategy (including key elements of the reintegration strategy) to provide guidance to the actors
involved on how they can move from the immediate problem of recovering from a conflict to the long-
term issue of development. In developing the reintegration strategy, DDR practitioners should consider
and link to the national reconciliation strategy, the overall development and reconstruction plan (if one
exists), and the DDRP.
The strategic plan for reintegration should include:
• The overall policy and institutional framework within which demobilization and reintegration
activities will occur;
• The parameters of the reintegration effort;
134
• Methods of incorporating the views of the demobilizing soldiers; and
• The roles the government, UN organizations, donor agencies, and NGOs will play in designing
and implementing programmes.
While demobilization programme benefits are considered entitlements, reintegration strategic

plans and programmes should cast themselves as opportunities — the short-, medium-, and long-term
goals based on context, political issues, available resources, and capacity. Programmes should identity
immediate employment opportunities while supporting economic revitalization, promoting community
development, and increasing longer-term employment possibilities.
Authorities must designate or establish a high-level organization to design, manage, and coordinate
the reintegration programme. One organization should have overall authority and responsibility for
coordination, planning, and management of the diverse organizations involved in the reintegration
process including technical committees, participating institutions, field structures, and implementation
partners. Authorities must also designate the duration of the reintegration organization.
Estimate Timeframe and Phasing of the Reintegration Programme
Planners must consider the duration of reintegration programmes early on. Many estimates exist,
but most DDR practitioners believe reintegration programmes require a minimum period of 2–3 years
to get a programme underway and potentially an additional 3–5 years to measure the full impact of the
programmes. Therefore, it is essential to make a realistic estimate for the context of the conflict and
the realities that exist. A partial reintegration programme may lead to disgruntled XC and a return to
conflict. Too generous a programme or one that focuses exclusively on the XC may result in social or
public pressure or backlash and reduce the effectiveness of the overall programme.
Transition from DDR to National Development Programme
A reintegration programme is not open-

ended and should tie into the longer-term national
development programme. At some point, the
targeted reintegration programme must transition to
the overall socioeconomic development programme.
This will help reduce dependency among beneficiaries
and help build community. How and when a DDRP
ends is often a subject of great debate. Most DDR
practitioners support phasing out the reintegration
programme as the XC gain skills and abilities and
The ADDR began demobilization processing on a site at
become functioning citizens. This may vary depending
Anyama, outside Abidjan, rehabilitated by UNMIL and its
on the individual, but most agree that a community- partners. XCs lined up to turn in their weapons, receive
based reintegration programme is better equipped to demobilization cards, and begin reintegration. 25 October
meet these variable needs and social inclusion and
can become self-sustaining in the longer term.
135
DDR in Colombia »
DDR practitioners should note the example of Colombia. This is a predominantly government-
funded programme that has learned from many previous global programmes and created
what is arguably the most effective reintegration programme to date. The Colombian Agency
for Reintegration (ACR) is the coordinator of the overall reintegration programme in Colombia.
The XCs reintegration route is configured as a multidimensional system composed of eight
specific dimensions: the individual, Health, Family, Education, Productivity, Housing-Habitability,
Citizenship, and Security. These eight dimensions are combined into a tailored programme that
promotes human development. Reintegration experts or coaches accompany the XC and help
develop a personalized work plan and follow up to ensure the XC complete it. The work plan ties
into other national organizations, ministries, or structures that accompany the XC reintegration
route. The process tries to reduce the vulnerabilities while building capacity and generating
confidence in the individual and the community in which they live.
To date, the ACR has handled some 57,000 XC. Each XC stays within the system for a period
not exceeding 6.5 years. The duration varies depending on individual conditions and characteristics
of each demobilized XC, specifically the level of education that XC have to start the process.
• If a person is illiterate at the start of the process, they need to complete their basic
education to grade 12 and will nominally take 6.5 years to complete an intense programme
of education, skills, and psychosocial assistance.
On the other hand, if a person already has an advanced educational level, their tailored
programme spends less time on education and more on skills training along with psychosocial
assistance, and they will graduate much earlier.ii
ii) Available from: <http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/en>, last consulted 15 June 2016.
Section 5.7 Reintegration – Needs Assessment

This section provides a quick overview of the various types of information needed for planning,
implementing, and monitoring reintegration programmes and the methods of collecting necessary data,
frequently encountered problems, and options for addressing such obstacles.
DDR planning normally includes a needs assessment, but it is separated here for clarity. A good
needs assessment of the socioeconomic characteristics and employment aspirations of the future XC
in conjunction with a labour market analysis (local opportunity structure and institutional capacity) will
help planners improve the design of the DDRP. Designing effective programmes requires good data.
The question remains: Programmes need data, but how do you determine the labour market without
access to the primary recipients and the future region where they will reintegrate?
• Assessment of XCs: Collecting detailed information on the demobilizing combatants is critical

for reintegration planning and implementation. As part of the initial declaration of forces,
commanders sometimes provide lists detailing numbers, sex, ages, etc. of the dependents.
136
Some know their people well and know their skills and expectations, but programmes often need
a more thorough survey to fully determine such issues as areas of resettlement, educational
level, work experience, and employment preference.
DDR practitioners call this assessment a socioeconomic survey, and it records skills, capacities,
needs, family status, capabilities, and expectations to help create a profile of the demobilizing
combatants. It is important for this survey to identify the needs of specific sub-groups such as
rural and urban destinations, families, women, child soldiers, and disabled persons. This survey
helps programmes create the reinsertion assistance available upon demobilization as well as
aiding the design and funding of appropriate reintegration programmes and associated project
proposals.
• Assessment of Opportunities: One part of the planning equation is determining who

the XC are and what they want; the other is to determine what is available in the country.
This requires an assessment of economic opportunities and employment prospects for XCs
at national, provincial, district, and — when and where possible — community levels. This
opportunity mapping collects and analyses the job data on the demand side: the capacity of the
economy to absorb labour in specific sectors (i.e. the agricultural sector, available employment
and self-employment opportunities — national, local, general, and sector-specific labour market
analysis — opportunities for establishing small businesses and micro-enterprises, and land
availability in different areas). Programmes often use university students to help collect the data
based on context-specific collection questionnaires. Programmes often require additional critical
information on the institutional capacity of the country by region, sectors, and industries —
things like transportation capacities and networks, the banking system, training infrastructure/
facilities, and technical schools and education opportunities. This will be critical for communities
receiving large concentrations of XCs and their families.
The needs and existing skills of XCs must match the availability of training to avoid wasting
resources through over-training, under-training, or irrelevant training. Training planned without
hard data on needs and market demand emerged as major problems in several post-conflict
countries.
Common mistakes faced by many post-

conflict demobilization and reintegration
programmes include false assumptions
that the agricultural sector would absorb
most XCs and an overestimating of the
farming knowledge of rural XCs. In fact,
many XCs wish to leave the rural setting
and go to cities or urban settings for the
anonymity and perceived better economic
opportunities. Some entered military
service at a young age and never acquired
An officer with UNOCI compiles profiles of XCs during a DDR
farming skills, forgot how to farm after
operation in Attécoubé, Abidjan. 8 February 2012. UN Photo
years of military service, or do not want #504394 by Patricia Esteve.
137
to perform the back-breaking labour inherent in agriculture. Many of those who do engage in
agriculture may need to supplement farm work with off-farm employment to support a family
One reason why DDRPs often rely on untested assumptions is the lack of data and difficulty in
obtaining information on both the intended beneficiaries and particular localities. Urgency is
key, and poor assumptions, weak local input, and partial data collection can hamper programme
outcomes. Even with sufficient time, the resources (staff, financial, and technical) may not
be available or the security situation and lack of freedom of movement do not allow sufficient
information-gathering.
Methods of Needs Assessment
DDR practitioners have many tools in their tool box. A few of the more common ones include:
• Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA):

This is common and many models exist. Many
Expectations management »
bilateral donors and partners (EU, USAID, DFID,
CIDA, GIZ, SIDA, etc.) have specific processes This is always a factor that a DDRP
for completing PCNAs. Details normally appear must manage. Developers of DDRP
on their websites or through consulates and must take pains to avoid creating
embassies. The key for DDR practitioners is needs, desires, and demands of
to select the tool and refine a methodology for combatants for their reintegration that
needs assessment that best fulfils the objectives did not exist previously, nor unduly
of the tasking organization. Practitioners should raise the expectations of XCs over
discuss with the UN and other partners and the potential benefits of reintegration
collect and analyse data from respondents from programmes.
various groups. They should also hold focus

groups to derive qualitative data to supplement
the quantitative analysis.
• Questionnaires: Questionnaires are common vehicles used to determine the status of things
or to review circumstances. Staff often conduct them upon the entry of XC into a DDRP, but they
can appear at different times during the programme as part of the Information and Referral
Services. Experience shows the responses of combatants to these questionnaires often differed
between first arrival and their eventual reintegration into the community. Past programmes
found that having trained facilitators assist XCs fill out questionnaires is essential for a more
complete response due to a high rate of illiteracy among XC. Facilitators must have proficiency
in local dialects and train to avoid biasing the responses of XCs.
• Surveys: Surveys of XC populations conducted prior to the beginning of the demobilization process,
although often difficult to conduct, help to guide early reintegration planning efforts. Repeated
surveys during and following the demobilization process are essential to re-evaluate reintegration
needs and to adjust the reintegration process. It is important for programmes to survey a
representative sample from all involved XC groups. DDR practitioners need timely data from partial
surveys to inform further, more detailed reintegration plans and the demobilization process.
138
• Community Needs Assessment: Collect

Key Point »
information on specific programme-related
aspects (i.e. skills training facilities, damage to Prior to their demobilization, XC likely
infrastructure, population availability of target do not have definite (or informed)
communities, and commitment and capacity ideas about what they want to do after
to carry out designated responsibilities). demobilization have vague or unrealistic
Additional requirements of community needs ideas. Those engaged in fighting and
assessments include accessibility (e.g. ease away from home for a long time will
of access, transportation concerns, access for find it especially difficult to realistically
expatriate programme staff, and freedom of assess their prospects when they arrive
movement); the security situation; available at their settlement destination. Because
socioeconomic data and general conditions in of this evolution of perceived needs and
target areas; current programme coverage (if eventual outcome, it is crucial for DDR
any); community readiness, participation, and practitioners to conduct preliminary,
capacity; and estimates of labour availability, secondary, and eventually follow-up
investment capital availability, wage costs, and surveys of the XC community. This will
institutional capacity help monitor their progress toward

meeting reintegration goals.
• Pilot Programmes: It is possible in some
cases to conduct pilot programmes in
representative communities and extrapolate from their responses to the community at large.
This is not a one-size-fits-all solution, and programmes must adapt to different communities,
as they may vary greatly in organization; infrastructure; resources; and attitudes toward the
government, military, XC acceptance, optimism, representation, participation of community
members in community decisions and activities, distrust and fear, services they have and lack,
and their status and condition.
Section 5.8 Reintegration Programme Funding Issues

This section introduces various aspects of reintegration programme funding, sources of funds
(including formal and informal donor coordination mechanisms), obstacles to appropriate donor
involvement, and the need for early involvement of donors. These are intended as an introduction to
financing and funding a reintegration programme.
DDRPs are expensive to run and require good cooperation from all levels of government as well as
the international community. They should not exclude domestic funding as many governments have
funds to pay for military expenditures that can shift to help run the peace process. Depending on the
capacity of the State, DDRP may receive a broad range of domestic funding. Existing development
programmes may pause during the conflict, and the private sector may assist with both the provision
of training as well as much-needed funding for development and jobs. International pressure can help
encourage the government to utilize and redirect these existing sources.
Possible instruments to motivate greater government financing include requiring matching funds/
counterpart contributions at a stipulated level to qualify for any external reintegration assistance. Even that
may not motivate some governments (i.e. those that exhausted their resources in the war effort or those
that no longer feel obligated to support XCs).
139
Darfur Drama actors perform at El

Srief (North Darfur), as part of a DDR
outreach activity, organized by UNAMID
and supported by UNDP, UNICEF, the
North Sudan DDR Commission and the
local NGO FPDO. 25 July 2011. UN Photo
#480965 by Albert González Farran.
In virtually all past DDRPs over the last two decades, external financial support was essential to a
programme’s success. While some development assistance donors hesitate (due to their own mandates)
to participate in programmes that deal with XCs, many of them will assist once the combatants are
disarmed and join a community-focused reintegration programme with social expenditures such as
health, education, and social services.
Donors come in all sizes, ranging from small to very large. Multilateral donors are international
financial institutions (i.e. the World Bank, regional development banks, etc.). A UN mission has a funded
budget, but that budget does not cover reintegration activities — those funds normally come from a
donor conference. UN components such as UNDP, International Labour Organization (ILO), and the
IOM — not strictly donors — need to obtain external funding to implement programmes. Bilateral donors
are normally governmental organizations designed to promote relief and development and further their
government’s foreign policy objectives. They include the UK’s Department for International Development
(DFID), EU developmental assistance, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the US Agency for International Development
(USAID), and the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (GIZ), among others.
Different funding mechanisms exist for donors and programmes. Some are long-term, multi-year
plans, while others are short-term or quick-disbursing mechanisms. Contingency planning is important,
as well as considering the unexpected. Both can benefit from access to the more rapid and flexible,
quick-disbursing funding mechanisms.
Phasing is a common way of implementing a peace process. It is also useful for donors, as they
can plan their funding to line up with the various phases of the process. While it has advantages,
programmes must take steps to enable solicitation of donor funding throughout all phases, as donor
support may dwindle.
Programmes must take care to align to donor budget cycles and their procurement procedures to
help avoid delays, which may impact overall confidence in the peace process.
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Early Donor Involvement and Coordination
Donors must be involved and coordinate their participation well in advance of the implementation
phase of reintegration programmes. For demobilization and reintegration to proceed smoothly and with
maximum effectiveness, planning should begin well before troops assemble. Programmes must seek
donor support during early planning to budget funds based. The danger always exists that changes to
the peace accord could derail early plans. As such, programmes must take care to plan broadly, rather
than planning specific tasks that may change at the last minute.
Reasons for early donor involvement include the following:
• Adequate lead time can allow for the

timely delivery of assistance and allow
time for donors to determine if existing
programmes can expand to accommodate
XCs;
• Expediting a peace accord — the

negotiating parties might be more willing
to reach a settlement if they know of
specific programmes potentially available
to their soldiers;
• Donors are usually cautious and want

to see movement before committing
funds — this includes during peace talks,
and it can help encourage both sides to
seek an agreement early;
• Donor funding or provision of technical

assistance aids the government and other
organizations to plan and prepare for
DDR activities and other components of
the peace process; and
• Slow disbursement of assistance pledged

previously (i.e. during a roundtable
The ADDR began demobilization processing on a site at
conference) heightens mistrust and
Anyama, outside Abidjan, rehabilitated by UNMIL and its
tension between host governments and partners. XCs lined up to turn in their weapons, receive
the international community and places demobilization cards, and begin reintegration. 25 October
unreasonable internal pressures on the
government and signatories to the peace
accord.
IDDRS chapter 3.41 refers to these and other issues in more detail. DDR practitioners should take
the time to review them if they are called to assist in this delicate but critical phase of DDR planning.
141

Reintegration is a complex process with significant security, socioeconomic, and political concerns.
XCs often need assistance finding their place in communities and readapting to civilian life. In most
cases, the reintegrating XC belong to that country, that region, or that locality — they mostly are not
strangers or foreigners. In some cases, they have been victims of the conflict and did not voluntarily
choose to become a combatant — violence, loss of family, difficult circumstances, or abuse brought
them to it. For others, armed groups forcibly coerced them into their ranks and threatened the XC with
death if they left. Oftentimes, all sides suffered as a result of the conflict and now must move past the
negative social, economic, and political consequences of conflict — past the vengeance — and onward
to break the cycle of conflict.
Reintegration programmes seek to assist those trained in war to leave that life behind and begin
anew, living and contributing to a new community. Reintegration is not reconciliation — that takes
more time and is mostly individual in nature. However, reintegration is a crucial step in leaving the past
behind and opening the door to a new future.
The Cartagena Conference on DDR addressed many of these issues:
“Finally, DDRPs should take the interests and needs of

participants, beneficiaries, and the broader community
into account. Combatants have widely varying needs and
aspirations, and receptor communities may adopt a range
of stances towards persons attempting to reintegrate into
their social fabric. Effectively designing and implementing
DDR programmes requires that practitioners engage in a
participatory, open-ended dialogue with former combatants and
communities, both to elicit information vital to the appropriate
design of the intervention, and to provide information, as the
scope and objectives of the DDR process can be misunderstood
by the communities and combatants. Receiving communities
should be publicly informed of the aims, implementation and
meaning of the process. On the one hand this can increase
acceptance and on the other hand it can decrease possible
resentment.”12
Annex A provides a summary of the latest developed reintegration approach, called Community
Based Reintegration and Security.
12) “The Cartagena Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration” in International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Congress (CIDDR), June 2009, 20.
142
Suggested Readings
• UNDP-ILO, “UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income generation and
Reintegration”, May 2008. Available from: <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_
emp/---emp_ent/---ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_117576.pdf>.
• United Nations, IDDRS 4.30, updated 9 May 2014. Available from: <http://unddr.org/uploads/
documents/IDDRS_4.30%20Reintegration%20WEB.pdf>.
• UNDP Livelihoods and Economic Recovery in Crisis Situations 2013. UNDP, 2013. Available from:
<http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/20130215_UNDP%20
LER_guide.pdf>.
• Irma Specht, “Jobs for Rebels and Soldiers”, in Jobs after War: A critical challenge in the peace
and reconstruction puzzle, Eugenia Date-Bah, ed. (Geneva: ILO, 2003) pp. 73-110.
143
1. Which of the following is NOT 4. Vocational training for XCs focuses on

an essential function of effective _____.
governance?
A. reintegration into formal education
A. Executive decision-making B. political rights and responsibilities
B. Administration C. providing new and marketable skills
C. Legislation (law making) D. “catch-up” education programmes on
D. A judicial system livelihood and income generation options
E. Order
5. Key guidelines on education and training
2. The main difference between reinsertion for XCs rely on _____.
and reintegration lies in the fact that A. cultural considerations and donor
_____.
expectations
A. reinsertion is a longer process than B. inclusiveness, market demands, and
reintegration practical application
B. reintegration requires long-term external C. community participation and male
assistance while reinsertion focuses on employment rates
short-term safety allowances
D. public sector job creation
C. reintegration is a quicker process than
reinsertion 6. All the following components are key
D. contemporary reinsertion and reintegration issues in the social reintegration of XCs
EXCEPT _____.
programmes have the same time length in
all new DDRPs A. providing television and internet facilities for
distance-learning activities
3. Community-based reintegration focuses B. providing land for resettlement
on _____.
C. re-education of XCs in civilian life
A. how to provide XCs with individually focused D. providing agricultural extension services to
and designed solutions XCs returning to rural communities
B. how to provide rapid transitional support
for resettlement and short-term income 7. How can public information assist in the
generating activities DDR programme?
C. the cheapest cost per XC when DDR budgets A. Preparing the communities for the arrival of
are tight the XC
D. how to provide communities with tools and B. Inform regional stakeholders and
capacities to support the reintegration of XCs international NGOs
C. Educate the XC and their families on what
will happen to them
D. All of the above
144
8. When it comes to reintegration 10. Political reintegration allows for the

programmes, which of the following is transformation of an armed group
NOT true? _____.
A. They must be self-sustaining and stand- A. by preparing the communities for the arrival
alone activities of the XC
B. They must be based on assessed needs and B. into an illegitimate political party or similar
opportunities entity
C. They must include programmes for retiring C. into a legitimate political party or similar
members of the country’s armed forces entity and thus partake in the new political
D. They must provide agricultural services to process
the communities D. to avoid the lengthy delays in the formation
of a political party
9. What is the impact of social stigma on
XCs?
A. It makes it difficult to get a job in the private
sector
B. It makes it difficult to be seen as a hero in
the local community
C. It makes it easy to get a job with the
government
D. All of the above
Answer Key »
1. E
2. B
3. D
4. C
5. B
6. A
7. D
8. B
9. A
10. C
145
LESSON
Post-Conflict Issues and
6 Linkages to DDR
Formerly opposed
communities sometimes
continue their tensions
and distrust in the
aftermath of civil
conflicts.
UN Photo #522591 by Stuart Price.
Section 6.1 The Post-Conflict Security • Describe the key concepts of DDR and security.
Situation
• Understand the interrelationships between DDR
Section 6.2 DDR and SSR and SSR.
Section 6.3 UN Military Roles and • Describe the UN military roles in DDR.
Responsibilities in DDR
• Describe the UN Police roles in DDR.
Section 6.4 UN Police Roles and • Understand the key concepts of transitional
Responsibilities in DDR justice.
Section 6.5 DDR and TJ • Understand the linkages between natural
Section 6.6 Natural Resources and DDR

resources and DDR.
Section 6.7 Summary of DDR Linkages
to other Humanitarian and
Peacebuilding Programmes
146
LESSON 6 | Post-Conflict Issues and Linkages to DDR
United Nations Peacekeepers, joined by the members of the Patriotic Force of Resistance (FRPI), welcome the announcement of the
signing of the disarmament agreement with the representatives of the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). 28 November 2006. UN Photo #133295 by Martine Perret.
Introduction
Programmes that support the reintegration of XCs

and help to establish the mechanisms for the non-
violent management of conflict in the aftermath of
war have multiple means to achieve their goals. These
include security, transitional justice (TJ), reforming
security forces, building government capacity, restoring
and strengthening civil society, and enhancing human
rights.
Formerly opposed communities sometimes

continue their tensions and distrust in the aftermath
of civil conflicts. As such, DDR practitioners must
have mechanisms to promote cohesion and encourage
formerly hostile communities to work with each
other within a framework of agreed-upon procedures
that channel their competing interests and policy
differences into peaceful forms of competition and
147
collaboration. It is critical for DDR practitioners to make these peaceful channels more attractive than
taking up arms as the means for achieving group and individual interests. Other post-conflict political
problems and obstacles to reintegration include a shortfall in government legitimacy, a diminished State
capacity to undertake basic government functions, and a lack of experience by both the State and by
civil society with democratic structures and processes.
The post-conflict environment also offers opportunities. One of these opportunities is to reform the
State and its built-up systemic issues, which likely contributed to the outbreak of violent conflict in the first
place.
The four essential functions of government — executive decision-making, administration, legislation,

and a judicial system — must be restored or reformed to effectively regulate disputes without resorting
to violence. Former enemies should cooperate within the same or a revised political system, rather
than attempt to subordinate them through force, intimidation, or expulsion. This means using dialogue
and discussion to resolve the many issues between the former adversaries before government and
political institutions will be stable and durable. Parties must agree to the constitutional and financial
arrangements for government, which may include agreements about division of powers between central
and local governments and autonomy for certain regions or self-government for some groups. After
conflict, states may need outside help to reform civil services and build their capacity to administer
effectively. Parties will also need to agree on reforms that address the interests of minorities and
disadvantaged groups. Some possible responses include:
• Strengthening government capacity to carry out key tasks;
• Undertaking activities to strengthen democratic structures and processes;
• Strengthening electoral institutions, including support for developing political parties;
• Reforming the civil service; and
• Civic education.
In the short term following a civil conflict,

the task of improving governance may involve
temporary fixes such as an interim government with
international peacekeeping forces providing security.
In the medium term, the task requires building more
developed institutions to make national political
decisions, balance the interests of various groups,
and conduct security sector reform (SSR) (revised
and improved laws; a balanced military; and a more
representative, professional police force). These Faustin Archange Touadéra (centre), President of the
Central African Republic (CAR), and Parfait Onanga-
efforts must include civil service reform and capacity-
Anyanga (front, centre left), Special Representative of
building and developing constitutional provisions. It the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSCA, visit the
is important for DDR practitioners to require former town of Kaga-Bandoro, where the President met with
representatives of civil society and of armed groups, as
enemies to talk and work together. It may even be
well as UN partners. The president also visited sites of
necessary to include hardliners who are potential MINUSCA QIPs and DDR projects. 4 August 2016. UN
“spoilers” to the peace. Photo #688845 by Nektarios Markogiannis.
148
It is important for authorities to establish procedures and institutions that express the preferences
of the general population so new governments can wield legitimate authority and be held accountable.
Doing so will create a basis for the electorate and competing political movements to believe that the
public debate and electoral competition — not armed opposition — is the most promising way to pursue
their aspirations. Activities in support of this include creating political incentives for transforming armed
movements into peaceful political parties, devising rules for party formation and election campaigns,
organizing and monitoring elections, discouraging demagogic political campaigns, and empowering
elected legislatures.
Section 6.1 The Post-Conflict Security Situation

Uncertainty and insecurity typically characterize the post-conflict environment. These fundamental
challenges impact national security, public security, and the personal security of all and have a
detrimental effect on the prospects for reintegration of XCs. Within the post-conflict political, legal, and
social vacuum, criminality may even replace militarized violence as the principal source of personal
insecurity. Some of these issues may include:
• Increased crime;
• Continued human rights abuses (sporadic and systematic);
• A lack of accountability by security forces;
• A lack of civilian control over the military;
• Resistance to change by military factions and the existence of rogue military units;
• Low competence of police forces to perform the domestic security function; and
• The continued presence of landmines.
Society itself may be overly militarized with a proliferation of arms, disproportionate military
expenditures, and economic dominance of military-related production and expenditures. It may require
reforms beyond DDR including SSR, the creation of TJ mechanisms, restructuring of the economy, and
support for civil society.
In the aftermath of a civil war, national military and police forces may be weak or non-existent, and
the UN or other stabilization forces may be required to assist with — or even perform — many functions
of the State. This should be a temporary or interim measure while military and police forces reform and
retrain.
Mid-Long Term Security
Measures to provide security for the long term involve establishing both internal sources of order and
the capacity to provide security through means such as providing international assistance to reform the
security sector and the judicial system. This helps reduce the culture of impunity. The government must
demonstrate a capability of enforcing laws and providing protection to all law-abiding citizens including
minorities. This may require reform of the police so they function as guarantors of public safety for all
citizens. It requires the military to come under the control of duly elected and appointed civilian officials
and the separation of functions of internal security and external defence. It may also call for mechanisms
to monitor basic human rights violations, including international and domestic observer missions. A
149
corollary requirement is a reformed, competent, and impartial judicial system to adjudicate disputes and
enforce laws and to have competent courts, prisons, and legal counsel. Subsequent sections in this lesson
discuss this as part of the DDR and SSR and the DDR and TJ components.
Another important component is the development of a stronger civil society that fosters a peace
mentality by empowering local, regional, or national organizations dedicated to maintaining peace (i.e.
peace committees and community watch groups). These groups help prevent community violence,
mediate, serve as go-betweens, support local peace initiatives, and provide incentive and support for
local authorities to advocate for conciliatory actions.
Security Needs for Reintegration
Measures to improve security that also assist reintegration may include the following:
• National security – often through SSR, accountability of political and security officials, and
developing a competent military, competent police forces, and other security institutions
ensuring domestic security;
• Judicial and legal reforms – a professional judicial system that can impartially adjudicate
disputes and enforce laws, including courts, prisons, and legal advice;
• Electoral reforms – legal impartiality to protect political rights and civil society;
• Economic security – including land reforms, job protection, freedom of movement, and
protection of movement and trade; and
• The ability to prevent any militant forces arising either from within or outside the peace
process that choose to use violence, terrorism, and other coercive means — overtly or covertly —
to subvert the peace process.
However widely accepted the new framework may be, small, disruptive groups can derail political
progress through assassinations, paramilitary activity, and related activities. This could suppress an
open public politics and reignite the sources of violence.
Security Concerns of Demobilized Combatants
XCs who lay down their weapons and leave behind their identities as part of an armed group often
have concerns for their own physical safety and the safety of their family members. They may fear
for their rights and freedoms and may worry that any political or territorial gains made through the
conflict will be lost. Especially when one side wins a decisive military victory, the losing side will require
guarantees of protection and that they will not suffer reprisals after demobilizing and disarming. In the
case of a negotiated settlement, the non-government side may have similar security concerns.
XCs likely need material and personal security. Many need to see a safe alternative before they
will be willing to stop the fighting. Additionally, their leaders may need to feel sufficiently confident
that their legitimate interests will be respected. Without this confidence, there is no will for peace.
Some of the issues that affect material security include ownership of land, protection of movement and
trade, available work, and benefits packages. Police or paramilitary activity, respect for human rights,
protection of political rights and civil society, and free and fair electoral and judicial systems affect
personal security. Security of the person includes freedom of choice, ethnicity, and religion, as well as
freedom from slavery, torture, inhumane treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest, detention, and
exile.
150
Prince Zeid Bin Ra Zeid Al Hassan (left),

Chair of the United Nations Peacebuilding
Commission (PBC), and its eleven-
member delegation, visit the site of the
security and justice hub being built in
Gbarnga, Liberia. The establishment of
such hubs was an essential component
of the SSR priority for peace in Liberia.
13 June 2011. UN Photo #478010 by
Emmanuel Tobey.
Section 6.2 DDR and SSR

As both external and internal threats and circumstances change, so must the security sector evolve
to meet the changing security needs of the state. Many countries conduct a review of their security
sectors on an as-required basis. This is especially true at the end of an internal conflict or civil war.
These conflicts often result from years of neglect, poverty, inequality, or other root causes that escalate
internal strife to conflict. Different approaches may resolve these problems, including a peace process
and a peace accord. In many recent conflicts, the peace accord included DDR and SSR components. The
DDR process often leads into or sets the stage for the SSR process. Authorities should harmonize both
processes to reduce any possible conflicts.
The 2008 Secretary-General’s report, Securing Peace and Development: the Role of the United
Nations in Security Sector Reform, refers to SSR as:
“a process of assessment, review and implementation as well

as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that
has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable
security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and
with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.’1
“‘Security sector’ is a broad term often used to describe the

structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the
management, provision and oversight of security in a country.
It is generally accepted that the security sector includes
defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and
institutions responsible for border management, customs and
civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible
for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct
1) Report of the Secretary-General on Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform, 23 January
2008, A/62/659–S/2008/39, sect. III, para. 17.
151
and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included.

Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role
in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of
security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society
groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part
of the security sector include customary or informal authorities
and private security services.”2
The various DDR components have elements that directly impact the security sector. Proper
disarmament activities and design can go to great lengths to reduce the number of arms held by XCs and
even allow the security forces to focus on illegal armed groups and their weapons. On the other hand,
a poorly implemented disarmament component can worsen the security situation by leaving too many
weapons in society. Successful demobilization and reintegration activities can help the XC re-enter society
and reduce the rates of recidivism among them.
The dynamics of a peace process depend on the context of the conflict, the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the parties, and the outcome of the political talks/negotiations that may take months
or even years. The conflict and peace process may have seen a variety of ceasefires (unilateral or
bilateral), but at some point, the parties could develop sufficient confidence that an official ceasefire
is coming. This could then lead to a formal agreement and the signing of a peace accord. The accord
normally includes a broad timeline or sequence of events including key DDR milestones such as formal
separation and disposition of forces (including some form of concentration of irregular forces while the
regular forces normally return to barracks).
The politically driven peace process normally includes DDR/SSR issues. This depends on the context
and the relative strengths of the parties during the peace process. If one party is considerably stronger
than the other, it will probably impact the content of the agreement and how the integration/reintegration
and future DDR/SSR will progress. Additional considerations may be needed to address other armed
groups such as government, paramilitary, and local militias or community self-defence forces.
The CPA could include detailed provisions for both DDR and SSR as well as legal and political reforms
(i.e. a new constitution with possible changes to the form of government and some form of timetable
leading to future elections). DDR practitioners must take care throughout. Corruption, impunity, and
media politicization paired with under-representation of minority groups and the absence of political will
may pose further problems to the peace process and future restructuring of the new government and
even the armed forces.
In the aftermath of a civil war, local police forces may be non-existent, ineffectual, or partisan. In
post-conflict countries, individuals and groups often believe they must take up arms to protect themselves
against crime, which the police cannot or will not stop. Individuals and groups who armed on account of
persecution by police or government forces may not disarm until they have sufficient confidence in new or
revamped security.
2) Report of the Secretary-General on Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform, 23 January
2008, A/62/659–S/2008/39, sect. III, para. 14.
152
In the short term, the international community can fulfil some of the security needs through the
mission on the ground (i.e. peacekeeping forces, UN Police Division [UNPOL], UNHCR, NGOs, etc.).
However, this is a stop-gap or temporary provision and is inadequate for building a genuine sense of
security.
Measures to provide security for the longer term Recidivism: A definition »

involve establishing internal sources of order and
What determines the recidivism of XCs
capacity to provide security through means such as
from armed conflicts? In post-conflict
(re-)training; international police cooperation; and
settings around the world, there has
community-based policing including empowering
been growing interest in reintegration
local organizations dedicated to maintaining peace,
programmes to prevent XCs from returning
parliamentary oversight, and reform of the justice
to illegal activities or to armed groups,
system. These steps should help eradicate the culture
yet little is known about who decides
of impunity. Other steps include:
to “go bad”. We evaluate explanations
• Covering police issues in civic education
for recidivism related to combatant
campaigns;
experiences and common criminal motives
• Implementing community policing practices; by combining data from a representative
• Police training; survey of XCs of various armed groups in

Colombia with police records of observed
• Demobilization;
behaviours that indicate which among the
• Disarmament;
respondents returned to belligerent or
• Monitoring of cease fires; illegal activities. Consistent with a theory
• Demining; of recidivism being shaped by driving and

restraining factors, the results suggest
• Disbanding paramilitary and extra-legal
that factors such as antisocial personality
security organizations;
traits, weak family ties, lack of educational
• Restructuring the armed forces;
attainment, and the presence of criminal
• Reforming military education and training; groups are most highly correlated with
• Establishing/reinvigorating legitimate legal various kinds of recidivism and hold
institutions; and implications for programmes and policies to

successfully reintegrate XCs into society.i
• Taking actions to make the security forces
more disciplined and governed by the i) Oliver Kaplan and Enzo Nussio, Explaining Recidivism of XCs in
Colombia, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 May, 2016.
constitution and the rule of law. 3
The international community and governments must have the will and means to support reforms
to strengthen public security and eradicate patterns of abuse and military control. Without viable public
security, there can be no community or personal security. Authorities must implement a doctrine of
civilian citizen rights-oriented security and policing.
DDR and SSR linkages are contextual and must be well thought-out and not simply transferred in from
examples in other conflicts. Countries with conflicts stemming from ethnic separation such as Burundi and
South Africa incorporated the XCs into the new military, police, and other elements of the security sector to
3) OECD DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform, Supporting Security and Justice, section 7 (Paris: OECD DAC, 2007), 163-168.
153
ensure proper or balanced representation in this sector. In other countries, such as Colombia, this would be
unthinkable due to other ongoing conflicts and operations against other armed groups.
This graphic represents the roadmap of one possible form of DDR and SSR in the case where the
peace agreement includes reform of the armed forces:
DDR/SSR linkages-operational
considerations -Relative strength military and politically of
the parties
Nature of the peace -Detail of agreement

Military Defeat/Victory -Including operational SSR/DDR provisions
or more of a political roadmap
-Involvement of international community
Political settlement/CPA in process (UN peacekeeping mission to be
established)
According to victor’s will?
No or only partial DDR of First DDR of all combatants—

army/regular forces OR regular and/or irregular
Integration Demobilization
New army/reconstructed army
If all combatants — both regular and irregular — go through DDR, security gaps or voids may form
in areas formerly controlled by the armed groups of which armed groups not participating in the process
or organized crime can take advantage.
One of the ways to prevent this security gap is through phasing by time or by individual units (or
segments), fronts, or groups of the armed groups, staggering the reductions and recruitment into the
new armed forces, and keeping sufficient capacity and presence to counter whatever threat exists. The
difficult task of bringing together ethnically diverse and formerly opposed armed groups into a common
military requires time and confidence. The reconstruction of the South African Defence Forces provides
one example for how to do it.
Another option is to professionalize the new armed forces as a voluntary force with all sides agreeing
on ethnic quotas and clear vetting criteria for all former combatants and selection criteria based on
skills, abilities, education, etc. This can help reduce stigmatization and enhance the integrity of the new
armed forces.
IDDRS chapter 6.10 goes into great detail on the issue of DDR and SSR and points out a broad
range of related activities that planners and host nations alike should consider. The Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) “Next Generation” report4 and other UN documentation also review
this. Other documents, such as Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR,5 explore the interface
4) DPKO, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, (New York: United Nations 2010), 11.
5) Institute for National Strategic Studies, Monopoly of Force The Nexus of DDR and SSR, Melanne A Civic, Michael Miklaucic, eds. (Washington, D.C.:
National Defence University Press, 2011). Available from: <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/monopoly-of-force.pdf>.
154
Samantha Power (right), Permanent

Representative of the United States
to the UN, addresses the Security
Council open debate on “Security
sector reform: challenges and
opportunities”. The Council had
before it the Secretary-General’s
report entitled, “Securing States and
societies: strengthening the United
Nations comprehensive support to
security sector reform”. 28 April
2014. UN Photo #586534 by Evan
Schneider.
between DDR and SSR. This document seems to validate the assumption that DDR and SSR contribute
to the same ultimate goal — enduring peace. However, experience does not justify the associated
assumption that DDR and SSR complement each other or coordinate in practice. The document examines
the politics of DDR and SSR, the challenges of reintegration, problems related to implementing DDR and
SSR programmes, and lessons and recommendations on how DDR and SSR programmes can establish
or restore the State’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force and thereby support sustainable peace.
Section 6.3 UN Military Roles and Responsibilities in DDR

The UN does not have its own military and relies on Member States to provide the peacekeeping
force authorized by Security Council mandates. These forces assemble from around the world based
on standing agreements between the UN and Member States to contribute soldiers, airmen, naval
personnel, and their varied equipment (including weapons, armoured personal carriers, helicopters,
riverine boats, etc.) as needed to fulfil the mandate. Only those countries mutually agreed to by the
former warring factions in each case can provide military forces for operations inside and around another
Member State.
While security is the main role of UN military personnel in DDR, they work in a broad range of
capacities including observation, monitoring and reporting (by air, sea, or land), air support, clearing
routes of mines, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), and a host of other military-related tasks.
The makeup of the UN force is as varied as its mandate in each context. With that said, the military
component uses certain special terminology:6
• Formed units or contingents: These include a broad mix of military professionals drawn from
the various Member State army, air force, and naval personnel. Their specialities can vary based
on the need and mandate of the mission, the perceived threat, and geography in the field.
They most often come from the army — infantry, support, logistics, and engineering regiments.
They can be generalists or specialists in logistics, aviation, planning, or explosives and weapon
destruction.
6) United Nations, Table 4.40.1: The composition of the military component, “OG 4.40: UN Military Roles and Responsibilities” in Operational Guide to
the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), (2014) 183.
155
• Military Observers: UNMOs are unarmed officers drawn from Member States’ army, air force,
and naval staff, who meet specific needs and functions of the mandate. They normally speak
the language used for the mission and serve for a period of not less than 12 months. They can
operate in the mission headquarters or in field offices in small teams.
• Staff officers: Although technically part of contingents, individual military officers serve in staff
posts — both within the force headquarters and in various specialized positions where they are
integrated with civilian staff.
The disarmament and demobilization components are usually heavily military, largely technical, and
best assisted by the UN military component. As such, the UN military component contributes most often
to the following seven areas of the DDRP:7
• Pre-deployment planning: From participating in the initial technical assessment mission to

developing a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and contingency planning, the military component
can assist the DDR section in the preparation of its tasks and can help ensure that appropriate
assets will be available and phased to help the DDR task on the ground.
• Security: The military component often provides security for different areas of the disarmament
and demobilization programmes. These include the core functions of DDR process planning,
coordination, and implementation of secure movements throughout all phases of DDR from the
initial separation of fighting forces and the security of holding areas, cantonment sites, weapons
and ammunition storage areas, and the community reintegration.
• Information gathering and reporting: From the initial phases of mission start-up through
consolidation, movement of forces, and all phases of DDR.
• Information distribution and sensitization: Through all phases of DDR and for all areas of
the country where the XC will resettle and reintegrate.
• Programme monitoring and reporting: In conjunction with the DDR team and its access to
local communities.
• Specialized weapons and ammunition expertise: From review of numbers to safety and
security of transport and storage and eventually to destruction.
• Logistics support: To all phases of the DDRP.
Successfully concluding the DDR process requires a good understanding of the military’s capabilities
and limitations. Programmes must plan and phase the UN military activities well to match the rest of
the UN mission requirements. Mission priorities will vary day to day, and proper contingency planning is
necessary to ensure DDRPs proceed — even if slightly advanced, or more likely, slightly delayed.
7) United Nations, Table 4.40.2: The composition of the military component, “OG 4.40: UN Military Roles and Responsibilities” in Operational Guide to
the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), (2014) 183.
156
A woman walks past a police officer

holding a riot shield at the Bentiu
Protection of Civilians site in South
Sudan. 15 February 2016. UN Photo
#664155 by JC McIlwaine.
Section 6.4 UN Police Roles and Responsibilities in DDR
“Conflict and post-conflict countries are often characterized by a

collapse of public law and order and major security and human
rights deficits, leading to the erosion of public confidence in the
security sector. The presence of United Nations Police, however,
contributes to restoring popular confidence in the Host State
police and in rule of law structures as a whole. By promoting
a service-oriented culture, community interaction and citizen
participation, United Nations Police personnel assist the Host
State police in regaining the trust of the communities they
serve, which is a key factor for the effective functioning of the
national police. Ultimately, the greatest community confidence
builder is visible professional efforts by the Host State police
leading to tangible improvements in security, and it is towards
this goal that police-related peacekeeping efforts are directed.”8
In a post-conflict country, the internal conflict often compromises the domestic police forces. They
may be killed off, flee as refugees, or are co-opted by one side or another. In most cases, the domestic
police forces must rebuild and reform in some way. Accordingly, international police receive a training
mandate.
UN Police forces are made up of various international police and peace officers. They may be
individually seconded men and women or part of composite units of international police. They frequently
live in the community and mostly do not carry arms in their advisory capacity. In some contexts, they
exercise executive powers and carry arms in lieu of the local police until those forces reform.
8) Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations Police, A/66/615, 15 December 2011.
157
UN Police normally provides assistance to local

police as a monitor and mentor — or even as an
accompanier. They also provide training to local police
forces as a capacity-building measure. Formed police
units (FPUs) are rapid-reaction forces meant to deal
with large scale disturbances or riots. The larger, fully
mobile rapid-reaction police unit usually consists of
125–140 members and normally comes entirely from
one contingent. These units are self-sustaining with
The police contingent of MINUSCA, along with the
unit integrity and associated equipment. The mission
country’s national police, conducted a joint operation in
mandate defines their tasks, but they normally the capital Bangui, specifically in the Boy Rab area. The
include: purpose of the operation was to set up checkpoints at
all entries and exits of the Boy Rab area and to inspect
• Public or civil order maintenance tasks – all vehicles and drivers for valid ownership and license
crowd control and protection functions (UN papers. 26 February 2015. UN Photo #624250 by
Nektarios Markogiannis.
staff, property, etc.);
• Filling in the capacity gap of the new or modified host State police and conducting confidence-
building patrols and/or tactical support in more difficult areas; and
• Enhancing capacity through mentoring or monitoring.
Although UN Police have a primarily mission-related task, they assist various DDR tasks including:
• Coordination through good offices with local authorities, leaders, and communities;
• Assisting and advising the local law enforcement authorities on the route planning for DDR
movements and the maintenance of security and law and order as well as criminal investigations
within demobilization and cantonment areas;
• Improving (through local police) provision for the security of demobilized XCs while they
integrate back into the civil society;
• Carrying out confidence-building activities through advocacy and education on all aspects of the
social reintegration of XCs into the society;
• Assisting the military in clearing weapons from civilian areas through information sharing and
controlling movements and civilian populations; and
• Assisting local police in developing policies and capacities needed to facilitate close involvement
in the national DDR process.
Lastly, UN Police can assist reintegration activities by assisting the national police service in its reform
process through vetting its existing members and selecting new ones. This process of police reform
may include rebuilding and restructuring. This is a complex and difficult task. The military roles used in
conflict need to convert to community-style policing and support. It consists of partially restructuring
roles and even demobilizing police forces. Authorities must carefully orchestrate such activities to avoid
a vacuum in the presence of trained personnel during the transition period. In some instances, this
restructuring has included the reintegration of suitably qualified ex-guerrillas into the new police forces.
In other cases, the restructuring entailed removing military-style training and weapons from the regular
158
Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson

delivers remarks at the Panel Discussion
on “Transitional Justice as Transformative:
Building a Sustainable Peace for All”, co-
organized by the Permanent Mission of
the United Arab Emirates, the United
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the
Empowerment of Women (UN Women),
and the Georgetown Institute for Women,
Peace, and Security. 24 February 2015.
UN Photo #623895 by Loey Felipe.
police and transferring them to the national FPUs. Authorities must phase this carefully so the police still
have adequate capacity and/or weapons to counter criminal violence during the transition phase.
UNPOL is a key partner in the early DDR process to provide security, coordination, and assistance
with controlling the movements of the former warring parties. As the process progresses, their focus on
community-based policing can help with the social reintegration of the XC into their communities and
may rebuild the trust and confidence of returning refugees, IDPs, and stayees.9
Section 6.5 DDR and TJ10

The United Nations defines TJ as “the full range of processes and measures associated with a society’s
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability,
serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”11
In the same way, the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines TJ as:
“...a response to systematic or widespread violations of

human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and promotion
of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy.
Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice
adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period
of pervasive human rights abuse. In some cases, these
transformations happen suddenly; in others, they may take
place over many decades.”12
Taking these definitions into account, we can define TJ as the set of processes or mechanisms of a
transitional and exceptional nature used to overcome situations of serious violations of human rights or
International Humanitarian Law in times of internal strife and conflict to move towards peace and the
9) For further guidance on this key issue, please refer to UN IDDRS Chapter 5.40.
10) This section was co-written with Ms. Ana Maria Rodriguez, an attorney and independent DDR consultant who formerly worked on transitional justice
issues for the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR).
11) Organización de las Naciones Unidas, “Justicia transicional y derechos económicos, sociales y culturales”, Nueva York y Ginebra, (2014). Available
from: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR-PUB-13-05_sp.pdf>.
12) Centro Internacional para la Justicia Transicional, “¿Qué es la Justicia Transicional?” Available from: <https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-
Transitional-Justice-2009-Spanish.pdf>.
159
full establishment of the rule of law. In those contexts, TJ aims to protect the rights of victims to truth,
justice, reparation, and the guarantee of non-repetition.
Generally, TJ measures include mechanisms for truth-seeking and non-judicial truth commissions;
judicial mechanisms such as national courts, international courts, and hybrid tribunals; repair
mechanisms; institutional reforms like SSR; and vetting.
Some of the key lessons of TJ are:
1. Amnesties for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,

and gross violation of human rights will not be recognized by
the international community and UN and are inconsistent with
international law.
2. The relationship between DDR and TJ is not black and white.

Creative approaches are possible and context-dependent.
3. DDR practitioners must be aware of and consider questions of

human rights and TJ.
As such, there is no single formula for establishing TJ mechanisms. Therefore, these mechanisms
are context-specific and chosen in every case based on the type of conflict; the government; the peace
agreements; and the type, length, and nature of the conflict. However, international standards set
limitations to the application of TJ — especially concerning the prohibition of complete forgiveness
or amnesties for those who have committed serious violations of international human rights law;
International Humanitarian Law; and crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.
TJ Approaches
In accordance with the IDDRS, TJ has five primary approaches that DDR practitioners must
understand:13
• Prosecutions: One of the main objectives of TJ is to lead the investigations and judicial
proceedings against alleged perpetrators of a crime in accordance with international standards
for the administration of justice. The use of TJ measures lets authorities adjust a model to every
context. It can cover different prosecutions from a wide spectrum of possibilities, from trying
many perpetrators to focusing on the individuals who bear the most responsibility for the crimes
committed.
• Reparations: These are a set of measures that provide redress for victims of gross violations
of international human rights law, serious violations of International Humanitarian Law, and
violations of international criminal law. Reparations can take the form of restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. Reparations programmes have two
goals: First, to provide recognition for victims, because reparations are explicitly and primarily
carried out on behalf of the victims; and second, to encourage trust among citizens — and between
citizens and the State — by demonstrating that the new government takes past abuses seriously.
13) United Nations, “OG 6.20: DDR and Transitional Justice” in Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Standards (IDDRS). Available from: <http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>.
160
• Truth commissions: These are non-judicial or quasi-judicial fact-finding bodies. They have the
primary purpose of investigating and reporting on past abuses in an attempt to understand the
extent and patterns of past violations and their causes and consequences. The commission works
to help a society understand and acknowledge a contested or denied history and bring the voices
and stories of victims to the public. It also aims at preventing further abuses. Truth commissions
can be official, local, or national. They can conduct investigations and hearings and can identify
the individuals and institutions responsible for abuse. Truth commissions may also be empowered
to make policy and prosecutorial recommendations.
• Institutional reform: This means changing public institutions — including those that may have
perpetuated a conflict or served a repressive regime — and transforming them into effective and
accountable institutions that are better able to support the transition, sustain peace, and preserve
the rule of law. Following a period of massive human rights abuse, building fair and efficient public
institutions plays a critical role in preventing future abuses. It also enables public institutions — in
particular in the security and justice sectors — to provide criminal accountability for past abuses.
• TJ and the rights of victims: The TJ processes involve transitory changes in the law, and
consequently, the truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition as part of the catalogue
of rights of victims. The State must ensure these rights because they are essential to keeping a
sustainable peace and preventing the resurgence of violence created by the dissatisfaction of the
victims.
The relationship between DDR and TJ Measures
Governments have the great challenge of finding appropriate mechanisms for reaching peace
agreements. They must balance the rights of victims and the need to create conditions for building
peace, forgiveness, and reconciliation. In the criminal justice field, DDR practitioners should implement
measures that will lead to the satisfaction of retributive and/or restorative justice. To contextualize this
subject, this section includes case studies from Colombia after each topic.
Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions in DDR and TJ
The DDR and TJ processes can work together in several ways to facilitate prosecutions and ease the
DDR process. Some of those include:
• Information exchange: One of the most important things to consider for the exchange of
information is that information must provide the location of former combatants for legal proceedings
and for executing measures of DDR to improve their systematization. At the same time, DDR
practitioners should avoid sharing information that could be a spoiler in the implementation of the
measures of DDR.
• Cooperation of the XCs: One of the most important things the demobilized bring to both the
DDR and TJ processes is cooperation. Consequently, XCs must receive sufficient information
about each of the processes so that they will move to prevent judicial investigations and criminal
prosecutions limiting cooperation that DDR and TJ could offer former combatants. Likewise,
programmes cannot present DDR processes as a way to evade legal responsibility. They should
make this clear to demobilized groups from the beginning so that they can complete their DDR
process but also respond in court.
161
• Legal benefits: It is possible for programmes to coordinate the actions of DDR with the aim
of offering legal benefits in criminal investigations and court rulings determining the criminal
demobilization, disarmament decisions, the effective delivery of minors, and the successful
completion of reintegration into civilian life.
Truth Commissions in TJ and DDR
Truth commissions are important for establishing truth and reconciliation. They allow the truth
to come out on the basis of individual views — most often without any legal consequence. Truth
commissions worked well in many different situations including South Africa, El Salvador, and Sierra
Leone. The fact that an individual tells their story — their suffering documented and posted to a national
record — helps the reconciliation process. Truth commissions also play a role in providing the victims
with access to the truth. While truth commissions are not part of the DDR process per se, it is important
for the two to coordinate as it allows all — including XC and their families — to document their parts
in the conflict. The most logical timeframe for the XC to take part in a truth commission is during the
reintegration phase as they return and become part of society again.
The measures adopted by TJ processes should focus on ensuring the rights of the victims of the
conflict, and they can be more effective when they link with the DDR process. Assuring the rights of
Snapshot from Colombia »

In Colombia, Law 975 of 2005 applied to
demobilized persons of the Autodefensas Unidas
de Colombia (AUC). This act offered a maximum
penalty of five to eight years in prison for people
who committed heinous crimes or were involved
in serious violations or criminal acts against
international human rights law or International
Humanitarian Law. Law 975 was amended in
2012 by Law 1592, which required these people
to follow a special process to reintegrate into A Colombian guard stands at attention during a presidential
event in Bogotá to sanction the Victims’ Rights and Land
civilian life as part of the conditions necessary to
Restitution Bill, to which Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
keep the legal benefits they acquired through Law
served as honorary witness. 10 June 2011. UN Photo
975. #476164 by Evan Schneider.
In the case of Law 975 and its reform, active exchange of information between the judicial bodies
and entities that run the various processes of DDR is evident. Senior members of the group prepared
a list of people who demobilized and provided it to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace.
This entity certifies who demobilized under that law. It shares this information with the ACR, which
tracks those who have demobilized and those who have not started the process of reintegration into
civilian life. This entity is also in contact with judicial enforcement bodies to keep track of which of the
veterans are carrying out the reintegration process to keep the beneficial sentences received under
the act.ii
ii) Congresso de la Republica. Secretaria del Senado. Law 975 of 2005. Available from: <http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/
ley_0975_2005.html>.
162
victims in a peace process is essential. Doing so helps avoid the risk that the process does not “respond
with dignity to the victims and the press [does not] forget the offenses committed against them; which
entails a sacrifice to their just demands, for the sake of peace and reconciliation in the community.”14
Although the victims are not obligated to forgive the perpetrators, the international community
recognizes the satisfaction of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition as a necessary
step towards reconciliation and the establishment of a fairer society that can overcome the conflict.
Additionally, the objectives of DDR can work with the TJ process to increase security and create a
secure environment for post-conflict recovery, restore State control over the use of force, prevent the
renewal of armed violence, promote confidence in the peace process, and help reconciliation. Protecting
the rights of victims requires this environment.
Coordination between DDR and TJ can benefit the goals sought by both processes, such as the exchange
of information, or even help the prosecution of crimes committed during the internal conflict. In the same
way, the TJ measures associated with the DDR process can stimulate a successful reintegration by
promoting the completion of the various stages of DDR as a condition of obtaining the benefits of the
TJ process.
Furthermore, the synergy between these two processes can give legitimacy to the TJ process and
increase confidence in the DDR process. It also fosters credibility among veterans and the people of the
host communities particularly in cases:
• Where they know the former combatants did not perpetrate of serious crimes;
• When the former combatants return to their homes children who were recruited illegally;

Colombia’s Act 1424 of 2010 suspended the
criminal convictions of veterans conditioned
on, among other things, the signing of a
contribution agreement to the truth and
performing “repair and reintegration” into
civilian life. In the contribution agreement to
the truth, the XC commit to go to the Centre
of Historical Memory of Colombia to give their
version of the events during the conflict. The
truth as told by demobilized persons has no
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (centre left) and Colombian
legal implications or adverse effects on the
President Juan Manuel Santos depart the Presidential Palace in
XC.iii Bogotá, Colombia, for the nearby Plaza de Armas where Mr. Ban
served as honorary witness at an event to sanction the Victims’
iii) Congresso de la Republica. Secretaria del Senado. Law 1424
of 2010. Available from: <http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/ Rights and Land Restitution Bill. 10 June 2011. UN Photo
senado/basedoc/ley_1424_2010.html>. #476162 by Evan Schneider.
14) Camila De Gamboa y Wilson Herrera, “Verdad, memoria y reconciliación En Memorias.” En III Congreso de Responsabilidad Social Justicia Transicional
y Escenarios de Reconciliación : ¿qué soy capaz de hacer por la paz y la reconciliación?, ed. María Claudia Romero Amaya (Bogotá D.C: Universidad
Externado de Colombia, 2014), 35.
163
• When the former combatants surrender their arms to the State;
• When the illegal forces have, in fact, been dismantled; and
• When they have begun the process of reintegration into civilian life.
The connection between these two processes also helps reconciliation, especially in those cases
where the DDR package links with the remedies offered by TJ like XCs working as volunteers in the
receiving communities. Admission to DDRPs through the incentive of favourable treatment offered by TJ
measures can appeal to combatants, especially when there is pre-existing distrust.
It is important for DDR practitioners to note that the connection between the two processes must
work in such a way that the TJ process continues during the reintegration phase. This is especially true
with regards to the allocation of criminal legal benefits and obligations in relation to the satisfaction of the
rights of victims.
Final Considerations
Both DDR and TJ programme design must account for and not harm the other process. This
requires clear guidance and strong coordination between the different components as well as a good
understanding of their differences and their impact on the XC. TJ is an ongoing issue that must respect
international norms while also creating a new and flexible tool for post-conflict peace and stability.
Authorities must take care when developing and writing TJ legislation to make sure it includes people
with a good understanding of DDR. In the same way, it should operate with the aim of understanding its
impact on society and serve as a deterrent for future crimes.

Colombia made an important step in
reparations to victims through Law 975 of
2005. XCs receive an alternative sentence of
up to eight years in prison for crimes against
humanity, violation of human rights, and
violation of International Humanitarian Law. In
this context, people who are sentenced must
provide reparations to victims through various
Traditional dancers perform at an event in Cartagena, Colombia, to
measures ordered by a judge based on the reaffirm the political will for joint work between the Government of
Colombian laws of transitional justice. One of Colombia and the UN system. In particular, the event underlined
the obligations requires the XC to undergo the the objectives of the United Nations Development Assistance
Framework (UNDAF), among them sustainable development, peace,
reintegration process into civilian life, which
security and reconciliation, and support during flood emergencies.
seeks to prevent rearmament and thus ensure
11 June 2011. UN Photo #476181 by Evan Schneider.
guarantees of non-repetition. Colombia has
also implemented, within the obligations of the reintegration process, compulsory social service in
favour of host communities to promote reconciliation.iv
iv) Congresso de la Republica. Secretaria del Senado. Law 975 of 2005. Available at <http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/
ley_0975_2005.html>.
164
Section 6.6 Natural Resources and DDR

While DDR cannot take all issues into account in a post-conflict environment, it should recognize
the various root causes of the conflict. For example, the issue of natural resources (like gold, gems
and minerals, timber, etc.) may help fuel the conflict cycle of arms trafficking and funding the various
militias and other armed groups. DDRPs should conduct a thorough analysis of the natural resources
component and develop a gender-sensitive plan incorporating them into the overall reintegration and
redevelopment plan.
The peace process must consider what to do with illegal activities when the combatants are in the
process of disarming and demobilizing. The major question is how to convert these former illegal activities —
which may have connections to other armed groups or organized crime — to legality and bring them under
the legal umbrella of the State.
An additional difficulty during the conflict is the use of sanctions by states or the UN Security Council to
restrict the flow of these resources. They are not always effective in restricting the flow of those resources,
especially if those who are engaged in those activities have no alternatives. Furthermore, as a peace process
takes hold, it means that DDRPs must make a concerted effort to factor in all variables to ensure progress in

In the case of Colombia, XCs contributed
their stories and memories to the Centre for
Historical Memory, which helped create a better
understanding of the conflict and its impact on the
victims and society.
The need to balance the rights of victims with

transitional justice processes that enable the
DDR and peace processes is important. The ACR The flag of Colombia (centre) flying at United Nations
reintegration process included guarantees of non- headquarters in New York. 14 July 2016. UN Photo
#685750 by Loey Felipe.
repetition, a system to strengthen and overcome
vulnerability (with clear rules or agreements), and
the exercise of proper citizenship of the demobilized population, which helped towards peace
building and reconciliation activities with communities affected by the conflict.
It is important for DDRPs to create conditions in which people in the reintegration process offer
support and directly help the victims or the host communities in which they settle to aid with
reconciliation and assimilation. Their reintegration process may help to strengthen a stable and
lasting peace.
Lastly, it is important for DDRPs to ensure a relationship between its processes and the victims
by providing for collective reparations for victimized host communities and individuals directly.
165
lifting these same restrictions. This ensures that the highest number of activities can provide employment for
those reintegrating and provide much-needed income for their communities.
IDDRS chapter 6.30 addresses many of the key issues for natural resources and environmental
concerns that form a part of the greater human security dimension of the peace operation. It goes into
great detail linking aspects of natural resources, DDR, and the overall peace process and post-conflict
realities.
The UN Environmental Programme (UNEP15) provides additional information including the report, The
Role of Natural Resources in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration – Addressing Risks and Seizing
Opportunities. This report builds on the IDDRS and expands it further:
“The findings of this report and its recommendations target both

the DDR and natural resource management communities. It aims
to help DDR policy makers and practitioners to prepare conflict-
sensitive, gender responsive programmes that mitigate risks
posed by the potential capture of natural resources by former
members of armed forces and groups and to identify opportunities
to use natural resources to contribute to post-conflict economic
recovery, reintegration and sustainable development.”16
Section 6.7 Summary of DDR Linkages to other Humanitarian and

Peacebuilding Programmes
The DDR process is one of the many components or links in the overall peace process in a country.
It sits at a crucial juncture dealing with the former warring factions and how they reintegrate into
society. The success or failure of this process directly impacts the future of the overall peace.
There are many linkages to the peace process, and DDR is but one of them. Depending on the context
of the situation, the DDR process may or may not have links or ties to each one. At the same time, the
other components must understand the DDR process. Strong coordination is essential between the various
components, and a well-coordinated peace process is essential for the country’s overall recovery.
15) UNEP, “The Role of Natural Resources in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Addressing Risks and Seizing Opportunities”. Available at:
<https://reliefweb.int/report/world/role-natural-resources-disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-addressing-risks>.
16) UNEP, “The Role of Natural Resources in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Addressing Risks and Seizing Opportunities”. Available at:
<https://reliefweb.int/report/world/role-natural-resources-disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-addressing-risks>.
166
DDR and TJ Bibliography and Suggested Readings
• Louise Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition”, presented at the Second
Annual Transitional Justice Lecture hosted by the New York University School of Law Centre
for Human Rights and Global Justice and ICTJ, New York University School of Law, New York,
25 October 2006.
• Antonio Beristain, “Criminología, victimología y carcéles”, Tomo I, Colección Profesores No. 22,
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Facultad de ciencias jurídicas, 1996.
• Centro Internacional para la Justicia Transicional, “¿Qué es la Justicia Transicional?”, 2009.

Available from: <https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-
Spanish.pdf>.
• Departamento Nacional de Planeación, “Documento CONPES No. 3554 de 2008”, 2008.

Available from: <https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/3554.
pdf>.
• United Nations, “Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

Practices in Peace Operations”, 2010.
• United Nations, Integrated DDR Standards, 2018. Available from: <http://www.unddr.org/

iddrs.aspx>.
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Transitional Justice and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 2014. Available from: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/HR-PUB-13-05.pdf>.
• United Nations, “OG 6.20: DDR and Transitional Justice” in Operational Guide to the Integrated
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), 2014. Available from:
<http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>.
• Camila De Gamboa and Wilson Herrera, “Verdad, memoria y reconciliación en Memorias” in III
Congreso de Responsabilidad Social Justicia Transicional y Escenarios de Reconciliación: ¿qué
soy capaz de hacer por la paz y la reconciliación? (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia,
2014).
• Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, María Paula Saffon Sanín, Catalina Botero Marino, and Esteban
Restrepo Saldarriaga, ¿Justicia transicional sin transición? Reflexiones sobre verdad, justicia y
reparación para Colombia (Bogotá: Centro de Estudio de Derecho Justicia y Sociedad, 2006).
Available from: <https://www.minjusticia.gov.co/Portals/0/Foros%20Justicia%20Transicional/
LIBRO%20J.TRANS..pdf>.
167
1. What are some of the types of 6. Measures to improve security that are
programmes that support the also essential to DDR — and especially
reintegration of XCs? reintegration — include which of the
following?
A. Security, transitional justice
B. Reforming security forces A. National security
C. Restoration and strengthening of civil society B. Electoral security
D. All of the above C. Economic security

D. All of the above
2. Which is NOT part of government
functions with respect to DDR? 7. The Report of the United Nations
Secretary-General refers to the security
A. Provision of a new postal service
sector as _____?
B. Clear executive decision-making
A. a broad term used to describe the security
C. Enabling reform of legislation
structures and institutions
D. Establishment of a judicial system
B. the management, oversight, and control of
3. Parties will need to agree to reforms the security apparatus in a country

that address the interest of minorities C. A and B
and disadvantaged groups _____. D. None of the above
A. in order to strengthen government capacity
B. to create new and representative democratic 8. The Secretary-General’s report “Securing
Peace and Development” defines the role
structures
of the United Nations in Security Sector
C. A and B Reform as _____?
D. None of the above
A. a process of assessment
B. review and implementation
4. Which of the following does not
fundamentally challenge national C. monitoring and evaluation
security, public security, and personal D. All of the above
security?
A. Proliferation of small arms 9. How can UNPOL assist in the DDR
process?
B. Regional interest
A. Training and re-equipping new forces
C. Lack of unemployment
B. Vetting and screening of their own forces
D. Weakened social institutions
C. Both A and B
5. Measures to provide security for the long D. None of the above
term may involve _____.
A. establishing internal sources and capacity 10. Transitional justice normally aims to
protect the rights of _____.
B. international assistance
A. the general population
C. reform the security sector and the judicial
system B. victims to truth, justice, reparation, and
guarantees of non-repetition
D. All of the above
C. military and police officers
168
Answer Key »
1. D
2. A
3. C
4. B
5. D
6. D
7. A
8. D
9. C
10. B
169
LESSON
DDR Challenges and Current
7 Issues
DDR is a flexible concept

that can adapt to many
circumstances and
contexts.
Section 7.1 DDR History and Policy • Understand some of the history of DDR practice
and policy.
Section 7.2 DDR Programming Challenges
• Explain in general terms some of the challenges
Section 7.3 Community Violence Reduction
facing DDRPs.
(CVR) and Haiti
• Understand the key components of CVR and CVE.
Section 7.4 DDR and Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) • Explain the difficulties and challenges in
or Demobilization and measuring success in DDR.
Disengagement of Violent • Understand some of the key concerns of

Extremists (DDVE) corruption, private military companies, and
Section 7.5 DDR Measures of Success – the mercenaries as they relate to DDR.
Quantification of DDR
Section 7.6 DDR and Corruption
Section 7.7 Private Military and Security
Companies versus Mercenaries
and DDR
170
LESSON 7 | DDR Challenges and Current Issues
A man participating in a reintegration programme held at the National Service Camp in Nyala (South Darfur) shows his registration
card. DDR constituted an integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation in Sudan. The work was undertaken by UNAMID. 1 June
2011. UN Photo #474497 by Albert González Farran.
Introduction
This lesson introduces some of the challenges to

DDR and explores concepts and solutions offered by
DDR practitioners working in those areas. It contains
personal perspectives and interpretations that the
UN might not officially endorse. Where possible, UN
frameworks are cited and reflected. DDR is a flexible
concept that can adapt to many circumstances and
contexts. The challenges are numerous, and developing
a fully harmonized approach is difficult as each entity
brings different priorities to bear on the problem.
171
Section 7.1 DDR History and Policy

While the concept of mobilizing and arming for conflict and subsequently disarming and demobilizing
is an ancient concept, modern DDR is based on global DDR operations during the 1990s. The current
policies as established by the IDDRS synthesize lessons learned up to its publication in 2003. The
Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration managed to get broad
cross-cutting agreement between 21 different UN agencies, plans, programmes, and funds along
with agreement from the European Union (EU) and understandings with many bilateral donors. Many
missions applied the IDDRS with varying degrees of success.
From an administrative point of view, one of the main issues with the IDDRS was its lack of a
schedule or easy mechanism for updating the document. As such, it became static rather than a living
document. The problem is that circumstances change. Missions change and evolve and DDR must
evolve with it. A broad, blanket policy for DDR does not evolve easily as each partner has its own
perspective of what should change and how to do it. As such, finding common ground has not been
easy. Additionally, funding cuts due to the 2009 financial crisis caused many entities to scale back
to preserve core activities. The Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR lacked continued funding and
subsequently contracted. Opportunities for cooperation were missed and members had to go their own
way to further their policies to meet their own organizational needs.
Today, the IDDRS remains a useful toolbox of ideas and concepts that work well under certain
circumstances and contexts, but DDR practitioners need to adapt or modify the ideas to meet the new
demands of current missions. In some cases, programmes can adjust or modify the IDDRS to meet
some current needs, but in other cases it simply does not fit. Practitioners are creating and applying
new ideas and concepts in the field to meet operational necessities. Conflict dynamics are shifting. New
factions are emerging that push the definition of combatants and how to meet their needs. Situations
change, lose clarity, and no longer fit into standard DDR policy and operations. As such, entities adjust
procedures and test new policies to meet the circumstances on the ground.
Today’s situations are challenging some of the basic premises of DDR. DDR is operating under
circumstances never previously considered. For example, many DDR practitioners previously believed
that DDR could not bring security by itself; rather, it must be established in a secure environment and
based on a peace agreement. If that were the case, where was this secure environment in Somalia, Mali,
or the Central African Republic? Not only were these situations insecure, but some cases lacked a CPA
within which to function. Forces previously undertook DDR voluntarily after a peace accord, but how
does one conduct DDR during an ongoing conflict, such as in Colombia or Somalia? These are distinct
environments, but the tools must evolve to meet the needs of DDR operations in these new contexts.
Another problem is that DDR may receive insufficient priority from the warring factions as politics,
policies, personal ambitions, resource sharing, and other issues may cloud the sombre realities on the
ground. Assumptions are many and details are few. Timelines may be unrealistic and delays frequent,
security is tenuous, resources are late or insufficient, and host or receiving communities are insufficiently
involved.
172
DDR teams in the field face these and other issues as they attempt to provide a process for the XC
facing a new environment. Many have spent years in the bush and do not have adequate resources and
skills for their new lives — be it in the city or as farmers. Many are illiterate and must start over to gain
the skills necessary to function in a modern society. Other difficulties include modern technology, social
media, and weak social acceptance issues coupled with daunting routines of city life (e.g. handling
money, transport, timeliness, budgeting, employment, etc.). Post-conflict contextual issues frequently
mean that a DDRP may reintegrate an XC back into a society only to face the common cycle of poverty
and under-employment or unemployment.
The social stigma of status as an XC may be high, and forcing XCs to move to new locations without
the support of their families or former social networks may exacerbate the difficulty of reintegrating.
Potentially jobless, poor, and needing to support their families, XCs are vulnerable to re-recruitment
or worse — a life of crime. Disarmament and demobilization frequently make the headlines and have
priority and visibility, but as the XCs rejoin society, the focus shifts to other issues. Proper long-term
reintegration takes a back seat and often remains incomplete.
DDR in Peacekeeping and Reconstruction »

DDR activities play an increasingly important
role in peacekeeping and the post-conflict
reconstruction process.
1. DDR is one of many elements in a peace

process that can serve as a comprehensive
instrument to support a peace-building
framework.
2. DDRPs have operated as preventive

Civilians fleeing fighting that broke out and seeking refuge wait
interventions, core components of peace
outside a compound of UNMISS in Bor. 18 December 2013. UN
agreements, and post-conflict reconstruction
Photo #575265 by Hailemichael Gebrekrstos.
initiatives independent of formal peace deals.
3. The context in which DDRPs currently operate is increasingly complex. The approach to DDR
must adapt to the country or region in which it operates. Although the integrated DDR standards
lay down policy based on lessons learned, they do not provide a panacea. DDR practitioners must
understand that just as situations vary, so do possible solutions.
4. At the same time, DDRPs are not magic bullets with the potential to assist in every aspect of the
post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction process.
5. DDRPs alone cannot prevent further conflict and restore stability on their own. Other economic,
political, and social reforms must accompany them. DDR practitioners must therefore conceptualize,
design, plan, and implement programmes within a wider recovery and development framework.i
i) Peacebuilding initiative, “Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, & Reintegration: DDR & Peacebuilding Processes”. Available from:
<http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index4a2d.html?pageId=1819>.
173
One such example is the recent failed DDRP in South Sudan. A focus on power, resources, and
politics — instead of governing a new country — opened up old tribal enmities and gave rise to a new
civil war. Although DDR did not cause these issues, the DDRP was insufficient:
“Ultimately, close to half of the DDR target ‘group’ was

demobilized. Less than a quarter of the target were
reintegrated. This indicates that the majority of XCs were never
reintegrated. Being jobless and redundant, they were easily
promised economic fortunes and reabsorbed in different militia
or rebel groups fighting the government, the latest group being
under the general command of the former vice president-Riek
Machar. On December 15, 2013, Riek Machar attempted a coup
d’état and sustained rebellion against the government because
of the unpopularity of the government particularly among the
XCs and some factions within the SPLM/A.”1
DDR does not need to fail as demonstrated

by the ongoing success of the Colombian
government DDRP run by the Colombian
Agency for Reintegration (ACR). While the
context is different, it operates despite an
ongoing conflict and in serious circumstances
of narco-criminality. The programme stems
from the initial Programme for Reincorporation
to the Civil Life (PRVC) run by the Ministry
of Interior and Justice from 2003–2006. The
High Presidential Council for Reintegration,
Event participants during the signing ceremony of the Colombian
created in September 2006, aimed to meet Peace Agreement in Cartagena. 26 September 2016. UN Photo
the massive collective demobilization process #696425 by Rick Bajornas.
of the AUC (Paramilitary Groups) and raise

awareness that reintegration needed a sustainable, long-term programme. Renamed the Colombian
Agency for Reintegration in 2011, it oversees the reintegration of some 47,000 combatants in a well-
designed, comprehensive, and multi-year programme. Its programmes meet the need of the larger
collectively demobilized groups of paramilitaries.2
Section 7.2 DDR Programming Challenges

DDRPs often face a range of challenges from time and resource limitations to unrealistic timelines,
limited or delayed funds, and a host of other issues. Although the IDDRS has not always evolved with
changing circumstances or context on the ground, individual countries and UN departments, agencies,
plans, programmes, and funds may review and update their relevant policies to meet these new challenges.
1) Robert Turyamureeba, “The CPA-DDRP in South Sudan: What went wrong?”, ALC Research Report #7, 1 October 2014, (Nairobi and London: African
Leadership Centre, 2014), 2.
2) Cornelis Steenken, personal observations and numbers from the ACR, “La Reintegración en cifras”. Available from: <http://www.reintegracion.gov.
co>.
174
DPKO developed the Second Generation DDR Practices in Peace Operations in January 2010. It
listed several challenges:
“1. Lack of political will – This is systematic in the cases examined,

with the exception of Liberia. While peacekeeping operations
have mandates to assist national actors with the design and
implementation of DDR, most case studies demonstrated that,
without strong political will, DDR cannot progress.
2. Inadequate DDR and SSR links – In all [examined] cases,

DDR-SSR links have not been well developed. Many questions
arise on how to include irregular armed groups, militias, and
gangs in the peace process. Weapons are still in circulation
even where disarmament has occurred, or where the process
has been superficial or symbolic, which undermines SSR. In
addition, some ill-conceived community security mechanisms
can threaten present alternative/competing forces or emergent
local police structures.
3. Poorly regulated natural resources, illicit drugs, and organized

crime – In all the countries examined, it is widely acknowledged
that there are political elites who are involved in drug
production and trade or natural resource exploitation and in
some cases organized crime, which undermines State authority
and legitimacy. It was further noted that natural resource
exploitation continues to fund violence (e.g. Afghanistan) and
illegal activities (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia), threatening
the likelihood of success for state building and undermining
efforts to establish or restore the rule of law. These issues also
challenge DDR efforts, as has been the case in Afghanistan,
Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia.
4. Economic insecurity – There is a lack of economic security

in each of the cases examined, which links increasingly to
the issue of the sustainability of DDR and wider stabilization
efforts. There appear to be deep-rooted assumptions that in
post-conflict settings, economic recovery will occur, providing
absorption capacity for former combatants and other war
affected people. Yet, evidence for this is severely limited. In
post-conflict settings, there is often a lack of diversification in
the economy and heavy dependence on particular resources
(e.g. Liberia; Afghanistan).
175
Officers of UNOCI conduct a DDR

operation with XCs in the Abobo
area of Abidjan. 1 February 2012.
UN Photo #504397 by Hien
Macline.
5. Integration and coordination mechanisms – While the UN is

always challenged by coordination and integration issues in
complex settings, with Second Generation DDR, the challenges
are even greater given the scope and breadth of the activities
involved and the necessary links between security and
development work. While there are commendable efforts to
address challenges to effective coordination and integration,
there remain significant challenges to UN missions around the
coordination of Second Generation DDR efforts. In Afghanistan,
in addition to the vast range of actors with varied interests
operating within the country, coordination between the ISAF
and UNAMA is at times difficult as they operate on two different
but interconnected Security Council mandates.”3
These conditions persist to the present day with many missions facing a broad set of challenges
requiring innovative solutions to meet the hardened attitudes of the warring factions. Security
guarantees are hard to negotiate and write into an accord — and even harder to believe in on the
ground after prolonged conflict. This is made worse in an era where many missions are spread thin, with
negative effects for all components. In many cases, DDR has too many tasks and too few resources —
both in budgets and staff. Creating strong guarantees linked to a fixed timeline — including phased
implementation of key elements and a strong conflict resolution mechanism — are some of the options
programmes may use to advance these delicate negotiations and missions on the ground.
With respect to reintegration, the IDDRS reintegration module is one of the few updated and
modified documents to include new and current issues. The 2013 UNDP evaluation of its reintegration
programmes pointed out some of these updates, while country programmes and headquarters reviews
identified the others. The UNDP evaluation covered the period from 2007–2012 and reviewed all relative
documentation for each programme.
3) United Nations, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, (New York: United Nations,
2010), 15.
176
Based on the findings, the UNDP evaluation team identified the following lessons and best practices:
• Measurement and review of reintegration initiatives depends on the quality of impact-

monitoring and assessment mechanisms.
• Mainstreaming conflict analysis in DDR facilitates sensitive programming and implementation

in difficult political contexts.
• Inter-agency cooperation in reintegration processes gathers the comparative advantages,

expertise, and added value of each particular UN agency.
• An emphasis on community involvement, local ownership, and XCs’ personal investment in

projects can help contribute to the success of reintegration programmes.
• Targeted gender-specific support increases the ratios of women participating in reintegration

processes.
• Customized assistance in the last sequences of a reintegration process has a key impact on
sustainability of individuals and associated groups.
• An ideal DDR design considers a mix of individually focused reinsertion/reintegration

initiatives and community-based initiatives.
• Community Security Structures are initiatives that do not replace traditional DDR but act as
an alternative, complement, or follow-up of a DDRP.
• The success of community-recovery initiatives depends in part on the proportions of XCs

per capita.
• A relevant and successful training programme focuses on employment-market opportunity

mapping and assessment.
• Training is not reintegration in itself; it is a means to support an overall reintegration

process.ii
ii) Paul Bonard and Yvan Conoir. Volume I - Final Evaluation Report Independent Consultants: Paul Bonard & Yvan Conoir. Sabine Cornieti and Jon
Grosh, eds., 8. Available at: <https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/6162#>. (Last consulted 25 June 2016.)
More work is needed. Successful reintegration of XC into a society requires proper assessments and
analysis; flexible, gender-sensitive approaches to both individual and community participation; along
secure living conditions; and sustainable employment. It requires continued good work and dedication
from all members of the DDR team as well as good efforts and goodwill from the XC to reintegrate into
the new society.
Section 7.3 Community Violence Reduction and Haiti

The set-up of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) included DDR. It was a classic
DDRP established to deal with disarming the Haitian Armed Forces. When it became evident that the
programme was unnecessary for its intended purposes, its aim shifted to deal with the ever-present
threat of gangs. This demonstrated the flexibility of DDR and the creativity of the mandate:
“...following the 2004 crisis in Haiti. Notwithstanding early

attempts to undertake a conventional (or first-generation)
177
DDRP, it became quickly apparent that such an approach was

ill-suited to urban armed gangs with ties to political elites
and organized crime. A new community-oriented model was
swiftly developed to address gangs, who in form, behaviour
and motivation were distinct from the military-style units that
were typically the focus of DDRPs around the world. Building
on crime and violence prevention models tested in Latin
America and other parts of the world, MINUSTAH developed a
Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programme.”4
This was a combined effort between

national and UN entities (UNDP, DPKO [now
DPO], UNIFEM [now UN Women], and UNICEF)
along with “Viva Rios” favela experience in
an integrated office coordinating at all levels
with the international, national, and local
communities to demobilize and reintegrate
criminal gangs.
“Instead of marginalizing gangs,

they explicitly brought les bazes The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
[the gangs] into an iterative Community Violence Reduction (CVR) Section worked with the
Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI) to help
process of negotiation, dialogue, disenfranchised women in at-risk neighbourhoods across Port-au-
and ultimately self-regulation.”5 Prince, Haiti. 17 August 2011. UN Photo #559918 by Logan Abassi.
The CVR programme included close work with the affected communities and their organizations to jointly
develop activities that would promote dialogue and action in the community regarding ways to encourage
peace. This work also required close coordination with relevant government ministries — Employment,
Education, Women, Youth, Culture, and Sport — to sponsor and promote peace initially through small steps
such as sports, music, dance, artists’ exhibitions, and theatre. As confidence grew, other opportunities
emerged through community collaboration to host informal community forums, formal debates, and
workshops to stimulate discussion about violence in the community and how to work together towards
peace. Some CVR vocational training projects focused on peace through good works; reclamation of problem
areas; cleaning of waterways; and reconstruction of community centres, roads, and sports fields.
The CVR programme was an adaptation of some of the reinsertion concepts of DDR that originated
from the DDR team in Sierra Leone. This demonstrated that innovative and important tools and ideas
exist built on sound principles and adaptable to meet the needs of local situations and contexts. It also
demonstrated the flexibility of DDR and how the application of DDR in peacekeeping missions must be
free to adapt and innovate.
4) Robert Muggah, Desmond Molloy, and Maximo Halty, “(Dis)integrating DDR in Sudan and Haiti? Practitioners’ Views to Overcoming Integration
Inertia,” in Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War, Robert Muggah, ed. (Milton Park, UK: Routledge,
2009), 213.
5) Robert Muggah, “Stabilization and Humanitarian Action in Haiti”. Available from: <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Muggah/
publication/264311028_Stabilization_and_Statebuilding_in_Haiti/links/53e2705a0cf216e8321ba912/Stabilization-and-Statebuilding-in-Haiti.pdf>.
178
“[CVR] aims to create economic

opportunities in neighbourhoods prone
to armed violence — hopes that the
State draws on the experience gained
in the areas of CVR’s intervention and
expands its programme of vocational
training in other areas affected by
community violence… Since 2007,
more than 2,500 young people
from Haiti’s most disadvantaged
neighbourhoods — especially those in
A view inside the waterfront community of Wharf Jeremy in
the West, Artibonite and North of the Port-au-Prince, Haiti, where the UN Stabilization Mission in
country — have received vocational Haiti (MINUSTAH) Community Violence Reduction Section
and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have
training for six months or more funded
employed over two hundred residents in projects to repair
by [the MINUSTAH] CVR programme. roads and drainage systems. 12 September 2012. UN Photo
The courses offered cover masonry, #525842 by Logan Abassi.
electricity for buildings, carpentry,

agriculture and livestock, sewing and
mechanics.”6
Section 7.4 DDR and Countering Violent Extremism or

Demobilization and Disengagement of Violent Extremists
This section introduces the concept of countering violent extremism (CVE), looks at some of the
key issues, examines how they impact DDR, and observes what the UN and other international actors
(such as the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization [ICSR] and the Global Counterterrorism
Forum [GCTF])7 are doing to address these challenges from a policy and operational perspective.
In many ways, DDR has been a victim of its own success, growing and evolving beyond the confines
of the IDDRS — often through trial and error — to meet the needs of missions in the field. Some say
that DDR is designed to function inside a secure environment — not to establish a secure environment.
Yet many current missions use elements of DDR to provide a vehicle for establishing a more secure
environment.
As this is an evolving issue, there is no single definition. This lesson uses the term CVE. The 2014
DDR Planning Workshop in Oslo, Norway, stated:
“The terms de-radicalization and disengagement describe

processes whereby individuals (or groups) cease their
involvement in organized violence and/or terrorism. However,
while de-radicalization aims for substantive changes in
individuals’ (or groups’) ideology and attitudes, disengagement
concentrates on facilitating behavioural change, that is, the
6) Thomas Kontogeorgos, Chief of the CVR Section of MINUSTAH. Available from: <https://www.un.int/news/haitiminustah-agreement-regulate-
vocational-training-risk-youth>.
7) Additional information on the GCTF is available at <www.thegctf.org/>.
179
rejection of violent means. According to John Horgan, ‘the

disengaged terrorist may not be ‘de-radicalized’ or repentant
at all. Often physical disengagement may not result in any
concomitant change or reduction in ideological support.”6
Additionally, many authors distinguish between collective and individual de-radicalization and/or
disengagement, depending on whether the process is led by or aimed at individuals or entire groups.
In summary:
• Disengagement means ceasing to engage in violence (behavioural de-radicalization).
• De-radicalization means abandoning extremist beliefs (cognitive de-radicalization).
• Counter-radicalization means preventing vulnerable individuals/communities from being

radicalized in the first place.
• Some authors distinguish between DDVE »

individual and collective de-radicalization. UN researchers James Cockayne and Siobhan
• CVE is a combination of de-radicalization O’Neil argue for Member States to support
and counter-radicalization at both the the development of a new conceptual and
individual and the collective or group practical approach, drawing on both DDR and
levels.8 CVE, for DDVE, resting on three legs, and

intended to support both UN DDR efforts in
This discussion led to further study in order to
the field, and UN support to Member States
develop tools for missions dealing with extremists,
dealing with foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs)
such as those in Somalia (Al-Shabaab) and Mali
at home:
(Ansar Dine and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), among others). In 2015, UN University 1. A new practice framework for demobilizing
conducted a review of current DDR missions and disengaging combatants and violent
titled UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: extremists, integrating lessons from both
Is It Fit for Purpose?. It examined the new and DDR and CVE;
expanded UN missions and the evolving roles
of DDR, especially in the context of offensive 2. A detention and internment framework for
military operations, counterterrorism, CVE, and application in DDVE contexts; and
non-permissive environments.
3. A cheap, scalable case management
The report is an independent “collection system to track DDR and CVE participants
of think pieces” and is not official UN policy. and allow more detailed risk management.iii
However, it does provide important insights into
iii) United Nations University, UN DDR in an Era of Violent
the changing context of DDR based on current Extremism: Is it Fit for Purpose?, James Cockayne and
expanded mandates and roles and makes some Siobhan O’Neil, eds. (United Nations University, 2015).
Available from: <http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6149/
useful policy suggestions. It also suggests a UNDDRinAnEraofViolentExtremism.pdf>.
name for this emerging field of practice —

“demobilization and disengagement of violent
extremists” (DDVE).9
8) Peter R. Neumann. “ICSR Report 2010 Prisons and Terrorism, Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries”, (ICSR, 2010), 14.
9) United Nations University, UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is it Fit for Purpose?, James Cockayne and Siobhan O’Neil, eds. (United Nations
University, 2015).
180
Image from a panel discussion on “Media

and Information Literacy: Educational
Strategies for the Prevention of Violent
Extremism”. The event was co-organized
by the United Nations Alliance of
Civilizations (UNAOC) and United Nations
Academic Impact (UNAI), Department of
Public Information. 10 February 2017.
UN Photo #714305 by Manuel Elias.
Furthermore, on 23 September 2015, Hedayah and the Global Centre on Cooperative Security
organized two panel discussions on the margins of the UN General Assembly titled “Perspectives on
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Challenges and Opportunities for Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE)”:
“The two panels explored issues related to the lessons learned

and future challenges for rehabilitation and reintegration, as
part of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration)
efforts particularly within the framework of countering violent
extremism. This framework specifically cites the Global Counter-
Terrorism Forum’s Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for
Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders.
»» The first panel presented relevant cases from Northern Ireland,

Colombia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. The speakers shared
applicable lessons learned through country-specific case studies.
»» The second panel included presentations from experts and

practitioners, which focused on rehabilitation and reintegration
and its potential contributions to the DDR and CVE practice in
view of current transnational challenges with violent extremism.
In this panel, participants were also asked to reflect on the
current role of the United Nations and other international actors,
such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) in addressing
these challenges from a policy and operational perspective.”10
CVE is here to stay, and it will take time and considerable effort to develop new policies and
procedures to deal with the issue. The US and the UK are leading various efforts to deal with this
sensitive and dangerous issue.
10) Hedayah, “Perspectives on DDR Panel: Challenges & Opportunities for CV”. Available from: <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/activites/765/2014/800/
perspectives-on-ddr-panel--challenges---opportunities-for-cve>.
181
From a DDR perspective, it is urgent. DDR normally deals with voluntary combatants — those who
willingly come forward into the DDRP for their benefit and future as a citizen. This concept changes
dramatically when combatants are forced to attend the programme or are already radicalized into a
different belief system that may put the DDRP and its operators at greater risk. Should the programme
place them with “regular” XCs or into a separate, more secure environment? Furthermore, is it the role
of DDRPs to identify those who are radicalized? If not them, who, and by what means? What type of
training do DDR practitioners need to deal with these individuals? These are but a few questions facing
senior planners and policy makers. Whatever form it takes, it requires dedicated efforts to de-radicalize
a combatant.
Children line up at the water distribution

centre in El Srief (North Darfur) where the
nearest water point is 15 kilometres away.
The activity fosters DDR. The outreach
activity is organized by UNAMID and
supported by UNDP, UNICEF, the North
Sudan DDR Commission, and the local NGO
FPDO. 25 July 2011. UN Photo #480962 by
Albert González Farran.
Section 7.5 DDR Measures of Success – the Quantification of DDR

DDRPs are now key components of both national and international peacekeeping efforts. It is a
broad concept and activity that affects — and is affected by — the security, political, social, and economic
circumstances of the country and region where programmes operate, and national and international
bodies have developed policies (IDDRS) and run programmes in many different contexts. While DDR
continues to incorporate more and better monitoring and evaluation programmes, policymakers,
academics, and those who want to see clear and quantifiable results have questioned its overall
measurable impact. Despite numerous evaluations, it is often difficult to attribute success or failure to
the DDRP itself due to these extended variables.
“Connected to this is a mounting unease among policy-

makers and aid workers that DDR lacks clear benchmarks
or metrics of success. As this volume shows, there are still
widespread disagreements as to whether DDR amounts to
a minimalist emphasis on security promotion alone or more
maximalist aims associated with enhanced development and
fundamental changes in governance. Not surprisingly, most
182
interventions tend to emphasize a combination of the two. But

the comparatively limited evidence available to demonstrate
whether DDR achieves any of its intended effects perpetuates
confusion and frustrates practice.”11
In addition to this, there is the distinction between a DDRP (specific activities over a finite period)
and the DDR process (mostly individual and variable depending on the ability, needs, capacities, and
limitations of each person). Some XCs may not require a programme at all. They are self-sufficient, leave
their previous fighting connections behind, and carry on. Others require a broad range of assistance
from the DDRP to make it in the new society. Some fail and cannot cope with their new society.
Within DDR, there is no common agreement as to when reintegration ends, let alone when a person
is truly “reintegrated”. Most measurements focus on social/economic assistance. Programmes establish
them to enable the XCs to function better and sustain themselves in their new environment. This
concept is not new and is part of the evolving nature of DDR.12
While measurements are needed, there are some common factors that point to how DDR can
succeed. Lilli Banholzer of the German Development Institute recorded one, summarized here:
• While DDR can improve the personal

economic situation of combatants,
it cannot improve the economy as a
whole. It therefore needs to operate
in economically prosperous settings
or accompany a broader recovery
strategy. In the worst case, combatants
might otherwise simply reintegrate into
poverty.
• There needs to be a certain degree

of State capacity to ensure that
governments are not only willing
The UN Integrated DDR Unit launches its programme in Ed
to carry out the DDR process, but
Damazin, Sudan. Fifteen combatants from the Sudanese north-
also are capable of fulfilling their south war, ended with the 2005 CPA, were demobilized during
commitments and providing security an official ceremony attended by senior governmental officials,
donor countries, and UN representatives. During the process,
to the demobilized combatants. A
the ex-soldiers symbolically handed over their weapons,
functioning legal system and peaceful registered and received a DDR ID card, cash, non-food items,
problem-solving mechanisms can help and a coupon for food rations. 5 May 2009. UN Photo #395260
by Johann Hattingh.
to “tame combatants” and prevent
minor conflicts from escalating into
major hostilities.
11) Robert Muggah, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction - Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009),
3.
12) There are several different writers on this issue, such as Jeremy Weinstein and Macartan Humphreys, and Robert Muggah, formerly of the Small Arms
Survey and now director of research at the Igarape Institute in Brazil (<https://igarape.org.br/en>) who has written extensively on DDR and related
issues. See suggested readings for more information.
183
• The presence of a third party cannot replace the warring factions’ commitment to DDR, but it
can provide a framework that facilitates the DDR process. If commitment is genuine, a third
party can help by monitoring both sides’ compliance and thus have a positive impact on the
feasibility of DDR.
• Implementation while hostilities are

still ongoing can constrain DDRPs.
It should therefore initiate when
violence ebbs or a peace agreement
comes into play. In this regard, DDR
should be seen more as a peace-
stabilizing than a peace-creating
tool. As combatants require a great
deal of trust in the peace process to
hand over their primary instruments
A DDR candidate validates his pre-registration form with his
of defence and income, launching
fingerprint, during the DDR pre-registration exercise. 13 December
such initiatives before the conflict is 2006. UN Photo #135244 by Fred Noy.
over may be too much.
• Programmes need to match the target group. All too often, members of armed groups —
especially women — fall through the cracks even though they should receive help. On an
equal footing, the type of skills training offered to combatants needs to be relevant to the
local economy. Otherwise, participants will become deeply frustrated if they cannot find any
employment.
• Finally, DDRPs should not treat combatants as a homogeneous group. Some former fighters
may handle their return very well, while others will struggle immensely. The identification of
these high-risk groups should be a key component of DDR preparations. The literature suggests
this is especially true of combatants who were recruited at a very young age and soldiers
suffering from mental issues such as PTSD. Equally, individuals with low chances of finding
alternative employment (i.e. those who remained with an armed group for many years) and
those combatants profiting from the war economy (i.e. those who receive drugs as pay) will
be less willing to disarm. Only by clearly identifying such groups is it possible to address their
needs properly and for DDR to reach its full potential.13
Section 7.6 DDR and Corruption

Corruption is a major impediment to development and regularly afflicts post-conflict societies. Not
only does it affect normalization in a post-conflict country, but it can also hamper savings and the
creation of wealth.
Corruption is difficult to eradicate. It includes an immense network of links and bonds in the private
sector and across society. In many cases, it infiltrates the very core of public sector structures and
governmental ethics. Corruption is a phenomenon that starts at the personal level and, a series of
13) Lilli Banholzer, “When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed?” (Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
gGmbH, 2014), 30-31. Available from: <www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_8.2014.pdf>.
184
Faiza Patel (Pakistan), member of

the UN Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries, briefs correspondents
on the use of private military and
security companies in United Nations
peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations in the field. 1 August 2013.
UN Photo #557790 by JC McIlwaine.
factors pushes an individual either to take part in it or resist it. The individual’s values, morals, and
sense of ethics influence their response to these factors. For instance, one could resist corruption for the
sake of one’s family, job, or reputation, or simply because it is not good behaviour according to social
norms. It can be involuntary, however, if peer pressure or threats coerce one into it. In some cases, the
individual has twisted values and morals that do not deem the behaviour undesirable or inappropriate.
In these cases, the pursuit of personal gain wins over ethics.
International anti-corruption initiatives work hard to fight the malady through strategies that focus
on hindering and eradicating the problem at the structural level. Due to the “personal” aspect of the
problem, however, these efforts might only bring a temporary relief from corruption and not truly resolve
the problem. We must remember that structures and regimes are made up of and led by individuals
with distinct sets of values, morals, and ethics that guide their actions. Therefore, we must create a
moral framework that helps these individuals self-regulate and resist corruption before it reaches the
structure in addition to the efforts to solve the structural problem. Putting forward self-regulation as the
first means of regulation could lead to a decrease in the need for structural reforms and could ultimately
eradicate corruption.
Some training programmes aim to raise awareness of the consequences of corruption on a personal
level. They try to convince the individual to willingly and consciously regulate their behaviour through a
framework of values, morals, and ethics. In the case of DDRPs, the reinsertion or reintegration phases
of the programme can include anti-corruption training. The programme brings them to realize how
corruption touches them individually by emphasizing the personal level. The participants assess the
factors that can motivate one to resist corruption. They reflect on their own values, morals, and sense of
ethics. The programme then groups these factors into categories of values and morals and applies them
to real-life situations, sometimes through case studies and simulations. The training draws on reverse
psychology — by pushing them to reflect on their own values, the training uses guilt to strengthen their
moral framework and push for self-regulation.
185
Section 7.7 Private Military and Security Companies versus

Mercenaries and DDR
This section provides a snapshot of the issue of
private military and security companies (PMC-PSF) and
mercenaries, lists further references, and considers
how they impacts the DDR process.
The issue of PMC-PSF has evolved over the years.

They played important roles in some instances, ranging
from support and logistics to provision of security for a
variety of states and international organizations.
The UN defines PMC-PSF as:
“...for profit businesses which must

remain competitive in order to survive.
They are not military nor government,
but have a corporate status in the
country of registration and subject to
corporate law and national criminal law.
They are not subject to the Geneva
Conventions, International Law nor UN
Regulations per se. They are however A view of an UNMIL DDR sensitization event. 20
November 2003. UN Photo #29552 by Shima Roy.
covered by the Montreux Document
— covering legal obligations and good
practices — but it is not legally binding,
nor signed by all states).”14
The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries
defined mercenaries differently:
“One who is specifically recruited for the purpose of

participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at
overthrowing a government or undermining the territorial
integrity of a state, and is motivated by the desire for private
gain and material compensation, is neither a national nor a
resident of the state against which such act is directed, has
not been sent by a state on official duty, and is not a member
of the armed forces of the state on whose territory the act is
undertaken.”15
14) Benedict Sheehy, Jackson Maogoto, and Virginia Newell, Legal Control of the Private Military Corporation, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),
170. United Nations, “Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private
Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the
protection of victims of armed conflicts, Sixty-Third General Assembly, Agenda Item 76”, A/63/467-S/2008/636. Available from: <https://www.icrc.
org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf>.
15) As defined by the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries (International Alert 1999). Passed in
2002.
186
Governments, individuals, and even corporations can hire mercenaries to fight with varying degrees of
professionalism, capability, and success.
DDR planning does not include PMC-PSF or mercenaries since DDRPs do not generally consider
them to be participants in the conflict. Under certain circumstances, they may help run logistics or the
security components of a DDR process if key issues such as accountability, oversight, transparency, and
legitimacy are addressed.
Mercenaries and DDR are distinct, and both are included in existing UN guidance. Mercenaries in the
employ of a rebel group or government may or may factor into the DDR process depending on the CPA
and the context of the conflict. In some cases, they have been overlooked or ignored. In others, they
were considered — and even included in the CPA. Thus, DDR considerations/treatment can range from
full participation in the DDRP to no participation, and from repatriation to expulsion from the country.16
Conclusion
These are but a few of the issues affecting DDR as it evolves and adjusts to new realities, contexts,
and missions. It is important to note that DDR is flexible and DDR practitioners must not throw out
existing policies and procedures without reflection. They do apply — fully or partially — for some contexts
and can still be part of the toolbox to help shorten the adjustment period of a newly adapted idea.
16) The IDDRS Operational Guide 5.40 Chapter 3-1 (p. 225) details the issue of mercenaries.
187
Further Reading
»» Section 7.3
• “Re-orienting DDR to Community Violence Reduction (CVR) in Haiti”, September 2007.

Available from: <https://deanpiedmont.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/minustah_cvr_strategy.
pdf>.
• Robert Muggah, “Stabilization and Humanitarian Action in Haiti”, 2011. Available from: <https://
www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Muggah/publication/264311028_Stabilization_and_
Statebuilding_in_Haiti/links/53e2705a0cf216e8321ba912/Stabilization-and-Statebuilding-in-
Haiti.pdf>.
• Timothy Donais and Burt Geoff, “Vertically Integrated Peace Building and Community Violence
Reduction in Haiti”, Cigi Papers, No. 25, February 2014.
• ICG, “Reforming Haiti’s Security Sector”, Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 28, 18 September
2008. Available from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/haiti/28_
reforming_haiti_s_security_sector.ashx>.
»» Section 7.4
• Anne Aly and Sara Zeiger, eds., Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an evidence-base
for policy and practice. Available from: <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-
23201691817.pdf>.
• “DDR in the Context of Offensive Military Operations, Counterterrorism, CVE, and Non-Permissive
Environments: Key Questions, Challenges, and Considerations”, produced by Vanda Felbab-
Brown for the new United Nations University book, UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is
it Fit for Purpose? (UNU, June 2015), James Cockayne and Siobhan O’Neil, eds. Available from:
<https://www.brookings.edu/research/ddr-in-the-context-of-offensive-military-operations-
counterterrorism-cve-and-non-permissive-environments-key-questions-challenges-and-
considerations/>.
• Dean Piedmont, “The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration in Countering Violent
Extremism”, No. 3, June 2015, Centre for Security Governance. Available from: <http://ztest.
inprol.org/news-features/14829/the-role-of-disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-in-
countering-violent>.
»» Section 7.5
• “Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration”, Centre for

Global Development, Working Paper Number 69, September 2005.
• Robert Muggah, “Reflections on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sudan”, Small

Arms Survey, Geneva, and Oxford University, April 2006.
188
»» Section 7.6
• United Nations Convention against Corruption, General Assembly Resolution 58/4, 31 October
2003. Available from: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/
Convention/08-50026_E.pdf>.
• Phillipe Le Billion, “Corrupting Peace? Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Corruption”, International

Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No. 3, June 2008, 344–361.
• “Corruption: threats and trends in the twenty-first century”, Working paper prepared by
the Secretariat, 16 March 2005. Available from: <https://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/
corruption_pub_threats_trends.pdf>.
»» Section 7.7
• Doug Brooks and Gaurav Laroia, “Privatized Peacekeeping”, The National Interest, 80, 2005,
121-125.
• DCAF, “Private Military Companies”, DCAF Backgrounder, 4, 2006, 1-8. Available at: <http://
www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=17438>.
• Lauren Grace Fitzsimons, “Should Private Military Companies be used in UN Peace Operations?”
17 November 2015. Available from: <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/11/17/should-private-military-
companies-be-used-in-un-peace-operations/>.
• Marcus Hedahl, “Unaccountable: The Current State of Private Military and Security Companies”.
Criminal Justice Ethics, 31, No. 3, 2012, 175-192.
• Jutta Joachim and Andrea Schneiker. “All for One and One in All: Private Military Security
Companies as Soldiers, Business Managers and Humanitarians”, Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, 27, No. 2, 2014, 246-267.
• Tirta N. Muritsama and Wahyu Setyawan, “Emerging Role of Multinational Corporations as

Private Military Companies: Converging International Relations and International Business
Perspectives”, International Journal of Business and Social Science 3, No.23 (2013), 205-213.
• Christopher Spearin, “UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and Security
Industry”, International Peacekeeping, 18, No. 2, 2011, 196-209.
189
1. What problems exist with DDR manuals? 7. Which of the following is not affected by
corruption?
A. Circumstances change
B. Missions change and evolve A. Savings and creation of wealth in its many
forms
C. A and B
B. Normalization in a post-conflict country
C. A and B
2. When can DDR be used? D. None of the above
A. As a post-conflict reconstruction process
8. Which of the following is TRUE of a
B. As comprehensive instruments to support a
mercenary?
peacebuilding form
A. Specifically recruited for the purpose of
C. During peacekeeping
participating in an act of violence
D. All of the above
B. Motivated by the desire for private gain
3. Basic DDR premises _____. C. Not a member of the armed forces of the
state
A. must be established in a secure environment
and based on a peace accord D. All of the above
B. can take place while conflict is still in play

9. A CVR programme aims to create _____.
C. apply before a peace accord is signed
A. economic opportunities
D. only apply if the national government asks
B. a change in political structure
for it
C. a constant flow of funding
4. What issues can sometimes affect the D. an environment where only sensitive groups
implementation of DDR? are given priority
A. Politics, political policies
10. What does “de-radicalization and
B. Personal ambitions, resource sharing
disengagement” describe?
C. A and B
A. Individuals or groups cease their
involvement in organized violence
5. Which of the following is a challenge in B. Substantive changes in individual or group

DDR programming? ideology and attitudes
A. Availability of resources C. Disengagement on facilitating behavioural
B. Unrealistic timelines changes
C. Lack of funding D. All of the above
D. All of the above
6. What are some of the challenges in DDR

practices and peace operations?
A. Lack of political will, economic insecurity
B. Inadequate DDR and SSR links, integration
and coordination
C. Poorly regulated natural resources, illicit
drugs and organized crime
D. All of the above
190
Answer Key »
1. C
2. D
3. A
4. C
5. D
6. D
7. D
8. D
9. A
10. D
191
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, A N D R E I N T E G R AT I O N (D D R): A PRACTICAL OVERVIEW
Appendix A: List of Acronyms
Acronym Meaning
ACR Colombian Agency for Reintegration
ADDR Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
AMISON African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
AVSI Association of Volunteers in International Service
CAAFAG Children associated with armed forces or armed groups
CAR Central African Republic
CBR Community-based rehabilitation
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CONOPS Concept of Operations
CPA Comprehensive peace agreements
CPAF Cambodia People’s Armed Forces
CVE Countering violent extremism
CVR Community violence reduction (and lesson 2)
DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DDRP DDR programme
DDRR Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration
DDVE Demobilization and disengagement of violent extremists
DFID United Kingdom Department for International Development
DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO United Nations Department of Peace Operations
DPPA Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
EOD Explosive ordnance disposal
192
EU European Union
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FNI Front for National Integration/Front des Nationalistes and Intégrationnistes
FPDO Friends of Peace and Development Organization
FPU Formed police unit
FRPI Patriotic Force of Resistance
FTF Foreign terrorist fighters
GCTF Global Counterterrorism Forum
GIZ German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation
IATG United Nations International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
ICCs Interim Care Centres
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSR International Centre for the Study of Radicalization
ICTJ International Centre for Transitional Justice
IDDRS Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards
IDP Internally displaced person
ILO International Labour Organization
IOM International Organization for Migration
ISACS International Small Arms Control Standards
ISM Interim Stabilization Method(s)
MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central

African Republic
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIS monitoring and information system
MISCA International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
193
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic

of the Congo
MRC Congolese Revolutionary Movement
NCDDR National Commission for DDR
NGO Non-governmental organization
ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
PBC United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
PCNA Post-conflict needs assessment
PMC-PSF Private military and security companies
POC Protection of civilians
PRVC Programme for Reincorporation to the Civil Life
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
PUPs Pick-up points
QIP Quick impact project
RDRC Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
RPG Rocket-propelled grenade
SALW Small arms and light weapons
SANDF South African National Defence Forces
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SIDDR Stockholm Initiative on DDR
SIU Security Institution Unit
SNA Somali National Army
SPLA South Sudanese Army
SPLM-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Moving-in-Opposition

194
SSR Security sector reform
TJ Transitional justice
UN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNAI United Nations Academic Impact
UNAMID African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAOC United Nations Alliance of Civilizations
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMO United Nations Military Observers
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire
UNODA United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNPOL United Nations Police Division
USAID United States Agency for International Development
UXO Unexploded ordnance
WCPs Weapons collection points
WFP World Food Programme
XC Ex-combatant
195
Appendix B: IDDRS Glossary of Terms and Definitions

The following definitions are drawn from IDDRS Chapter 1.20 Glossary: Terms and Definitions.
Absorption capacity The ability of a community, economy and/or country to include

ex-combatants as active full members of the society. Absorption
capacity is often used in relation to the capacities of local
communities, but can also refer to social and political reintegration
opportunities.
Advisory Committee The advisory body that reviews the budgets of peacekeeping missions
on Administrative and and makes recommendations to the Fifth (Administrative and
Budgetary Questions Budgetary) Committee of the General Assembly.
(ACABQ)
AIDS Acquired immune deficiency syndrome: The stage of HIV when the
immune system is no longer working properly, leaving the body
vulnerable to one or more life-threatening diseases.
Ammunition See ‘munitions’.
Anti-retroviral (ARVs) Broad term for any medicines to treat HIV/AIDS.
Arms control The imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread
of weapons by an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce
such restrictions.
Arms exports The sending of weapons, guns and ammunition from one country to
another, often closely monitored and controlled by governments.
Armed forces The military organization of a State with a legal basis, and supporting
institutional infrastructure (salaries, benefits, basic services, etc.).
Armed group A group that has the potential to employ arms in the use of force
to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; is not
within the formal military structures of a State, State-alliance or
intergovernmental organization; and is not under the control of the
State(s) in which it operates.
Asylum The protection granted by a State on its territory to persons from

another State who are fleeing serious danger or persecution based
on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group
or political opinion. A person who is granted asylum is a refugee.
Asylum includes a variety of elements, including non-refoulement
(for definition, see ‘non-refoulement’), permission to remain in the
territory of the asylum country and humane standards of treatment.
Asylum seeker A person whose request or application for refugee status has not been
finally decided on by a prospective country of refuge.
196
Behaviour change A participatory, community-level process aimed at developing positive

communication (BCC) behaviours; promoting and sustaining individual, community and
societal behaviour change; and maintaining appropriate behaviours.
Beneficiary/ies Refers to both individuals and groups who receive indirect

benefits through a Unsupported DDR operation or programme.
This includes communities in which DDR programme participants
resettle, businesses where ex-combatants work as part of the DDR
programme, etc.
Border controls The existence of checks and regulations between countries that
control access to and from the country of people, goods and services.
Broker The natural person or legal entity that carries out a brokering activity;
anyone who directly performs an activity defined as a brokering
activity in the exercise of their own commercial or legal relations. The
acts of natural persons, especially employees, are to be ascribed to
the legal entity.
Brokering Activities that serve to facilitate the transfer of arms between persons
in different third countries, insofar as such transfer is furthered
through the assistance of a so-called broker. Core brokering activities
include:
• acquisition of SALW located in one third country for the purpose
of transfer to another third country;
• mediation between sellers and buyers of SALW to facilitate the

transfer of these arms from one third country to another;
• the indication of an opportunity for such a transaction to the

seller or buyer (in particular, the introduction of a seller or buyer
in return for a fee or other consideration).
Business development A set of ‘business services’ that include any services that improve the
services (BDS) performance of a business and its access to and ability to compete in
markets.
Buy-back The direct link between the surrender of weapons, ammunition, mines
and explosives in return for cash. There is a perception that such
schemes reward irresponsible armed personnel who may have already
harmed society and the innocent civilian population. They also provide
the opportunity for an individual to conduct low-level trading in SALW.
Capacity The strength and ability, which could include knowledge, skill,
personnel and resources, to achieve desired objectives.
197
Capacity-building Used as a noun, refers to processes and programmes that empower

and enable the recipients’ independent development. Can also be
used as an adjective (e.g., capacity-building activity).
Ceasefire agreement A binding, non-aggression pact to enable dialogue between conflicting

parties.
Child Any human below the age of 18, unless under the law applicable to
the child in a particular country, majority is attained earlier.
Child associated with The definition commonly applied to children associated with armed
fighting forces/armed forces and groups in prevention, demobilization and reintegration
conflict/armed groups/ programmes derives from the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices
armed forces (1997), in which the term ‘child soldier’ refers to: “Any person under
18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed
force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to:
cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups,
other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for
sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only
refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.”
In his February 2000 report to the UN Security Council, the

Secretary-General defined a child soldier “as any person under the
age 18 years of age who forms part of an armed force in any capacity
and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family
members, as well as girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced
marriage”. The CRC specifies that a child is every human below the
age of 18.
The term ‘children associated with armed forces and groups’, although
more cumbersome, is now used to avoid the perception that the only
children of concern are combatant boys. It points out that children
eligible for release and reintegration programmes are both those
associated with armed forces and groups and those who fled armed
forces and groups (often considered as deserters and therefore
requiring support and protection), children who were abducted, those
forcibly married and those in detention.
Access to demobilization does not depend on a child’s level of

involvement in armed forces and groups. No distinction is made
between combatants and non-combatants for fear of unfair treatment,
oversight or exclusion (mainly of girls). Nevertheless, the child’s
personal history and activities in the armed conflict can help decide
on the kind of support he/she needs in the reintegration phase.
198
Child demobilization, The term ‘demobilization’ refers to ending a child’s association with
release, exit from an armed forces or groups. The terms ‘release’ or ‘exit from an armed
armed force or group force or group’ and ‘children coming or exiting from armed forces and
groups’ rather than ‘demobilized children’ are preferred.
Child demobilization/release is very brief and involves removing a

child from a military or armed group as swiftly as possible. This action
may require official documentation (e.g., issuing a demobilization
card or official registration in a database for ex-combatants) to
confirm that the child has no military status, although formal
documentation must be used carefully so that it does not stigmatize
an already-vulnerable child.
Child reintegration According to article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote …
social reintegration of a child victim of … armed conflicts”.
Reintegration includes family reunification, mobilizing and enabling

the child’s existing care system, medical screening and health care,
schooling and/or vocational training, psychosocial support, and social
and community-based reintegration. Reintegration programmes need
to be sustainable and to take into account children’s aspirations.
Civil society The three-sector model, which looks at the State as consisting of the
government, the market and the citizenry, is a useful starting point
to define civil society. In this perspective, civil society constitutes
the third sector, existing alongside and interacting with the State and
profit-seeking firms. Civil society emerges as a voluntary sector made
up of freely and formally associating individuals pursuing non-profit
purposes in social movements, religious bodies, women and youth
groups, indigenous peoples’ organizations, professional associations,
unions, etc.
Civil society organization Non-State organization composed of voluntary participants.

(CSO)
Combatant Based on an analogy with the definition set out in the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
in relation to persons engaged in international armed conflicts, a
combatant is a person who:
• is a member of a national army or an irregular military
organization; or
• is actively participating in military activities and hostilities; or
• is involved in recruiting or training military personnel; or

199
• holds a command or decision-making position within a national

army or an armed organization; or
• arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or

as part of a military structure; or
• having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian,

thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of
the above attributes.
Community based policing CBP involves the police participating in the community and responding
(CBP) to the needs of that community, and the community participating
in its own policing and supporting the police. It can further be
explained as the police working in partnership with the community;
the community thereby participating in its own policing; and the two
working together, mobilizing resources to solve problems affecting
public safety over the longer term rather than the police, alone,
reacting short term to incidents as they occur.
Community disarmament/ In the context of peace-building, community disarmament/small arms

Small arms limitation limitation advocates a change of public attitude toward the possession
and use of weapons, as well as the benefits of weapons control
measures within the community.
Community involvement In the context of SALW, the term refers to a process designed to
place the needs and priorities of affected communities at the centre
of the planning, implementation and monitoring of SALW control and
other sectors.
Community involvement is based on an exchange of information

and involves communities in the decision-making process in order
to establish priorities for SALW control. In this way, SALW control
aims to be inclusive, community focused and ensure the maximum
involvement of all sections of the community. This involvement
includes joint planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of
projects.
Community involvement also works with communities to develop

specific interim safety strategies that encourage individual and
community behavioural change. This is designed to reduce the impact
of SALW on individuals and communities until such time as the threat
is removed.
Community sensitization Sensitizing a community before, during and after the DDR process
is essentially the process of making community members (whether
they are ex-combatants or not) aware of the effects and changes
200
DDR creates within the community. For example, it will be important

for the community to know that reintegration can be a long-term,
challenging process before it leads to stability; that ex-combatants
might not readily take on their new livelihoods; that local capacity
building will be an important emphasis for community building, etc.
Such messages to the community can be dispersed with media tools,
such as television; radio, print and poster campaigns; community
town halls, etc., ensuring that a community’s specific needs are
addressed throughout the DDR process. See also ‘sensitization’.
Conflict prevention Taking measures to try and prevent violent confrontation.
Conflict reduction Process employed by States with the aim of diffusing tensions and
building sustainable peace.
Conflict reduction strategies may include programmes designed

to build national and local capacity to settle disputes; encouraging
the establishment of coordinated conflict prevention policies among
international actors, and assisting countries in reducing the spread of
arms.
Conflict resolution Efforts designed to increase cooperation among the parties to a

conflict and strengthen their relationships by building or deepening
the institutions and processes through which the parties interact.
Conflict resolution is used to reduce the possibility of violence, or to

consolidate the cessation of a violent conflict in an attempt to prevent
its re-escalation.
Cooperation The process of combining separate actors (States/members/armies)

to work together as a cohesive unit in attaining pre-defined goals.
Coping mechanisms/ The methods by which members of households try to deal with a
strategies crisis. For example, at times of severe food insecurity, household
members may (1) make greater use than normal of wild foods, (2)
plant other crops, (3) seek other sources of income, (4) rely more
on gifts and remittances, (5) sell off assets to buy food, or (6)
migrate. Coping mechanisms should be discouraged if they lead to
disinvestment, if they reduce a household’s capacity to recover its
long-term capacity to survive, and if they harm the environment.
Positive coping mechanisms should be encouraged and strengthened.
Counselling (HIV) Support generally offered before and after a test in order to
help individuals understand their risk behaviour and cope with
an HIV-positive result or maintain an HIV-negative status. The
counselling service also links individuals to options for treatment, care
201
and support; and provides information on how to stay as healthy as

possible and minimize the risk of transmission to others.
Crisis management Actions undertaken by governments and non-governmental agencies

in an attempt to respond to security problems, identify their root
causes and build international capacity to prevent conflicts from
recurring.
Demilitarization The complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition

and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose.
Demilitarization not only involves the final destruction process, but
also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and
pre-processing operations that are equally as essential to achieving
the final result.
Demobilization (see also “Child demobilization”)
“Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active

combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first
stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual
combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps
designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments,
assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization
encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized,
which is called reinsertion” (Secretary-General, note to the General
Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).
Dependant A civilian who depends upon a combatant for his/her livelihood. This
can include friends and relatives of the combatant, such as aged men
and women, non-mobilized children, and women and girls. Some
dependants may also be active members of a fighting force. For the
purposes of DDR programming, such persons shall be considered
combatants, not dependants.
Destruction The process of final conversion of weapons, ammunition and

explosives into an inert state so that they can no longer function as
designed.
Detailed field assessment A detailed field assessment is essential to identify the nature of the
problem a DDR programme is to deal with, as well as to provide
key indicators for the development of a detailed DDR strategy
and its associated components. Detailed field assessments shall
be undertaken to ensure that DDR strategies, programmes and
implementation plans reflect realities, are well targeted and
sustainable, and to assist with their monitoring and evaluation.
202
Disarmament “Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal

of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons
of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament
also includes the development of responsible arms management
programmes” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly,
A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).
Disarmament, A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict

demobilization, and recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of
reintegration (DDR) combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and
helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by
finding civilian livelihoods.
Also see separate entries for ‘disarmament’, ‘demobilization’ and

‘reintegration’.
Disposal The removal of ammunition and explosives from a stockpile using a

variety of methods (that may not necessarily involve destruction).
Logistic disposal may or may not require the use of render safe
procedures.
Diurnal cycling The exposure of ammunition and explosives to the temperature

changes caused by day, night and change of season.
‘Do no harm’ An approach that tries to avoid unintended negative impacts of

development and other interventions.
Eligibility criteria Criteria that establish who will benefit from DDR assistance and
who will not. There are five categories of people that should be
taken into consideration in DDR programmes: (1) male and female
adult combatants; (2) children associated with armed forces and
groups; (3) those working in non-combat roles (including women);
(4) ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic Illnesses; and (5)
dependants.
When deciding on who will benefit from DDR assistance, planners

should be guided by three principles, which include: (1) focusing on
improving security. DDR assistance should target groups that pose the
greatest risk to peace, while paying careful attentions to laying the
foundation for recovery and development; (2) balancing equity with
security. Targeted assistance should be balanced against rewarding
violence. Fairness should guide eligibility; and (3) achieving flexibility.
The eligibility criteria are decided at the beginning of a DDR planning

process and determine the cost, scope and duration of the DDR
programme in question.
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Employability A combination of skills, knowledge and attitudes that improve a

person’s ability to secure and retain a job, progress at work and cope
with change, secure alternative employment if he/she so wishes or
has been laid off, and enter more easily into the labour market at
different periods of his/her working life.
Empowerment Refers to women and men taking control over their lives: setting their
own agendas, gaining skills, building self-confidence, solving problems
and developing self-reliance. No one can empower another; only
the individual can empower herself or himself to make choices or to
speak out. However, institutions, including international cooperation
agencies, can support processes that can nurture self-empowerment
of individuals or groups. Empowerment of recipients, regardless
of their gender, should be a central goal of any DDR interventions,
and measures must be taken to ensure no particular group is
disempowered or excluded through the DDR process.
Evaluation Evaluation is a management tool. It is a time-bound activity that

systematically and objectively assesses the relevance, performance
and success of ongoing and completed programmes and projects.
Evaluation is carried out selectively, asking and answering specific
questions to guide decision makers and/or programme managers.
Evaluation determines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact
and sustainability of a programme or project.
Exclusion from This is provided for in legal provisions under refugee law that
protection as a refugee deny the benefits of international protection to persons who would
otherwise satisfy the criteria for refugee status, including persons
in respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that
they have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime
against humanity, a serious non-political crime or acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the UN.
Ex-combatant (XC) A person who has assumed any of the responsibilities or carried out
any of the activities mentioned in the definition of ‘combatant’, and
has laid down or surrendered his/her arms with a view to entering
a DDR process. Former combatant status may be certified through
a demobilisation process by a recognized authority. Spontaneously
auto-demobilised individuals, such as deserters, may also be
considered ex-combatants if proof of non-combatant status over a
period of time can be given.
Explosive ordnance It may also include the rendering safe and/or disposal of such
disposal (EOD) explosive ordnance, which has become hazardous by damage or
deterioration, when the disposal of such explosive ordnance is
beyond the capabilities of those personnel normally assigned the
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responsibility for routine disposal. The presence of ammunition and

explosives during disarmament operations will inevitably require some
degree of EOD response. The level of this response will depend on
the condition of the ammunition, its level of deterioration and the way
that the local community handles it.
Explosives Substances or mixtures of substances that, under external influences,

are capable of rapidly releasing energy in the form of gases and heat.
False negative/positive HIV test result that is wrong, either giving a negative result when
the person is HIV-positive, or a positive result when the person is
HIV-negative.
Finance and Management The office in the Office of Mission Support (OMS) in DPO mandated to
Support Service (FMSS) provide financial management and support services to peacekeeping,
peacemaking and preventive diplomacy operations, and trust funds
related to peacekeeping and peacemaking activities from start-up
through closure and liquidation.
Food for training (FFT) Programme in which food is supplied on condition that the recipient
attends a training programme.
Food for work (FFW) FFW projects and activities are those in which food is given as full or
part payment for work performed in the context of a supervised work
programme.
Food insecurity A situation where people lack secure access to sufficient amounts
of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development, and
an active and healthy life. Food insecurity may be caused by the
unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate
distribution, or inadequate use of food at the household level.
Food security A situation where all people, at all times, have physical, social and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy
life. Note: This definition includes the following three key dimensions
of food security: sufficient availability of food; adequate access to
food; and appropriate utilization of food.
Foreign former combatant A person who previously met the definition of a combatant and has
since disarmed and genuinely demobilized, but is not a national of the
country where he/she finds him-/herself.
Formed police unit (FPU) A self-contained police unit of 125 officers capable of providing a
range of tactical options, including an effective public order function.
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Former combatant See ‘ex-combatant’.
Gender The social attributes and opportunities associated with being male
and female and the relationships between women, men, girls and
boys, as well as the relations between women and those between
men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially
constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They
are context/time-specific and changeable. Gender is part of the
broader socio cultural context. Other important criteria for socio
cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and
age. The concept of gender also includes the expectations held about
the characteristics, aptitudes and likely behaviours of both women
and men (femininity and masculinity). The concept of gender is vital,
because, when it is applied to social analysis, it reveals how women’s
subordination (or men’s domination) is socially constructed. As such,
the subordination can be changed or ended. It is not biologically
predetermined, nor is it fixed forever. As with any group, interactions
among armed forces and groups, members’ roles and responsibilities
within the group, and interactions between members of armed forces/
groups and policy and decision makers are all heavily influenced by
prevailing gender roles and gender relations in society. In fact, gender
roles significantly affect the behaviour of individuals even when they
are in a sex-segregated environment, such as an all-male cadre.
Gender analysis The collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated information. Men and
women perform different roles in societies and in armed groups and
forces. This leads to women and men having different experience,
knowledge, talents and needs. Gender analysis explores these
differences so that policies, programmes and projects can identify and
meet the different needs of men and women. Gender analysis also
facilitates the strategic use of distinct knowledge and skills possessed
by women and men, which can greatly improve the long-term
sustainability of interventions. In the context of DDR, gender analysis
should be used to design policies and interventions that will reflect the
different roles, capacity and needs of women, men, girls and boys.
Gender balance The objective of achieving representational numbers of women

and men among staff. The shortage of women in leadership roles,
as well as extremely low numbers of women peacekeepers and
civilian personnel, has contributed to the invisibility of the needs and
capacities of women and girls in the DDR process. Achieving gender
balance, or at least improving the representation of women in peace
operations, has been defined as a strategy for increasing operational
capacity on issues related to women, girls, gender equality and
mainstreaming.
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Gender equality The equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men
and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will
become the same, but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities
and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male
or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and
priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, while
recognising the diversity of different groups of women and men.
Gender equality is not a women’s issue, but should concern and fully
engage men as well as women. Equality between women and men
is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, and
indicator of, sustainable people-centred development.
Gender equity The process of being fair to men and women. To ensure fairness,
measures must often be put in place to compensate for the historical
and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from
operating on a level playing field. Equity is a means; equality is the
result.
Gender mainstreaming Defined by the 52nd Session of ECOSOC in 1997 as “the process of
assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action,
including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all
levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns
and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political,
economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit
equally and inequality is not perpetrated. The ultimate goal of gender
mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.” Gender mainstreaming
emerged as a major strategy for achieving gender equality
following the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in
1995. In the context of DDR, gender mainstreaming is necessary
in order to ensure women and girls receive equitable access to
assistance programmes and packages, and it should, therefore, be
an essential component of all DDR-related interventions. In order
to maximize the impact of gender mainstreaming efforts, these
should be complemented with activities that are directly tailored for
marginalized segments of the intended beneficiary group.
Gender relations The social relationships among men, women, girls and boys. Gender
relations shape how power is distributed among women, men, girls
and boys and how it is translated into different positions in society.
Gender relations are generally fluid and vary depending on other
social relations, such as class, race, ethnicity, etc.
Gender-aware policies Policies that utilize gender analysis in their formulation and design,
and recognize gender differences in terms of needs, interests,
priorities, power and roles. They further recognize that both men
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and women are active development actors for their community.

Gender-aware policies can be further divided into the following three
policies:
• Gender-neutral policies use the knowledge of gender differences
in a society to reduce biases in development work in order to
enable both women and men to meet their practical gender
needs.
• Gender-specific policies are based on an understanding of the

existing gendered division of resources and responsibilities and
gender power relations. These policies use knowledge of gender
difference to respond to the practical gender needs of women
or men.
• Gender-transformative policies consist of interventions that

attempt to transform existing distributions of power and
resources to create a more balanced relationship among
women, men, girls and boys by responding to their strategic
gender needs. These policies can target both sexes together, or
separately. Interventions may focus on women’s and/or men’s
practical gender needs, but with the objective of creating a
conducive environment in which women or men can empower
themselves.
Gender responsive Programmes that are planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated
DDR programmes in a gender-responsive manner to meet the different needs of female
and male ex-combatants, supporters and dependants.
Gender responsive objectives Programme and project objectives that are non-discriminatory,
equally benefit women and men and aim at correcting gender
imbalances.
Gendered division of labour This is the result of how each society divides work between men and
women according to what is considered suitable or appropriate to
each gender. Attention to the gendered division of labour is essential
when determining reintegration opportunities for both male and
female ex-combatants, including women and girls associated with
armed forces and groups in non-combat roles and dependants.
Harm Physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to

property or the environment (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Harmful event Occurrence in which a hazardous situation results in harm (ISO Guide
51: 1999[E]).
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Hazard Potential source of harm (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Hazardous situation Circumstance in which people, property or the environment are

exposed to one or more hazards (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus, the virus that causes AIDS.
HIV confirmation tests According to WHO/UNAIDS recommendations, all positive HIV test
results (whether ELISA (enzyme-linked immunoabsorbent assay) or
simple/rapid tests) should be confirmed using a second, different
test to confirm accuracy, or three different rapid tests if laboratory
facilities are not available.
HIV counselling Counselling support generally offered before and after a test in order
to help individuals understand their risk behaviour and cope with
an HIV-positive result or stay HIV-negative. The counselling service
also links individuals to options for treatment, care and support, and
provides information on how to stay as healthy as possible and how
to minimize the risk of transmission to others. Test results shall be
confidential.
Usually, a voluntary counselling and testing service package ensures

that: the HIV test is voluntary; pre-test counselling is offered;
informed consent is obtained (agreement to a medical test or
procedure after clear explanation of risks and benefits); and HIV tests
are performed using approved HIV test kits and testing protocols.
HIV-negative result The HIV test did not detect any antibodies in the blood. This either
means that the person is in the ‘window period’ or that he/she is not
infected with the virus at the time of the test. It does not mean that
he/she is immune to the virus.
HIV-positive result A positive HIV test result means that a person has the HIV antibodies
in his/her blood and is infected with HIV. It does not mean that he/she
has AIDS.
HIV test Usually a test for the presence of antibodies. There are two main
methods of HIV tests:
• HIV ELISA (enzyme-linked immunoabsorbent assay) test: This
is the most efficient test for testing large numbers per day, but
requires laboratory facilities with equipment, maintenance staff
and a reliable power supply.
• Simple/Rapid HIV tests: These do not require special equipment

or highly trained staff and are as accurate as ELISA. Rapid tests
will usually give results in approximately 20 minutes and are
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easy to perform. Suitable combinations of three simple/rapid

tests are recommended by WHO where facilities for ELISA or
ELISA/Western Blot testing are not available.
Host country A foreign country into whose territory a combatant crosses.
Human capital The knowledge, skills, competencies and other attributes embodied
in individuals that are relevant to economic activity. (Duration of
schooling and levels of qualification are the standard measures.)
Human security Constitutes (1) safety from chronic threats, such as hunger,
disease and repression, and (2) protection from sudden and hurtful
disruptions in the patterns of daily life. Although the scope of
human security is vast, it can be divided into seven areas: economic
security (freedom from poverty), food security (access to food),
health security (access to health care and protection from diseases),
environmental security (protection from the danger of environmental
pollution), personal security (physical protection against torture,
war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, etc.), community security
(survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups) and political
security (civil and political rights, freedom from political oppression).
Implementation plan Also known as an operations or action plan, an implementation plan

describes the detailed steps necessary to implement programme
activities, together with a division of labour and overall time-frame.
Implementing partner Organizations and agencies that execute programmes and services
within UN supported DDR operations. The presence and capacity of
implementing partners varies significantly in different countries and
may include national authorities, UN missions and agencies, national
and international NGOs, community-based organizations and local
businesses.
Incentives Acts or conditions that encourage the achievement of a goal.
Inconclusive A small percentage of HIV test results are inconclusive. This means
(indeterminate) test that the result is neither positive nor negative. This result may be due
to a number of factors that are not related to HIV infection, or it can
occur early in an infection when there are insufficient HIV antibodies
present to give a positive result. If this happens, the test must be
repeated.
Incubation period Time period between first infection by the disease agent and the
appearance of disease symptoms. With HIV, this can vary from
months to many years.
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Indicator Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple

and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect changes
connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a
given development or aid factor.
Information, education The development of communication strategies and support materials,

and communication (IEC) based on formative research and targeted at influencing behaviours
among specific groups.
Integrated disarmament, The co-operative implementation of policies, structures and processes

demobilization and that support effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
reintegration operations within a peacekeeping environment.
Integration The implementation of policies and processes, in pursuit of a common

strategic aim, that provide mechanisms for mutually beneficial
cooperation.
Internally displaced Persons who have been obliged to flee from their homes “in particular
persons (IDPs) as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts,
situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized State border” (according to the definition in
the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement).
International guarantor State, international or regional body or organization that plays

the role of facilitation and arbitration in negotiations and the
implementation of a peace accord.
Internee A person who falls within the definition of a combatant (see above),
who has crossed an international border from a State experiencing
armed conflict and is interned by a neutral State whose territory he/
she has entered.
Internment An obligation of a neutral State when foreign former combatants

cross into its territory, as provided for under the 1907 Hague
Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in the Case of War on Land. This rule is considered to have
attained customary international law status, so that it is binding on
all States, whether or not they are parties to the Hague Convention.
It is applicable by analogy also to internal armed conflicts in which
combatants from government armed forces or opposition armed
groups enter the territory of a neutral State. Internment involves
confining foreign combatants who have been separated from civilians
in a safe location away from combat zones and providing basic relief
and humane treatment. Varying degrees of freedom of movement can
be provided, subject to the interning State ensuring that the internees
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cannot use its territory for participation in hostilities.
Intervention A process in which an actor enters into the area of another, with or
without the consent of the other.
Irregular force For the purposes of the IDDRS, defined as armed group.
Justice For the UN, an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection
and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of
wrongs. Justice implies regard for the rights of the accused, for the
interests of victims and for the wellbeing of society at large. It is a
concept rooted in all national cultures and traditions, and while its
administration usually implies formal judicial mechanisms, traditional
dispute resolution mechanisms are equally relevant. The international
community has worked to articulate collectively the substantive and
procedural requirements for the administration of justice for more
than half a century.
Legislative disarmament/ The national legal regimes that regulate the possession, use and
small arms control circulation of small arms and light weapons. These may be enforced
by the State’s security forces.
Livelihood The capabilities, assets (including both material and social assets) and
activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable
when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, and
maintain or improve its capabilities and assets, while not undermining
the natural resource base.
Mandatory testing Testing or screening required by federal, State or local law to compel
individuals to submit to HIV testing without informed consent. It is
usually limited to specific populations such as categories of health
care providers, members of the military, prisoners or people in
high-risk situations.
Mercenary “A mercenary is any person who:

• (a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
• (b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the

desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf
of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in
excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank
and functions in the armed forces of that party;
• (c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident

of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
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• (d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the

conflict; and
• (e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.
A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:

• (a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of
participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
• (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise

undermining the constitutional order of a State; or
• (ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
• (b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire

for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise of
payment of material compensation;
• (c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against

which such an act is directed;
• (d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
• (e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose

territory the act is undertaken” (International Convention
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, 1989).
Militia A military group that is raised from the civil population to supplement
a regular army in an emergency or a rebel group acting in opposition
to a regular army. Also see ‘irregular force’.
Millennium Development The Millennium Development Goals summarize the development goals
Goals agreed on at international conferences and world summits during the
1990s. At the end of the decade, world leaders distilled the key goals
and targets in the Millennium Declaration (September 2000).
The Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved between 1990 and

2015, include:
• halving extreme poverty and hunger;
• achieving universal primary education;
• promoting gender equality;
• reducing under-five mortality by two-thirds;
• reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters;
213
• reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB;
• ensuring environmental sustainability;
• developing a global partnership for development, with targets

for aid, trade and debt relief.
Monitoring Monitoring is a management tool. It is the systematic oversight of

the implementation of an activity that establishes whether input
deliveries, work schedules, other required actions and targeted
outputs have proceeded according to plan, so that timely action can
be taken to correct deficiencies.
National authority The government department(s), organization(s) or institution(s) in a

country responsible for the regulation, management and coordination
of DDR activities.
National plan A comprehensive, short, medium or long-term strategy to bring about

the development of a specific issue in a country.
Needs-based approach An approach that focuses on what people need or are short of and,
therefore, on what they should be provided with.
Non-refoulement A core principle of international law that prohibits States from

returning persons in any manner whatsoever to countries or
territories in which their lives or freedom may be threatened. It
finds expression in refugee law, human rights law and international
humanitarian law, is a rule of customary international law, and is
therefore binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to
specific instruments such as the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Nutritional requirements AIDS patients usually need a food intake that is 30 percent higher
than usual.
Operational objective Specific target set by an organization to achieve a mission.

Operational objectives should be precise, ideally quantifiable, and
should be achievable with the resources that are likely to become
available.
Opportunistic infection (OI) Infection that occurs when an immune system is weakened, but which
might not cause a disease — or be as serious — in a person with a
properly functioning immune system.
Participants All persons who will receive direct assistance through the DDR
process, including ex-combatants, women and children associated
with fighting forces, and others identified during negotiations of the
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political framework and planning for a UN supported DDR process.
Participatory rural Tool designed, in a World Food Programme (WFP) intervention,

assessment (PRA) to assess rural people’s perceptions, access to and control over
resources, attitudes, benefits, decision-making positions, constraints
and degree of involvement.
Peace-building Process to prevent the resurgence of conflict and to create the

conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies. It
is a holistic process involving broad-based inter-agency cooperation
across a wide range of issues. It includes activities such as
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces
and groups; rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure; human
rights and elections monitoring; monitoring or retraining of civil
administrators and police; training in customs and border control
procedures; advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilization
policy and support for landmine removal.
Peacekeeping assessed The assessed contribution of Member States to the operations of

budget the UN peacekeeping missions, based on a scale established by the
General Assembly.
Peer education A popular concept that variously refers to an approach, a

communication channel, a methodology and/or an intervention
strategy. Peer education usually involves training and supporting
members of a given group with the same background, experience
and values to effect change among members of that group. It is often
used to influence knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours at the
individual level. However, peer education may also create change
at the group or societal level by modifying norms and stimulating
collective action that contributes to changes in policies and
programmes. Worldwide, peer education is one of the most widely
used strategies to deal with the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Police statute A law, decree or edict enacted by the relevant authority governing
the establishment, functions and organization of a law enforcement
agency.
Policy A set of statements that define the purpose and goals of an

organization and the rules, standards and principles of action that
govern the way in which the organization aims to achieve these goals.
Policy evolves in response to strategic direction and field experience.

In turn, it influences the way in which plans are developed, and
how resources are mobilized and applied. Policy is prescriptive and
compliance is assumed, or at least is encouraged.
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Policy development The process whereby many academic, international and

non-governmental organizations provide assistance to governments
in developing their strategies and managerial approaches to particular
issues, problems or events.
Political stability A situation where the political system and its actors, rules, cultures
and institutions achieve balance and maintain a certain degree of
order.
Post-conflict Can describe the time, period or events taking place in a given State
or region that had experienced an outbreak of violence or conflict in
its recent past.
Post-exposure prophylaxis/ A treatment to prevent a person from contracting HIV after contact
Post exposure prevention with infected body fluids, such as blood through occupational
(PEP) exposure (like an accidental injection needle injury experienced by
a health care professional) or as a result of rape. The treatment
generally consists of high doses of ARVs for 28 days. To be effective,
the treatment must start within 2 to 72 hours of the possible
exposure; the earlier the treatment is started the more effective it is.
Its success rate varies.
Poverty reduction PRSPs are prepared by governments in low-income countries

strategy papers (PRSPs) through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders
and external development partners, including the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. A PRSP describes the
macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes that
a country will follow over several years to bring about broad based
growth and reduce poverty, as well as external financing needs and
the associated sources of financing (IMF, Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper: A Fact Sheet, September 2005, <http://www.imf.org/external/
np/exr/facts/prsp.htm>).
Practical gender needs What women (or men) perceive as immediate necessities, such as
water, shelter, food and security. Practical needs vary according
to gendered differences in the division of agricultural labour,
reproductive work, etc., in any social context.
Pre-discharge orientation Programmes provided at the point of demobilization to former

(PDO) combatants and their families to better equip them for reinsertion
to civil society. This process also provides a valuable opportunity to
monitor and manage expectations.
Pre-mandate commitment The sources of budgetary support available to the Secretary-General

authority (PMCA) of the UN to establish or expand a peacekeeping operations or special
political mission. Certain conditions govern the use of the PMCA,
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which may include (depending on circumstances) approval from the

ACABQ or notification of the President of the Security Council.
Prevention of recruitment, Child-focused agencies use the term ‘prevention of recruitment, and
and demobilization and demobilization and reintegration’ rather than DDR when referring to
reintegration (PDR) child-centred processes.
Prima facie As appearing at first sight or on first impression; relating to refugees,

if someone seems obviously to be a refugee.
Programme A generic (general) term for a set of activities designed to achieve

a specific objective. In order to ensure that a programme’s results,
outputs and overall outcome are reached, activities are often framed
by a strategy, key principles and identified targets. Together, these
indicate how the activities will be structured and implemented.
Programmes also include a description of all aspects necessary to
implement the planned activities, including inputs and resources
(staff, equipment, funding, etc.), management arrangements, legal
frameworks, partnerships and other risk analysis.
Project Within each programme there may be several projects, each of which
is a separately identified undertaking. A project is an intervention
that consists of a set of planned, interrelated activities aimed at
achieving defined objectives over a fixed time. A project’s activities
and objectives are normally given in a project document. This legal
agreement binds the signatories to carry out the defined activities
and to provide specific resources over a fixed period of time in order
to reach agreed objectives.
Protection All activities that are aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of
the individual, in accordance with the letter and spirit of international
human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law.
Public information Information that is released or published for the primary purpose of
keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding
and support. The objective of public information within SALW control
is to raise general awareness. It is a mass mobilization approach that
delivers information on the SALW problem. In an emergency situation,
due to lack of time and accurate data it is the most practical means
of communicating safety information. In other situations, public
information can support community liaison/involvement.
Quick Impact Project (QIP) Quick-impact projects are small, rapidly implemented projects
intended to:
• help create conditions for durable solutions for refugees and
returnees through rapid interventions;
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• through community participation, provide for small-scale initial

rehabilitation and enable communities to take advantage of
development opportunities;
• help strengthen the absorptive capacity of target areas, while

meeting urgent community needs (UNHCR, Quick Impact
Projects (QIPs): A Provisional Guide, Geneva, May 2004).
Rapid assessment (RA) Assessment that uses a variety of survey techniques for quick and
inexpensive assessment. Rapid assessments tend to be qualitative
rather than quantitative, and they depend more on the ability and
judgment of the person carrying out the survey than do other
research methods that are more rigorous, but also slower and costlier.
Receiving communities The communities where the ex-combatants will go, live and work.
Within this concept, the social network of a small community is
referred to, and also the bordering local economy.
Reconstruction The process of rebuilding the institutions of State that have failed or
are failing due to circumstances of war or to systematic destruction
through poor governance.
Recovery A restorative process in relation to the situation prior to the

distress. It might entail ‘healing’, reparation, amelioration and even
regeneration.
Recruitment Includes compulsory, forced and voluntary recruitment into any kind
of regular or irregular armed force or armed group.
Refugee Defined in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees

as a person who:
“Is outside the country of origin;

• Has a well founded fear of persecution because of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion; and
• Is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that

country, or to return there, for fear of persecution.”
In Africa and Latin America, this definition has been extended. The
1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa also includes as refugees persons fleeing civil
disturbances, widespread violence and war. In Latin America, the
Cartagena Declaration of 1984, although not binding, recommends
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that the definition should also include persons who fled their country
“because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by
generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive
violations of human rights or other circumstances which have
seriously disturbed public order”.
Refugee status Legal and administrative procedures undertaken by UNHCR and/or

determination States to determine whether an individual should be recognized as a
refugee in accordance with national and international law.
Regular forces Institutionalized armed cadre in organized, structured and trained

professional armies, with a legal basis and supporting institutional
infrastructure (salaries, benefits, basic services, etc.).
Reinsertion “Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during

demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration.
Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic
needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional
safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term
education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a
long term, continuous social and economic process of development,
reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet
immediate needs, and can last up to one year” (Secretary-General,
note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).
Reintegration “Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian

status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is
essentially a social and economic process with an open time -frame,
primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of
the general development of a country and a national responsibility,
and often necessitates long-term external assistance” (Secretary-
General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).
Reintegration of children The provision of reintegration support is a right enshrined in article

39 of the CRC: “State Parties shall take all appropriate measures
to promote … social reintegration of a child victim of … armed
conflicts”. Child-centred reintegration is multi-layered and focuses
on family reunification; mobilizing and enabling care systems in the
community; medical screening and health care, including reproductive
health services; schooling and/or vocational training; psychosocial
support; and social, cultural and economic support. Socio-economic
reintegration is often underestimated in DDR programmes, but should
be included in all stages of programming and budgeting, and partner
organizations should be involved at the start of the reintegration
process to establish strong collaboration structures.
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Render safe procedure The application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and
(RSP) tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of
essential components to prevent an unacceptable detonation.
Repatriation The return of an individual to his/her country of citizenship.
Resettlement The relocation of a refugee to a third country, which is neither the

country of citizenship nor the country into which the refugee has fled.
Resettlement to a third country is granted by accord of the country
of resettlement, and is based on a number of criteria, including legal
and physical protection needs, lack of local integration opportunities,
medical needs, family reunification needs, protecting survivors of
violence and torture, etc.
Residual risk In the context of disarmament, the term refers to the risk remaining
following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove the risks
inherent in all collection and destruction activities (adapted from ISO
Guide 51:1999).
Results-based budgeting A strategic planning framework that focuses on concrete objectives,

(RBB) expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement for the
allocation of resources. As such, the RBB aims to shift focus from
output accounting (i.e., activities) to results-based accountability
(indicators of achievements).
Returnee A refugee who has voluntarily repatriated from a country of

asylum to his/her country of origin, after the country of origin has
confirmed that its environment is stable and secure and not prone
to persecution of any person. Also refers to a person (who could be
an internally displaced person [IDP] or ex-combatant) returning to a
community/town/village after conflict has ended.
Risk Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity

of that harm (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Risk analysis Systematic use of available information to identify hazards and to

estimate the risk (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Risk assessment Overall process comprising a risk analysis and a risk evaluation (ISO
Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Risk evaluation Process based on risk analysis to determine whether the tolerable risk
has been achieved (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Risk reduction Actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences or

both, associated with a particular event or series of events.
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Routine opt-in testing Type of testing before which the individual in a defined group is given
advance notice that an HIV test is going to form a standard part of
a treatment/health check that he/she is about to receive and he/she
has the right to give or withhold consent.
Rule of law A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and

entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable
to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures
to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application
of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making,
legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal
transparency.
‘Safe to move’ A technical assessment, by an appropriately qualified technician or

technical officer, of the physical condition and stability of ammunition
and explosives prior to any proposed move. Should the ammunition
and explosives fail a ‘safe to move’ inspection, then they must be
destroyed on site (i.e., at the place where it is found), or as close
as is practically possible, by a qualified EOD team acting under the
advice and control of the qualified technician or technical officer who
conducted the initial ‘safe to move’ inspection.
Safety The degree of freedom from unacceptable risk (ISO Guide 51:
1999[E]).
SALW awareness A programme of activities carried out with the overall goal
programme of minimizing, and where possible eliminating, the negative
consequences of inadequate SALW control by carrying out an
appropriate combination of SALW advocacy, SALW risk education
and media operations/public information campaigns, which together
work to change behaviours and introduce appropriate alternative
ways attitudes over the long term. Wherever it exists, the operational
objectives of a national SALW control initiative will dictate the
appropriate type of SALW awareness activities. SALW awareness is
a mass mobilization approach that delivers information on the SALW
threat. It may take the form of formal or non-formal education and
may use mass media techniques. In an emergency situation, due
to lack of time and available data, it is the most practical way of
communicating safety information. In other situations it can support
community liaison.
SALW advocacy A programme of activities that aim to raise SALW problems and issues
with the general public, the authorities, the media, governments
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and their institutions to achieve changes at both institutional and/

or individual levels. These types of activities also include campaigns
highlighting the SALW problems and issues with the aim of
encouraging people to surrender weapons. This is generally carried
out to support weapons collection programmes.
SALW control Activities that, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and
environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW spread and possession.
These activities include cross-border control issues, legislative
and regulatory measures, SALW awareness and communications
strategies, SALW collection and destruction operations, SALW
survey and the management of information and SALW stockpile
management.
SALW risk education A process that encourages the adoption of safer behaviours by
at-risk groups and by SALW holders, and which provides the links
among affected communities, other SALW components and other
sectors. SALW risk education can be implemented as a stand-alone
activity, in contexts where no weapons collection is taking place. If an
amnesty is to be set up at a later stage, risk education activities will
permit an information campaign to take place efficiently, using the
networks, systems and methods in place as part of the risk education
programme and adapting the content accordingly.
SALW risk education is an essential component of SALW control.

There are two related and mutually reinforcing components: (1)
community involvement; and (2) public education.
Generally, SALW risk education programmes can use both

approaches, as they reinforce each other. They are not, however,
alternatives to each other, nor are they alternatives to eradicating
the SALW threat by weapons collection and destruction. The use of
those approaches will also depend on whether a weapons collection
programme is taking place or not.
SALW survey A systematic and logical process to determine the nature and extent
of SALW spread and impact within a region, nation or community in
order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective
and efficient intervention by an appropriate organization. The
following terms have been used in the past, though the preferred one
is as indicated above: ‘national assessment’, ‘base-line assessment’
and ‘mapping’.
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Security An individual’s or State’s feeling of safety or well-being, protected

from attack or violent conflict.
OR
The control of threat, integrated with an appropriate response

capability.
Security sector reform A dynamic concept involving the design and implementation of
(SSR) strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically
accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate and support
reform of the national security infrastructure. The national security
infrastructure includes appropriate national ministries, civil
authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces,
police, intelligence services, private–military companies (PMCs),
correctional services and civil society ‘watch-dogs’.
Sensitization Sensitization within the DDR context refers to creating awareness,

positive understanding and behavioural change towards: (1) specific
components that are important to DDR planning, implementation
and follow-up; and (2) transitional changes for ex-combatants, their
dependants and surrounding communities, both during and post-DDR
processes. For those who are planning and implementing DDR,
sensitization can entail making sure that specific needs of women and
children are included within DDR programme planning. It can consist
of taking cultural traditions and values into consideration, depending
on where the DDR process is taking place.
For ex-combatants, their dependants and surrounding communities

who are being sensitized, it means being prepared for and made
aware of what will happen to them and their communities after
being disarmed and demobilized, e.g., taking on new livelihoods,
which will change both their lifestyle and environment. Such
sensitization processes can occur with a number of tools: training and
issue-specific workshops; media tools such as television, radio, print
and poster campaigns; peer counselling, etc.
Sentinel surveillance Surveillance based on selected population samples chosen to

represent the relevant experience of particular groups.
Sero-conversion The period when the blood starts producing detectable antibodies in
response to HIV infection.
Sero-positive Having antibodies to HIV; being HIV positive.
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Sex The biological differences between men and women, which are
universal and determined at birth.
Sex disaggregated data Data that are collected and presented separately on men and women.
The availability of sex-disaggregated data, which would describe
the proportion of women, men, girls and boys associated with
armed forces and groups, is an essential precondition for building
gender-responsive policies and interventions.
Sexually transmitted Disease that is commonly transmitted through vaginal, oral or anal
infection (STI) sex. The presence of an STI is indicative of risk behaviour, and also
increases the actual risk of contracting HIV.
Small arms and light All lethal conventional weapons and ammunition that can be carried
weapons (SALW) by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require
a substantial logistic and maintenance capability. There are a variety
of definitions for SALW circulating and international consensus on a
‘correct’ definition has yet to be agreed. Based on common practice,
weapons and ammunition up to 100 mm in calibre are usually
considered as SALW. For the purposes of the IDDRS series, the above
definition will be used.
Small arms capacity The component of SALW survey that collects data on the local
assessment (SACA) resources available to respond to the SALW problem.
Small arms distribution The component of SALW survey that collects data on the type,
assessment (SADA) quantity, ownership, distribution and movement of SALW within the
country or region.
Small arms impact The component of SALW survey that collects data on the impact of
survey (SAIS) SALW on the community and social and economic development.
Small arms limitation See ‘community disarmament’.
Small arms perception The component of SALW survey that collects qualitative and
survey (SAPS) quantitative information, using focus groups, interviews and
household surveys, on the attitudes of the local community to SALW
and possible interventions.
Social capital The existence of a certain set of informal values or norms shared
among members of a group that permit cooperation among them. The
sharing of values and norms does not in itself produce social capital,
because the values may be the wrong ones: the norms that produce
social capital must substantively include virtues like truth-telling, the
meeting of obligations and reciprocity. Note: There are multiple and
nuanced definitions of social capital.
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Stakeholders A broad term used to denote all local, national and international
actors who have an interest in the outcome of any particular DDR
process. This includes participants and beneficiaries, parties to peace
accords/political frameworks, national authorities, all UN and partner
implementing agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, and regional
actors and international political guarantors of the peace process.
Standard A documented agreement containing technical specifications or

other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines
or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products,
processes and services are fit for their purpose. IDDRS aim to
improve safety and efficiency in DDR operations by encouraging the
use of the preferred procedures and practices at both Headquarters
and field level. To be effective, the standards should be definable,
measurable, achievable and verifiable.
STI syndromic management A cost-effective approach that allows health workers to diagnose
sexually transmitted infections based on a patient’s history and
symptoms without the need for laboratory analysis. Treatment
normally includes the use of broad-spectrum antibiotics.
Stockpile In the context of DDR, the term refers to a large accumulated stock of
weapons and explosive ordnance.
Stockpile destruction The physical activities and destructive procedures towards a continual
reduction of the national stockpile.
Strategic gender needs Long-term needs, usually not material, and often related to
structural changes in society regarding women’s status and equity.
They include legislation for equal rights, reproductive choice and
increased participation in decision-making. The notion of ‘strategic
gender needs’, first coined in 1985 by Maxine Molyneux, helped
develop gender planning and policy development tools, such as the
Moser Framework, which are currently being used by development
institutions around the world. Interventions dealing with strategic
gender interests focus on fundamental issues related to women’s (or,
less often, men’s) subordination and gender inequities.
Sustainable livelihoods Approach that tries to ensure that households can cope with and
approach recover from stresses and shocks, and maintain and improve their
capabilities and assets now and in the future.
Tolerable risk Risk that is accepted in a given context on the basis of the current
values of society (ISO Guide 51: 1999 [E]).
225
Transition The period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in

supporting or underpinning still fragile ceasefires or peace processes
by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security,
justice and social equity. Thus, peace-building is the area where
UN activities in a transition context intersect. Consolidating peace
remains the overarching aim of transition.
Transitional justice Transitional justice comprises the full range of processes and
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may
include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing
levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting
and dismissals, or a combination thereof.
Transparency Free and open access to information that enables civil society to
perform its regulatory function. Transparency is sometimes used as a
synonym for accountability in governance.
UN development assistance UNDAF is the common strategic framework for the operational
framework (UNDAF) activities of the UN system at the country level. It provides a
collective, coherent and integrated UN system response to national
priorities and needs, including PRSPs and equivalent national
strategies, within the framework of the Millennium Development
Goals and the commitments, goals and targets of the Millennium
Declaration and international conferences, summits, conventions and
human rights instruments of the UN system (UN, Common Country
Assessment and United Nations Development Assistance Framework:
Guidelines for UN Country Teams, 2004).
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise
prepared for action, and which has been dropped, fired, launched,
projected or placed in such a manner as to be a hazard to operations,
installations, personnel or material, and remains unexploded either by
malfunction or design or for any other cause.
Universal precautions Simple infection control measures that reduce the risk of transmission
of blood borne pathogens through exposure to blood or body fluids
among patients and health care workers. Under the ‘universal
precaution’ principle, blood and body fluids from all persons should be
considered as infected with HIV, regardless of the known or supposed
status of the person.
Use of new, single-use disposable injection equipment for all

injections is highly recommended. Sterilizable injection should only be
226
considered if single-use equipment is not available and if the sterility

can be documented with time, steam and temperature indicators.
Discard contaminated sharps immediately and without recapping in

puncture- and liquid-proof containers that are closed, sealed and
destroyed before completely full.
Document the quality of the sterilization for all medical equipment

used for percutaneous procedures.
Wash hands with soap and water before and after procedures; use
protective barriers such as gloves, gowns, aprons, masks and goggles
for direct contact with blood and other body fluids.
Disinfect instruments and other contaminated equipment.
Handle properly soiled linen with care. Soiled linen should be handled
as little as possible. Gloves and leak-proof bags should be used
if necessary. Cleaning should occur outside patient areas, using
detergent and hot water.
Verification Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that

specified requirements have been fulfilled (ISO 9000:2000).
Violence The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual,

against oneself, another person, or a group or community that either
results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death,
psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.
Violence against women/ Defined as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is
Gender based likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering
violence to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private.
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be
limited to, the following:
• (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the
family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the
household, dowry related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women,
non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;
• (b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within

the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual
harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions
and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution;
227
• (c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated

or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs” (UN General
Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, 1993).
Voluntary contributions Financial support that Member States pledge (often in a donors’
conference) and commit on a case-by-case basis to support
programme implementation. Contributions can be made to UN or
non-UN trust funds. At times, donors implement their contributions
through their own bilateral aid agency or directly through
non-government organizations.
Voluntary HIV testing A client-initiated HIV test whereby the individual chooses to go to a
testing facility/provider to find out his/her HIV status.
Voluntary surrender The physical return on their own accord by an individual(s) or

community of SALW to the legal government or an international
organization with no further penalty.
Vulnerability The high probability of exposure to risks and reduced capacity to

overcome their negative results. Vulnerability is a result of exposure
to risk factors, and of underlying socio-economic processes, which
reduce the capacity of populations to cope with risks.
Weapon Anything used, designed or used or intended for use: (1) in causing
death or injury to any person; or (2) for the purposes of threatening
or intimidating any person and, without restricting the generality of
the foregoing, includes a firearm.
Weapons collection point A temporary, or semi-permanent, location laid out in accordance with
(WCP) the principles of explosive and weapons safety, which is designed to
act as a focal point for the surrender of SALW by the civil community.
Weapons in competition The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and
for development (WCD) light weapons by competing communities in exchange for an agreed
proportion of small-scale infrastructure development by the legal
government, an international organization or NGO.
Weapons control Regulation of the possession and use of firearms and other lethal
weapons by citizens through legal issuances (e.g., laws, regulations,
decrees, etc.).
Weapons in exchange for The indirect linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms
development (WED; WfD) and light weapons by the community as a whole in exchange for
the provision of sustainable infrastructure development by the legal
government, an international organization or NGO.
228
Weapons in exchange for The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms
incentives (WEI) and light weapons by individuals in exchange for the provision of
appropriate materials by the legal government, an international
organization or an NGO.
Weapons linked to The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and
development (WLD) light weapons by the community as a whole in return for an increase
in ongoing development assistance by the legal government, an
international organization or an NGO.
Weapons management Within the DDR context, weapons management refers to the handling,
administration and oversight of surrendered weapons, ammunition
and unexploded ordnance (UXO) whether received, disposed of,
destroyed or kept in long-term storage. An integral part of managing
weapons during the DDR process is their registration, which should
preferably be managed by international and government agencies,
and local police, and monitored by international forces. A good
inventory list of weapons’ serial numbers allows for the effective
tracing and tracking of weapons’ future usage. During voluntary
weapons collections, food or money related incentives are given in
order to encourage registration.
Alternately, weapons management refers to a national government’s

administration of its own legal weapons stock. Such administration
includes registration, according to national legislation, of the type,
number, location and condition of weapons. In addition, a national
government’s implementation of its transfer controls of weapons, to
decrease illicit weapons’ flow, and regulations for weapons’ export and
import authorizations (within existing State responsibilities), also fall
under this definition.
Window period The time period between initial infection with HIV and the body’s
production of antibodies, which can be up to three months. During
this time, an HIV-test for antibodies will be negative, even though the
person has the virus and can infect others.
Working age The Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) contains provisions
aimed at protecting young persons against hazardous or exploitative
activities or conditions of work. It requires the setting not only of a
general minimum age for admission to work — which cannot be less
than age 15 and, according to its accompanying Recommendation No.
146, should be progressively raised to age 16 — but also of a higher
minimum age of 18 for admission to work likely to jeopardize the
health, safety or morals of young persons.
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Worst forms of child labour The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) aims
at putting an end to the involvement of all persons under age 18 in
the harmful activities it lists. Forced or compulsory recruitment of
children for use in armed conflict is listed as one of the worst forms of
child labour.
Youth Within the UN system, young people are identified as those between
15 and 24 years of age. However, this can vary considerably between
one context and another. Social, economic and cultural systems
define the age limits for the specific roles and responsibilities
of children, youth and adults. Conflicts and violence often force
youth to assume adult roles such as being parents, breadwinners,
caregivers or fighters. Cultural expectations of girls and boys also
affect the perception of them as adults, such as the age of marriage,
circumcision practices and motherhood. Such expectations can be
disturbed by conflict.
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Appendix C: UN Documents and Legal Instruments Guiding DDR
Source: IDDRS 2.10, Annex B
1. UN Documents
Each mission-specific mandate for DDR is established through a unique Security Council resolution,
but direction can also be drawn from the following:
• Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2000/10, of 23 March 2000, in

which “the Council notes that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration must be addressed
comprehensively so as to facilitate a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace-building”;
• Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, in which the Council “[e]
ncourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the
needs of their dependants” (para. 13);
• Resolutions 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003) and 1539 (2004) on Children in Armed Conflict, in the
last of which the Security Council “[r]eiterates its requests to all parties concerned, including UN
agencies, founds and programmes as well as financial institutions, to continue to ensure that
all children associated with armed forces and groups, as well as issues related to children are
systematically include in every disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, taking
into account the specific needs and capacities of girls, with a particular emphasis on education,
including the monitoring, through, inter alia, schools, of children demobilized in order to prevent
re-recruitment” (art. 8);
• A series of statements and resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians
in Armed Conflict that are relevant to the planning and implementation of DDR programmesii.
The Secretary-General and other UN bodies provide policy guidance on DDR in a number of reports
adopted by the Security Council and General Assembly, including:
• The Secretary-General’s report on The Role of UN Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization

and Reintegration, S/2000/101, of 11 February 2000, paras. 2 and 8, in which the Secretary-
General lays out the UN’s basic approach to DDR as a key element of stabilization in post-
conflict situations to facilitate a society’s transition from conflict to development. He establishes
that DDR cannot be viewed as a simple sequence of events, but rather, that each activity forms
a continuum whose elements overlap and mutually reinforce each other;
• The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/55/305; S/2000/809, of 21 August 2000,
which reaffirms the importance of DDR to the achievement of the UN’s peace-building objectives,
the indivisibility of its component parts and the importance of linking DDR programmes to
other elements of the peace-building framework, such as the rule of law and democratic
governance. In addition, the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/55/502/2000, calls
for an integrated or team approach to be taken by the different departments, agencies and
programmes of the UN system to achieve peace-building objectives;
231
• The Secretary-General’s Study on Women, Peace and Security (2002), which recommends
that the UN system should incorporate the needs and priorities of women and girls as ex-
combatants, ‘camp followers’ and families of ex-combatants in the design and implementation
of DDR programmes, in order: to ensure the success of such programmes, the participation
of women and girls and their full access to benefits; to pay attention to the specific needs of
girl soldiers; to develop programmes on the prevention of domestic violence in the families
and communities of ex-combatants; and to recognize the contributions of women and girls in
encouraging ex-combatants to lay down their armsiii;
• The Secretary-General’s bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation
and Sexual Abuse, ST/SGB//2003/13, of 9 October 2003, which applies to the staff of all UN
departments, programmes, funds and agencies, as well as to forces conducting operations
under UN command and control, who are prohibited from committing acts of sexual exploitation
and sexual abuse and who have a particular duty of care towards women and children. The
bulletin also establishes standards of conduct and the responsibility of heads of office, mission
or department in this regard;
• The Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, of 2 December
2004, which concludes that “[d]emobilization of combatants is the single most important factor
determining the success of peace operations” (paras. 227, 228), but notes that it is difficult to
secure timely funding for DDR operations. The Panel calls for the creation of a standing fund for
peace-building to be used to finance the recurrent expenditure of a newly formed government
and key agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration;
• The report of the Secretary-General on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,

A/60/705, of 2 March 2006, which discusses the UN’s increased engagement in DDR processes
as part of complex peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping operations over the last five years,
including lessons learned from these operations. The report further discusses the development
of the Organization’s new approach to DDR within the United Nations system, based on these
lessons learned, which is articulated in the IDDRS.
2. International Legal Framework
The standards and provisions of international law operate both during and after conflict and establish
the broad normative framework for peace-building and recovery programmes, including DDR.
Legal regimes with particular relevance to DDR operations include the following:
International humanitarian law
• The Geneva Conventions (1949) and Additional Protocols (1977) provide legal definitions of
combatants and armed groups, standards for the protection of civilians, and rights to relief for
the wounded, sick and children;
232
• The International Criminal Court Statute (1998) establishes individual and command
responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.
International human rights law
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1978) recognizes the right of all
people to self-determination and establishes a range of civil and political rights to be respected
without discrimination, including rights of due process and equality before the law, freedom of
movement and association, freedom of religion and political opinion, and the right to liberty and
security of person;
• The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1978) establishes
rights of individuals and duties of States to provide for the basic needs of all persons without
discrimination, including access to employment, education and health care;
• The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(1984) establishes that torture is prohibited under all circumstances, including a state of war,
internal political instability or other public emergency, regardless of the orders of superiors or
public authorities;
• The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and promotes equal access for men and women to
employment, education, and legal, political, economic, social and cultural rights;
• The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) recognizes the special status of children and
establishes their economic, social and cultural rights, as well as States’ duty to protect children
in a number of settings, including during armed conflict.
International refugee law
• The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) establishes the rights of refugees and
duties of States in this regard, including the prohibition of forced repatriation.
Statements of international principles and standards
• The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (1997) establishes 8 as the minimum age for
recruitment in any form into any armed force or armed group and encourages governments
to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which raises the
minimum age for recruitment from 15 to 18 years. Children associated with armed groups and
forces are defined as “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or
irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters,
messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition
includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only
refer to a child who is carrying or who has carried arms.”
233
Endnotes
ii. S/1999/957, S/1999/1265, S/2000/1296, S2001/331, S/PRST/2002/6, S/2002/1300, S/

PRST/2002/41, S/PRST/2003/27.
iii. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf.
234
Appendix D: Current Peacekeeping Missions
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

MINUSMA MINURSO UNAMID UNMIK UNFICYP UNIFIL UNMOGIP
Mali Western Sahara Darfur Kosovo Cyprus Lebanon India and Pakistan
MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MONUSCO UNMISS UNISFA UNTSO UNDOF

Haiti Central African Republic Dem. Rep. of the Congo South Sudan Abyei Middle East Syria
Map No. 4259 Rev. 25 (E) UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support
April 2018 Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)
UN Peacekeeping Map from the UN Cartographic Section, April 2018: <www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/P_K_O.pdf>.

MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara established: 1991
MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the established: 2014
»» Looking for statistics
Central African Republic or other data about
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali established: 2013
MINUJUSTHpeacekeeping around
United Nations Mission the
for Justice world
Support today? Visit
in Haiti established: 2017
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Dem. Republic of the Congo established: 2010
the UN Peacekeeping resource page for the
UNAMID African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur established: 2007
UNDOF most up-to-date
United information
Nations Disengagement about current
Observer Force established: 1974
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus established: 1964
peacekeeping operations and other UN
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon established: 1978
UNISFA missions:
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei established: 2011
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo established: 1999
UNMISS
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/resources>.
United Nations Mission in South Sudan established: 2011
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan established: 1949
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Orginization established: 1984
235
About the Author: Mr. Cornelis Steenken
Cornelis Steenken is Dutch by

birth, Canadian by choice, but
international at heart having
travelled to or worked in many
countries.
Photo used with permission of Mr.

Steenken.
He joined the Canadian Navy in 1975 and graduated from the Royal Military College in 1980 and served
in numerous staff, command, exchange, training, and operational positions onboard ship and ashore. In
1991, he went as a UN peacekeeper to El Salvador.
Seconded to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) in 1995, Steenken co-created its DDR course,
which included all components of SALW, demobilization planning, reinsertion, and social and economic
reintegration. Working closely with the United Nations, he advised numerous national DDR programmes.
After retiring from the Navy in 2002, he continued as Director of DDR Programmes at the PPC, further
developing and strengthening all aspects of DDR and co-authored the DDR Handbook A Field and Classroom
Guide and initiated the Integrated DDR Training Group (IDDRTG).
Steenken was selected to be the Senior Adviser on DDR at the Swedish Defence University from 2004
to 2008, where his duties included DDR-related advice to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DDR
training on their international and national courses. He was sent as an adviser to numerous countries to
develop national policies for inclusive DDR. He also developed and taught on many DDR trainings throughout
the post-conflict world and also helped initiate and develop the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR). He
was part of the Swedish parliamentary forums that helped create the ISACS SALW standards and was an
integral part of the development of the UN Integrated DDR Standards, which is the first significant multi-
agency UN DDR guidance document (<see www.unddr.org>).
In April 2008, Steenken was selected as the first Coordinator of the UN Inter-Agency Working Group
on DDR where he helped coordinate 21 UN Agencies working with the IDDRS and DDR at both the policy
and field levels, collecting field lessons and developing knowledge management tools, trainings, and new or
revised DDR policy. This led to closer liaison among SALW, SSR, Mine Action, and other post-conflict actors.
Steenken left the UN in 2012 and is now a private consultant. He has conducted DDR assessments,
reviews, and workshops in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Colombia, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, the
Philippines, and Somalia. He continues to teach on numerous DDR and post-conflict courses around the
world.
236
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination
Format and Material
The End-of-Course Examination is a multiple-choice exam that is accessed from the Online
Classroom. Most exams have 50 questions. Each question gives the student four choices (A, B, C, and
D), and only one is the correct answer. The exam covers material from all lessons of the course and may
also include information found in the annexes and appendices. Video content will not be tested.
»» Access the exam from your Online Classroom

by visiting <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/
courses/> and clicking the title of this course.
Once you arrive at the course page, click the red
“Start Exam” button.
Time Limit
There is no time limit for the exam. This allows the student to read and study the questions
carefully and to consult the course text. Furthermore, if the student cannot complete the exam in one
sitting, he or she may save the exam and come back to it without being graded. The “Save” button is
located at the bottom of the exam, next to the “Submit my answers” button. Clicking on the “Submit
my answers” button will end the exam.
Passing Grade
To pass the exam, a score of 75 per cent or better is required. An electronic Certificate of Completion
will be awarded to those who have passed the exam. A score of less than 75 per cent is a failing grade,
and students who have received a failing grade will be provided with a second, alternate version of the
exam, which may also be completed without a time limit. Students who pass the second exam will be
awarded a Certificate of Completion.
Continue your POTI training experience »

• Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/courses/> for a list of all current courses.
• If a particular category of study interests you, such as Human Rights,

Logistics, or Military Studies, consider the POST Certificate programme
available in six areas of specialization. See the requirements at
<www.peaceopstraining.org/specialized-training-certificates/>.
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with other students through social media and sharing photos from your
mission. Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/community> for more. Once you
pass your exam, see your name featured on the Honour Roll as well.
237

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Disarmament, Demobilization,

and Reintegration (DDR):

Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.

Peace Operations Training Institute

Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

Cover Photo: UN Photo #535676 by Basile Zoma.

Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.

Peace Operations Training Institute

Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

Peace Operations Training Institute

First edition: 2008 by Yvan Conoir

Method of Study xiii

Lesson 1 Outline and Context of DDR 14

Section 1.1 Introduction 16

Section 1.2 Context of DDR 17

Section 1.3 DDR Terminology 17

Section 1.4 Objectives of DDR 21

Section 1.5 Post-Conflict Environment 21

Section 1.6 Post-Conflict Security Situation 23

Section 1.7 Security Concerns of Demobilized Combatants 24

Section 1.8 What is a DDRP? 24

Section 1.9 Security Threat Posed by XCs 30

Section 1.10 Impact of Past Programmes 30

Section 1.11 Conclusion 31

Lesson 2 Participants, Beneficiaries,

Section 2.1 Participants and Beneficiaries 36

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Section 2.2 Communities 37

Section 2.3 XCs as a Specific Needs Group 37

Section 2.4 Targeted Assistance 39

Section 2.5 Eligibility and Screening Mechanisms 41

Section 2.6 Specific Needs of Female XCs, Veterans’ Wives, and

Section 2.7 Youth 52

Section 2.8 Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed

Section 2.9 Disabled XCs 64

Lesson 3 Disarmament and Small Arms Control 74

Section 3.1 Basic Principles of Disarmament 77

Section 3.2 The Four Main Phases of Disarmament 79

Section 3.3 SALW – Weapon Control and Disarmament 85

Lesson 4 Demobilization 90

Section 4.1 Approaches to Demobilization 92

Section 4.2 Planning and Preparation 93

Section 4.3 Conduct of Demobilization 96

Section 4.4 Camp Support and Internal Programming 100

Section 4.5 Information Campaigns to Help Expectations

Section 4.6 The Moment of Demobilization (Discharge) 104

Section 4.7 Reinsertion 105

Section 4.8 Conclusions 107

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Lesson 5 Reintegration 110

Section 5.1 Introduction 111

Section 5.2 Security Needs for Reintegration 113

Section 5.3 Economic Reintegration 115

Section 5.4 Social Reintegration 121

Section 5.5 Political Reintegration 127

Section 5.6 Reintegration Planning and Design 131

Section 5.7 Reintegration – Needs Assessment 136

Section 5.8 Reintegration Programme Funding Issues 139

Section 5.9 Conclusion 142

Lesson 6 Post-Conflict Issues and Linkages to DDR 146

Section 6.1 The Post-Conflict Security Situation 149

Section 6.2 DDR and SSR 151

Section 6.3 UN Military Roles and Responsibilities in DDR 155