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Persons and Family Relations 2019
Persons Exam 3 Cases
VALDEZ v RTC Branch 102 Quezon City
FACTS:
• Antonio Valdez (petitioner) and Consuelo Gomez
(private respondent) were married on Jan 5, 1971 and
had 5 children. On June 22, 1992, Valdez filed a
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage pursuant to Art 36 of
the FC. RTC granted the petition. The decision
contained a portion directing the petitioner and
respondent to liquidate their common properties as
defined by Art 147 of the FC and comply with Articles
50, 51, and 52 of the same code.
• Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification for such portion
contending that the FC contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in
‘unions without marriage.” The children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their
father, herein petitioner.
• On May 5 1995, RTC made the clarification in an order:
that Art 147 of the FC explicitly provides that the
property, including the family home, acquired during
their union are presumed to have been obtained through
joined efforts and the property would be owned by them
in equal shares and the liquidation and partition of
property would be governed by the provisions on
ownership found in the Civil Code (co-ownership).
• The provisions of Art 102 and 129 of the FC cannot be
applied since Art 102 refers to the procedure for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership property, and Art
129 for the liquidation of the absolute community of
property.
• Petitioner moved for a reconsideration: which was
denied on Oct 30, 1995. In his recourse to the SC, he
submits Art 50, 51, and 52 of the FC should be held
controlling; arguing:
o Art 147 of FC does not apply where parties
are psychologically incapacitated;
o Art 50-52, in relation to Art 102 & 129 of FC
govern the disposition where a marriage is
declared void ab initio;
o Assuming arguendo Art 147 applies to void
marriages on the ground of psych incap, the
same may be read consistently with Art 129;
o It is necessary to determine the parent w/
whom majority of the children wish to stay.
ISSUE:
• WON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and
void pursuant to Art 36.
RULING:
• RTC correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, property relations
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during the cohabitation is governed by Art 147 or 148 of
the FC.
• With regards to Art 147, this kind of co-ownership
applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or
without benefit of marriage.
• Under Art 147, property acquired by both spouses
through their work & industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition of property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto if said party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household. Unlike the CPG, the fruits of the couple’s
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Such contributions and shares are presumed to be
equal; share of any party who is married to another shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership if so existing under a valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
already expressed.
• Art 147 of the FC clarified what used to be Art 144 of
Civil Code.
• RTC correctly held that petitioner and private
respondent own the family home and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as concluding that, in
the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code (not Art 50-52 in relation to Art 102 & 129)
shall aptly prevail.
• The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43,
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of
the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
• The questioned orders, dated May 5 and October 30,
1995, of the RTC are affirmed.
BUENAVENTURA v CA
FACTS:
• This involves a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on the
ground of psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel
Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After
respondent filed her answer, petitioner amended his
petition saying they are both psychologically
incapacitated. Respondent denied such allegation.
• The RTC declared their marriage void ab initio; ordering
Noel to pay Isabel moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs. RTC also ordered liquidation
of the assets of the conjugal partnership property, also
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for Noel to give regular support to heir child and
awarding the custody of their minor child to Isabel.
Isabel was authorized to use her maiden family name:
Singh.
• On the pendency of the appeal, respondent filed a
motion to increase monthly support of their son. CA
granted the motion and increased the support pendente
lite to Php 20k. Petitioner appealed and was denied by
the CA.
ISSUE:
• WON co-ownership is applicable to this case.
RULING:
• The RTC, found that the Noel deceived Isabel into
marrying him by professing true love instead of
revealing to her that he was under heavy parental
pressure to marry. His career was and always would be
first priority.
• The contention of petitioner that there is no decided
case by the SC where damages by reason of
performance or non-performance of marital obligations
were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for
damages may be made. Isabel in her amended answer
specifically prayed for damages, the lower court in the
exercise of its discretion found full justification of
awarding at least half of what was prayed for. Award for
damages by the RTC is based on Art 2217 & 21 of the
Civil Code.
• The RTC and CA considered acts of petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity hence
his actions are beyond his control due to an innate
inability, while at the same time considered the same
set of acts willful. By declaring petitioner psychologically
incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award for moral damages should be predicated, not on
the mere acts of entering into the marriage, but on
specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her
disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such
evidence appears in this case. Award for moral
damages was without basis in law and in fact. Since no
moral damages, there is also no exemplary damages.
• NOW WITH REGARDS TO THE ASSETS OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP in the event of declaration
of annulment of the marriage. When a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
previous proceedings.
• the parties herein were legally married in 1979, thus all
property acquired during the marriage is presumed to
be conjugal unless the contrary is provided (Art 116 of
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FC, Art 160 of Civil Code) Art 117 of the FC provides
what are conjugal partnership properties.
• It was disclosed during the proceedings that Noel who
worked as a Branch Manager and later Vice-President
of FEBTC received separation/retirement package from
the said bank. Under Art 129 of the FC, “the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement
or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture
of such share as provided in this Code.” In this case,
there had been no marriage settlement between the
parties, nor any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture. The
previous cession and transfer by Noel of his ½ share in
the residential house in favor of Isabel as stipulated in
their compromise agreement, was intended to be in full
settlement of any and all demands for past support.
Here, what was done was ½ of the portion of the house
was ceded to Isabel so that she will not claim for past
unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to
their only child as his presumptive legitime.
• Since this present case does not involve the annulment
of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Art 50 in
relation to Art 41-43 of the FC do not apply. Rather the
general rules apply, which is that in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable
and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that
of equal co-ownership.
• The trial court correctly applied the law. The petitioner
and respondent own the family home and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as concluding
that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code should prevail. The
rules set up to govern the liquidation of either ACP or
CPG, the property regimes for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common law spouses.
• In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do
away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of
the second marriage.
• Unlike the CPG, the fruits of the couple’s separate
property are not included in the co-ownership. Since the
properties to be distributed by the courts were found to
have been acquired during the union of the parties, the
same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits
of a separate property appear to have been included or
involved in the distribution. The liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the properties owned by the parties,
therefore, should be sustained, but on the basis of co-
ownership and the regime of CPG.
• The decision of the CA is modified (deleting the award
for moral, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
expenses of litigation and costs). The order giving
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respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of
petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-
half of petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila Memorial
Park and in the Provident Group of Companies
is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
ABING v WAEYAN
FACTS:
• John Abing and Juliet Waeyan, sometime in 1986, met
and fell in love and eventually cohabited as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they
bought a 2-storey house from Benjamin Macua on a lot
owned by a certain Alejandro Diño in Benguet. The tax
declaration was transferred to Juliet.
• On Dec 2, 1991, Juliet worked in Korea and would send
money to John who deposited the same in their joint
bank account.
• In 1992, the house underwent renovation. To it was
annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store.
This new structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the
properties involved in this case.
• In 1994, Juliet returned and managed the sari-sari store
while John worked as a mine employee of the Lepanto
Consolidated Mining, Inc.
• In 1995, their relationship turned from bad to worse,
they decided to partition their properties. On Oct 7,
1995, a memorandum of agreement was executed
which was left unsigned by the parties but signed by the
witnesses. Under said unsigned MoA, John shall leave
their dwelling w Juliet paying him P428,470
representing his share in all their properties. On the
same date, Juliet paid John P232,397.66 as partial
payment. Balance was to be paid by Juliet in 12 monthly
installments beginning Nov 1995.
• Juliet failed to make good on the balance. John
demanded her to vacate the annex structure housing
the sari-sari store and Juliet refused. John filed an
ejectment suit against Juliet before the MTC of Benguet.
• In said complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for
the construction of the subject property through his own
funds and money he borrowed from his relatives. He
added that the tax declaration for the structure under his
name; claiming exclusive ownership giving him the right
to eject Juliet therefrom for failure to pay the balance
due him.
• Juliet, in an answer, countered that their original house
was renovated through their common funds and that the
annex was merely an attachment.
• The MTC ruled in favor of John and ordered Juliet’s
eviction. Juliet appealed with RTC, but it affirmed the
MTC’s decision. She then went to the CA which
reversed the decision of the RTC entitling her to
possess the property and maintain therein her business.
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• To the CA, John’s evidence failed to establish that he
alone spent for the construction of the annex. Being co-
owner herself, Juliet cannot be evicted. His action
should have been for a sum of money for Juliet to pay
the remaining balance.
ISSUE:
• WON John exclusively owns the subject property of the
suit.
RULING:
• No. Other than John’s bare allegation failed to establish
by the required quantum of proof that the money spent
for the construction thereof solely came from him. While
petitioner was able to present in evidence one affidavit
from Manuel Macaraeg where he borrowed money, it
cannot be proven that the money went into the
construction of the structure, and that he failed to
present similar affidavits of his close relatives from
whom he claimed to have made similar borrowings.
Payment of taxes Is not proof of ownership, any more
than indicating possession in the concept of an owner.
• In this connection, Art 147 of the FC is instructive.
• The law is clear. In the absence of proofs to the contrary,
any property acquired by common-law spouses during
their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been
obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in
equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by
the rules on co-ownership. Being a co-owner, Juliet, as
correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
• However, the SC disagrees with the CA in holding that
the MoA, being unsigned, had no binding effect between
them. It is a matter of record that under said Agreement,
Juliet initially paid John with a balance payable in 12
monthly installments. It is also a matter of record that
the Agreement was signed by the witnesses thereto.
Even though Juliet failed to pay the balance against the
MoA, John’s action, at best, should have been for sum
of money against Juliet, or rescission of said agreement
and not ejectment.
• The petition is denied.
METROPOLITAN BANK (MBTC) v PASCUAL
FACTS:
• Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga
were married. During their union, Florencia bought from
spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250 sqm lot w/ 3-
door apartment standing thereon in Makati City.
• Florencia filed for a suit for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Art 36 of the FC. The RTC rendered a
decision, declaring their marriage null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Nicholson.
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• In the same decision, the RTC ordered the dissolution
and liquidation of the ex-spouses’ conjugal partnership
of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their
separate ways without liquidation their conjugal
partnership.
• Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira
Oliveros, obtained a Php 58M loan from petitioner
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank)
• To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses
Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages.
• Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure
the loan were a copy of the TCT No. 156283 (Makati
City property), a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying
RTC decision, and a document denominated as
“Waiver” that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9,
1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered
the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein,
but did not incidentally include the lot in question.
• Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros
to pay their obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, on
Nov 1999, initiated foreclosure proceedings.
• At the auction sale on Jan 21, 2000, Metrobank
emerged as highest bidder. Getting wind of the
foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed before the
RTC a Complain to declare the nullity of the mortgage
of the disputed property. Nicholson alleged that the
property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged
without his consent.
• Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-
claim, alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in
Florencia’s name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also
asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
• The RTC declared the REM invalid. The Court ordered
Metrobank and Florencia jointly and severally pay
Nicholson moral damages and attorney’s fees and the
costs. Even as it declared the invalidity of the mortgage,
the RTC found the said lot to be conjugal and invoked
Art 116 of the FC. Metrobank had not overcome the
presumptive conjugal nature of the lot. And being
conjugal, RTC concluded that the disputed property
may not be encumbered by Florencia w/o Nicholson’s
consent. The Court also found that the waiver presented
was fatally defective. Also, it found Metrobank as a
mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence.
• CA affirmed RTC’s decision with modifications. The CA
held that Metrobank did not enter into the mortgage
contract in bad faith. Thus deleting the award for moral
damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
• WON the property being disputed is conjugal.
RULING:
• The property is conjugal. Metrobank is correct in saying
that Art 160 of the Civil Code and not Art 116 of the FC
is the applicable provision since the property was
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acquired prior to the enactment of the FC. However,
Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of
acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal. Art 160 of the
Civil Code provides that “all property of the marriage is
presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be
proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.” This article, however, does not require proof
that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership.
• The termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not
ipso facto end the nature of conjugal ownership. While
the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and
Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the
conjugal partnership, the character of the properties
acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and
partition of the partnership. The relevant provisions of
both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal
properties before a regime of separation of property
reigns.
• In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art 493 of the Civil Code
shall govern the property relationship between the
former spouses. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved.
• Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot
on April 30, 1997, or almost 2 years after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before
the liquidation of the partnership.
• Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her ½
undivided interest in the disputed property even without
the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of
Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the ½
undivided portion that Florencia owns. Therefore, the
REM on Makati property is null and void with respect to
the ½ part of Nicholson but valid with respect to the ½
part of Florencia.
DIÑO v DIÑO
FACTS:
• Alain M. Dino (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dino
(respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts.
They started living together in 1984 until they decided to
separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent
decided to live together again. On Jan 14, 1998, they
were married before Mayor Aguilar of Las Pinas City.
• May 30, 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage against respondent pursuant to Art
36 of the FC alleging that respondent failed in her
marital obligation to give love and support to him, and
had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
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gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family
assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was
not faithful and would at times become violent and hurt
him.
• Respondent did not file an answer despite receipt of
summons. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed
a petition for divorce which was granted by the Superior
Court of California on May 25, 2001 and married a
certain Manuel Alcantara on Oct 5, 2001.
• Dr. Tayag, a psychologist, submitted a psychological
report establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder w/c was deeply
ingrained in her system in her early formative years also
finding it long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
• RTC granted petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated. It also rendered
judgment dissolving the regime of ACP. Petitioner filed
a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the
dissolution of the ACP and the ruling that the decree of
annulment shall only be issued upon compliance w Art
50 & 51 of the FC. RTC partially granted the motion and
modified its decision: ruling that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Art 147 of the FC.
ISSUE:
• WON RTC erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Art 147 of the FC.
RULING:
• Petition has merit. Assailing the said ruling of the RTC,
petitioner correctly argues that Sec 19 (1) of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, said rule does not
apply to Art 147 of the FC.
• For Art 147 of the FC to apply, the following elements
must be present:
o The man and the woman must be
capacitated to marry each other;
o They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and
o Their union is w/o the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void.
• All elements were found to be present in the case and
there is no question that Art 147 applies to the property
relations of the parties.
• The RTC erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Art 147 of the FC. This ruling has no basis since Sec 19
(1) does not apply to cases governed by Art 147 & 148
of the FC.
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• In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Art 36 of the FC. Thus, the
liquidation is governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Citing Valdes v RTC, the Court ruled that property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period
of cohabitation is governed by Art 147 or 148 of the FC.
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of
the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Art 496
of the Civil Code, “partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings.” It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
• The RTC decision is affirmed with modification that said
decree shall be issued upon finality of the RTC’s
decision w/o waiting for the liquidation etc.
SALAS JR. v AGUILA
FACTS:
• On Sept 7, 1985, petitioner Juan Salas Jr. and
respondent Eden Aguila were married. On June 7,
1986, respondent gave birth to their daughter and five
months after, petitioner left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or
their daughter,
• On Oct 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, citing psychological incapacity under
Art 36 of the FC. The petition states that they “have no
conjugal properties whatsoever.”
• On May 7, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision declaring
the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila. It further
provides for the “dissolution of their CPG, if any.”
• On Sept 10, 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and
Motion stating that she discovered several properties
covering TCT’s named under petitioner’s name, married
to a certain Rubina C. Salas, found to be the common
law wife of Salas. The manifestation was set for hearing
on Sept 21, 2007 but Salas’ notice of hearing was
returned unserved with remark, “RTS Refused to
Receive.”
• On Sept 19, 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry
of Appearance requesting for an Entry of Judgment of
the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration or
appeal was filed and no conjugal property was involved.
• 2 days after, the hearing for Aguila’s manifestation
ensued. During the hearing, Aguila testified that on Apr
17, 2007 someone informed her of the existence of the
discovered properties. She verified the information and
secured copies of the TCTs of said properties. When
asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas is
Salas’ common-law wife.
• On Feb 8, 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the
Manifestation alleging that there is no conjugal property
to be partitioned based on Aguila’s petition. Accdg to
Salas, Aguilas’ statement was judicial admission and
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was not made through palpable mistakes. Salas
claimed that Aguila waived her right to the Discovered
Properties. Salas enumerated properties he allegedly
waived in favor of Aguila namely, several parcels of land
in Batangas, Php 200k in cash, and 3 motor vehicles.
Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties
were already partitioned.
• RTC ruled in favor of Aguila directing the partition of the
properties to include the discovered properties.
• RTC held that pursuant to the Rules, even upon entry of
judgment granting the annulment of marriage, the court
can proceed with the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the CPG if it has not been judicially
adjudicated upon, as in this case. The RTC found that
the discovered properties are among the conjugal
properties to be partitioned between Salas and Aguila.
RTC also held that Salas failed to prove existence of the
waived properties.
• On Nov 11, 2008, Rubina filed a complaint-in-
intervention, claiming that: 1) she is Rubina Cortez, a
widow and unmarried to Salas; 2) the Discovered
Properties are her paraphernal properties; 3) Salas did
not contribute money to purchase the discovered
properties as he had no permanent job; 4) RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in
the case; and 5) she authorized her brother to purchase
the discovered properties but because she was not well-
versed with legal documentation, he registered the
properties in the name of “Juan S. Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas.”
• RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of Salas, it
found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila
transferred the waived properties to 3rd persons. It
further held that Salas and Rubina were at fault for not
correcting the TCTs, if they really weren’t married as
they claimed.
• Salas filed an appeal w the CA, The CA affirmed the
order of the RTC and denied Salas’ motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
• WON CA erred in affirming RTC’s decision ordering the
partition of the discovered properties and in not allowing
Rubina to intervene in the case.
RULING:
• The petition lacks merit. Since the original manifestation
was an action for partition, SC cannot order a division of
the property, unless it first makes a determination as to
the existence of a co-ownership. Thus, the settlement of
the issue of ownership is the first stage in this action.
• Salas alleged that contrary to Aguila’s petition stating
they had no conjugal property, they actuall acquired the
waived properties during their marriage. However, RTC
found and CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the
existence and acquisition of the waived properties
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during their marriage. Salas only presented photocopies
and not certified true copies.
• Aguila submitted original copy of certification issued by
the Municipal Assessor certifying that Aguila has no real
property listed in the Assessment Roll for taxation
properties. She also proved that the Discovered
Properties were acquired by Salas during their
marriage. RTC and CA agreed that the TCTs of the
Discovered Properties entered into on July 2, 1999 and
Sept 29, 2003 or during the validity of Salas and Aguila’s
marriage.
• Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the
Discovered Properties. She has no right to intervene in
this case.
• Citing Dino v Dino, SC held that Art 147 of the FC
applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
declared void under Art 36 of the FC, as in this case.
• Under Art 147, properties acquired while parties lived
together or during validity of their marriage shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work, or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. The properties shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on co-ownership. In this
case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. Citing
Buenaventura v CA as similarly ruled by the SC that
properties acquired during the union of the parties shall
be governed by co-ownership.
• The petition of Salas is denied.
VENTURA JR. v SPS. ABUDA
FACTS:
• Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married on
June 9, 1980 both of them had children from prior
marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline
Abuda and Socorro had a son, who is the father of
Edilberto Ventura Jr (petitioner).
• Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting
marriage to Crispin Roxas when she married Esteban.
She married Crispin inn 1952 and this was not annulled,
and Crispin was alive at the time of her marriage to
Esteban.
• Esteban’s prior marriage was dissolved by virtue of his
wife’s death in 1960.
• In 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot in Vitas,
Tondo, Manila. The remaining portion was purchased
by Evangeline on her father’s behalf in 1970. The Vitas
property was covered by a TCT issued to “Esteban
Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro
Torres.”
• In 1978, Edilberto claimed that Evangeline and Esteban
operated a small business establishment in Delpan,
Tondo. (Delpan property)
• On 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties
to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda as
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Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer as stated by
Edilberto. Esteban died on Sept 11, 1997, while Socorro
died on July 31, 1999.
• Leonora Urquila (mother of petitioner) discovered the
sale in 2000. Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a
Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC.
Petitioner alleged that the sale of the properties was
fraudulent because Esteban’s signature was forged.
Respondents argued that because of Socorro’s prior
marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to
Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor
her heirs can claim any right or interest over the
properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
• RTC ruled in favor of respondents, holding that Socorro
and Esteban’s marriage were void ab initio citing Art 83
of the Civil Code as it was the governing law at the time
of their marriage. It also ruled that the lack of a judicial
decree of nullity does not affect the status of the union.
(citing Ninal v Badayog)
• RTC also ruled that the Vitas and Delpan properties are
not conjugal and are governed by Art 144 and 485 of the
Civil Code:
o Art. 144. When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
o Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the
benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any
stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall
be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in
the co-ownership shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proved.
• RTC concluded that Socorro did not contribute any
funds for the acquisition of the properties. Hence, she
cannot be considered a co-owner and her heirs cannot
claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.
• Edilberto filed an appeal to the CA. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision, ruling however that RTC should have
applied Art 148 of the FC providing property regimes in
unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other. CA held that this
provision applies even if the cohabitiation for the
acquisition of the property occurred before the effectivity
of the FC. CA found that Edilberto failed to prove of
Socorro’s contributions. Edilberto’s motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
• WON petitioner can claim any rights or interests over
the subject properties.
RULING:
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• No, petitioner cannot. He admitted that in unions
between couples who are incapacitated to marry each
other, the ownership over the properties acquired during
the subsistence of the relationship shall be based on
actual contributions. Reiterating Art 148 of the FC.
• Applying the provis of Art 148, the Vitas and Delpan
properties can be considered common property IF:
1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of
Esteban and Socorro; and 2) there is evidence that the
properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry.
• Edilberto argues the TCT covering Vitas property shows
that parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro.
The SC disagrees, the TCT itself shows that Esteban is
the sole owner of the Vitas property. The phrase
“married to Socorro” is merely descriptive of his civil
status and does not mean Socorro co-owned the
property. Evidence shows Esteban acquired Vitas prop
before his marriage to Socorro.
• SC says that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership, but only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large. Certs of titles
are not a source of right.
• Edilberto claims that Esteban’s contribution to the
Delpan property was not proven since Evangeline
shouldered some of the amortization. This is incorrect.
Both RTC and CA found that the Delpan property was
acquired before the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.
Even if payment of the purchase price of Delpan prop
was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on
behalf of her father.
• During the trial, Sps. Abuda presented receipts
evidencing payment of amortizations of the Delpan
property. Edilberto failed to show any evidence of
Socorro’s monetary contribution.
• Settled is the rule that in civil cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or tha nature of the case, asserts the
affirmative of an issue. Here it is Edilberto who is duty
bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which he
miserably failed to do so.
• Petition denied, CA Decision affirmed.
BEUMER v AMORES
FACTS:
• Willem Beumer (petitioner), a Dutch National, married
Avelina Amores (respondent), a Filipina, on March 29,
1970. After several years, RTC declared the nullity of
their marriage on Nov 10, 2000, on the ground of
Beumer’s psychological incapacity. (Art 36 of FC)
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership on Dec 14, 2000 praying for distribution of
properties claimed to have been acquired during their
marriage:
• By purchase
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o Lot 1 Blk 3 consolidated survey of Lots 2144
& 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre;
o Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre (DC);
o Lot 5845 of the DC;
o Lot 4 Blk 4 consolidated survey of Lots 2144
& 2147 of the DC.
• By way of inheritance:
o 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the DC; (2635 sqm;
376.45sqm appertains to the conjugal
partnership)
o 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the DC. (360sqm;
24sqm appertains to the conjugal
partnership)
• In defense, respondent averred that, except 2
residential houses in lots 1 and 2142, they did not
acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage,
the truth being that she used her own personal money
to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845., and 4 out of her
personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of
inheritance. She submitted a joint affidavit executed by
her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she
purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon
using her own money. Respondent sought dismissal of
the petition.
• On trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845,
and 5 were registered in respondent’s name, these were
acquired with the money he received from the Dutch
government as his disability benefit since he did not
have any sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
He claimed that the joint affidavit was invalid as it was
contrary to Art 89 of the FC.
• Respondent maintained that the money used to
purchase the properties came exclusively from her own
personal funds, her earnings from selling jewelry and
products from Avon, Triumph, and Tupperware. She
asserted that after she filed for annulment in 1996,
petitioner transferred to their 2nd house and brought
along him certain personal properties, such as tools and
equipment amounting to Php 500k.
• RTC ruled in favor of respondent awarding her all the
parcels of land as her paraphernal properties; the tools
and equipment in favor of petitioner; and Lots 1 & 2142
as co-owned by parties.
• RTC ruled that regardless of the source of funds,
petitioner could not have acquired any right over the
subject properties as petitioner tried to acquire them
notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands as
evidenced by his sworn statements that subject parcels
of land were purchased from wife’s exclusive funds. His
plea for reimbursement was denied for not having come
to the court with clean hands.
• Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA affirmed in toto the
judgment rendered by the RTC. CA stressed the fact
that petitioner was “well-aware of the constitutional
prohibition x x x. hence, he cannot invoke equity to
support his claim for reimbursement.”
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ISSUE:
• WON petitioner may assail the decision of the RTC and
CA.
RULING:
• The SC has already denied a claim for reimbursement
of the value of purchased parcels of PH lands instituted
by a foreigner against his spouse. One cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition under Sec 7 Art XII
of the 1987 Constitution. (Citing this as the ruling of the
court In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller)
• Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he is aware
of such prohibition, and even asseverated that, because
of such prohibition, they registered the subject
properties in respondent’s name. in his admission, SC
finds no reason not to apply Muller ruling and deny
petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.
• As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle
is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the
ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair,
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
• Petitioner’s statements re: real source of funds used to
purchase the subject properties dilute the veracity of his
claim. While admitting to have previously executed a
joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were
used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same.
Clearly, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness.
Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any
equitable refuge.
• SC cannot grant reimbursement even on the grounds of
equity since petitioner has acquired no right over subject
properties as it was unconstitutionally purchased.
• Neither can the court grant petitioner’s claim for
reimbursement on the grounds of unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the constitution.
• Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates
the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning
Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban
against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built
thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1
and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned
by the parties subject to partition.
• Petition is denied. Resolution of the CA affirmed.
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OCAMPO v OCAMPO
FACTS:
• On Sept 10, 1990, Viriginia Ocampo (petitioner) filed a
petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
Deogracio Ocampo (respondent) before the RTC on the
ground of psychological incapacity. (Art 36 FC)
• On Jan 22, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision
declaring the marriage between the parties as null and
void. Decision became final since no party appealed to
the judgment.
• On March 31, 1999, RTC directed parties to submit a
project of partition of their inventoried properties. Having
failed to do so, hearing ensued where parties adduced
evidence in support of their respective stand.
• On Jan 13, 2004, RTC stated that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of them on
a 50-50 sharing.
• Feb 2, 2004, Virginia filed a notice of appeal before the
RTC.
• Feb 13, 2004, Deogracio filed a motion to deny and/or
dismiss the notice of appeal and for immediate
execution of Sec 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-10.
• On Feb 20, 2004, RTC denied aforesaid motion filed by
Deogracio for lack of merit.
• March 4, 2004, Deogracio filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the RTC denied.
• In the disputed Decision, the CA denied Virginia’s
appeal. Virginia moved for reconsideration but was
denied.
ISSUE:
• WON respondent should be deprived of his share in the
CPG by reason of bad faith and psychological
perversity.
RULING:
• Even if they were married in 1978, Art 105 of the FC
explicitly mandates that the FC shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established BEFORE the effectivity of the
FC. Thus, under the FC, if the properties are acquired
during the marriage, the presumption is that they are
conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming
that they are not conjugal.
• In this case, Art 149 of the FC is the applicable law in so
far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership is
concerned, in relation to Art 147 of the FC.
• SC held that in a void marriage (under Art 36 of FC) the
property relation of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Art 147 or 148 of the
FC. In this case, Art 147 applies and the properties are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on co-
ownership. This particular kind of co-ownership applies,
and for Art 147 to operate, the man and the woman: 1)
must be capacitated to marry each other; 2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3)
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their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void. Any impediment to marry has not been
shown to have existed on the part of either parties. They
lived exclusively each other as husband and wife.
However, their marriage was found to be void under Art
36 of the FC.
• Thus, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry should, therefore, be governed by the
rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if
said party's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household.
• Citing Valdes v RTC, lower courts did not commit a
reversible error in utilizing Art 147 of the FC and in ruling
that the former spouses co-own the family home and all
their common property in equal shares, as well as
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property that they owned in common, the provision on
co-ownership under the Civil Code should prevail.
• RTC and CA correctly held that the parties will share on
equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove
that the properties were acquired solely on her own
efforts.
• Only testimonial evidence was presented by both
parties to prove and dispute the claim of the other with
regard to the properties and assets acquired during the
marriage. Absent documentary evidences, all properties
acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal.
• While it may be true that management of business
referred to herein may have been actively undertaken
by petitioner, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner was
able to do so without the invaluable help of respondent.
• Petitioner's claim that the seed money in that business
was provided by her mother and that, had it not been for
that reason, the properties now subject of controversy
could not have been acquired. That may be true, but the
Court is not prone to believe so because of insufficient
evidence to prove such contention but petitioner's self-
serving allegations.
• Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the
subject properties were in fact acquired during the
marriage of Virginia and Deogracio. We give due
deference to factual findings of trial courts, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case.
• The former spouses both substantially agree that they
acquired the subject properties during the subsistence
of their marriage.
• Petition is denied. Decision and resolution of the CA are
affirmed.
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AGAPAY v PALANG
FACTS:
• Miguel Palang married private respondent Carlina
(Cornelia) Vallesterol on July 1949. He left to work in
Hawaii in Oct 1949. Their only child, Herminia was born
on May 12, 1950.
• He returned for a year in 1954. Then his next visit was
in 1964 and during his stay in the PH, he stayed in
Zambales with his brother. RTC found evidence that as
early as 1957, Miguel attempted to divorce Carlina in
Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused
to live with private respondent, and lived alone in a
house in Pangasinan.
• On July 15, 1973, at 63yo, he contracted his 2 nd
marriage with 19yo petitioner Erlinda Agapay. 2 months
earlier on May 17, 1973, they purchased a parcel of land
in Binalonan, TCT covering said land was issued in their
names.
• A house and lot in Binalonan was likewise purchased on
Sept 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as sole vendee w
TCT issued in her name.
• On Oct 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed
of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to
settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties
therein agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of 6 parcels of land to their only child,
Herminia.
• Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son,
Kristopher born on Dec 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and
Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s
complaint. 2 years later, on Feb 15, 1981, Miguel died.
• On July 11, 1981 Carlina and Herminia instituted an
action for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against petitioner before the RTC. Private
respondents sought to get back the Riceland and the
house and lot both located in Binalonan allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with
petitioner.
• Petitioner as defendant, said that w regards to the
riceland she already gave her half of the property to their
son Kristopher. Adding also that the house and lot is her
sole property for having bought the same with her own
money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from
claiming said properties since the latter had already
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
• RTC ruled in favor of petitioner dismissing the complaint
of Carlina and Herminia. That there was little evidence
to prove that said properties pertained to conjugal
property of Carlina and Miguel. RTC also provided for
the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of
Kristopher, Miguel’s illegitimate son. RTC confirmed
ownership of house & lot to Erlinda and the ½ portion of
Riceland to Erlinda. Adjudicating to Kristopher the ½ of
the Riceland as is inheritance from his deceased father
provided that Kristopher executes, within 15 days after
this decision becomes final and executory, a quit-claim
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forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the
donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal
properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina
Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975, otherwise,
the estate of deceased Miguel Palang will have to be
settled in another separate action.
• On appeal, CA reversed the RTC’s decision. Declaring
Carlina and Herminia owners of subject properties.
Ordering Erlinda and Kristopher to vacate and deliver
properties to Carlina. Ordering register of deeds of
Pangasinan to cancel TCT and to issue another in the
name of Carlina and Herminia.
ISSUE:
• WON the court should sustain the validity of Erlinda’s
ownership of the disputed properties.
RULING:
• The SC denies the petition and affirms the decision of
the CA.
• The sale of the Riceland on May 1973 was made in
favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Art 148 of the FC providing for cases
of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage under a void marriage. Erlinda and Miguel’s
marriage is was void as Carlina and Miguel’s marriage
was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de
facto separation.
• Under Art 148 of the FC, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common proportion to their respective contributions.
ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION IS REQUIRED IN ART 148
OF THE FC, in contrast with Art 147. If actual
contribution of property is not proved, there will be no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
• Erlinda tried to establish by testimony that she is
engaged in buy and sell business and had a sari-sari
store but failed to persuade the court of her actual
contribution to buy the Riceland. She was in her
twenties at the time and Miguel was a pensioner of the
US Govt. even assuming that the Riceland was bought
before cohabitation in an attempt to skirt Art 148 of the
FC, the rules on co-ownership would still apply and
proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since Erlinda failed to prove her actual contribution,
there is no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel.
It should belong to the conjugal property of Carlina and
Miguel.
• It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously
agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of their
daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in
holding that the decision adopting their compromise
agreement in effect partakes the nature of judicial
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confirmation of the separation of property between
spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership.
• Re: the house and lot, the testimony of the notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
reveals falsehood of the claim that it was bought by
Erlinda. Atty. Sagun testified that Miguel provided the
money and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed
as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation
by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of law as it was made
between persons guilty of adultery and concubinage at
the time of donation. Art 87 of the FC provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt
would turn out better than those in legal union.
Mallilin, Jr. vs Castillo
FACTS
• On February 24, 1993, Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a
complaint for “Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership
Share, Accounting and Damages” against Ma. Elvira Castillo,
alleging that she and him were both married, with children,
and separated from their respective spouses.
• They cohabited in 1979 while their respective marriages still
subsisted.
• During their cohabitation, they set up the Superfreight
Customs Brokerage Corporation, with Eustaqiuo as
president and chairman of the board of directors, and Elvira
as vice-president and treasurer.
• They acquired properties registered only under Elvira’s name.
• In 1992, the couple separated. Eustaquio demanded from
Elvira his share in the subject properties, but she
refused, alleging that said properties had been registered
solely in her name.
• On November 25, 1994, Elvira filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. She contended that summary judgment was
proper, because the issues raised in the pleadings were sham
and not genuine.
CONTENTION (Elvira)
• Elvira and Eustaquio did not live as husband and wife
because the fact was that they were still legally married to
their respective spouses.
• She is the exclusive owner of all real and personal
properties involved in Eustaquio’s action for partition on the
ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own
money and registered solely in her name.
ISSUE
• Was summary judgment proper?
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RULING
• No, summary judgment was not proper.
• Summary judgment is proper only when, based on the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and after
summary hearing, it is shown that except as to the amount
of damages, there is no veritable issue regarding any
material fact in the action and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
• Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, i.e.,
an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for the
presentation of evidence, summary judgment is not proper.
• In the present case, genuine issues exist. Eustaquio
anchors his claim of co-ownership on two factual grounds:
1. Said properties were acquired by him and Elvira during
their union from 1979 to 1992 from profits derived from
their brokerage business;
2. Said properties were registered solely in Elvira’s name
only because they agreed to that arrangement, thereby
giving rise to an implied trust in accordance with Art.
1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code.
• These allegations are denied by Elvira. With such conflicting
positions, the only way to ascertain the truth is obviously
through the presentation of evidence by the parties.
On the Applicability of Co-Ownership
• The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties
actually lived together as husband and wife because Art. 144
of the Civil Code can not be made to apply to them as they
were both incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was
impossible for a co-ownership to exist between them.
Civil Code, Article 144
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but
they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. (n)
• Art. 144, CC applies only to cases in which a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, provided they are not incapacitated or are
without impediment to marry each other, or in which the
marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art.
144, therefore, does not cover parties living in an
adulterous relationship.
• Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-
ownership in cases where the parties in union are
incapacitated to marry each other.
Family Code, Article 148
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
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corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith. (144a)
• In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the
parties. Consequently, whether Eustaquio and Elvira
cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are
part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine and material.
• All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have
been acquired after the Family Code took effect. With respect
to the property acquired before the Family Code took effect,
if it is shown that it was really acquired under the regime of
the Civil Code, then it should be excluded.
CONTENTION (Eustaquio)
• Eustaquio alleges that there was an implied trust under Art.
1452 of the Civil Code that existed between him and Elvira,
since Eustaquio alleged in his complaint that due to the
effective management, hardwork and enterprise of Eustaquio
assisted by Elvira, their customs brokerage business grew
and out of the profits therefrom, the parties acquired real and
personal properties which were, upon agreement of the
parties, listed and registered in Elvira’s name with Eustaquio
as the unregistered co-owner of all said properties.
ISSUE
• Was there an implied trust?
RULING
• No, there is no implied trust due to the nature of co-ownership
under Art. 148, FC.
• The legal relation of the parties is already specifically covered
by Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the properties
acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contributions of
money, property or industry shall constitute a co-ownership.
• Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a
trustee for the other. Hence, there is already a trust relation
between the parties as co-owners
• Consequently, the provision of Art. 1452, CC, don’t apply.
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12
Saguid vs Court of Appeals
FACTS
• Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de
facto from her husband, when she met Jacinto Saguid in
Marinduque, sometime in July 1987, and the two cohabited.
• Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel
“Saguid Brothers.” Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish
dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan
from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacinto’s
relatives turned sour. In 1996, the couple decided to separate
and end their 9-year cohabitation.
• On January 9, 1997, Gina filed a complaint for Partition
and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership
against Jacinto with the RTC. She alleged that she was able
to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their
unfinished house. Also, she was able to acquire and
accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and
household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She
prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing
her contribution to the construction of their house, be
reimbursed to her.
• Gina testified that she had a total of P35,465.009 share in the
joint account deposit which she and Jacinto maintained with
First Allied Development Bank. Said deposits were spent
for the purchase of construction materials, appliances
and other personal properties. In his answer, Jacinto
argued that from his income in the fishing business, he saved
P75,000.00 and placed it in a joint account deposit with
private respondent. This savings, according to Jacinto
was spent in purchasing the disputed personal
properties.
• On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared Jacinto as in
default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by the
SC. On May 26, 1997, Jacinto filed a motion for
reconsideration of the May 21, 1997 order, which was denied
on June 2, 1997, and Gina was allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
• On July 15, 1998, a decision was rendered in favor of Gina,
ordering the reimbursement of P70,000 and declaring her the
exclusive owner of the personal properties she claimed.
ISSUE
• Was the decision correct?
LAW
• Article 148, Family Code applies.
• Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, Article 148 thereof applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code
was enacted, there was no provision governing property
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relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage.
• Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article
148 governs.
RULING
• No, the decision was not correct.
• As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense.
On the House
• In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and
personal properties of the parties. Gina alleged in her
complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion
of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she
specify the extent of her contribution.
• What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the
purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995
and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.
On the Personal Properties
• On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to
purchase the disputed personal properties came partly from
their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While
there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint
account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the
exact amount of their respective shares therein.
• Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of
proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their
share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed
personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the
existence and value of which were not questioned by Jacinto.
Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e.,
P55,687.50 each.
Summary
• On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of Gina’s
co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to the
amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the
construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her
participation therein should be limited only to the amount of
P55,687.50.
Atienza vs De Castro
FACTS
• Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of
Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime
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13
Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda De
Castro as accountant for the two corporations.
• Despite Atienza being a married man, he and De Castro
eventually lived together in consortium, but parting after the
birth of their second child.
• Atienza filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against
De Castro for the judicial partition between them of a
parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati City. Atienza alleged that the subject
property was acquired during his union with De Castro as
common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-
owned by them. The property in question was supposedly
acquired by Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his
exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred
by the seller in Yolanda’s name without his knowledge
and consent.
• In her answer, De Castro denied Atienza’s allegations.
According to her, she acquired the same property for
P2,600,000.00 using her exclusive funds. She insisted
having bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a
businesswoman.
• The trial court decided in favor of Atienza, but the CA reversed
the decision in favor of De Castro
CONTENTION (Atienza)
• Pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, Atienza was in no
way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition
of the subject property because with or without the
contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner
thereof.
• Adding that under Article 148 of Civil Code, as long as the
property was acquired by either or both of them during their
extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by
them in common and governed by the rules on co-ownership,
which apply in default of contracts, or special provisions.
ISSUE
• Under Article 144 Civil Code and Article 148 Family Code, are
the parties automatically deemed co-owners, with or without
proof of actual contribution?
RULING
• No, there is no automatic presumption.
• The parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other
because Atienza was validly married to another woman at the
time of his cohabitation with De Castro. Their property
regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code.
• Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
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Persons and Family Relations 2019
• Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions…” Proof of actual
contribution is required.
• Atienza contends that De Castro, having no financial capacity
to acquire the property in question, merely manipulated the
dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the
amount needed therefor. Unfortunately, his submissions are
burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts
duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March
24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated
March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27,
1987, all entered into by and between De Castro and the
vendor of said property, to the exclusion of Atienza.
• The CA found:
o Rather than presenting proof of his actual
contribution to the purchase money used as
consideration for the disputed property, [Atienza]
diverted the burden imposed upon him to [De
Castro] by painting her as a shrewd and
scheming woman without the capacity to
purchase any property.
o He presented documents pertaining to the ins and
outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and
EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his
actual contribution in the purchase of the said
property. The fact that [Yolanda] had a limited
access to the funds of the said corporations
and had repeatedly withdrawn money from
their bank accounts for their behalf do not
prove that the money she used in buying the
disputed property, or any property for that
matter, came from said withdrawals.
• True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of
any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with
persons not named in the certificate. However, as already
stated, Atienza’s evidence in support of his claim is either
insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial court’s finding that
the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of
the Family Code.
• In contrast, De Castro was able to present preponderant
evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no
co-ownership when, as here, De Castro sufficiently
established that she derived the funds used to purchase the
property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also
as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading,
money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele
and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with
her clients. She also presented her bank account statements
and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial
capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property.
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Borromeo vs Descallar
FACTS
• Jambrich met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a
separated mother of two boys who was working as a
waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Falling in love, the two
cohabited. They transferred to their own house and lots
at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City.
• In the Contracts to Sell covering the properties,
Jambrich and Descallar were referred to as the
buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16,
19873 was likewise issued in their favor.
• However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented
for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration
was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an
alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s name was
erased from the document. But it could be noted that his
signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1,
beside respondent’s signature as buyer on page 3, and
at the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. So, the
titles to the properties were issued in Descallar’s name alone.
• The cohabitation did not last long and the two separated.
• In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from Camilo Borromeo, for
which he became indebted to the latter for about
P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights
and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to Camilo
for P250,000, as evidenced by a “Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment.”
• On July 26, 1991, when Camilo sought to register the
deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three
lots have been transferred in the name of Descallar, and
that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
• On August 2, 1991, Camilo filed a complaint against
Descallar for recovery of real property before the
Regional Trial Court.
CONTENTION (Descallar)
• She claimed that she “solely and exclusively used her
own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase
price of the subject lots in question,” and that Jambrich,
being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real
property in the Philippines.
ISSUE
• Who owns the subject properties?
• Was the transfer of the subject properties to Camilo valid?
RULING
On Ownership of Subject Properties
• Jambrich was the true owner.
• At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to
1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz
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Persons and Family Relations 2019
Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was earning an
estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00. Then,
Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year
where his monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00.
• On the other hand, Descallar was employed as a
waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of
not more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels
of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as
admitted by her during the pre-trial conference. Her
allegations of income from a copra business were
unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was
actually the business of her mother and their family, with
ten siblings. She has no license to sell copra, and had
not filed any income tax return.
• Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-
direct examination and during the proceedings for the
adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the
owner of the properties in question, but that his name
was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of
legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in
the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.
• The money used to pay the subject parcels of land
in installments was in postdated checks issued by
Jambrich. Descallar has never opened any account with
any bank. Receipts of the installment payments were
also in the name of Jambrich and Descallar.
• In 1986-1987, Descallar lived in Syria with Jambrich and
her two children for ten months, where she was
completely under the support of Jambrich.
• Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he,
as owner, bequeathed the subject properties to Descallar.
• Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his
rights, interests and participation over the subject
properties to Camilo by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he
executed on July 11, 1991.
• Further, the fact that the disputed properties were
acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does not
help Descallar. Article 147 Family Code does not apply.
• Descallar was still legally married to another when
she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists
between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to
any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.
On the Validity of the Transfer to Camilo
• Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is
only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with
notice to the world at large. Thus, the mere fact that
Descallar has the titles of the disputed properties in
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Persons and Family Relations 2019
15
her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner.
• Further, it was proven that Descallar did not contribute a
single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She
had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have
any savings. She and her two sons were then fully
supported by Jambrich.
• Now, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development
Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have
been declared invalid if challenged, due to the constitutional
prohibition against aliens acquiring public or private lands.
• But Jambrich conveyed the properties to Camilo who
is a Filipino citizen. Based on United Church Board for
World Ministries v.Sebastian, since the ban on aliens is
intended to preserve the nation’s land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making
lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became
Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made
by aliens to Filipino citizens.
• As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a
qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no
more public policy to be protected. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has
been achieved.
• Thus, the transfer to Camilo was valid.
Lavadia vs Heirs of Juan Luces Luna
FACTS
• Atty. Juan Luces Luna separated from wife Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna and obtained a divorce in the Dominican
Republic. He thereafter married Soledad.
• Atty. Luna organized a law firm, LUPSICON. On February
14, 1978, LUPSICON purchased a condo unit to use as
a law office for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment
basis for 36 months starting on April 15, 1978. After full
payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and
CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which
was registered bearing the following names:
o JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna (46/100);
o MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (25/100);
o GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz
A. Puruganan (17/100); and
o TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio
J.M. Sison (12/100)
• Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100
share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium
unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko.
• Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners.
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Persons and Family Relations 2019
The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA
over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
• ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed
another law firm with Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz and
used a portion of the office condominium unit as their
office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY.
LUNA on July 12, 1997.
• After the death of ATTY. LUNA, his share in the
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over
by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100
portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father
to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz.
• The 25/100 pro indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office
furniture and equipment became the subject of the
complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY.
LUNA with the RTC.
ISSUE
• Did Soledad’s marriage to Atty. Luna entitle her to her to any
rights in the subject properties?
RULING
• The marriage was void for being bigamous, but their
property relations was governed by the rules on co-
ownership under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Civil Code
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together
as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on coownership. (n)
• In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership
carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To
establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for
Soledad to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence,
would warrant no relief in her favor.
CONTENTION (Soledad)
• Soledad asserts herein that she sufficiently proved
her actual contributions in the purchase of the
condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least
P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had
obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino
totaling P146,825.30; and that such aggregate
contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the
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Persons and Family Relations 2019
16
entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the unit’s
purchase price of P1,449,056.00.
• Soledad further asserts that the lawbooks were paid
for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty.
Luna had even sent her a “thank you” note; that she
had the financial capacity to make the contributions and
purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the
properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income
derived from his law practice.
• The CA found:
o As to the 25/100 pro indiviso share of ATTY.
LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD
failed to prove that she made an actual
contribution to purchase the said property. She
failed to establish that the four checks that
she presented were indeed used for the
acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in
the condominium unit.
o The first check for P55,000.00 was issued on
January 27, 1977 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz
Sison, which was thirteen (13) months before
the Memorandum of Agreement was signed.
Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the
amount of P97,588.89 was payable to Banco
Filipino. According to Soledad, this was in
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third
check which was for P49,236.00 payable to
PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth
check for P4,072.00 was dated December 17,
1980. None of the foregoing prove that the
amounts delivered by Soledad to the payees
were for the acquisition of the subject
condominium unit.
o The Deed of Absolute Sale covering the
condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law
firm. The name of Soledad does not appear
as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna.
The same was acquired for the use of the
Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied
Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and
Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and
his partners and Soledad does not have
evidence to show that she paid for them fully
or partially.
o The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently,
CCT No. 21761 were in the name of “JUAN
LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna”
was no proof that Soledad was a co-owner of
the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It is
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Persons and Family Relations 2019

well-settled that registration does not confer title

but merely confirms one already existing. The
phrase “married to” preceding “Soledad L.
Luna” is merely descriptive of the civil
status of ATTY. LUNA.
o SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even
a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD
had no participation in the law firm or in
the purchase of books for the law firm. It is
more logical to presume that it was ATTY.
LUNA who bought the law office space and
the law books from his earnings from his
practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg
or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the
law firm that he headed.
• Indeed, Soledad, as the party claiming the co-ownership,
did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere
allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, did
not serve the purpose.
• In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that
Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own
personal funds and effort remained. It should then be
justly concluded that the properties in litis legally
pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of
the time of his death.
• Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro
indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit,
and of the law books pertained to heirs of Luna as the
lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

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Persons and Family Relations 2019