THE ERA OF NEPOLEON

Submitted To: Sir Saeed Ahmed

Butt

Submitted BY: Irfan Ali Khuhro

Roll NO: (0469)

Subject: History
Government College University,
Lahore
 Contents
Introduction

The rise of Napoleon

Constitutional Monarchy

Civil Code or Code Napoleon

The Age of Napoleon

Napoleon's Road to Glory

Napoleon's Red Lancers

Political behavior

Napoleon and his Impact

Negative Impact

Napoleon's Last Grande Army

The Naval War

British Napoleonic Artillery

Austrian Napoleonic Artillery

Napoleon's Artillery

Jena 1806

Napoleon Bonaparte's will

Success

Defeat

Conclusion
Introduction:
, he was Emperor of the French from 1804 to 1814. He undertook many reforms across Europe,
ending feudalism for example. His legal reform in France, the Napoleonic Code, has been a
major influence on many civil law jurisdictions worldwide. Napoleon is best remembered for his
role leading France against a series of coalitions, in the Napoleonic Wars. He won the great
majority of his battles and seized control of most of continental Europe in a quest for personal
power and to spread the ideals of the French Revolution. Napoleon was one of the greatest
military commanders of all time, and his campaigns are studied at military academies worldwide.
Indeed, he remains one of the most studied political and military leaders in all of history.
Napoleon was born in Corsica in a family of noble Italian ancestry which had settled in Corsica
in the 16th century. He spoke French with a heavy Corsican-Italian accent. Well educated he
rose overnight to prominence under the French First Republic and led successful campaigns
against the enemies of the French revolution who set up the First and Second Coalitions, most
notably his campaigns in Italy.

In 1799, he took power in a coup d'état on November 9, 1799 ("the 18th Bumpier" according to
the revolutionary calendar) and installed himself as First Consul. In 1804 he made himself
emperor of the French people. He fought a series of wars —the Napoleonic Wars—that involved
complex coalitions for and against him, but Britain was always his great enemy. After a streak of
victories, France secured a dominant position in continental Europe, and N, he was Emperor of
the French from 1804 to 1814. He undertook many reforms across Europe, ending feudalism for
example. His legal reform in France, the Napoleonic Code, has been a major influence on
many civil law jurisdictions worldwide. Napoleon is best remembered for his role leading France
against a series of coalitions, in the Napoleonic Wars. He won the great majority of his battles
and seized control of most of continental Europe in a quest for personal power and to spread the
ideals of the French Revolution. Napoleon was one of the greatest military commanders of all
time, and his campaigns are studied at military academies worldwide. Indeed, he remains one of
the most studied political and military leaders in all of history. Napoleon was born in Corsica in a
family of noble Italian ancestry which had settled in Corsica in the 16th century. He spoke
French with a heavy Corsican-Italian accent. Well educated he rose overnight to prominence
under the French First Republic and led successful campaigns against the enemies of the French
revolution who set up the First and Second Coalitions, most notably his campaigns in Italy.

In 1799, he took power in a coup d'état on November 9, 1799 ("the 18th Bumpier" according to
the revolutionary calendar) and installed himself as First Consul. In 1804 he made himself
emperor of the French people. He fought a series of wars —the Napoleonic Wars—that involved
complex coalitions for and against him, but Britain was always napoleon maintained the
French sphere of influence through the formation of extensive alliances and the elevation of
friends and family members to rule other European countries as French vassal states.
The Peninsular War (1807–1814) and the invasion of Russia in 1812 marked major military
failures. His was badly damaged and never fully recovered. In 1813, the Sixth
Coalition defeated his forces at Leipzig and his enemies invaded France. Napoleon was forced to
abdicate and go in exile to the Italian island of Elba. In 1815 he escaped and returned to power,
but he was finally defeated at the Battle of Waterloo in June 1815. Napoleon spent the last six
years of his life in confinement by the British on the island of Saint Helena. An autopsy
concluded he died, but there has been some debate about the cause of his death, as some scholars
have speculated that he was a victim of arsenic poisoning.

The rise of Napoleon:

Early 1795 France had defeated the allies on every front and had pushed to Amsterdam, the
Rhine, and the Pyrenees; more importantly, Prussia had been forced out of the coalition and had
signed a separate peace that held until 1806. In May 1795 the United Provinces of
the Netherlands became the French-influenced Batavian Republic. In northern Italy, a strongly
positioned French army threatened Austrian-Sardinian positions, but its commander proved
reluctant to move. In March 1796 he was replaced by a more dynamic general, Napoleon
Bonaparte.

(Napoleon executed a brilliant campaign of maneuver against Austrian and Sardinian forces
in Italy and in the resultant treaty of Campo Formic forced Austria to cede the Austrian
Netherlands (now Belgium and Luxembourg), which became the first territorial additions to the
French Republic, and to recognize the Cisalpine and Liguria republics established by French
power in northern Italy. Napoleon’s next campaign was a major failure. He sailed an army
to Egypt in May 1798 with the idea of conquering the Ottoman Empire. The defeat of a French
naval squadron by Admiral Horatio Nelson in the Battle of the Nile (August 1, 1798) left him
without sufficient naval support, however, and, after failing to take Acre in 1799, Napoleon
withdrew to France)i. His army continued to occupy Egypt until 1801. Mean while , other
French forces had occupied new territories and established republican regimes in Rome. As a
result the Second Coalition formed, comprising Britain, Russia, the Ottoman
Empire, Naples, Portugal, and Austria. The allies’ initial successes were reversed by their
inability to agree on strategy, however, and by the time Napoleon became the first consul of
France by the coup d’état of 18 Bumpier , year VIII (November 9, 1799), the danger of foreign
intervention against the Revolution in France was over. A victory over Austria at Marengo in
1800 and the consequent Treaty of Laneville left France the dominant power on the Continent.
For two years thereafter only Great Britain, with its powerful navy, remained to oppose
Napoleon. Nelson’s smashing victory at Trafalgar (October 21, 1805) ended a French threat to
invade England. In 1805 a Third Coalition formed with Britain, Russia, and Austria. Napoleon
won major victories at Ulm and Austerlitz in 1805 and at Jena, over the new coalition member
Prussia in 1806. The resulting Treaty of Titlists, in which Prussia was halved at the Elbe and also
lost part of Poland, and the Treaty of in 1809, following a brief Austrian uprising, left all of
Europe from the English Channel to the Russian border, with the exceptions of Portugal,
Sweden, Sardinia, and Sicily, either part of the French Empire, under the control of France, or
allied to France by treaty.

In 1806, in an attempt to use French control of continental ports to blockade Britain indirectly,
Napoleon issued the Berlin Decree, by which ships passing to French-controlled ports after
calling at British ports were liable to seizure. The Continental System, as this policy was called,
was not successful. The general inhibition of European trade that ensued (for Britain responded
with a like policy of detaining ships bound for French ports) and the perceived favoritism in the
French government’s granting of licenses to French merchants for trade with Britain cost
Napoleon considerable political support. Meanwhile, though pressed at home, the British were
able to expand their colonial markets so as to emerge from the trade war more prosperous than
before.

Constitutional Monarchy:
King Louis XVIII’s second return from exile was far from glorious. Neither the victorious
powers nor Louis’s French subjects viewed his restoration with much enthusiasm, yet there
seemed to be no ready alternative to Bourbon rule. The allies avenged themselves for
the Hundred Days by writing a new and more severe Treaty of Paris. France lost several frontier
territories, notably the Saar basin and Savoy that had been annexed in 1789–92; a war indemnity
of 700 million francs was imposed; and, pending full payment, eastern France was to be
occupied by allied troops at French expense.

Within France, political tensions were exacerbated by Napoleon’s mad gamble and by the
mistakes committed during the first restoration. The problem facing the Bourbons would have
been difficult enough without these tensions—namely, how to arrive at a stable compromise
between those Frenchmen who saw the Revolutionary changes as irreversible and those who
were determined to resurrect the régime. The reactionary element, labeled ultra royalists (or
simply “ultras”), was now more intransigent than ever and set out to purge the country of all
those who had betrayed the dynasty. A brief period of “white terror” in the south claimed some
300 victims; in Paris, many high officials who had rallied to Napoleon were dismissed, and a few
eminent figures, notably Marshal Michel Ney, were tried and shot. The king refused, however, to
scrap the Charter of 1814, in spite of ultra pressure. When a new Chamber of Deputies was
elected in August 1815, the ultras scored a sweeping victory; the surprised king, who had feared
a surge of antimonarchical sentiment, greeted the legislature as la chamber intro (“the
incomparable chamber”). But the political honeymoon was short-lived. Louis was shrewd
enough, or cautious enough, to realize that ultra policies would divide the country and might in
the end destroy the dynasty. He chose as ministers, therefore, such moderate royalists and —
men who knew the nation would not tolerate an attempt to resurrect the 18th century.

There followed a year of sharp friction between these moderate ministers and the ultra-
dominated Chamber—friction and unrest that made Europe increasingly nervous about the
viability of the restored monarchy. Representatives of the occupying powers began to express
their concern to the king. At last, in September 1816, his ministers persuaded him to dissolve the
Chamber and order new elections, and the moderate royalists emerged with a clear majority. In
spite of ultra fury, several years of relative stability ensued. Richelieu solid support in the
Chamber could proceed with their attempt to pursue a moderate course. By 1818 they were able,
thanks to loans from English and Dutch bankers, to pay off the war indemnity and thus to end the
allied occupation; at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, France was welcomed back into
the Concert of Europe. In domestic politics there were some signs that France might be moving
toward a British-style parliamentary monarchy, even though the Charter had carefully avoided
making the king’s ministers responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. In the Chamber something
anticipating a party system also began to emerge: ultras on the right, independents (or liberals)
on the left, constitutionalists (or moderates) in the centre. None of these factions yet possessed
the real attributes of a party—disciplined organization and doctrinal coherence. The most
heterogeneous of all was the independent group—an uneasy coalition of republicans, Bonaparte,
and constitutional monarchists brought together by their common hostility to the Bourbons and
their common determination to preserve or restore many of the Revolutionary reforms.

The era of moderate rule (1816–20) was marked by a slow but steady advance of the liberal left.
Each year one-fifth of the Chamber faced reelection, and each year more independents won
seats, despite the narrowly restricted suffrage. The ultras, in real or simulated panic, predicted
disaster for the regime and the nation; but the king clung stubbornly to his favorite, Decades,
who by now was head of the government in all but name, and in turn, clung to his middle way.

Civil Code or Code Napoleon:

The longest lasting effect of Napoleon Bonaparte's rule over France was his overseeing the
implementation of a series of national laws collectively known as the Civil Code, or Code
Napoleon. They included the Codes of Civil Procedure, Commercial Law (1807), Penal Code
(1810) and Criminal Procedure (1808). Napoleon wanted to replace a series of existing laws -
that varied in each French province - and replace them with a standard code for all French
people.

He had already reformed the French taxation system bringing to his imperial coffers almost 700
million francs annually. The sources for the money came from taxes on income and a series of
levies on goods - such as wine, tobacco and salt. In 1800 he added to his overhaul of the
financial system by creating the Bank of France.

Napoleon did not play a part in its formation, which was handled by an official commission from
1801, nor did he look many of the 2281 suggested laws before they had been debated by the
Council of State. But once that had happened Napoleon focused his attentions on it and used his
exceptional administrative talents to influence its overall impact. The principal tenet of the Civil
Code was that every French person was equal before the law. This was a boon for many,
however, while he took the religious aspect out of divorce, many of his views did limit
Revolution-founded freedoms for women.

For example women were not allowed to independently trade in chattels or property, but had to
ask their husbands before they did so.

He tightened divorce laws and fathers were empowered as rulers of their homes. They could ban
children from inheritance and also imprison children for a month. He showed great foresight in
beginning a program me of public works that included building canals, harbors and made roads
better and safer by improving their condition and cracking down on brigands. Education was
improved for many, although the majority of children did not gain benefit from his new
specialized and high schools. He encouraged the creation of private schools and sowed the seeds
of community-wide literacy. Never one to accept criticism well, Napoleon cracked down on the
press, censoring newspapers and eventually closing down all but a few. The Civil Code was
officially enacted in 1804 and in 1807 was renamed Code Napoleon. It applied to all French
domains and territories as well as being adopted by countries within the sphere of French
influence. Today the Civil Code forms the basis of many European legal systems.

The Age of Napoleon:

While it seems he has little time for Napoleon the man, he respects some of his achievements.
For example he says as a rebuttal to folk who compare Napoleon with Hitler. "In terms of civil,
non-military accomplishments, Hitler after 12 years in power bequeathed to Germany nothing
but a mountain of skulls and rubble. Napoleon, on the other hand, had he never fought a single
battle, would still have to be rate one of history's great leaders for the system of administration
and civil reforms he left behind him in France."

And it is on the social and civil part Napoleon played in France that Horne has focused. He has
10 major parts to The Age of Napoleon that cover every aspect of his period in power. They
include his rise, his loves, and the master builder, style by decree, the pleasures of empire and his
fall. The three areas that particularly grabbed my attention were The Master Builder, Style by
Decree and The Pleasures of Empire.

Wanting to make Paris the most beautiful city in the world, Napoleon threw his energy into
cleaning it up and redesigning it. He was not gentle about it at times - demolishing older houses
with draconian decisions - and he was obsessed by providing the city with clean water. It is hard
to imagine the Paris of today being a rather squalid place, but before Napoleon it still had open
sewers and took his will to build a 60-kilometre canal to channel fresh water to the capital.

In Style by Decree, Horne tells how the decorative arts flourished under the emperor, with
manufacturers of fabrics and linens, as well as silversmiths doing very nicely indeed. His Empire
style of furniture - simple and solid - followed Napoleon's own tastes as did his patriarchal move
towards limiting the excesses of the Directory's social habits. He through the example of
Josephine, changed the fashions from the see-through, near naked dresses to more modest and
moral items of clothing.

One of the great mental pictures in this chapter is where Napoleon - always cold in a Paris
winter - is described as being "seen constantly wielding a pair of fire-tongs; or, in the early
morning, working with a handkerchief tied around his head, its two corners flopping on to his
shoulders".

In The Pleasures of Empire there are some wonderful tales of the riotous behavior at the opera,
including where rival gangs would back their own favorites and try to end the careers of their
opponents. And how Napoleon would demand changes to what was showing only hours before
the performance even if that meant people didn't know their lines. There are just too many great
little anecdotes to be touched on in a review, but needless to say The Age of Napoleon is one of
those books that fans of the Napoleonic Era should have in their home libraries. It offers a
different, civilian view of life under Napoleon and because of this adds so much more our
understanding of the times

Napoleon's Road to Glory:

It is detailed and will those interested in the Napoleonic Era a really good overview of what
went on, together with some of the intrigues, jealousies and great (and not so great) characters of
the period. It covers his early life, education, his prospering during the French Revolution,
Toulon, Josephine, the Egyptian campaign, the years of the Consulate, Italy, his political and
social reforms, becoming emperor, economic warfare, the disasters in Spain, the invasion of
Russia, his battle for survival in Germany, his first abdication, Elba, the 100 Days campaign,
Waterloo, then St Helena and his treatment there.

Markham has highlighted lots of information that I did not know before - including the reason
Napoleon crowned himself - and explains concisely how he managed to unite a fractious France
under his rule and his social and economic reforms. Napoleon's military campaigns are covered,
but not in as much detail and they could have been. Markham has concentrated more on the
political and social than the martial. Bonaparte was a great man, but he was no angel.

He was enlightened, but autocratic. Ruthless, yet could be compassionate. He did monumental
things and gave his name to history as possibly the greatest political and military leader of all
time. His achievements are not lessened by his flaws and mistakes.
Napoleon's Red Lancers:
One of Napoleon Bonaparte's most elite units was the courageous and dashing men of the
scarlet-clad Dutch Red Lancers. Even among the great units of the era, their loyalty and
professionalism stood them apart. Originally hussars and part of the bodyguard of the
Dutch royal family, the Red Lancers gained their fearsome new weapons after 1810 when
Holland was absorbed by France.

Discipline was originally a bit of a problem, usually caused by high spirits more than anything
else, but the arrival of the strict Baron Eduard Colbert as regimental colonel began an association
with Napoleon and the Imperial Guard that made the Lancers a legend. They covered themselves
with glory during the ill-fated 1812 invasion of Russia, suffering huge losses, but iron discipline
and unit pride ensured the survival of the regiment. Again in 1813 and 1814 they distinguished
themselves with bravery and loyalty and again showed the feared Russian Cossacks they could
not be taken lightly. After Waterloo, it was the Red Lancers that escorted Napoleon away from
the scene of his army's destruction.

In Napoleon's Red Lancers, Ronald Pawley, has given us a superb look at one of the great
military regiments of the Napoleonic Era. Pawley is regarded as the leading authority on the
regiment and he has packed in a wealth of detail on its leaders, particularly Eduard Colbert, its
origins, training, weaponry and campaigns. There are some wonderful black-and-white portraits
of the Red Lancers' officers and Patrice Cordele’s color artwork is rich with uniform details.
Napoleon's Red Lancers will fit very nicely on any Napoleonic buffs home library shelve

Political behavior:
THE first reaction of an historian of Old Regime diplomacy to Harold Parker's characterization
of Napoleon's international behavior is that Napoleon was something of a mutation in the
international arena. His behavior was so reckless and novel as to be clearly discontinuous with
the past. Thus, Napoleon, like Adolph Hitler, must be explained- primarily-in terms of his
personality and psychological development, rather than in terms of patterns of traditional
diplomacy. Yet, on a second reading, one finds that Parker's essay again and again contains
descriptions of Napoleon's style and behavior which were quite similar to patterns of the past.
Sometimes, indeed, Napoleon violated tradition and precedent with arrogance and contempt; at
other times, however, he seems to have recognized and grasped with amazing energy, threads
which were already woven into past French diplomatic agendas. In his discussion of the
European "world of international politics," Parker indicates that he is well aware of this
dimension of Napoleon's behavior. Nevertheless, I would like to carry the analysis a bit further
and include some examples of how some aspects of Napoleon's international behavior grew out
of specifically French Old Regime pat- terns of international politics. To illustrate, I must begin
with a brief characterization of French Old Regime diplomacy and the international system in
which it operated. Then we can better determine when Napoleon broke with the past and when
he developed it.

several illustrations of what I mean. Louis developed his foreign policy in collaboration with the
Comte de Vergennes and the policy was the dominant one from 1774 until its collapse in 1787 as
a result of the humiliating defeat of France in the Dutch crisis. Some of the components of this
policy were the following: (a). No territorial expansion.( B). Support the smaller powers of
Europe against the larger ones in the name of international law and justice.(C). Support and
protect Sweden and the Ottoman Empire from the aggressions of Russia. (D). Exclude from
Europe the dangerous and anti French influence of England. (E). Restrain Austrian (Joseph II)
ambitions, but keep the alliance with Austria. (F). Ally with the Dutch Republic as one means of
shutting England out of Europe. (G). Establish a network of commercial treaties. All of this
provide the foundation for the notion that the French monarchy had traditionally been and should
continue to be the arbiter of Europe. Each of these elements of Louis XVI's policies were highly
controversial and had, in most cases, replaced policies that many Frenchmen in and out of
government believed should not have been replaced. This opposition argued for alternative
policies, some of which later reappear in Napoleon's saddle bags, but in a different context and
with a different style and energy. Consider, for example, the idea that France should protect the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It was one of the keystones of Louis XVI's foreign policy.
Nevertheless, in 1782 Joseph II of Austria suggested to Louis XVI that France should
acknowledge that the Ottoman Empire was no longer capable of protecting itself and Louis
should take advantage of that weakness to annex Egypt. It was not a new idea

Napoleon and his Impact:

Few men have dominated an age so thoroughly as Napoleon dominated his. In many ways he
was like Adolph Hitler: charismatic, a master psychologist and politician, and ambitious to the
point of self-destruction. Both started wars that led to vast destruction and a new political order.
Both men shaped their times, but both were also products of their times who went with the
currents of their respective histories and adeptly diverted those currents to suit their own needs.
And ultimately, both were dismal failures.

To a large extent, Napoleon's career resulted from the military and political forces he inherited
from the Revolution and exploited for his own purposes. In military affairs, he was lucky to
inherit the military innovations of the French Revolution, such as mass conscription which made
possible the use of block tactics in order to attack in column and eliminated the need for supply
lines, thus making French armies much more mobile. Therefore, the two characteristics of
Napoleonic warfare, massed firepower and mobility were already present when he started his
career. However, it was Napoleon's genius that knew how to use them effectively in his first
Italian campaign against the Austrians.
Politically, France had suffered a full decade of revolutionary turmoil by 1799, making the
government unstable and corrupt. Church policies were unpopular, especially since they had
triggered rampant inflation. People were sick of this turmoil and longed for a more stable
government that would make their lives more secure. Therefore, the interplay of military
innovations that made Napoleon a national hero and the longing for a strong, secure government
that Napoleon promised led to his seizure of power in 1799. Further military victories, once
again against the Austrians in Italy allowed Napoleon to consolidate his hold on power and
declare himself emperor of France in 1804. While we mainly think of Napoleon as a general, he
was also a very active administrator, and his internal reforms did a great deal as far as both
consolidating some accomplishments of the French Revolution and suppressing others. One way
to assess his government of France is to see how it conformed to the revolutionary motto:
"Liberty, fraternity (i.e., nationalism), and equality". As far as political and civil liberties were
concerned, Napoleon largely suppressed them with strict censorship and the establishment of a
virtual police state in order to protect his power. However, Napoleon saw equality as a politically
useful concept that he could maintain with little threat to his position. After all, everyone, at least
all men, were equally under his power. One of his main accomplishments as a ruler was the
establishment of the Napoleonic Civil Law Codes, which made all men equal under the law
while maintaining their legal power over women. Therefore, any hopes women may have had of
the Revolution improving their legal position were thwarted by Napoleon.

Napoleon saw nationalism as indispensable to maintaining the loyalty of the French people to his
regime. After all, it was the spirit of nationalism that had inspired its armies in a remarkable
series of victories that had especially benefited Napoleon and allowed his rise to power. The trick
was for Napoleon to build a personality cult around so that the French people would identify him
with France itself and therefore make loyalty to him equivalent to loyalty to France. However, by
identifying national loyalty with one man, Napoleon inadvertently weakened the inspirational
force of nationalism and thus his own power.

Overall, Napoleon's internal policies strengthened France and allowed it to dominate most of
Europe after a series of successful military campaigns (1805-7). Naturally, he established his
style of rule in the countries he overran. However, he mistakenly thought that the administrative
and legal reforms of the revolution he carried to the rest of Europe could be separated from the
ideas of Nationalism and Liberalism (liberty and equality) that had given those reforms life and
substance. Therefore, Napoleon's imperial rule inadvertently spread these ideas of Nationalism
and Liberalism.

This had three effects, all of which combined to overthrow Napoleon. First of all, the empire's
non-French subjects picked up the ideas of Nationalism and Liberalism and used them to
overthrow, not support, French rule. Second, subject rulers adopted many of the very military
and administrative reforms that had made France so strong. Once again, this was not to support
French rule, but rather to overthrow it.
Finally, Napoleon's power and success up until 1808 apparently blinded him to his own
limitations. Therefore, he got involved in a long drawn out war in Spain (1808-14) and launched
a disastrous invasion of Russia (1812). This led to the formation of a new coalition that finally
defeated and overthrew him in 1815. The victors met at the Congress of Vienna, hoping to
restore the old order as it had existed before the Revolution.

Negative Impact:
Hundreds of thousands French soldiers during the Napoleonic Wars. The French economy was
ruined by the cost of the wars and the effects of the British naval blockade. France lost overseas
possessions and in influence in North America, Haiti, and India .Napoleon attempted to
reintroduce slavery in Haiti. Severe Press censorship, Establishment of a police state Fouche ,
Napoleon's Minister of Police, ruthlessly crushed all internal opposition by whatever means
necessary.

Kidnap and execution of the (1804), without any kind of due process or evidence, for better
reason than, as a Bourbon, Napoleon saw him as the potential figurehead of Royalist Restoration
plots. Removal of monarchs in other countries Napoleon replaced with members of his own
family, who had no right to these thrones, and were certainly no better as rulers. British Army
Napoleon: Facts and Lists 1805-1815. It has a huge title, but The British Army Against
Napoleon Facts, Lists and Trivia 1805-1815 has an even bigger wealth of detail on the members
of the Redcoat army that took on the Corsican Ogre, Napoleon Bonaparte.

Take these for example...

Did you know that in 1809 the daily amount of forage for mules and horses was: 14lbs of hay or
straw, 12lbs of oats or 10lbs of barley of Indian . Or the cost of shipping items from Plymouth to
the Peninsula ranged from 1 shilling for under 250lbs, to 20 shillings for between 1500 and 2000
lbs. How about the cost of food in the Peninsula between 1809 and 1813, or prize money shares
for all army ranks? I didn't even know the army got shares but, they did.

For example a sergeant taking part in the actions at Coimbra and the Douro got paid 2 pounds 19
shillings 7.5 pence, while other ranks got 7 shillings and 2.5 pence.

For the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz they got 2.3.6.5 and 6.3.5 pence respectively.
Not exactly generous for the hell they went through. And do you know what the most common
first name was among officers in the Peninsular War?

If you guessed Richard, you'd be wrong. We Richards only made up 2.71%, or 241, of the officer
brothers. John was the most common (1305 men or 14.7%), followed by William (1024, 11.6%)
and James (605, 6.83%). As for surnames Campbell was No1 (105), then Smith (58) and Stewart
(57). The authors also throw in the most unusual names of Peninsular officers, they include:
Sholto Douglas of the 4th Lt Dragoons and Christmas Knight of the 61st Foot. To lose the
regimental colors was a slight upon the unit and so many men died defending their symbols on
all sides of the conflict. You'll find out how many times British colors were lost in this book,
along with medals and honors awarded for merit and honorable service. The British Army
Against Napoleon Facts, Lists and Trivia 1805-1815 is a wonderful book filled with details in
more than 300 pages that give a really good glimpse into life in the British army that was
fighting Napoleon. - Richard Moore

Napoleon's Last Grande Armey:

The 1813 Campaign in Germany ruined Napoleon Bonaparte's last major fighting army and all
but ended any hopes he had of maintaining an empire far outside of France's borders. All up the
French had more than 500,000 men under arms but that was dwarfed in comparison with the
mighty combined Allied armies of about 700,000 soldiers.

As the battles of Leutze, Bautzen, Kulim, Dresden, and Katz Bach took their toll, Napoleon
Bonaparte had only some 200,000 men at Leipzig to fight the Allies' 350,000 soldiers. Leipzig
was the Battle of Nations - the largest clash of arms of the Napoleonic Wars - and France's defeat
resulted in an end to the campaign of German liberation. Never again would an exhausted France
field a Grande Armey and so author and historian Alfred Umbel magnificent bound volume of
uniform plates from the Dresden and Freiberg manuscripts enshrines the 1813 army in pictorial
history. curator of the German Army Museum and is now a consultant for museums and
historical exhibitions . Napoleon's Last Grande Armey is a stunning 1000-copy limited edition
that is the finest book I have seen on the Napoleonic Wars. It is leather bound with gilt-edged
pages, is larger than A4-sized paper and is of an unsurpassed quality. And we haven't even got to
the information packed within its 348 pages - or the sensational full color picture plates. It should
be noted we are very fortunate to see these rare images as many images in the manuscripts were
lost for much of the 20th century. They disappeared in 1963 and the missing Freiberg Manuscript
became a legend. The plates are from artworks done by artists Kurt Winkler (1794-1862) and
Charles (1825-1908) with the latter using as a reference the works of Christophe Bummer (1790-
?) in the Dresden Manuscripts.

There are 50 Winkler watercolors and 63 from Burn based on the Freiberg Manuscripts and a
further 34 by Burn from the Dresden collection. All up in Napoleon's Last Grande Armey there
are almost 150 full-page color uniform plates, complete with a facing page of details on the
troops and a brief description of where they were serving during 1813. Many of the works
include ink sketches. In addition you have detail on cavalry cloaks of the various units, horse
furniture, the artillery and their horses and excellent views of soldier's packs. I found this really
interesting seeing how various objects - including a leg of ham, loaf of bread, metal plate - were
packed. I loved the chained rabbit on top of one of them.

Napoleon's Last Grande Armey is one of those rare books that even non-Napoleonic fans can
look at and go "Wow!". In fact even I - despite my vast Napoleonic library - was a little awed by
it. I just wanted to touch it and admire it and it took a wee while to get the courage up to thumb
through it.
The volume is not cheap - around US$250 - but its superb presentation and magnificent
collection of plates makes it shine out as a must-have book. It really is hard to think of a better
book for a Napoleonic devotee's library. Napoleon's Last Grande Armey is a glorious volume of
work that presents a trove of uniform information at parallel level of quality.

British Napoleonic Artillery

1793-1815

The Naval War:

While France's armies ruled Europe, the waves were dominated by Britain's Royal Navy
.Backed by huge amounts of money, Britain's wooden walls kept it safe from invasion and
enabled it to build a trading empire.

The Royal Navy's key tactic was to attack whenever possible and its admirals and captains
obliged with gusto. We have biographies for the leading sailors including Horatio Nelson,
Cuthbert Collingwood, Thomas Cochrane and Edward Pellew. In the following pages we cover
many aspects of naval warfare in the age of fighting sail and provide some wonderful images
from naval artists such as Paul Deacon and Richard Moore. We detail the naval balance
between the Powers in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, explain the type of ships that
were used, what life was like aboard a sailing warship, how far cannons could fire and provide
a glossary of naval terms.

The main weapons within the defenses were large caliber cannons that were difficult to move
and so relied upon expert placement to be most effective .These same massive guns were also
used to conduct siege warfare and in attempts to break down the walls of enemy fortifications.
In British Napoleonic Artillery 2, 1793-1815 author Chris Henry takes an in-depth look at the
heavy caliber guns - iron or bronze weapons usually 24-pounders or heavier - and mortars used
away from battlefields He describes in fascinating detail the process of proofing the guns and
their shells, as well as explaining how howitzers and mortars worked. Other key areas within
his description of the equipment types and their organization include transportation, training for
the crews and coastal defenses.

British Napoleonic Artillery 2, 1793-1815 is yet another very informative work from Chris
Henry on Britain's heavy weapons.

With the threat of an invasion from Britain boosted its shore defenses with forts and gun

Austrian Napoleonic Artillery

1792 to 1815:
.Austrian artillery corporals and non-commissioned officers spent up to seven years studying
their craft and learnt advanced math, geometry, mechanics and ballistics. Throw in the study of
topography, siege warfare, tactics and logistics - plus actually handling and firing their cannon -
they seemed superbly ready for their military tasks. This is just one of many new things I learned
about the Austrians in Austrian Napoleonic Artillery 1792 to 1815 by David Collins.

Another was Vienna's guns, which differed from other nations' forces in that they were there to
go forward with the cavalry but not actually fight besides them. Instead their highly mobile
cannons were used as forward support or defensive platforms if the horsemen were either
attacking or covering a retreat. The main subjects covered are within two main chapters -
Organization & Operations and Equipment - and then they look at various sub categories such as
training, personnel, the very successful Lichtenstein system for artillery, gun manufacture,
ammunition and many more. Panels offer good details on Austrians weights and measures,
elevation, weapon size, gun wagon contents, effective ranges and crew sizes. Austrian
Napoleonic Artillery 1792 to 1815 contains eight fine color plates from Brian that go into
excellent detail about cannons and equipment such as the 6-pounder gun, a 6-pounder field gun,
a 12-pounder siege gun and a nice representation of gun tactics.

Napoleon's Artillery:
As an artilleryman, Napoleon Bonaparte was certain that it was by cannons that battles were
won. His Emperor's Daughters, as they were known, were one of the key parts to his armies and
his long run of battlefield successes. Napoleon Bonaparte was determined to ensure that if his big
guns could not outnumber the enemy's, then they would at least be better served by a corps of
gunners and artillery officers who were professionally trained.

In Napoleon's Artillery, author Robert Wilkinson-Latham details the organization, equipment,

uniforms and campaigns of the French artillery. The artillery suffered greatly during the early
years of the Wars through losing many experienced men who refused to swear allegiance to the
new order, but came back bigger and stronger than ever with professional artillery schools and
training. Wilkinson-Latham goes into the type of cannons used, their crew and firing structures
and the reforms that led to an armaments industry that could boast more than 250 ironworks in
Paris alone.

People interested in the artillery of Bonaparte's allies will get good information on those of
Switzerland, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Baden and Wurttemberg to name but a few. The
campaigns are seen from an artilleryman's point of view and cover three periods from The
Revolutionary Wars (1792 to 1804), the main Napoleonic Wars (1805 to 1815) and the 100 Days
Campaign (1815). Napoleon's Artillery is an excellent guide to the big guns of the Emperor and
how it played such an important role in the expansion of French empire.

Jena 1806:
In 1805 Prussia stayed on the sidelines while Austria and Russia were humiliated at Austerlitz.
Then in turn it was politically humbled by an unofficial treaty with France that saw three rich
principalities - Neuchatel, and Cleves - given over to Napoleon on the promise that it would get
Hanover in exchange. To further rub salt into Prussia's bleeding prestige Napoleon then created
the Confederation of the Rhine and even offered Hanover back to Britain as part of peace
overtures.

This proved too much for the Prussians who had more than 220,000 troops in its forces and were
still living off the glory days of Frederick the Great. Many Prussian nobles wanted war to avenge
the insults and even the Queen, Louise, pushed for hostilities. What followed was
a military disaster for the Prussians as Napoleon unleashed a thunderbolt upon them that
completely and utterly destroyed their forces within five weeks. It was a campaign that stunned
Europe and the doyen of Napoleonic experts, David Chandler, covers the destruction of Prussia
marvelously well in Jena 1806. As is usual in the Campaign Series from Osprey, Jena
1806 covers the lead-up to war, how the armies were led and organized, battle orders of La
Grande Armey and the Prussians and the two major clashes at Jena and Austria Jena is pretty
well documented historically and my personal opinion is that with the odds very much in his
favor Napoleon could have won that without getting out of bed.

However, is where this chap's interest really lies as magnificent III Corps, outnumbered by
almost three-to-one, put the main Prussian army to flight with a gutsy display of cool courage
and outstanding leadership? Chandler's details of Austria are must-read stuff and any fan of the
Iron Marshal should grab this book as you can see just how his superb corps fought its way into
the annals of military legend. Jena 1806 is filled with excellent maps of the campaign and
battlefields, as well as portraits of the leading soldiers and images. This is yet another first-class
effort from Osprey.
Napoleon Bonaparte's will:

This 15th April, 1821, at Longwood, Island of St. Helena.

This is my Testament, or act of my last will.

1. I DIE in the A Roman religion, in the bosom

of which I was born more than fifty years since.

2. It is my wish that my ashes may repose on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French
people, whom I have loved so well.

3. I have always had reason to be pleased with my dearest wife, Maria Louisa. I retain for her, to
my last moment, the most sentiments-I beseech her to watch, in order to preserve, my son from
the snares which yet environ his infancy.

4. I recommend to my son never to forget that he was born a French prince, and never to allow
himself to become an instrument in the hands of the triumvirs who oppress the nations of
Europe: he ought never to fight against France, or to injure her in any manner; he ought to adopt
my motto: "Everything for the French people."

5. I die prematurely, assassinated by the English oligarchy and its tool. The English nation will
not be slow in avenging me.

6. The two unfortunate results of the invasions of France, when she had still so many resources,
are to be attributed to the treason of Marmot, , Talleyrand, and La Fayette. I forgive them--May
the posterity of France forgive them as I do.

7. I thank my good and most excellent mother, the Cardinal, my brothers, Joseph, Lucien,
Jerome, Pauline, Caroline, Julie, Hornets, Catharine, Eugene, for the interest they have
continued to feel for me. I pardon Louis for the libel he published in 1820: it is replete with
false assertions and falsified documents.

8. I disavow the "Manuscript of St. Helena," and other works, under the title of Maxims,
Sayings, &c., which persons have been pleased to publish for the last six years. Such are not the
rules which have guided my life. I caused the to be arrested and tried, because that step was
essential to the safety, interest, and honor of the French people, when the Count was
maintaining, by his own confession, sixty assassins at Paris. Under similar circumstances, I
should act in the same way.
Success:
Napoleon’s mother reportedly recalled that, from an early age, her son exhibited a disposition to
reign. While hindsight may have been at work here, Napoleon certainly took naturally to
political rule, putting into practice ideas inspired by years of reading and reflection. He had
already shown his abilities as an administrator in Italy and Egypt, but it was during the
Consulate (1799- 1804) that his talent for state administration and reform on a large scale
became apparent. Determined to restore order to France, he neutered factions on the political
left and right, reduced the number of newspapers, repaired relations with the Catholic Church,
and, through institutional innovation that ranged from creating a central bank to reorganizing
France’s police, returned stability to French society and safeguarded it for the future. Claiming
to have preserved the achievements of 1789 – a claim most apparent in the Civil Code later his
name – further helped him to construct what Jean Tulare identified as ‘the myth of the savior’.
This compelling image of Napoleon as France’s savior facilitated both his self-promotion to
Emperor and the hereditary regime intended to protect the shaky grounds of his rule.

(He was assisted by his military victories and the prestige, territory, and resources they acquired
for France. Caisson et Eugenie, a short piece of fiction Napoleon wrote in 1785, opens with the
probably autobiographical declaration that ‘From birth, Caisson was strongly attracted to war.’
Napoleon seemed to thrive on the mental and physical challenges of war, able to survive on
little sleep, go for eight days without changing his shirt (as he reported to Joseph after
Austerlitz), or work on a problem late into the night. He was practical, taking as much care over
the organization of his troops as the type of soup they were fed, and he was fanatical about
planning, deliberately exaggerating possible dangers in an attempt to leave nothing to chance.
Napoleon’s thoughts about strategy and tactics, including his preference for offensive
engagement, again came mostly from his reading, but his capacity to change his plans in the
midst of battle, whether provoked by ingenuity or necessity, was all his own. Yet strategy and
tactics formed only part of his personal military ideology)ii. In a letter of 1804, he advised one
of his generals to remember three things: ‘concentration of strength, activity, and a firm resolve
to die with glory. These are the three great principles of military art which have always turned
fortune favorable to me in all my operations. Death is nothing; but to live defeated and without
glory is to die every day.’

Such rousing advice reflects Napoleon’s legendary ability to inspire his men. Napoleon was
known for his temper – more than one contemporary would compare him to a volcano – but he
could also be affectionate towards others, as revealed in the Italian-inflected nicknames
bestowed on his aides or his fondness for family members. In war, however, human life was
clearly a commodity. Episodes during the Egyptian campaign, such as the massacre at Jaffa, or
the abandonment of soldiers fallen victim to plague, had already shown that Napoleon could be
as ruthless with the lives of his own men as those of the enemy. A throwaway comment to the
Council of State reinforces this impression: attacking the celibacy of monks, he added that
‘military fanaticism’ was the only type of fanaticism of use to him ‘as it makes men indifferent
to death.’ Sentiments like this endorse Madame de Stael’s observation that Napoleon was ‘a
skilful chess-player for whom the human race is the opposite party that he intends to
checkmate’. The promise of glory may have been useful for inspiring his troops, but the
memory of glory was to be associated with Napoleon alone.

Napoleon’s pursuit of glory naturally had its critics. The strain of ongoing war created hostility
in France, as did the imposition of taxes, conscription, and new policies in the broader Empire.
Napoleon himself maintained that it was not a question of whether there were groups in France
and Europe hostile to him, but of finding something that made each group respond to his rule,
whether through laws or military action. Such claims again show Napoleon’s awareness of how
his public personality, as savior, lawmaker, or warrior, could be used to reinforce his power. As
historians such as Annie Jordan have shown, Napoleon had an incisive understanding of how to
promote his rule through image, objects, and the written word. From carefully falsified army
bulletins, to paintings and engravings, to the jeweled snuffboxes adorned with his portrait and
distributed to the bishops who officiated at his coronation as Emperor, Napoleon knew how to
create a cult of personality that maximized his popularity and sought to win the loyalty of those
who might oppose him. Where this was unsuccessful, censorship and repression saw that his
public image remained untarnished and the illusion of widespread support unharmed.

If the myth came apart, it was perhaps in his attempts to construct an image of himself as a
peacemaker while so obviously pursuing confrontation. Historian Paul Schroeder notoriously
branded Napoleon’s foreign policy ‘a criminal enterprise’, believing him unable even to
conceive of making peace. Duplicity carried Napoleon a certain distance: the Austrian
statesman Metternich observed that while ostensibly occupied with one activity, he was always
planning another. Even Napoleon’s advisors came to disapprove of his enthusiasm for war. In
June 1813, Napoleon complained about the efforts of his Minister of Police to encourage him to
negotiate peace. ‘This hurts me,’ he wrote, ‘because it supposes that I’m not pacific.’ He wanted
peace, he insisted, but not Above: Napoleon surrounded by his adoring troops. How did he
manage to generate loyalty among his men? an unstable peace that would dishonor France or
return it to war within three months. ‘I do not make a profession of war,’ he contended, ‘and no
one is more peaceful [than I].’ Justifying the continuation of hostilities in this manner permitted
his plans for confrontation to be extended indefinitely. By insisting on his pacific nature,
however, a gap opened between myth and reality that damaged his credibility and, ultimately,
his support.
Defeat:
‘Power is my mistress,’ Napoleon once said to the politician Pierre-Louis Renderer; ‘I’ve done
too much for her conquest to let anyone abduct or even covet her.’ Yet it was this possessive
attitude that led to her loss. (Historians differ on the precise moment this occurred: some date it
to 1805, after victory at Austerlitz, or the peace of Titlists in 1807, others to the advent of the
Peninsular War in 1808, the success of the Austrian campaign in 1809, or the disastrous Russian
campaign in 1812. Some also factor in his second marriage in 1811 to the young Austrian
princess Marie- Louise, a distraction for Napoleon and a royal reminder of the régime, be it
welcome or worrying, for everyone else. Most agree though that there was a moment, whether
carried away by the success of Titlists or intoxicated by the possibilities of Russia, when
Napoleon’s ambition and imagination ceased to be tempered by sound judgment and reason.
Where the eager young officer would energetically mine others for advice, and the self-assured
First Consul could openly admit to being wrong, as Emperor Napoleon became increasingly
reluctant to hear the opinions of advisors, gradually preferring to work long hours in a solitude
that suggested not so much ambition as quiet desperation as he led France to defeat. This
nevertheless alternated with defiant bluster of the sort that saw him declare to Joseph, just
before his downfall in March 1814, that ‘I am the master today every bit as much as I was at
Austerlitz.’ In the lead-up to his abdication in April 1814 he kept conceiving plans to seize back
power, postponed only by his exile to the Mediterranean island of Elba)iii.

Before leaving for Elba, Napoleon had announced that ‘I will write what we have done.’ In the
event, this project was not started until after the Hundred Days, the period of Napoleon’s reign
following his escape from Elba until defeat at Waterloo. During this time, he abandoned the
more authoritarian measures of his rule and instituted new ones that signaled a more liberal and
peaceful era. Although short-lived, it provided the foundation of the Napoleonic legend and,
through it, the ideological basis for Bonaparte’s. This work was consolidated during his second
exile on the remote South Atlantic island of St Helena through the dictation of his memoirs, the
most celebrated of which were published by Emmanuel de Las Cases as the Memorial de
Sainte-Hélène. Here Italian historian Luigi Marcella identified ‘one last battle’, fought over how
Napoleon would be remembered. The enemy was the ‘Black Legend’, an opponent of British
origins that combined liberal condemnation of Napoleon’s reign with an exaggerated portrayal
of the horrific crimes of the ‘Corsican ogre’. The Memorial took care to dispel such notions,
encapsulated in Napoleon’s claim that, having never committed ‘a single crime’, he did not fear
God’s judgment. ‘He will never glimpse in me the thought of murder, of poisoning, of unjust or
premeditated death, so common in those careers that resemble mine,’ he explained. ‘I only ever
wanted glory, power and prestige for France: all my faculties, all my efforts, all my time were
[directed] there. This cannot be a crime, I see there only virtue!’

St Helena made for a bleak and uncomfortable exile, offering little beyond the satisfaction of
renovating the historical record. The possibility of suicide, contemplated in his youth, now
returned. Increasingly troubled by ill health, Napoleon wondered ‘Has a man the right to kill
him He thought perhaps the answer was yes if life offered only pain and suffering, although he
again renounced the idea. Despite his disdain for the Catholic Church, Napoleon was not an
atheist and on St Helena his thoughts turned more often to religion. But destiny, which had
proved a crucial element of the Napoleonic myth, still taunted him. A young English girl, Betsy
Buncombe, whose father was stationed on the island, recalled Napoleon being asked if, as
reported, he believed in predestination. Despite his casual invocation of fate throughout his life,
Napoleon told Las Cases that he thought fatalism ‘an absurdity’, an assertion unsurprising in
someone so frequently adept at creating his own destiny. But on this occasion Napoleon replied
that, ‘I believe that whatever a man’s destiny calls upon him to do, that he must fulfil.’ With
destiny now out of his hands, it was perhaps an easier thought to live with.

Conclusion:
‘Napoleon was more than anything else a temperament,’ decided historian Georges Lefebvre.
The impressions of his temperament gleaned here – disciplined and passionate, practical and
unrestrained, self-justificatory and despondent – still diverge considerably, but we see in these
contradictions how Napoleon’s career was powered by his ability to respond to different
situations and people as required. Despite certain enduring features, Napoleon’s personality, as
with most people, also changed over the course of his life: we see his transformation from a
young man trying to make a place for himself in a rapidly changing world, to a ruler who
covered a lack of legitimacy with a veneer of self promotion and glory-seeking ambition, to an
exile who tried too late to replace a record of self-serving dishonesty and aggression with one of
consistency and principle. Yet throughout, we find a man whose temperament was not so much
extraordinary as stretched by a period that opened the way for a new type of society while being
unable to abandon the old. In Napoleon, it found a personality able – for some fifteen years – to
negotiate the two.
References:

i
The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, http://www.angelfire.com/vamp/raeya/writing/napoleon.html
ii
Napoleon Bonaparte's Lasting Contributions, http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/napoleon-bonapartes-
lasting-contributions.html
iii
What are the causes for the Defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte,
http://www.preservearticles.com/2011090713124/what-are-the-causes-for-the-defeat-of-napoleon-bonaparte.html

Bibliography:
 British Napoleonic Artillery 1793-1815 (2): Siege and Coastal Artillery, Vol. 65
 Austrian Napoleonic Artillery 1792-1815
 Jena 1806 : Napoleon Destroys Prussia, Vol. 20
 Daya , Raghubir , A Textbook of MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY, third edition, CBS publishers.
 J.lee, Stephen , some economic aspects of the European history , second edition,
 H. L ,Peacock ,A history of modern Europe, 3rd edition, 2005