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G.R. No.

: 190286, January 11, 2018


RAMON E. REYES AND CLARA R. PASTOR VS. BANCOM
DEVELOPMENT CORP.

Principles:

Section 145 of the Corporation Code states that, no right


or remedy in favor of or against any corporation, its
stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or officers, nor
any liability incurred by any such corporation, stockholders,
members, directors, trustees, or officers, shall be removed
or impaired either by the subsequent dissolution of said
corporation or by any subsequent amendment or repeal of
this Code or of any part thereof.

As a necessary consequence of the above rule, the


corresponding liability of the debtors of a dissolved
corporation must also be deemed subsisting. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction the unjust enrichment of the
debtor at the expense of the corporation. As guarantors of the
loans of Marbella, petitioners are liable to Bancom. Bancom
extended additional financing to Marbella on the condition that the
loan would be paid upon maturity. It is equally clear that the latter
obligated itself to pay the stated amount to Bancom without any
condition. The unconditional tenor of the obligation of Marbella to
pay Bancom for the loan amount, plus interest and penalties, is
likewise reflected in the Promissory Notes issued.

GR No. 220926, Mar 21, 2018


LUIS JUAN L. VIRATA v. ALEJANDRO NG WEE

Principles:

1. Power Merge is liable to Ng Wee under its Promissory Notes.


Virata is liable for the Promissory Notes even as an accommodation
party. Under Section 60 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the
maker of a promissory note engages that he will pay it according to
its tenor. It cannot escape the attention of the Court that this is not
the first time for Virata to transact with Wincorp. Power Merge and
Virata cannot then feign ignorance that the money they have been
receiving are from the clients that Wincorp attracted to invest.

2. The circumstances of Power Merge clearly present an alter ego


case that warrants the piercing of the corporate veil. Virata not only
owned majority of the Power Merge shares. He is not only the
company president, he also owns 374,996 out of 375,000 of its
subscribed capital stock. Meanwhile, the remainder was left for the
nominal incorporators of the business.

Meanwhile, UEM-MARA is an entity distinct and separate from Power


Merge, and it was not established that it was guilty in perpetrating
fraud against the investors. It was a non-party to the "sans
recourse" transactions.

Basically, a corporation is invested by law with a personality


separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it as well
as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related.
Following this, obligations incurred by the corporation, acting
through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities,
and said personalities are generally not held personally liable
thereon. By way of exception, a corporate director, a trustee or an
officer, may be held solidarily liable with the corporation under Sec.
31 of the Corporation Code.

Applying the doctrine, petitioner cannot escape liability by


claiming that he was merely performing his function as Vice-
President for Operations and was duly authorized to sign the Side
Agreements in Wincorp's behalf. The fact also remains that
petitioner Estrella accepted the directorship in the Wincorp board,
along with the obligations attached to the position, without question
or qualification. The careless management of corporate affairs, in
itself, amounts to a betrayal of the trust reposed by the corporate
investors, clients, and stakeholders, regardless of whether or not the
board or its individual members are being paid. The RTC and the CA,
therefore, correctly disregarded the defense of Estrella that he is a
mere nominee.

G.R. No. 199161, April 18, 2018


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JAMES T. CUA

Principles:

The CA is mistaken when it ruled that the promissory note is devoid


of any evidentiary value. Promissory note is the best evidence
of the existence of the loan. A promissory note is a solemn
acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay it on
the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and
the lender. A person who signs such an instrument is bound
to honor it as a legitimate obligation duly assumed by him
through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his
good faith. If he reneges on his promise without cause, he
forfeits the sympathy and assistance of this Court and
deserves instead its sharp repudiation.

The trial court's reliance on James' self-serving allegation is


erroneous. Nothing in the promissory note would suggest that it was
executed merely to secure future loans. The words “FOR VALUE
RECEIVED” shows that Cua acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of
the loan. As a businessman, Cua cannot claim unfamiliarity with
commercial documents. No reasonable and prudent man would
acknowledge a debt, and even secure it with valuable
assets, if the same does not exist. Even though the
promissory note is only a renewal of a previous promissory
note, it does not adversely affect the fact that it is an
acknowledgment of a loan duly received.

Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides for the


parol evidence rule which states that when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement. To overcome the presumption that the written
agreement contains all the terms of the agreement, the parol
evidence must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient
credibility as to overturn the written agreement.